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„The role of young unemployed persons and young precarious employees in social movements in Egypt since 2000 compared to Italian movements“

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IE Bleibt!

List of Acronyms

CI	Collective Identity (Theory)
CGIL	Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
ESF	European Social Forum
FIOM	Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici
GDP	Gross Development Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa (Region)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSM	New Social Movements
PIIGS	Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain
POS	Political Opportunity Structures (Theory)
RMT	Resource Mobilization Theory
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Egypt)
SMT	Social Movement Theories
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

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“Anybody can become angry - that is easy, but to be angry with the right person and to the right degree and at the right time and for the right purpose, and in the right way - that is not within everybody's power and is not easy.”

Aristotle

“Necessity is blind until it becomes conscious. Freedom is the consciousness of necessity.”

Karl Marx

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1. Introduction

From 2010 on, the world is monitoring the situation on the so called ‘Arab Spring’¹ in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and other countries in this region. A couple of years ago, for a majority of social scientists and people knowing the region it was unimaginable that this kind of protests and uprisings in the MENA region would take place in the near future.

The so called ‘Arabic’ societies, often rated as very traditional and rigid, revolted against the state and the unbalanced power relations.

Suddenly demonstrations and various forms of protests took place in different countries: First in Tunisia, then in Egypt and then followed by a number of other countries in this region.

The people demanded dignity, social justice, participatory democracy, the abandonment of their rulers and much more.

Certainly, some observations indicated a possible upcoming protest, but it was not predictable at all that uprisings to this extent will take place.

Todenhoefer, a German journalist and so called expert for the MENA region wrote in an article that in his 50 years of experience in the ‘Arab World’ he never have noticed any indication for uprisings.

Even though the situation in these countries were since a long time precarious and marked by frustration - only the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi and the growing repression by security forces in Tunisia and Egypt triggered the uprisings of the so called ‘Arab Spring’.

Suddenly thousand people went to the streets, were involved in direct actions and occupied public space and squares. Suddenly a supposed revolutionary spirit took over. In this phase almost nobody understood what was going on to a full extent (Todenhoefer 2012, p. 20).

This leads me to the question how this protests started and what has been triggering them?

I was very surprised by the happenings as well. When I was choosing the topic for my thesis, in February 2011, I already analysed Social Movements in Europe, especially in Italy, Latin America and the USA. At this stage it was not clear which perspective the uprisings have and what exactly triggered them, at least not for me.

¹ Arab Spring as an narrative coming from western definitions

As I would consider myself as an activist, participating in several protests and movements in Germany, Austria and Italy, I experienced a strong intrinsic motivation to name triggers, mechanisms and potential perspectives. During different events, manifestations and interviews I tried to figure out what caused the events in Egypt in January 2011.

After that a comparison with the status of potential Social Movements in Italy took place.

While researching and analysing movements in Egypt and Italy empirical it became clear that there is a need for a theoretical approach. (New) Social Movement Theories might bring along the theoretical base for any explanation of the Uprisings in Egypt and Italy. The community in social sciences still hasn't agreed on the applicability of these Social Movement Theories concerning the current developments. This thesis pretends to spotlight the utility of (New) Social Movement Theories, its practical approach and capacity to explain Italian and Egyptian Movements.

Based on assumptions and analysis of several theoreticians and reports of Activists potential reasons and triggers for the Egyptian uprisings and an analysis on the perspective of Italian Movements should be named in this thesis. The Results of the empirical research on the Case Studies will be compared with approaches of (New) Social Movement Theories.

In depth analysis of happenings in Egypt and the status quo of Italian Movements are necessary to understand the complexity and to give assumptions on possible perspectives as the visible protests are just the tip of the iceberg (Roth & Rucht 2008, p, 22).

This thesis has as its object to research (New) Social Movements, the role of young unemployed and precarious employed people in it. Criteria is on the one side the period from 2000 until July 2013 and on the other side the definition of New Social Movements, the category of young unemployed and precarious employed people.

A dedicated focus of the Research will be conducted by considering following aspects:

Who, in the complex framework of several actors, are the protagonists of the so called 'Arab Spring' and in movements in Italy? Do they define themselves as a specific category?

Why did the uprisings come up in general and why under these special circumstances? Has there been a development, leading to the uprisings or even preparations for the mass-protests? In fact, what are the triggers of the so called 'Arab Spring'?

How did it come to that point? Has there been a mechanism behind? To answer this question theories of social movements are going to be the base for case studies. Are they applicable?

In the second step the case study of Egypt will be compared to the case study of Italy. Are the frameworks comparable in general? Could an ‘Arab Spring’ happen in Europe, especially in these phases of high youth-unemployment rates? Even though it is very speculative, thus not very serious to answer this question, it could be answered why not? What makes the difference, even though there might be similarities in the current socio-economic situation?

These various confuse questions are bundled in Research Questions:

1.1. Research Questions

- 1) What are the reasons and triggers of uprisings in Egypt 2011?
- 2) To which extend did the young unemployed people and young precarious employers play a role in social movements in Egypt and in Italy?
- 3) Are ‘New Social Movement Theories’ applicable to current movements in Egypt?
- 4) What are reasons and triggers for social movements in Italy?
- 5) Are there any links between movements in Egypt and Italy?
- 6) Are there any feedbacks of Egypt uprisings to Italy?

1.2. Research Hypothesis

- 1) The *Washington Consensus Related Policy*², the economic crisis and cuts in public spending for social sectors are significant triggers for the uprisings. In special the situation of young unemployed and precarious working persons triggered the protest. Uprisings in Egypt are not only against autocratic structures of ‘dictatorships’ but much more an answer to the global crisis of the world system (on current capitalistic systems) and consequently a result of precarious socio-economic conditions.
- 2) A high unemployment rate amongst young people can be an essential basis for the appearance of social movements and uprisings.
- 3) Young unemployed people played an essential role in the preparation and the implementation of the uprisings in Egypt and in social movements in Italy.
- 4) ‘(New) Social Movement Theories’ are just partial applicable in the Case Studies. They need to be revised, at least for this Case Study.
- 5) Privatization, cutting in public spending, the precarious situation of the youth and a lack of participation triggered social movements in Italy since 2000.
- 6) General conditions in Egypt and Italy are very similar. So are triggers, structures and protagonists of social movements in both countries.

1.3. State of the Art

Social Movement Theories in general are considered as a part of sociology and political sciences and has a kind of mid-range popularity in sciences. Several authors claimed the applicability of these theories on practical aspects and concrete movements, even though there is no consensus about the use within the social scientists community.

The so called ‘Arab Spring’ was very well present in all kinds of media right after the self-immolation of the street vendor Bouazizi in Tunisia and throughout the happenings in Egypt and Libya. But even though it was picked out as a central theme in the news there were no assured facts about triggers and mechanisms of these movements named. The presence of the

² This refers to the concrete policy description on deregulation, neoliberalism and strictly market-based models of development, defined by John Williamson. The approach was and is often used for structural adjustment programs forced by the Bretton-Woods Organizations.

topic in the ‘mainstream’ media disappeared to certain degree but still there is no in-depth detailed analysis pointed out in the reports.

Due to this media coverage the public opinion and public discourses were quite strong in the very first month of 2011, but again without assured facts based on quantitative or qualitative inquiries.

The State of the Art in the very specific research field of this thesis is not extensively fruitful to my knowledge. As examples I would like to highlight Henri Onodera from the University of Helsinki who is currently doing a research on Youth Activism in Egypt. Also Korotayev and Zinkina doing a research on triggers of the uprisings in general by taking the ‘Youth Bulge’ into consideration. Further relevant or comparable researches are published in the latest stage of the process of writing this thesis and are just partly taken into consideration

Literature and empirical studies on the Case Study Egypt

For the first month after/during the uprisings in Egypt in January 2011 not that much was published besides the already mentioned news in various media and blogs from different actors and activists. These blogs were an important tool and mouthpiece for getting a direct perspective and observation out of the scene, especially in a historical context of potential preparations of social movements. “Blogs initiated during the early phases of the movement have since become part of the political landscape in Egypt. By 2007 there were said to be 6,000 active bloggers, among whom a minority addressed political issues but with an impact disproportionate to their numbers”³ (Saleh in El-Mahdi 2009, p. 90f.).

In this thesis articles in blogs are fully used as a source of indication of historical assumptions but at the same time not that much as a source for giving evidence.

Another form of using perspectives from activists and contemporary witness is the significance of diaries.

Research institutes and some scientists already published findings in 2011. Andrey Korotayev and Julia Zinkina for example tried to name in their study *Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis* (2011) possible triggers of the uprisings in Egypt.

Also the German foundation ‘Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)’ and the German magazine ‘Analyse und Kritik’ were notably active from the very first moment as they have

³ See also info box about *The role of blogs and social media* in this thesis

published several articles and dedicated special editions about the question on which actors are involved in the uprisings and what triggers formed the basis of the so called 'Arab Spring'.

Later on, mostly from 2012, different authors, research institutes and scientific magazines published literature on the happenings in Egypt. Besides several publications, the findings of the *Arab Opinion Index*, published by the *Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies* in March 2012, and the publication of Hichem Karoui *The Middle East in the Making* from September 2012, are considered as essential parts of this thesis.

Even though there are, as of today, various articles and books on the uprisings, there is still no consensus and no clarity on reasons and triggers of the so called 'Arab Spring'.

Therefore this thesis is not only based on literature but also on primary data.

Literature and empirical studies on the case Italy

As Italy and its movements are not in particular very present in the media and as a specific topic in social sciences, the capacities in dedicated literature is limited. Never the less some articles and books were published on social movements and bigger protests in Italy since 2000.

A similar approach as this thesis has, has also the article of Kristin Carls which was published in 2012, in the anthology of Peter Birke and Max Henninger *Krisen. Proteste* (Crisis and Protests) (So one year after I have chosen the topic).

Besides this anthology several authors, activists and other actors published articles on the Situation in Italy, but most of them dated back to the mid-2000s.

In this thesis literature from antagonists and activists of student and social movements from 2000 were used.

Social Movement Theories

The field of New Social Movement Theories was created in the late 1960s in delineation to previous Social Movement Theories. Important theorists of this 'new' school of thinking were, amongst others, Ted Gurr, Alain Touraine, Dieter Rucht, Roland Roth, Charles Tilly, Alberto Melucci, Michel Foucault, Juergen Habermas and Andre Gunder Frank.

The American author and social scientist Steven Buechler highlights four theorists with four different (partly interdependent) approaches: Manuel Castell is focusing on “the impact on the transformation of urban space and the role of urban social movements in this process” (Buechler 1995, p. 443). Alain Touraine with his *Theory of Collective Identity* contributes to a large extent to contemporary debate on social movements. Also considered as essential, among the other two theorists are Juergen Habermas and Alberto Melucci. The current status and the *State of the Art*, concerning Buechler, is determined by the discourse if New Social Movements are really ‘new’, if they are reactive or progressive and if New Social Movements are more political or cultural (Buechler 1995, p. 447).

There are studies and articles on youth unemployment and young precarious employed as well as theories on triggers and mechanisms. But to my knowledge there is a clear gap in the linkage of both sectors with its aspects. This thesis has the approach to identify and name possible links between SMT, empirical data on youth unemployment and the potential role of young unemployed and precariously employed people in the emergence of social movements.

2. Methodological Approach

This thesis has a multi-methodological approach and has following criteria:

Geographical

The field of research is geographically limited to Egypt and Italy with a very narrow focus on the capitals Cairo and Rome. In addition the Egyptian city of Suez is taken into the portfolio as it is a stronghold of *Anti-Governmental protests*⁴.

Period

The researched time period is between 2000 and July 2013, as this phase might have influenced the uprisings in Egypt. Furthermore it was the timespan in which in Italy as well as in Egypt massive cuts in public spending and a raising unemployment rate took place.

Expert Interviews/talks

⁴ Suez as a stronghold of Anti-Governmental protests: stated by activists from the Suez Youth Bloc.

Selected Key-Informants were interviewed in a semi-structured way with standardized questions. In Italy a total of five interviews with Simone Oggioni, *Rifondazione Comunista Italiana* ; Michele DeParma, *Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici (FIOM)*; one activist from the students network *Unicommon*; and one activist from the students network *Ateneinrivolta* were conducted in April 2012.

As the Literature about the happenings in Egypt was very poor, I decided to conduct a total of five interviews and to attend several talks.

Various activists, who asked to keep anonymous due to potential repressions, from the *Suez Youth Bloc*, *the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution*, *Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights* and from the *Popular Community Committees* were interviewed.

Besides the Key-Informant interviews some other talks from so called ‘middle-east experts’ were held in Frankfurt, Germany and Vienna, Austria.

Empirical Data

Furthermore empirical data from several sources is used. An essential resource for this thesis is the *Arab Opinion Index* from March 2012, published by the *Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies*. Another important provider for empirical data on Egypt is the study conducted by Andrey Korotayev and Julia Zinkina as well as several statistics on both Case Studies conducted by the *Development Research Institute at the New York University*.

Literature based analysis

The major part of this thesis is based on literature. Especially the theoretical framework is based on literature from several theorists, considered as key actors in this field of research. Furthermore articles and blogs on the situation in Italy and Egypt are analysed and incorporated into the line of arguments.

3. Definitions and theoretical framework

3.1. Definition of Keywords

Young unemployed

The definition *young unemployed* in this thesis is linked to the indicator ‘Youth Unemployment’, categorized by the International Labour Organization (ILO): “The unemployed youth comprise all persons between the age of 15 and 24 who, during the reference period, were: (a) without work; i.e. had not worked for even one hour in any economic activity (paid employment, self-employment, or unpaid work for a family business or farm); (b) currently available for work; and (c) actively seeking work; i.e. had taken active steps to see work during a specified recent period (usually the past four weeks)”(ILO 2013, based on Resolution concerning statistics of the economically active population, employment, unemployment and underemployment, adopted by the 13th ICLS (October 1982))

$$\text{Youth Unemployment Rate} = \frac{\text{number of unemployed young persons}}{\text{Youth Labor Force}}$$

Figure 1: Formula for Youth Unemployment (ILO, 2013).

Precarious employed

Even if there might be a common understanding of what precarious work means, there is no consensus on the definition. In this thesis a description of a potential definition of precarious work from the *Study on Precarious work and social rights*, which was conducted by the *London Metropolitan University* (carried out for the European Commission) is utilised.

A main characteristic of precarious work is the absence of choice under which conditions someone is forced to work. The study which is used as a reference here “(...) concluded that the most precarious work involved the inability of individuals to enforce their rights, where social insurance protection is absent, where health and safety is put at risk and where work does not provide sufficient income to enable people to live decently” (McKay et al. 2012, p. 8).

Furthermore it is stated in the study that also insecurity, lack of protection and insufficient income are factors of precarious work.

Very relevant for the situation in Egypt and Italy is the “factor that promoted precarious work was the issue of the lack of qualifications or a mismatch between the qualifications that workers have and those required where jobs are available” (McKay et al. 2012, p. 9).

The mismatch is defined in this thesis as an inequality in the match of high educated people doing these jobs where a higher education is actually not required.⁵

Social Movements

The definition or attribution of the category *Social Movements* is nowadays used in a very inflationary way. ‘Traditional’ Social Movements are defined in many different ways. This thesis is using definitions from the US American sociologist and political scientist Charles Tilly and from the German researcher and sociologist Dieter Rucht. Both theorists are chosen because they are well-known and commonly accepted in this particular field of research.

The expression *Social Movement* was the first time mentioned by the German sociologist Lorenz von Stein in 1850.

Tilly dates the emergence of Social Movements, even though they were not called like this, back to 1750, originally in the West.

Social Movements, as a “form of contentious politics” (Tilly 2009, p. 3) have basically three characteristics:

- “1. A sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities (let us call it a *campaign*);
2. Employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering (call the variable ensemble of performances the *social movement repertoire*); and

⁵ e.g. Call Centers

3. Participants' concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (call them *WUNC displays*)" (Tilly 2009, p. 3f.).

Campaigns are defined by Tilly as process in which claimants, objectives and a public is present.

The content of social movements is hereby often similar to other political entities like parties or trade unions. And in fact social movements work together with these entities and sometimes social movements emerge from parties or trade unions. "But the integration of most or all of these performances (variety of different forms of action and coalition building; note from the author) into sustained campaigns marks off social movements from other varieties of politics" (Tilly 2009, p. 4).

The WUNC theory sounds quite logic even though it needs to be further elaborated. Worthiness means a specific grade of consternation of a specific group of people (also category). Unity relates to the identity of a united group of consternated people. Alberto Melucci refined this thesis and defined it in 1989 as the theory of *Collective Identity*.

A further important element of the WUNC theory is the number of participants and/or people contributing to this specific movement. The higher the participation is, the more the movement is definable as a social movement. Commitment is influencing the sustainability of movements. The more people resist repression and the more people brave the weather conditions, it keeps the number of participants and therefore it is another indicator for a phenomenon to be defined as social movement (Tilly 2009, p. 4).

In the 19th century the attribute *Social Movements* was mostly used in the context of workers and proletarian movements, whereas other movements were marginalized: "all previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority" (Marx & Engels in Tilly 2009, p. 6).

Collective actions from workers in the 19th and 20th century, mostly described as 'traditional' social movement, were often initiated and supported by trade unions.

These movements became over the years more and more institutionalized, whereby they delegated their participation and direct political action (Roth & Rucht 2008, p. 7).

The American sociologists John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald describe social movements as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society” (McCarthy et al. 1990, p. 20).

Tilly claims that the term *Social Movements* is often wrongly applied to a phenomenon: “Inflation of the term to include all sorts of protest past and present; conflation of the movement with its supporting population, networks, or organizations; and treatment of movements as unitary actors do little harm in casual political discussion. (...) That is the task at hand” writes Tilly (2009, p. 7).

Even though “No one owns the term ‘social movement’” (Tilly 2009, p. 7), Tilly’s definition of social movements refers to the criteria mentioned above.

As this thesis does not aim to use the attribute social movement inflationary the definition of Tilly, which is just one out of several in this field of research, will be utilized.

New Social Movement Theories

In the late 1960s a reinterpretation and rethinking of existing theories and categories took place. This thesis is mainly based on Social Movement Theories⁶ with which the Case Studies Egypt and Italy will be analysed.

The differentiation from ‘new’ Social Movement Theories to the ‘traditional’ Social Movement Theories is based on the rejection of traditional Marxists assumptions that the proletarian revolution is unique and privileged. “New social movement theorists, by contrast, have looked to other logics of action based in politics, ideology, and culture as the root of much collective action, and they have looked to other sources of identity such as ethnicity, gender and sexuality as the definers of collective identity. The term ‘new social movements’ thus refers to a diverse array of collective actions that have presumably displaced the old social movement of proletarian revolution associated with classical Marxism” (Buechler 1995, p. 442).

In the 1970s the foundation of several fragmented pressure groups, focused on specific sectors, increased. Most of these groups used the street as their stage for political articulation. Different action groups and citizen initiatives started to get engaged in several

⁶ These ones which have NSM as an focus

topics and created Peace and Anti-War movements, Feminist movements, Social-Ecology movements, Anti-Nuclear movements and alternative housing projects.

From this moment the chronological classification of New Social Movements took place. Still, this field of research has a lot of challenges in defining and in doing classification as there is no distinctive institutional research on social movements with consensual results (Rucht 2008, p. 7).

We also need to be clear about the threat to “treat the social movement as a phenomenon sui generis, and to search for general laws of its operation’ as this approach to compare human affairs and social sciences to ‘the laws of Newtonian mechanics has, however, utterly failed” (Tilly 2009, p. 10).

Characteristics of New Social Movements, defined by the German sociologist Rucht:

- Intermediate level of organization
- Membership is not well-regulated
- Spontaneity
- Differentiation to other movements and political campaigns
- Mostly it has an historical development and/or an historical precursor
- Structures similar to the structure of networks
- Standard of inclusion and participation
- Abolishment of negative consequences of the modernisation of
- Collective and public action
- Having presence in the media
- Not institutionalized, extra-parliamentary
- Campaign and project based mobilization
- There is a perspective
- It has an impact

(Roth & Rucht 2008, p. 21f.)

Aims and goals of new social movements are very diverse but in general there are some claims inter-sectorial. First of all the call for democratization and participation. Furthermore

most movements demand the improvement of living conditions. All claims are linked with a clear criticism on authorities and institutions.

New social movements are distinctively characterized as a kind of network with uncomplicated and informal internal structures, which might be active either locally or internationally.

The range of utilized instruments and actions can be very diverse: From ‚classical‘ demonstrations to civil disobedience.

Even though movements and protest are normally recognized in the public as spontaneous and not well organized, most of them are very well prepared and are internally organized to a large extent.

A movement is not an organization in itself, but needs organizations to get moved. Without the continuous engagement of some organisations a mobilization for movements is unlikely (Roth & Rucht 2008, p. 25).

How these organisational structures are influencing movements and the process of mobilization will be contextualized in the chapter *Framing Theory*.

The German sociologist Dieter Rucht, who is also professor at the University of Berlin and a researcher in the field of social movements, is looking into the question what *New Social Movements* are. Movements in general are considered as movement not before a network of groups and organisations, based on a collective identity, continuously claims the restructuring of societies and systems. So it should be more than just negating things (Roth & Rucht 2008, p.13).

Here it is an essential attitude that the movement has the will and the potential for bringing about a social change. This characteristic differ social movements from episodes of protests or other political actions (Roth & Rucht 2008, p. 13).

Furthermore it is necessary that the movement has the assumption that society is changeable. New Social Movements are strategic or able to establish strategies.

Political parties and associations might be potentially part of collective actions, but are not a condition for the emergence of social movements (Roth & Rucht 2008, p. 13ff.).

The American researcher on social movements Alan Scott, who published in 1990 the standard work *Ideology and the new social movements*, defines new social movements as a network of collective action, created by individuals “who understand themselves to have common interests and, for at least some significant part of their social existence, a common identity. Social movements are distinguished from other collective actors, such as political parties and pressure groups, in that they have mass mobilization, or the threat of mobilization, as their prime source of social sanction, and hence of power. They are further distinguished from other collectivities, such as voluntary associations or clubs, in being chiefly concerned to defend or change Society or the relative position of the group in society” (Scott 1990, p. 6). Alan Scott characterizes new social movements as social and cultural which have an impact on the civil society. They try to change the society in living an alternative way of living (See standard work from Scott 1990).

By describing and defining social movements in a particular framework and field of research the historical context has to be taken into consideration. “On the whole, analysts of social movements treat them as expressions of current attitudes, interests, or social conditions rather than as elements of longer-run histories” (Tilly 2009, p. 8).

Due to this line of argumentation this thesis will take historical aspects and contexts into consideration of the analysis of the case in Italy and Egypt (See chapter *Milestones of Social Movements*).

This will be conducted by following arguments of Charles Tilly: “first we must trace the origins and transformations of the social movement’s major elements: campaigns, repertoires, and WUNC displays. How, for example, did the now-familiar street demonstration take shape and even acquire an uneasy legal standing in most democratic countries? Second, we must uncover the social processes that encourage or inhibit proliferation of social movements. (...) Third, we must examine how the elements of social movements interacted with other forms of politics. To what extent and how, for example, did industrial strikes, electoral campaigns, and social movements intersect and influence each other? Finally, we must show what causes important aspects of change and variation in social movements” (Tilly, 2009 p. 12).

3.2. Social Movement Theories

An ongoing, very controversial discourse in the field of research of social movements is the conflict between positivism, constructivism and critical realism. This conflict is actually just reflecting the status quo of controversies in social sciences in general.

As this thesis is partly based on interpretations of the theorist Alan Scott, besides several other scholars, a strong argument of not using a positivist approach is existent.

A positivist assumption is that (natural) laws, rules and mechanisms are applicable to social sciences. Smelser's theory of collective behaviour for example is based on the "creation of master propositions" (Smelser in Scott 1990, p. 40).

Scott argues that there are a number of further criticisms to Smelser's approach. "Even if we suspend possible doubt as to the adequacy of a positivist philosophy of science in general, there remain serious obstacles to identifying 'laws' in the sphere of social life" (Scott 1990, p. 41).

Furthermore Scott indicates that general theories of social movements has a clear limitation, just because it "stem(s) precisely from their generalizing ambitions" (Scott, 1990, p. 52).

Scholars of new social movements are in contrast to this generalizing and positivist approaches and "there has been a return to actual conditions under which social movement activity takes place" (Scott 1990, p. 52).

	Workers' movement	New social movements
<i>Location</i>	Increasingly within the policy	Civil society
<i>Aims</i>	Political integration/ economic rights	Changes in values and lifestyle/ defence of civil society
<i>Organization</i>	Formal/ hierarchical	Network/grass roots
<i>Medium of action</i>	Political mobilization	Direct action/ cultural innovation

Table 1: Key points of contrast between new movements and the workers movement (Scott 1990, p. 19).

3.2.1. Resource Mobilization Theory

The Approach of the *Resource Mobilization Theory* (RMT) was first published in the 1960s by mainly four theorists: Olson, McCarthy, Zald and Gurr.

This theory has different interpretations but it aims to explain and describe mechanisms and reasons of mobilization for and participation in social movements.

Olson's interpretation in *The Logic of Collective Action* from 1965 is based on the assumption that 'individuals act rationally to maximize their interests and minimize their costs' (Scott, 1990 p. 110)

Resource Mobilization Theory has become one of the 'main' theories, especially in the US, to describe and analyze social movements. "With its characteristic premises of rational actors engaged in instrumental action through formal organization to secure resources and foster mobilization, this paradigm has demonstrated considerable theoretical and empirical merit for understanding social movements" (Buechler 1995, p. 441).

"The resource mobilization approach emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. It examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements. (...) The new approach depends more upon political sociology and economic theories than upon the social psychology of collective behavior" (McCarthy et al. 1990, p. 16).

The RMT is based on Ted Gurr's theory of relative deprivation, which identifies deprivation and disadvantages as one psychological factor for individuals to participate in protests (See also standard work *Why men rebel* from Ted Gurr 1972).

Relative deprivation is the discrepancy between goods and circumstances people believe they are in title of, and goods and circumstances they actually have or can, realistically, achieve. The emotion and realization of this contradiction and/or gap is defined as relative deprivation. This deprivation leads to frustration and might activate individuals to rebel (Gurr 1972, p. 33f.).

In this period the RMT brought a new perspective on social movements as it was not arguing just on an individual level nor on a pure systemic level. The combination of institution, individuals and movements was a new approach.

Main characteristics of social movements according the RMT are:

- “(a) movement actions are rational, adaptive responses to the costs and rewards of different lines of action;
 - (b) The basic goals of movements are defined by conflicts of interest built into institutionalized power relations;
 - (c) The grievances generated by such conflicts are sufficiently ubiquitous that the formation and mobilization of movements depend on changes in resources, group organization, and opportunities for collective action;
 - (d) centralized, formally structured movement organizations are more typical of modern social movements and more effective at mobilizing resources and mounting sustained challenges than decentralized, informal movement structures; and
 - (e) The success of movements is largely determined by strategic factors and the political processes in which they become enmeshed”
- (Jenkins 1983, p. 528).

Deprivation is just one factor while the RMT tries to name other aspects on what triggers the emergence of social movements. Hence the theory defines structural deficits and problems in societies as a main cause for the development of protest and social movements from a socio-political, economic and cultural (hegemonic) angle. These deficits are essential triggers for displeasure, which lead people to articulate their needs and to participate, more or less active, in movements.

As already mentioned: Deprivation represents just one factor of motivation for participation and is not sufficient enough to explain why people participate in protest movements, as a widespread disappointment on socio-political or economic issues leads not automatically to large movements.

In fact basic requirements for the mobilization of resources needs to be identified:

Only after disadvantaged, non-organized social groups do have the possibility to use resources to support their claim for change, deprivation and consternation will turn into protest and movements (Jenkins & Perrow in Zimmermann 1998, p. 55).

The German historian Zimmermann argues that the RMT describes very well why highly motivated individuals who do not avoid high ‚costs‘ in the start-up phase of a social

movement, contribute to the emergence of it, whether the reason is that these individuals do have the intrinsic ideological beliefs or that they gain leading positions at a later stage (Zimmermann 1998, p. 60).

Hence the ability of organized individuals to mobilize resources can influence the success of protest movements. These resources might be financial, staffing, experience, expert knowledge, tangible goods, solidarity or other means (Zimmermann 1998, p. 55).

Which taxonomy is behind potential mobilization?

The *Rational-Choice-Theory*⁷ indicates possible mechanisms: There is a cost-benefit equation of individuals concerning the participation in such movements.

- (1) As participation in collective action is always related to costs and investments (financially, time wise or by other means) deprivation is not automatically leading to the Emerge of protest movements. Participation is often based on a cost-benefit equation of individuals.
- (2) Potential actors in social movements are not only coming from marginalized groups, rather from established (pressure) groups or institutions (such as associations, political parties, etc.)
- (3) Coordination is an essential key for the allocation and mobilization of resources
- (4) Costs for protests might be influenced (reduced or increased) by governmental interventions

(Kern 2008, p. 122).

Hence the *Resource Mobilization Approach* assumes that social movements are an organizational entity as such, are calculable and do act in a (normative) rational way.

Critics accuse this approach as a very positivist one. Continuous dynamics of such movements would not be properly and detailed taken into consideration, critics say.

3.2.2. Collective Identity

The *Collective Identity* (CI) Theory, which emerged in the 1980s, was mainly defined and described by the Italian researcher on social movements Alberto Melucci. In his publication

⁷ By Schumpeter et al.

Nomads of the present Melucci is questioning why people get actively involved in protests and actions.

Based on aspects of the RMT that there is a cost-benefit equation of individuals and indications from several empirical studies that there is a high degree on deprivation of actors in protests, Melucci doubts that these factors are sufficient for the emergence of social movements. “Sociologists of social movements have also been attracted to collective identity as a response to gaps in dominant resource mobilization and political process models” (Polletta et al. 2001, p. 283).

An important additional factor for mobilization and participation of individuals in protests and social movements is the identification of individuals as deprived persons and the realization that it is a collective concern. Melucci and the French sociologist Touraine call this factor *Collective Identity*. Aspects of identities are defined as potential resources for mobilization.

Touraine describes the concept as tool to assess and describe roles and identities in movements as the traditional (Marxist) category of classes seems not to be a priority identity in post-modern and post-industrial societies. Collective identities fulfill the function to break up the technocratic order and normative categories of societies (Haunss 2001, p. 260f.).

Melucci describes *collective identity* as a driver for the continuity of movements as it gives the opportunity to have ties with other people of the same ‘identity’ and as it regulates the ‘entrance’ for people to join these movements, which strengthen the feeling of participants to be a part of this movement and collective identity.

Furthermore identities serve the purpose to create a strong sense of unity and to enforce a consensus for all participation actors on the claims and hegemony of the movement (Luhmann & Hellmann 1997, p. 19).

The process of the creation of a collective identity is influenced and conducted by individuals, which do have the consciousness of their options and perspectives. Furthermore the process needs

1. A cognitive definition of aims, goals, means and field of action
2. to identify a network of potential relationships of actors, partners and supporters
3. an emotional investment (or as described in the RMT: an emotional resource)

(Haunss 2001, p. 262) (See also standard work *Nomad of the present* from Alberto Melucci)

In fact theorists of this approach are often using social categories as Class or Milieu (Luhmann & Hellmann 1997, p. 19). Hence Collective Identity Theories do recognize and include dynamics of movements and societies.

3.2.3. Framing Theory

The *Framing Theory* is basically analyzing and describing patterns of interpretation of mobilization processes in and for social movements. It attempts to name mechanisms on how social movements emerge and what processes need to take place.

Theorists of the *Framing Theory* do have the specific focus on “meaning work — the struggle over the production of mobilizing and counter mobilizing ideas and meanings” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 613).

„Meaning work”, in this theory, is replaced and conceptualized with the category „framing”.

The „meaning” or frame of movements is created and influenced by involved actors, as they are “actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 614). Hence these actors and other movement-influencing entities construct, by establishing and implementing frames, a kind of reality.

So this approach might have the potential to analyze the context and link of contents and mobilization processes of movements.

Core framing tasks of the *Framing Theory* is the elaboration of three levels of analysis:

Naming and identification of problems (diagnostic framing), analysis of strategies and perspectives (prognostic framing) and naming of motivational strategies (motivational framing) (Kern 2008, p. 142).

Diagnostic Framing

This frame is supposed to identify problems against which the movement is protesting and assumed persons who caused them.

Such an analysis and identification, which is normally conducted by actors within the movement, is not always going without complications and is not going without saying.

Structures and participating actors are mostly very heterogeneous, hence it is hampering the process of a consensual identification of problems (Kern 2008, p. 143f.). “Controversies regarding whom or what to blame frequently erupt between the various SMOs comprising a social movement as well as within movement organizations” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 616).

Prognostic Framing

Within this frame several approaches and strategies to solve the problem, which were identified in the Diagnostic Framing, are discussed and developed.

Strategies and perspectives are an essential element of social movements as they need to have an idea on how to reach their aims and, not at least, to keep a definite reliability in the public. As in the process of diagnostic framing the process to develop a common understanding on how to solve the problem and which strategy should be applied is a result of complicated negotiations of actors in the movement (Kern 2008, p. 144).

Although different movements have sometimes common identified problems, their strategies and perspectives on how to solve the problem might be totally different. This difference stems from antithetic and diverse ideological, regional, etcetera standpoints.

Actors of the movement have to decide to which extent claims should be detailed. Because the more general claims are, the higher is the likeliness that more people with their individual strategies and claims can join and exist in the (heterogeneous) movement.

Arguments, campaigns and other ‘counter-framing’ measures of the government or opponents can influence prognostic frames “on the one hand, by putting movement activists on the defensive, at least temporarily, and, on the other hand, by frequently forcing it to develop and elaborate prognoses more clearly than otherwise might have been the case” (Benford & Snow 2000, p. 617).

Motivational Framing

The third level of the Framing Theory is the analysis on how to stimulate individuals to participate active in such a movement. The addressees of mobilization need to get some inducement to get engaged: Whether it is appreciation and solidarity or a moralist appeal (Kern 2008, p. 145).

Framing-Strategies

Framing Strategies and the Framing Theory is having its focus on constructivist approaches of social movements. Patterns of interpretation are constructed with the aim to ensure

legitimation within the movement and to justify its existence and the importance of the claims to the public (Luhmann & Hellmann 1997, p. 20).

According to scholars of the *Framing Theory*, movements do use basically four different strategies to reach this aim: the systematical link of several ideological approaches to a framework of interpretation, the accentuation of specific contents, the broadening of previous patterns of interpretation and reinterpretation of conflicting interpretive patterns (Kern 2008, p. 146f.).

Master Frames

Most new social movements do have a very specific focus on a dedicated topic or theme. They have particular claims which are related to this limited theme.

The experience of the last years indicated that several movements in different countries and continents (e.g. Occupy movement, ‚Arab spring‘) do have common patterns and can be seen as one collective (global or regional) movement.

This phenomenon is described by the term *Master Frames*: generally formulated and developed frames can be applied on a sum of smaller or geographical spread movements.

It includes the de-specification of identified problems and triggers and a generalization of claims.

The success and the expansion of movements is linked to the concept of *Master Frames*, according to scholars of this theory (Kern 2008, p. 149ff.).

To conclude: If it is to be believed, social movements create public attention in favor for their protests to convince the public and to mobilize further actors.

3.2.4. Political Opportunity Structures

While the *Resource Mobilization* and the *Framing Theory* are more focused on ‘push-factors’ of mobilization for protests, the theory of *Political Opportunity Structures* is more looking into ‘pull-factors’ in social movements (Kern 2008, p. 153).

Important scholars of this approach are Eisinger, Goldstone, Gamson and Meyer.

An essential assumption in this theory is that protests and movements always needs to be contextualized with current circumstances in which they emerged.

Social movements are presenting themselves in the public on the one hand as representatives for public welfare and on the other hand as advocates for reforms. With this strategy movements do reach people, who have the feeling that they are not represented by existing political actors and, as a consequence, are getting mobilized.

The concept of political and cultural opportunity structures is analyzing and describing the connectivity of topics and patterns of action in a broader societal framework, as not all signs, rite and symbols are efficient to create a kind of resonance in the public (Kern 2008, p. 157).

The better patterns of interpretation, claims and the analysis of problems are adjusted to institutional and societal frameworks, the higher is the potential and the success for protest movements (Kern 2008, p. 157).

In the POS, these societal and institutional frameworks are often defined as civil spheres with three categories: 1. Mass media, 2. Politics and 3. Law, Justice

Thereby it needs to be considered that this civil sphere is not existing autonomy as an isolated category rather than being a crosscutting aspect which needs to be defended.

Movements have the function to establish concepts of solidarity and to create collective identities (Kern 2008, p. 161f.).

A movement has a high chance to succeed with its project when it creates public acceptance by linking their patterns of interpretation and their identification of problems with the predominant hegemony, cultural and political structures and frames.

Furthermore the theory assumes that social movements are not isolated actors in the public.

In fact they are embedded in a complex structure of the society in which, interdependently, they act and react to the action of other actors in the society.

Opportunity-Sets are dependent on structures of an institutional framework. Public recognition of protest movements are directly affected by cultural patterns of interpretation.

Furthermore the reaction of the state and other public actors do influence, either positive or negative the emergence and the process of social movements (Kern 2008, p. 158).

Another essential factor of opportunities of movements is the way a state or government react to the emergence. If protests are accepted by the state and if the claims of the movement are well linked to the hegemony of a society, there is a high possibility that a broad movement emerge. If the claims are not well linked and large parts of the society do not respond to the

protests, the movement will get isolated and will be very limited (by thematic aspects or geographically) (Kern 2008, p. 173).

Same aspects are applicable for the sector of repression. The success of a movement is also very dependent on the repression of a state.

In fact if we compare both factors with a potential perspective of movements a matrix can be drawn:

Reaction of the state:	Acceptance	Weak repression	Heavy repression
Cultural/political resonance high	Social movement	Revolution	Instable/failing state
Cultural/political resonance low	Isolated movement	Guerrilla/Terrorism	Underground movement

Table 2: Interdependencies between the reaction of the state and cultural/political resonance (Goldstone in Kern 2008, p. 173).

By rating this table we come to a temporary conclusion: The number of activists and supporters raises the higher cultural and state acceptance is. With an increasing repression (from the state) the coordination between several actors of the movement and with the public is getting much more difficult (Kern 2008, p. 174).

Developments of a movement is not only dependent on the previous discussed factors. Especially in the case of a high cultural and political acceptance in the public, the movement has to invest more and more resources in order to keep the unity of a movement. This phenomenon is due to the fact that, with an increasing number of ‚participants‘, coordination is getting harder. This can lead to a kind of ‚burn out‘ of a movement (Tarrow 1991, p. 660).

Even if this approach is increasingly being used in the field of research of social movements it is not without controversy: Jasper and Goodwin are criticizing the missing consensus of scholars on how to operationalize this concept. Furthermore this approach has its limits as there are a number of contradictory definitions of this theory, due to the complexity of this approach (Kern 2008, p. 154).

3.2.5. Social Movements in the World System (Frank)

The co-founder of the *World System Theory* Andre Gunder Frank developed in the 80s and 90s a theory on how social movements function and how they are embedded in international frameworks. His theory is based on his participation and observation in and of protest movements.

New social movements emerged as a kind of ‘the other side of the coin’ of colonialism and nation building. Potential reasons for this change of paradigm are, according Frank, the failing success previous movements had when they relied on political parties and the approach to take over the power in the state by using the structures of the existing state. This frustration led to the development of new strategies, which are aiming to change the society and not only to replace the power of the state (Frank 1990, p. 163f.).

Paradigms and claims of new social movements are definable and reducible to three aspects: Liberty (L), Equality (E) and Solidarity (S). As the analysis of ‘older’ movements sometimes includes Fraternity (F) too, it is included in the analytical framework. Frank calls these paradigms LEF/S.

Already the transition from the paradigm *Revolution* towards new social movements and the claim for Freedom, Equality and Solidarity has an impact on the civil society, as it is already implementing empowered democracy in a participatory society (Frank 1990, p. 164).

Based on the assumption of Marx, and further developed by Lenin, Stalin, Mao and other theorists, labor force and relations of production are created by the state.

Nowadays there is a doubt that the state itself still has the capacities to create them.

Concerning Frank Marxists and (Neo) Liberalists do have the same assumption that labor force and relations of production are only partly influenced by the power of the state (Frank 1990, p. 165).

This change of perspective is emerging by the observation that the globalized world economy is increasingly out of control of governments and states as the power of the state has a limited potential to react across borders of nations.

Hence the control and influence of parties in this field of politics is also very limited nowadays. Much more than previous ,traditional' movements has assumed (Frank 1990, p. 167).

Frank developed ten aspects/thesis on new social movements. Before this chapter will elaborate two of them further, all ten as an overview:

1. New social movements are not new as relations of production didn't change, but they have new strategies. 2. There is a large variety in social movements. 3. Strength and meaning of social movements are periodic 4. Actors and protagonists of movements are coming in the western countries out of the Middle-Class while in the south they have their roots in the workers class. In the east both backgrounds are present. 5. Social movements which are aiming to take over the power of the state are in a high risk of eliminating themselves as a social movement. 6. Social Movements are important agents of social change. 7. Social movements have mostly the clear characteristic that they refuse the capitalistic system. 8. Actors of social movements might get involved in several parallel movements and can get into coalitions with other movements. 9. The Emerge of social movements is not predictable by using general explanations based on positivism. 10. The task of social movements today is to develop and reinterpret democracy further (Frank 1990, p. 171).

In this chapter two dedicated aspects will be elaborated and analyzed in detail: thesis three and nine. Thesis three is based on the assumption of the theorist Kondratieff that there are cycles of economical processes and developments. Nicolai Kondratieff, a Russian economist, experience in the 1920s that "the historical record of some economic indicators then available to him appeared to indicate a cyclic regularity of phases of gradual increases in values of respective indicators followed by phases of decline" (Korotayev 2010, p.3).

This cycle seems to last around 50 years and is continuously, according Kondratieff.

Long wave number	Long wave phase	Dates of the beginning	Dates of the end
Three	A: upswing	1890-1896	1914-1920
	B: downswing	From 1914 to 1928/29	1939-1950
Four	A: upswing	1939-1950	1968-1974
	B: downswing	1968-1974	1984-1991
Five	A: upswing	1984-1991	2008-2010
	B: downswing	2008-2010?	?

Table 3: Phases three, four and five of the Kondratieff - Waves (Korotayev & Zinkina 2010, p. 4).

These Kondratieff-Waves do not only indicate cycles of economic growth but also indicate other processes in the society, according several theorists. “Long waves of economic growth possess a very strong claim to major significance in the social processes of the world system. Long waves of technological change, roughly 40–60 years in duration, help shape many important processes... (...) K-waves have become especially critical to an understanding of economic growth, wars, and systemic leadership... But they also appear to be important to other processes such as domestic political change, culture, and generational change” (Thompson in Korotayev 2010, p. 6).

Hence Frank concludes that protest movements are in a direct interdependency to political, economic and ideological cycles. He assumes that social movements are strong in downswing phases (B). If the circumstances which triggered protest are not existent anymore the movement is breaking down (Frank 1990, p. 171).

Thesis nine is clearly stating that social movements are not predictable and plan-able with general assumptions based on a natural law and inherent mechanisms, as it is used in the field of applied sciences. Frank accuses that plans, thoughts and roadmaps of external ,scientists’ are contra productive and irrelevant (Frank 1990, p. 171f.).

This critics is addressed to all the theories which emerged in the 70s and 80s in the US, such as the RMT or the Deprivation Theory.

3.2.6. Concluding comparison of presented Social Movement Theories

As already indicated in the beginning of this chapter (new) social movement theories do have a great variety in the interpretation of triggers and mechanisms of movements.

The table below shows characteristics of *New Social Movements*.

Issue	Political Version	Cultural Version
General Orientation	Pro-Marxist	Post-Marxist
Representative Theorist	Manuel Castells	Alberto Melucci
Societal Totality	Advanced capitalism	Information society
Image of Power	Systemic, centralized	Diffuse, decentralized
Level of Analysis	Macro-, mesolevel, state-oriented	Meso-, microlevel, civil society, everyday life
Movement Activity	Retains role for instrumental action toward strategic goals	Eschews strategic concerns in favour of symbolic expressions
First Debate: View of New Movements	Potential for progressive orientations if allied with working-class movements	Sees new movements as defensive or rejects category of “progressive”
Third Debate: Evaluation of Movements	Sees political movements as most radical, cultural movements as apolitical	Sees cultural movements as most radical, political movements as co-optable
Fourth Debate: Social Base of Movements	Analyzed in class terms via contradictory locations, new class, or middle class	Analyzed in terms of nonclass constituencies or issues and ideologies

Table 4: Political and cultural versions of New Social Movement Theory (Buechler 1995, p. 457).

Most of the so called theories of new social movements do have a focus on questions like how and why people join protests and less on assumed structural principles (in a positivist way).

Joel Beinin and Frederic Vairel analyzed the applicability of SMT in the Middle East. They come to the conclusion that a pure analysis based on SMT is not sufficient enough to describe movements in the MENA region. A research on social movements in this region needs to be contextualized with history and socio-economic contexts.

“These regions are an inseparable part of global modernity, and that is why authors of this volume regard social and political mobilization, contentious politics, and social movements from these regions as an integral part of the empirical data on which our understanding of these phenomena should be based, using the tools of SMT without embracing them uncritically” (Beinin & Vairel 2011, p. 23).

This thesis has a similar approach as Joel Beinin and Frederic Vairel. The Case Studies will be analyzed on basically four levels:

1. A selection of SMT
2. Historical context
3. Socio-economic context
4. Empirical data

Another pivotal question is if the happenings in Egypt in 2011 were a revolution, a reformist movement or something different. This thesis takes Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin’s aspects on revolutionary situations into consideration, in order to categorize the events in Egypt.

Lenin describes a *revolutionary situation* as the pre-condition for a revolution, even though a revolutionary situation must not lead to a revolution. Main characteristics of a revolutionary situation:

1. “When it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the “upper classes”, a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for “the lower classes not to want” to live in the old way; it is also necessary that “the upper classes should be unable” to live in the old way;
2. when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual;
3. when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in “peace

time”, but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the “upper classes” themselves into independent historical action.” (Lenin 1975, p. 213)

Lenin’s aspects of a revolutionary situation delivers an important guidance on how to initiate an analysis on the case Egypt. So far, this thesis will go further into details, it seems on the first sight, that a revolutionary situation was present in Egypt, while it is very controversial to call the uprisings ‘revolution’. A revolution includes, from a Marxist point of view, a radical change of ownership conditions and relations of production (see standard work *Capital* from Karl Marx) – this radical change didn’t happen so far in Egypt.

As discussed in this chapter there are several layers of social movement theories but actually only two levels: Individual and structural. The separation of social movement theories is not valid without doubts. Most theories do have their origin on an Individual level and spread into the structural level.




Figure 2: Positioning of theories about New Social Movements.

4. Case Study Egypt

4.1. General Conditions

Before this thesis is going to analyze movements in Egypt in detail, a description and interpretation of socio-economic and political conditions of this country of the last decades will be conducted.

For the analysis a limited selection of data on economic growth, demographics and strategies of the economic system will be used. Various standard publications, such as the *Human Development Index*⁸, etc. functions hereby as sources.

Egypt as a country of the semi-periphery shows similar developments as its neighboring countries. By deregulation and export-orientation, often forced by the *International Monetary Fund* and the *World Bank*, the gap between the rich and the poor is getting wider in the last decades. When the world economic crisis occurred recently, the situation got worse (Wettig 2011, p. 38f.).

The strategy of the deregulation in Egypt is based on the structural reform for debt reduction between the Bretton-Woods organizations and the Egyptian government.

State owned companies, which shared 85% of the Egyptian market were privatized in the 90s. Furthermore deregulation in the labor and collective bargaining law and the cut in subsidies for food, energy and medicines took place in this period.

On the country side well-funded investors pushed a high number of peasants out of the market, which led to a rural exodus (Wettig 2011, p. 38f.).

The gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 110 bn. USD (1980) to 450 bn. USD (2010). Between 1990 and 2010 the unemployment rate ranged between 8 and 12 percent. Compared to international standards Egypt shares the rank with Belgium, USA and Sweden.

From 1991 to 2010 the percentage of parts of the society which has to live with less than 1.25 USD per day decreased from 4.5 % to 2 %. The rate is comparable with France or the USA. However: 23 percent of the Egyptian population has not more than 2 USD per day. This number raised and is still raising since the emergence of the recent world economic (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011, p. 68f.). The *World Bank* published in 2007 that the sum of all

⁸ Published annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

categories of ‘poor’ (extremely, poor, near-poor) makes nearly 44 percent of the population (Beinin & Vairel 2011, p. 186).

A focus on very distinctive statistical series which might influenced the emergence of the movements in January 2011: As we can see in figure 6 the prices for wheat increased dramatically end of 2010 and in the beginning of 2011.

The price for a ton of wheat in February 2011 was already 350 USD, whereas in May 2010 the price was 200 USD for the same amount (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011, p. 58ff.).

So far the results are: an increasing number of people in Egypt, who have less than 2 USD per day for their disposal, while the costs for wheat and food are rising.

The *Food Price Index* from the *Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)* indicates a rise in Egypt from 2003 till 2011 of about 200% (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011, p. 75).




Figure 3: Prices in USD per ton of wheat (US, No.2 Hard Red Winter (Ordinary Protein), US Gulf, f.o.b., (Tuesday)) (Food and Agricultural Organization – FAO 2013).

The population structure is affected by a demographic change, similar to Europe.

Thus the birth rate between 2003 and 2009 dropped from 1.9 to 1.78. This trend will continue.

Remarkable indeed is the increasing number of Egyptians who are between 20 and 24 years old.

Baby boomers and a dwindling child mortality led to this phenomenon called ,Youth-Bulge‘. As a result there is be a disproportional high ratio of young people between 1995 and 2015 (See Graph below).




Figure 4: Youth aged between 20 and 29 in ratio to Egyptian population (United Nations Population Information Network - calculated by author of this thesis).

The American sociologist Jack Goldstone is arguing 2002 that a fast rise of a young social stratum might lead to an instability in the concerned state. “Large youth cohorts are often drawn to new ideas and heterodox religions, challenging older forms of authority. In addition, because most young people have fewer responsibilities for families and careers, they are relatively easily mobilized for social or political conflicts. Youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded history, and the existence of a youth bulge (...) has historically been associated with times of political crisis. Most major revolutions, most twentieth-century revolutions in developing countries have occurred, where exceptionally large youth bulges were present” (Goldstone 2002, p. 11f.).

To overcome the economic stagnation in the end of the 90s, the government of Ahmed Nazif pushed forward in a very offensive way the deregulation and privatization to attract investors

from Europe, USA and China. With this reform agenda an increasing tension between classes and a social friction was provoked which the state tried to contain by a promotion of repression (Probst & Kraitt 2011, p. 8f.).

“Law 203 of 1991 implementing the ERSAP specified 314 public sector enterprises eligible for privatization. By mid-2002, 190 enterprises were fully or partially sold off (CARANA Corporation 2002). An economic slowdown slackened the pace of privatization for the next two years. Law 203 forbids mass layoffs after privatization of a firm. Therefore managers of public sector firms slated for privatization typically make them more attractive to buyers by reducing the workforce before the sale” (Knight in Bein in Bein & Vairel 2011, p. 186).

In addition the terms of employment are often very precarious in Egypt. In 2010 estimated three million people do not have sufficient regular contracts or contracts at all. Precarious in this case means that they do not have job protection and can be dismissed at any time. Furthermore these employers do not have any social or health insurance (Probst & Kraitt 2011, p. 10f.).

Due to the deregulation large parts of the industry in Egypt are not bounded on a number of labor legislations and as a result the minimum wage, which was approved in 2010, is for around seven million employers’ not applicable (Probst & Kraitt 2011, p. 11).

The typical wages for workers were in July 2007 some 19 USD. This is less than wages in 1988 (Bein in Bein 2011, p. 187).

Another important factor in the field of socio-economics in Egypt is the exceptional role of the Army. Approximately 25% market share is in the hand of active or former high rank army members. The reform agenda of the government was clearly criticized by these army functionaries, as the monopole of this economic empire was in danger. These circumstances might explain the conflict between new and old economic elites which probably resulted in the very special opinion and the dedicated behavior during the uprisings in 2011. One of these actors who criticized the agenda of the government was the owner of a major steel producing company Ahmed Ezz, which unfolded the dispute, especially about the successor of Hosni Mubarak (Probst & Kraitt 2011, p. 9).

These factors are indicators for the fragmentation and might explain the role of the army in the Egyptian society and are important to understand the environment in which the uprisings took place. A further analysis will be conducted in chapter 4.3.4.

All these aspects made the Egyptian society since the beginning of the world economic crisis in 2008 very vulnerable: Increasing prices for wheat and food, deregulation, precarious labor conditions, the 'Youth-Bulge'.

The 'hand in hand' of global developments, the claim for economic power and political elites – with fragmented actors and entities, characterizes the (specific) conditions of Egypt.

But this thesis will analyze possible triggers and reasons for the uprisings in Egypt in chapter 4.4.

4.2. Milestones of social movements in Egypt since 2000

The last decade in Egypt was characterized by a rise of protest within and from the civil society.

This rise and the developments in Egypt are not an isolated phenomenon of this country.

In general there is an increasing number of social movements and protests in the last years, especially in Asia, Northern Africa and the Middle East.

Probst and Kraitt (2011, p. 6) locate the origin of those protests in the processes of unequal developments of capitalist accumulation and the *World System*, which produces tensions and conflicts within societies. A very specific characteristic for Egypt is the presence of two capitalist regimes within one system: State capitalism and a neoliberal economy. According Leo Trotzki such combinations do not contain an inherent stability and so the likelihood that uprisings emerge in such countries is much higher than in western states. (Probst & Kraitt 2011, p. 6). Furthermore the permanent discrepancy of 'modern societies' versus 'underdeveloped societies', created mostly by a eurocentristic understanding of development, triggers a fragmentation within a state and implements a hegemony of the need for 'modern' elites and a 'delivering' population (see also Davidson Neil 2012).

As a consequence the historical emergence of movements needs to be taken into consideration.

In the media and even in social sciences the uprisings in the MENA region are often called 'the Arab spring'. What happened in the end of 2010 and 2011, especially in Tunisia and in

Egypt wouldn't have been possible, if there weren't processes of mobilization and organization of protest movements in the last decade.

Also the fact that a ,new left', mostly organized by young activists emerged in the last decade, fostered the developments, strategies and mobilization processes of the uprisings in Egypt 2011.

For a better understanding the last decade is basically divided into four cycles of protests, as a concept known in social movements:

Cycle 1: 2000-2003

In September 2000 the "start of a new era of Egyptian street politics" (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 94) based on the solidarity movement with Palestine took place. "The second intifada triggered perhaps the largest and most radical spontaneous demonstrations in the Arab worlds since the first Gulf war" (Pratt in El-Mahdi 2009, p. 94).

Main actors of the organization of these protests had been (left-wing) students, supported by peace activists and high-school students. An important role in this process played the students of the American University in Cairo: highly educated people from the elites, "attended by many sons and daughters of senior officials of the regime" (El-Mahdi 2009, p.94; Taghian 2011).

During this protests the Tahrir square was for the first time scene of the gathering of protesters. All over the country large numbers of demonstrations in schools and on public spaces were registered.

"The solidarity movement provided an opportunity for broad sectors of the Egyptian masses, especially students, to practise expression of disenchantment towards the regime through demonstrations, on-campus activities and boycott campaigns directed against Israel and its American ally" (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 94).

Out of this mobilization big demonstrations against the US invasion in Iraq 2003 took place. Indeed these demonstrations were not as big as during the Intifada, but still students and other organizers of the demonstrations in 2000 succeeded in keeping a continuous mobilization for various concerns.

"On 20 March 2003 activists called a demonstration in central Cairo, expecting a few hundred to attend but drawing over 40,000 people to Tahrir Square. (...) Protestors occupied the square for over 24 hours in what soon became known as a Tahrir intifada before security forces could disperse them. (...) Over the following days university campuses around the

country as well as potential assembly spaces – mosques, squares and student residences – were surrounded by armoured security cars and riot police” (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 94f.).

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was not very present and did not participated in these protests. In fact the MB was irrelevant for these movements (Taghian 2011).

Cycle 2: 2004-2005

Out of the peace and solidarity movements from the first cycle, a (large) coalition emerged in 2004 and 2005. This coalition contained mostly youth activists with several ideological backgrounds as for example Nasserists, Socialists, Liberals and parts of the youth of the MB. Various groups were also included: “Women for Democracy (,The Street is Ours‘), Youth for Change, Journalists for Change, Artists for Change and Workers for Change. Despite differences, underlying principles were shared by these groups” (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 88).

The coalition (alliance) was named *Kifaya!*, which means ,Enough‘. ”Kefaya‘ (sic!) ,and its sister groups, together known as Harakat al-Tag’eer (Movement for Change), attracted much attention in Egypt and abroad’ and marked, by keeping continuous protests alive, a ‘distinct period in contemporary Egyptian politics’” (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 87 f.).

2004 the alliance challenged for the first time since years the government (Regime) and claimed the resignation of Hosni Mubarak respectively “rejecting the prospect that Gamal Mubarak, the president’s younger son, would ,inherit’ power” (Shehata 2004, p. 4).

Furthermore they agreed on the concept of electoral democracy as a potential aim. Mostly young people which were new to politics in general and street action in particular were drawn by this movement.

The strategies of the movement was very diverse: From street action and protests to ‘guerrilla’ methods, from city centers to specific districts (such as Sayyida Zeinab) or villages. Mobile Short Message Service, social network platforms and other digital means, as well as ‘ordinary’ flyer distribution was used for the mobilization. “In an important development, young people made extensive use of blogs and activist websites dedicated to arranging demonstrations, disseminating information about arrests and charges, and debating strategy and tactics” (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 90).

One of these demonstrations was near the center of Cairo in the district Shubra. By calling claims and slogans “most residents had never heard in public” (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 91), around 500 activists walked through the district, shopping malls and residential areas.

Even though the *Movement for Change* was not a mass phenomenon, it succeeded in confronting the state and in empowering people by encouraging them.

The following movements and protests were inspired by the ‘new’ groups and networks which emerged in this cycle. ‘Kifaya’ was the corollary of the first cycle and the model for following cycles (and protests) (Bassem 2013).

Also El-Mahdi (2009, p. 93) came to a similar conclusion after conducting interviews with activists: “Kifaya was in fact a ‘third cycle’ of activism that followed closely upon earlier movements – the pro-intifada mobilisations of 2000-2001 and the anti-war movement of 2003”.

These coalitions and protests from 2004 on were very important as they were “providing forums for engagement of activists outside the discredited party platforms. They also provided space for continued contact and collaboration among activists, offering opportunities for self-education in negotiation, tactics, and means of overcoming ideological divisions in the interest of achieving shared aims” (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 94f.).

Beinin (2007, p. 11) comments that although Kifaya’s national organisational capacity was limited, “the slogan Kifaya! [‘Enough!’] caught on in Egypt and abroad. For... two years the movement inspired myriad offshoots” (El-Mahdi 2009, p. 90).

In the end of 2005 the alliance lost its prominence and influence, due to internal conflicts and increasing repression from the state (Taghian 2011). Even though the organizational capacity of *Kifaya!* was limited, the movement was able to inspire many following movements.

Cycle 3: 2006-2008

In 2006 strikes of workers took place across the country, which was the first time since the coup d’état of Nasser.

Egypt hasn’t had any real independent trade unions, as the official trade union was staffed and linked by the Government. Labor agreements were often just a farce, if approved at all, and had no real impact on working conditions and wages.

This wave of strike was triggered by a walkout of workers of the textile industry in the small city Mahalla al-Kubra and spread across the country within days.

Show down of this movement was on the 6. April 2008 when the workers of the textile manufactory *Ghazl El-Mahalla* in Mahalla al-Kubra occupied buildings of the company and claimed higher wages, a minimum wage and improved working and living conditions.

The action opened out in a two day street battle between the workers, solarized neighbors and a large number of security forces (Taghian 2011).

On 6. April 2008 the workers and activists of the strike wave were supported by a group called ‘Youth Movement of the 6 April’ which was founded via Facebook. This, later on very famous Facebook group called for a general strike, which was not successful at all.

This ‘6 April Movement’ continued its work after the suppressed strike wave by staying active on Facebook and by acting as a kind of blog for reports of repression and direct actions.

They were also very involved in the mobilization for the protests in January 2011 (Bassem 2013).

Cycle 4: 2008-2012

In this cycle several initiatives, networks and action groups emerged. Based on questions and topics like Human Rights, repression and corruption, most of these groups organized themselves and mobilized new activists via social networks and blogs. One of the most important campaigns was the movement ‘We are all Khaled Said’ which refers to the murder of the blogger Khaled Said in Egypt. Khaled Said was beaten to death by police officers in Alexandria on 6 June 2010 (Human Rights Watch 2010).

Chronic of happenings from January 2011

- 25.01.** Manifestations in Cairo, Mahalla Al-Kubra and many other cities in Egypt. Occupation of Tahrir.
- 26.01.** Eviction of Tahrir. Street riots in Cairo.
- 27.01.** Heavy street riots in Suez.
- 28.01.** Massive manifestations in Cairo. Army is entering the streets. Tahrir is occupied again.
- 01.02.** From this day ‘Pro Mubarak’ thugs attacking the Tahrir again and again.
- 10.02.** Press conference: Mubarak stays but his vice takes over daily business.
- 11.02.** After weeks of massive protests steps Mubarak down. The SCAF takes over.

In addition to the relatively large campaign in the context of the murder, the happenings in Tunisia in 2010 mobilized more and more people in Egypt.

On Tuesday 25th January a manifestation against the National Police Day was planned, due to the increasing repression of the police in general and the killing of Khaled Said in particular.

Many opposition groups supported and joined this demonstration – the demonstration from where the Egypt uprisings took its course.

The protests and uprisings from January 2011 are the result of a long-toothed process of frustration, marginalization and finally of experiences from social conflicts. What happened in the beginning of 2011 was not appearing spontaneously from nowhere but rather a happening prepared by hundreds of activists and networks with experiences and partnerships from the last cycles (Shahyar 2011, p. 56f.). Only in 2010 around 1000 strikes, various demonstrations against the ‚inheritance’ of the power to Gamal Mubarak and the claim for human rights took place. There was an opposition even before January 2011. But this opposition was small (Saber 2011, p. 20).




Figure 5: Supporters and opponents of Mubarak's overthrow (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 2012, p. 21).

4.3. Protagonists of the movements

It is a clearly difficult undertaking to define protagonists of a social movement in general and of the movements in Egypt in particular. Definitions about categories are always linked to ideological schools, historical context and not least on identities of activists and actors. As this thesis is dealing with contemporary movements, these would be identified as New Social Movements, according the discourse and arguments of several scholars (as discussed in the chapter on SMTs). New Social Movements do not categorize actors as classes in the meaning of traditional Marxism. As a consequence it is very difficult though to identify actors as a class or any other mostly from the west established category.

Some scholars do use categories such as subalterns or popular forces. The professor of political sciences at the SOAS in London, Salwa Ismail uses 'the terms 'subaltern forces' and 'popular forces' interchangeably' (Ismail 2013, p. 867). By doing so, she grounds her category on definitions of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian theorist and founder of the Communist Party of Italy. In the view of the author of this thesis, the use of western categories and categories of 'traditional' Marxism are not sufficient, as it refers to social classes. In this chapter it will be elaborated that most actors did not identify themselves primarily as a part of a social class and as the movements in Egypt are considered as NSM.

The protest movements of the last decade in general and of the uprisings in particular is characterized to a large extent by heterogeneity.

Indeed, in the opinion of various activists and scholars the back bone of social protests and movements in Egypt is the left, but still: different groups and networks from different ideological schools supported and influenced protests. From the right wing to the left wing, from secular forces to religious groups and parties: all of them mobilized and participated in the demonstrations and direct actions.

It is to be emphasized again, that the happenings in January 2011 were in its core not only spontaneous: the actors and organizations which were key elements in the organization of the protest were connected already years before *Tahrir*.

The membership structure was characterized by young unemployed and young academic members, which organized themselves via internet and Facebook. Out of this network the *Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution* was born (Asseburg 2011).

In this coalition following groups, in addition to individuals, were organized:

- the Campaign for Supporting ElBaradei,

- the April 6 Movement,
- the Youth Movement for Justice and Freedom,
- the Youth of the Democratic Front Party,
- the Muslim Brotherhood Youth
- the Facebook group ‘We are all Khaled Said’

(The Revolutionary Youth Coalition’s Final Report; Shahyar 2011, p. 23f.)

Robert Dreyfuss wrote on 31. January 2011 in the American magazine *The Nation*: “It’s spontaneous, yes, triggered by the explosion in Tunisia. But contrary to some media reports, which have portrayed the upsurge in Egypt as a leaderless rebellion, a fairly well organized movement is emerging to take charge, comprising students, labor activists, lawyers, a network of intellectuals, Egypt’s Islamists, a handful of political parties and miscellaneous advocates for ‘change’” (Dreyfuss 2011).

Main actors of the uprisings are primarily the unemployed youth which has almost no perspectives. Many of them are highly educated and some received their education in the western world. This revolutionary youth was supported by lower classes from the suburbs as the unemployment rate there is also very high (Todenhöfer 2012, p. 21).

Within the structures of the *Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution* the *6 April Movement* had an essential role. The coalition took profit from the potential of mobilization of this movement and especially from the highly experienced members. (See also chapter about *6 April Youth Movement*)

Another important actor within the coalition is the Facebook group ,We are all Khaled Said‘, which organized the manifestation against the National Police Day in Egypt on the 25 January 2011. Original reason for this manifestation was the killing of the blogger Khaled Said in 2010.

Left activists and radical socialists played a big role at the Tahrir in general. They have been the backbone of the protests in the first days and weeks. The committee of the revolutionary youth was the highest representative of the uprisings (Shahyar 2011, p. 23f.).

Hassan Saber, activist of *Kifaya!* indicates in an interview that most activists are coming from Student movements, NGOs and workers. The opposition had a very difficult time during the

government of Mubarak, as they have been oppressed during all the years (Saber 2011, p. 20).

This thesis is presenting some selected organizations and entities, which are considered as 'key players' or are important in the context of the framework of the Emergence of the uprisings:

National Association for Change (NAC)

The NAC was established beginning 2010 around the previous head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and potential opposition leader Muhammad ElBaradei.

It is a very heterogeneous melting pot of several ideologies and religions, without a clear program on policy. Nevertheless many activist which used to stay with *Kifaya!* joined the NAC (Asseburg 2011).

Youth movements

As already contextualized in the chapter 'General Conditions' since 2005 Egypt experiences a so called youth bulge with an increasing youth unemployment rate.

Parts of the affected youth organized themselves in several networks, organizations and parties. Blogs and Facebook groups, such as 'We are all Khaled Said' and many others played a big role in the mobilization process, but was surely not the only tool or trigger. Many young activists joined, among many others, the 6 April Movement, the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood youth or the Revolutionary Youth Union. The variety is huge and as a result we cannot refer to the *Youth Movement*. Young were actually present all over the organizations as a kind of crosscutting phenomenon.




Figure 6: Respondents on participation in the protests (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 2012, p. 29).

Kifaya!

The coalition was founded in 2004 from over 300 intellectuals with different ideological backgrounds. It was a melting pot of activists which basically claimed the end to the Mubarak era. As already described in this thesis *Kifaya!* organized several protests, actions and demonstrations since 2004 against the emergency law, corruption, elites and much more

„On 12 December 2004 *Kifaya!* held its first – silent – demonstration. This came less than three months after the idea for a new Campaigning group and the slogan ‚Kifaya!‘ had first been discussed at a dinner by seven veteran activists, including Marxists, Nasserists, Islamists and Liberals. (...). Nonetheless, a year after its establishment, *Kifaya!* had accumulated some 1,800 signatures on a founding statement – a significant index of support in a society in which public expression of dissent has long implied close attention by the security services” (*Kifaya!* in El-Mahdi 2009, p. 89f.).

Main claims of *Kifaya!*:

- „termination of the current monopoly of power at all levels, starting with the seat of the President of the Republic;
- Effecting the rule of law as the supreme source of legitimacy;
- Elimination of the current unfounded [economic] monopoly and squandering of the wealth of the nation;
- Regaining Egypt’s legitimate and significant, if now lost, place among the family of nations (*Kifaya!* in El-Mahdi 2009, p. 89f.)

Decision making within *Kifaya!* happened on a horizontal level, although there is a steering committee which consists of representatives from ‘the Karama Party (Nasserist); the Ghad Party (Liberals); the Center Party and the Labour Party (Islamists); and the Revolutionary Socialist Organisation. With the exception of the Ghad, all were illegal (unlicensed by the state)’ (El Mahdi 2009, p. 92).

Due to the repression from the Mubarak administration and internal conflicts *Kifaya!* Disrupted in 2006. With the protests 2011 *Kifaya!* gained in importance again.

Youth for Freedom and Justice

The pluralist network with a strong participation of the left was founded after demonstrations and the action day on 6 April 2010 (in the tradition of the Strike Wave of 6 April 2008).

It was very present from the very first day of the protests and gained within a short period more than 4000 new members. A founder and activist of the *Youth for Freedom and Justice* reported in an interview that they have started with 20 people founding the network, while during the protests they had contact to some 40.000 people of various local committees all over the country. This network also organized the *Popular Committees* which emerged to self-organize their districts and neighborhoods when the police disappeared after the uprisings. First these committees had the role to ensure safety in the neighborhood but got increasingly involved in political issues and self-administration of their districts (Shahyar 2011, p. 25).




Figure 7: Egyptian respondents who participated in the process of the Egyptian revolution (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 2012, p. 29).

Suez Youth Bloc

The *Suez Youth Bloc* is a network which “belongs to the youth movements of the public work Lovers (and) was launched at the initiative of Suez youth” (Suez Youth Bloc 2013). Basically this network is not linked to any party, even though members might be involved in parties. Main objective is the “work on the conservation of the revolution and complete the principles, objectives and seek to make it a success and to fight against corruption within the city of Suez, detection and preservation and to help the process of democratization and

political awareness, social cultural within the community and communicate directly with people and get in touch with them in their places and follow the work of the executive authorities and assist them in case of serious power at work” (Suez Youth Bloc 2013). The network in this form didn’t exist before the ouster of Mubarak, but the single members and membergroups were very involved in several protests during the rule of Mubarak and in the protests in January 2011. Suez was since ever one of the strongholds against Mubarak.

Secularist parties

- **national-liberal New Wafd Party**

The national-liberal Wafd party, which means *delegation* in English was founded after the World War I. It was an answer to the failed efforts for independency of the Egyptian delegation.

Claims and core values of this party between its foundation 1919 and its ban by Nasser in 1952 the independency of Egypt, decolonization (from GB), abolition of the Monarchy and the fight against the strengthening of the MB.

The party was re-established in 1978. “Historically the party of the business elites and the Copts, al-Wafd has had trouble holding on to those constituencies and attracting new ones. The business elites gravitated toward the National Democratic Party, particularly after the launching of economic reforms. Copts became leery after al-Wafd entered into a short-lived electoral alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood in 1984” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

Al-Wafd was a member of the *Democratic Alliance*.

- **National Progressive Unionist Party (NPU or „Al-Tagammu“)**

Beginning 1970 this party was founded by ex-members of the *Arab Socialist Union (ASU)*. It is a left wing party with Marxists, Nasserists and other socialists as members (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2005, p. 25f.).

The NPU was together with *Al-Wafd* and the *Nasserist Party* considered as one of the most important opposition parties before the uprisings.

During the uprisings the NPU was not very supportive to the protesters. “After demonstrations began gaining momentum, Al-Said later announced that Al-Tagammu Party activists could not participate in the demonstrations because they were in detention. He also added that the party would have agreed to participate in the protests if it were not for the fact that they were organized on a day that was meant to celebrate and honor police officers” (Jadaliyya 2011a).

- **The Arab Democratic Nasserist Party (Al Arabi Al Nasser)**

After a decision of the *Supreme Court*, Al Arabi Al Nasser was founded and established in 1992. This party considers itself as the ideological predecessor of Nasser and pan Arabic socialism. The state plays an essential and central role in the manifesto of the party.

Furthermore the party claims a dedicated national economy (Import Substituted Industrialization) (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2005, p. 23).

- **Revolutionary Socialists (later Democratic Workers Party)**

The Revolutionary Socialists were founded in 1995 by anti-capitalist students and workers. Their main aim and claim were workers' rights, minimum wages and a (global) socialist society. "Though initially confined to university and intellectual settings, Revolutionary Socialists took to the streets during the second Palestinian Intifada and have taken part in many coalitions since, and its members participated as individual members in the 2005 Kefaya (sic!) Movement. (...) So far, the DWP has participated in all major demonstrations and sit-ins organized in Tahrir Square" (Jadaliyya 2011b).

The presented four parties were in general present, allowed and established before the uprisings in 2011. For sure there are more parties, but these are both very small, and thus not deciding for this research or are just founded after or during the uprisings.

This thesis is not describing the formerly ruling *National Democratic Party (NDP)* as it is not a protagonist of the movements, even though it might be considered as a protagonist of Egypt's elite and oppressor.

With exception of *the Democratic Workers Party*, most parties were not involved in previous protests, nor supporting the manifestation on the 25 January 2011. An article in the largest (English speaking) Egyptian Newspaper *Al-Ahram weekly* comes to the same conclusion: "When thousands of angry Egyptians took to the streets it was immediately clear that the vast majority of officially licensed opposition parties were withholding any support" (El-Nahhas 2011).

As indicated parties did not play a role in the organization or mobilization for the uprisings. Which entities and networks did it then?

4.3.1. Workers' and Labour movements

The role of workers in (social) movements in Egypt since 2000 is rated differently. From a historical point of view the workers movements are a response to liberal economic policies

from 1974 and the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) which restructured the society and economy in a distinctive neoliberal way (Beinin 2011, p. 186).

Workers were quite active in the various protest cycles of the last decade but the question is if they identified themselves as workers/working class in the tradition of collective identities. Beinin (2011, p. 182) states that “While worker activists have disparate understandings of their experiences, „working class” is a legible term in Egypt. It refers to the structural category historically formed and reformed (...). It simultaneously comprises the micro histories and local cultures of social networks in urban and suburban industrial areas.”

Two deciding moments of movements since 2000 where workers participated with the collective identity ‚workers’: on the one hand it was the strike wave in 2008 and on the other hand during the last days of the Mubarak regime. In these last days large numbers of workers went on strike and got organized in solidarity with the other protesters. The moment workers joined the movement the whole situation of the uprisings changed. Many theorists argue that only when the strikes began Mubarak had no further choice to keep his post (Saber 2011, p. 20).




Figure 8: Workers protest 2000 - 2008 (Markaz al-Ard li-Huquq al-Insan in Beinin et al. 2011, p. 190).

As figure 6 indicates, there is an increasing number of protests of workers since 2000. 2345 protests of workers took place in total between 2000 and 2008. Around 2 million workers took part in various forms of protest actions only between 2004 and 2008.

The largest victory of the workers movement was in December 2006. After promised but not paid bonuses some ten thousand workers of the textile factories in Ghazl al-Mahalla went on a four day strike. Finally they achieved bonuses and a guarantee that the company will not be privatized (Beinin 2011, p. 193).



Figure 9: Number of protesters 2004 - 2008 (Markaz al-Ard li-Huquq al-Insan in Beinin et al. 2011, p. 189).

Since the uprisings in January 2011 a number of trade unions were founded and in this context the army and other governmental bodies put pressure on workers and trade unions to quit striking.

In 1957 the official Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) was founded and since then under strict control of the government. Labor agreements and other measures were not considered as an improvement⁹. “The Unified Labor Law (no. 12 of 2003) legalized strikes. However, only one of the strikes referred to here has been legal (and only partially), because the law permits strikes only when they have been approved by the relevant national general union and the ETUF executive committee” (Beinin 2011, p. 183).

On the 30 January 2011 the *Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Union* (EFITU) was founded as an answer to the previous policy on trade unions. In the midyear 2011 already 20 independent unions with around 250.000 members joined this federation (Schmid 2011, p. 42).

⁹ Opinion of a high number of workers.

“These developments at Ghazl al-Mahalla, where the workers’ movement was best organized and nationally visible, indicate that it is not necessary to agree on values and strategies in order to constitute a movement” (Beinin 2011, p. 200).

4.3.2. The 6 April Youth Movement

The foundation and the name of the *6 April movement* is dated back to the workers’ protests and strikes in 2008. Originally this movement started as a group on Facebook which has the aim to support the protesting workers and in fact gained some 70000 ‘members’.

For the first time to this extent, the group was ‘visible’ outside of the internet on 25 January 2011 and subsequently established several offices in some cities across the country.

In their self-portrayal on *Facebook the 6 April Movement* emphasizes their character of being an ideological melting pot:

„We are a group of Egyptian Youth from different backgrounds, age and trends gathered for a whole year since the renewal of hope in 6 April 2008 in the probability of mass action in Egypt which allowed all kind of youth from different backgrounds, society classes all over Egypt to emerge from the crisis and reach for the democratic future that overcomes the case of occlusion of political and economic prospects that the society is suffering from these days. Most of us did not come from a political background, nor participated in political or public events before 6 April 2008, but we were able to control and determine our direction through a whole year of practice.“ (6 April Youth Movement: Facebook page)

The movement is structured in the way that there is a board for coordination and several sectorial working groups.

Founded was the movement from the civil engineer Ahmad Maher, at that time 28 years old, who started to mobilize student and grass-roots movements with the purpose to create a secularist youth movement to support the workers’ struggles.

In January 2011 the movement linked with the Facebook group ‘We are all Khaled Said’ and mobilized for the demonstrations in January 2011, which they, with other actors, organized (Dreyfuss 2011).

“In addition, its members helped organize Egypt-based protests against the Israeli invasion of Gaza. On Sunday, January 30, they helped bring together a committee of ten people, nominally led by ElBaradei, that emerged after a meeting of Egypt’s “shadow parliament”, including officials from the Muslim Brotherhood, dissident Ayman Nour, ElBaradei’s

National Association for Change, and others. They coordinated with a meeting of several political parties, including the opposition Wafd Party. The April 6 movement also led the meetings held in Tahrir (“Liberation”) square” (Dreyfuss 2011).

People from all social classes got connected virtually to fight together for the same aim.

It was very difficult for the state to put repression on the members of *the 6 April Youth Movement* as they were not tangibly physically until January 2011, due to their form of action by using just the internet.

Protests and demonstrations were posted and published on internet by using different tools like Twitter, Facebook or blogs.

The occupation of the Tahrir and the uprisings had been the biggest success for this movement.

But with the resignation of Mubarak one of the main claims were achieved. Since that this movement faces the problem that they have to redefine their claims and purpose of existence, which led to a discussion and tension between¹⁰ reformist and radical forces in the organization. Furthermore many members left the movement as their purpose for joining it was not present anymore. The 6 April Youth Movement was one of the most important actors for the organization of the Protests in January (Shahyar 2011, p. 25).

4.3.3. Muslim Brotherhood (MB)

This thesis is describing history, positions and the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) very detailed as it was and is a main actor in the Egyptian civil society. The MB also played a role in the decade from 2000, during the protests and after the uprisings.

Founded in 1928 in Ismailia the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was initially part of a bigger religious and social movement, which took place all over the country. Still the MB had a very dedicated role in the movement as it was one of the few organizations which followed the ideology of the *Nizam Islami* (Murtaza 2011, p. 37).

Purpose for the religious and social movement was the context of the colonization and as a consequence the 22 year old teacher Al-Banna founded the MB with the aim to reach a large number of Egyptians to confront the colonialists and to fight for a self-determined Egypt.

¹⁰ Whoever reads this gets a bottle of wine from the author of this Diploma Thesis.

Furthermore the MB used to work primarily as a charitable organization (Murtaza 2011, p. 38) (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2005, p. 23).

The idea of Al-Banna was that the MB has following characteristics:

- A movement for reforms which includes all experiences and activists from previous movements
- In contrast to the colonial hegemony the MB calls for a return to the Quran and the Sunna, in fact to the Salafīyya da'wa
- A movement which emphasizes people to copy their lifestyles to this one of the prophet Muhammad
- A political organization which claims reforms
- A institution for culture and science
- A commercial enterprise and a social system

In fact the MB could be seen as an Islamic movement for self-help (Murtaza 2011, p. 41).

Al-Banna wanted to unite all Islamic people and forces, regardless of differences in theology or in confession. He wanted to create an activist movement for change. To avoid controversies and to achieve this aim the founders abandoned to get too much into detailed programmatic discussions and agendas (Kapferer in Murtaza 2011, p. 41).

The strategy to establish a ‚melting-pot’ movement to avoid the split of Muslims with different confessions and to create a movement of social change was a success (Murtaza 2011, p. 43).

In 1930 the Muslim Brotherhood achieved also the status of a political party. At this time the MB had basically five main credos: Allah is our aim. The prophet is our role model, the Quran is our constitution, Jihad is our way and the martyrdom is our biggest hope (Al-Banna in Murtaza 2011, p. 55).

The organization of the MB is very centralistic. It has one or view leader, a leading board and several gradations in the membership. The right to say and participation in decisions are dependent on the length of one's membership and on the importance and size of the branch offices where the member is based at. At the same time the MB has and had a dedicated strategy on how to commit people to the organization: seven stages on religious education and a distinctive network of welfare.

Zainab Al-Ghazali founded in 1936, in dependence on the MB the Muslim Women's Association (Gama at al-sayyidat al-muslimat). Main aims and claims of the organization were at that time: religious education for women and broad introduction of decent clothing for women (muhtasim) (Murtaza 2011, p. 164).

In the 1940s the MB counted some 500.000 members and expanded in many other Muslim countries. At this time and stage there were two main tendencies within the organization – the radicals and the reformists. Under Hasan Al-Banna both tendencies had a certain level of coordination, even though the radical forces claimed for a radical change of the policy of the organization (Murtaza 2011, p. 116).

As a consequence of intensified confrontation Al-Banna decided in 1941 to establish paramilitary scout groups under the umbrella of the MB. And in fact the run was immense: In the first year around 2000, in 1942 around 15.000 and in 1947 some 75.000 people joined these paramilitary groups (Murtaza 2011, p. 87).

After the coup d'état of Nasser in 1952 the MB was on the one hand very supportive to it and on the other hand parts of the organization don't wanted to collaborate with the military. As a result of a period of controversies and conflicts between the MB and the Nasserists, the MB prohibited in 1954. Some 450 Muslim brothers were arrested in this context.

In the following decades the MB went through several legalization and illegalization processes. Finally they were rehabilitated in the 1970s under President Sadat. The paradigm on mobilization of the MB changed in the 1970s. More and more students and unemployed graduates were in the focus of the member mobilization of the MB.

The situation of students and academics were very precarious as the unemployment rate was high and flats were rare. As a result a strong student movement emerged in this years, supported by the MB. Subsequently a rising number of membership requests from students and academics was registered (Murtaza 2011, p. 190).

From its rehabilitation in 1970 till the uprisings in January 2011 the MB was tolerated. (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2005, p. 23)

A turnover in the internal organization of the MB was triggered by the war of the Soviet Union against Afghanistan in 1979. Radical forces of the organization went to Afghanistan to support the resistance there and to follow the gihād. This led to a unique position of reformist forces, which manifested their power in the MB and became the lead of the organization, as it is still today.

Since it's radical and violent phase in the 1980s the MB was rearranging and reorienting itself and dismissed political violence since then. The clear and proactive acceptance of the MB on democracy is seen by some scholars as a methodological trick in the strategy of the MB (Forstner in Murtaza 2011, p. 214).

The MB participated in the political life and some single members participated also in state elections. This was possible due to coalition and cooperation with the Wafd Party. In the elections in May 1984 the coalition achieved 58 of 448 seats, while the National Democratic Party of Mubarak won 390 seats. Still, for the first time Muslim brothers were represented in the Egyptian Parliament.

In the following decades the MB formed several new coalitions and broke up with old ones (Murtaza 2011, p. 211 f.).

As a result of the separation of the so called new generation in the MB the Al-Wasat Party was established in 1996. This new generation founded Al-Wasat because this progressive forces, mostly politicized during the student protests in the 70s, were excluded from any decision-making in the MB, due to the internal structure of the organization (mostly very old traditional Muslim brothers in the leading boards). Until 2006 Al-Wasat remained as a non-registered, thus illegal party (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2006, p. 2f.)

Mubarak tolerated that the Wafd party nominated Muslim brothers on their list, as he tried to legitimize his power by representing himself as a Muslim.

In the elections 2005 the MB gained 88 seats and was thereby biggest opposition party in the parliament. Since that the organization opened up to the west and implemented several reforms (Murtaza 2011, p. 230 f.).

General political agenda of the MB was endorsement for democracy, free speech and for political pluralism (Asseburg & Roll 2011, p. 3).

However, the MB is not to be seen as an organization with a homogenous structure. Since ever there are, since ever, conflicts between conservative and progressive forces in the organization (Saber 2011, p. 21).

Since 2000 a new conflict between young members and the (older and traditional oriented) leaders emerged. These young members articulated their positions on blogs (Murtaza 2011, p. 237).

In 2007 the MB presented for the first time a draft of a party platform. It contained a clear endorsement for democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to life and the freedom of belief. In particular the MB wanted to tackle the deficit in education of women and the precarious situation of young unemployed and precarious employed people. The latter the organization wanted to address by establishing youth centers and sport associations to get the young people from the streets and give them further vocational education. Old elements or traditional contents of party policies disappeared: No discussion and claim to establish a consistent Islamic state or a Caliphate. But still: a concrete plan and definition on 'State' and 'Governance' was and is still missing (Murtaza 2011, p. 233).

A part of the agenda was to influence trade and professional institutions and to take over leading functions in it. Thus the MB manifested their historical role as to be "a state within the state" (Murtaza 2011, p. 214).

Before the elections 2010 several Muslim brothers were arrested again and as a consequence the MB had no seats in the newly elected parliament. Campaigns against the electoral fraud, initiated mostly from young Muslim brothers and the *Muslim Brotherhood Youth* changed something in the public opinion. During the protests in 2011 the MB was one of the biggest and most organized opposition force. Although the position of the organization was very controversial: The leaders took a moderate and conformist role as their aim was not the overthrow of the old system but a restructuring and a distinctive participation in power structures and to govern. At the same time many members, mostly young people, were more radical and participated in the protests on the streets (Taghian 2011).

The role of the MB during the protests is indisputable: Whereas young members from the very first beginning of the uprisings were very active and involved in several coalitions and in the organization of the protests, the leaders were reluctant. Even though the organization placed its infrastructure at the disposal (Taghian 2011). As the leaders of the MB wanted to participate actively in the government after the resignation of Mubarak, they needed to act very sensitive to convince the western world, the own population and especially the *Copts* that the MB stands for democracy, pluralism and tolerance (Murtaza 2011, p. 239).

Till today the ideological agenda of the MB is not without controversies. Islamic theorists in the organization fear that in a democracy in which the will of the people is considered as

more important than the will of god, where the law created by the people is standing above the law of god is a dangerous form of government (Murtaza 2011, p. 227).

The economic agenda of the MB is much clearer: A claim for a neoliberal economic system.

Various members of the MB are part of the (new) economic elite, which took profit of the privatization in the 1990s. For example the high rank Muslim brother Hassan Malek, who is, together with his son, owner and manager of a large chain of textile and furniture factories. Even the magazine ‚Bloomberg BusinessWeek’ is describing the economic agenda of the MB as “extreme capitalism” (Achcar 2013).

When the commission for the composition of the constitution was founded in 2011, the MB send delegates of the neoliberal wing, brokers of the financial sector and owners of large companies. Hence the elites in Egypt remain the same, of which Muslim brothers since decades are an essential part of. The economic and financial system of Egypt will most probably not change towards a social welfare state (Achcar 2013).

One of the main tasks for Egypt was and still is to break through the economic ties between Muslim brothers, elites of the Mubarak regime and the army. A very specific characteristic of Egyptian conditions is the strong link of political power and the economy (Achcar 2013).

4.3.4. Army

This thesis is also taking the army as a protagonist in consideration as they were and are one of the main actors in the state and so they influenced behavior and decision making of the movement and the government.

Even though the army is not homogenous, as there are different ranks, it is to be seen as one entity in the state. But still, the conflicts between ranks and social status in the army is enormous. Generals and other high ranks are often part of the ruling elites, also economically. Approximately 25 percent of the Egyptian economy is owned by former high rank military or family members of officers and generals (Saber 2011, p. 21).

Since the coup d’état in 1952 all Egyptian Presidents originated from the higher ranks of the army, so does Hosni Mubarak too. In addition the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has since decades far reaching powers in the public space. In February 2011 the

SCAF took over government affairs and the minister for defense took over the business of Mubarak.

Many Egyptians consider the army as a guarantor for stability, even though the military was since 1952 always involved in governing Egypt. While it had a visible leading function until the 1970s it disappeared from the visible political stage and managed politics from the background since then (Taghian 2011).



Figure 10: Public opinion about the confidence in the army in percent (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 2012, p. 48).

At the same time the Army had an essential role in the days of the protests in 2011. Many low rank soldiers and mid-ranked officers sympathized with the protesters in the streets, while high-rank militaries were not interested in a system change, as they are part of the ruling class. But maybe this might describe the behavior of the Army during the protests: In order to keep the situation under control and to keep the economic system, means also to keep the economic elites, the Generals decided to intervene and to remove Mubarak from office (Taghian 2011).

And in fact the behavior of the Army influenced essentially the development of the protests and the situation. In January 2011 all protesters were very curious what the Army will do until they received an SMS from that the Military will not fight against their own people. Still it was a frightening moment when tanks and soldiers entered the Tahrir and many streets in Cairo and other cities (Saber 2011, p. 21).

The SCAF had in the beginning of their interim government a very intense cooperation with the MB, as both are parts of the ‚new‘ economic elites. It was a good moment to get rid of former ‚traditional‘ elites around Mubarak and to take over these markets.

This was not very surprising, as the leaders and the elites of the MB do not hesitate to support neoliberal policies and privatization (Probst & Kraitt 2011, p. 16).

During the Protests against the changes in the constitution, the introduction of the Sharia and against the „Islamic“ Government of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, „Egypt's top general raised the issue of a „collapse of the state“ if civilian leaders failed to restore order. And the interior minister warned that armed militias could take over if his forces gave way“ (Kirpatrick 2013).

These comments just show the difficult situation and the fear of having a direct military rule again. And while this thesis is written, Egypt just experiences another coup d'état.

4.4. Reasons and triggers for the uprisings in spring 2011

Very often the self-immolation of the Tunisian Mohammed Bou' Azizi is defined as one of the most important triggers for the uprisings in Egypt. The self-immolation of a person who tried to survive by selling vegetables on the streets, without having perspectives and got punished by the police several times is a symbol for a whole generation, which faces very similar living conditions (Schmid 2011, p. 40). Certainly it was a very advertising and mobilizing tragedy but was for sure not the only trigger.

Analyzing the factors, named in the chapter on conditions in Egypt, this thesis, and a number of scholars, identifies high youth unemployment rate, precarious working conditions, rising food prices and an increasing repression from the state as potential triggers (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011, p. 88ff.).




Figure 11: Opinion poll on reasons for the outbreak of the uprisings. In percent (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 2012, p. 28).

As already indicated: The reasons and triggers for the protests and uprisings in Egypt are very versatile. But the movements did not emerge out of an vacuum, in fact oppositional groups and movements have an persistand continuity since 2000 which contributed to the intensified situations in January and February 2011. Despite this continuity, something different must have triggered and finally implemented the withdrawal of Mubarak.

The question is what exactly has forced Mubarak and the army to gives in.

Certainly there is a complex logic behind: All over the country protesters occupied public space, attacked police stations and demonstrated in the streets. But the straw that break the camels' back was the moment when the workers, as organized entity, entered the protests. After the ordered closure of companies by Mubarak took place, many workers came back to work and got organized. They went on strike and walked in huge masses to the Tahrir: Ten thousands came from the University, ten thousands from the Unions, ten thousands from various districts and suburbs. It was clear that a large amount of the population supported the protests.

Finally, when the perseverative strikes in addition to the protests took place the Army and the government had to react. They needed a new representative of the ruling class (Saber 2011, p. 21).

Korotayev researched in his empirical studies potential reasons and triggers for the uprisings in Egypt. As already mentioned in this thesis one essential potential trigger might be the unemployment rate amongst young people, even though the unemployment rate of the whole population is around 9 percent: „on the eve of the Revolution Egypt had about one million of unemployed young people aged 20–24 who made up the main striking force of the Revolution” (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011, p. 88ff.).

These protesting young people were supported by a high number of Egyptians which were in somehow involved in the protests (see also chapter on Protagonists) and of Egyptians which were heavily affected by the high prices for food and wheat, as they are living below the poverty level.

4.5. Characteristics of the movement 2011

If the public and also some scholars talk about the ‚Arab spring’ they often refer to it as it would be an act of a homogenous group. Heterogeneity and controversies of the movement are underexposed.

Certainly there was a unity of many entities in the protests against Mubarak but claims and strategies differ from actor to actor. A part of the movement, mostly reformist forces like the *National Association for Change* (NAC), argued to stop the protests and demonstrations after the resignation of Mubarak and to turn back to normal.

Also several parts of the Youth Movements, for example parts of the MB Youth or the *Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution* started immediately after the resignation of Mubarak negotiations with the SCAF. While many parts of the opposition aimed to end the protests and to turn back to ‚normality’ left forces of the movement argued to continue the movement in order to achieve a social

The role of blogs and social media

Facebook was a tool in the days of the uprisings and before. Due to restrictions in political activism in Egypt, online platforms were an important and excellent opportunity to share information and to mobilize.

But the uprisings were not a ‘Facebook Revolution’ as often described. In fact it was an important strategy to use all communication channels to raise awareness. It did not replace the happenings on Tahrir (Saber 2011, p. 20f.).

Another important information sharing tool were various **blogs**, maintained by intellectuals and mostly young people. These different blogs were useful to raise awareness on injustice by reporting about cases of repression and corruption. The case *Khaled Said* showed the power of such Blogs, as within a short time the government was forced onto the defensive. During the protests blogs were used for mobilization and to inform people about the happenings – also internationally.

change and the establishment of independent trade unions. Mobilizations and protests should have changed from Tahrir to companies and factories. The left also warned to trust the SCAF as a guarantor for social change (Taghian 2011).

The election victory of the MB institutionalized a part of the uprisings, even though reformist and left forces mobilized further for protests.

That shows that the eurocentristic view on 'Islamists' or 'Muslim brothers', considering these actors as a homogenous group, is not appropriate. This school of thinking has a long tradition, coming from the process of 'othering': the Orient, the Islam as something different, not developed in contrast to the modern Europe. But it contains a narrow minded and dangerous line of argumentation. The 'Islam itself' does not exist, as there is a whole variety of different point of views and policies – from left religious forces which fight for a feminist reinterpretation of the Quran to radicals which try to establish a Islamic state, and everything in between (Lenner 2012, p. 9).

An essential factor of the protests is the social aspect. It is determining the frames of the movement. Even though the initial protests on 25 January 2011 started as anti-repression demonstrations, the social question was present from the very first moment. From the beginning of the protests people all over the country claimed for food and for the introduction of minimum wage (Shahyar 2011, p. 56).




Figure 12: Citizens' confidence in public institutions. In perc. (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 2012, p. 47).

Indeed the uprisings are not to be minimized on to an economic base. As figure 6 indicates, people also protested against corruption, injustice and a political system which is responsible for poverty in Egypt. It was not the case that a traditional working class is doing a revolution against the capitalist class, as the people protested against specific circumstances and for an improvement for their live conditions. Therefore the uprisings can be categorized as a New Social Movement (Shahyar 2011, p. 56).

As already mentioned, left forces tried to continue the uprisings and to work towards an economic and social change but is confronted with the elites, which are supported by the SCAF. The strategy of the SCAF to suppress these efforts includes demobilization of the movement, partial admissions to the protesters and pure repression, as the interest of the army is clearly to keep economic and property structures functioning. Almost the half of the emergency laws are still in effect and the changes of the constitution, originally from 1971 are marginal. The old security service just got a new name without restructuring it.

Furthermore the SCAF is calling for an end of the strikes and criminalizes the protests of trade unions and workers in order to establish 'national unity' (Probst & Kraitt 2011, p. 15).

Immediately after the protests and the resignation of Mubarak a coalition between the SCAF, several fractions of the Neo-Nationalist bourgeoisie and the MB was established. Important posts were staffed with persons of the elite. For example Hosam Badrawy, who took profit of

the reform of the health sector in the 1980s and who owns several companies working in the field of health, was chosen as the minister for health (Probst & Kraitt 2011, p. 15).

4.6. Relevance of “Social Movement Theories”

This chapter aims to investigate the applicability of Social Movement Theories on the Case Study Egypt.

Initially it has to be identified if the uprisings in Egypt fall under the category of *New Social Movements*. Therefore definitions from various scholars and theorists will be taken into consideration:

Roth and Rucht, as already elaborated in chapter two, define new social movements as a network in which groups and organizations, based on a collective identity, together continuously fight for a social change. It should be more than just a simple ‘No, we don’t want to’ (Roth & Rucht 2008, p. 13).

Characteristics of New Social Movements defined by Roth and Rucht, such as informal membership, organized in networks, high participation of young people, campaigning, an extensive use of media and a mid-range degree of organization: All these characteristics can also be found in the movements of Egypt.

The claims of the protestors in January and February 2011 were democratization, participation, critic on institutions and an improvement of living conditions.

In accordance with this definition the uprisings in Egypt might be considered as New Social Movements. But still, this definition by itself is not clearly characterizing the category. There is a need to complement it with other approaches.

Andre Gunder Franks’ definition of *New Social Movements* is mostly based on the appearance of movements. The three paradigms he described Liberty (L), Equality (E) and Solidarity (S) are applicable to the protests in Egypt. These paradigms reflect basically the claims of the movements. A further factor of New Social Movements defined by Frank is the sphere of action of new movements. Actors are coming and acting mostly in the civil society and are not based at all in political parties. In the Egyptian protests political parties did not play an essential role at all, as elaborated in chapter 4.3.

Alan Scott describes *New Social Movements* as movements which are located more in the civil society, aims to change values and to defend civil society, organized in networks and grass roots groups and uses direct actions.

As already elaborated in chapter three, *New Social Movements* consist of actors “who understand themselves to have common interests and, for at least some significant part of their social existence, a common identity. Social movements are distinguished from other collective actors, such as political parties and pressure groups, in that they have mass mobilization, or the threat of mobilization, as their prime source of social sanction, and hence of power. They are further distinguished from other collectivities, such as voluntary associations or clubs, in being chiefly concerned to defend or change Society or the relative position of the group in society” (Scott 1990, p. 6).

The movements in Egypt do fit to this description: Political parties did not play an essential role (see chapter four), the activists came from the civil society and defended or claimed their (human) rights and were organized in networks (e.g. 6 April Movement, ‘We are all Khaled Said’, several coalitions). Their tool was the direct action.

Buechler defines *New Social Movements* in contrast to ‘traditional’ social movements. As social movement scholars “have looked to other logics of action based in politics, ideology, and culture as the root of much collective action, and they have looked to other sources of identity such as ethnicity, gender and sexuality as the definers of collective identity. The term ‘new social movements’ thus refers to a diverse array of collective actions that have presumably displaced the old social movement of proletarian revolution associated with classical Marxism” (Buechler 1995, p. 442). If we apply this definition to the current movements in Egypt, we will find other tactics of collective action and various collective identities. In fact some of the workers identified themselves as part of the working class, while many others see themselves as young unemployed, victims of repression or as something different (Suez Youth Bloc 2013).

Based on the four just elaborated definitions, the protests and movements in Egypt do have the characteristics of New Social Movements. This is the pre-condition to test the applicability of New Social Movement Theories on Egyptian Movements.

The general term *New Social Movement Theories* includes various definitions and theories, as already discussed in this thesis.

A first attempt to apply aspects of the *Resource Mobilization Theory* on Egyptian Movements is dissatisfactory: Neither causes, functioning nor structures of the movement is alleageable with this approach. The essential thesis of this theory that an individual participation is often based on a cost-benefit equation, either because of strong intrinsic ideological motives or to gain leading positions in the movement or parties at a later stage. After a review of the set-up of Egyptian movements this thesis comes to the conclusion that a cost-benefit equation is not provable: Neither a leading ideology led to the protests nor political parties/leading institutions are present.

In fact the cost-benefit equation is in the Egyptian context not very clear.

Further aspects of the RMT are as well not applicable without controversies. For example the assumptions that “basic goals of movements are defined by conflicts of interest built into institutionalized power relations” or “centralized, formally structured movement organizations are more typical of modern social movements” (Jenkins 1983, p. 528) are not applicable to Egypt’s uprisings.

More relevant the *Collective Identity Theory* seems to be: In all its facets the movement had several identities, even though from January 2011 they considered themselves as, more or less, one movement. Before that moment activists mostly identified themselves with the network or organization in which they were engaged¹¹.

The process to establish a collective identity is mainly influenced by individuals which realizes their options to change something and their limits. When first activists started to occupy the Tahrir, many individuals in the movement realized their potential options to change the current situation and started to identify themselves with the bright term ‘Arab spring’ or Egyptian uprisings. Many activists reported that from this moment on the people on the Tahrir and in many other cities developed a sense of belonging together.

Still the question remains if the activists had a second line identity. And in fact many workers identified themselves as members of the ‘working class’, a term commonly used in Egypt, and many young people identified themselves as a part of the youth without perspectives. This category includes unemployed and precarious employed people as conducted interviews indicate.

¹¹ e.g. ‘We are all Khaled Said’, MB, 6 April Youth Movement

Another theory which seems to be applicable is the *Framing Theory*. The *Diagnostic Frame*, which is described in chapter 3.2, seems to be applicable on the Egyptian uprisings as the identification of problems within the movement is clearly visible. Hence problems, which triggered the movements, are defined in the movement and present at many activists: missing democracy, rising food prices and poverty. This is indicated by the claims of the movement - Ash-sha‘b yurīd isqā ṭ an-niḏ ām (the people want to overthrow the regime – [of Mubarak]), ilguu ʕ kafir (A hungry man is an angry man) or laa lilfasaad wanahb tharwaat albilaad (No for corruption and rifling of the country's wealth).

Even though it is hard to identify a unified diagnostic frame just by means of the claims, it seems that most forces (leftists, reformers, religious...) addressed the same problems. Certainly different forces identified the systemic or structural pre-conditions for the ‚problems‘ very different (e.g. leftist activists identifies capitalism as the main conditional problem) but based on the tactic to mobilize as many people as possible, networks and groups abandoned the use of very detailed claims.

The concept of the Prognostic Frame seems also to be applicable. Even though many different solutions were formulated by various activists, the claim for the withdrawal of Mubarak was the main common solution for all activists. This was also one of the main motives of the mobilization.

In addition to the factors for mobilization already discussed in the context of the Diagnostic and the Prognostic Frame, also ethical and solidarity aspects mobilized many activists.

The *Motivational Framing* seems to be applicable as well, hence moral appeals and solidarity claims were implemented: Due to a number of reports, the repression of the state on the Tahrir and on the streets mobilized a large amount of additional activists and supporters. Motivation might have been the will and the ‚duty‘ to support family members and friends to keep the Tahrir, which were attacked by the police and regime loyalists.

As Master Frame the category ‚Arab spring‘ which describes the regional phenomenon of protests and uprisings in the MENA region might be applicable.

As already indicated large parts of the population in Egypt did not feel adequately represented by the government. The *Political Opportunity Structures Theory* (POS) is exactly

identifying an insufficient representation as a main factor for people to get organized in a social movement. So this approach might be relevant to describe the happenings in Egypt.

Reaction of the state:	Acceptance	Weak repression	Heavy repression
Cultural/political resonance high	Social movement	Revolution	Instable/failing state
Cultural/political resonance low	Isolated movement	Guerrilla/Terrorism	Underground movement

Table 5: Interdependencies between the reaction of the state and cultural/political resonance (Goldstone in Kern 2008, p. 173).

If the matrix above, already discussed in chapter 3.2 is applied to the situation in Egypt, following observations may be taken into consideration;

The protesters and the movement had in January and February 2011, mostly because of the tightened economic situation, a significant cultural and political resonance. At the same time repression of the state was very intense, even though it is hard to define the extent of repression in general.

According to the matrix (above) the consequences of such a constellation must be an instable, failing state or a revolution.

In this context the POS seems to come a bit short: How is an instable or failing state and a revolution defined?

It is in fact not clearly operationalized what makes it very difficult to categorize the happenings in Egypt in opportunity frames of phases. There is neither a ‚classical’ revolution in Egypt as capitalist relations of production and ownership remains the same as before, nor a distinctive failing or instable state (administration and public order is still in place). Furthermore Egypt is not an exceptional authoritarian state, as for example the freedom of press is significantly more liberal than in many other states.

Plausible instead seems to be the assumption of the POS that with increasing cultural and political resonance the number of supporters and activists is rising. When the army send the mass SMS to the population, indicating that they will not fight the protesters, many additional people were mobilized and supported the uprisings.

At the same time activists had to invest in the infrastructure of the movement as all the new comers had to be supervised. These additional resources often leads to a collapse of

movements as activists do have practical constraints¹² can just invest a limited amount of resources¹³.

The development and the establishment of (partly conflictive) coalitions and networks before and during the uprisings is explainable with the POS approach: In the context and contradiction of policy, law and media a civil sphere is constituting a public space for social movements, which act as an advocating entity for affected and underrepresented groups and individuals. By doing so, these movements conflict very often with other actors or achieving more importance by the collaboration with other entities (Kern 2008, p. 171 ff.).

Assumptions of Andre Gunder Frank and his theory that (classical) political parties do not play an essential role in ‚new‘ social movements seems to be confirmed in the case study on the Egyptian movements - since 2000 political parties did not play a key role in Egyptian social movements (see also chapter 3.2.). The strategy of New Social Movements is not to achieve the state power, but to change realities by the process of protest.

Frank composed ten thesis in his theory: some of them will be applied to the Egyptian movement.

One of his thesis is that *New Social Movements* are not new, as capitalist relations of production haven't changed in the last decades, but movements have different strategies and tactics nowadays (Frank 1990, p. 171). This thesis apply to the movements of the last decade in Egypt, as the occupation of the Tahrir, the use of social media and other internet resources and the compromise to have popular basic claims is a totally new experience for Egypt. For sure the change of tactics and strategies influenced partly the success of the movement.

Franks thesis on the supposed cyclic appearance of social movements in the context of the Kondratieff Waves cannot finally be validated in this chapter, as this research is limited to just a decade, while a validation of this approach needs to have a broader period of analysis.

The concluding assumption of Frank that the main aim of new social movements is further democratization can be verified in the context of Egypt.

¹² E.g. wage labor, parenting, etc.

¹³ E.g. time.

4.7. Current Situation

“They are trying to build a new regime exactly like the old one” (Kirpatrick 2013), a young activist says when he was interviewed by the New York Times in 2013. This sentence is very typical and characterizes the (current) situation in Egypt very well. Massive protests throughout the whole period – from the fall of Mubarak until today – are a part of everyday life.

After the temporary rule of the SCAF and the victory of the MB in the first elections in 2011/12 a period started, in which a religious actor – determined by years of repression from the old government – took over the political responsibility and business of Egypt. In fact the MB haven’t had a detailed and clear political platform, agenda or policy at this stage, which made the course they took non-coherent. It was not clear if the MB will introduce the Shariya, how the MB will deal with minorities and what the solution for the difficult economic situation would be. The delegated task was a complicated one. “Not to mention their monopolization of the parliament and its most crucial legislative task ahead: the writing of the constitution” (Iskandar 2013, p. 1912).

And in fact the question on what constitution should be implemented seems to be the sticking point of the rule of the MB. Already during the occupation of the Tahrir and in the month after the *Egyptian Center for Economic & Social Rights*, in collaboration with trade unions and other actors initiated a process of developing a new constitution on a grass-roots level. Thousands of people from different backgrounds, occupations and social classes were involved in the writing of a proposal for a constitution of the people. It was presented in the parliament in 2012 and was refused by the members of the parliament. Instead a rigid constitution, created by the MB was forced through the parliament (Egyptian Center for Economic & Social Rights 2013).

In this period massive protests started again in the streets of Cairo and other cities. The revolutionary youth went on the streets again to defend their revolution, the original reasons for the uprisings. „Not just a better economic situation, a government that deals with the people that is not authoritarian or repressive. (...) Since Mr Morsi's decree suspending the power of the courts to challenge his decisions, violence has escalated sharply. (...) Brotherhood officials say moving too fast to reform the Interior Ministry might provoke a revolt by the police at a time when public security is fraying” (Kirpatrick 2013).

In addition to the conflict over the constitution, international money lenders, such as the IWF or the government Qatar, claim further structural reforms towards deregulation and privatization. Thus social conflicts were not solved during the rule of MB at all – in contradiction: the social and economic situation tightened (Achcar 2013).

Increasing conflicts between protestors and the government and between the government and the SCAF led to another Coup d'état by the SCAF in July 2013.

Since that point further massive protests, with additional actors take place: the people who are defending the uprisings from 2011 and the supporters of the MB. The SCAF regime is answering to both movements with extensive repression.

The very dynamic situation in Egypt, which developed rapidly during this thesis was written, is a clear challenge for the author. In order to keep the framework and external conditions for this thesis, developments from July 2013 will not be taken into consideration.

Who ever hailed the Arab uprisings as a revolution or discredit the happenings in Egypt after this few years, has a missing understanding of the history of revolutions. The history of revolution in Europe last a long time. Egypt and the Arab world can not reach the point Europe reached after generations (Todenhöfer 2012: 23).

5. Case Study Italy

5.1. General Conditions

In the media and the politics Italy is very often mentioned as one of the PIIGS states (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) – countries with negative growth or stagnation in economics and a precarious situation in social sectors.

Furthermore Italy as a country within the European Union is often presented as affected by serious social and economic problems and conflicts. A country with a high number of precarious employed and unemployed people.

But what exactly is behind this argumentation?

Italy's Gross Development Product (GDP) declines around 6 percent in the last years. It is one of the highest and most negative rates in the EU. Furthermore the spending capacity declined 3.6 percent in the last 4 years.

The most serious slump was traced in the metal industries and the mechanical engineering.

Greece, Italy and Belgium has a high public debt – more than 100 percent of the GDP. Compared to the average of the all European Countries, 78.7 percent, the situation in these countries seems to be serious (Tausch 2011, p. 117ff.).

But this situation did not emerge from a sudden-onset development. The weak GDP and the increasing public debt is a continuously ongoing trend since the 90ies. A possible reason for the rapid worsening of the so called debt crisis of Italy was a targeted attack on Italian government stocks in 2011. An important actor in this was the *Deutsche Bank* to increase the value of *Credit Default Swaps* in which the bank is market leader. In the context of the so called second Financial Crisis in 2011 the interests of Italian government stocks reached over five percent, for the first time ever and the spread between Italian and German stocks was at its historical peak with 400 percent. Profits, made by actors of the financial markets are concealed (Carls 2012, p. 245f.).

In parallel to this development the government of Italy, as many other European governments, introduced from 2008 on massive cuts in public spending and a very rigid austerity policy by implementing higher consumption taxes and cutbacks especially in the welfare system.

Under the umbrella of the crisis and on the base of laws for liberalisation of 1997 and 2003 an additional intensive deregulation of the labour market took place (Carls 2012, p. 246ff.).

Only in 2011 four laws on deregulation were introduced: *Manovra di Ferragosto*, *Legge di Stabilità*, *Decreto Sviluppo*, *Manovra estiva di stabilizzazione finanziaria* (DeParma 2012; Carls 2012).

This deregulation led to a situation in which 46 different forms of contracts are currently applicable for temporary work or (false) self-employment in Italy. Since two years the government puts its focus on the deregulation of collective agreements as for example the case of FIAT, which finally left collective agreements and implemented its own contracts of labour and self-defined wages – while measures like Article 8 or the *Collegato Lavoro*, laws for limiting the right for striking and for deregulating labour contracts were implemented (Carls 2012, p. 246 ff.).

Collective contracts can, as a result of the implementation of such laws, nowadays only be changed by the three biggest unions and the employer, while local committees and unions do not have any right to influence the decision making.

One of the most significant phenomenon which stands in interdependency with the current crisis is precarious employment and the high youth unemployment rate. Even though a challenge is to really measure precarious employment as it is not a unique category and will not be found as a value in statistics. This paper is using different numbers and statistics, mostly taken from the EU Statistics Agency EUROSTAT¹⁴ and articles from Kristin Carls, who is an active researcher in the field of precarious employment in Italy. Therefore I would like to apply her methodology: “as an approximation, data on so-called “a-typical” or “non-standard” forms of employment will be used, particularly on temporary employment (including fixed term and temporary agency work), part time contracts and own account labour (referring to self-employment without employees)” (Carls 2012, p. 4).

Anyway, the definition of precarious work is quite complex and hardly to find in official papers but Kristin Carls identifies criteria for describing it: A precarious worker “ has the lowest income quartile, has a tenure of less than one year, is based on a fixed term or temporary agency contract, implies working unsocial hours, has a low intellectual job content, is characterised by a high degree of heteronomy or a bad physical job environment, and/or if the worker has suffered harassment during last 12 month” (Carls 2012, p. 5).

So let us have a closer look on the data:

Young people from 14 to 29 are particularly affected by the economic situation: more than 30 percent of people to the age of 29 are in a precarious employment. Precarious employment means in this context temporary contracts.

¹⁴ EUROSTAT is the Directorate-General of the European Commission, working on statistics.




Figure 13: Proportion of temporary and part-time workers of the Italian Labour Market, in percentage (EUROSTAT).

“In Italy, in turn, the higher share of temporary youth employment reflects the strong flexibilisation policies undertaken during the last ten, fifteen years. Besides the more recent reductions in rights and protections also for workers with open-ended contracts (through rather encompassing opening clauses with regard to collective bargaining and possibilities of derogating even from national labour law), these consisted above all in the introduction of a multitude of different flexible contract types. This has produced a substitution process between “old” open-ended, protected and new, flexible forms of employment which comes into act through new hiring and thus touches first of all on the youth and new labour market entrants in particular” (Carls 2012, p. 11).

In Europe there are several countries with an increase of part time employment, especially under young people – the number in Italy rise up to 9.7% (Carls 2012, p. 36).

“Informal work is generally taken to provide precarious work and, in particular, in Greece, Spain, Italy, Latvia and Bulgaria it appears to be growing. This has led to legislative measures to address the growth of such forms of employment” (McKay et al. 2012, p. 6).

The dismissal protection is massively cut back in the last years. Especially in small business, with less than 15 employers each, which concerns 67 percent of all employees in Italy.

If we include the number of self-employed, Italy would not have more than 50 percent of dismissal protection (Carls 2012, p. 253).

Another significant factor which characterizes the current situation in Italy is the (exploding) number of unemployed youth.




Figure 14: Youth unemployment rate in Italy (EUROSTAT).

The number of youth unemployment in Italy is by trend relatively high since 1990. A recession in the early 90s and the following measures by the government, such as cuts and deregulation, led to a high youth unemployment (around 30 percent). Between 2001 and 2008 the Italian Economy had a recovery phase so that the youth unemployment rate dropped to 10 percent.

From 2008 on the financial crisis and deregulation led finally to extreme high numbers – up to 40 percent in the first quarter of 2013.

This precarious situation on the labour market is still getting worse, due to the reaction and so called counter measures from the government.

In addition the cuts in social welfare leads to an increasing poverty in Italy. The youth from today has less money than all generations since the World War II. The policy of the government to build on family based welfare and exclusion of precarious workers from social services is tightening the situation. This ‘tighten one’s belt’ policy as the only solution for the crisis, has the potential to trigger much bigger crisis (Tausch 2011, p. 117ff.).

The parliament and political parties do not have big trust in Italy anymore. Political parties do not play such a role as opposition as the extra parliamentary opposition does (see also chapter *Protagonists of the movements*).

Compared to Egypt the general conditions are slightly different. A distinctive character of the situation in Egypt was the youth bulge in this period. Italy's demographics indicates another situation.




Figure 15: Demographic ratio of youth in Italy (EUROSTAT).

Also the food prices: In fact they rise in the last years, but due to subventions it was a moderate increase.

The poverty in Italy worsened. “In 2012 the relative poverty incidence was equal to 12.7%, whereas the absolute poverty to 6.8%. The relative poverty threshold, for a two-member household, was equal to 990.88 Euros (about 20 euros less compared with 2011 threshold). Absolute poverty increased among households with three (from 4.7% to 6.6%), four (from 5.2% to 8.3%) and five or more members (from 12.3% to 17.2%); among couples with three or more children- the incidence from 10.4% increased to 16.2% - especially if the children are minors (from 10.9% to 17.1%).

The absolute poverty increased among single parents (from 5.8% to 9.1%) and households with aggregate members (from 10.4% to 13.3%).

The condition worsened, in terms of absolute poverty, for households having as reference person a worker (from 7.5% to 9.4%), a self-employed worker (from 4.2% to 6%), a manager or an employee (from 1.3% to 2.6%) and for households with employed and retired members (from 3.6% to 5.3%)” (ISTAT 2013, p. 1).

5.2. Milestones of movements since 2000

In general it seems that the last decade in Italy is not a dedicated period of the emergence of social movements – at least not as it is in Egypt. Nevertheless all interviewees and relevant literature is highlighting the existence of the same happenings, demonstrations and movements in Italy in the last 13 years: the anti-globalisation movement, the anti-war movement, several movements against the liberalisation of the labour market and cuts in public spending and two main student movements.

Inspired by the categorization of the chronology of social movements in Egypt, this thesis applies, after analysing the frameworks, also four cycles of protests in Italy.

Cycle 1: 2000 – 2002

Globally a huge anti-globalisation movement emerged in the late 90s and the period from 2000 - 2002. This movement experienced an extended mobilization, bright acceptance in the civil society and big manifestations. After the extraordinary ‘success’ of Seattle in 1999 (massive protests against WTO summit) the anti-globalization movement mobilized for protests against the Group of Eight (G8) summit in Genoa (Italy) which took place between 18. – 22. July 2001 in the center of the ligurian city.

A broad coalition of various groups – the Genova Social Forum - organized the days of protests, workshops, sit-ins, general assemblies and many other forms of political activism. Main protagonists of the *Genova Social Forum* were the movement ‘Tutte Bianche’, Rifondazione Comunista, FIOM and other trade unions, migrants and many NGO’s. This very new experience was organized without hierarchy in a horizontal way and with support of various local assemblies from all over Italy and Europe (Oggioni 2012).

The period in which the G8 took place was a phase of a very strong leftish non-parliamentary protest movement as an answer to the weak and neoliberal left government of the last years and to the new right wing government of Berlusconi.

Already weeks before the summit took place the police, the media and the government warned and tried to create an ambient of panic and fear of the so called ‘Black Block’ and the pretended very violent participants of the upcoming manifestations.

And in fact the days in mid-July were very violent: the repression of the (diverse) police units, the government bodies and other state actors was very intensive. Various human right watchdogs, victims, witnesses, journalists, courts and many other peoples and institutions accused the authorities that they planned to escalate the violence and partly initiated direct aggressions towards the police as ‘agents provocateurs’. The sad highlights of the days of Genoa were the murder of the activist Carlo Giuliani, the attack of the school A. Diaz (which many activists used as accommodation) and the convergence center by police men, and the torture, physical and psychological violence against imprisoned people in the barracks of Bolzaneto. The result of the repression had been one casualty, hundreds of injured and many hundreds of imprisoned activists. As several researches and investigations showed the evidence that the repression was planned many people and parts of the media appraised that the state wanted to break the neck of the left in Italy and the anti-globalization movement (Azzellini 2002, p. 11f.).

But there were not only ‘sad’ highlights of the protests against the G8 in Genoa. Around 300.000 people participated in the manifestations, assemblies and workshops during these days. All various forms of activism were tolerated within the movement and the quality of the political discussions was very high. It was a totally new idea of having such a social movement in Italy, by taking the experiences of Seattle and movements of South America into consideration, and it was surely one of the peaks of movements in Europe since 20 years (Oggioni 2012).

The G8 summit was the beginning of a new phase and starting point from where many new groups emerged. In the following years, inspired by Genoa, several strikes and movements took place.

In 2002 the first European Social Forum (ESF) took place in Florence, which was an important point for the movement, as the political content and discussion was very deep and created perspectives (Oggioni 2012).

Cycle 2: 2003 – 2005

This phase is, very similar to the phase in Egypt, characterized by anti-war protests. Mainly students, social centers and some trade unions mobilized onto the streets to protest against the ‘intervention’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. A highlight was the visit of the US President Bush in

Rome where thousands of people took part on several manifestations and direct actions against the visit.

In 2003 the fight for defending labour rights escalated due to several reforms of the government. One of the peaks of these protests was the manifestation and the general strike in October 2003 against the cut backs, reforms in labour law and the social sector and for the rights of the working class, where three million people marched through the streets of Rome. This manifestation was organized by the trade union Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL). “The power and the motivation in the movements was very high and all social movements were very strong. But unfortunately after all these events we started to lose energy and power. We didn’t manage to coordinate ourselves and to fight against the fragmentation of the movements. Also because the government implemented all reforms and it seemed that our protest is useless” (Oggioni 2012).

Cycle 3: 2005 – 2010

From 2005 on massive reforms in the education sector were implemented: *Riforma Moratti* (already in 2003, but the main protests took place in 2005), *Riforma Centotrentatre* in 2008 and the last act of the *Riforma Gelmini* in 2010. These reforms triggered one of the largest student movements in Europe and the largest in Italy since the 70s.

This student movement basically started in many universities all over the country but had always its ‘center’ in the University La Sapienza in Rome. The movement, which was called ‘L’Onda’ in 2008, fought against privatization of Universities and cuts in public spending in the education sector. Also it was a fight against the precarization of academics and jobs in universities. Especially in 2008 the movement criticized the policy of the government against the economic crisis, the financial/bank crisis and protested against the right wing government under Berlusconi in general. One of the important slogans was ‘Noi la crisi non la paghiamo’ (we will not pay for this crisis). Many actors and artists solarized themselves with the movement and wrote articles, gave shows and did many other actions in the public to support the movement and highlight the drawbacks on Universities.

Student movements were “in the last two years of L’Onda quite important and very strong all over the country. With this movement a new generation of militancy started to be involved in politics” (Oggioni 2012).

L'Onda had its peak in 2008 and was reanimated during the reform 'Gelmini' in 2010. In this phase of student movements various Universities all over the country were squatted very often and for long periods, huge manifestations and festivals were organized and an alternative way of studying – the self-education – was implemented by these movements. Furthermore the protagonists published a high number of books and readers on the crisis.

The movement against the reforms of the minister of education Gelmini in 2010 was not as big as the movement in 2008 but much more radicalized. Several ministries were occupied many times by the students and manifestations became more offensive.

In the end all reforms were implemented as planned by the government.

Cycle 4: 2010 – 2012

This cycle contains again a massive protest against privatization and labour market reforms.

Main actors in this period are trade unions, groups of precarious employed people and some student networks. A coalition called 'Comitato no debito' (Committee No Debts) is organizing a number of manifestations all over the country to protest against the neoliberal policy of the government and its cuts and reforms.

Trade unions, especially the FIOM, mobilized against the resignation of the labour agreement and mass layoffs of the car producer FIAT in 2010 and 2011. FIAT resigned from the collective labour agreement and lowered the wages of all employees. Furthermore the reform of article 18, introduced by the 'technocratic' Government of Mario Monti, excluded all trade unions (except the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori (CISL), the Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL) and the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL)) and local committees from any further decision making (DeParma 2012).

Local committees of workers and mainly the FIOM organized strikes, manifestations and direct actions, such as the occupation of the train stations in Rome and in Milano (Governali 2012).

Another additional trigger for protests in this period had been the mass layoffs at the state owned train operator 'Trenitalia'. After a reform of their transport network and strategy – night trains were abrogated and the network of fast trains was expended) – Trenitalia shut down several branches and factories. The fired workers occupied these factories and

mobilized, out from the factories and branches, mass demonstrations and other interventions (DeParma 2012; Oggioni 2012).

One of the biggest manifestations was the one organized by FIOM, student networks, networks of precarious employed people and many other organizations against the reform of article 18 and austerity measures of the technocratic government. On the 9 March 2012 hundreds of thousands marched through the streets of Rome and the students got into a conflict with the police, which ended in street riots (Governali 2012; DeParma 2012).

Almost every spring and every autumn an increasing number of big manifestations with an increasing radicalness take place in Rome and other places in Italy. Even though in the beginning of the takeover of the government of Mario Monti the mobilization for protests stagnated, because of the missing collective identity to be ‘against Berlusconi’. But after the rigid policy on public spending and the implementation of further deregulation measurements more and more people take part on manifestations and direct actions (Bernardi 2012).

Only in 2011 almost every week in autumn huge radical manifestations of students and trade unions against austerity measures and deregulation happened in Italy – partly with severe clashes with the police such as the one on 15 October 2011 in the city center of Rome.

Another important milestone in the last years had been the referendum ‘L’Aqua Pubblica’ which included basically four questions: against the privatization of water supply, rejecting profit on water supply, against the introduction of nuclear energy plants in Italy and rejecting the impediment of ministers to appear in a court. This referendum in June 2011 was prepared by a large coalition of various organizations and networks, from student networks to local committees and was accepted by a clear majority over 90 percent and a turnout of around 55 percent (Bernardi 2012, DeParma 2012). The coalition stopped working after the success of the referendum, which was “a mistake, as the movement against privatization was quite successful and should have been continued” (Oggioni 2012).

The NoTAV protest (refer to chapter 5.3), which lasts since more than 20 years, got a clear upsurge as the construction companies started to work on sight on the tunnel construction. As the NoTAV network mobilized for a huge demonstration and occupation of the construction site the police reacted with a strong repression, which mobilized more people from all over

the country. In fact the NoTAV movement became a new dimension – a movement of various protagonists claiming for their rights, active all over Italy (Governali 2012).

However, the effort to import the Occupy and Indignados movement, which emerged in Spain and spread all over Europe, failed, as the collective identity and the fragmentation of the movement in Italy differs to the other European movements (Carls 2012: 263f.)

5.3. Protagonists of the movements

To describe protagonists of movements in Italy is quite a challenge as the framework of political actors is highly fragmented and complex.

The situation of political parties is characterized by stagnation. Political parties are almost not presented at all in movements of the last decade. In Genoa and during the European Social Forum in Florence the Rifondazione was very active. The left-center *Partito Democratico* (PD) instead, was not extensively active and sometimes even not supportive.

“In Genoa the Rifondazione was part all over Italy of this movement but always refused to take official responsibilities. Because they believed in the spontaneous character of the movements” (Oggioni 2012).

This thesis picks out some protagonists, which are, by several authors and interviewees, considered as central actors for movements.

5.3.1. (Young) Precarious Employed People

As this thesis has already presented in the chapter about general conditions, there is a high amount of precarious employed people in Italy. In the last three years especially young people were very active in the field of protests of precarious workers – similar to the situation in the UK, USA and Northern Africa. Very radical actors in these movements were university and school students: 22-27 year olds, which graduated from University with a first degree and which are forced to work under precarious conditions as they have no possibilities to stay at

the university to continue to study or to research. Since five years the number of students drops continuously (Governali 2012).

“Precarious graduates from Universities, migrants and not educated young people are the first victim (sic!) of the situation” states Simone Oggioni, president of the young communists of the party ‘Rifondazione’. Furthermore he argues that precarious people do not act as a unity when it comes to protests, even though they have a clear collective identity. “They potentially would be a great power, while they are not organized. They were represented by movements in the past. But now nobody represents them” (Oggioni 2012).

The author Kristin Carls and other interviewees argued, in contrast, that there are networks and initiatives of precarious people: one of the biggest networks is ‘San Precario’. In this country wide acting initiative leftists, precarious workers and other individuals get together to offer consultancy and a helpdesk for workers with labour law related questions, to organize manifestations and strikes. One of the most important achievement and events of the movement is the Mayday parade/manifestation in Milan and many other cities in Italy and in the meantime in several cities in Europe, which takes place every year on the 1 May (traditional Workers Day in many European countries) (Carls 2012, p. 261f.).

There is a growing number of such initiatives all over the country. At the moment another level of intervention is conducted by these networks: a programmatic agenda to change hegemonic assumptions on work and wages. Topics on this includes the claim for the unconditional basic income, the right for private and state insolvency and the right of free transnational movement of people. These claims should implement a generic precarious position and point of view in public discourses and should create a counter-hegemony to neoliberal positions.

One of the main strategies of the networks is the preparation of a mass strike of precarious workers in order to abolish the system inherent conditions of the division of workers in precarious and non-precarious and the profit maximisation of companies at the expense of workers. Further tactics of this collective action are blockades, the refusal to work and sabotage (Carls 2012, p. 260).

The situation of young precarious employed people in protest movements in Italy is the worst. ‘Children’ are staying at their parents place until they get married (30-40 years). They

are present in protest movements but actually they are not represented by anybody. FIOM tries to advocate for them (De Parma 2012).

There is also another group within the category ‘precarious workers’: precarious working migrants. Most of them do earn even less than ‘Italian’ precarious workers, mostly between 3-4 euros per hour or up to 30 euros per day. They live in collective shelters in degrading overcrowded conditions. Main sectors of work are farming and gastronomy (Besic 2013).

It is estimated that only in Calabria there are around 20.000 illegalized day labourer. In the last years several (radical) strikes of precarious workers took place in the south of Italy (Carls 2012, 260).

These collective actions of migrants, working under precarious conditions, is still in the very beginning. Even though strikes of migrants in farms and some supermarket chains had an overwhelming mobilization which led to a discourse about this issue in the public. Also the almost institutionalized ‘Day of Migrants’ on the 1 March, where the call is that migrants should not appear on that day at work and go on strike, indicates a growing activity in that political field. Still: government policies didn’t change at all (DeParma 2012).

A remaining challenge is the mobilization and coordination of and between the various actors. So far there are just some intercept points between unions, students, precarious workers networks – a coordination body is still missing.

Also because the collective identity of ‘precarious workers’ has a very broad definition and due to that fact it is not clear if this category serves as a mobilization factor. Trade unions, except the FIOM, have never picked up the concerns of precarious workers (Governali 2012).

5.3.2. Unions, Workers

Italy has an extensive variety of trade unions. There are three main trade unions (CISL, UIL and CGIL) in which an average of 30 percent (that is in total 12.5 million members) of workers and employees are organized. The high number of small companies, in which almost 67 percent of all workers are employed, limits the sphere of action of trade unions.

Wage and salary negotiations take place on different levels: On the level of the concerning company and on the level of the industry sector (Namuth 2012: 1). Since deregulating

reforms in 2009, 2011 and 2012, mainly the reform of article 18, wage agreements can be adjusted in all ways and locally. Local collectives of workers and local branches of trade unions are, by law, now excluded from any decision making (DeParma 2012).

Each of the three big trade unions in Italy is closely linked to a political parties and ideologies. CISL, UIL and CGIL in comparison:

	Ideology, Link to	Members 2011	Chair
CGIL	former Communist Party, Social democrats	5.8 m	Susanna Camusso
CISL	Conservative	4.5 m	Raffaele Bonanni
UIL	Republicans and Liberals	2.2 m	Luigi Angeletti

Table 6: Big three trade unions in Italy and their main characteristics (Namuth 2012, p. 3).

Besides the three big trade unions some smaller ones are on the landscape of unions in Italy: CISAL and CONFSAL (autonomous unions), COBAS (umbrella organization of local committees) and the right wing UGL (Namuth 2012, p. 3).

In fact the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori (CISL) and the Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL) were not very active in mobilizing for protests in the last decade. Quite the contrary: both unions agreed on several reforms and austerity measures – except from 2012 on, when both unions supported the CGIL in threatening the government to organize a general strike, if the austerity measures will continue (DeParma 2012).

Much more seen as a protagonist of social movements in Italy is the trade union ‘Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL)’ and it’s affiliated Federation of Metalworkers (Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici).

Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL)

The CGIL was founded in 1944 and was meant by the founders to be the only union in Italy – independent from parties. This changed some years later due to the fact that the CGIL got closer to the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and so other trade unions with links to other parties emerged in 40s, 50s and 60s. It has the most members of all trade unions in Italy and is one of the biggest in Europe. The membership structure is characterized by industrial workers which are mostly very leftish (DeParma 2012).

Main objectives of the CGIL is the fight against privatization and austerity measures. The mobilization resources of the CGIL are enormous: In national manifestations they can mobilize up to 3 million participants from all over the country (Governali 2012).

During the ruling time of the right-wing parties and Berlusconi, the CGIL was excluded from national negotiations with the Government. Only during the actual Government of Monti they returned to the round tables (Namuth 2012, p. 1).

Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici (FIOM)

This federation within the CGIL was already founded in 1901 and has an important and unique role in trade union politics and in social movements in Italy. It is very active in several protests and movements of the last decade. Back in 2000 FIOM was a main actor in organizing and mobilizing the protests against the G8 summit in Genoa, the protests against the wars, general strikes, student movements, the referendum 'L'Aqua Pubblica', protests against privatization and the recently happened protests in the FIAT factories. There were large movements of metal workers in the last years.

A unique role is that the FIOM is in solidarity with the student movements and with networks of precarious workers. Also a very special characteristic of FIOM is the not restricted membership policy – this trade union is independent and not attached to a company or factory but acts intersectional (DeParma 2012).

Furthermore maintains FIOM coalition and good links to other networks and organisations, such as the cooperation between the FIOM, FIOM youth and student networks. An example was the big manifestation on 16 October 2011 in Rome in which students and metal workers together protested against privatization and the university reform (De Parma 2012, Bernardi 2012, and Governali 2012). Nevertheless, international links with movements, especially to the movements in Egypt and Tunisia are not very well maintained (DeParma 2012).

“In every protest of the last years, FIOM was an integral part which had great resources in mobilization. FIOM has an important role. It is the potential new movement” (Oggioni 2012).

Uniti contro la crisi (Autoconvocati)

This network of workers, organized on the micro-level of companies, was born out of the critique on established trade unions. Workers come together in committees and conduct direct actions on local and regional levels. Precarious work, workers' rights and deregulation are the main topics of the Autoconvocati. In the last years they had quite a success in mobilization and organisation of manifestations and direct actions, such as the occupation of closed companies and factories. Unfortunately the network is losing power as many activists had to take inconvenient posts or lost their job, due to lost conflicts. As a result the network is not a central protagonist of Italian wide movements right now (Carls 2012, p. 260).

5.3.3. Student associations

Out of the tradition of the student protests back in the 70s and 80s and especially during the big student protest 'L'Onda' in 2008 several student associations emerged. But already before 2008 student networks and groups were very active in organizing and mobilizing for various manifestations, university occupations and in publishing readers and books on the situation of the universities and precarious academics. Such publications were 'Studiare con lentezza' (2006), 'Fare collettivo' (2007) and 'Università in conflitto' (2008).

Right now there are various networks with different ideologies and tactics: LINK, Rete della conoscenza, Rete delle collettivi, Unicommon, Ateneinrivolta and many more.

The structure of these networks and groups is often similar. On several faculties of a University is a 'branch' of one or more of the networks. These 'branches' deal with on the one hand with issues on the level of the faculty and on the other hand on the level of the University. Concrete acts of the 'branches' are mobilization for manifestations, organizing public discussions and congresses and conducting self-organized courses in the university. As most of the networks act in different universities over the country, they consider themselves as a country wide network and as a consequence the networks have national meetings, conferences and other working group meetings (Governali 2012; Bernardi 2012).

But there is also an international activity of most of the networks. For the European Social Forum in Florence in 2003 many networks have been involved in the preparation. The Italian networks are also very active in (annual) meetings of international student associations and in various international manifestations and conferences. For example for the big counter summit

and the manifestation against the Bologna Reform (Bologna Burns) in Vienna, some 400 – 500 students from Italian networks were present (Governali 2012).

Right now most networks are involved in the mobilization for ‘Bloccupy Frankfurt’, a manifestation in Frankfurt Germany against the European austerity measures.

A good international link between some associations and Spain is present while it is missing to Greece or France. Right before and during the uprisings in ‘the Arab world’ a strong link with the movements in Tunisia were established, at least between Ateneinrivolta and Unicommon. But there was no active link to movements in Egypt or other ‘arab’ countries in which uprisings took place (Governali 2012; Bernardi 2012).

Strong cooperation between CGIL, FIOM and some student associations are implemented, even though not with all networks.

Main topics of student associations and movements are rejecting privatization in general and in university in particular, against reforms which trigger an increasing number of precarious academics and unemployed, and against increasing student fees.

These student associations organized between 2008 and 2013 big manifestations in cooperation with FIOM, unemployed people and precarious workers/academics. In the years the manifestations got more radical, partly with riots, by using new techniques and tools, such as the ‘book block’ – plastic shields in form of over dimensional books are used to protect a manifestation (Bernardi 2012; DeParma 2012).

Students have a central role in protests against reforms and privatization in the last years. In the tradition of Italy when students won their battles at the university it always had an impact on social change (DeParma 2012).

5.3.4. Topic related Movements - NoTAV

NoTAV is a grassroots movement which emerged some 20 years ago to fight against the construction of ‘High Speed Trains’ (Treno ad Alta Velocità).

“The most important No Tav struggle is located in Susa Valley, near Turin, where people have been resisting for two decades against the Turin - Lyon high speed rail projects. (...) In the last years, the movement becomes an important benchmark for everyone rejecting the

neoliberal crisis, the demolition of social welfare, the austerity measures imposed by governments, and the dismantling of social rights, as we are clearly witnessing in Southern Europe” (Infoaut 2013).

Organized by local assemblies in a very horizontal decision making process, manifestations, occupations and many other forms of direct action had been used. A milestone in the NoTAV protests had been the occupation of the construction site in the Susa Valley, which the authorities pushed back with a high number of riot police and army troops.

“Six days after, a huge demonstration (some 80.000 people) tries to reclaim the militarized area (3rd July 2011); resulting in hours and hours of clashes between people and riot police, that threw more than four thousands poisonous CS tear gases in a single day” (Infoaut 2013).

NoTAV has turned from a local protest to an Italian social movement against neoliberalism, corruption, privatization and power structures of the ‘technocrat’ government. A movement which is growing since 20 years, with common strategies and a collective identity (Governali 2012). Also “(t)he legitimacy of the No Tav movement is increasing in front of the deep crisis of the Italian representative political system” (Infoaut 2013).

5.4. Conditions of movements today

System – Government – Repression

As already described in the chapter about general conditions, the policy of the last 20 years in Italy is characterized by a rigid neoliberal de/reconstruction of the society, the economy and as a result also of the conditions of the labour force. During the right-wing government under Prime Minister Berlusconi and due to the pressure from international institutions and investors a number of reforms pushed Italy towards a distinctive case of privatization, deregulation and massive cut backs in labour rights. But it would be too easy to point just to the right-wing government: the trade unions CISL and UIL agreed on most of the reforms and when the ‘social democratic’ Partito Democratico (PD) has been on power the very same course was applied.

In addition to the critiques on the policy of governments, especially in the socio-economic context, the fight against Silvio Berlusconi and its excessive faux pas unified and mobilized many protesters.

The first months after the implementation and the takeover of the ‘technocrat’ government under Mario Monti the force of mobilization became weaker, because the collective ‘enemy’ Berlusconi was not on power anymore and the previous protesters had a kind of flicker of hope that conditions will change. Nevertheless the conditions stayed the same and became even worse. The neoliberal course of the government became more radical and got a distinctive shape.

A supposed consensus of the biggest parties that this ‘technocratic’ government seems to be without alternative led to a situation in which protestors and social movements, which were fighting against the austerity measures and cut backs, were confronted with a union of all established big parties.

In November 2012 the parliament was suspended after the resignation of Mario Monti. The following elections delivered a constellation of coalitions and parties in the Senate and the chamber of deputies, which was not able to rule as the proportions were not enough for any coalition to have the majority in the senate. A movement ‘MoVimento 5 Stelle’, a party led by the comedian Beppe Grillo, entered the parliament with around 25% by having a very diffuse party platform. This political stagnancy, in addition to the previous implemented austerity and deregulation measures, triggered much more extra parliamentary protests.

Since mid of 2013 a compromise prime minister was assigned with support of the new right-center wing coalition (the old coalition broke up and Silvio Berlusconi was excluded) and the left-center coalition. Further (neoliberal) reforms of this new government led finally to a situation in which various movements and protests all over the country emerged. A peak of all this movements was in December 2013 and is still ongoing. This thesis will not be able to go into details concerning this current development.

Conditions of left wing movements

As of 2012 the analysis on movements in Italy resulted in the assumption that there is no social movement in Italy in this period. “Now there is no social movement. There is a lot of possibility in this situation. It remains important and it should be able to create something. But now we have not (sic!) organized movements. This movement in the last 3 years water¹⁵, university were very sectorial. They weren’t able to speak to each other and to get organized” (Oggioni 2012).

A distinctive distance between activists, civil-rights movements and political parties triggers a broad extra parliamentary opposition. In addition the fragmentation of left parties and their rivalled behaviour leads to a stagnation in parliamentary politics (Governali 2012; Oggioni 2012).

But on the other side organizations, initiatives and other actors of protests, which are located at the left, are fragmented as well: “All the movements share the same alternative to neoliberalism. But they hadn’t the capability to get connected. A coordination and connection is still missing. But the Strategic goal is the same” (Oggioni 2012).

This fragmentation has several reasons. On the one hand the economic situation has worsen so that the number of precarious employed and unemployed people has dramatically increased while there is no dedicated organization advocating for these forces, on the other hand every organization and initiative is fighting in their own particular sector (Oggioni 2012, Governali 2012). “Ten years ago workers with the same conditions, contracts, problems had better opportunities to protest in their companies” (Oggioni 2012).

Nevertheless, the number of protests seems to rise.

¹⁵ Aqua Pubblica

Workers still occupy closed factories and premises of the state owned train operator 'Trenitalia' in Rome and other cities. Furthermore these workers organize together with FIOM large manifestations and direct actions such as the occupation of railway stations.

Student networks mobilizing for demonstrations and direct actions against the reforms of the universities and against austerity measures. Since 2011 a high number of (radical) manifestations were organized by several student networks and the last clashes at the campus of the 'La Sapienza' University in Rome happened because Students tried to enter a meeting of various ministers at the premises of the university. Furthermore student networks have organized congresses and meetings over the last years with a distinctive international participation, such as 'La rivolta di una generazione' – a Euro-Mediterranean meeting of student movements from Europe and Tunisia and the 'Agora 99 – European meeting on debt, rights and democracy'.

The student networks 'Ateneinrivolta' and 'Unicommon' are still very active in maintaining a European (and Mediterranean) network. Both initiatives are involved in the mobilization for the manifestations 'Bloccupy Frankfurt' in Germany.

Still, students missed the opportunity to establish a new broad movement in 2011 and 2012, even though the attempt was there.

Slowly a broader movement emerges. On the 20 October 2013 a large coalition of trade unions, social centers, La Rifondazione, student networks and other protagonists conducted a massive demonstration against austerity measures and precarious conditions in Rome with more than 150.000 participants (La Repubblica 2013).

This week of protests reached a very radical level with several riots and the attempt to implement strategies such as squatting public places by camping there like in Tunisia, Egypt or Turkey.

Conditions of right wing movements

There is a limited action of right-wing movements in Italy in the last decade¹⁶. With the stagnation of established traditional parties of the right and the left and the rise of the ‘protest-party MoVimento 5 Stelle’ a new force entered the public discussion and confrontation in politics. A protest movement which refuses ‘any ideology’ and claims for lower taxes, a cut back in the state bureaucracy and direct democracy. This movement, they call themselves ‘I Forconi’¹⁷ is influenced by the ‘MoVimento 5 Stelle’ and supported by far right-wing actors such as ‘Casa Pound’ or ‘Forza Nuova’. Participating actors in this movement are mostly small-scale entrepreneurs, farmers, unemployed and precarious employed people. In fact this movement sprout in various cities and villages all over the country and becomes bigger. Their strategy is mostly to demonstrate and occupy public infrastructure¹⁸ (Internazionale 2013).

Perspectives

Right now it seems that the extra parliamentary opposition in Italy became a driver in politics. Almost every week several manifestations and direct actions take place in Italy. While the (right-wing) movement ‘I Forconi’ has a high degree of organisation and mobilisation and shows a kind of unity up to a certain level.

Left-wing movements instead are highly fragmented. “The movements of the last decade had a good idea, were able to analyse different parts of the same problem but without a general connection” (Oggioni 2012).

Right now there are definitely frame conditions for the emergence of a social movement, but so far a broad left movement is not in sight (Oggioni 2012; Governali 2012; and DeParma 2012).

“Another movement potentially hegemonic is a movement of working class in the factories of FIAT” (Oggioni 2012).

A high risk for the left at the moment, is that the ‘I Forconi’ movement is creating a discourse of counter hegemony and that it the movement gets bigger.

¹⁶ Fascist Movements under Mussolini are excluded, as they are not a chronological element of this thesis. Nevertheless there had been strong movements in the 70s and 80s.

¹⁷ Equivalent to the English ‘muck-rake’

¹⁸ Such as streets and railways

5.5. Reasons and triggers for a low activity on uprisings

Several interviewees stated that the condition for a broad social movement is present. As already discussed in the previous chapter several reasons hamper the emergence of a progressive left social movement. But the frame conditions are clearly indicating an upcoming need of an essential change: High unemployment rates, increasing precarious working conditions, rising prices and massive cut-backs in the welfare system – the people are getting more and more aggressive. There is definitely a need to have uprisings like in northern African countries, as an interviewed student stated (Governali 2012).

Simone Oggioni from the party *Rifondazione Comunista* in contrast: “The events of Egypt and Tunisia and its frameworks are not exportable. There is no comparable situation to Egypt in Italy. Politicians are not corrupt as in Egypt. The people still have something to eat. Furthermore Italy has a distinctive civil society with forms of expression, in contradiction to Egypt” (Oggioni 2012).

Nevertheless, the youth nowadays are much poorer than all generations since the war (DeParma 2012; Governali 2012).

Student networks are quite active at the moment and as student movements had very often a leading role in Italy it strongly depend on the future development of possible upcoming movements. Reforms from 2005 till today triggered broad student movements but for that moment a sustainable networking of various actors with students is missing. Still, universities are a breeding ground for protests as the situation is very precarious and perspectives are quite bad (Governali 2012).

“Students and young activists do not see the whole picture and just have minor ideas about politics. They feel the small power they have in the university, to organize protests and they are happy” (Oggioni 2012).

Parties do not play a big role in protests and movements right now, due to the stagnation in the parliament. Progressive parties, such as the ‘Rifondazione’ “would like to convince millions but we don’t have the power now to do that” (Oggioni 2012).

As already mentioned, the potential for a big social movements which claims a radical change in politics is present, but all interviewees assume that there is a missing composition and coordination of all protesting actors – which are quite a lot right now (DeParma 2012).

An interesting situation is that the right-wing movements as well as the left-wing movements claim more direct democracy and an end of austerity. It is not clear so far if they might find a way on working together, even though it seems unlikely.

The collective identity of being against Berlusconi is lost. For most actors it was easy to mobilize people against Berlusconi, even though the forces were very fragmented. This factor is clearly missing (DeParma 2012).

Also missing is a central symbolic place of protests. While in Egypt it was the Tahrir and in Turkey it was the Taksim square, Italy has not yet such a symbol where people can always show up and enter a protest.

Even though repression in Italy is present and hard, it has not yet such an effect on solidarity mobilization as it had in Egypt with the *We are all Khaled Said* campaign. This might be another reason why uprisings has not yet emerged.

But right now in this moment, while this thesis is written, hundreds of peoples go on the streets and claiming an end of austerity and more direct democracy. It seems that this might be a new attempt to create a new big Italian social movement.

6. Conclusio

While this thesis was written, the situation in Egypt and Italy almost changed on a daily base. For that reason not all dynamics in both countries were taken into consideration, even though most aspects which supported the process of answering the research questions were analyzed.

6.1. How social are movements in Italy and Egypt?

As already discussed at an earlier stage in this thesis, the protests from 2011 in Egypt can be considered as Social Movements. Even though this thesis comes to the conclusion that the uprisings are not a revolution per se (yet) but nevertheless a revolutionary situation, based on Lenin's categories.

The situation in Italy is slightly different. Let us have a closer look to definitions of Social Movements and let us categorize protests in Italy of the last decade:

A Social Movement, defined by Roth and Rucht, as a network in which groups and organizations, based on a collective identity, together continuously fight for a social change. It should be more than just a simple 'No, we don't want to' (Roth & Rucht 2008, p. 13).¹⁹

Following the definition and characteristics of social movements, described by Roth and Rucht and elaborated in this thesis prior to this chapter, the protests in Italy cannot yet be clearly identified as Social Movements. Aspects of the theory of Roth and Rucht are applicable, such as the organization in networks and the claim for democratization, participation and to improve living conditions. But still, high participation of young people, a category of Roth and Rucht, is not further defined and so it is quite difficult to apply this category to the case of Italy. Hence further aspects of other theories need to be taken into consideration.

Characteristics defined by Frank, also already elaborated in previous chapters, are actually applicable to the protests in Italy. Especially the main characteristic that movements are mainly based in the civil society and not attached to political parties at all is relevant.

But an essential factor is missing: the collective identity²⁰ of actors in Italy with common claims, strategies and concept of the enemy. Furthermore a common diagnostic frame, the identification of the problem is clearly missing, as all interviewees stated. In summary this

¹⁹ Already elaborated in chapter 3 and applied to the situation in Egypt in chapter 4.

²⁰ Defined by Buechler as a precondition for Social Movements.

thesis comes to the conclusion that the protests of the last decade in Italy cannot be categorized as Social Movements.

6.2. Applicability of Social Movement Theories

This passage aims to discuss and conclude the research question '*Are 'New Social Movement Theories' applicable to current movements in Egypt?*' and the research hypothesis '*New Social Movement Theories' are just partial applicable in the Case Studies. They need to be revised, at least for this Case Study*'.

This thesis researched on the question if the SMT are applicable in the case of Egypt. Based on the analysis, made in chapter *Relevance of "Social Movement Theories"* this thesis comes to the conclusion that aspects of selected theories might be applicable to the case of Egypt. Even though these aspects do not foresee or explain movements to a full extent, they might lead to a better understanding of elements of social movements. Thus Social Movement Theories are just applicable to a very limited extend.

Not considered in this thesis is the approach of McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow, published in the book *Dynamics of Contention* in 2001. This approach is analysing present Social Movement Theories and combines different levels, such as individual and systemic perspectives and the umbrella of contention at its dynamics. A further analysis of social movements in Egypt by using the approach of *Dynamics of Contention* might uncover new aspects and contribute to the general debate of the uprising in Egypt.

As already discussed, protests in Italy are not considered as social movements by this thesis, hence Social Movement Theories are not applicable to a full extent by definitions. Sincerely aspects of the Collective Identity or Framing Theory are very useful to analyse and describe protests, networks and possible upcoming movements.

6.3. Conditions in Italy and Egypt – the emergence of protests

One of the core aims of this thesis was to discuss and name reasons and triggers for protests in both countries in the last decade - the big **why**. This discussion is based on the research questions: **‘What are the reasons and triggers of uprisings in Egypt 2011?’** And **‘What are reasons and triggers for social movements in Italy?’**

Basically three hypothesis were formulated in the beginning of this research. First assumption was that **a high unemployment rate amongst young people can be an essential basis for the appearance of social movements and uprisings.**

In fact it was the core assumption of this thesis which seems to be discussed adequately. As several statistics indicate there is a very high youth unemployment rate in Egypt and in Italy and as protests in both countries are linked to claims related to the precarious situation of the youth it seems that there is a interdependency between protest and unemployment. Around 30 percent stated in the Arab Opinion Index that the deteriorating economic conditions are the main reason for the uprisings in Egypt.

Also the researcher Korotayev and Zinkina come to the conclusion that „on the eve of the Revolution Egypt had about one million of unemployed young people aged 20–24 who made up the main striking force of the Revolution” (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011, p. 88ff.).

But is there a mechanism behind? Can a high youth unemployment rate always be an essential basis for the appearance of social movements? To get an adequate result, a further aspect needs to be analysed: The role of unemployed people in Social Movements. This will be conducted bit later in this thesis.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that not only a high youth unemployment rate leads to social movements and uprisings. It is much more a combination of several aspects, facts and circumstances which trigger a revolutionary situation. As we can see in the cases of Spain, Greece, Italy, Tunisia and Egypt the results of protests with a large participation of young unemployed and precarious employed people are very different. While in Egypt and Tunisia the protests led to uprisings and a radical change in the political system, the other named countries haven’t finished or haven’t even started a transition of the system. What are then the other aspects playing a role in the process towards a revolutionary situation? As already discussed in chapter 4 this thesis, and a number of scholars, identifies high youth unemployment rate, precarious working conditions, rising food prices and an increasing repression from the state as potential triggers (Korotayev & Zinkina 2011, p. 88ff.).

This thesis would like to highlight of the role of repression: A high youth unemployment rate in Egypt is not a suddenly emerged phenomenon but existing since years. The increasing number of repression and assaults by the different police entities on the population led to solidarity and as a consequence to a higher number of protesters. Essential in this process was the use of Blogs and other Internet tools to create a public discourse on this and other topics. An example might be the 'We are all Khaled Said' movement which, in fact, was one of the main organizers of the protests on 25 January 2011, as it was the protests against the National Police Day. This assumption is supported by the theory of Political Opportunity Structures, which states that a high degree of repression in combination with a high acceptance of the claims of a movement by the population leads to a fragile state, thus to uprisings.

In addition to this mix cuts in public spending and austerity measures worsened or even created the situation of unemployed a precarious employed people. This is actually the second central hypothesis of this research: **The '*Washington Consensus Related Policy*', the economic crisis and cuts in public spending for social sectors are significant triggers for the uprisings. In special the situation of young unemployed and precarious working persons triggered the protest. Uprisings in Egypt are not only against autocratic structures of „dictatorships“ but much more an answer to the global crisis of the world system (on current capitalistic systems) and consequently a result of precarious socio-economic conditions.**

Reasons for the emergence of the movement in Egypt are very variable and a complex framework. So is the economic, social and political situation in which movements evolve from. In Egypt marginalized groups and individuals which are not part of the elites of the country, suffers from the circumstances and living conditions, especially since structural adjustment programmes, claimed by the Bretton-Woods Institutions, were implemented. Privatization, the sold out of state owned industries and cuts in social services led in fact to a high youth unemployment rate. Never the less, the government recognized this unbalance and tried, presumably to save their own power, to go against this development by subsidizing selective sectors. Especially the situation of poverty where only two percent of the population lives in total poverty (less than 1.25USD/day) but 20 percent lives in relative poverty (less than 2USD/day) was in the focus of counter measures of the government. Their reaction was not to (re)build social services and a welfare system but to hand out vouchers for food and to subsidize wheat. Rising wheat prices in 2010 and 2011 tightened the situation. But all factors and aspects would not have been triggers without a decade of increasing empowerment of,

mostly leftist, protesters and movements. This historical development of protests, the consequent fight for space in the public and experiences made by several networks and generations of protestors was a precondition of what was later called ,the Arab Spring‘.

In summary this thesis comes to the conclusion that there is a highly complex framework which led to the uprisings:

1. by neoliberal structural adjustment programmes²¹ implemented cuts in social services and welfare systems, tightened by the World Economic Crisis from 2008, a critical social and economic situation emerged.
2. In addition a youth bulge in the years 2008 – 2015 increased the youth unemployment rate up to 48%.
3. Precarious employment, fostered by deregulation, as the day-to-day form of employment, forced people into a actuality of life without social insurance, job protection and without a income which is enough to survive.
4. Extensive repression and the possibility to publish assaults mobilized people.
5. Rising food prices made the situation for unemployed and precarious employed people unendurable.
6. A continuous implementation of further neoliberal policies²² thightened the already precarious situation.
7. Missing participation in politics and decision making of the population. Further more a deep distrust in political parties.
8. Experiences made in protests in the decade before empowered people to protest. Already established networks of political activists, mostly young precarious employed or unemployed people, played an essential role in the organization and the process of mobilization.

²¹ Claimed by international organizations such as International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

²² Austerity measures, deregulation, cuts in public spending

The situation in Italy is slightly different. What we find today in Italy is a situation of precarious employment and a high youth unemployment rate, caused by the World Economic Crisis and tightened by austerity measures. Furthermore a deep distrust on political parties is currently present²³. This is very similar to the framework existing in Egypt which leads to a (partial) confirmation of the hypothesis that **General Conditions in Egypt and Italy are very similar. So are triggers, structures and protagonists of social movements in both countries.** However the situation in Italy does not show various other phenomenon like in Egypt: There is no youth bulge, the level of repression is limited and no extensively rising food prizes. Furthermore this thesis already concluded that the protests in Italy are not (yet) considerable as social movement. Thus the thesis that **Privatization, cutting in public spending, the precarious situation of the youth and a lack of participation triggered social movements in Italy since 2000** is not fully confirmable nor proof able.

The research question on **any links between movements in Egypt and Italy** can be answered on the base of several interviews: There had been links between networks and organizations in Italy and the movement in Tunisia but almost no links with the movement in Egypt. Nevertheless an exchange of strategies and tactics, especially in direct action, is recognizable²⁴.

6.4. Protagonists – role of young unemployed and precarious employed

This thesis aims to identify who, in the complex framework of several actors, are the protagonists of the so called ‘Arab Spring’ and in movements in Italy and if they define themselves as a specific category. Basically the hypothesis is that **young unemployed people played an essential role in the preparation and the implementation of the uprisings in Egypt and in social movements in Italy.**

In fact, in the process of the research for this thesis it became quite obvious that young unemployed and precarious employed people did and still do play an essential role in the movements and protests of the last decade and especially for the uprisings in Egypt. All

²³ As the victim of the MoVimento 5 Stelle in the last election and several interviewees indicate.

²⁴ Such as the method to occupy public spaces with tents.

interviewees, in the case of Egypt and Italy, stated that the (economic) situation of young people forced them to participate to a high degree in the organisation and mobilization of protests. However the central question is if they also acted in the collective identity as young unemployed and/or young precarious employed people. This can not fully be proved. In Italy there the category of unemployed or precarious employed is very common, thus activists go onto the streets with their individual identity as precarious. Nevertheless in both countries, Italy and Egypt, there are almost no existing movements or networks with the collective identity as 'the precarious'. Networks like SanPrecario in Italy is definitely a pressure group and network of precarious employed and unemployed people, but they don't have a leading role in protests of the last decade.

But still, young unemployed and precarious employed people were the grand of movements and protests in Egypt and in Italy. During the uprisings in Egypt, workers and other parts of the society joined the protests and brought the whole story to an glory end: the ouster of Mubarak.

6.5. Perspectives

After the analysis of the existing phenomenon, frameworks and mechanisms some questions remain: **Could an 'Arab Spring' happen in Europe, especially in these phases of high youth-unemployment rates? Even though it is very speculative, thus not very serious to answer this question, it could be answered why not? Are there any feedbacks of Egypt uprisings to Italy?**

In fact it seems that there are, so far, no feedbacks from the uprisings in Egypt to Italy. All interviewees stated that the general situation in Italy would be pretty ready to have such movements and protests like in Egypt but so far not even an interpersonal exchange, an exchange of strategies and policies with Egyptian activists took place to a large degree. Similar tactics like the setup of tents in public spaces were taken by parts of the Italian networks, as we have seen some months ago on Piazza S. Pia in Rome. Also influenced has been the Spanish Indignados Movement in 2010 and 2011 by Tunisian activists: The Euro-Mediterranean Meeting 'La Rivolta di una Generazione' in Rome in 2011 was a platform of exchange for activists from Tunisia and Europe. And in fact two days after the meeting in

Rome, the Spanish participants started a huge occupation of the Plaza del Sol in Madrid, just like the Tunisian activists did during the uprisings.

The question if uprisings like in Egypt could emerge also in Europe is not seriously and easily answered. One of the main problems of movements in Italy is the fragmentation and thus the missing collective identity of the protesters. Also the reaction of the state, when it comes to repression is for sure brutal up to a certain level, but nevertheless the repression hasn't reached a level of nationwide solidarity with oppressed persons. But if the state continues with austerity measures, increases its repression and if the movement comes to a common hegemony – a massive uprising might take place, even though the dimension and the development is quite unpredictable.

But what seems to be predictable is that austerity measures and neoliberal policies of deregulation in Egypt and in Italy will not solve structural problems. The very reverse is the case: As this thesis has already elaborated in the Case Studies, austerity measures and deregulation has partly caused the socio-economic crisis and is still tightening the situation of young unemployed and precarious employed people in both countries.

Even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that austerity measures are not the right way out for countries like Greece. Much more a policy is needed in which deregulation and austerity measures are not the essential part (Decker 2013).

What we can see nowadays on the streets and squares of the world might be the start of a new, powerful social movement. The people are angry. They are angry about missing possibilities to participate in decision making, angry about austerity measures while billions were spent to save the financial sector. It is the generation of angry people and as soon as they are angry with “the right person and to the right degree and at the right time and for the right purpose, and in the right way” (Aristotle) it will be dangerous for many governments – especially in Europe.

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Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit Protesten, Aufständen und Sozialen Bewegungen in Ägypten und Italien seit dem Jahr 2000. Vor allem die Rolle von jungen Arbeitslosen und dem jungen Prekariat innerhalb der Bewegungen werden beleuchtet. Des Weiteren werden mögliche Gründe und Auslöser fuer Protestbewegungen in beiden Ländern untersucht und benannt. Einen bedeutenden Einfluss haben hierbei Rahmenbedingungen der letzten zwanzig Jahre. So spielen die sozialen und ökonomischen Faktoren wie eine hohe Jugenarbeitslosigkeit, Deregulierung der Arbeitsmärkte und Privatisierungen eine bedeutende Rolle in der Verschlechterung der Lebens- und Arbeitsbedingung junger Menschen. Zusätzlich hat das Auftreten der *Youth Bulge*, das steigen der Lebensmittelpreise und eine zunehmende Repression zu einem erheblichen Mass zu den Aufständen in Egypten vom Januar 2011 beigetragen. Diese Aufstände sind aber nicht entkoppelt zu historischen Entwicklungen der letzten Dekade zu betrachten: Die Arbeitskämpfe und Proteste seit 2000 haben zu einer Vernetzung und einer Ermächtigung diverser AkteurInnen geführt, die erheblich zu dem Erfolg der Aufstände im Januar 2011 beigetragen haben.

Die Italienische Bewegung hingegen hatte zu Beginn der 2000er Jahre eine ausserordentliche Kraft und kann, bis ca. 2003, als eine soziale Bewegung definiert werden. Gerade die Proteste zu dem G8 Gipfel in Genua und das Europäische Sozial Forum in Florenz können als Höhepunkte der Italienischen Bewegung seit 2000 bewertet werden. Seit 2003 allerdings erleben Italienische Bewegungen eine massive Fragmentierung was zu einer Schwächung der Proteste geführt hat. Auch wenn gerade seit 2008 grosse Studierendenbewegungen Italien geprägt haben, so kann in Italien nicht mehr von sozialen Bewegung gesprochen werden. Ein Ausblick auf die kommenden Jahre, gerade im Hinblick auf die derzeit stattfindenden massiven Proteste, wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit gegeben. Auch wenn sich beide Länder teilweise von Ihren ökonomischen und sozialen Rahmenbedingungen vergleichen lassen und gewisse parallelen in der Entwicklung von Protesten in dieser Arbeit aufgezeigt werden, so kann dennoch nicht von ein und derselben Entwicklung und von selben Perspektiven gesprochen werden. Eine vertiefte Analyse der Rahmenbedinungen beider Länder ist wesentlicher Bestandteil dieser Arbeit. Die Analysen in dieser Arbeit basieren auf *Social Movement Theories* die sich auf Neue Soziale Bewegungen fokussieren. Eine Anwendbarkeit dieser Theorien wird in dieser Arbeit evaluiert und geprüft.

Abstract

This thesis conducts a research on protests, uprisings and social movements in Egypt and Italy since 2000. Especially the role of young unemployed and precarious employed in the organization and mobilization of protests is object of this research. Furthermore triggers of protests in both countries are named in this thesis. Social and economic frameworks do have an essential influence on protests and movements of the last twenty years. Thus factors such as youth unemployment, deregulation of the labor market and privatization play a role in the process of the worsening of living- and working conditions of young people. The appearance of the *Youth Bulge*, rising food prices, increasing repression and the (new) possibilities to network and to share experiences, supported by internet tools, led finally to the uprisings in Egypt in January 2011. Nevertheless these uprisings are not to be seen without the historical context of the last decade: Struggles and protests since 2000 led to an establishment of networks and empowerment of and between various actors and activists.

However, the Italian movements were very powerful in the first years of this millennium and can be considered as social movements until 2003. First and foremost, the protests against the G8 in Genoa and the preparation of the European Social Forum in Florence were the highlights of protests and movements since 2000. From 2003 on, Italian movements are characterized to a high degree by fragmentation, which led to a weakening of protests in Italy. Even though the student movements from 2008 on were very strong and radical, these movements cannot be seen as social movements and there is no indication that actual protests can be identified as social movements. This thesis is analyzing current protests and discusses potential developments of the situation in Italy.

This thesis is discussing and analyzing potential similarities in the profile of social and economic conditions of both countries, even though there is no linear analogy of situations in Egypt and Italy. An in depth analysis and a comparison of conditions, frameworks, perspectives, protests and their triggers are essential elements of this thesis.

The research is based on Social Movement Theories, with a dedicated focus on New Social Movements. Thus the applicability of these theories on the cases Egypt and Italy are discussed and evaluated in this thesis.

Curriculum Vitae

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Professional Experience and Graduation

Since 1999	Lecturer and Trainer, Logistics Officer, Urban Search and Rescue Expert, Team-leader, and Command Post Operational Staff, German Federal Agency for Technical Relief
Since 2010	Freelancing Advisor and Consultant for Humanitarian Aid, Disaster Response and Development
April 2013 – October 2013	Emergency Services, Secretariat of the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP), core planning and control of the largest humanitarian-led exercise TRIPLEX 2013. Field Coordination Support Section, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Geneva
February 2009 - November 2009	Junior Information Management Officer, Logistics Cluster, World Food Programme, Rome, Italy (2 Month break between)
September 2003 – September 2007	Freelancer in the sector of Event Management
November 2000 – July 2003	Professional/vocational training for Event Management and Event Technology. Vocational School for the State Bavaria, Munich and Company Licht und Ton, Munich Degree as registered professional in Event Technology

Education & University

Since October 2007	Student of International Development Studies (Magister) University of Vienna, Austria
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February 2013	Bachelor Degree in Political Sciences. University of Vienna, Austria
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