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I devote this paper to my girlfriend, the wonderful Teresa, who shares my dreams and goals, supporting me in so many ways.

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1 Introduction

Since the 1980s a certain form of individualism has become reality of Chinese social life and politics. Individualism, however, can not be seen as a matter of course in a socialist country. There are implications to the introduction of such a concept, that are of concern in this paper. But why talk about tradition in this respect? Ever since I started learning Chinese, I have been impressed how one can say much with very few words. Chinese language is closely related to what we could call ‘Chinese culture,’ a particular identity often being traced back as early as 2000 B.C.E. Ancient sayings and idioms still are frequently used in modern Chinese.¹ Despite the apparent importance of this ‘identity’ in Chinese language and, hence, in daily life, China now already for more than 60 years is ruled under the banner of socialism – a concept having its roots in the ‘Western’ philosophical tradition. The devotion to such theories is deeply related to the wish for modernisation, starting with the humiliating experience of the opium wars in the 19th century and the following ‘Self-Strengthening Movement.’² Over the 20th century many scholars advocated socio-scientific theories originating from ‘Western’ scholars, which were articulated in different political schools and parties. With a power vacuum given after the collapse of the Qing dynasty the first half of the 20th century was mainly characterised by the struggle between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD). This ultimately resulted in the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and a fundamental change of the socio-economic environment under the concept of a planned economy. Since the 1980s, however, under Deng Xiaoping fundamental economic reforms³ have taken place, introducing market

¹Most often encountered in the form of *chengyu* (成语), a type of idiomatic expressions found in traditional Chinese. They typically contain four characters and are often related to stories from Chinese classics. For example there are a lot of *chengyu* stemming from *lunyu* (论语, The Analects of Confucius).

²*Yangwu Yundong* 洋务运动

³*Gaigekaiifang* 改革开放 (Reform and Opening up)

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mechanisms and forming the term ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics.’⁴ With growing individualism in China and after the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, in the 1990s also a new concept of moral education was introduced, integrating ‘traditional Chinese’ concepts, namely *ruist*⁵ ones. How come that after a whole century of trying to get past ‘Chinese tradition,’ this identity returns in contemporary policies in the PRC? How can the reintroduction of the very same principles, being fought before, be understood?

In order to get a better insight into motives behind the reintroduction of ‘tradition’ in contemporary policies on moral education in China, we have to look at Chinese history itself. For that purpose the foundation of the PRC is an important starting point. The adoption of Marxism-Leninism as a national guideline implicated fundamental changes in the conception of Chinese society. Since 1949 modernisation has been understood in terms of class struggle, putting the working class at the center of theories of progress. Planned economy henceforth was the mode of production, making society highly centralised through the introduction of the Soviet model, finding its formulation in the foundation of the *danwei* (单位)⁶ system. This also affected the educational system – for the first time in the history of China compulsory education has been provided. But education in general also was under the guidance of class struggle, reflecting a materialist point of view. Therefore humanistic sciences were secondary, most importance has been laid upon industrialisation and practicability. Moral education under Mao mainly reflected political ideologies aiming at the construction of collectivism, not putting emphasis on individualism. The basic idea of education has been, that the proletariat as a class has all

⁴*Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi* 中国特色社会主义

⁵I will use the term ‘Ruism’ instead of ‘Confucianism,’ as Eno (1990: 7) suggests. Since Confucianism actually is a Western conception and is used in many different contexts, the term ‘Confucianism’ does not seem to adequately reflect the holistic approach in the Chinese philosophical tradition:

Confucianism is (...) sometimes describing a set of doctrines or an ideology of state, sometimes a cultural point of view, sometimes a way of life. In its earliest incarnation, the tangible constituents of Confucianism were the members of a small group of men known as “Ru” [儒], who viewed their distinguished trait as a commitment to a particular set of ideas *and* well-defined practices, with no sharp division possible between the two. Any analysis that assumes that early Confucianism is adequately conceived as a set of ideas, on the model of Western enterprises, fails to approach the school on its own terms and cannot help but encounter a wealth of enigmatic problems. (ibid.: 6, italics in original)

⁶The smallest unit in the Chinese model of planned economy. The *danwei* (or working unit) was the place daily life-routine was organised around and where state policies ultimately were implemented. It included the working place, schools, shops etc. Workers were lifelong members of a particular *danwei*, according to their occupation.

the possibilities to provide sufficient education in order to industrialise and thus modernise the country. ‘Bourgeois’ and ‘feudal’ elements on the other hand had to be wiped out, defined during the Cultural Revolution as the ‘Nine Black Categories.’⁷ During the period of 1966-1976 education was let down in favor of ‘purging’ Chinese society. With the death of Mao in 1976 the movement found its end. In the following period Chinese policies under Deng Xiaoping were aimed at economically boosting the country, laying less stress on political principles than before. The decollectivisation in agriculture in form of the Household-responsibility system⁸ and the introduction of market mechanisms decentralised the power of the CCP. In combination with this marketisation in the name of modernisation, policies growingly were justified by ‘science.’ As education in the post Mao era was the foundation of modern science and technology (Cheung/Pan 2006: 38f.), the allowance of individuality was seen as an important step in the implementation of the Four Modernisations.⁹ This decentralisation of power gave intellectuals freedom to articulate themselves again, which resulted in a phase of conditional political liberalism in the 1980s. As critical voices radicalised and the Tiananmen Square protests emerged in 1989, the CCP felt the need to strike hard again. This ‘incident’¹⁰ made politicians in China aware of a certain ‘lack’ of morality and discipline in the Chinese society. But politicians also were aware that a functioning market society needs consuming individuals. As a result the concept of ‘individualism’ was introduced into moral education (*deyu* 德育). Not only would pupils learn to love their socialist country, but also they now learned to become individuals in their everyday life. Moral education in China is a tightrope walk, tending to emphasise the guidance of the Communist Party on the one hand and creating an (in-)dependent individual on the other. Although individuality now officially is an important concept in the growth of every child in China, it is a regulated one (see *ibid.*). Individuality particularly serves the purpose of innovation and national development, not self-fulfillment and personal development. The emer-

⁷“The “Nine Black Categories” were: landlords, rich farmers, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, rightists, traitors, spies, capitalist roaders, and intellectuals. All were loosely defined and all were fair game for attack.” (Tanner 2010: 232) Especially the category of intellectuals had a bad notion, becoming known as the “Stinking Old Ninth” (*choulaojiu* 臭老九).

⁸*Jiating Lianchan Chengbao Zerenzhi* 家庭联产承包责任制

⁹*Si ge Xiandaihua* 四个现代化: first formulated by Zhou Enlai in 1963 and implemented by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 they include: agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology.

¹⁰In Chinese the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 are referred to as ‘*Liusi Shijian*’ (六四事件), which can be translated as ‘Incident of the 6th of June.’

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gence of the individual through the decentralisation of state-power is closely watched and has definite limits. Those limits are characterised by a certain identity China gives itself, which in turn is defined through the historical setting politicians in China see themselves within. This identity can also be called ‘Chinese modernity,’ meaning a certain dominant perception of China in Chinese policies, that is opposed to a modernity in the ‘Western’ sense. I argue that this ‘Chinese modernity’ needs ‘tradition’ to constitute itself and that the very same tradition is used to control a decentralised individual in the Chinese modern state.

The aim of this paper is to show how individualism in the teaching process is actually constructed, and how it is related to the state. For this purpose I will look at a university course on the topic ‘Principles of Moral Education’ (*Deyu Yuanli* 德育原理, see Tang 2005). In the context of a discourse analysis I will use the theory of governmentality, which also presumes a conditional freedom of the individual. With this approach I attempt to give insight into a new mode of governing in China, that significantly differs from the ‘traditional authoritarian state.’ In the course of the analysis I will also consider the use of ‘tradition’ in moral education and which function it fulfils. I will argue that tradition serves both, a marker of identity, giving China a distinctive role in a globalised world, as well as supporting the implementation of moral education itself. There is a considerable amount of research concerning this topic. Regarding governmentality in China, Greenhalgh (2005) looks at population policies in China and how through the use of certain categories citizens are governed. She critically reflects these categories, regarding them as a form of ideology. Hoffman (2007) gives an example of how the state in China uses the market place to implement ‘loyal citizens.’ In this respect she looks at the role of nationalism and how it is manifested in the daily life of people. Sigley (2009) discusses governmentality in late-socialist China regarding the concept of *suzhi* (素质) and what this implicates for Chinese politics. *Suzhi* can be translated as ‘quality’ and is an important concept in Chinese politics, but also in the daily life of people. Here Chinese policies most importantly are concerned with the quality of people and the quality of the nation. For a general introduction to the term see Kipnis (2006). For *suzhi* in moral education, Murphy (2004) presents examples of rural schools. Woronov (2007, 2009, 2011) on the other hand considers moral education in Chinese cities. Both show how through the use of a discourse about *suzhi* the state interacts with pupils and implements its policies. For a discussion about *suzhi* and the Chinese middle class see

Tomba (2009). When it comes to the actual implementation of governmentality and the concept of *suzhi*, moral education is of important concern. For a general introduction and overview of policies regarding moral education in the past twenty years see Cheung and Pan (2006). Using the example of moral education Hansen (2013) shows the relation between individualism and the cultivation of 'responsible citizens.' Bakken (2000) gives a very broad introduction to moral education in China, also considering the role and function of 'tradition' in this context. He considers tradition as a form of identity that helps politics to deal with 'modernity.' For a general introduction to ideas and concepts of traditional Chinese moral education see Tran, Shen and McLean (1991).

What this research has in common is that it looks at governmental policies of the Chinese state and critically reflects it as a form of ideology. All the authors question the newly gained freedom in China, seeing it as conditional in some form. What this paper provides is an attempt to reconstruct the actual implementation of these categories. I do not see the individual as a given entity, I rather regard it as *constructed*. Hence, building the individual is a process that can be analysed. Therefore, I want to apply the findings of this research to actual texts and critically look at the process itself. This way I will show how through the involvement of the state and the use of tradition an individual is formed that is restricted by certain terms. For this purpose I will first give an introduction to the theory of governmentality and discuss what this implicates when working with texts. Following this I will look at the context, consider important terms and concepts regarding government in contemporary China and the role of moral education in this sense. Taking this as a basis I am going to conduct the analysis and discuss my findings. I will show an individual that is bound to a modernising state which applies certain categories to citizens. In this respect tradition plays a crucial role. Not only does it form an identity, it also represents a *tool* of moral education. With the use of tradition, the individual is able to stabilise development towards modernity, harmonising itself and the nation.

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2.1 Governmentality

Basically governmentality is “concerned with the manner in which we govern, or what is sometimes referred to as the ‘how’ of governing. It asks questions concerned with how we govern and how we are governed, and with the relation between the government of ourselves, the government of others, and the government of the state.” (Dean 1999: 2) This means that at the core of the concept one can find the inquiry by asking *how*, which should be the central question to any attempt of analysing government (C. Gordon 1991: 7). The term ‘governmentality’ itself can be translated as ‘mentalities of government’ (Dean 1999: 16), ‘art of government’ (ibid.: 18), or ‘conduct of conduct,’ and is closely related to the particular form of government as it emerged in modern Western Europe. It “seeks to distinguish the particular mentalities, arts and regimes of government and administration that have emerged since ‘early modern’ Europe[.]” (ibid.: 2) At first this section takes a closer look at the concept of ‘government,’ from which we are able to discuss what can be meant by the term ‘governmentality.’

2.1.1 The term

After Dean (ibid.: 11) we can define ‘government’ as follows:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.¹

¹in original in italics

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Government here is not primarily defined by the execution of authority or force. It rather can be understood as a means to an end. Government uses certain ‘tools’ to accomplish a given goal. These tools are also referred to as ‘technology’ – the ideas that let people act in accordance to reach a certain goal. Therefore, in the definition above, “the term *government* is used as a more general term for any calculated direction of human conduct.” (Dean 1999: 2, italics in original) The key concept is to understand ‘government’ as a ‘rational activity,’ that works through the conduct of people. Rationality of government is “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced.” (C. Gordon 1991: 3) A rationality forms ideas that in order become part of the subject and make it act. It forms a kind of reality, a certain view on things. This implies that rationality is determined by a form of *truth*, about what is ‘right or wrong,’ as well as about ‘human nature’ and ‘existence’ (Dean 1999: 18). It claims to obtain knowledge and apply it in a certain way in turn to achieve a given result.² In other words, government is conducted for a specific reason, employing certain forms of knowledge, seeking to act upon a certain aspect (ibid.: 17).

As government tries to work through the subject rather than on it, it aims to ‘take root’ in the reality of people. This is achieved by referring to a set of norms and a selection of ends (ibid.: 10). ‘Government’ becomes productive, rather than being an *oppressive force*. “Power here is not seen in its negative sense of taking away the right to life, but rather in its ‘positive’ sense as the power to form and ‘improve’ life.” (Bakken 2000: 66f.) The goals set by a rationality of government are not perceived as something being ‘dictated,’ they rather act like originating from the governed themselves. The ‘proper conduct’ in accordance to those goals is perceived as something ‘natural,’ something the subject also benefits from. According to this idea Foucault introduced the concept of ‘society of security,’ opposing the idea that we are today living in a ‘Rechtsstaat’ characterised only through sovereignty. The method of security is made up of three aspects: “It deals in series of possible and probable events; it evaluates through calculations of comparative cost; it prescribes not by absolute binary demarcation between

²Still the very idea in this notion of government of being able to control the correlation between in- and output, the very idea of being able to obtain secure knowledge and ‘improve’ society through governing, is a mere utopia (Dean 1999: 33) – since truth is a relative concept, there can never be total control in governmental activities (Bakken 2000: 74).

the permitted and the forbidden, but by the specification of an optimal mean within a tolerable bandwidth of variation.” (C. Gordon 1991: 20) This means that a norm is set that acts as an ideal for dealing with a concrete problem. The person becomes abstract and idealised. Certain attributes are assigned to individuals and become naturalised. Although there is room for some variation, there is a general idea of what is *normal* and what *exceeds* a certain margin. Such norms at the same time provide security. Since an agent knows how to fulfil a certain norm, she/he also knows how to *behave* ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ Government in this sense provides the necessary means by which agents can gain security through their own performance. Acting according to given norms means acceptance and support of others. Doing otherwise will eventually result in the loss of this support. Security becomes a *choice* people make. The ability of persons to act ‘responsible’ in relation to a broader rationality reflects the quality of their choice. People are to accept this rationality and ought to conduct themselves by established ways of doing so. The freedom of the individual, hence, is restricted by the act of governing. Still, the government is not dictated, it is self-chosen. Subjects *learn* to conduct themselves through rational calculation. Only by conforming to an established norm, they realise a rational, and therefore accepted, choice.

2.1.2 Notions of governmentality

The basis for this change in the way people are governed can be found in the erosion of the feudal system in Europe, which was based on loyalty and dependence. Morality too played a crucial role, since the church and the state were entangled. With secularisation, however, there was the need for a new way of pastoral guidance (ibid.: 12f.), morality became a part of ‘worldly’ politics. The need for a new way of conduct emerged. The state in ‘early modern Europe’ became a moral agent, introducing a responsible subject in the form of ‘citizens.’

If morality is understood as the attempt to make oneself accountable for one’s own actions, or as a practice in which human beings take their own conduct to be subject to self-regulation, then government is an intensely moral activity. (...) It is moral because policies and practices of government (...) presume to know, with varying degrees of explicitness and using

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specific forms of knowledge, what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and collectives. (Dean 1999: 11f.)

According to the ‘truth’ of what is best, subjects are regulated in turn to behave rationally, “or at least deliberately[.]” (ibid.: 10) It follows that there are agents who are able and willing to take responsibility, to regulate themselves.

Notions of morality and ethics generally rest on an idea of self-government. They presume some conception of an autonomous person capable of monitoring and regulating various aspects of their own conduct. (...) Thus the notion of government extends to cover the way in which an individual questions his or her own conduct (or *problematizes* it) so that he or she may be better able to govern it. (ibid.: 12, italics in original)

Solutions to a certain problem are not dictated by government. Government rather teaches persons to *think* in a way to come up with these solutions. In this respect Foucault draws upon the concepts of ‘discipline’ and ‘confession.’ These concepts aim at governing bodies and their ‘habits and movements.’ On the one hand through examination discipline is executed, this way objectifying people. On the other hand, by means of confession, people are confronted with their own choices and the meaning of those choices to other people. They are subjectified by the moral confrontation with other people (Fairclough 1992: 52f.). According to this morality people can be made responsible and accountable.

To be accountable, however, the individual has to have the freedom of acting on its own. Only if the governed are free to think and act, they are able to choose what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ In other words they are only able to conduct themselves if they have the freedom to choose. Still, in this form of liberalism, laissez-faire must be understood both in a regulative and in a non-active way (C. Gordon 1991: 17). The *scope* of possible action is a given one. “To govern (...) is to structure the field of the possible action, to act on our own or other’s capacities for action.” (Dean 1999: 14) ‘Right’ and ‘wrong’ in fact *are* categories that influence the choices of subjects. Therefore, governmentality “is a study only of the attempts to (more or less) rationally affect the conduct of others and ourselves.” (ibid.: 198)

Government uses science and tradition to obtain the ‘truth(s)’ which it uses to govern (Fairclough 1992: 50). They both serve the purpose of setting boundaries to change in

human society in the frame of this liberalism and aim to control social transformation (Bakken 2000: 30). Especially science becomes an important source for the formulation of politics. It provides the ‘facts,’ that legitimate the current practise. “This form of power is bound up with the discovery of a new reality, the economy, and concerned with a new object, the population.” (Dean 1999: 19) The ‘citizen’ becomes the foundation for a state that bases its politics on a calculation of output and income. The services of the state providing security – education, health care, police, etc. – serve as an investment for an efficient economy. Efficiency brings economic growth, leading to material wealth. Material wealth at the same time serves as a legitimating basis for political rule. Hence, the economy and the relation to society are important aspects in the act of government. In this context “[t]he term ‘rational’ (...) refers to the attempt to bring ‘any’ form of rationality to the calculation about how to govern.” (ibid.: 11)

Nevertheless, ‘modern development’ also is perceived as a threat to the established order. The changes brought about by rapid economic development are often related to ‘social decay.’ Therefore, tradition represents an important role too in the act of governing. It becomes a point of reference for defining the present. In opposition to ‘modernity,’ tradition might as well serve the purpose of ‘controlling change.’ “By creating traditions, society builds up patterns of reference aimed at making social interaction predictable. A lack of predictability and tradition not only makes people feel insecure, with nothing to respect and nothing to oppose, but makes it difficult to define one’s own position and historical identity.” (Bakken 2000: 29) Whether tradition is advocated or opposed, it serves as a common ground on which a future can be established. This aspect is most important for ‘transitional societies,’ in which modernisation is on the agenda of government. Both societies that are perceived as ‘highly modernised’ or still ‘traditional’ tend also to be the most stable ones (ibid.: 22). Change brings along uncertainty and often is perceived as insecurity. Modernisation in this respect is the attempt to control change, government provides security in this modernity. Therefore, modernisation and tradition have to be understood as intermingled with one another: “[W]ithout the precedence of tradition and myth, a culture will be deprived of memory, and thereby also deprived of an important ‘binding’ element in society. On the other hand, without foresight it will be deprived of its dreams and ideas for a future society: deprived of an idea about where to go[.]” (ibid.: 17) In the attempt of defining the past, government tries to colonise the

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future (Dean 1999: 204). The past serves as a means of legitimation, creating a binding force and forming normative guidelines (Bakken 2000: 4).

With the discussion given above I want to reconsider the notion of ‘governmentality’ as introduced by Foucault. Foucault (1991: 102f.)³ sees ‘governmentality’ as a particular, historically shaped form of ‘government’, which shows some particular characteristics:

1. The object of government is population and it seeks to govern ‘each and all,’ the individual as well as the population as a whole.
2. “The notion of governmentality implies a certain relationship of government to other forms of power, in particular sovereignty and discipline.” (Dean 1999: 19) The bases of sovereignty is jurisdiction and executive, discipline is provided over several institutions including the educational apparatus.
3. Governmentality provides a frame of security. There are several apparatuses ‘providing’ this security, including the military apparatus and the police, as well as health, education, and welfare systems. The economy is yet another field of interest in the conduct of governmentality. Such apparatuses are aimed at securing a population within national boundaries.
4. A fourth aspect mentioned by Foucault is the process in which those mechanisms are constituted itself. This can be summarised in the term “governmentalization of the state”⁴ (ibid.: 20).

In the process of this ‘governmentalisation,’ the state attempts to “colonize everything outside itself.” (C. Gordon 1991: 4) This incorporates two important spheres: rationality and technologies of government. The first one refers to the answer imposed by concrete problems occurring in a certain period of time. Technology refers to “the instrumental level and embraces the means by which particular policies are devised and implemented[.]” (Fimyar 2008: 4) Rationality and technology might best be described as a set of ideas/notions, and *how* government attempts to implement them.

³See also Dean 1999: 19f.

⁴Unfortunately an in depth discussion of this aspect goes beyond the scope of the current thesis.

2.1 Governmentality

When we see government as acting “in the name of the truth” (C. Gordon 1991: 8), this ‘truth’ also establishes certain ‘mentalities of government.’ Governmentality concerns how we talk about government and the mentalities that are concerned with these questions. The governing actors themselves, however, are not always able to critically reflect their conduct. “It is to say that the way we think about exercising authority draws upon the theories, ideas, philosophies and forms of knowledge that are a part of our social and cultural products.” (Dean 1999: 16) If this government through applied knowledge is perceived as something that is not a priori given,⁵ that involves certain techniques and tactics, being a creative action in establishing realities and identities and directing the conduct of individuals and whole populations, then it can be called an ‘art’ (ibid.: 18). “The object of our studies, then, is not the simple empirical activity of governing, but the *art of government*.” (ibid.: 18, italics in original) An integral part of this analysis, therefore, is not to take values for granted but instead to ask, *how* certain values are used to establish mentalities and for which ends (ibid.: 34).

Following this, in the process of conducting an analysis of government one shall not presume, it is not the intention of the analysis to ‘judge’ out of a ‘better’ point of view. In the same way the state is not able to control every aspect of life, the person conducting an analysis is never able to include all factors at play.⁶ Governmentality rather looks at concrete situations, analysing them out of four dimensions (ibid.: 23):

1. characteristic forms of visibility, ways of seeing and perceiving;
2. distinctive ways of thinking and questioning, relying on definite vocabularies and procedures for the production of truth (e.g. those derived from the social, human and behavioural sciences);
3. specific ways of acting, intervening and directing, made up of particular types of practical rationality (‘expertise’ and ‘know-how’), and relying upon definite mechanisms, techniques and technologies; and
4. characteristic ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents.

These four dimensions have to be seen as always present and interdependent.

In this sense the state can’t be seen as a unified actor, having jurisdiction over a certain territory (ibid.: 23f.), but rather as a “mystic entity” (ibid.: 26), generated by a mix of

⁵Or to say that the distribution of power is not a priori given.

⁶Or to speak of mentalities in an absolute way.

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individual and collective interests, articulated and unarticulated aims, as well as their practice. It is because of this mystic character that the state can not be the point of origin for our analysis. We can only tempt to approach it through the analysis of its ‘attempts at governing,’ through its mentalities and regimes, and the technologies that this attempt incorporates. The analysis of government is an attempt to critically reflect ‘the act itself,’ concerned with the *how* and the *why* of governing.

2.2 Discourse analysis

In this section I want to combine the idea of ‘governmentality’ with the concept of ‘textual oriented discourse analysis’ as discussed by Fairclough (1992, 1998, 2003). Fairclough combines the method of textual analysis with the idea of discourse, analysing both the semantical as well as the social dimension. Discourse in this paper is regarded as (re-)constructing society – there is a dialectical relation between society and discourse, effect and condition (Angermüller 2007: 29). Furthermore I agree with Foucault (1984: 109, as cited in Fairclough 1992: 51), that “in every society, the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable, materiality[.]” If we understand discourse as (see Jung 2001: 32) the number of texts

1. concerning a certain topic,
2. holding semantic as well as conclusive, communicative, functional, or intentional relations,
3. holding time or space overlaps,
4. and implicitly or explicitly referring to one another,

this means that discourses are concerned with processes of producing predominance over a certain sphere in society through the medium of texts. These texts are interrelated. In this sense ‘discourse’ is accessible through statements provided by these texts (ibid.: 48), making statements the central elements of analysis. For the purpose of explaining this approach in depth I first want to discuss the term ‘discourse’ and its implications.

2.2.1 Approaching discourse

As the theory of this paper heavily draws on the work of Foucault, I also want to take it as a starting point. Although Foucault himself did not provide a definition of ‘discourse’ (Kreisky 2002), nevertheless we can identify certain key points of the concept. He understands discourse as the privileged place of social reality (Villa 2003: 18), where power is expressed or rather produced. Discourse in this sense not only *represents* social reality, it rather acts as a *producer* of this reality. This in particular can be seen as manifested on a verbal level. Language is the expression of our abstract consciousness and hence is our tool to grasp ‘reality.’ As far as language is concerned, dominant discourses form certain terms, which in turn limit the possibility of expression to a certain scope. In other words, these terms determine the framework in which we are able to speak and act (ibid.: 18–20). Foucault does not understand language as an image of reality, but rather as a creative moment. This creative moment produces statements, which are embedded in a certain context and in turn result in new statements. This is why any statement is unique and not the expression of ‘abstract truth.’ In contrast to a ‘phrase,’ which is repeatable at any moment, a statement is a ‘fact’ that can only be understood in the context it has been formulated in – the only thing that is alterable about it, is its interpretation.⁷ This is why Foucault is also referring to statements as ‘narrow’ (Dürr 1995: 35f.), he does not see a constant background structure, to which statements could refer to. The very moment discourse is put into practise, it is regenerated. Discourses are not static, they are not something external effecting texts. In contrast the text as it puts discourse into practise, at the same time alters it. So discourses have to be regarded as interactive and constantly changing. It has to be analysed in terms of practise, which can be found in its least element: the statement (ibid.: 35). Those statements are produced in a certain environment and conducted by certain societal codes. There are particular generally accepted processes, that serve the regeneration of discourse. This does not imply that discourses are coherent, they bear “constraints upon what can be said, by whom, and on what occasions[.]” (Fairclough 1992: 51)

Thus, an analysis of discourse has to be seen as an undertaking that critically reflects ideology (ibid.: 60). This is particularly important regarding the analysis of government-

⁷Still interpretation is a necessary step in the analysis of statements, which is why it can’t be understood as a ‘fact’ in the strict sense.

tality: “[t]o the extent that we seek to analyse the language associated with government, it is construed as ideology, as a language that arises from and reflects a dominant set of power relations.” (Dean 1999: 9) Discourse in its appliance only serves as an intermediary between thought and the actual text. It claims to express truth, without reflecting it (Foucault 1991: 31). Thus, we have to consider possible discourses that are drawn upon and elaborate their relation to the text as well as their relations to one another. Discourses are conducted in reference to certain rules, which determine the possibilities regarding “the ‘right to speak’ and ‘ability to understand’ as well as the right to draw upon ‘the corpus of already formulated statements’[.]” (Fairclough 1992: 48) These possibilities are unequally distributed, a peasant in rural China does not have the same ‘right to speak’ in a public discourse as a professor teaching at the Beijing University. It is therefore important to consider power relations in a given context, deriving from the possibility to ‘speak’⁸ in the first place.

2.2.2 Discourse as the construction of subjects

As the paper is going to analyse the construction of individuality I want to have a few words about the subject in relation to power in this context. Power is not perceived as being constituted by a given entity, the subject does not exist a priori. On the contrary the individual as a speaking and acting subject is only constituted in the use of discourse, technically speaking it is constituted only in the use of language (Angermüller 2007: 68). Following Lacan this language can be seen as accumulated, hence producing a certain order (ibid.: 69f.). When we consider language as a definite pool of possibilities to express oneself, the manifestation of the subject through the use of language is also restricted by it. In the act of speaking individuals choose from this pool and only through the very same act form their conscious identity. This selection can not be seen as dependent to ‘character,’ the character of a person is formed in the act of speaking itself. This approach can also be found in the work of Foucault: “Foucault’s main thesis with respect to the formation of ‘enunciative modalities’ is that the social subject that produces a statement is not an entity which exists outside of and independently of discourse, as the source of the statement (its ‘author’), but is on the contrary a function of the statement itself.” (Fairclough 1992: 43) Dominant conceptions influence this con-

⁸And in combination to this the possibility to be ‘heard.’

stitution of the individual as a social being, only if individuals fit themselves in a certain order they can interact as intelligible subjects (Meißner 2008: 13). This ‘fitting in order’ can be understood as according to certain social norms and accepted ‘rules of conduct.’ The question of which kind of morality is ‘right,’ which norms are accepted and which ones are ‘wrong,’ is a question of defining social reality and controlling the socialisation of the individual. Agents form their identity as a result of these social rituals, either conforming with it or fighting it. Anyway the rituals themselves are acknowledged, a certain identity is formed one way or another. Considering this we have to understand discourses as producing certain artefacts, or categories (e.g. criminals, homosexuals, or academics), through which power constitutes itself in the form of subjects (N. Gordon 1999: 401). This is why we can say, that “the subject is produced by power” (ibid.: 396) – power is not the result of a priori material divisions (Dean 1999: 26).

Here it is important to mention two points. First, one shall not on the one hand fall for the idea of a completely determined individual and on the other hand for complete relativism and overemphasise the construction of discourse. Although the production of categories is to a certain degree dependent on the foregoing accumulation of language, individuals always have the freedom not to choose from a predominant pool of options. Resulting contradictions in the boundaries of discourse result in the re-articulation of orders of discourse – an outcome is the stronger or weaker emphasis of certain discursive elements (Fairclough 1992: 69). In this sense “the relationship between discourse and social structure should be seen dialectically[.]” (ibid.: 65) This does not mean, that actors do not attempt to ‘naturalise’ the boundaries of settings and practises (ibid.: 68), trying to avoid contradictions. Secondly, if we understand discursive practise as a form of social practise (ibid.: 71), so are texts and the consideration of actual texts can benefit discourse analysis. In this respect the work of Foucault must be seen as too deterministic: he is missing the aspect of concrete application of discourse, “that practice has properties of its own which (i) cannot be reduced to the implementation of structures; (ii) imply that how structures figure in practice cannot be assumed, but has to be determined; and (iii) ultimately help to shape structures.” (ibid.: 58) With this critique in mind Fairclough (ibid.: 55f.) lists five important aspects reading Foucault regarding textual oriented discourse analysis:

2 *Theory and method*

[regarding his archaeological work:]

1. the constitutive nature of discourse – discourse constitutes the social, including ‘objects’ and social objects;
2. the primacy of interdiscursivity and intertextuality – any discursive practice is defined by its relations with others, and draws upon others in complex ways.

[regarding his genealogical work:]

3. the discursive nature of power – the practices and techniques of modern ‘biopower’ (e.g. examination and confession) are to a significant degree discursive;
4. the political nature of discourse – power struggle occurs both in and over discourse;
5. the discursive nature of social change – changing discursive practices are an important element in social change.

As for this part, we can summarise, that in a certain discourse we detect fixed statements, which as ‘facts’ can’t be transformed and only as an interpretation are able to bear new meaning. At the same time there are certain codes conducting the regeneration of discourse. Regarding the analysis of concrete practise as desirable, the approach of textual oriented discourse analysis in this paper is a form of ideological critique. Discourse is an important element of the idea of governmentality. Discourses draw on a certain form of rationality and work through the application of categories. Hence, the analysis in this paper aims at looking at the implementation of certain discourses in the Chinese context through the formulation of definite categories.

2.3 Design

Fairclough (1998: 161) states that

one needs an overall sense of the order of discourse and the social order in analyzing individual discursive events and texts. One needs, for instance, a sense of the range of genres and discourses used within the political order

of discourse as a horizon against which to assess the genres and discourses drawn upon in a particular discursive event.

In this section I draw a design that lets us fix a certain framework to work with. This framework is shaped according to the following hypotheses:

- There are mainly three broad influences on the construction of individualism in the contemporary PRC's moral education, which are socialism, globalisation, and 'Chinese tradition.'⁹
- Since the opening up and the integration into the global capitalist system, a form of individualism emerged in China, that is conflicting with former communist ideals of collectivism.
- Moral education intends to neutralise the antagonism between the individual and the collective drawing on the use of 'tradition.'

Figure 2.1 demonstrates my basic approach and is divided into two distinct spheres: all the influences affecting Chinese society (*Influences*) and Chinese society itself, where those influences are expressed (*Manifestation*).¹⁰ The first sphere labelled *Manifestation* has to be seen as the concrete formation of certain policies and their implementation. I choose to examine the state¹¹ as an instance filtering influences that are in consequence handed down to the people under the jurisdiction of the state, in particular the Ministry of Education.¹² This in the first instance happens through the formulation of policies – in our example the formulation of educational policies –, which are in order performed by schools, universities, the media etc. The content being produced, for example by teachers or professors, has to be seen as social practice, being expressed in the discourse about moral education and other discourses (like individuality) which are combined with it. In the sphere labelled *Influences* on the other hand, there are abstract concepts, which

⁹I will discuss these concepts in the chapter 'Framework' in more detail.

¹⁰Although the two spheres are distinct in my conception, they are at the same time interrelated to each other in any possible way. What I am going to look at can, of course, just be a selection of all the correlations given and is directed at my research questions. Also there is, as I display, not just *one* direction, which, again, must be seen as directed at my research interest. I want to state clearly that in reality relations are fairly complex and this is just a model to work with.

¹¹Understood as discussed in the section 'Governmentality' (p. 7).

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


Figure 2.1: Framework for the analysis

are used in the discourse to rationalise constructs. These abstracts are certain views on the past, a selection of influences is used for a certain aim. Such abstracts find their implementation in the use of certain categories, that in turn become productive.¹³ The following chapter attempts to grasp the constitution of mentalities that in turn led to the implementation of certain technologies in contemporary Chinese moral education, trying to give a possible shape to the state as a filtering instance. For this end I choose three different spheres of interest:

1. The socialist experience of collectivism under the CCP and related policies,
2. the integration into global capitalism in the post-Mao era and its influence on policies, as well as
3. ‘Chinese tradition’ and its relation to the contemporary Chinese political landscape.

The following discussion within this scope will serve as a ‘discursive basis,’ and as a source for interpretation in the analysis.

¹³In the sense that they shape the ‘reality’ of the people on which they are performed.

3 Framework

3.1 ‘Marketisation’: individualism in a socialist country

The socio-economic changes in contemporary China and related dynamics gave rise to the emergence of individualism. Also new political concepts and notions were introduced. This section reflects important ideas and concepts, that were introduced in Chinese politics in this regard from the angle of governmentality.

3.1.1 Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

Reorientations: towards nationalism

The death of Mao led to a new orientation in China. Deng was able to succeed in the power struggles within the CCP and in turn established a more ‘practical’ approach to modernisation. This approach was characterised by marketisation of the Chinese economy and the acceptance of private property. Along with the coexistent claim for socialism, antagonisms were emerging in this environment. An important one was the contradiction of the development of individualism in a socialist society. On the one hand a planned economy was too inflexible to spur economic development, on the other hand the Chinese state did not want individuals to drift away ‘too far’ from the official policies. Regarding this, the rule of law was considered an increasingly important aspect in Chinese society, along with ‘scientification’ of policies, therefore putting emphasis on the establishment of rational governance. The basis for this attempt of ‘controlled change’ (Bakken 2000: 5) has to be seen in the shift from ‘class struggle’ to ‘economic reconstruction’ (Qi/H. Tang 2004: 466). While in the period under Mao ‘class struggle’ was emphasised as a guideline, in the 1980s the concept of ‘harmony and stability’ was

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(re-)introduced.¹ The concept of harmony evidently opposes the idea of two struggling classes, subsequently there are not two antagonistic fronts anymore in the rhetoric of Chinese politics. This new form of rationality aims at putting different opinions in society harmoniously together (Tomba 2009: 593). The term '*jieji*' (阶级) has been abandoned in favour of the term '*shehui jieceng*' (社会阶层), which, again, tries to avoid antagonism (Woronov 2011: 78f.). But this approach is not only chosen to oppose the idea of class struggle in particular, it evenly is embedded in a broader discussion on development and modernisation. "Harmony and stability are set up as explicit prerequisites for modernization in most of the Chinese literature on the subject. It is necessary to achieve a 'harmonized development' (*xietiao de fazhan*) throughout the entire society, if one is to have any hope of solving the emerging social problems." (Bakken 2000: 61, italics in original) This 'harmonised development' can be seen as being represented in the introduction of nationalism into Chinese politics. With the emergence of cultural diversity in the process of globalisation, the state represents a mediating entity. With the reincorporation of Hongkong in 1997 the notion of nationalism was even deepened.

Introducing the market

With the abandonment of revolutionary socialism, also the perception of society and its functioning had to change. An important characteristic of the transitional era under Deng has been that expertise and talent were preferred over the 'right' political orientation. Although politics in this process increasingly oriented towards the market, the overall goal of socialism/communism remained. "In the absence of an egalitarian, redistributive thrust to the practice of Chinese 'socialism,' the Party's ideologues have been assigned the task of repackaging the Communist brand – or rather of refilling the existing package with new ideological content." (Vickers 2009: 525) Instead of "radical and romantic communism" (Tse 2011: 164), today the CCP relies on nationalism on an ethnic basis: "Today the Communist Party posits itself as the vanguard of the Chinese *nation*—not the proletariat—and as the privileged agent to carry forward the Chinese nation's long-deferred dream of wealth, power, and international respect[.]"² (Woronov

¹This concept played a crucial role in imperial China and its political constitution (see also 'Ruism and social control,' p. 40).

²Still nationalism in China is not solely a top-down project, "but instead a potent combination of popular sentiment, state authority, and intellectual approval[.]" (Woronov 2007: 652) In the Chinese popula-

3.1 'Marketisation': individualism in a socialist country

2007: 652, italics in original) Though the overall plan has been abandoned in favour for market mechanisms, still means of governing remained; they only have been transformed into a 'struggle of the nation' instead of 'class struggle.' The introduction of market mechanisms does not go along with an exclusion of the CCP in the economic sphere. Still the market is perceived

as part of a sophisticated planning regime characterized by a technoscientific rationality. (...) In this scheme of things, "planning" (*jihua*), "social engineering" (*shehui gongcheng*), and even "eugenics" (*yousheng*) are positive terms firmly incorporated into a post-Mao developmentalism. These categories of thought and representation should not be considered strange leftovers and anachronisms from a bygone socialism. On the contrary, they are active constitutive components of the present. (Sigley 2009: 551, italics in original)

This form of 'technoscientific rationality' is closely bound to the idea of national development, and, hence, the idea of nationalism. In order to develop a strong nation, the population and in consequence the individuals have to be 'developed.' Therefore, since the 1980s a tendency towards elitism in the market place and in the educational system was established and accelerated in the 1990s, aiming at the promotion of national economic and social development. But not only were the reforms inward oriented, they also to an increasingly greater extent oriented the country to outward influences. With the incorporation of China into the global market and the conscious opening up through official policies, a lot of 'Western' ideas and technologies were introduced to China. Although such influences are seen as accounting to economic development and diversification, the CCP makes a clear distinction "between learning from the West and wholesale westernisation." (Cheung/Pan 2006: 43) The influences shall be filtered from its 'bad' elements and be 'prepared' for the Chinese people to receive it. To do so it is crucial for the political leaders to establish a new identity, to preserve a certain 'Chineseness,' through which desirable attitudes are justified and others are abandoned. Diversity arising from Western influences bears the risk of 'decays' such as individualisation, materialistic he-

tion the idea of nationalism is quite popular. As academics in China rediscovered the value of their cultural heritage over the course of the 1990s, they started advocating Chinese nationalism as well.

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donism, or liberated sexual ideas, “giving them [the youth] physical and psychological pressures, diseases and other problems.” (Qi/H. Tang 2004: 475)

The individual that makes independent responsible choices – in opposite to making collective choices in socialism – is a necessity in a market-oriented society. At the same time it is anticipated that individualism might become ‘too extreme.’ The loss of collectivity is perceived as a threat to the well-being of society as a whole, people are ‘in danger’ of becoming selfish and irresponsible. All the more important it becomes to attempt still to bind the individual to the collective in the post-Mao era, giving it a sense of national awareness. This in turn will provide for the stability of the individual (*wenguxingzhi* 稳固性质) in an environment of conflicting values and beliefs. The stability of the individual is perceived as the foundation for its development in particular and for national harmony in general. Through the government of the individual, Chinese people and ethnicities in reform era China shall be harmoniously brought together, as a sum being represented by the Chinese nation. But Chinese nationalism not solely serves the purpose of national unity, it – along with rejection of the idea of ‘Westernisation’ – also stresses the distinctiveness of China from other nations in a global arena of competition. The term ‘globalisation’ (*quanqiuhua* 全球化), being understood as competition of nations, is used to justify the new developmental approach: “In this emerging hybrid of neo-social Darwinism, Chinese socialism, and neoliberalism, the end game is described as the competition between nations (*minzu*). And in terms reminiscent of Liang Qichao and other turn-of-the-twentieth-century Chinese writers, success in this competition will boil down not to the size (*shuliang*) of the population but to the quality (*suzhi*) of individuals.” (Sigley 2009: 554, italics in original) Within its mission to build a strong nation, the Chinese government has chosen to start at its smallest unit – the individual. Its performance and behaviour are seen as the cornerstone of the overall development and are of special concern to governance in China.

3.1.2 The concept of ‘suzhi’ and governance

Within the reforms of the 1980s and the introduction of new forms of population policies, the term ‘*suzhi*’ (素质)³ – being translated as ‘quality’ – became important. Under

³Basically *su* (素) among others means ‘unadorned,’ ‘plain,’ ‘white,’ or ‘essence’ (Kipnis 2006: 297), *zhi* (质) can be translated as ‘nature,’ ‘character,’ or ‘matter’ (ibid.: 296). Regarding the three terms *pinzhi* (品质), *zhiliang* (质量), and *suzhi*, *zhi* can also be translated as ‘essence’ (Sigley 2009: 540).

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this concept the individual became quantified and its 'quality' became measurable. The use of the term 'quality' might be confusing and misleading in the 'Western' context. It is therefore important to take a look at its history and connotations.

Roots

The groundwork for the discourse on *suzhi* in the contemporary Chinese political sphere can be seen in making humans part of the overall plan under Mao and, therefore, objectifying them. This in turn led to "ongoing tensions between the production of subjects as the bearers of collective revolutionary agency and as the passive targets of administrative commands." (ibid.: 550) Bodies were perceived as a variable being controlled by the overall plan (ibid.: 544). Initiative in this environment was rather deduced from a certain historical view stemming from Marxist-Leninist theory, where humans are the source of all historical progress, being reflected in class struggle and the power of humans over nature. It is the masses that are to make history, out of a certain self-consciousness (*zijue* 自觉) of the working class. Out of this historical awareness the individual becomes active and initiative (ibid.: 547). Although officially individualism was not intended in this environment, there have been mechanisms that de facto created it. Yan (2010: 491) identifies four major mechanisms in communist China under Mao that helped providing the foundation for the emergence of an individual:

1. Class labels, giving people a certain identity with regard to their function in society and the revolution.
2. The household registration system, giving people a certain identity that is locally bound.
3. A centralised system of employment, expressed in the rural collective and the urban work unit.
4. Detailed records of employees, recording individual histories.

"These four mechanisms, which fixed the individual into an almost immutable position with a standard biography, resulted from a series of ideological, political, and economic projects of social engineering that aimed to transform China into a strong and wealthy modern nation-state through state socialism and nationalism." (ibid.: 492) Along with

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these processes traditional forms of societal networks were disembedded and ‘traditional’ values and norms were undermined. Still the perspective that the group doesn’t exist to support the individual, but rather that the individual exists to support the group, was incorporated in communist rule. “The various practices of Maoist socialism did nothing less than detraditionalize, disembed, and re-embed the individual, shifting the individual from an individual-ancestor (read: family) axis in social relations to a new axis between the individual and the party-state.” (Yan 2010: 493)

In the 1980s the debate changed and introduced a shift from the passive (*beidong* 被动) role of the individual to an active (*zhudong* 主动) one. It was not sufficient anymore to dictate people through the implementation of a plan, the agency of the individual in the process of change was increasingly emphasised. So the duality of controlling population growth and raising population quality became the dominant guideline of the reforms (Sigley 2009: 552). Although in the 1980s more focus was laid upon the former aspect, quality became increasingly important in the following period. The question of “‘quality,’ whether of individual, class, population, or nation, has been a consistent feature and problem of Chinese modernity.” (ibid.: 543) The modern use of the word has to be regarded in relation to its semantic history. In the attempt to modernise and build a strong nation in the post-Qing period, the ‘quality’ of the population was an important element being considered by the newly established nation state. Politics emphasised “physical, mental, and moral attributes of the citizen, which are necessary to ensure national survival and revival.” (ibid.: 542) For this purpose there was a lively discussion about eugenics in the 1920s, taking racial improvement as an important end. This ‘racial improvement’ in turn was perceived as building a strong nation that is able to compete in a global arena. “Though contemporary *suzhi* discourse places much more emphasis on education than breeding, many of the same concerns appear. Foremost is the link between nationalism and social Darwinism. (...) Linked to this concern with supremacy is a clear and holistic distinction between the superior and the inferior.” (Kipnis 2006: 305, italics in original).⁴ In this context the term ‘*suzhi*’ over the course of the 20th century was associated with inborn characteristics, based on the idea of a ‘nature/nurture dichotomy’ (ibid.: 297), dividing the population and nations along the distinction of superiority/inferiority. As late as 1979 *suzhi* continued to be associated with inborn

⁴The word *youshengxue* (优生学), meaning eugenics – being used in contemporary birth control policy –, even explicitly refers to inborn qualities of people and to the Darwinist notion of *suzhi*.

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qualities and as opposed to *suyang* (素养) (ibid.: 297), representing acquired capabilities.

Population policy and the 'quality of the nation'

During the 1980s the notion of the term *suzhi* was significantly altered, which was reflected in the debate about population control. Whereas in the 1970s and early 1980s the term '*renkou zhiliang*' (人口质量) was widely used to refer to 'population quality,' in the following period *zhiliang* rather was used to distinguish the material sphere from humans (ibid.: 297, italics in original). Making this distinction *suzhi* rather is used with individuals and *zhiliang* with complex systems (like education or industry). Kipnis (ibid.: 297) identifies three characteristics of the altered meaning of *suzhi* in this period:

First, *suzhi* no longer connotes the natural in a nature/nurture dichotomy. While contemporary usage still implies qualities that are deeply internalized, these qualities are very much affected by one's upbringing. (...) Secondly, contemporary usage is limited to individually embodied, human qualities. [as opposed to *zhiliang* for the material sphere] (...) Thirdly, *suzhi* has taken on sacred overtones. It now marks the hierarchical and moral distinction between the high and the low and its improvement is a mission of national importance.

The discourse about *suzhi* is about some people already having achieved high quality, while others still have not, yet implying that in principal high quality is 'achievable' by anyone willing to do so. The perception of this high quality can be seen as similar to social status – through natural selection the 'best' gain power (Sigley 2009: 557). It is "attached to a hierarchy of subjects – those who have the "high quality" to govern themselves, those with "low quality" who need to be governed by others, and those somewhere in between." (ibid.: 558) *Suzhi* becomes a concept of holistic development, containing physical, intellectual, and moral features. Such an approach in China has roots in both Ruist and communist traditions.⁵ In this sense the new notion of *suzhi* in the reform period is a form of adaptation of the rule of the CCP, that accords with

⁵In Ruism through the study of the classics the development of the individual was ensured, accordingly there was an 'all-around development' in the Marxian tradition (Kipnis 2006: 307).

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the new environment of an emerging market economy and individualism. Past concepts have been reintroduced and altered where needed.

Placing population quality at the ideological centre of birth control advocacy enabled birth control advocates to draw on the language of both the Republican eugenicists and the Republican population specialists. Improving the quality of the population required a dual focus on both nurture and nature. The eugenicists' focus on genetic improvement was thus considered valuable, needing only to be purged of its links to racism and its exclusive reliance on nature. Socialist population policy would involve superior genetic counselling, advances in the education system and proper moral education. The language of the eugenicists (superior birth) and the population specialists (population quality) both had their place. (Kipnis 2006: 306)

With this focus, the 'science of population' was made up into a 'Marxist' one and in order was able to serve the needs of the CCP to nurture a strong nation. Such a discourse on human quality is about fostering (*peiyang* 培养) people and can be seen as what Foucault referred to as 'biopower' (see Bakken 2000: 66). The attempt of controlling the 'quality of the nation' is a strongly technocratic one. The Chinese intelligentsia believes that the methods of science are able to 'know it all' and that science is impartial. A technocratic approach can also be found in humanistic sciences (ibid.: 52).

The basis for the increasingly technocratic approach to quality of the population in the 1980s can be traced back to the introduction of the concept of 'two civilisations' (*liang ge wenming* 两个文明), put forward by Hu Yaobang at the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party in 1982. It divides the Chinese modernity into two spheres: a 'material civilisation' (*wuzhi wenming* 物质文明) and a 'spiritual civilisation' (*jingshen wenming* 精神文明).⁶ With growing concern of 'scientification' of policies, science not only wanted to control material processes, but also spiritual processes. Still the terminology of such approaches remained a technocratic one, being oriented towards economic development. Theorists like Qian Xuesen put forward the claim that culture (mainly in the form of literature and art) is to become the 'fourth industry' (*di si chanye*

⁶Though this notion introduced a new orientation in the policies of the 1980s in China, the distinction between material and spiritual aspects of personal development in China can be traced back as early as the 1920s, namely in the theories of Sun Benwen (see Kipnis 2006: 302).

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第四产业), which was to represent a “preparatory stage of production” (ibid.: 56). This approach resulted in the formulation of ‘culturology’ (*wenhuaxue* 文化学), where economics treat the material aspects of the same coin. In this manner Qian even used economic terminology to ground his theory:

There are three aspects of people’s knowledge of the objective world. First comes the person (*ren*), the subject of knowledge. Second comes the objective world, the object of knowledge; and third comes spiritual wealth, the means of knowledge created by mankind. The objective world is material and primary. People’s consciousness is spiritual and secondary. Spiritual wealth is the creation of human beings; reflecting man’s knowledge of the objective world, it too is secondary. Despite this, Qian regards the creation of spiritual wealth as ‘an undertaking or industry’ (*yi zhong shiye huochanye*) of science and culture. (ibid.: 56, italics in original)

Such a concept has to be seen as building upon the concept of ‘two civilisations,’ which in turn is combined with the idea of ‘human quality’:

Material civilization cannot be achieved without simultaneously building spiritual civilization; growth cannot be achieved without social and moral order. (...) The quality of workers and people in general should be improved. Such quality concerns not only their cultural level of knowledge, but also ideological, political, moral, and behavioural aspects. This is a crucial task for building the four modernizations and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics. Human improvement is thus linked with the development of the productive forces[.] (ibid.: 57)

The discussion resembles the discourse on human capital in the West, seeing the capabilities of the individual as crucial to overall economic development. But, still, the conception goes further by containing political and cultural attempts of control.

An well known example of this approach was the introduction of the ‘One Child Policy’ (*Jihua Shengyu Zhengce* 计划生育政策). Since the 1980s not only the quantity of children, but also quality mattered (Greenhalgh 2005: 214). The control of human reproduction was advocated along with the theory of ‘two types of production’ (*liang zhong shengchan* 两种生产) in 1978 (Sigley 2009: 552), again referring to economic

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terminology. Behind this policy a huge scientific apparatus has been nurtured to ‘verify’ its legitimacy (see Greenhalgh 2005). Here ‘culture’ turns into ‘science’ too:

[c]ulture is seen as a submerged dimension which controls behaviour through the operation of value concepts. Such a cultural approach could in theory ‘soften’ the often hard technocratic assumptions of the relationship between individual and society. In the Chinese debate, however, such culturalist assumptions are combined with a strong inclination towards scientism. Human behaviour, values, and norms are incorporated into a system of cultural and social engineering that is meant to fit the development of and linked to the fortunes of the modern state and Chinese modernization. Tradition, culture, and human life itself are subsumed under a system of social control and turned into objects for the techniques of social discipline and social engineering linked to the alleged eradication of ‘social decay.’ (Bakken 2000: 50)

Especially the aspect of ‘social engineering’ (*shehui gongcheng* 社会工程) has become very important in reform and modernisation and lies at the core of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (ibid.: 50).

‘Suzhi’ as an political instrument

In the discussion about modernisation in contemporary China three important aspects can be identified: politics, economy, and human quality, the latter being the most important one. Politics is seen as a form of superstructure, only being able to produce the conditions for modernisation. Human quality on the other hand is seen as superstructure and base at the same time, since the economy is dependent on the cultivation of the work force. In this sense it is sometimes even considered superior to the economic sphere (ibid.: 62). In late socialist China stress has been laid upon the decentralisation of government, out of the fear of governing ‘too much,’ similar to concerns in ‘Western’ nations. Instead the Chinese government expects “that “high-*suzhi*” citizens will be responsible enough to play a constructive role in maintaining social order.” (Tomba 2009: 595, italics in original) This approach is similar to the centre-periphery model in ancient China, where government too was not concerned about military strength, but rather about educating elites that are loyal to the state (see Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2004).

3.1 'Marketisation': individualism in a socialist country

The idea of controlling the state through the individual in modern China therefore has its roots in Ruism. "It is another map for understanding and controlling problematic social reality, bringing order into the process of modernization." (Bakken 2000: 65) With the introduction of market mechanisms, the citizens of post Mao China can not rely on a state plan anymore, but must seek security through self development (Hoffman 2007: 554). This is the result of the experience of being 'thrown' onto a market, where the essential factor of making a livelihood is succeeding in competition. Still the market is not 'free' of the influence of the CCP, the successful competition of individuals in the market place is of great concern for the CCP. Tomba (2009: 592f.) argues that there are three objectives of *suzhi* government:

1. Create autonomous subjects that are able to consume;
2. create subjects that are able to govern themselves;
3. and create subjects who are willing to improve themselves.

Such 'responsible and improving individuals' are defined through their role in the market. In the new environment of a 'socialist market economy,' a certain feeling of 'stress' (*weiji gan* 危机感) is produced, that is formed differently on different levels: the ones that lose out have existential stress (*shengcun de weiji* 生存的危机), those in a better position are in stress of losing it (*shiqu youshi de weiji* 失去优势的危机). This stress leads everyone to constantly compete, "producing superior talents as well as superior products." (Bakken 2000: 62) This results in a 'personality model' that consists of two main competences: initiative (*nengdong xing* 能动性) and adaptability (*shiyiing xing* 适应性). These are "two sides of the same process" (ibid.: 61). Initiative is seen as a driving force to change the objective, material world. Adaptability is a conscious process, letting the individual reflect its environment. Both are combined with the concept of change and, hence, personal and individual 'perfection.'

At the same time the state tries to balance the market place by providing incentives, in this manner having citizens making independent but responsible choices (Hoffman 2007: 554). 'Responsibility' is bound to the idea of the Chinese nation, which for example is reflected in the choice of career and personal development, which is often related to the overall well-being of the nation (ibid.: 560–562).

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Within the discourse of patriotism, lofty and noble ideas are equated to the grand, selfless aspiration of self-devotion to the fatherland. The pursuit of this ideal is considered a process of hardship and struggles and students are expected to take up the spirit of arduous struggle or pioneer an enterprise with painstaking efforts[.] (Tse 2011: 173)

Newly gained freedoms, such as to choose an occupation and form one's own identity, have to be seen as a form of governmentality. The people are not governed directly through a plan anymore, but by putting the development of their independent identity in the context of serving the nation, they identify themselves under the governance of the CCP. It is not about state-society power struggles, but about mechanisms of governing and subjectification (Hoffman 2007: 553). The CCP "experiment[s] with how to build a neo-socialist individual who is submissive to Party rule and accepts dominant behavioral norms, but who is at the same time potentially capable of innovating and creating economic value through self-assertive behaviour." (Hansen 2013: 75) This process has to be understood as aiming at 'personal improvement' and 'perfection,' "a process of gradually 'completing' one's physiology and psychology. (...) The aim of such perfection is to achieve a 'striving forward' (*jingqu xing*), embedding values like risk-taking (*maoxian*), innovation (*chuangxin*), competition, and independence." (Bakken 2000: 61, italics in original)

This private discourse of reliable, responsible, self-disciplined, "high-*suzhi*" citizens, justifying their grievances with the need to improve the nation and contribute to its advancement and modernization, signals the emergence of new subjects, self-disciplined and in tune with the goal of the "community" project. These subjects are essential for a transition to a form of government relying on the "responsibilization" of private stakeholders in the management of society. (Tomba 2009: 605)

In this sense individualism must not be understood in its 'Western' sense, "Western individualism is still very much rejected by the Party. Individualism is not recognized as a moral principle but as a conditional strategy." (Cheung/Pan 2006: 37) Individualism in reform China has to be understood as a regulated one (*ibid.*),⁷ letting the individual

⁷See also section 'Introducing the 'regulated individual'' (p. 37).

only exist within boundaries defined by official policies. New requirements to the single body are introduced in modernising China regarding its economic and educational needs. Citizens are ‘fostered’ and their needs are put into relation to the needs of Chinese nationalism. “[T]he CCP increasingly claims its own legitimacy in terms of producing a strong nation by individually and collectively raising the quality of its citizens.” (Kipnis 2006: 296) ‘Quality’ in this sense allows to associate the subject with a certain value that correlates to the “overall national stock” (Sigley 2009: 541). As such Chinese biopolitics emerge, life becomes something that has to be secured. “[I]n the context of the “socialist market economy” *zhi* is the substance, the bare life, of the body and the person that is to be worked on and improved, and in some cases, to have its surplus value extracted.” (ibid.: 555, italics in original) The subject in post Mao China in a sense remains an objectified one, initiative in many cases still is something that is initiated by the state.

3.2 Bringing China morality

In regulating the individual, education becomes an important tool of Chinese politics. The introduction of morality in the context of ‘education for quality’ (*suzhi jiaoyu* 素质教育) is an important phenomenon in this respect. I therefore will discuss *how* this introduction has taken place, and will look at important themes in relation to the analysis. In a second part I consider the role of ‘tradition’ in relation to moral education, considering it a means to an end.

3.2.1 ‘Suzhi jiaoyu’ and moral education

Education for quality

Bakken (2000: 75) writes that “[s]ocial control is a pedagogical project in China.” This educational approach since 1949 has to be understood as guided by the official policies of the CCP, consequently varying in character along with political changes. In the post Mao era the importance of education in national policies even increased. “As a result of the shift in national focus from the Maoist “class struggle” to economic reconstruction, education had become the foundation for modernizing science and technology, the key to realizing the Four Modernizations programme.” (Cheung/Pan 2006:

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38f.) Hence, an important sphere in the implementation of the concept of *suzhi* is to be found in *suzhi jiaoyu* (素质教育), being translated as ‘education for quality.’⁸ Along with birth control propaganda *suzhi jiaoyu* became an important element in reshaping the meaning of *suzhi*. The term *suzhi jiaoyu* in the 1980s originally was used to criticise teaching methods only aiming at preparing students for high school entrance (*shengxue jiaoyu* 升学教育) or *yingshi jiaoyu* (应试教育), not giving a broad range of content in education (Kipnis 2006: 298). But the connotation changed when the concept was included into politics. In 1985 the CCP Central Committee announced that it is the first priority of educational reform to raise the *suzhi* of the people (ibid.). In the 1990s there was a boom of the term *suzhi jiaoyu*, finding its way into the formulation of national education policy by the Ministry of Education in 1999 (Woronov 2009: 571). The concern about education is rather obvious. In the problematisation of *suzhi renkou* (素质人口) to advance into a prosperous future in a highly competitive world, children play a key role. They become both “marker of the family’s modernity” and the nation’s saviours (ibid.: 571). Similar to rational management and investment in the economic sphere, methods to raise children are also the product of scientific experts and some kind of capital input (e.g. computers in class rooms), often being oriented towards a foreign market. In this sense, over the course of the 1990s, *suzhi* has become a “proper industry” (Kipnis 2006: 302f.) in China, producing the kind of individual that is seen as beneficial to the nation. The role of *suzhi jiaoyu* is to modernise China and make it strong on a global scale in economic and political terms. The individual through various mechanisms is defined through its role in the collective, binding it to the Chinese nation as a whole. In this sense such state policies often contrast disciplines of the market economy, putting emphasis on collectivism rather than individualism. There are certain technologies implemented to exercise this form of control: “By examining and rating their own behavior, attitudes, and consciousness, children are self-individuated, quantified, and disciplined as high- (or low-) quality subjects.” (Woronov 2009: 576) Proper conduct is being formulated through the evaluation of children according to a certain curriculum. It has to be seen as serving the needs and visions defined by the CCP. Following president Jiang the soul of quality education can be found in patriotic education, collective education and socialist

⁸This term is a more adequate translation than ‘quality education,’ since the goal of *suzhi jiaoyu* in the first place is to foster the quality of individuals – and in turn the population – rather than enhancing education itself (Kipnis 2006: 301).

3.2 Bringing China morality

education (Yu 2004: 10), pointing at development of the nation rather than individual development. The term *suzhi jiaoyu* remains vague, meaning both, concrete methods to raise quality and the broader social implication. The term is often used very broadly, not being specific on ‘how’ changes are to be brought about (Woronov 2009: 572).

Despite this vagueness, the implementation of *suzhi jiaoyu* is quite sophisticated. Regarding the fostering of *suzhi* the approach is split into 4 categories: *zhiyu* (智育), *deyu* (德育), *tiyu* (体育), and *meiyu* (美育), representing intellectual, moral, physical, and aesthetic development. All four categories aim at raising the children’s quality in one of these areas (ibid.: 572), and together form what is called *quanmian fazhan* (全面发展), or ‘full development.’ Especially the sphere of *deyu* (moral education) is interesting in the light of social change in contemporary China. The moral landscape of China has changed since the time of revolutionary communism, from a selfless communitarism to a morality based on individualism and individual rights. In the era under Mao

the emphasis on collective morality was promoted at the expense of individuality and individual rights, and a moral person was defined as selfless and willing to sacrifice individual interest for the larger group[.] (...) In the reform era, this collective morality of responsibility and self-sacrifice has been replaced by a new individual morality of rights and self-realisation. (Yan 2009: 22)

Along with this shift the CCP became increasingly concerned with the ‘morality’ of the nation. In 1985, 1991 and 1995 there have been major documents, supporting the idea of moral education as a necessary means of spreading the party’s ideology (Cheung/Pan 2006: 40). This follows the tradition that since the foundation of the PRC, education always served to teach Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary history as well as socialist values⁹ (ibid.: 38). Though, with the emergence of market mechanisms the character of education changed. After the Cultural Revolution schools in China increasingly focused on tests and preparation for college. In this environment moral education “lost its prior lofty status[.]” (Yu 2004: 12f.) Still it continued to be emphasised in philosophy and politics and was even considered the most important element in *suzhi jiaoyu* by Jiang. Although education started serving science and technology, the overall ideology remained a Marxist-Leninist one, which only was interpreted differently by the

⁹Such as patriotism and collectivism.

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Party. Under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao socialism was understood as still being stuck in a primitive stage, so capitalistic mechanisms are needed to create the foundation for a socialist society. Along these developments students started losing belief in communism and after the precariousness of the Tiananmen uprising in 1989 the party began to implement educational institutions in the whole country, in order to equip students with morality, proper behaviour, values of legality, and psychological health (Cheung/Pan 2006: 39), which were necessary under the new circumstances of economic openness and reform. A conference in 1990 blamed a ‘lack in moral education’ for the emergence of the student movement resulting in the Tiananmen incident. “The subsequent effort to moralize the nation went hand-in-hand with a drive to nationalize morality” (Vickers 2009: 526), resulting in the formulation of *aiguozhuyi jiaoyu* (爱国主义教育, education for patriotism). This way socialist political values and the leadership of the CCP should be guaranteed and constantly renewed (Cheung/Pan 2006: 39). The content of moral education has also been expanded since the 1980s, including law, psychology, and knowledge of life (ibid.: 41). At the same time contents are divided by different ages, providing materials appropriate to the context students are confronted with. In the 1980s moral education often was rejected because of poor teaching methods and pedagogy. In response a focus was laid upon enhancing the quality of teaching and giving schools and teachers the freedom to act more autonomously. Easy to pass master and doctoral programmes in Marxist Theory and Political Education were installed, providing people who aim to teach moral education with pedagogy and teaching methods. Emphasis was laid upon how to relate socialist values to personal characteristics and through extra-curricular activities making moral education more attractive to students (ibid.: 42f.). At the same time this freedom in the pedagogical process might not be ‘abused.’ Still “the primary aim of moral education was to serve political needs, train students ideologically, and enable all of those who received an education to develop morally, intellectually, and physically, so as to become well-educated workers imbued with a socialist consciousness.” (ibid.: 39) It is therefore, that this autonomy in the teaching process as well as for citizens, has to be regarded as being confined. To understand the potential of this newly granted freedom, one has to look at implications of this ‘confinement.’

Introducing the ‘regulated individual’

Cheung and Pan (ibid.: 38) in this respect introduce the concept of ‘regulated individualism’ and identify four dimensions in it:

1. Insisting upon the goal of socialism in national education policy,
2. legitimising the reform of moral education,
3. broadening the framework for moral education and diversifying its methods, and
4. emphasising the conditionality of the tolerable degree of individualism, defined by the state.

When it comes to putting limits to the ‘degree of individualism,’ morality plays a crucial role as an instance of control. The changing of the nomenclature of political education over different periods reflects the increasing importance of moral education when it comes to ideology. At the same time it shows a certain de-politisation of the topic. In 1977 political education was reintroduced as *zhengzhi* (政治), being renamed as *sixiang zhengzhi* (思想政治) in 1992¹⁰ and referred to as *sixiang pinde* (思想品德) starting from 2003 (Tse 2011: 162). Regarding this change in notation, the increasing emphasis on ideology as well as morality is evident. This development at the same time is connected with the orientation towards harmony and stability, as it is in the official line of the CCP. “In fact, ideology (*sixiang*) describes a state of harmony and discipline; it seeks to make thoughts alike to achieve harmony.” (Bakken 2000: 86, italics in original) In the context of a changing, uncertain China, harmony plays a crucial role in Chinese politics to ensure stability and further growth. Moral education has to be understood in terms of serving as a bridge between the past of the nation and preparation of the youth for the future (Woronov 2009: 570). Control over morality in this environment is so important because it is a long lasting system that, once established, is hard to change. ‘Good’ morality is the cornerstone for a flourishing future, ‘wrong’ morality will lead to chaos (*wenluan* 紊乱) (Bakken 2000: 58). This is embedded in the idea about modernisation. The need for *suzhi jiaoyu* is constructed in order to gain control over societal change.

¹⁰In the very same year at the 14th National Congress of the CCP also the goal of establishing a market economy was officially declared (Qi/H. Tang 2004: 467).

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The Chinese discourse on modernization and human quality is a version of the theory of individual modernity. (...) Central to this kind of theory is the assumption that modern concepts or values of a psychological kind lead to modern behaviour, which again contributes more or less directly to the development of societies. (Bakken 2000: 65)

To assure this development of society, the discourse about morality uses sociology as a scientific basis (ibid.: 86), bringing about “an objective ‘moral science’ operating as a binding as well as a transforming ‘moral force’ in society (...) [and producing] individuals in line with ‘objective standards’ of exemplarity.” (ibid.: 1)

In producing a ‘regulated individual’ through controlling moral behaviour, *suzhi jiaoyu* brings up contradictions in what it morally asks from children: “Moral *suzhi* demands that children exhibit the moral qualities of the socialist era by tolerating hardships, expending focused and concerted effort, and demonstrating discipline, diligence, and constraint. Yet market disciplines produce children as consumers and encourage the playful construction of self through the immediate gratification of market goods.” (Woronov 2009: 584, italics in original) Hence, moral education is deeply concerned with the life of children in a market economy and their proper behaviour in such a context. “The most significant characteristic of ‘regulated individualism’ is the conditional adjustment of the state-defined individual-collective relationships in line with the changes of social circumstances.” (Cheung/Pan 2006: 43) So the official curriculum reform of 2003 endorsed a stronger orientation towards the real life of pupils (Tse 2011: 167). Various topics were introduced to moral education such as knowledge of life, or psychological health (Cheung/Pan 2006: 42). This orientation can be traced back as early as the 1980s, which in the first place served to attract students to moral education, but also was a reaction to the occurrence of individualism. Students are allowed to cultivate individualism, while still holding collectivism high. In addition to enhancing pedagogy and teaching methods, off-campus alliances were built with institutions like museums or social organs, using the form of extra-curricular activities. Also school’s experience in moral education were promoted over many channels, overall through television, over websites, and on the radio (ibid.: 43). Such attempts to bring moral education into spheres that are out of school represent the attempt to address the ‘real life’ of children to better reflect their reality.

The content of moral education is adjusted to different levels of schooling. Teaching pupils in elementary schools emphasises “basic life and social skills” (ibid.: 42), covering questions about safety and health, creativity, and ‘self-knowledge.’ In middle and highschool philosophy becomes an important topic, “such as sense of responsibility, positive attitude, self-determined [sic!], and self-discipline.” (ibid.: 42) The topic of health is widened by using psychology in order to explain adolescent development. Morality in higher education serves the purpose of handling employment related issues, as well as topics concerning family. Important values at this stage are creativeness, competitiveness, self-management, independence, and problem solving (ibid.: 42). Such values go in line with the general acceptance of ranking students, which is also expressed in the university entrance exam (*gaokao* 高考) (Woronov 2011: 83), still playing an important role in the Chinese educational system. Although certain values as competitiveness or effectiveness gain importance, they still are in many cases neglected for collective values, which is due to the still important role of the CCP in Chinese society (Yu 2004: 14). To be able to adequately serve society, children have to be able to bear responsibility. For this reason there are methods in schools that lay stress on developing ‘strength’ through teaching them to ‘eat bitterness’ (*chiku* 吃苦), which is perceived necessary since children in China are seen as not being able to tolerate hardships anymore (Woronov 2009: 581). For sure, the emergence of the ‘only-child’ (*dusheng zinü* 独生子女) after the introduction of the One-child Policy attributed to this perspective, which is referred to as a reason for social decay (Qi/H. Tang 2004: 474). ‘Bad influences’ stemming from globalisation are perceived as a possible threat as well, because children have not yet developed the right moral abilities (ibid.: 470). In this manner moral education in contemporary China emphasises ‘five loves,’¹¹ as well as ‘four have,’¹² which serve the legitimization of the CCP’s dominant leadership and strengthen patriotism (Cheung/Pan 2006: 41). Accordingly different content of law is taught according to different school-levels. This at the same time enforces the role of the CCP in Chinese society as an avant-garde in terms of social change, and the role of the nation state in ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics.’ “The aim of moral education is to produce good people who

¹¹*wu ai* 五爱: love the motherland (*ai zuguo* 爱祖国), love the people (*ai renmin* 爱人民), love labour (*ai laodong* 爱劳动), love science (*ai kexue* 爱科学), and love socialism (*ai shehuizhuyi* 爱社会主义).

¹²*si you* 四有: have ideal (*you lixiang* 有理想), have morality (*you daode* 有道德), have knowledge (*you wenhua* 有文化), and have discipline (*you jilü* 有纪律).

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will contribute to the society. Such a broad conception of moral education is rooted in Mao's theory. (...) In reality, under this broad umbrella of moral education, there is a tendency to connect social problems to moral issues and use moral education to remedy social ills." (Yu 2004: 13) In response to such 'social ills' content of traditional Chinese moral education is rediscovered in contemporary China and instrumentalised to serve the needs of challenges in a new social environment. The most prominent content derives from Ruist teachings, which today is accepted by the CCP.

3.2.2 Ruism and social control

Ruism today

When we are talking about Ruism in contemporary China, there are mainly two lines of argumentation. One is to emphasise the role of Ruism as a form of cultural heritage, building an essential part of the modern Chinese nation. Any modernising nation has to analyse and create its own past. The process of modernisation has to build upon this foundation as well.

By creating traditions, society builds up patterns of reference aimed at making social interaction predictable. A lack of predictability and tradition not only makes people feel insecure, with nothing to respect and nothing to oppose, but makes it difficult to define one's own position and historical identity. (...) In this perspective, tradition is a means to educate and civilize human nature in a period in which human life is in danger of being torn apart by the modern anomic conflict of too many ideals and too many ways of life. (Bakken 2000: 29)

In the process of change, tradition can bear the role of bringing security in fixing the individual to a certain identity.

Of course the process of modernization also makes each member of society more uncertain about his or her own identity, making possible a reflexive process of self-identification that is potentially dangerous to the social order. This 'homelessness' of personal identity and the reflexivity of strategies to build new 'homes' represent a potential 'disharmony' that has to be mended

in some way or the other. For this purpose, the re-embedding effect of tradition is emphasised as a part of the modernization project itself. (ibid.: 28)

This identity is bound to the ‘problem-solving’ nation state, and is connected to the second line of argumentation: the role of Ruism as a means of fighting ‘moral decay’ in the society.

Although in the past ‘tradition’ was seen as a whole (*zhengti* 整体), scholars claim that there can be found a quintessence of Ruism, which in turn can help to address recent social problems. What in particular is to represent this quintessence is debated. However, the debate itself is generally acknowledged by scholars and politicians. “It is significant and surprising that the Communist Party and the Ministry of Education have also overtly encouraged and strongly supported this movement.” (Yu 2004: 14f.) The debate is concerned with solutions to concrete problems, mainly concerning the education of the Chinese youth. Nowadays it has become possible to pick aspects of tradition to use it for a certain purpose: “‘Throw away the dross, and adopt the essence’ (*qi qi zaopo, qu qi jingjua*)” (Bakken 2000: 28, italics in original). Hence, the use of Ruism is no continuity of the practise in imperial China and means of control today do not derive from ‘traditional’ modes. Tradition nowadays has to be seen more as an interpretation, becoming an instrument in modern Chinese policies. “‘Confucianism’ is not re-emerging as ideology or culture as such, but as a theory of social control which is also linked to the understanding of culture.” (ibid.: 24) But it is not merely the reconstruction of this quintessence, at the same time social relations and power distribution within this tradition are picked up: “we are dealing not only with the construction of culture, but with the construction of a particular form of social control which is part of that culture.” (ibid.: 26) An excellent example of this is the concept of filial piety, still being used in moral education today (see Tse 2011: 174). In this sense ‘tradition’ is seen as a continuum (*lianxuti* 连续体), but not as an evolutionary process. Rather there are aspects of tradition and modernity mixed together in order to serve a certain purpose.

This process has to be understood in the circumstances of the newly emerged market economy and its political requirements. Being fought for many years – especially in the time of the Cultural Revolution –, Ruism now is accepted by the CCP and serves as a kind of moral philosophy. Tradition often is even perceived as a moral economy, watch-

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ing over certain values like thrift or industriousness (Bakken 2000: 29f.). “Communists are seeking cultural support from Confucianism for their own social and educational purposes.” (Yu 2004: 15) They do this through only picking certain aspects of this philosophy. “For example, they stress the relational and communal nature of Confucianism, the Confucian call for proper social ordering and harmonious interpersonal relations, the inculcation of community values, and the criticism of individualism.” (ibid.: 15) In such a way Ruism has been interpreted as not to oppose socialism. Traditional concepts of rule in China are especially popular among leaders, because they emphasise the importance of stability – of the population as well as of the individual – in order to grow. These concepts are heavily concerned with long term change and inculcating values in the identity of the individual. “A person’s nature might tend to move him in a certain direction, but only habit could make this tendency continuous and predictable. The ‘genealogy of predictability’ in today’s China has to be sought in these traditional characteristics. Inculcation of habit was necessary for the stability of individuals and society alike.” (Bakken 2000: 132) Furthermore, moral education is seen as a kind of long-term investment, since values and morality are fundamental and tend to change rather slowly. In this manner policies become something that are able to control social change in a long-term perspective, to make it predictable and corrigible. The modern idea of the control of the nation through the habits of the individual has its roots in Ruism, which is continued to be used in Chinese politics today. “Historical antecedents for *suzhi* can be seen in Confucian teachings that each individual is malleable, trainable and obliged to self-cultivate and that all subjects share in responsibility for the fate of the empire.” (Murphy 2004: 2, italics in original) It is in this sense that tradition becomes reusable, and through which a link between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ is established. In the following I will discuss foundations for responsibility through self-cultivation in ‘traditional’ Chinese moral education.

‘Traditional’ moral education: an introductory approach

As stated above, in imperial China ‘tradition’ was seen as an holistic approach.

Tradition represented the totality of experience, and reflection about it was limited primarily to a clarification of the transmitted past. This we see in Chinese tradition with its all-powerful emphasis on interpretations of the

Confucian ‘classics,’ in particular refined in the interpretations of the ‘four books’ (*si shu*) and the ‘five classics’ (*wu jing*). (Bakken 2000: 25, italics in original)

Moral education can be seen as representing a part of the whole, being related to the ‘classics’ on the one hand, and to the order of the imperial state on the other. During the Han dynasty, when Ruism became the official theory of education, also *tianming* (天命, the mandate of heaven) was established as the “metaphysical foundation for individual ethics and for social principles.” (Woo 1991: 10). *Tianming* kept this function until the collapse of imperial China and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. Still, with the emergence of so called ‘Neo-Confucianism’ in the Song and Ming dynasties, who’s adherers rejected the concept of *tian* (天) as a legitimising basis, the notion changed. In contrast to the former approach they took an anthropocentric and humanistic position as a starting point, “considering human nature as the center-point and ultimate philosophical foundation[.]” (ibid.: 8f.) This anthropocentric education in the school of *daxue* (大学) “neglects the transcendent God and holds human nature to be absolute in both the epistemological and the ontological sense[.]” (ibid.: 13) It puts emphasis on the rationality of knowledge when realising a morally good life, following in the footsteps of Mencius and Xunzi (Hang 1991: 32). So, although a more ‘worldly’ point of departure was established, still attempts to cultivate moral life by Confucius and his successors were adapted. With emerging influence of Buddhism during Sui and Tang dynasty the perception that the self-cultivation of the individual is the ‘root of everything’ was even strengthened – due to ideas about Karma and transmitting ‘bad’ and ‘good’ deeds to further lives (Woo 1991: 10f.). Still, ‘right’ moral behaviour has been regarded as deriving from universal objective laws. “The ancient phrase *tian fa* – meaning ‘Laws of Heaven’ – does not refer to law of nature in a scientific sense, but concerns social affairs, and indicates a fixity or objectivity of social conduct. It was thought that human conduct and moral order somehow had a superhuman, but not necessarily a supernatural, authority.” (Bakken 2000: 53, italics in original) Given the perception that there is some kind of ‘objective’ morality, in traditional China rule by morality was more widespread than rule by force. This morality was bound to a specific perception of human nature, from Sui and Tang dynasties onwards playing an even more important role in the conduct of morality.

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Woo (1991: 12) argues that “the metaphysical foundation of educational theory lies in human nature.” According to this foundation and different perceptions of human nature, methods of education also differed in the history of Ruism. If nature was perceived as ‘good,’ methods tended to be mild; if it was ‘bad,’ methods were rather rigorous. In ‘*The Analects*’ Confucius himself stressed that people in essence are alike,¹³ but through their interactions with the world around become ‘far apart’ (ibid.: 8). Mencius on the other hand perceived human nature as good in essence, becoming ‘bad’ by unfortunate influences (ibid.: 8). However, both Confucius and Mencius emphasised the role of education in developing the right attitude. In the case of Mencius this is quite obvious, since one needs to ‘preserve’ good nature when confronted with ‘bad’ influences. But also “[i]f human nature is neutral and changeable [sic!], then it needs education to lead nature into becoming good.” (ibid.: 12) The common ground for both approaches lies in the perception that humans are able to cultivate themselves in order to fulfil a certain form of morality that is perceived as being beneficial to society as a whole. In principle the cultivation of the individual in Ruism is achieved through two principles: *junzi* (君子) and *shenren* (神人). “The former refers to personal perfection, and the latter to the order of community.” (ibid.: 14) In this regard *ren* (仁) displays a basic principle through which one is to achieve the ideal of *junzi* by cultivating oneself and a *shenren* by assisting others (ibid.: 8). There is no consent about how to interpret *ren*,¹⁴ but there are two tendencies: “one focusing on man of *jen* (loving man) and the other on *jen* as overcoming oneself and restoring “li” (rite).” (Yuan 2002: 111, italics in original) In regarding *ren* and *li* as two sides of the same coin, the social dimension of cultivating ‘one’s own nature’ becomes more clear. The duties of the individual in society can only be fulfilled if both *ren* and *li* (礼) are accomplished: “*jen* exists not in itself, not in speaking, but in doing, in the relationship between individual men, and in *li*.” (ibid.: 111) In this sense the two concepts can never be seen as divided, only those who develop *ren* can actually benefit to society, only those who sincerely practice *li* can accomplish their ‘nature.’ In this sense the ‘accomplishment’ of the individual was defined through soci-

¹³Although Fu (1991: 53) argues that Confucius saw human nature as ‘good’ in essence.

¹⁴There are several translations for *ren*, among the most prominent are “benevolence (Legge etc.), perfect virtue (Legge), the Good (Waley), or humanity (popular today).” (Dubs 1951: 48, italics in original) Confucius simply referred to it as *ai* (爱). I think that ‘inter-personality’ (Hang 1974: 56) can be seen as the best translation when considering the societal character of *ren* and accordingly the claim to overcome egoism.

ety, at the same time ‘accomplishing society’ was perceived as being dependent on the cultivation of the individual. “The ideal personality to which the Confucian School aspired is therefore a twofold achievement: individual perfection and social order.” (Woo 1991: 8) The foundation for this cultivation of the individual can be found in the concept of *xin* (心) – being translated as heart. After Confucius the core of societal problems can be found in the problems of the individual itself. The solution is a change of the heart (Liu/Wang 2013: 22). ‘Heart’ as a concept in Ruism bears various notions. Mencius and Xunzi alike regard human nature as defined by *xin* and emphasise its cultivation (Hang 1991: 32) Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are declared to be aspects of the individuals heart by Mencius, being perceived as ‘nature’ of humans (Fu 1991: 22). According to Mencius, “a fully actualized “hsin” would proceed to realize “hsing” or properly human nature.” (Hang 1991: 30) This ‘nature,’ or *xing* (性) is related to the term *sheng* (生), pointing towards inborn characteristics (Fu 1991: 21). Nature itself furthermore is distinguished as “innate and properly human aspiration” – or the ‘greater part’ of human nature – and sensuality as inferior – or the ‘lesser part’ of human nature (Hang 1991: 30). To actualise human nature, one has to cultivate *xin*, which means to enhance the ‘greater part’ of human nature. As such *xin* refers to “the very broad spectrum of subjectively experienceable phenomena from affection, attention and knowledge, up to the highest human aspirations.” (ibid.: 30) It divides individuals into two categories: the ones who measure the expectation of actualising *xin*, hence becoming ‘good’ humans, and those who do not. This resembles the conception of *suzhi* as discussed above, regulating human moral conduct by justifying it through human nature. As well through the individual the state tried to maintain social order and achieve harmony and stability. The book *daxue* for example promoted three goals: “[the] manifestation of one’s illustrious virtue, loving the people, and resting in the highest good. Its method is to begin from self-cultivation as the fundamental standpoint, and proceed to the regulation of the family, the order of the state, and finally the peace of the whole world as the ultimate aim.” (Woo 1991: 10) Though school and family were regarded as important sources of cultivation, the individual was also regarded as being in need of ‘practise,’ which means that the individual should actually conduct principles. Confucius for one emphasised the combination of knowledge and practise, regarding exemplarity as an important foundation for learning (Liu/Wang 2013: 23). Furthermore he saw thinking and learning as an interrelated concept, being open minded towards other people’s opinions (ibid.: 14). A

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certain openness was important in this approach, only through reflection of one's own conduct making people 'human' at all.

Through interpersonal love and concern the Confucians believe that the world would be united in one. Thus in training as well as in the content of education the emphasis is upon interpersonal benevolence, especially upon the concrete social order in which sovereigns rule the people, not by means of law and punishment, but through their own virtue. (Woo 1991: 14)

The 'rule by virtue' was the very foundation of imperial China and is being reconsidered in contemporary China. The prominence of this approach is quite evident: "[a] discipline based on the norm is more durable than one based on outer force only because it seeks to bind people to society with their own ideas." (Bakken 2000: 8) Although after the May-Fourth-Movement and the communist revolution the influence of Ruism diminished in China and education shifted from a moral to a technical basis (Woo 1991: 12), nevertheless Ruist thought is being rediscovered in contemporary China. The main values transferred from 'Chinese tradition' today are harmony (*hexie* 和谐) and stability (*wending* 稳定) which are used on society as well as on the family (Bakken 2000: 29).

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4.1 Operationalisation

We now might attempt to operationalise theory and method with regard to the given context. Regarding what has been said in the chapter ‘Framework,’ a central guideline in contemporary Chinese politics, that derives from the sphere of influences,¹ is the concept of ‘harmony and stability,’ which can be understood as a form of governmental rationality. The orientation towards this form of rationality can be seen as the outcome of a political shift from class struggle to economic reform and a growing concern with individualism. Still this rationality is embedded in a bigger ‘mentality,’ consisting of a certain economic jargon deriving from a socialist technocratic approach,² connections to modernist thinking and development on different levels,³ as well as nationalism.⁴ Such discourses, brought about by the emergence of the rationality of ‘harmony and stability’ are the basis for my inquiry about governmentality in contemporary Chinese moral education. But first we have to look for indicators of governmentality regarding the construction of an individual. Through these we can deduct certain technologies, which in turn are to be compared with the given context. In the chapter ‘Framework’ we have already encountered several aspects that have been considered in the theoretical discussion. In the following I present the indicators/categories I will conduct my analysis of governmentality by:

- The attempt to govern through improvement rather than punishment, constituting a subject that can be ‘worked’ upon.

¹Namely from the sphere of ‘tradition’ (see p. 20).

²Trough concepts like ‘two civilisations’ and ‘two types of production.’

³In our case most prominently found in the discourse about *suzhi*.

⁴Containing ‘tradition’ as a form of Chinese identity.

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- Trying to control each and all – or in the case of education rather each aspect of life – by attempting to regulate the ‘habits and movements’ of agents.
- Emphasising freedom of choice and agency, making the subject capable of acting.
- The subjectification and objectification of individuals, being visible in the aspect of discipline,⁵ as well as moral confrontation with others.⁶
- The ‘responsibilisation’ of the individual, putting the subject into a certain relation to the societal sphere.

These aspects of governmentality form certain technologies,⁷ and have to be seen as interconnected. The analysis therefore attempts to seek for ‘rules’ how these technologies of the self are constructed regarding each indicator, how through the use of various discourses such technologies are formulated, rationalised, and put into relation to one another. Hence, the analysis attempts to look at governmentality from its own categories. The interpretation and discussion on the other hand will discuss the findings under the following categories:

- Individualism: considering the role of subjects through their self-development in the contemporary Chinese context.
- Nationalism: providing security for the development of individuals, as well as assigning them ‘duty’ on a national level.
- Tradition: being understood as a form of ‘controlled change’ in the sense that it serves as a *marker of identity*.

The technologies identified in part one here will be re-embedded into the given context. This way, I will try to show attempts of government by the actual performance of the state⁸ through the medium of the individual and the use of ‘tradition.’

⁵Especially evaluation and self-control.

⁶In this respect we are able to speak of ‘moral capacities of thinking,’ determining the scope of possible action for the agent.

⁷Measures and conceptions leading to the achievement of harmony and stability can be considered as a form of such technology.

⁸If we understand the state not as a given entity, but rather as the attempt to conduct a certain form of mentality.

Below I provide some aspects regarding the application of textual oriented discourse analysis. The approach can be summarised as follows:

When we analyse specific texts as part of specific events, we are doing two interconnected things: (a) looking at them in terms of the three aspects of meaning, Action, Representation and Identification, and how these are realised in the various features of texts (their vocabulary, their grammar, and so forth); (b) making a connection between the concrete social event and more abstract social practices by asking, which genres, discourses, and styles are drawn upon here, and how are the different genres, discourses and styles articulated together in the text? (Fairclough 2003: 28)

These two aspects can also be referred to as ‘description’ and ‘interpretation,’ which refer to analysis of texts and analysis of social practise (Fairclough 1992: 73f.).

There are in general four main headings for textual analysis: vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure. “These can be thought as ascending in scale: vocabulary deals mainly with individual words, grammar deals with words combined into clauses and sentences, cohesion deals with how clauses and sentences are linked together, and text structure deals with large-scale organizational properties of texts.” (ibid.: 75) Furthermore one has to consider the ‘force of utterances’ (which kind of language is used), the ‘coherence’ of a text, and ‘intertextuality’ (ibid.: 75). With these aspects given, one is able to conduct an analysis of production, interpretation, and formal aspects of texts.

4.2 Data and background

The analysis will be based on an introductory course on moral education held at Shandong Normal University (*Shandong Shifan Daxue* 山东师范大学), being taught in the winter semester of 2006/07. Although a course held at an University contains more elements than just text, the thesis will solely focus upon the textual elements. This on the one hand is for pragmatcal reasons, in order not to go beyond the scope of this thesis. On the other hand certain other material (like videos showing the professor teaching) is not available. There are several reasons for choosing this particular course.

- Availability: the course is part of the Chinese National Top Level Course Project (TLCP) (*Guojia Jingpin Kecheng* 国家精品课程). Implemented by the Ministry

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of Education in 2003 this program aims at providing ‘high quality’ courses and materials to the Chinese population. Therefore the course is an open educational resource and available to anyone having access to the internet and registered at the homepage.⁹

- Representation: since the course is part of the TLCP it is classified as a model-course by the Ministry of Education. Hence, it can be seen as representing legitimate policies in China.
- Scope: since the course is an introduction to moral education, it contains different approaches to the topic, ranging from psychology over history to philosophy, trying to give a whole picture. At the same time it is manageable, consisting of eleven separate lessons.
- Currentness: the course was held in the winter semester of 2006/2007 at Shandong Normal University and published online in 2009.

The university Shandong Normal University is located in Jinan (济南), the capital of the province Shandong (山东), and subordinated to the provincial government of Shandong. Established in 1950 as Shandong Normal College (*Shandong Shifan Xueyuan* 山东师范学院),¹⁰ the university counts as one of the earliest established in the PRC. It is renowned for taking the implementation of policies to heart and has exemplary character in implementing patriotism. It also cooperates with Confucius institutes (*Kongzi Xueyuan* 孔子学院) in South Korea, Kenya and the USA, in this respect being one of the most involved educational facilities of higher education in China. The current headmaster is Zhao Yanxiu (赵彦修), who during his career had several functions within the Communist Party and the state, and most importantly is concerned with ‘life sciences’ and ‘developmental biology.’

The author Tang Hanwei (唐汉卫) is president of the ‘Faculty for Education of Shandong Normal University’ (*Shandong Shifan Daxue Jiaoyu Xueyuan* 山东师范大学教育学院) and also a professor at the university. His field of research is composed of pedagogy, philosophy of education, and moral education. Besides his occupation at

⁹<http://www.jingpinke.com/>

¹⁰<http://www.sdnu.edu.cn/xxjj.html>.

the university, he is ‘secretary-general of the special committee for moral education in primary and secondary education of the Shandong province’ (*Shandongsheng Zhongxiao xue Deyu Zhuanyue Weiyuanhui Mishuzhang* 山东省中小学德育专业委员会秘书长). He is an author, writing monographs and teaching material, as well as a translator. For his work he received various awards in the province of Shandong.

4.3 Outline

Before conducting the actual analysis I want to introduce important topics and ideas that are discussed in the course. This section on the one hand serves as an overview and introduction of the topics discussed in the course, at the other hand it aims at giving a general idea about the ‘line of argumentation’ of the author. In the second part of this section, I will therefore look at how the diverse themes of the course are put together in form of a *central theme*.

Citations of the texts are composed of the relevant chapter, section, subsection, etc., which are delimited by a slash. E.g. “Tang 2005: 1/2/3/4” means that the relevant piece can be found in chapter one, section two, subsection three, paragraph four of the course.¹¹ For the sake of readability, citations are put into footnotes. For the same reason, original Chinese text of citations that exceeds eight characters can be found in footnotes. This way, I attempt to provide a compromise between giving sense of formulations used by the author and readability.

4.3.1 Overview

The course consists of eleven chapters (or lectures), which are divided into several sections and subsections. The single chapters aim at providing an overview of important topics and aspects regarding the field of moral education. They try to establish an insight of *how to arrange and implement* a curriculum of moral education, discussing abstract and practical aspects in this field. The first three chapters are concerned with the “disciplinary basis” (*xueke jichu* 学科基础) of moral education, discussing philosophy (*zhexue* 哲学), psychology (*xinlixue* 心理学), as well as sociology (*shehuixue* 社会学).

¹¹Please note that the third section of chapter six by mistake is labeled with ‘第一节.’

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The following chapter four reflects the “experience”¹²(*jingyan* 经验) of moral education in China as well as moral education in the USA and Europe. This ‘experience’ in chapter five first is discussed by means of “models” (*moshi* 模式) of moral education on a theoretical level, being succeeded by examples of the implementation of moral education in four countries.¹³ These first chapters of the course can be considered as laying down the principal foundation, discussing theoretical aspects of moral education and, thus, serving as a prerequisite for its implementation and the reflection of its practise.

The second part considers more practical aspects of moral education and focuses on the reality of students and teachers participating in the class room. Chapter six consists of different spheres when considering a principal “idea” about moral education (*daode jiaoyu linian* 道德教育理念). First the “humanisation” (*rentihua* 人体化) of moral education is discussed, being followed by the question about “the subject” of moral education (*zhutixing* 主体性), the role of “daily life” (*shenghuohua* 生活化), “democratisation” (*minzhuxing* 民主性), and “lifelong learning” (*zhongshenhua* 终身化). Chapter seven is dedicated to the goal(s) (*mudi* 目的) of a curriculum, considering its distinctiveness to other forms of education, the question of values and its practical implementation. The topic of Chapter eight and nine is the curriculum (*kecheng* 课程) itself, discussing different aspects shaping the concrete form of the curriculum.¹⁴ Chapter ten discusses the position (*diwei* 地位) and function (*zuoyong* 作用) of the teacher, also covering necessary prerequisites considering the “quality” (*suzhi* 素质) of teachers. The final chapter concludes the course with “tactical” (*celüe* 策略) aspects of moral education. This final lecture most importantly is concerned with consciousness (*yishi* 意识), being composed of “clarification of values” (*jiazhi chengqing* 价值澄清) and empathy (*yiqing* 移情).

At the end of each lecture some questions are listed that concern the content of the lesson. As homework the students attending the course have to reflect upon the given questions, which are intended to help them to review the content. Additionally to the single lectures a synopsis (*dagang* 大纲) of the course, an examination paper (*shijuan* 试卷), power point presentations for each lecture and a file with exercises regarding the course (*kehou xiti* 课后习题) are provided.

¹²In particular for China the term “tradition” (*chuantong* 传统) is used, the USA and Europe the term “history” (*lishi* 历史) is assigned.

¹³The ‘exemplary’ countries consist of the USA, England, Japan, and Singapore.

¹⁴Here the author discusses the curriculum as a discipline (*xueke kecheng* 学科课程), activity courses (*huodong kecheng* 活动课程), and the hidden curriculum (*yinxing kecheng* 隐性课程).

4.3.2 Themes

The distinction between theory and practise, between implementation and reflection can be found throughout the whole course. The relationship between those two spheres is discussed on different levels. Still, in the end they are to form a coherent curriculum of moral education, they are to assemble in form of a ‘practical application’ in teaching. When looking at nationalism as something that is *performed*, this approach lays an important foundation for the analysis. Moral education does not only impart knowledge, at the same time it tries to find ways to work upon the subject in efficient ways. Therefore, I will discuss the relation of theory and practise in more depth.

On a basic level, the author distinguishes between philosophical considerations on the one hand and empirical evidence deriving from the discipline of psychology on the other. Nevertheless the two fields are seen as interdependent. In this respect Philosophy on a general level serves three purposes:¹⁵

1. To interpret “facts” (*shishi* 事实) and “laws” (*guilü* 规律) that are derived from psychology and consider to which degree (*chengdu* 程度) and scope (*fanwei* 范围) they have influence on moral education. An important discussion in this respect is the meaning of philosophy with regard to education (*jiaoyu yiyi* 教育意义) in general and the realisation of values (*jiazhi de tiren* 价值的体认) in moral education in particular.
2. Accordingly philosophy defines which goal is most reasonable and ideal (*zui heli de* 、 *zui lixiang de mudi*),¹⁶ defining which knowledge is most valuable in moral education (*zui jiazhi de daode zhishi*)¹⁷ and which method is most effective (*zui youxiao de daode jiaoyu fangfa*).¹⁸
3. Philosophy also serves the purpose of reflecting the practise of moral education in a rational manner (*lixing kaolü* 理性考虑) as opposed to an approach purely based on “feeling” (*ganjue yuanze* 感觉原则).

Regarding this function philosophy builds a framework of ideas, in which moral education is to be implemented. This framework serves as guidance and as a reference for

¹⁵Tang 2005: 1/1.

¹⁶最合理的、最理想的目的

¹⁷最价值的道德知识

¹⁸最有效的道德教育方法

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reflecting practise. While philosophy in this way is seen as obtaining ideals and beliefs through rational reflection (*lixing de sikao huode lixiang he xinyang*),¹⁹ psychology on the other hand serves the purpose of giving the arguments (*lunzheng* 论证) obtained by philosophy an “exquisite,” scientific structure (*kexue de jingzhi de jiegou*).²⁰ Accordingly certain “rules of moral development” (*daode fazhan de guilü* 道德发展的规律) are derived from psychological facts.²¹ From these rules a method (*fangfa* 方法) and “way” (*tujing* 途径) can be elaborated for moral education, which both shall accord with these rules.²² In this sense philosophical thoughts (*sixiang* 思想) and concepts (*guannian* 观念) are seen as important to understand (*lijie* 理解) and realise (*shijian* 实践) moral education from a practical perspective (*xianshi yiyi shang* 现实意义上).²³ Such concepts are discussed in close relation to both, teacher and students. Eventually in Chapter ten those different aspects add up to the formulation of different “qualities” regarding teachers (*jiaoshi de suzhi* 教师的素质) of moral education: “An ideal teacher of moral education should be a philosopher and a psychologist of morality, as well as an artist in education.” (*yi ge lixiang de daode jiaoyu jiaoshi , yinggai shi yi ge daode zhexuejia 、 daode xinlixuejia he jiaoyu yishujia* 。)²⁴ Thus, theoretical considerations are ultimately implemented with regard to practicability and the actual use in moral education. This at the same time is closely related to the subjects of moral education, which are the teacher and pupils.

Yet another level of distinguishing theory and practise is a concern about sociology. Very similar to the role of philosophy and psychology, sociology is concerned with “real” (*shishizaizai* 实实在在) societies.²⁵ Here a distinction between China and ‘the West’ becomes important. Societies are seen as presenting “different stages”²⁶ (*butong*

¹⁹理性的思考获得理想和信仰

²⁰科学的精致的结构 Tang 2005: 1/1.

²¹Ibid.: 2/0.

²²Ibid.: 2/0.

²³Ibid.: 1/0.

²⁴一个理想的道德教育教师，应该是一个道德哲学家、道德心理学家和教育艺术家。ibid.: 10/3/2

²⁵Ibid.: 3/1.

²⁶The term ‘*cengci*’ (层次) can be translated as ‘rank order,’ ‘administrative level,’ ‘arrangement of ideas,’ ‘stratification,’ or ‘layer/level.’ When looking at the single characters ‘*ceng*’ can be translated as ‘layer,’ ‘*ci*’ on the other hand can be translated as ‘order.’ As the course in respect to a societal sphere is also concerned with the establishment of a market economy and it will become clear later, that I regard the course as representing a kind of ‘Western oriented modernism,’ I find the translation of ‘stage’ as adequate, as it represents a certain developmental orientation, as well as implicating inequality with regard to ‘developed’ societies.

cengci 不同层次).²⁷ Dependent on the “composition of a society” (*shehui goucheng* 社会构成),²⁸ the role of moral education on a societal level differs. This ‘composition’ is bound to different histories in different countries. Therefore sociology is an important aspect in defining the role moral education is assigned in a certain historical formation. Despite diverging characteristics some tendencies are seen as being ‘universal.’ Regarding a certain form of ‘modernity,’²⁹ those are most importantly an orientation towards the subjects of education³⁰ and democratisation.³¹ The concern about ‘modernity,’ as opposed to ‘traditional’ moral education, represents an important theme throughout the whole course. In particular the author is concerned with the role of students and the teacher in moral education. ‘Traditional’ moral education is characterised by the use of “authority” (*quanwei* 权威)³² and disregarding the “demands” (*xuqiu* 需求) of the individual.³³ Within this modernity the role of the subject as an agent is strengthened. The ‘modern’ subject in this sense is not determined by society anymore, but has the freedom to choose. In this way a new, freed identity of an individual is established, paving the way for creativity and, hence, fulfilment. With this newly gained freedom, also society is to prosper on a new level. Philosophy is to help implementing by means of the formulation of goals and beliefs. This way the flourishing of the individual and society is to be guaranteed: “Moral education has to form a kind of moral belief and corresponding way of conduct and life. Namely [moral education] makes students spend a form of good, healthy moral life.” (*daode jiaoyu yao xingcheng yi zhong daode de xinnian yiji yu ci xiangying de xingwei fangshi 、 shenghuo fangshi 、 ji shi xuesheng guo yi zhong hao de 、 jiankang de daode shenghuo* 。)³⁴ What this ‘good and healthy life’ might be according to the author is a topic to be discussed in the analysis. The desirability of moral education and philosophy to act as a medium for the realisation of such a life, however, can be considered given.

²⁷Tang 2005: 3/1.

²⁸Ibid.: 3/1.

²⁹see ibid.: 4.

³⁰see ibid.: 6/1.

³¹see ibid.: 6/4.

³²Ibid.: 9/1/2/3.

³³With regard to the liberation of the individual the capability to independent thinking (*duli siwei nengli* 独立思维能力) and the capability to be creative (*chuangzao nengli* 创造能力) are mentioned (ibid.: 10/2/1/1).

³⁴道德教育要形成一种道德的信念以及与此相应的行为方式、生活方式，即使学生过一种好的、健康的道德生活。ibid.: 9/2/2/2.

With this general outline in mind, the analysis will take a closer look at the texts regarding the concept of governmentality. When interpreting the findings with regard to the context in the next chapter, the general ideas discussed in this section will serve as a point of reference.

4.4 Governmentality and the course

All of the five aspects of governmentality I choose for the analysis were found within the texts and are related to one another. In this part I aim to show *how* these aspects become productive in constructing a certain form of individualism.

4.4.1 Government through improvement

When talking about governmentality, an important aspect is the improvement of the individual. In order to judge the performance of an individual as ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ there has to be the potential of improving the subject, it has to meet the premise of being ‘workable upon.’ How this premise is met is of concern in the first part of this section. The second part will look at *how* improvement itself is defined and how according to the author it ought to be installed within the subject.

Setting the premise: making an individual ‘workable upon’

The premise of bearing the potential for improvement within the subject is met in certain ways. In the very first chapter of the course the author emphasises, that morality is not inborn (*tianfushenshou de* 天赋神授的), but following the theory of ‘pragmatism’ by John Dewey has to be understood as a form of “circumstantial ethics” (*jingyu lunlixue* 境遇伦理学).³⁵ This means, that the individual is not determined by its environment, but rather that morality is formed in the process of interacting with it. Such a point of view breaks with the traditional perception of fixed, unchangeable principles of morality (*dapo le chuantong de shi daodeyuanze wei guding bubian de zhuangtai de kanfa*),³⁶ modernity on the other hand being defined as a form of relativism (*xiangduizhuyi* 相对主义).³⁷ In the same way that there is no fixed societal moral code given by a superhu-

³⁵Tang 2005: 1/3/1/4.

³⁶打破了传统的视道德原则为固定不变的状态的看法

³⁷Tang 2005: 1/3/1/4.

man god (*chaoren liliang de shen* 超人力量的神), there is no automatic development according to a priori given instincts (*xiantian benneng de zidong zhankai*)³⁸ regarding the morality of children.³⁹ There is the potential for both, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ tendencies. This means that the direction of the “development” (*fazhan* 发展) of pupils is not given, it can be influenced in the process of the child growing up. The same way that moral development does not stem from priori given instincts it can not be reduced to forces of the environment (*waibu huanjing liliang* 外部环境力量) alone.⁴⁰ Moral development has to be seen as depending on both, internal and external factors. There is, however, a “internally given moral structure” (*neizai daode jiegou* 内在道德结构) that depends on “the help of outer forces” (*waizai liliang de bangzhu* 外在力量的帮助) in order to develop (*fazhan* 发展) and mature (*chengshu* 成熟).⁴¹ Development is the result of the subject being constructed (*jiangou qilai de* 建构起来的) in the process of actively (*zhudong* 主动) interacting with its surroundings (*zhouweihuanjing* 周围环境), overall in the process of interacting with other humans in “practising life” (*yu ren jiaowang de shenghuo shijian zhong*).⁴² This development, however, is perceived as something that inherits an ‘upwards tendency’ – the individual has to improve in some way. Such a view accords with the definition of ‘development’ (*fazhan* 发展) given in the course.⁴³ Important aspects of this definition include that development leads to higher adaptability (*geng neng shiying* 更能适应), higher level of organisation (*geng you zuzhi* 更有组织), more efficiency (*geng you xiaolü* 更有效率), and in general a higher level with a higher function (*geng gao shuiping de zhuangtai he jineng*).⁴⁴

Essentially any child bears the potential for moral growth. There are, however, some prerequisites that influence the moral development of the single pupil. The ‘level’ of a child’s development can be seen as being dependent on her/his “nature of learning” (*xuexi de ziran* 学习的自然),⁴⁵ which is determined by

1. the “quality” of heredity (*yichuan suzhi* 遗传素质),

³⁸ 先天本能的自动展开

³⁹ Tang 2005: 6/3/1/2/2.

⁴⁰ Ibid.: 6/3/1/2/2.

⁴¹ Ibid.: 2/1/2.

⁴² 与人交往的生活实践中 *ibid.*: 6/3/1/2.

⁴³ Ibid.: 2/1/1.

⁴⁴ 更高水平的状态和机能 *ibid.*: 2/1/1.

⁴⁵ Ibid.: 8/3/1.

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2. the level to which a child already matured (*chengshu chengdu* 成熟程度),
3. and the level of psychological development (*xinli fazhan shuiping* 心理发展水平).

Heredity has to be seen as a given factor, but the “maturing” and psychological development are aspects that can be intentionally operated upon. Below I will discuss how according to the author those two aspects are used to implement an individual that is able to ‘develop.’

Improving the individual

In this part I want to discuss the need of actively ‘moulding’ the subject presented above. When speaking about *how* the subject is improvable, especially the second chapter of the course has to receive great interest. Here the pupil of moral education is installed as an individual going through certain ‘stages of morality,’ using the theory of “stages of moral development” by Lawrence Kohlberg. As the name suggests, the theory is based upon the assumption that the child goes through a series of stages during moral growth. These stages are derived from analysis conducted by Kohlberg in different countries. In the course, the premises for the implementation of the developmental model by Kohlberg is met in the section about psychoanalysis (*jingsheng fenxi* 精神分析).⁴⁶ Here moral development is defined by the process from an unconscious stage⁴⁷ to a conscious one (*cong wu yishi de guodu dao you yishi de*),⁴⁸ from a subconscious stage to awareness (*cong bu zijue de guodu dao zijue de*),⁴⁹ and the process from bodily control to mental control (*cong shenglishang de zizhi dao xinlishang de zizhi de guocheng*).⁵⁰

In this process the morality of the individual develops from rather simple reasoning to the point of more complex reasoning. The stages in Kohlberg’s theory also have a fixed direction, assuming lower stages of moral development that progressively lead to higher stages. The direction of this order (*shunxu* 顺序) is fixed (*yiding fangxiang de* 一定方向的) and cannot be changed (*bu ke ni de* 不可逆的).⁵¹ These stages are seen as ‘laws’

⁴⁶Tang 2005: 2/2/1/1.

⁴⁷Note that the term ‘*guodu*’ (过渡) used by the author actually means ‘intermediate stage’ or ‘transition.’ The use of this term further emphasises an ‘upwards tendency.’

⁴⁸从无意识的过渡到有意识的

⁴⁹从不自觉的过渡到自觉的

⁵⁰从生理上的自制到心理上的自制的过程 Tang 2005: 2/2/1/1.

⁵¹Ibid.: 2/1/1.

(*guilü* 规律) provided by psychological theory, that are the foundation for implementing certain moral ideals and goals (*lixiang he mudi* 理想和目的) as defined in the sphere of philosophy.⁵² They serve as a method and a way/channel (*fangfa he tujing* 方法和途径), in which the moral development of the pupil is defined. There are three levels (*shuiping* 水平) and six stages (*jieduan* 阶段) that can be summarised as follows:⁵³

1. Pre-Conventional level
 - a) Obedience and punishment orientation
 - b) Self-interest orientation
2. Conventional level
 - a) Interpersonal accord and conformity orientation
 - b) Authority and social-order maintaining orientation
3. Post-Conventional level of independence or having principals
 - a) Social contract orientation
 - b) Universal ethical principles orientation

On the first level children can differentiate established standards of a culture (*qufen wenhua zhong de guiju* 区分文化中的规矩) and distinguish “good or bad” (*haohuai* 好坏).⁵⁴ The ability to do so is produced by the child’s behaviour (*xingwei chansheng*

⁵²see *ibid.*: 2/0, see also section ‘Themes,’ p. 53.

⁵³In Chinese the single levels and stages are called:

1. *xisu qian de shuiping* 习俗前的水平
 - a) *yi chengfa he fucong wei dingxiang* 以惩罚和服从为定向
 - b) *yi bijiao xingwei de gongju zuoyong wei dingxiang* 以比较行为的工具作用为定向
2. *xisu de shuiping* 习俗的水平
 - a) *yi ren yu ren zhijiang de hexie yizhi (...) wei dingxiang* 以人与人之间的和谐一致 (...) 为定向
 - b) *yi weihu quanwei he shehui chengxu wei dingxiang* 以维护权威和社会秩序为定向
3. *xisu hou zizhu de huo you yuanze de shuiping* 习俗后自主的或有原则的水平
 - a) *yi putong de lunli yuanze wei dingxiang* 以普遍的伦理原则为定向
 - b) *yi fadeng de shehui qiyue wei dingxiang* 以法定的社会契约为定向

(*ibid.*: 2/2/1/2/1).

⁵⁴*Ibid.*: 2/2/1/2/1.

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de 行为产生的), morality is the result of the child interacting with its environment. On the second level the individual acts according to the needs of the family (*jiating* 家庭), a group (*jitian* 集团), or the state (*guojia* 国家), “no matter what the consequences might be” (*buguan houguo zenyang* 不管后果怎样).⁵⁵ On the third level, however, the child “strives to break away from the authority of the group and individuals when considering value” (*nuli baituo jitian he geren de quanwei lai kaolü jiazhi*),⁵⁶ choosing his/her own standard (*biaozhun* 标准).⁵⁷ At each level and stage the child is able to solve all kinds of moral issues (*jiejue gezhong daode wenti* 解决各种道德问题), according to a certain line of moral thinking, or moral reasoning (*daode siwei* 、 *daode tuili* 道德思维、道德推理).⁵⁸ The goal of moral education is to “progressively cultivate and increase the child’s ability to distinguish right and wrong and to come up with a morally proper decision and choice when confronted with moral problems.” (*zhubu peiyang 、 tigao ertong zai mianlin daode wenti shi mingbianshifei 、 zuochu zhengque de daode panduan he daode xuanze de nengli* 。)⁵⁹ Development is achieved when the pupil is confronted with problems that exceed its possibilities of moral thinking. Therefore, the teacher has to know which level a pupil is at and use thinking that accords with one level higher, to let the child grow from “contradictions and conflicts” (*maodun he chongtu* 矛盾和冲突).⁶⁰ The emphasis lies upon an orientation towards growing consciousness being inherent in the process,⁶¹ letting the superego have a more diverse conscience (*liangxin* 良心) and letting the ego “dream” (*ziwo lixiang* 自我理想).⁶² With this the goal of moral education to ‘harmonise’ the ID (*benwo* 本我), the ego (*ziwo* 自我), and the superego (*chaowo* 超我) is to be achieved.⁶³ A loss of balance (*sangshi pingheng* 丧失平衡) between those three entities of the individual will eventually lead to mental

⁵⁵Tang 2005: 2/2/1/2/1.

⁵⁶努力摆脱集团和个人的权威来考虑

⁵⁷Tang 2005: 2/2/1/2/1.

⁵⁸Ibid.: 2/2/1/2/2/1.

⁵⁹逐步培养、提高儿童在面临道德问题时明辨是非、作出正确的道德判断和道德选择的能力。
ibid.: 2/2/1/2/2/1.

⁶⁰Ibid.: 2/2/1/2/2/2.

⁶¹Interestingly enough the author does not use the word ‘stage’ for the process of becoming more conscious, but instead utilises the word ‘*guodu*’ (过渡) which rather means ‘intermediate stage,’ ‘transition,’ or ‘interim’ (ibid.: 2/2/1/1/3). With this he implies an upward motion, neglecting the possibility or desirability of remaining in a lower state of consciousness.

⁶²Ibid.: 2/2/1/1/2.

⁶³Ibid.: 2/2/1/1/1.

disorder (*jingshenbing* 精神病) and bring about immoral behaviour (*budaode de xingwei* 不道德的行为).⁶⁴

With this model of moral development the author sets a concrete plan for moral education. Also, the demands of moral education of the individual are defined by the given stages. It is an important concept in the course, laying the psychological foundation for the moral development of the child. Still, this model also introduces an individual whose development is not predetermined. We, therefore, have to take a closer look at the aspect of control. In the next section I will discuss how moral development is related to different spheres regarding the individual and society.

4.4.2 Controlling each and all

Daode is not only a school subject, more importantly it is a societal phenomenon. Consequently the course also touches upon other spheres than the pupil's life in school. It considers society and the individual's relation to it. The first part of this section is going to discuss how the author deals with this aspect in the course. Since moral education not only is the dissemination of knowledge but rather tries to 'work' within the subject, the second part of this section discusses how moral education differs from other school subjects in also accounting for the 'habits and movements' of pupils.

Population and institutions

Morality and society are mutually connected to one another. Moral development is seen as part of the socialisation process of persons (*ren shehuixing fazhan de yi bufen*).⁶⁵ At the same time socialisation (*shehuixing* 社会性) is defined as being part of "human development" (*ren zishen de fazhan* 人自身的发展).⁶⁶ This means that *daode* can be found throughout society and its institutions, these institutions at the same time influencing a child's moral development. There are three entities mentioned by the author, which are

- society,
- family,

⁶⁴Ibid.: 2/2/1/1/1.

⁶⁵人社会性发展的一部分 ibid.: 2/1/2

⁶⁶Ibid.: 2/1/2.

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- and school.

These realms are interdependent and connected to each other in the texts. Most importantly they are discussed in relevance to their role in moral education. The essence of moral education, however, is a “societal” one (*genbenshang shi shehui de* 根本上是社会的).⁶⁷ Therefore, “the whole life in and the practise of society need to be integrated” (*bixu yu zhengge shehui shenghuo he shehui shijian xiang lianxi*).⁶⁸ Regarding important aspects of life and societal practise, the author mentions influences on moral education including mass communication (*dazhongchuanmei* 大众传媒), which is seen as a form of social education (*shehuijiaoyu* 社会教育),⁶⁹ as well as organisations outside of school (*xiaowai she* 校外社), youth organisations (*tuanzuzhi* 团组织), educational organisations (*jiaoyu jigou* 教育机构), places for various activities⁷⁰ (*huodong changsuo* 活动场所), or tutors (*fudaoyuan* 辅导员).⁷¹ These different influences form the believe (*xinnian* 信念) of the pupil⁷² and are more or less unconscious (*wuyishi* 无意识).⁷³ As such they also influence the direction (*fangxiang* 方向) and speed (*sudu* 速度) of the moral development of a child.⁷⁴ Therefore the ‘hidden curriculum’ (*yinxingkecheng* 隐性课程) is an important part of moral education as it represents the three spheres of society, family and school.⁷⁵ As such it gives the opportunity to cultivate the believes of students (*xinnian de peiyang* 信念的培养).⁷⁶ Considering the hidden curriculum the campus becomes an important focal point of interaction between pupils and society. Relevant factors here are the school spirit (*xiaofeng* 校风), the school atmosphere⁷⁷ (*xuefeng* 学风), and even cultural tradition (*wenhua chuantong* 文化传统).⁷⁸

⁶⁷Tang 2005: 9/2/3/4.

⁶⁸必须与整个社会生活和社会实践相联系 *ibid.*: 9/2/3/4.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*: 9/1/2/4/4.

⁷⁰Examples here are ‘Children’s Palaces’ (*shaonian Gong* 少年宫), children’s parks (*ertongleyuan* 儿童乐园), parks (*gongyuan* 公园), zoos (*dongwuyuan* 动物园), museums (*bowuguan* 博物馆), art galleries (*meishuguan* 美术馆), or libraries (*tushuguan* 图书馆).

⁷¹Tang 2005: 8/3/3/1.

⁷²*Ibid.*: 9/3/2/1/1.

⁷³*Ibid.*: 9/3/2/1/2.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*: 8/2/1/1/1.

⁷⁵Family and school being represented by the head of household (*jiazhang* 家长) and teachers (*jiaoshi* 教师) (*ibid.*: 8/2/1/1/1).

⁷⁶*Ibid.*: 9/3/2/1/1.

⁷⁷This term can also be translated as ‘school traditions,’ or ‘school discipline.’

⁷⁸Tang 2005: 9/3/2/3/2.

Still, the family receives special attention with respect to the moral development of a child. The family has already been mentioned at the first level in the theory of Kohlberg (see section ‘Government through improvement,’ p. 56). The family is not seen as a mere influence, it has to be included into moral education as well. In chapter five of the course the author cites the former president of the USA Bush senior, saying that “[one] again needs to channel the cultivation of a moral value system and the participation of the family into a plan of education” (*bixu ba daode jiazhiguan de peiyang he jiating canyu chongxin naru jiaoyu jihua*).⁷⁹ In the discussion about moral education in Singapore the author emphasises, that family serves as the basis (*jiating wei gen* 家庭为根) in order to establish an “unanimity of value systems” (*jiazhiguan yizhi* 价值观一致).⁸⁰ Regarding the child the level of education⁸¹ of the family head (*jiazhang de shou jiaoyu shuiping* 家长的手教育水平) is considered to influence the moral development to a “high degree” (*zai hen da chengdu shang yingxiang zinu de pinde fazhan*).⁸² Still other aspects like the structure of the family (*jiating jiegou* 家庭结构), social relations (*shehuiguanxi* 社会关系), or the number of siblings (*zinu de duogua* 子女的多寡) are important aspects.⁸³ Therefore, the propagation of moral norms in the family’s life, namely familial ethics (*jiating shenghuo de daode guifan*),⁸⁴ is seen as an important aspect of traditional Chinese moral education.⁸⁵

Family is seen as a direct means of forming morality (*daode de zhijie xingcheng fangshi* 道德的直接形成方式), whereas school education is an indirect means (*jianjie xingcheng fangshi* 间接形成方式).⁸⁶ It is with the growth of the child, in receiving influences from school, peer groups and a broader social milieu (*jieshou xuexiao 、tongbei tuanti yiji geng dafanwei de shehuihuanjing de yingxiang*),⁸⁷ that the influence of the family gradually weakens (*zhujian jianruo* 逐渐减弱).⁸⁸ However important the role of the family might be in the development of the child, the author points out that the

⁷⁹ 必须把道德价值观的培养和家庭参与重新纳入教育计划 *ibid.*: 5/2/1/2.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*: 5/2/4/2/3.

⁸¹ In the same paragraph the author also considers the “level of culture” (*wenhua chengdu* 文化程度) as an important factor in this respect.

⁸² 在很大程度上影响子女的品德发展 Tang 2005: 8/3/3/1/1.

⁸³ *Ibid.*: 8/3/3/1.

⁸⁴ 家庭生活的道德规范、即家庭伦理

⁸⁵ Tang 2005: 4/1/3/3/2/2.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*: 1/3/4/2.

⁸⁷ 接受学校、同辈团体以及更大范围的社会环境的影响

⁸⁸ Tang 2005: 8/3/3/1.

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school serves as the *most* important instance of conduct regarding the moral development of children.⁸⁹ Other societal spheres merely are influences on the curriculum of moral education that have to be considered in its formulation.

Still, moral education is not reduced to school, but also is part of a plan of “life long learning” (*zhongshenhua* 终身化).⁹⁰ Life long learning is a “necessity” (*xuyao* 需要) of modern life, which produces “pressure to learn” (*xuexi de yali* 学习的压力).⁹¹ At the same time life long learning is connected to every single member of society: “The implementation of life long learning in moral education relies on all members of society, on the coordination of every single department of society, to form a desirable morality and an environment for good moral education.” (*zhongshen daode jiaoyu de shishi youlai yu quanti shehui chengyuan 、gege shehui bumen de peihe 、xingcheng lianghao de daode 、daode jiaoyu huanjing* 。)⁹² School is the prime location for the process of *teaching* moral education. The aim, however, is to establish a society that *supports* this education. Therefore, moral education concerns not only the pupils, but also any other member in society.

The education of the child is seen as something that relates to other spheres in society. Such influences are accounted for by considering them when formulating a curriculum of moral education. Still, the aim of moral education is to carry the content on beyond school education, making it a part of life in society. Hence, below I will consider how moral education tries to implement such a goal by considering the ‘reality’ and actual life of children.

Moves and habits

As morality is not seen as solely being defined as an outer force,⁹³ an important aspect of modern moral education is that it “serves people” (*weiren* 为人)⁹⁴ as opposed to

⁸⁹The role of school is emphasised when talking about moral education in Ruism (Tang 2005: 4/1/2/1), in the discussion about ‘Western’ moral education (ibid.: 4/2/3/1), as well as in the process of industrialisation (ibid.: 5/2/1/1); see also section ‘Nationalism.’ p. 87.

⁹⁰Ibid.: 6/5.

⁹¹Ibid.: 6/5/2.

⁹²终身道德教育的实施有赖于全体社会成员、各个社会部门的配合，形成良好的道德、道德教育环境。ibid.: 6/5/2.

⁹³See section ‘Government through improvement,’ p. 56.

⁹⁴Tang 2005: 6/3/2.

traditional approaches which are “impersonal” (*wuren* 无人).⁹⁵ Accordingly focus is laid upon the student(s) in moral education (*yi xuesheng wei ben* 以学生为本),⁹⁶ the student is the “starting point” (*chufadian* 出发点).⁹⁷ To meet the claim of opposing ‘authoritarian tradition,’ the teacher has to consider every single pupil as an individual.⁹⁸ The ‘outer character’⁹⁹ of traditional moral education derives from its disability to “start from the needs and development¹⁰⁰ of persons” (*cong ren de xuyao he ren de fazhan chufa*).¹⁰¹ Therefore it is essential to consider the needs and “interests” (*xingqu* 兴趣) of pupils.¹⁰² “Only by acting according to interests selfish and unselfish behaviour is produced as a result, only then possessing moral sense.” (*zhiyou dang genju xingqu qu xingdong chansheng le liji huo lita de xingwei jieguo , cai you le daode yiyi .*)¹⁰³

These interests and needs are influenced by many factors. Moral education tries to account for these factors, putting the student into relation to them. According to the role of society in moral education discussed above, the life of students is seen as an integrated “whole” (*zhengti* 整体).¹⁰⁴ At the same time morality is orientied towards the reality of children, it is “the activity of actual people” (*xianshi de ren de huodong* 现实的人的活动).¹⁰⁵ In the same manner education is “devoted to improve actual life” (*zhili yu ren xianshi shenghuo de gaijin*)¹⁰⁶ and “spur the development of people’s morality” (*cujin ren daode de fazhan* 促进人道德的发展).¹⁰⁷ This close relation to the moral conduct of pupils in their actual life has implications for the “method” (*fangfa* 方法) of moral education and distinguishes it from other educational processes (*jiaoyu guocheng* 教育过程).¹⁰⁸ Moral education “requests students to actively participate intellectually,

⁹⁵Ibid.: 6/3/1.

⁹⁶Ibid.: 6/3/3.

⁹⁷Ibid.: 1/3/1/3.

⁹⁸Ibid.: 6/1/3.

⁹⁹By this referring to the notion of traditional moral education as an ‘outer force,’ instilling knowledge but not considering the students as participating subjects.

¹⁰⁰By ‘development’ here also the ‘needs in pupil’s development’ is referred to, implying that ‘guidance’ is needed for pupils to advance to a higher stage of morality (Tang 2005: 6/3/1/3, see also section ‘Government through improvement’, p. 56).

¹⁰¹从人的需要和发展出发 ibid.: 6/1/1.

¹⁰²Ibid.: 9/2/3/3.

¹⁰³只有当根据兴趣去行动产生了利己或利他的行为结果，才有了道德意义。ibid.: 9/2/3/3.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.: 6/3/2/4.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.: 9/2/2/1.

¹⁰⁶致力于人现实生活的改进

¹⁰⁷Tang 2005: 9/2/2/1.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.: 7/4/3/2.

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and even more emphasises the acquiring and realisation of moral values through the students practise and perceptual activity” (*yaoqiu xuesheng jiji de lizhi canyu , erqie geng qiangdiao tongguo xuesheng de shijian 、 tongguo xuesheng de ganxing huodong lai huode he shixian daode jiazhi*).¹⁰⁹ This means that pupils of moral education not merely ‘receive knowledge,’ they have to actively participate and realise the content in their daily life. This way pupils can “earnestly reflect” (*renzhen sikao 认真思考*) on the topic and “voluntarily conduct themselves according to the demands¹¹⁰ of morality” (*zijueziyuan de anzhaodaode de yaoqiu qu xingwei*).¹¹¹

So called “activity courses” (*huodong kecheng 活动课程*) are advocated, which “are made up of students actively participating in every kind of emotional activity, serving the purpose of enhancing pupil’s ability of moral reasoning and practise” (*you xuesheng zhudong canyu de gezhong ganxing huodong zucheng de , zhizai zengjin xuesheng daode lizhi he shijian nengli*).¹¹² Activity courses are seen as “leading courses” (*zhudao kecheng 主导课程*), which “promote the development of people’s activities, and put effort into the improvement of people’s actual life, which is promoting the moral development of people” (*cujin ren de huodong de fazhan 、 zhili yu ren xianshi shenghuo de gaijin jiushi ren daode de fazhan*).¹¹³ The goal, therefore, is the development of every single pupil (*yi mei yi wei xuesheng de fazhan wei mudi*).¹¹⁴ This development touches upon many aspects of the student’s life. An important concept deriving from ‘traditional Chinese’ moral education is “knowledge, emotion, intention, and action” (*zhi 、 qing 、 yi 、 xing 知、情、意、行*), where moral education should be practised in all of these fields.¹¹⁵ An important realm to implement such concepts are the values and ideals of the student. The author emphasises that one purpose of moral education is to “encourage students to continuously put effort into realising their own ideals” (*jili xuesheng wei shixian*

¹⁰⁹ 要求学生积极的理智参与，而且更强调通过学生的实践、通过学生的感性活动来获得和实现道德价值 Tang 2005: 7/4/3/2.

¹¹⁰ The ‘demands of morality’ can be found in the ‘psychological need’ to morally develop onto a next stage in Kohlberg’s model.

¹¹¹ 自觉自愿的按照道德的要求去行为 Tang 2005: 6/1/3.

¹¹² 由学生主动参与的各种感性活动组成的，旨在增进学生道德理智和实践能力 *ibid.*: 9/2/1, see also section ‘Freedom of choice and agency,’ p. 68 and “Objectifying’ the subject: interaction and discipline,’ p. 72.

¹¹³ 促进人的活动的发展、致力于人现实生活的改进就是促进人道德的发展 *ibid.*: 9/2/2/1.

¹¹⁴ 以每一位学生的发展为目的 *ibid.*: 6/1/3.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*: 4/1/1/3/3/1.

ziji de lixiang buduan nuli).¹¹⁶ Children's beliefs and values become an important tool for the teacher. Although the author acknowledges that the children are self-determined and that "the only thing a teacher can do is to help students to realise and develop their own value system" (*jiaoshi weiyi ke zuo de jiushi bangzhu xuesheng faxian bing fazhan tamen ziji de jiazhiguan*),¹¹⁷ he does not state *where* ideals and values should stem from. Partly they have to be understood as deriving from various societal spheres. The author, however, emphasises the importance of school in the moral development of the students. Accordingly, in reference to William Frankena, moral education also should include the teaching of rules, principles and ideals (*jiaoshou guize 、yuanze he lixiang* 教授规则、原则和理想).¹¹⁸ Frankena as well advocated "eclecticism" (*zhezong zhuyi* 折衷主义), on the one hand arguing for the independence (*zizhu* 自主) of the individual, on the other emphasising the importance of the "regular moral order of society" (*shehui zhengchang de daode zhixu* 社会正常的道德秩序).¹¹⁹ In this respect values shall be "clarified" (*ji-azhi chengqing* 价值澄清), where "students should be allowed¹²⁰ to have clarification of their value system(s)" (*yinggai rang xuesheng dui ziji de jiazhiguan you qingchu de renshi*),¹²¹ and in order "solve disequilibriums" (*jiejue (...) bu pingheng* 解决 (...) 不平衡) in this field.¹²² Such a disequilibrium is associated with both the moral health of the individual and functioning on a societal level. A 'higher level' of morality is seen as contributing to the avoidance of such disequilibriums. The teacher is there to promote pupils to a higher level of morality, thus also deciding what is 'adequate' in this respect – the teacher serves as a leader (*lingdao* 领导者).¹²³

Thus, the reality of pupils becomes an important aspect of moral education. Morality is mediated through the individual itself and the pupil is reflected in its role to other societal realms. However, to work with the individual regarding to this, 'freedom' is an important notion. The next part is going to discuss how the author deals with this topic and what this means for moral education.

¹¹⁶ 激励学生为实现自己的理想不断努力 *ibid.*: 8/3/2/1/1.

¹¹⁷ 教师惟一可做的就是帮助学生发现并发展他们自己的价值观 *ibid.*: 9/1/3/2.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*: 5/1/2/3/1.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*: 5/1/2/3/1.

¹²⁰ The term '*rang*' (让) could also be translated here as 'be made.'

¹²¹ 应该让学生对自己的价值观有清楚的认识

¹²² Tang 2005: 11/1/1.

¹²³ *Ibid.*: 10/2/1/3/3.

4.4.3 Freedom of choice and agency

In the section ‘Government through improvement’ we have seen that there is an individual who does not solely rely on outer forces, but that contrariwise possesses the ability of active moral development. In the section ‘Controlling each and all’ we have discussed that morality, besides influences on a societal level, is bound to the moves and habits, the beliefs and values of the individual. Here I will discuss how the individual is installed as actually choosing the development suggested by the texts and that this development is aimed at *active individual actions*.

Choosing identity

The introduction of the subject as an agent in the course is put into effect by opposing modern interaction between teacher and pupil to ‘traditional’ forms of moral education. The texts emphasise that traditional moral education denies the creativity and autonomy of pupils. ‘Modern’ moral education, on the other hand, serves the purpose of supporting a self-determined individual. When writing about the sociology of Durkheim, the author emphasises, that Durkheim’s approach is rather “conservative” (*baoshoude* 保守的), since it “neglects the freedom and creativity of people” (*hushi le ren de ziyou he chuangzaoxing*).¹²⁴ Durkheim overrated the authority (*quanwei* 权威) of schools and teachers, “neglecting the own sovereignty and creative potential of pupils” (*hushi le xuesheng zishen de zizhu quanli he chuangzao nengli*).¹²⁵ Consequently the subject of ‘modern’ moral education is a ‘freed’ one, that is living up to its potentials. To guarantee this freedom it is important not to “force” (*qiangpo* 强迫) students, but to “provide them with a lot of opportunities and possibilities to decide” (*tigong duo de xuanze de jihui*、*kenengxing*),¹²⁶ to make them “real moral subjects” (*qieshi de daode zhuti* 确实的道德主体).¹²⁷ This consequently can also be applied to the character of modern moral education. ‘Traditional’ moral education was characterised by “instilling” (*guanshu* 灌输) knowledge into students.¹²⁸ In modern moral education it becomes more important to consider the free will (*ziyou yizhi* 自由意志), the active participation (*jiji canyu* 积

¹²⁴ 忽视了人的自由和创造性 Tang 2005: 3/2/3/1/2.

¹²⁵ 忽视了学生自身的自主权利和创造能力 *ibid.*: 3/2/3/2/2.

¹²⁶ 提供多的选择的机会、可能性

¹²⁷ Tang 2005: 6/2/2.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*: 6/1/1.

极参与), as well as the active practise (*zhudong shijian* 主动实践) of students.¹²⁹ To neglect these aspects will lead to problems for the teacher (*shi cheng wenti de* 是成问题的), is ineffective in the process (*shi wuxiao de* 是无效的) and might even be harmful (*shenzhi shi youhai de* 甚至是有害的).¹³⁰ In this respect the author puts forward the postulate that people do not solely “obey and adapt established customs and rules in a given society” (*fucong he shiying teding shehui suo renke de xisu he guize*),¹³¹ but also choose their way of action (*xuanze xingdong* 选择行动), when confronted with different principles and behaviour (*yuanze he xingwei* 原则和行为).¹³² Norms determining these decisions (*xuanze de biao zhun* 选择的标准) might exceed the system of values in a given society, hence this approach represents an “eclecticist way of moral education” (*zhezong zhuyi de daode jiaoyu luxian*).¹³³ In this respect the author on the one hand emphasises the stabilising character of collective value systems, on the other giving the individual the ability to choose to a certain degree.¹³⁴

The aim of moral education, however, is to install a subject that is able to advance morally, according to the theory of Kohlberg. This does not only imply the ability of acting, but also that the subject makes use of it. Below I will consider this aspect in more depth.

Realising the self

To become an active member of society, not only the implementation of an subject being able to choose, but also the actual performance of ‘agency’ by students is an important aspect in the course. According to the author giving pupils choice means that they are able to “cultivate independent individuality and creativity” (*peiyang duli gexing 、chuangzao nengli*),¹³⁵ which in order allows them to become “responsible citizens” (*fu zeren de gongmin* 负责任的公民).¹³⁶ In this respect “morality is the result of the subject’s [own] creation” (*daode (...) shi zhuti chuangzao de jieguo*).¹³⁷ The indi-

¹²⁹Ibid.: 10/2/2/1.

¹³⁰Ibid.: 10/2/2/1.

¹³¹服从和适应特定社会所认可的习俗和规则

¹³²Tang 2005: 1/2/2/1/2.

¹³³折衷主义的道德教育路线

¹³⁴Tang 2005: 1/2/2/1/2.

¹³⁵培养独立个性、创新能力

¹³⁶Tang 2005: 6/2/2.

¹³⁷道德(...) 是主体创造的结果。ibid.: 7/4/3/1.

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viduality and creativity, however, has to be something that students *do*, something they perform.¹³⁸ A prerequisite to ‘perform’ morality is the individual’s capability for moral judgement. To take the student as a basis of education (*yi xuesheng wei ben* 以学生为本), therefore, means that education has to foster (*peiyang* 培养) the student’s ability to judge¹³⁹ morally (*daode de pipan* 道德批判) and their ability to choose (*xuanze nengli* 选择能力).¹⁴⁰ The author continues to say that these two abilities enable¹⁴¹ students to better understand (*renshi* 认识), experience¹⁴² (*tiyan* 体验), and practise (*shijian* 实践) a “moral life on their own responsibility” (*daode shenghuo wei yiren* 道德生活为己任).¹⁴³ Especially the aspect of practise is of particular concern to the author. When it comes to the implementation of moral education, the capability of students to “practise *daode*” (*daode shijian nengli* 道德实践能力) is seen as a major goal of moral education.¹⁴⁴ The aspect of agency can even be found in the very definition of development (see p. 57): to become ‘*zijue*’ (自觉) here not only can be translated as ‘conscious,’ but also can mean ‘on one’s own initiative.’ This accords with the picture of a “student having received education in morality” (*yi ge zai daode shang shouguo jiaoyu de ren*)¹⁴⁵ by Dewey given in chapter one of the course. In this concept the actual realisation of morality in student’s life is advocated. It says that “a person of morality should form particular styles of habits and should display [morality] in daily life” (*you daode de ren ying xingcheng yiding de xiguan fangshi bing tongguo richang shenghuo biao xian chulai*).¹⁴⁶ This is closely related to what has been discussed in the section ‘Controlling each and all,’ touching upon aspects of student’s life and making them acting agents. “Moral education in school has its roots in society, [it] must be linked with the whole social life and social practise. To achieve this, it is very important to encourage children to actively participate in social practise.” (*xuexiao daode jiaoyu genbenshang shi shehui de , bixu*

¹³⁸“Performance” (*juese banyan* 角色扮演) actually is a method of teaching advocated by the course (see section “Objectifying the subject: interaction and discipline,” p. 72).

¹³⁹The term ‘*pipan*’ (批判) actually means ‘to criticise.’ However, I find the term ‘judge’ a better and at the same time an adequate translation here, since the ability to criticise can be seen as an prerequisite for judgement.

¹⁴⁰Tang 2005: 6/1/3.

¹⁴¹The author uses the term ‘*shi*’ (使), which in this context is ambivalent. It could also be translated as ‘make/have somebody do something.’

¹⁴²More specifically ‘*tiyan*’ (体验) is translated as ‘learning through practise/experience.’

¹⁴³Tang 2005: 6/1/3.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*: 9/2/1/2.

¹⁴⁵一个在道德上受过教育的人

¹⁴⁶有道德的人应形成一定的习惯方式并通过日常生活表现出来 Tang 2005: 1/3/1/1/1.

yu zhengge shehui shenghuo he shehui shijian xiang lianxi 。 er yao zuodao zhe yi dian , feichang zhongyao de shi yao guli ertong jiji canyu shehui shijian 。).¹⁴⁷ In regard to goals of moral education the author even states that the “implementing or realising of morality” (*daode de caozuo huo shixian* 道德操作或实现) is more fundamental than the “acquiring of morality” (*daode de huode* 道德的获得).¹⁴⁸ In chapter seven the author emphasises, that

the essence of making the practise of a moral life the goal of moral education, means to make moral development and therefore the process of education into an active [one], into a process of practise and dynamic; [it] means to make moral development into a part of student’s own life, letting them be able to bear their own moral responsibility[.](*ba shijian daode shenghuo zuowei daode jiaoyu de mudi qi shizhi zaiyu ba daode de fazhan yiner ba daode jiaoyu de guocheng zhuanbian wei yi ge zhudong de 、 shijian de 、 liudong de guocheng ; zaiyu ba daode de fazhan biancheng xuesheng zishen shenghuo de yi bufen , shi qi geng hao de fuqi ziji de daode zeren*)¹⁴⁹

Thus, the author not only advocates an independent individual that has the ability to judge and choose morally, but that at the same time takes advantage of such abilities. This on the one hand is related to ‘performance.’ On the other hand, the active implementation of moral education is bound to the social life of students. In this respect the quotation above provides an important keyword: ‘responsibility’ or ‘duty’ (*zeren* 责任). This word will be important for the analyses and be discussed in more depth in the section ‘Responsibilisation’. Still, first, we have to take a look at how the active individual is embedded in social interaction with others. From this discussion below we can discuss the concept of ‘duty,’ putting the subject into a certain relation to overall society.

¹⁴⁷ 学校道德教育根本上是社会的，必须与整个社会生活和社会实践相联系。而要做到这一点，非常重要是要鼓励儿童积极参与社会实践。ibid.: 9/2/3/4.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.: 9/2/2/3/1.

¹⁴⁹ 把实践道德生活作为道德教育的目的其实质在于把道德的发展因而把道德教育的过程转变为一个主动的、实践的、流动的过程；在于把道德的发展变成学生自身生活的一部分，使其更好的负起自己的道德责任ibid.: 7/4/3/2.

4.4.4 ‘Objectifying’ the subject: interaction and discipline

In the section ‘Government through improvement’ I have discussed that the nature of the morality of a subject is defined by its interaction with its environment, more importantly its interacting with other people. Here I am going to discuss this aspect in more depth, asking *how* the subject in the course is related to other people in the process of socialisation. In a further step I will speak about the use of the concept ‘discipline’ in the course. Together, I argue, these two aspects form a way of restricting the subject and its ‘freedom.’

Interacting subject(s)

First, let us consider the theoretical framework that is used in the texts regarding the moral interaction of the individual with others. In reference to Albert Bandura the interaction with outward influences is seen as a constraint to the consolidation of the ego (*ziwo qianghua de zhiyue* 自我强化的制约).¹⁵⁰ This consolidation serves as a form of harmonisation (*tiaojie* 调节) and internalises a normative basis from exterior awarding and punishing (*wai zai de jiang cheng yuanze neihua wei ziji de pingjia biao zhun*).¹⁵¹ In reference to Dewey, a “person having received moral education” (*zai daode shang shouguo jiaoyu de ren*)¹⁵² is part of a certain society and social group (*shehuituanti* 社会团体).¹⁵³ On the basis of influences deriving from this environment, the consciousness controls and adjusts one’s own behaviour (*zijue kongzhi he tiaojie ziji de xingwei*).¹⁵⁴ This normative basis evidently is shaped by experience and differs from person to person. Hence, the confrontation with ‘others’ becomes a challenge to one’s own norms. The author follows this argument and considers the aspect of harmonisation in the interaction with others. He emphasises that any moral character (*renhe daode pinxing* 任何道德品性) derives from the “occurrence of suitable relations in the unification of people’s work and thoughts with others” (*renmen zai gongzuo he sixiang de tongyi zhong*

¹⁵⁰Tang 2005: 2/2/1/3/1.

¹⁵¹外在的奖惩原则内化为自己的评价标准 *ibid.*: 2/2/1/3/1.

¹⁵²在道德上受过教育的人

¹⁵³Tang 2005: 1/3/1/1/3.

¹⁵⁴自觉控制和调节自己的行为 *ibid.*: 2/2/1/3/1.

gen bie ren fasheng shidang de guanxi),¹⁵⁵ only then harmonising¹⁵⁶ their own behaviour (*tiaojie ziji de xingwei* 调节自己的行为).¹⁵⁷

One place that can serve as a medium (*zhongjie* 中介) for such a ‘harmonisation’ in school is the “campus culture” (*xiaoyuan wenhua* 校园文化).¹⁵⁸ This place serves the purpose of educating¹⁵⁹ people (*taoye ren* 陶冶人) about conceptions of values (*jiazhi guannian* 价值观念) and interpersonal relationships (*renji guanxi* 人际关系).¹⁶⁰ At the same time it shall provide a graceful (*youmei* 优美), tidy (*zhengjie* 整洁), and orderly (*youxu* 有序) environment.¹⁶¹ This way students learn to approve (*rentong* 认同) with an established culture (*jiding wenhua* 既定文化) in the spheres of thoughts (*sixiang* 思想), behaviour (*xingwei* 行为), and values (*jiazhi* 价值). The ‘medium of the campus’ serves the purpose of balancing¹⁶² people’s relation to one another and to society (*tiaozheng ren yu ren* 、*ren yu shehui de guanxi*)¹⁶³ – integration¹⁶⁴ into society (*shixian shehui zhenghe* 实现社会整合) is realised.¹⁶⁵ Harmony not only is something that is established within the individual, it also is a factor in the interaction with others.

A method to teach the ability of ‘integration’ in the classroom is to use role-playing (*juese banyan* 角色扮演). Here students shall experience different roles in society (*shehui juese* 社会角色) and become a “sense of practise” (*shiji de ganshou* 实际地感受).¹⁶⁶ Awareness of others and the ability of the self for sentiment is to be fostered (*peiyang renmen* “*yishi dao taren he ziwo ganqing de nengli*”).¹⁶⁷ In particular this “awareness” consists of the quality and behaviour (*pinzhi he xingwei* 品质和行为) of understanding (*lijie* 理解), empathy (*tiliang* 体谅), and care (*guanxin* 关心), which helps the subject to analyse its own behaviour (*fenxi ziji de xingwei* 分析自己的行为), to differentiate between roots and results of behaviour (*jianbie xingwei de yuanyin he jieguo*).¹⁶⁸ In

¹⁵⁵ 人们在工作 and 思想的统一中跟别人发生适当的关系

¹⁵⁶ Or ‘adjusting.’

¹⁵⁷ Tang 2005: 2/3/1.

¹⁵⁸ *ibid.*: 9/3/2/3/2, see also section ‘Controlling each and all,’ (p. 61).

¹⁵⁹ The term ‘*taoye*’ (陶冶) literally means ‘to fire pots and smelt metal.’

¹⁶⁰ Tang 2005: 9/3/2/3/2.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*: 9/3/2/3/2.

¹⁶² Another possible translation of the word ‘*tiaozheng*’ (调整) would be ‘to adjust,’ or ‘to regulate.’

¹⁶³ 调整人与人、人与社会的关系 Tang 2005: 9/3/2/3/2.

¹⁶⁴ The word ‘*zhenghe*’ (整合) also meaning ‘conformity.’

¹⁶⁵ Tang 2005: 9/3/2/3/2.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*: 8/2/2.

¹⁶⁷ 培养人们“意识到他人和自我感情的能力” *ibid.*: 8/2/2.

¹⁶⁸ 鉴别行为的原因和结果 *ibid.*: 8/2/2.

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the process of putting oneself in the position of others, pupils acquire the ability of interaction and reflecting their own behaviour. Another method to achieve this objective is to use “moral dilemmas” (*daode liangnan* 道德两难). This approach was put forward by Dewey and is regarded by the author as the “ideal training of morality” (*lixiang de daode xunlian* 理想的道德训练).¹⁶⁹ Those dilemmas put the students in a position where there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ forcing them to think about a situation in a more sophisticated way. This way the moral growth of the children shall be enforced and they reach a ‘higher level’ of moral thinking.¹⁷⁰ This method is also mentioned in relation to the “collision of different viewpoints” (*butong guandian de pengzhuang* 不同观点的碰撞), where the pupils are able to “confirm their more mature moral thinking” (*queren geng chengshu de daode sixiang*).¹⁷¹ Their ability and willingness to grow from encountered contradiction is perceived as something desirable by the author. As the following passage shows, the goal is to solve those arising problems:¹⁷² “In the process of people adapting to their environment, they will encounter various kinds of problems of moral nature. The function of people and their environment precisely lies in the effort of seeking ways and methods of solving [these] problems.” (*ren zai shiying huanjing de guocheng zhong , hui yudao ge zhong baokuo daode zainei de yinan wenti , ren yu huanjing de zuoyong jiu zaiyu nuli xunzhao jie jue wenti de tujing he fangfa .*)¹⁷³ The author here not only emphasises the problematic nature of moral interaction, but he also ascribes the competency of solving such problems to the subject. Moral education in this respect is the *key*, that enables the subject to think of a ‘way out.’ In a sense the subject has to consider a problematic situation in a creative manner, in order to come up with a ‘third way.’¹⁷⁴

The author accordingly sees the association between children (*ertong zhijian de jiaowang* 儿童之间的交往) as the only means to “spur the development of self-understanding and self-evaluation in children” (*cujin ertong ziwo renshi he ziwo pingjia de fazhan*).¹⁷⁵ An important premise (*qianti* 前提) is that the subject “steps outside itself” (*zouchu zishen*

¹⁶⁹Tang 2005: 1/3/2.

¹⁷⁰See also section ‘Government through improvement,’ p. 56.

¹⁷¹确认更成熟的道德思想 Tang 2005: 2/4/2.

¹⁷²Ibid.: 1/1/3/2.

¹⁷³人在适应环境的过程中，会遇到各种包括道德在内的疑难问题，人与环境的作用就在于努力寻找解决问题的途径和方法。

¹⁷⁴See also section ‘Freedom of choice and agency,’ p. 68.

¹⁷⁵促进儿童自我认识 and 自我评价的发展 Tang 2005: 9/2/2/3/2.

走出自身), that “[it] becomes understanding of opposing objects” (*yu zhuti “duili” de keti lai jiayi renshi*).¹⁷⁶ Here morality becomes something that bears societal character within the individual. Precisely the superego represents morality of society (*shehui daode de daibiao* 社会道德的代表), it therefore is the “most cultivated part of the character” (*renge de (...) zui wenming de bufen* 人格的 (...) 最文明的部分).¹⁷⁷ For this ‘cultivation’ of the self, one needs to have discipline. The implementation of this discipline is topic to the discussion below.

Discipline

We have seen in psychoanalysis that the process of moral development, of moral cultivation is one of bodily restraints to mental restraints.¹⁷⁸ Thus, discipline becomes an important aspect of moral education. It is also considered when talking about the usefulness of ‘Chinese heritage.’ According to the author an important characteristic of Chinese Ruist scholars is the idea to use “inwards oriented force” to cultivate oneself (*xiuyanglun xiangnei yongli* 修养论向内用力) and to be persistent (*yiguan* 一贯).¹⁷⁹ In particular the author presents citations from four scholars,¹⁸⁰ namely Confucius,¹⁸¹ Mencius,¹⁸² Zhu Xi,¹⁸³ and Lu Jiuyuan.¹⁸⁴ Without discussing those citations in detail, the common theme can be found in the reflection of oneself with regard to self-cultivation as mentioned above. In a later paragraph of the same lecture, being subordinated to the section ‘*jicheng shenme*’ (继承什么, ‘What to carry forward’), the author repeats the need for the “skill of training to pay attention to self-examination, and to restraint oneself” (*zhuzhong zixing 、zi ke de xiuyang gongfu*).¹⁸⁵ This can be accomplished by three steps/procedures (*buzhou* 步骤):

1. to be ascetic/to have few desires (*guayu* 寡欲);
2. to foster moral character (*yangqi* 养气); and

¹⁷⁶与主体“对立”的客体来加以认识 *ibid.*: 9/2/2/3/2.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*: 2/2/1/1/1.

¹⁷⁸See section ‘Government through improvement,’ p. 56

¹⁷⁹Tang 2005: 4/1/2/3.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*: 4/1/2/3.

¹⁸¹*keji nei sheng , gaiguo qian shan* 克己内省，改过迁善

¹⁸²*chi zhi yang qi , fanqiuzhuji* 持志养气，反求诸己

¹⁸³*cun yang xingcha* 存养省察

¹⁸⁴*qie ji zi fan , dao bu wai suo* 切己自反，道不外索

¹⁸⁵注重自省、自克的修养工夫 Tang 2005: 4/1/3/3/3/2.

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3. to examine oneself/to introspect, namely to “seek cause in oneself, not somebody else”¹⁸⁶ (“zifan” ji “fanqiuzhuji” “自反”即“反求诸己”).¹⁸⁷

To “preserve discipline” (*shou jilü* 守纪律) becomes an important quality amongst others in moral education.¹⁸⁸ When looking at the other qualities mentioned,¹⁸⁹ it becomes clear that this discipline is seen as related to the overall improvement of the individual as discussed in the section ‘Government through improvement’ (p. 56).

Still, discipline is not only perceived as a matter of individual behaviour, it also is discussed what discipline means in relation to society. In reference to Durkheim, morality as a societal phenomenon (*xianxiang* 现象) bears three essential factors:¹⁹⁰

1. the spirit of discipline (*jilü jingshen* 纪律精神),
2. the spirit to sacrifice oneself (*xisheng jingshen* 牺牲精神), and
3. the spirit of self-discipline (*zilü jingshen* 自律精神).¹⁹¹

According to Durkheim, by means of discipline societal demands are passed onto the children (*tongguo jilü ba shehui de yaoqiu chuanshu gei ertong*).¹⁹² Although the author criticises Durkheim for neglecting the autonomy and creative potential of pupils, he states that “the essence of moral education is to pass on moral achievements or real, rational, and reasonable moral values of predecessors to the current generation growing up and receiving education.” (*Daode jiaoyu de benzhi shi yao ba qianren de daode chuanguo huo xianshi de 、heli de 、zhengdang de daode jiazhi chuanshou gei zhengzai jieshou jiaoyu 、zhengzai chengzhang de yi dai 。*).¹⁹³ Hence, society as an entity *does* play a role in moral education, making demands to the pupils of moral education (I will

¹⁸⁶The idiom ‘*fanqiuzhuji*’ (反求诸己) refers to the citation of Mencius mentioned above.

¹⁸⁷Tang 2005: 4/1/3/3/2.

¹⁸⁸Ibid.: 8/2/2/1.

¹⁸⁹Besides ‘discipline,’ other important qualities here are sincerity (*zhencheng* 真诚), honesty (*chengshi* 诚实), courage (*yonggan* 勇敢), ‘kind-heartedness’ (*shanliang* 善良), tolerance (*rongren* 容忍), self-respect (*zizun* 自尊), and the improvement of the ego (*ziwo wanshan* 自我完善) (see *ibid.*: 8/2/2/1).

¹⁹⁰Ibid.: 3/2/1.

¹⁹¹These are the translations of the Chinese terms used by the author. Bakken (2000: 87) on the other hand uses the three terms as: discipline, attachment to the group, and autonomy.

¹⁹²通过纪律把社会的要求传输给儿童 Tang 2005: 3/2/3/2/1.

¹⁹³道德教育的本质是要把前人的道德创获或现实的、合理的、正当的道德价值传授给正在接受教育、正在成长的一代。 *ibid.*: 10/2/2/2.

talk about the meaning of ‘society’ in the next part). In this respect there are ‘societal qualities’ that are demanded to be fulfilled by the individual. According to the author those include cooperation (*hezuo* 合作), civil rights and duty (*gongmin quanli he yiwu* 公民权利和义务), a ‘spirit for communality’ (*gonggong jingshen* 公共精神), benevolence (*cishan* 慈善), respect for others (*zunzhong taren* 尊重他人), ‘fairness in society’ (*shehui gongzheng* 社会公正), dignity (*zunyan* 尊严), and work (*laodong* 劳动).¹⁹⁴ These values are introduced to make the individual responsible to society and others. The next part will discuss this aspect in further depth.

4.4.5 ‘Responsibilisation’

In the foregoing sections I have described the implementation of a moral individual that is restricted by the interaction with other people. Still, not only ‘inter-human association’ is an important part of the process of socialisation of the individual, also its relation to society as a whole is of concern in the texts. In the first part of this section I will talk about how different spheres of the individual and society are dealt with in the course, and show *how* society as an entity is constructed. In the second part I will talk about how the individual is actually related to this entity, taking a closer look at the concept of ‘citizenship and duty.’

The individual and society

So far in the analysis we have seen an independent individual that is concerned with its own morality and in relation to other people. An important question here is if there can be found a societal entity that qualitatively differs from the social interaction described so far.

The author writes that “leaving society, leaving the interaction between people [one] just cannot speak about the production of morality” (*likai le shehui 、likai le ren yu ren zhijian de hudong , jiu tanbushang daode de chansheng*).¹⁹⁵ More precisely “moral development originates from social interaction in a social environment” (*daode fazhan yuanzi shehui qingjing zhong de shehuixing xianghu zuoyong*).¹⁹⁶ Morality in this respect achieves a regulating role, ‘harmonising’ the interaction between different social

¹⁹⁴Ibid.: 8/2/1/1.

¹⁹⁵离开了社会、离开了人与人之间的互动，就谈不上道德的产生 ibid.: 3/0

¹⁹⁶道德发展源自社会情境中的社会性相互作用 ibid.: 6/4/1.

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actors. Still, society as an entity is considered as well in the texts. In chapter four the author states: “Morality is the sum of rules of conduct, that are to regulate the relation between the individual and others, and between the individual and society.” (*daode shi tiaozheng geren yu taren 、geren yu shehui zhijian guanxi de xingwei guize de zonghe* 。)¹⁹⁷ The term ‘to regulate’ (*tiaozheng* 调整) used here, which can also be translated as ‘to adjust,’ or ‘to balance,’ is important when speaking about ‘society.’ Society is defined by a certain functioning, which can be analysed by sociology. The role of moral education in this respect is to fulfil a role according to the constitution of a given society. With reference to Durkheim morality is perceived as a social phenomenon or social “fact” (*shehuixianxiang 、shehui shishi* 社会现象、社会事实).¹⁹⁸ As such the role of a sociology of morality is to “describe and analyse (...) [its] uniqueness and production according to mechanisms and laws of development” (*miaoshu he fenxi (...) dutexing 、chansheng yu fazhan de jizhi he guilü*)¹⁹⁹ This ultimately serves the purpose of continuing development in society (*chixu fazhan de yiyi* 持续发展的意义).²⁰⁰ It also serves the purpose of bringing order to society, which is seen as a prerequisite to development. The notion of ‘society’ here is a rather broad one. Regarding important content of moral education not only patriotism (*aiguo zhuyi* 爱国主义), and awareness of the nation (*guojia yishi* 国家意识) are mentioned, but also international understanding (*guoji lijie* 国际理解), as well as the “idea of a unified human race” (*renlei jie xiongdi de sixiang* 人类皆兄弟的思想) and the idea of the “mutual dependence among states” (*guojia zhijian xianghu cunzai de sixiang*).²⁰¹ Therefore, a sociology of moral education is based on the research of “actual societal formations on different levels²⁰² and of different kind to observe the interaction [of morality] with other societal phenomena, to observe its essence, changing mechanisms, as well as the meaning of its existence.” (*zai shishizaizai de butong cengci 、butong zhonglei de shehui goucheng zhong qu kaocha ta yu qita shehuixianxiang de hudong 、kaocha qi shizhi 、bianhua de jili yiji cunzai de yiyi*).²⁰³ Moral education, therefore, serves the purpose of “improving the atmosphere

¹⁹⁷ 道德是调整个人与他人、个人与社会之间关系的行为规则的总和。Tang 2005: 4/1/3/2.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.: 3/1.

¹⁹⁹ 描述和分析 (...) 独特性、产生于发展的机制和规律 ibid.: 3/1.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.: 3/1.

²⁰¹ 国家之间相互依存的思想 ibid.: 8/2/2/1/3.

²⁰² The term ‘cengci’ (层次) also means ‘stage,’ or ‘phase,’ as well referring to ‘administrative level.’

²⁰³ 在实实在在的不同层次、不同种类的社会构成中去考察它与其他社会现象的互动，考察其实质、变化的机理以及存在的意义 Tang 2005: 3/1.

of society, reconstructing the moral face of Chinese, and thereby promoting economic development” (*gailiang shehui fengqi , chongsu zhongguoren de daode mianmao , conger cujin jingji fazhan*).²⁰⁴ This phrase shows how moral education is perceived as being connected to society and its overall development on the one hand, and every single citizen on the other. To do so, moral education can be understood to build a ‘bridge to the past’ of a country. One important intrinsic quality (*benzhi* 本质) moral education is composed of is the need to pass on (*chuanshou* 传授) what predecessors (*qianren* 前人) have achieved or realised (*chuanghuo huo xianshi de* 创获或现实的), what is “rational” (*heli de* 合理的), and proper moral values (*zhengdang de daode jiazhi* 正当的道德价值).²⁰⁵ But it is not only ‘wisdom’ that is passed on, in reference to Durkheim also the transmission of societal demands (*ba shehui de yaoqiu chuanshu* 把社会的要求传输) is a function of morality.²⁰⁶ These demands differ from societal formation to societal formation. However, Chinese society is characterised by the “establishing and progressively perfection of a market society and along with economic globalisation the arising of the information era and a diversification of societal value systems” (*shichangjingji tizhi de quelu he zhubu wanshan yiji suizhe jingji quanqiuhua er chuxian de xinxihua yiji shehui jiazhiguan de duoyuanhua*).²⁰⁷ Market economy at the same time is an attribute of modern societies.²⁰⁸ It is perceived as a given factor that contributes to the overall development of China, as well as to the development of Chinese citizens.

Another marker of this ‘modern society’ is pluralism of value systems (*jiazhiguan duoyuanhua* 价值观多元化).²⁰⁹ Along with pluralism, there is conflict (*chongtu* 冲突) and contradiction (*maodun* 矛盾).²¹⁰ In their life in society children receive “somehow proper values” (*mouzhong “zhengque de” jiazhi de jiaoyu*)²¹¹ to deal with this arising contradictions. These influences, however, are regarded as “not being able to competently carrying out the duty value education has to fulfil” (*bu neng shengren dui ertong jinxing jiazhi jiaoyu de renwu*).²¹² The teacher in this respect serves as a “leader” (*ling-*

²⁰⁴ 改良社会风气，重塑中国人的道德面貌，从而促进经济发展 *ibid.*: 4/1/3/1.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*: 10/2/1/2.

²⁰⁶ *ibid.*: 3/2/3/2/1, see also section “‘Objectifying’ the subject: interaction and discipline,” p. 72.

²⁰⁷ 市场经济体制的确立和逐步完善以及随着经济全球化而出现的信息化以及社会价值观的多元化 *ibid.*: 6/2/1.

²⁰⁸ see *ibid.*: 6/1/1.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*: 11/1/1.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*: 11/1/1.

²¹¹ 某种“正确的”价值的教育 *ibid.*: 11/1/1.

²¹² 不能胜任对儿童进行价值教育的任务 *ibid.*: 11/1/1.

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daozhe 领导者),²¹³ guiding the pupils in this contradictory environment. He also serves as a “spokesperson of society” (*shehui daiyanren* 社会代言人),²¹⁴ representing social status and social function (*shehui diwei he zuoyong* 社会地位和作用).²¹⁵ In this role “the duty of the teacher precisely is to teach pupils certain rational and reasonable notions of values” (*jiaoshi de zeren jiu zaiyu ba mouxie heli de 、zhengdang de jiazhi guannian chuanshou gei xuesheng*).²¹⁶ If the teacher does not fulfil this role it leads to “release of duty” (*fangren* 放任) and anarchism (*wuzhengfuzhuyi* 无政府主义).²¹⁷

We can summarise that the ‘entity of society’ is composed of a certain developmental character that is producing certain needs that have to be passed on to the individual. Those needs can be seen as responding to certain ‘dangers of development.’ Extreme individualism is perceived as a problem emerging in Western countries.²¹⁸ One aim of moral education, therefore, is to harmonise individual values and societal values. In the process of change, society watches the individual, slowing down the process and making it ‘controllable.’ One aspect of modernisation can be found in the growth of technology in society, that bears both potential for ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ “Science and technology merely represent a double-edged blade. What economic development brings about also not necessarily all is good. Leaving the pursue of good and moral restrictions, developed science and technology and productive forces at once will foster the “bad” aspects of human nature; eventually bringing about the destruction of humanity.” (*kexuejishu zhishi shuangrenjian , jingji fazhan dailai de ye weibi dou shi haoshi , likai le dui shan de zhuiqiu he daode yueshu , fada de keji yu shengchanli jiu hui zhuzhang renxing zhong “e” de fangmian , zuizhong youkeneng zaocheng renlei de huimie .*)²¹⁹ Hence, one important function (*zuoyong* 作用) of moral education is to “keep order in society” (*weichi shehui zhixu* 维持社会秩序), which serves the purpose of coordination²²⁰ (*xietiao* 协调), stabilisation (*wending* 稳定), and letting society “work normally” (*yunzhuan zhengchang* 运转正常).²²¹ Still another function of moral education is to me-

²¹³Tang 2005: 10/2/1/3/3, see also section ‘Controlling each and all,’ p. 61.

²¹⁴Ibid.: 10/2/2/2.

²¹⁵Ibid.: 10/2/1/3.

²¹⁶教师的责任就在于把某些合理的、正当的价值观念传授给学生 ibid.: 10/2/1/2.

²¹⁷Ibid.: 10/2/1/2.

²¹⁸Ibid.: 1/3/2/4.

²¹⁹科学技术只是双刃剑，经济发展带来的也未必都是好事，离开了对善的追求和道德约束，发达的科技与生产力就会助长人性中“恶”的方面，最终有可能造成人类的毁灭。ibid.: 6/5/1/1.

²²⁰The term ‘*xietiao*’ (协调) might also be translated as ‘to harmonise.’

²²¹(Tang 2005: 3/2/1), see also ibid.: 5/2/1.

diate between persons with different beliefs²²² that might have the potential for conflict in this new environment. To guarantee this ‘mediation’ and guarantee a harmonised development, the author advocates the concept of citizenship, which will be discussed below.

Making the subject responsible: the importance of duty

To install a subject that becomes a ‘harmonising’ and ‘stabilising’ element of society, the concept of ‘citizenship’ or ‘civil rights’ (*gongminquan* 公民权) is advocated. “A person having received moral education is part of a particular society and group, and takes form by means of [this] society. Therefore, he[/she] should possess social responsibility and social skills.” (*zai daode shang shouguo jiaoyu de ren , shi yiding shehui he shehui tuanti de yi bufen , erqie shi tongguo shehui xingcheng de 。 yiner , ta ying juyou shehui zeren he shehui jineng 。*).²²³ Such responsibility and social skills can be found in the concept of ‘the citizen.’ In the foregoing part I have already mentioned the importance of patriotism and ‘awareness of the nation.’ Still, other important topics mentioned regarding citizens include “loyalty to leaders or emperors” (*zhongyu lingxiu huo huangdi* 忠于领袖或皇帝) and peaceful citizens (*heping de gongmin* 和平的公民).²²⁴ This loyalty to leaders and peace between citizens is based on the idea of “fairness in society” (*gongzheng shehui* 公正社会), as well as “rights and duties of citizens” (*gongmin quanli he yiwu* 公民权利和义务).²²⁵ The individual has to act ‘responsible’ in accordance to the established order. “The goal of moral education is to foster the individual to become capable of consciously carrying out duty to society, to [become a] person consciously acting according to the rules/norms of society[.]” (*Daode jiaoyu de mudi jiu shi yao ba geti peiyang chengwei nenggou zijue de luxing shehui zhize 、 zijue de anzhaoshehui guifan qu xingdong de ren*)²²⁶ In the concept of citizenship the social interaction of people is regulated according to established norms and rules. Though the individual in principal is free in making decisions, it can be made responsible according

²²² See also section ‘Objectifying’ the subject: interaction and discipline,’ p. 72.

²²³ 在道德上受过教育的人，是一定社会和社会团体的一部分，而且是通过社会形成的。因而，他应具有社会责任和社会技能。Tang 2005: 1/3/1/1/3.

²²⁴ Ibid.: 8/2/2/1/3.

²²⁵ Ibid.: 8/2/2/1/1

²²⁶ 道德教育的目的就是要将个体培养成为能够自觉地履行社会职责、自觉地按照社会规范去行动的人 Ibid.: 3/2/2/1.

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to established standards.²²⁷ Moral education serves as an institution giving the individual the *skill* to fulfil this responsibility. In this way a harmonised and stable society and development can be achieved that serves the benefit of all.

²²⁷Tang 2005: 1/3/2/4.

5 Interpretation and discussion

This chapter aims at discussing the findings of the analysis within the given context. For this purpose I will look at the texts out of the three perspectives of ‘individualism,’ ‘nationalism,’ and ‘tradition.’

5.1 Individualism

Individualism is an important topic in the texts and most importantly is related to the societal situation in contemporary China. At the same time it represents an instance of development both on the level of the individual and society. In this section I am going to discuss what individualism means with respect to the development of society in contemporary China and its role in an emerging ‘modernity.’

5.1.1 Development of society and the self

The individual in the texts basically is defined as a ‘developing’ entity. This development, however, is closely bound to society. The author even considers the level of development of a society (*shehui fazhan shuiping* 社会发展水平) as a restricting factor to the level of development of people, in particular the level of moral development of people (*dui ren de fazhan shuiping tebie shi dui ren de daode fazhan shuiping de zhiyuexing*).¹ Development in this respect, however, *can not* have an objective, scientific basis. It *has* to be prescriptive. The author of the course as well does not escape such assumptions. He writes that development “points towards a concrete direction of change, normally towards a good direction” (*shi xiang yiding fangxiang yiban shi zhixiang hao de fangxiang de bianhua*).² Such a ‘good nature’ of humans, and their “will to life and freedom” are presuppositions (Carr 2002: 12). The ‘freed’ individual that

¹ 对人的发展水平特别是对人的道德发展水平的制约性 *ibid.*: 7/3/3.

² 是向一定方向一般是指向好的方向的变化 *ibid.*: 2/1/1.

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becomes creative and responsible is not a given necessity, but a construct, idealised by the author. The ‘idealised citizen’ is related to the idea of an overall development of society towards a ‘Western oriented’ economic and political system. The introduction of the market economy is seen as a prerequisite for a modern society and individual.³ So also is “democratisation” (*minzhuhua* 民主化), which is seen as an “inevitable trend” (*biran qushi* 必然趋势).⁴ This is also true for education. “The democratisation of education reflects humanity’s thirst for a more equitable world” (*jiaoyu de minzhuhua fanying le renlei kewang yi ge geng gongzheng de shijie*).⁵ The individual being able to fulfil these presuppositions becomes a constantly renewed one, becomes an individual with an infinite desire to grow. This desire is bound to a developmental approach. “[A] pedagogy of development shifts the educational focus from a given endpoint to a process of growth with its own in-built standards of flourishing.” (ibid.: 7) These standards lie in the “qualitative movement through a series of *stages* of development[.]” (ibid.: 7) The teacher serves the purpose of bringing pupils to the point of “optimal human growth[.] that individuals are able to move effectively from one developmental stage to the next[.]” (ibid.: 7) This approach differs from traditional moral education, for it considers earlier stages as inferior to later ones, and that there is no end point to development. There is always the possibility for further growth (ibid.: 7f.).

The development of the individual becomes a function in the overall development of society. In this respect the language used by the author in many aspects is a rather technical one. The individual needs ‘competence’ (*nengli* 能力), it needs to possess ‘skills’ (*jine* 技能) – teaching methods have to be ‘efficient’ (*youxiao de* 有效的). Moral development of the individual and development of society are defined by ‘mechanisms’ (*jizhi* 机制) and ‘laws’ (*guilü* 规律). Although the author never substantiates what those mechanisms and laws might be, he nevertheless attributes certain qualities to the individual in order to let individual and societal development become ‘harmonised’ and ‘stabilised.’ These are formulated in the concepts of ‘citizenship’ and a ‘responsible individual.’ The introduction of the subject comes with qualification. It is required to play a role, to fit in a certain order. Below I will discuss this role, reflecting it out of a governmental perspective.

³See Tang 2005: 6/1/1 and 6/2/1.

⁴Ibid.: 6/4/1/1.

⁵教育的民主化反映了人类渴望一个更公正的世界 ibid.: 6/4/1/2.

5.1.2 The individual and technology

With respect to the development of a market economy and the political decentralisation in the Chinese context, I argue, moral development as proposed in the lectures serves as a form of technology. In order to regard the individual in moral education as a form of technology, we first have to look for a kind of rationality within the texts. The course clearly distinguishes between a philosophy of moral education and its implementation.⁶ The role of philosophy is to define certain goals and establish a certain ‘view of things.’ As discussed above, the overall goal is to install an individual being able to deal with a new economic and political environment. The ‘view’ advocated by the author, however, is oriented towards historical materialism (*lishi weiwuzhuyi* 历史唯物主义),⁷ and the consolidation of socialism (*gonggu shehuizhuyi zhidu* 巩固社会主义制度).⁸ Still, the discussion about society is not about class struggle anymore. Although ‘conflict’ (*chongtu* 冲突) and ‘contradiction’ (*maodun* 矛盾) are important terms in the discussion,⁹ the struggle is fought within the individual, not between antagonistic classes. The solution rather lies in finding a ‘third solution,’ than to fight others. The theory to support this is not a Marxist one, but derives from the social theory of Durkheim. In chapter three, the author relates the theory of Durkheim to 19th century France, writing that

Durkheim believes that France’s social crisis basically has its origins in the process of the social structure transforming from a pre-modern towards a modern form. [It] has its origins in the industrialisation and growth of division of labour, which brought about the upsurge of individualism and the collapse of the traditional social order.¹⁰ (*Tu’ergan renwei Faguo de shehui weiji cong genben shang yuanyu shehui jiegou cong qian xiandai xiang xiandai leixing de zhuanxing guocheng zhong*、*yuanyu gongyehua*

⁶See section ‘Themes,’ p. 53.

⁷Tang 2005: 4/1/3/1.

⁸Ibid.: 4/1/3/3/1.

⁹Ibid.: 11/1/1.

¹⁰The importance of moral education with regard to the changes in daily life in the process of the industrialisation is also mentioned in the context of the history of the USA (see *ibid.*: 5/2/1/1).

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*he laodong fengong de fazhan suo dao zhi de geren zhuyi de gaozhang yiji
chuantong shehui zhixu de beng kui 。)*¹¹

With respect to this ‘crisis,’ moral education serves as a means to promote “stability and harmony” (*wending yu hexie* 稳定与和谐).¹² China today can be seen as being in a very similar situation, transforming into a market society and being on the ‘path to modernity.’ Moral education and the individual within it, both serve as a ‘harmonising’ and ‘stabilising’ element for the author. The health of the individual becomes a guarantor for the ‘health’ of society and vice versa. If society or individuals, however, are ‘sick,’ moral education and development can provide the function of ‘healing.’ One kind of ‘medicine’ philosophy can provide are ‘rational’ (*heli* 合理)¹³ and ‘proper’ (*zhengque* 正确)¹⁴ concepts.

To implement these concepts, moral education relies on the help of science, namely psychology. The pupil is defined by concrete moral stages, implicating concrete measures that have to be taken. It furthermore is influenced by certain factors that can be accounted for, and aims at certain ‘inner resources of pupils for motivation’ that might be used. Although the individual chooses independently, it at the same time is made responsible in the interaction with others, according to ideals that promote the construct of a nation state, namely in the concept of the ‘citizen.’ Not only discipline, but also the awareness of the individual becomes an important tool, in implementing goals and ideals given by a certain philosophical foundation. Furthermore, the pupils are trained in actively using the tools that are given to them, an important characteristic of ‘modernity’ is to be ‘initiative’ (*zhudong* 主动) as opposed to being ‘passive’ (*beidong* 被动).¹⁵ With this ‘set of tools’ the individual is able to fulfil the needs of a market economy. The individual becomes ‘creative’ and ‘autonomous,’ at the same time having responsibility for others.

Hence, we can understand the construction of the individual as serving the purpose of dealing with a new socio-economic situation in China. In the following section I am

¹¹ 涂尔干认为法国的社会危机从根本上源于社会结构从前现代向现代类型的转型过程中、源于工业化和劳动分工的发展所导致的个人主义的高涨以及传统社会秩序的崩溃。Tang 2005: 3/2/1.

¹² Ibid.: 3/2/1.

¹³ see ibid.: 1/1.

¹⁴ Ibid.: 11/1/1.

¹⁵ see ibid.: 6/1/1.

going to discuss how this individual embedded in ‘Chinese modernity’ can be understood in relation to politics and the state.

5.2 Nationalism

Here I want to discuss which political role the individual presented in the texts is assigned in the context of contemporary China. For this reason I will look at the concept of ‘nationalism’ regarding the implementation of ‘harmony and stability,’ considering it a form of *ideology*.

5.2.1 ‘Arranging’ society

In the texts one important characteristic, both of ‘modern’ China and the life of pupils, is ‘pluralism’ (*duoyuanhua* 多元化).¹⁶ As China is a nation of diverse minorities, the author raises the question of value systems in this respect. He therefore looks at moral education in Singapore and in this regard discusses possible ways to deal with a multi-ethnic nation. Regarding the four ‘exemplary countries’ presented in the text, the discussion about Singapore is considerably longer than the others. The similarities between Singapore and China are emphasised. Most importantly, Singapore, is a “country with many ethnicities, many religions and of cultural pluralism” (*duo minzu 、 duo zongjiao 、 duoyuan wenhua de guojia*).¹⁷ Countries like Japan and Thailand in contrast, only have one ethnicity (*danyi minzu* 单一民族).¹⁸ To deal with such a ‘diverse’ country, there are two possible ways. The first is to take a “leading value” (*zhudao jiazhi* 主导价值) of every ethnic minority and form it into a “composition of values” (*jiazhi hejin* 价值合金). The author, however, questions the potential of this approach to unify minorities.¹⁹ The second possibility is to “take the value concepts that the society of Singapore needs as the basis for constructing a value system” (*yi xinjiapo shehui suo bixu de jiazhi guan-nian wei jichu goujian jiazhi tixi*).²⁰ With regard to the characteristics (*tezheng* 特征) of Singapore, “profound and far-reaching” (*shenyuan* 深远) value systems are:²¹

¹⁶see *ibid.*: 11/1/1.

¹⁷多民族、多宗教、多元文化的国家 *ibid.*: 5/2/4.

¹⁸*Ibid.*: 5/2/4/2/3.

¹⁹*Ibid.*: 5/2/4/2/3.

²⁰以新加坡社会所必需的价值观念为基础构建价值体系) *ibid.*: 5/2/4/2/3.

²¹*Ibid.*: 5/2/4/2/3.

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- society first (*shehui wei xian* 社会为先);
- family as the basis (*jiating wei gen* 家庭为根);
- seek common ground while holding back differences (*qiutongcunyi* 求同存异);
- agree on common views (*xieshang gong shi* 协商共视);
- harmonious ethnicities (*zhongzu hexie* 种族和谐); and
- tolerance of religion (*zongjiao kuanrong* 宗教宽容);

These values accord to the definition of a ‘harmonious’ individual in the texts. It incorporates societal spheres like the family, trying to introduce morality as a means of coping with arising contradictions in a modern, liberal nation. According to this a program of moral education on an scientific basis shall be constructed (*kexue de goujian daode jiaoyu jihua*),²² which has to be supported by the government and society alike.²³ When it comes to what can be learnt from Singapore, however, the author as a first item lists “to attach importance to the government” (*zhengfu de zhongshi* 政府的重视).²⁴ The government shall “foster awareness of the nation” (*peiyang guojia yishi* 培养国家意识) and “mould the spirit of nationality²⁵ to a high degree” (*suzao minzu jingshen de gaodu* 塑造民族精神的高度).²⁶ This leads to “stable politics” (*zhengzhi anding* 政治安定) and economic development (*jingji fazhan* 经济发展).²⁷ Like this the nation, society, and the individual can be brought together and balanced.²⁸ The “active intervention of the government” (*zhengfu jiji ganyu* 政府积极干预),²⁹ however, remains an important element in this task. One role here is to implement a “unified administration of moral education” (*dayitong de daode jiaoyu guanli*),³⁰ in which respect Japan is a positive example of government intervention.³¹

²² 科学地构建道德教育计划

²³ Tang 2005: 5/2/4/2/3.

²⁴ Ibid.: 5/2/4/5/1.

²⁵ ‘Minzu’ (民族) also means ‘ethnic group.’

²⁶ Tang 2005: 5/2/4/5/1.

²⁷ Ibid.: 5/2/4/5/1.

²⁸ Ibid.: 5/2/4/3/2.

²⁹ Ibid.: 5/2/4/3/3.

³⁰ 大一统的道德教育管理

³¹ Tang 2005: 5/2/3/3.

Considering the discussion about Singapore as an example for Chinese moral education and related politics, the role of the government is emphasised. We therefore have to critically reflect this role, looking at moral education as a *form of ideology*. The presupposition that economic development of a nation and the stability of the political situation is a moral task can not be considered a given fact. Below I will critically reflect what this means for the individual introduced by the author.

5.2.2 Harmony under the rule of the party

The introduction of an individual in moral education has to be understood in relation to the involvement of government, and in the Chinese context, therefore, the Communist Party. Although the author emphasises the need for democratisation in the class room and in the formulation of a curriculum,³² such an approach can also be seen as a tool for implementing a competitive subject that is able to endure in the environment of a market economy. This becomes clear when looking at the implementation of such a democratisation. According to Qi and H. Tang (2004: 472) important characteristics of pupils representing lived democracy in the class room are “being independent, self-motivated, distinctively individual and creative[.]” Accordingly students are chosen as representatives every year, which are elected by the categories of “moral behaviour, intellectual achievement and participation in physical activities.” (ibid.: 472f.) Only those elected students are allowed to act in a political way and criticise their teachers. Hence, competitive students are allowed to participate in political activities, non-competitive ones are not. Therefore, I argue, one result of the introduction of moral education is the *de-politisation* of children. The students are able to choose in a given scope. Such concepts as ‘nation,’ ‘civil duty,’ or ‘patriotism,’ however, are given factors that are not up for debate. In this sense the author emphasises the role of school, which basically means education by the state. There is no overall political guideline like the concept of class struggle anymore. “Political activity is only a sphere in life at most” (*zhengzhi huodong chongqiliang zhishi shenghuo zhong de yi ge lingyu*).³³ Making politics a ‘mere sphere of life’ distinguishes it from the private. Politics are given a certain proper place and system that not necessarily coincides with the individual. As the state is not the sole actor anymore, there are family, friends, organisations etc. influencing children and their

³²see ibid.: 6/4/2/2 and 6/4/2/3.

³³政治活动充其量只是生活中的一个领域 ibid.: 6/3/1/1/4.

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behaviour. The state, therefore, emphasises its structures and according legitimisation. It tries to implement a certain basic awareness of the nation that is ‘compatible’ with emerging spheres of citizen’s life and is able to pervade them. Those spheres, on the other hand, are confined to be ‘private affairs.’ Using ‘patriotism,’ and ‘awareness of the nation’ in moral education in this respect has to be understood as a form of ideology. They are not given categories, they are rather constructed for a certain purpose, being reused by certain agents. As such the use of the state of such categories in public education has to be understood in this way as well. Therefore, also the use of the concept ‘harmony and stability’ has to be regarded as a form of de-politisation. This concept de-legitimises conflict that might be inherent to any change. As such its implementation has to be critically reflected with regard to questions like: who advocates such concepts? Who is interested in the implementation of such a concept? In the context of an economy that is characterised by inequality and the presence of a Single-party-state, ‘harmony and stability’ are ideological tools that justify dis-accord and legitimise the established order.

5.3 Tradition

As the state uses the ideology of ‘harmony and tradition’ to carry out development, it relies on a certain form of ‘Chinese identity.’ Here I will discuss what ‘tradition’ contributes to this identity in the texts and its role in the formulation of an individual.

5.3.1 The role of tradition as a form of identity

A concern about tradition in the course can be understood in two respects. The first one is seeing tradition as an obstruction to modernity. In this respect, influences from Europe basically are perceived as something ‘positive.’³⁴ Still, ‘Westernisation’ (*xihua* 西化)³⁵ is of concern in the course. When discussing moral education in Singapore, the author mentions the fear of “becoming false Westerners” (*biancheng jia xifangren* 变成假西方人), which is “a legitimate worry” (*zhe yi danxin bu shi duoyu de*).³⁶ The

³⁴In the chapter about ‘traditional Chinese moral education,’ the author even sees the opium wars as an opportunity, for they “initiated to think back over the suffering of feudal, traditional education” (*kaishi le dui fengjian de chuantong jiaoyu de tongku fansi* 开始了对封建的传统教育的痛苦反思) (Tang 2005: 4/1/1/5).

³⁵Ibid.: 5/2/4/3/3.

³⁶这一担心不是多余的 ibid.: 5/2/4/2/3.

author advocates to learn from Singapore and emphasises “alertness regarding the overgrown maladies of values of the spirit of Western industrial culture and the critique of the rotten elements of value systems in Eastern traditional culture” (*dui xifang gongye wenming jingshen jiazhi huangwu bibing de jingjue he dui dongfang chuantong wenhua jiazhi guan zhong fuxiu chengfen de pipan*).³⁷ Besides the ‘bad elements’ in Eastern tradition that mostly are to be found in feudalism, moral education serves as a means to deal with “quick and violent economic development and the rapid Westernisation of the nation” (*jingji xunmeng fazhan , guojia xunsu xihua*).³⁸ Here the second approach to tradition can be found in the attempt to find a form of identity in tradition. This identity can be understood as serving the purpose of controlling change. By establishing an antipode to hegemonic Western culture, the ability to ‘act on one’s own’ is created. The author does not want China and its citizens to be in a passive role, dictated by ‘values from abroad.’ With Ruism China inherits “a treasure of traditional Eastern culture” (*dongfang chuantong wenhua de guibao 东方传统文化的瑰宝*)³⁹ that is able to forestall such a scenario. In this respect the author, again, looks at Singapore, which in Ruism found a “set of core values firmly rooted in Eastern culture” (*yi tao laogu de zhagen yu dongfang chuantong de hexin jiazhi*)⁴⁰ that withstands the “attacks of foreign culture(s)” (*wailai wenhua de chongji 外来文化的冲击*).⁴¹ Moral education therefore takes Ruism as the “basic spirit” (*jiben jingshen 基本精神*), “at the same time absorbing the Western scientific spirit and the temperament of the spirit of other ethnic groups” (*tongshi xiqu xifang de kexue jingshen he qita minzu de jingshen qizhi*).⁴² Ruism is regarded as an “already existing fine Eastern culture, other nations are not able to embody” (*ji you bie yu qita geguo you neng tixian dongfang youliang wenhua*).⁴³ In other words, Ruism serves as an identity in moral education. This identity is embedded in a global order of Western dominance, trying to give China a distinctive place in relation to other nations, at the same time enabling China to lock out ‘undesired’ influences.

³⁷ 对西方工业文明精神价值荒芜弊病的警觉和对东方传统文化价值观中腐朽成分的批判 *ibid.*: 5/2/4/5/4.

³⁸ 经济迅猛发展，国家迅速西化 *ibid.*: 5/2/4/3/3.

³⁹ *Ibid.*: 5/2/4/2/2.

⁴⁰ 一套牢固地扎根于东方传统的核心价值

⁴¹ Tang 2005: 5/2/4/2/3, see also section ‘Nationalism’ (p. 87).

⁴² 同时吸取西方的科学精神和其他民族的精神气质 *ibid.*: 5/2/4/3/1.

⁴³ 既有别于其他各国又能体现东方优良文化 *ibid.*: 5/2/4/3/1.

5.3.2 Tradition and the individual

Though ‘tradition’ is seen as a form of identity that is perceived as being necessary to fight the ‘maladies of Western culture,’ still, I argue, tradition in moral education also is used for implementing a regulated individual. On the one hand it justifies moral education in China, on the other it serves as a ‘tool’ for a regulation of the subject. Tradition in this respect is reflected under the aspect of ‘usability’ for modern moral education,⁴⁴ and aspects are integrated in the implementation of a curriculum of moral education. Tradition here refers to a philosophical realm in the discussion about morality and serves as an “ideal” (*lixiang* 理想). It on the one hand serves as an ideal of society (*shehui lixiang* 社会理想), on the other as an ideal of personality (*renge lixiang* 人格理想).⁴⁵ As such ideals of traditional moral education are relieved of their ‘feudal’ elements and integrated into modernity. For this purpose one “has to see its [traditional moral educations] backwardness, but also having to absorb its rational core.” (*yao kandao ta de luohuoxing , ye yao xiqu heli de neihe* .)⁴⁶ The ‘character of morality’ itself implicates the justification for ‘reusing’ tradition in this regard. “Morality has the nature of carrying on. Morality is the sum of rules of conduct to adjust the relation between the individual and others, between individual and society.” (*Daode shi you jichengxing de* . *Daode shi tiaozheng geren yu taren 、 geren yu shehui zhijian guanxi de xingwei guize de zonghe* .)⁴⁷ Tradition in this respect is seen as a societal phenomena. With respect to the life in school this most importantly can be found in the ‘campus culture,’⁴⁸ which is part of the ‘hidden curriculum.’ It therefore has to be considered a sphere in student’s life which moral education accounts for. In regard to the family the author points out the importance of the formulation of a certain ethic (*jiating lunli* 家庭伦理) in traditional moral education.⁴⁹

When it comes to the relevant content of tradition, the ‘typical’ classics are emphasised. With the ‘Four Books’ (*sishu* 《四书》) and the ‘Five Classics’ (*wujing* 《五

⁴⁴see Tang 2005: 4/1/3.

⁴⁵Ibid.: 4/1/2/1.

⁴⁶要看到它的落后性，也要吸取合理的内核。ibid.: 4/1/3/1.

⁴⁷道德是有继承性的。道德是调整个人与他人、个人与社会之间关系的行为规则的总和。(ibid.: 4/1/3/2).

⁴⁸see ibid.: 9/3/2/3/2.

⁴⁹Ibid.: 4/1/3/3/2/2.

经》),⁵⁰ the author approves of what we assumed in the chapter ‘Framework.’ Still, the texts also concretise some qualities regarding the individual, that are to be ‘carried on.’ First of all, the cultivation of morality is advocated using the example of the *junzi*. “To become a *junzi*, [one] first needs to have sublime training in morality.” (*zuowei junzi , shouxian bixu you chonggao de daode xiuyang* .)⁵¹ This ‘training’ or ‘self-cultivation’ most importantly implies the concept of “critically examining oneself” (*neixingzicha* 内省自察) and “to seek the cause in oneself rather than somebody else” (*fanqiuzhuji* 反求诸己).⁵² But this form of discipline is not understood as an oppressive force. It rather is understood as an impulse originating from the subject itself. It spurs moral development, hence representing a benefit for the individual. Therefore, pupils shall “grasp the firm believe of knowledge, the driving power of emotion, the temper of willpower and the efficiency of action” (*zhua renshi shang de duxin 、 ganqing shang de taoye 、 yizhi shang de duanlian he xingwei shang de jianlü*).⁵³ The role of the teacher is to serve as an example and “teach children to set up far-reaching ideals (...) and to teach children to personally undertake the realisation [of ideals] with great efforts.” (*yao jiaoyu xuesheng shuli yuanda lixiang (...) you yao jiaoyu xuesheng nuli gongxing shijian* .)⁵⁴ No matter which barriers or contradictions the individual might encounter, the subject has to keep on putting effort into the realisation of its values, acquiring the capability realising aims despite any resistance. The following passage from the texts illustrates this request:

[When] correcting evil doings and reverting to good deeds, there is a fault, what to do? First, [one] has to have the courage to face up to it and amend it. Then, [one] has to reflect upon oneself, at the same time modestly accepting the criticism of others. Finally, [one] has to reform and start afresh, learn from others, and be benevolent to people. (*Gaiguoqianshan you le guoshi zenme ban ? Shouxian yao you zhengshi he gaizheng de yongqi* . *Qici , yao jinxing ziwo fanxing , tongshi xuxin jieshou bieren de piping* . *Zuihou , yao gaiguoixin , xiang bieren xuexi , yao yu ren wei shan* .)⁵⁵

⁵⁰Ibid.: 4/1/3/3/2.

⁵¹作为君子，首先必须有崇高的道德修养。ibid.: 4/1/2/2.

⁵²ibid.: 4/1/2/3, see also section ‘Discipline,’ p. 75.

⁵³抓认识上的笃信、感情上的陶冶、意志上的锻炼和行为上的践履 ibid.: 4/1/3/3/3/1.

⁵⁴要教育学生树立远大理想 (...) 又要教育学生努力躬行实践。ibid.: 4/1/3/3/4.

⁵⁵改过迁善有了过失怎么办？首先要有正视和改正的勇气。其次，要进行自我反省，同时虚心接受别人的批评。最后，要改过自新，向别人学习，要与人为善。ibid.: 4/1/3/3/4.

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Thus, in formulating an identity, tradition not only opposes a form of ‘Western hegemony of values,’ it also serves the purpose of bringing pupils discipline and implementing a certain form of governmental rationality. When confronted with ‘hedonism’ and other bad ‘outer’ influences, children have to possess the ability for ‘eating bitterness’ (*chiku* 吃苦). Not only this way they develop the capability for a ‘good’ moral life, at the same time they contribute to the well being of the nation. In regard to the role of the individual in moral education, as presented in the texts, tradition serves as a form of technology. It provides the *solution* for certain arising problems, showing actors concrete measures that ought to be taken. The contents introduced from traditional moral education accord to the general theme of the course. As such they support and deepen the approaches of moral education in putting it in a ‘genuine’ Chinese context.

6 Conclusion

From what has been discussed in this paper, we can summarise that there is a form of individualism in the presented material and its conduct is of concern to the author. In this respect the involvement of the state is given, for it is represented by the use of certain categories. The individual is related to the state by being made responsible, and, hence, restricting it. Through the use of the concept of 'citizenship' a form of technology is introduced that serves the purpose of implementing a rationality of 'harmony and stability.' Not only is the individual seen as representing a developing entity, as such it also is related to national development. 'Nationalism' and 'national awareness' become a part of the reality of the individual and make it act according to the interests of the state. The actions of the subject are related to national economic development and political stability. Regarding this, the attempts of government analysed in this paper draw on concepts deriving from 'Chinese past.' Not only are there analogies of the perception of the relation between state and people, also concrete ways and methods of conduct are reintroduced. In this respect the role of tradition is to serve as a marker of identity on a national level on the one hand, and to enforce the implementation of an active and striving individual on the other. Important guidelines are the creativeness and the autonomy of subjects in the context of a market economy. The individual is introduced as an active agent, at the same time being bound to mechanisms and laws of development. With respect to this agency the subject also bears certain qualities regarding the relation to other people. In a state being defined by pluralism, the individual learns certain forms of 'behaviour' in the face of being confronted with different value systems and beliefs. This way it learns to deal with contradictions and conflicts arising from this new environment, finding ways to realise a harmonised and stable existence. Health, however, is defined by the psychological development on an individual level and by economic development and political stability on a national one. Inequality arising from an unequal socio-political system are not of concern to the texts. As well the accountability of the state to provide for its cit-

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izens is not considered. Political action is dependent on the concept of citizenship, the state itself is not questioned. For this reason, I argue, moral education in contemporary China inherits the ‘de-politisation’ of pupils, restricting political action to the state as opposed to other spheres of social life.

What can we learn from the discussions provided in this paper? For one, we have to see moral education for what it is: the mediation of moral concepts. Whatever scientific basis such concepts might have, they remain biased and implicate a certain view on human nature and how we ought to conduct ourselves. In the face of the state providing moral education, we have to consider it a form of ideology. Schools and universities in China are closely related to the political activity of the Communist Party. Not only does the government formulate the curriculum of moral education and goals related to it, such a curriculum also transmits certain concepts of the state. At the same time it relates the subject to these concepts. The ‘responsible citizen’ reflects an established regime, where the Communist Party acts as a dominant element. The use of the concept ‘harmony and stability’ in this respect serves to control conflict in society and justifies forms of inequality. Terms like ‘democratisation’ have to be regarded in this context and their actual implementation has to be questioned.

On the other hand, in the context of a globalised world and hegemony of ‘Western culture,’ the state accounts for the fear of losing identity and becoming dictated by outer influences. The ‘developmental’ state in China – at least in an economical sense – can be credited with achieving a certain standard. Although often emphasised in official politics, China is not a ‘developing country’ in a traditional sense any-more. China plays an important role in the global economic and political system. This position has to be ascribed to the efforts of the Communist Party over the past sixty years. The use of tradition as a tool of government can be seen as the attempt of maintaining a certain form of identity and independence in a global economic system that is dominated by foreign nations. In this regard the Chinese government tries to actively mould its future, creating its own modernity. This effort, however, is realised by restricting the individual and its political agency. Economic development does not automatically lead to democratisation, equality – in an economic as well as in a political sense – is *not* a necessity of ‘modernity.’

To advocate such concepts in the context of a course at a university, however, is questionable. The author draws on certain scenarios where a China without morality leads to chaos and despair. Without the foundation of ‘civilised’ co-operation, the fate of

humanity is at stake. Morality simply can not be assigned this role. There is no evidence whatsoever that might prove such a claim. When leaving the field of science, however, and looking at the struggle of the Chinese state over the past 150 years, such a concern is more apprehensive. Just as equality is no necessity of a globalised world, dominance of some nations over others as well is not. Therefore, it is not the role of science or Western public to judge this approach. The question of which regime is adequate or not is the concern only of the Chinese people themselves. Though we can not consider the topic by means of science, still we have to regard it from a political point of view. We can ask how the state governs citizens and whom this government serves. In the context of moral education it becomes clear that government has the function of restricting the subject. In a further step one could ask whether this form of government actually is accepted by the Chinese people. Although there are no considerable political forces challenging the position of the CCP, nevertheless there is resistance in China. The question of *how* the governed resist the attempts of government is an important one. This is not only of concern regarding China, it rather is a question of looking at government in general.

Therefore, further inquiry regarding the research in this paper could question the perception of the presented material. One could ask by whom such an approach is supported regarding different social layers. The actual implementation of the presented material in school as well could serve as a starting point for expanding the research of this paper. Although an analysis of (printed) texts can give an insight into the functioning of the construction of social categories, it falls short regarding social implications. Hence, this aspect can be seen as being the logical next step following the research in this paper. This way the concern with this topic could help us better understand social reality in China and how the perception of the state and the individual is constructed. This way we might develop a better understanding of how ‘Chinese reality’ differs from our own. We have to accept the fact of such a different existence. The ambition of China to aspire after an independent identity and way to acting is a legitimate one. Power relations, however, are not given. The theory of governmentality helps us to challenge dominant perceptions and elaborate alternatives. In the end we conduct ourselves and others according to certain categories through which we experience the world and ourselves. We have to question who is involved in the process of defining those categories and who is not. If, in this respect, one speaks about defining modernity, also a certain view on the past is implicated. Although Chinese government abandoned aspects of its ‘socialist

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experience,’ nevertheless it continues to look into its past to find solutions for the future. The guideline of class struggle has been succeeded by the introduction of ‘harmony and stability.’ If this concept can account for conflicts in a country inhabiting almost 1.4 billion people, however, only time can tell.

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Appendices

Appendix I: Chapters and sections of the course

第一章道德教育的学科基础论（上）：道德哲学基础

第一节何以需要道德哲学

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第一章第三节当代几种主要道德教育哲学理论

一、杜威实用主义道德教育哲学

(一) 关于道德教育目标——“一个在道德上受过教育的人”。

杜威所主张的“一个在道德上受过教育的人”至少应包括以下几方面内容：

第一，有道德的人应形成一定的习惯方式并通过日常生活表现出来，它是作为人格和人的日常生活的一部分发挥作用的。

第二，这种习惯方式不是人们经常所说“或多或少以一成不变的方式行事”，它包括“各种态度的养成，情感的和理智的态度，其中理智的态度最为重要”。

第三，在道德上受过教育的人，是一定社会和社会团体的一部分，而且是通过社会形成的。因而，他应具有社会责任和社会技能。

(二) 关于道德教育的途径和方法

为达至道德教育的目标，首先，让儿童参与社会生活，在合作的活动中形成道德判断的能力。杜威认为，正如社会为儿童提供了道德发展的实验室一样，学校也应该作为儿童道德发展的实验室为儿童提供指导。

第二，通过教育方法进行道德教育。杜威认为，教育方法上的道德训练，重在把儿童从自私自利转到为社会服务上来，重在创造的贡献，而不是单纯的吸收和学习。

第三，通过教材进行道德教育。杜威指出：“道德的目的是各科教学共同的和首要的目的”，所以，“知道如何把道德价值的社会标准加诸于学校所使用的教材上面，就是十分重要的”。

第四，通过解决问题促进儿童道德的成长。在杜威看来，理想的道德训练的方式是运用智慧进行“探究”的方法。因为，人在适应环境的过程中，会遇到各种包括道德在内的疑难问题，人与环境的作用就在于努力寻找解决问题的途径和方法。在道德训练过程中，教师应向学生提供现实生活的“道德两难”(dilemma)问题供其思考和讨论。

(三) 关于教师

杜威认为，在教育过程中，教师的作用主要表现在以下几方面：

1、教师的工作应以促进儿童的生长为中心。杜威认为，儿童的发展和生长就是教育的理想所在。因此，应以儿童作为自己工作的出发点。

2、以儿童为中心并不意味着否认教师对儿童经验的指导价值。杜威反对传统教师的“监督者”和“独裁统治者”角色，同时也不赞同把教师看成是一个微不足道的因素甚至是一个有害人物的倾向。在共同参与的活动中，教师既是一位领导者——组织活动并创造条件保证活动的顺利进行，也是一位学习者。

（四）评价

作为杜威道德教育理论哲学基础的实用主义伦理学实质是一种“境遇伦理学”，是相对主义的，这种相对主义伦理学的积极因素在于，从根本上动摇了道德天赋神授的观念，打破了传统的视道德原则为固定不变的状态的看法，具有积极的方法论意义。

然而，杜威的境遇伦理学有严重不足，他虽然突出了道德原则的相对性和易变性，但完全否认其绝对性和稳定性；强调道德行动道德情景的具体性、个别性，否认其普遍性和一般性等都是失之偏颇的。强调在道德情景中获得道德经验，并主张通过行动的后果来检验行动固然有合理的一面，但单纯强调具体的道德经验和行为的具体后果则显得肤浅。

当然，杜威在批判传统道德教育理论和实践的基础上，重新估价了教育在儿童道德发展、道德教育中作用，确立了儿童在道德教育中的地位；把促进儿童的道德的发展尤其是批判性探究能力的发展作为道德教育的重要任务；把儿童的主动性、积极性作为儿童道德发展的重要条件，作为道德教育的重要指

导思想；强调活动、实践在儿童道德发展中的作用等，对20世纪美国乃至整个西方道德教育理论的发展产生了积极的影响，代表了本世纪西方道德教育思想的主潮。

第三章道德教育的学科基础论（下）：社会学基础

第二节涂尔干道德教育的社会学理论

爱弥尔·涂尔干 (Emile Durkheim, 1858—1917) 是二十世纪第一个独创性的运用社会学理论来系统地、完整的关注道德教育的理论家，同时也鉴于涂尔干的理论对整个二十世纪的道德教育理论和实践产生的重要影响，从而他也被赋予“当代道德教育之父”（the father of modern moral education）的称号。

一、涂尔干的道德社会学思想

涂尔干认为法国的社会危机从根本上源于社会结构从前现代向现代类型的转型过程中、源于工业化

和劳动分工的发展所导致的个人主义的高涨以及传统社会秩序的崩溃。因此，解决问题的办法也就是要重建社会秩序。从如何使人的行为免于失范、从如何使工业化背景下的社会趋于稳定与和谐出发，涂尔干阐述了自己对道德和道德教育的看法，形成了独具特色的、也是首创性的道德、道德教育社会学思想。

涂尔干在社会学方面的一般看法：

首先，关于社会学的研究对象。涂尔干认为，强调社会学研究针对的应该是造成观念的社会事实，而不是关于社会事实的观念。

其次，关于社会学的研究方法。在社会学的研究方法上，涂尔干秉持的是自百科全书以来研究人类社会问题的基本立场——认为人类社会的发展像自然界一样，存在必然性。

涂尔干道德社会学理论的基本内容：

1、关于道德的本质。涂尔干认为，社会是宗教的原形，宗教就是“社会”，具体来说，宗教不过是社会生活的产物，即集体意识和集体表象的直接投射和最好的表征，是基于特定的社会情景，在集体情感的沸腾状况下出现的。道德同样也是源于社会，可以用社会来说明，而不是继续把道德掩盖在宗教的外衣之下。

2、关于道德的作用。涂尔干认为，道德的功能在于维持社会秩序，使社会能协调、稳定、运转正常。

3、关于道德的构成要素

涂尔干认为，道德这种社会现象包含了三种最基本的要素，即纪律精神、牺牲精神和自律精神。

二、涂尔干道德教育的基本观点

（一）道德教育的目的是要把个体培养成为能够自觉地履行社会职责、自觉地按照社会规范去行动的人，道德教育要满足的是社会的需求。

(二) 道德教育的方式上，涂尔干认可灌输的价值，认为有必要通过强制的方式让儿童服从既定的社会规则。同时，涂尔干为了免于使自己的教育模式带有过分的强制色彩，对他的教育概念进行了一些限定。首先，他把道德教育和道德教学进行了区分，前者就是他一般的教育定义，是以强迫、灌输为特征的；后者则以解释、说明为基本特征；其次，在讨论道德教学时，强调科学和历史教学，反对艺术教学。；第三，重视自律。

(三) 在师生关系上，主张教师权威论。涂尔干认为，教师的权威地位首先是由教师职责的性质决定的。在他看来，“教育应主要是一种权威的活动”，教师则是这一权威活动的具体执行者。

(四) 此外，涂尔干还分别阐述了如何培养人的纪律精神、牺牲精神和自律精神，就学校道德教育的实践提出了一些具体的建议。比如：涂尔干十分重视奖励和惩罚、学校环境与教学在道德教育中的作用；涂尔干认为教学也是一种道德教育的重要手段。

三、对涂尔干道德教育理论的评价

(一) 关于涂尔干的社会道德观

1、涂尔干的道德教育理论从根本上是社会中心或以社会为本位的。涂尔干道德教育的社会本质观

的积极意义是明显的，认定社会条件是产生道德的决定性条件，社会道德教育的最后根据；承认道德规

范、道德准则在维持社会秩序、维护社会和谐、统一中的职能作用；承认道德规范的社会文化变异性与普遍性等都有积极的意义，是应该予以充分肯定的。另外，强调社会规范对个体的制约作用，也有一定的合理因素。

2、涂尔干道德社会观的主要问题在于忽视了人的自由和创造性，因而是保守的。涂尔干所期望的是结构严谨、纪律严明的班级和学校，无论在班级还是在学校，都有明确的道德规则和行为准则要学生遵守。涂尔干的这一观点是错误的。人不仅仅是受先前存在的规则的约束，而且制定新的规则。规则是人们为了满足自己的需要而创造出来的、其功能一方面在维持秩序，另一方面满足自身的发展需要，当某些规则不符合人们的需要时，人们就势必改造旧有的规则、创造新的规则。涂尔干似乎只强调了规则对维护社会秩序的重要性，而忽视了人们改造、制定规则的需要。

在个人和社会的关系问题上，认为社会绝对优于个人，把个人和社会视作一种隶属关系的看法也是片面的。

(二) 关于涂尔干道德教育的理论与实践

1、涂尔干对道德教育理论的最大贡献在于他第一个把社会学的研究方法引入道德教育领域，从而开道德教育的社会学研究之先河。涂尔干的理论旨在建立一种理性主义的道德教育模式，为此，涂尔干对传统的宗教教育进行了全面。清理，成为当代道德教育世俗化运动中的先锋人物。

涂尔干对道德教育中的许多重要理论和实践问题进行了独特论证。他一方面认定应通过纪律把社会的要求传输给儿童；另一方面又认为，教育必须从了解儿童的心理或本性开始。

2、涂尔干的道德教育理论也有许多严重的不足。在理智和行为的关系问题上，涂尔干过份夸大了知识和理智在道德中的作用，混淆了“事实”和“价值”之间的区别；另外，涂尔干的道德教育理论过分突出了社会、学校和教师的权威，而忽视了学生自身的自主权利和创造能力；在学校的奖励和惩罚问题上，涂尔干过分夸大了惩罚的作用，而忽视了奖励的积极的教育价值。

第四章第一节中国传统德育及其现代意义

二、中国传统德育的基本特点

（一）德育——道德理想主义的实践

依据儒家的人文精神，教育是其道德理想主义的实践过程，学校就是开展这种实践活动的场所之一。儒家的社会理想和人格理想，都要通过学校教育去实现。

（二）成圣成贤的德育理想与目标

在儒家的人格结构中，圣人是理想人格，君子则是一种众趋人格。君子最能体现中国传统文化的精髓。

作为君子，首先必须有崇高的道德修养。

（三）内省自察、反求诸己的道德修养论与德育方法论

中国儒家之道德修养论向内用力的特征十分明显，而且以一贯之。孔子讲克己内省，改过迁善；孟子讲持志养气，反求诸己；朱熹讲存养省察；陆九渊讲切己自反，道不外索。之所以如此，根源有二：一是其本体论上的天人合一论；二是道德起源上的先验论。

三、中国传统德育的批判继承

建设现代化国家的历史重任，要求我们探索合乎时代需要的道德精神与教育模式。理性地、客观地分析中国传统德育的得失利弊，对于今天的道德教育理论建设和实践探索无疑都是有益的。

（一）对待传统德育的两种不同观点

一种观点是“道德重建论”。它认为中国传统文化（包括传统道德文化和德育文化）是一个超稳定的封闭系统，不能产生任何启蒙；只有靠引入外来文化，才能创造过去的中国人不曾有过的、现代的民族心理结构。重建的第一步就是“反传统”。按照这种主张，传统德育对于现代化是一无是处，应全盘否定，彻底抛弃。

另一种观点是“儒学复兴说”。当代新儒家把儒家伦理与西方的经济自主、个性自由相结合，既重视个人才能胆略和气魄，又以和谐的心理调节和人际关系为基础。认为充分发挥社团、群体的聪明才智，就能改良社会风气，重塑中国人的道德面貌，从而促进经济发展，实现民族振兴。根据新儒家的观点，只要把传统德育发扬光大，就能解决时代德育面临的一切困难和问题。

历史唯物主义告诉我们，对待人类历史上的文化遗产，应当采取实事求是、一分为二的科学态度。

既要看到它的落后性，也要吸取合理的内核。

（二）继承与批判的理由

传统德育对现代德育具有重要的借鉴意义，有许多东西值得继承。从理论上讲，这种可继承性有如下两点理由。

第一，德育现象本身的独立性。不同时代、不同社会的德育并不随着一定的社会政治经济结构的被打破而消失，总存在一些共同的东西。这些共同的东西就可以相互继承、相互借鉴和相互吸收。

第二，道德是有继承性的。道德是调整个人与他人、个人与社会之间关系的行为规则的总和。

（三）继承什么

1、传统德育的理论基础

任何时代的统治阶级及其教育家 in 实施德育的时候，对学校德育的地位和作用，都会有所认识。对此，传统德育是从两个方面来认识的：

（1）“德政”思想封建统治者重视德育，是以维护其狭隘的阶级利益为目的的；我们今天把德育放在首位，是从维护劳动人民来之不易的胜利果实，巩固社会主义制度出发的。二者不能同日而语。

（2）“人性论”现代德育理论影响个人道德发展有4个方面的因素：遗传、环境、教育和个人主观努力。

2、传统德育内容

传统德育的教材主要是《四书》（《论语》、《孟子》、《中庸》、《大学》）、《五经》、（《诗》、《书》、《礼》、《易》、《春秋》）。

（1）关于社会生活道德规范，即社会公德

要维系人类生存，保持社会稳定和发展，就必须有一套大家共同遵守的道德原则和行为规范，这是人类有别于动物界的重要特征之一。

（2）关于家庭生活的道德规范，即家庭伦理

（3）关于个人道德修养及道德行为准则

3、传统德育方法

（1）强调知、情、意、行的培养古代教育家 in 实施德育的过程中，总结出知、情、意、行的德育过程理论，强调必须抓认识上的笃信、感情上的陶冶、意志上的锻炼和行为上的践履这四个环节来进行道德教育。

（2）注重自省、自克的修养工夫重视外在的行为习惯和强调内在的道德修养，是传统德育方法的两个特点。三个步骤：

第一，寡欲；第二，养气；第三，“自反”即“反求诸己”

4、德育原则

第一，以身作则德育活动是在教师的引导下进行的。教师首先要给学生树立一个榜样，才有说服力。

第二，立志力行在道德教育中，一方面要教育学生树立远大理想；另一方面，又要教育学生努力躬行实践。

第三，改过迁善有了过失怎么办？首先要有正视和改正的勇气。其次，要进行自我反省，同时虚心接受别人的批评。

最后，要改过自新，向别人学习，要与人为善。

第五章第二节几个主要国家的学校德育模式

四、新加坡的学校德育

新加坡是一个新兴的多民族、多宗教、多元文化的国家。多年以来，新加坡政府一直把提高国民道德整体水平视为民族振兴的重要因素，坚持不懈地致力于中小学道德教育的探索。

（一）新加坡学校德育的背景

- 1· 20 世纪 70 年代以前的新加坡社会：放任、自治与独立
- 2· 经济腾飞后的困境与道德教育的复苏
- 3· 美好社会的梦想及道德教育在学校正式课程中地位的确立

（二）新加坡德育的过去、现在和未来

以上论述为新加坡道德教育的历史发展铺展了较为广阔的背景，我们对新加坡道德教育过去的回顾，现在的分析和未来的瞻望是这种背景的延续和深化。

- 1· 新加坡德育的过去
- 2· 新加坡学校德育的现状

宗教学习对于道德教育计划的不懈探究并没有因上述两个计划的推行而止步，尽管这两项计划代表了较为精致灵活的价值教育方式，但政府领导人并不确信这两项计划足以为新加坡社会提供足够强大的道德支柱。

儒家伦理由于宗教学习面临诸多困境，新加坡领导人又将目光投向了儒家伦理这一东方传统文化的瑰宝。

3· 新加坡学校德育的未来

展望新加坡未来的道德教育，人们所担心的是新加坡人是否会变成假西方人。尽管新加坡接纳了西方社会的生活方式，但却不具备承载乃至维持西方社会机构的那种深厚的文化底蕴，这一担心不是多余的。不过，对新加坡而言，最近 25 年来社会发展的巨大成就所证实的那些道德价值不会被轻易抛弃，它很可能在某种意义上决定着未来新加坡社会的命运。现在人们所关注的是能否制订一套牢固地扎根于东方传统的核心价值。在 21 世纪，新加坡正通过现代通讯技术更加开放地面临外来文化的冲击，建立以东方价值为核心的价值体系成为一种明智的选择。由于新加坡不像日本、泰国那样由单一民族构成，多种族、多宗教的历史传统给核心价值的形成设置了层层障碍，文化融合成为一个敏感而又棘手的难题。解决的方法之一是从每个民族的价值中选择出其主导价值加以整合形成“价值合金”，但这种合金是否具有本质上的内在统一性尚需斟酌；另一种方法是以新加坡社会所必需的价值观念为基础构建价值体系，从而形成新加坡

人确定的特征以同其它社会相区别。目前，下列价值观一致被看作是具有深远意义的：社会为先；家庭为根；求同存异、协商共视；种族和谐、宗教宽容。这仅仅是一种框架，人们所面临的困难是如何以上述价值观为基础科学地构建道德教育计划的理论体系，合理地制订相应措施并有效地贯彻执行。这不仅需要政府和社会的鼎力支持和大力投资，而且还需要对教师进行必要的培训，需要对价值教育的评价标准作出科学的改进。瞻望未来，目标是明确的，但任务也是艰巨的。

（三）新加坡学校德育的基本特征

1·新加坡中小学道德教育以儒家伦理价值追求为基本精神，同时吸取西方的科学精神和其他民族的精神气质，形成了一种视野开阔、立足国情、求同存异、强调特色的总体特征。

新加坡学校德育始终坚持多民族、多元文化的国情，不搞硬性统一，根据各民族可接受的方式进行，符合德育规律；同时，又根据新加坡人中 76.4% 是华人，儒家有根深蒂固的传统而不照搬西方价值观，多年来，政府领导人极力倡导一种既有别于其他各国又能体现东方优良文化美德的有新加坡特色的学校德育，这一点具有深远的意义。

2·倡导三位一体的德育方针。在目标体系上坚持传统文化、社会现实和远景发展的融合一体，倡导国家、社会、个人三者利益兼顾；在内容体系上总结 60 年代注重伦理教育而失之对新加坡意识的培养，70 年代强调国家集体观念教育忽视了个性塑造的经验教训，从而确立了发展个性、培养社会公德和树立国家观念为一体的德育内容；在工作系列上建立法制、德育和改造相辅相成，以德育塑造为主体的三体融合制；在教育途径上倡导教学、活动、辅导三位一贯法等等。

3·政府积极干预、德育体制灵活机动。新加坡自独立后就认识到，由于资源缺少，发展人才资源是重要的，同时也希望通过教育整合多民族的文化价值，因而一直强调德育，尤其 70 年代后，新加坡经济迅猛发展，国家迅速西化，政府进一步突出德育，作为学校和社会的首要工作，通过制订和颁布一系列的教育法令和政策，积极引导和规划学校德育。为了适应环境的变迁与社会的需要，新加坡的教育体制具有程度相当大的现实性与易变性。政府采取了灵活机动的德育态度，以图使学校德育工作对社会需求作出积极的反应，以谋适应。

（四）新加坡学校德育的成功与失误

新加坡的学校德育成绩斐然，主要表现在：独立后，培养和确立了新的国家意识；人民具有社会的互助同情心；人民的公德心和自律性初步形成，养成了遵纪

守法、讲卫生的良好习惯；社会秩序井然，环境优美，享有花园式城市国家的美誉。

（五）启示。新加坡作为一个新兴的多民族、多宗教、多文化的亚洲国家在道德教育方面进行了坚持不懈的探索，并取得了引人注目的成绩，当然其中还存在不足。它的成败得失无疑对我国具有很大的启发意义。表现在：

1·政府的重视。把道德教育提高到培养国家意识，塑造民族精神的高度，这有利于政治安定，经济发展。

2·强调教育对社会现实问题作出积极的反应。德育始终面向社会，针对问题，不空喊口号，而是直面现实的挑战。

3·广阔的视野，开放的思维方式，宽容的心态。这是新加坡道德教育计划不断推陈出新的基本保证。

4·强烈的危机意识和审慎的态度。对西方工业文明精神价值荒芜弊病的警觉和对东方传统文化价值观中腐朽成分的批判同时影响着新加坡人的价值选择，这也是我国德育建设所必须注意的问题。

第十一章道德教育策略论

第一节意识策略：学会了解自己和周围的人

意识策略不是一种单独的方法，其实质是通过一系列的学习活动来使人们对自我有清醒地认识，并通过移情来把握别人的价值观。

一、价值澄清是意识策略的源泉

霍尔认为，意识策略所采取的一系列活动最早发源于价值澄清运动。价值澄清学派认为，现代社会是价值观多元化的，其中充满了冲突、矛盾，传统的劝说儿童接受某种“正确的”价值的教育方法已不能胜任对儿童进行价值教育的任务，正确的做法应该是指导学生在澄清自己价值的基础上，把自己的价值观排出先后次序，进行自我选择并转化为行动。好的意识策略应该让学生对自己的价值观有清楚的认识，并带来认知上的不平衡，最终，在自我认识的过程中经过思考来解决这种不平衡，确定自己的选择。

二、移情：超越判断

移情，即对别人的情感、动机和价值观的了解，是意识策略的一个重要方面，也是所有人文和社会科学都关注的问题，但在道德教育中，具有尤其重要的意义。

Appendix III: Curriculum vitae

BERND REIß



WORK EXPERIENCE

PERIOD	October 2007 — July 2008	
EMPLOYER	Jugend am Werk	8480 Mureck
JOB TITLE	Civilian Service	
	Supervision and assistance of single residents and groups in the context of a facility for people with disability.	

EDUCATION

PERIOD	September 1995 — June 1999	
SCHOOL	Primary	8505 St. Nikolai i.S.
PERIOD	September 1999 — June 2007	
DEGREE	General qualification for university entrance	
SCHOOL	Secondary	8430 Leibnitz
PERIOD	October 2008 — April 2014	
DEGREE	Master of Arts in Developmental Studies	
UNIVERSITY	University of Vienna/University of Klagenfurt	Vienna
	In addition to a geographic focus on China, also preoccupation with interculturality, sociology of population, Foucault and discourse analysis, and development economics. Attendance of classes at the 'Faculty for Interdisciplinary Research and Advanced Training' (IFF – Fakultät für Interdisziplinäre Forschung und Fortbildung) dealing with communication and teamwork. Thesis: critical discourse analysis entitled "The construction of individualism in contemporary Chinese moral education: reinventing tradition."	

PERIOD	October 2008 — September 2010	
DEGREE	African Studies, no degree	
UNIVERSITY	University of Vienna	Vienna

PERIOD	October 2010 — April 2014	
DEGREE	Bachelor of Arts in Sinology	
UNIVERSITY	University of Vienna/Peking University	Vienna/Peking
	Semester abroad (winter semester 2011/12) in the context of the study of sinology at the Peking University (Beijing Daxue).	

SKILLS AND INTERESTS

Languages	English (fluently), Chinese (good), French (knowledge)
IT	Office, Latex, Citavi, Linux, Programming (Java, Linux scripting)
Personal details	Gongfu, Taiji, Meditation
Other	Driving licence, interest in processes of work and life organisation

Appendix IV: Abstract

English

The paper looks at the construction of individualism in contemporary People's Republic of China's moral education and subsequently questions the role of tradition in this respect. The role of the state is critically reflected, asking *how* moral education is used in the implementation of policies and the construction of an image of the 'Chinese nation.' To do so I conduct a critical discourse analysis using the example of an introductory course on moral education at the Shandong Normal University (*Shandong Shifandaxue* 山东师范大学). There are two central research questions the thesis will be looking at: 1) How is individualism created in contemporary PRC's moral education? 2) Which role does tradition play in the construction of this individualism?

The findings on the one hand suggest that moral education creates a form of identity in contemporary China. On the other hand it serves as a form of technology, restricting the individual in the context of a market society and making it 'responsible.' In this respect tradition is integrated in the concept of citizenship, serving the purpose of relating subjects to the created 'Chinese' identity. This at the same time leads to a 'de-politisation' of pupils, defining political action in respect to the state and its institutions. Tradition also is used to advocate certain concepts and notions found in the Chinese past that serve the purpose of implementing an active and striving individual. Furthermore I found that moral education is characterised by a certain form of developmentalism – on the one hand regarding the individual, on the other also concerning the state. In this respect individualism is embedded in a 'Chinese modernity,' which is defined by a new socio-economic environment and the Chinese past. Together they can be found in the concept of 'harmony and stability,' which played a central role in imperial China and was reintroduced into politics in contemporary China. By means of terms like *suzhi* (素质, quality) inequality is justified and conflicts are avoided. For this reason, the introduction of this concept has to be regarded as a form of *ideology*.

German

Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Konstruktion von Individualismus in der Moralerziehung des heutigen China und hinterfragt die Rolle von Tradition in dieser Beziehung. In einer kritischen Reflektion über die Rolle des Staates wird gefragt, *wie* Moralerziehung in der Umsetzung von Politik und der Schaffung eines Selbstbildes der „Chinesischen Nation“ angewendet wird. Zu diesem Zweck führe ich eine kritische Diskursanalyse anhand des Beispiels eines einführenden Kurses zu Moralerziehung an der Shandong Normal University (*Shandong Shifandaxue* 山东师范大学) durch. Die Arbeit betrachtet das Material dabei anhand von zwei zentralen Forschungsfragen: 1) Wie wird Individualismus in der Moralerziehung des heutigen China erzeugt? 2) Welche Rolle spielt Tradition in der Konstruktion dieses Individualismus?

Die Ergebnisse zeigen auf der einen Seite, dass Moralerziehung eine Form von Identität im heutigen China erzeugt. Auf der anderen Seite funktioniert sie als eine Form von Technologie, die das Individuum im Kontext einer Marktwirtschaft beschränkt und es „verantwortungsbewusst“ macht. In dieser Beziehung wird Moralerziehung mit dem Konzept von Bürgerrecht verknüpft, durch welches Subjekte mit der geschaffenen „Chinesischen“ Identität in Verbindung gebracht werden. Das führt zugleich zu einer „Depolitisierung“ von SchülerInnen und definiert politisches Handeln im Rahmen des Staates und seiner Institutionen. Tradition wird auch dazu verwendet, bestimmte Konzepte und Ideen der Chinesischen Vergangenheit zu fördern. Diese dienen der Umsetzung eines aktiven und bestrebten Individuums. Des Weiteren beobachte ich, dass Moralerziehung durch eine bestimmte Form von Entwicklungsdenken bestimmt ist – auf der einen Seite Entwicklung des Individuums, auf der anderen Seite Entwicklung des Staates. In diesem Zusammenhang wird Individualismus in eine „Chinesische Modernität“ eingebettet, welche durch eine neue sozio-ökonomische Umgebung und die Chinesische Vergangenheit definiert ist. Zusammen können die beiden Bereiche im Konzept von „Harmonie und Stabilität“ gefunden werden, welches eine zentrale Rolle im kaiserlichen China spielte und in die Politik des heutigen China wieder eingeführt wurde. Unter Anwendung von Begriffen wie *suzhi* (素质, Qualität) wird dabei Ungleichheit gerechtfertigt und Konflikten aus dem Weg gegangen. Deswegen muss die Einführung dieses Konzeptes als eine Form von *Ideologie* betrachtet werden.