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Kurzfassung

Ethnonationalismus stellt das größte Hindernis für Demokratie in Bosnien-Herzegowina dar. Der jetzige Hohe Repräsentant sieht keine Entwicklungen oder Fortschritte Richtung EU-Integration mit der gegenwärtigen Ethnopolitik. Weiters ist die einzige Lösung eine radikale Veränderung der politischen Führung. Die Aussichten der Gründung einer neuen politischen Macht in Bosnien-Herzegowina, welche das Funktionieren des bosnischen Staates jenseits des ethnonationalistischen Paradigmas suchen würden, sind zurzeit düster. Dennoch ist der Übergang vom Kommunismus zur Demokratie ein langwieriger Prozess. Zusammengefasst zeigen die Analysen, dass für einen erfolgreichen Weg in die EU, für welchen die politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung des Landes eine Voraussetzung darstellt, die internationale Gemeinschaft ihre Strategie gegenüber dem „Sonderfall" Bosnien-Herzegowina ändern muss.

Abstract

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethno-nationalism constitutes the biggest threat to democracy. The current High Representative sees no future developments towards EU integration with the current ethno-politics. The only solution is a radical change of the political leadership. The prospects for establishing a new political power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would seek to strengthen the functioning of the Bosnian state beyond the ethno-national paradigm, are at the moment bleak. Nevertheless, the transformation from communism to democratisation is a lengthy process. Taken together, the analyses show that in order for Bosnia-Herzegovina to succeed on its path towards membership of the EU, comprehending the political, economic as well as social development of the country, the international community has to change its strategy towards this "special case".

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Abbreviations

BiH	Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia-Herzegovina
BPS	Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party-Sefer Halilovic
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
DF	Democratic Front
DNS	Democratic People's Alliance
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
ESI	European Stability Initiative
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
Federation	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
HDZ 1990	Croatian Democratic Union 1990
HDZ BiH	Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina
HR	High Representative
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Assistance
IPTF	International Police Task Force
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDI	National Democratic Institution for Foreign Affairs
NHI	Independent Croatian Initiative
OHR	Office of High Representative
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDP	Party of Democratic Progress
PIC	Peace Implementation Council

RS	Republika Srpska
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SBB BiH	Union for a Better Future of BiH
SBiH	Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDP	Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SNS	Serb Nationalist Alliance
SNSD	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats
SPRS	Socialist Party of Republika Srpska
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organisation

1 Introduction

1.1 Brief Introduction to the Topic

On the 6^{th} and the 7^{th} of April 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former socialist republic of Yugoslavia, was recognised as independent by the United States of America (USA) and the member states of the European Community, respectively. Subsequently, the Bosnian war began. Initially, the Yugoslav National Army, controlled by the Serbian authorities, attacked Bosnian regions. The achievement of a Great Serbia was in sight. The goal was to gain as much territory as possible. Non-Serbs were expelled or killed (Petritsch 2001:31). Military clashes between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks took place in central Bosnia and in some parts of Herzegovina (Petritsch 2001:33ff). A proportion of the Bosnian Croats targeted Croatian-dominated territories in Bosnia in order to unite these with Croatia (Petritsch 2001:51ff). In other parts of the country, Croatian and Bosniak armies fought together against the Serbian army (Petritsch 2001:33ff). The peak of the Bosnian war was the massacre in Srebrenica in July 2005, where an ethnic cleansing was carried out by the Serbian army. About 7,500 Bosniaks were massacred within a few days (Petritsch 2001:21). On the 14^{th} of December 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in Paris by all parties, and therewith the Bosnian war was officially ended. The number of the dead is an estimated one and accounts for more than 200,000 people. The number of displaced persons and refugees is 2.2 million (Petritsch 2001:50).

The former Yugoslavian federal state Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which population groups with different religious and cultural-historical backgrounds lived together for centuries (Petritsch 2001:27), was now split into two entities. In January 1992, the Bosnian-Serbian nationalistic leaders had already proclaimed a separate republic, namely Republika Srpska (RS), in which mostly Bosnian Serbs live (Petritsch 2001:29). The second entity, consisting

primarily of Bosniaks and Croats, is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation). The division of the single area into two territories of both entities complies with the borders which arose in the course of the late war. 51% belongs to the Federation and 49% to the RS (Petritsch 2001:48).

For both of these entities, among others, the DPA meant that elections should be conducted under international supervision and to incorporate international human return or compensation (ibid.). As for the political system of the state as a whole, it has a government, a three-member presidency, a parliament and a constitutional court (Petritsch 2001:49). The government on the state level was initially in charge of "foreign affairs [...], foreign trade, costumes, monetary policies, finances in relation to international institutions, refugee and asylum policies, cooperation with Interpol, common and international communication systems, the traffic between both entities and the air surveillance" (Petritsch 2001:56 - own translation into Eng.). All other competencies were ascribed to the entity level. In the course of the post-war era some reforms have been implemented which involved the transformation of some competencies to the state level. However, the overall state is being kept fragile. The two entities have, independently of one another, thir own institutions such as governments, parliaments and ministries. Additionally, the two entities have freedom in building their own territories as they prefer, as long as they do not violate the DPA and international law (ibid.)

According to the DPA, Bosnia-Herzegovina is defined as a sovereign state, but in practice it is being supervised by the international community with the High Representative (HR) and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) at the top (cf. Petritsch 2001:58). The HR monitors the implementation of the civilian side of the DPA. In addition, the HR takes part in meetings of donor organisations and reports regularly to the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and other stakeholders about the current situation of the country (Petritsch 2001:60f). The Office of the High Representative (OHR) will be maintained as long as particularly the political situation in the country is perceived as being unstable.

In the state structure of the Bosnian state, non-nationalist parties and movements in Bosnia-Herzegovina acknowledge the "victory of the ethnic principle". The Presidency and the National Assembly are in practice represented only by the three constitutive ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Other groups such as Jews, Albans and Roma are excluded. Multicultural parties such as the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP) and the Democratic Front (DF) perceive this exclusion as a violation

of internationally accepted constitutional principles (Petritsch 2001:57). Furthermore, the Dayton constitution has turned out to be inefficient and costly for the Bosnian country. The politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not run on a factual basis, but rather on an ethno-nationalistic basis. Ethno-nationalism and ethno-politics are being used as power techniques by the ethno-nationalistic parties (cf. Dzihic 2009:22). Ethno-nationalism constitutes a major problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina because on the one hand, the interests and prospects of each ethnic group, concerning not only the statehood and the political system but almost every political matter, are diametrically diverse and thus decision-making and the implementation processes become inefficient and sometimes impossible due to the veto rights of each party; and on the other hand, ethno-nationalism implies a means of power and coverage of the interests of the ethno-national political leadership. As a result, the Bosnian statehood and the country's development are being blocked. Ethno-nationalism is, in other words, the biggest threat to democracy. Bosnia-Herzegovina is still facing low standards of living and high poverty and unemployment rates today (cf. Dzihic 2009:390ff, 405f).

The country signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2008 but has been in a deadlock since spring 2013 on its path toward EU integration. While the Bosnian political elite cannot agree on reforms in order to proceed in the country's Europeanisation process, its neighbouring countries are making significant progress in this direction. Croatia is already a member of the EU, Serbia will begin accession negotiations with the EU in January 2014, Montenegro is already conducting negotiations and Albania is recommended for the status of candidate. Nevertheless, the EU is also being criticised for its inadequate strategy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This diploma thesis aims to define the fundamental issues which hinder the political, economic and social development of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to analyse the recent political development of the country in order to discuss the prospects for the political development of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1.2 Research Question and Scope

The research question of this diploma thesis is "Prospects for the Political Development of Bosnia-Herzegovina". Due to the limited scope of this paper, only occurrences in the pre-war and war era which are perceived as being crucial for the understanding of further analyses or relevant for the argumentation will be discussed. Therefore, this paper will focus on recent political developments in the country but will not be able to elaborate all political events and developments in this time period. Similarly, the theoretical approaches to nationalism and the world-systems theory will be analysed to an extent which is adequate for the research question of this paper.

1.3 Purpose of the Diploma Thesis

The purpose of this diploma thesis is to provide a contribution to the scientific world about the ongoing and complex political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are numerous existing scientific works on the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian war in the 1990s, the DPA, the development of the peace process, international interventions etc. The HR and the European Commission also report regularly on the development status of the country. However, most of these papers focus on previous or already existing occurrences or developments. This diploma thesis will, on the basis of previous elaborations, analyse the prospects for and assessments of the future political development of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Questions which should be answered in this paper are: is a sustainable cooperation for a united and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina possible? Which conditions are needed for this kind of cooperation? How do external stakeholders such as the UN and the EU assess the current situation of the country? What possible prospects are there, according to internal and external stakeholders?

2 Method

This paper is based on scholarly literature from primarily the fields of international relations and international politics. Literature research as a method constitutes a significant part of this diploma thesis. Moreover, primary literature, for instance the official websites of international organisations and also the OHR, progress reports by the EU and serious interviews with internal and external stakeholders which are available on the internet, will be combined with secondary literature for the purpose of comparing, verifying and complementing information.

Through a first literature research, an overview of the history and the political development of the country will be acquired. Furthermore, the following question will be elaborated: how and why has the prevailing political situation emerged? A further literature research will provide an insight into the current debate about the possible prospects for the political development of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Articles from quality newspapers will also be applied for the elaboration of the present political status. Data from the World Values Survey will also be applied. The World Values Survey is the most comprehensive survey of human values in the world. This own compilation of the data will provide an overview of the values and opinions of the Bosnian population regarding various social and political matters such as "who should decide in the country?" and "what language do you speak at home?". Opinion polls from other institutions and organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) will be applied for similar purposes.

This diploma thesis will be based on two theoretical approaches, namely the theory of nationalism and the world-systems theory. The Bosnian political situation cannot be analysed without an approach to nationalism because the DPA is based on the ethnic principle

which implies that the Bosnian constitution and the political system rely on the same principle. The world-systems theory is a development theory which will be applied for the crucial understanding of the role of the international community and the Bosnian stance in this context.

To begin with, the theories of nationalism and the world-system analysis will be elaborated and will provide the reader with theoretical approaches for further reading. Subsequently, the first section of the historical context will highlight some occurrences and aspects of Bosnia's history until 1995 which will provide a better understanding of the further analyses for the reader. Then the emergence of the DPA will be described and its intent elaborated. The section covering the political development between 1995 and 2009 will portray and analyse significant political events and developments in the first post-war years; in the new era of the Bosnian leadership; during the first steps towards the EU integration process; in the period of reform failures and achievements; during the prolonged political, social and economic crises; and throughout the country's path to EU integration. Thereafter, the present political situation will be portrayed and analysed. The fundamental problems which hinder the country's political development will also be outlined. The next chapter deals with the actual subject of this diploma thesis, namely the prospects for the political development. This chapter is divided into the following subsections: the issue of ethno-nationalism, constitutional reform, the role of the civil society, sovereignty vs. protectorate and the assertion that Bosnia-Herzegovina's future lies in the EU. Although the five subsections of this chapter will be separately discussed, their correlation is evident. Finally, in the resume, the main findings of this diploma thesis will be summarised and the limitations and unsolved issues will be discussed.

3 Theoretical Approach

3.1 Approach to Nationalism

There are diverse approaches to nationalism, therefore no consistent definition exists. The following section aims to explore some leading approaches to and perceptions of nationalism and then to apply these in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ivan Krastev define nationalism as follows: "Nationalism is an umbrella term, covering elements such as national awareness and mobilisation, the expression of national identity, and loyalty to the nation, labeled by some authors as patriotism. The exercise of nationalism is a community's assertion of sovereignty in the form of a nation-state". Furthermore, Mungiu-Pippidi and Krastev quote Barry (1987): "Nationalism as an ideology '[...] calls on its supporters to subordinate the common interests (based on class, religion or party, for example) that they share with their fellow citizens to those that they share with other members of national group'". Moreover, "nationalism as an expression of identity defined the nature of an individual's relationship to a collectivity. [...] There is enough evidence that every ethnie has the potential to become a nation, given the proper circumstances, and some academics have gone so far as to claim that every ethnie is a nation without a territory of its own" (Mungiu-Pippidi, Krastev 2004:14).

The core of most debates about nationalism is the question whether nationalism or national and ethnical identities are constitutional (naturally present) or constructed. According to Ernest Gellner, the emergence of nationalism was necessary in the industrialised society but rather unimaginable in the agrarian society (Gellner 1983:140). Furthermore, he points out that: "Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent [...] political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and

turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is reality" (Gellner 1983:48f). The term "nationalism" is closely linked with the term "nation" which is defined by Benedict Anderson as follows: "it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 2006:6). Vedran Dzihic distinguishes between objective and subjective determinations of a nation: objective definition attempts assume that a nation can be defined through specific attributes such as language, history, culture, ancestry etc., whereas the nation is seen as a constitutional ethnic-cultural community. The subjective approach defines nation as a political voluntary association (Dzihic 2009:51).

In this context, Sanda Cudic indicates that each ethnic group is trying to find boundaries and distinctions from other groups. In order to achieve this uniqueness, mobilisation elements such as group constitutive myths, memories and symbols are used (Cudic 2001:107). In relation to Benedict Anderson's approach, actors and especially the political elite are of note. Furthermore, the political elite with its tools and ways to manipulate is able to exploit the broad mass and achieve an imaginary national collective (Dzihic 2009:54). As a result, the term "nationalism" should be seen as an invented or constructed element associated with myths, stories and subjective perceptions. Dzihic points out that political elites and national intellectuals are working on the construction and maintenance of these myths through mass media, rewriting of history, and also greater use of places and elements of memory. Furthermore, he states that these processes can be seen in all ex-Yugoslav republics, and especially in the Bosnian case (ibid.:56).

Sanda Cudic indicates that the Bosnian population share many commonalities, for instance the same territory, history, and language and also to a large extent the same culture. The only disjunctive element is religion, in that Bosniaks are Muslims, Bosnian Croats are Roman Catholic and Bosnian Serbs are Orthodox. Subsequently, the collective identity of each of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina is largely based on religion. The religious relevance not only involves religious rites, customs and practices, but it also determines positions in economic and social life. As an effect, each group of people identifies itself with its own religious group and is solidarised with its members. This differentiation and separation are present in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina (Cudic 2001:124). In this context, Dzihic refers to the role of religion in Bosnia since the 1990s and its contribution to the advancement of radical nationalism (Dzihic 2009:20).

The nationalist movements in Bosnia and also in most other former Yugoslavian coun-

tries reached their peak in the 1990s when politicians and other stakeholders strived for a historical dimension of ethnicity for political reasons. In order to legitimise the nation, it was sought where it never existed, namely in the prehistory of the Balkans, whereby many ambiguities in the history could be replaced through mysticism and mythology. These constructed and selective historical images served the purposes of nationalism and offered members an idealised image of a common origin (Cudic 2001:108 f). In this context, Vedran Dzihic explains how the ethnic narrative was developed and what functions it had:

> „Dieses tägliche Plebiszit in Verknüpfung mit Erinnerungen an vorangegangene Kriege führte gerade am Gebiet des ehemaligen Jugoslawien zur Herausbildung einer epischen ethnischen Kultur, in dem mit andauernden - selektiven - Erzählungen über ethnonationale Kämpfe, Kriege, Opfer und Helden ein enorm starkes und widerstandsfähiges ethnisches Narrativ erschaffen wurde. Im Kern dieses Narratives wird die eigene Ethnie als bessere, stärkere, widerstandsfähigere und überlegenere exklusive, Wir'-Gruppe stets den anderen Ethnien, die immer als Bedrohung für die eigene Ethnie dargestellt wird, gegenübergestellt" (Dzihic 2009:64f).[1]

In other words, myths and (constructed) selective historical occurrences together with the social exclusion of "the others" have served as a mobilisation and stabilisation of power on the part of ethno-nationalist politicians. Furthermore, Dzihic notes that in the Bosnian case, nationality is determined by ethnicity and thus ethno-nationalism emerges. In addition, ethno-nationalism is convertible and is still the dominant form in the politics of the country today and accordingly, it is used as a means to achieve political goals in the political practice (Dzihic 2009:65,68). As a result, the majority of the Bosnian population still votes for ethno-nationalist political parties today. The politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina is therefore run on an ethnic basis rather than a political basis.

The selective historiography, on the one hand as a political means, and on the other hand as a condition of maintaining group identities, can be elucidated in the following examples: the Bosnian church - which was independent of the Catholic and Orthodox churches - is used by many Bosniak historians and politicians in order to construct a national creation myth for the Bosniak nation. Since the 19^{th} century, Serbian and Croatian national

[1] Own translation into English: "This daily plebiscite in association with memories of previous wars led - especially on the territory of the former Yugoslavia - to the creation of an epic and ethnic culture, in which an enormously powerful and resistant ethnic narrative was created through enduring and selective stories about ethno-national struggles, wars, victims and heroes. At the core of this narrative, the own ethnic group - as the better, stronger, more resistant, superior and exclusive 'we'-group - is constantly being opposed to other ethnic groups which are always portrayed as being a threat to the own ethnic group".

movements, however, tended to relate the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Church to the Orthodox and Catholic Church respectively, in order to legitimise their claim for the Bosnian territory and its Muslim population (Dzihic 2009:110f). Bosniaks also adopt a similar motive in order to distinguish their own identity from Croats and Serbs, namely Bogomilism, as the basis for their conversion to Islam (Zanic 1999:295). Furthermore, a well known myth which is a part of the Serbian identity is the battle of Kosovo in 1389. This myth has been adopted for the development and consolidation of the Serbian nation and is still an effective conception today (Dzihic 2009:112).

Due to the finding that ethnicity and nationalism are constructed categories, different ethnic belongings are no cause for conflict. Dzihic points out that a potential conflict may occur when ethnicity becomes a means for establishing and ensuring political and also economic power (Dzihic 2009:65). Similarly, Mungiu-Pippidi and Krastev stress that "nationalism and ethnic-conflict theory are two partly overlapping, partly distinct bodies of knowledge" (Mungio-Pippidi, Krastev 2004:14). Furthermore, "ethnonationalism only occurs when ethnic groups regard the state as their own - not of the entire body of citizens - and try to use the state for their sole purpose and in virtue of some ethnic attribute, not of individual citizenship" (ibid.:15).

In addition, ethno-nationalism contains an emotional component which strongly contributes to an enhanced effectiveness and the susceptibility of the masses. Emotionality serves the production of legitimacy and is usually the result of a mixture of subjective sensations such as fear, uncertainty, threat, apathy, isolation etc. Political elements based on emotions and emotionally occupied claims of statehood, however, prevent the transformation of Bosnia into a functioning democracy (Dzihic 2009:68f). The interaction between the social, mental and political structures in post-Dayton Bosnia has resulted in public and legitimate institutionalisation of ethno-nationalism and subsequently it appears as something natural and constitutional (ibid.71). In this context, Rogers Brubaker notes that "the fears and fault lines, the resentments and aspirations, the myths and memories that defined the national question in Yugoslavia have long been well known. But they did not foreordain the bloody breakup of the state. That was a contingent outcome of the interplay of mutually suspicious, mutually monitoring, mutually misrepresenting political elites [...]" (Brubaker 1996:75f).

Nonetheless, Dzihic stresses that ethno-nationalism is being revived in the post-war era. Since the war, ethno-nationalism has become a part of everyday life. It covers all areas

of private and public life and is being perpetuated through institutions, political actors, media, symbols, songs and jokes. In this sense, it is common to practice selective historiography and also to "remember" and "forget" selectively, even though one is aware of the fact that the members of the other ethnic groups have their own "truths". In post-war Bosnia, it has become normal to say that one speaks three languages and that texts have to be translated in order for each ethnic group to be able to read the texts in their own language - although the three languages are same (Dzihic 2009:72).

3.2 Approach to the World-Systems Theory

This section aims to analyse a theory of development, namely the world-systems theory and then to apply it in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The world-systems theory, which emerged in the 1970s, is an approach that explains long-term and large-scale social changes. Originally, it was developed to comprehend European hegemony since the 16^{th} century. There are two key propositions: "(1) societies are importantly constrained and affected by their interactions with one another, and (2) the modern world-system has been structured as a core/periphery hierarchy in which economically and militarily powerful core states have dominated and exploited less powerful peripheral regions as the Europe-centred system expanded to incorporate all the areas of the globe" (Kardulias 1999:xi). The world-systems theory deals with the capitalistic society, which starting in Europe, spread over the whole world. Overseas trade, colonial conquest and the generalisation of the profit principle repressed other world economic systems and therefore established the global capitalist system. Furthermore, capitalism needs not only markets and products, but also labour, involving people who are lured or forced to produce goods that are, however, sold at a price which is higher than the costs of the seller. The profit principle involves a social question of capitalism which in turn concerns the human part of life as well as the living conditions of the work force (Crome 2003:1). Immanuel Wallerstein, one of the most well-known developers of the world-system analysis, noted that the historical development of capitalism has the effect of transforming all things into commodities (Wallerstein 1984:11). Western Europe was, since the beginning of the capitalistic world economy system, the centre and strived to establish production processes. However, the entire surplus which could be obtained was never distributed evenly to the geographic locations where it was gained, but rather it was always concentrated disproportionately in some zones more than in others. Therefore, peripheries are zones which gain a small proportion

of the surplus and cores are those zones which gain the biggest part of the surplus. As a result of the capitalist system, peripheries and cores can be distinguished in three areas: a) in the capital accumulation, b) in the societal organisation of the local production processes, and c) in the political organisation of the state structures (Wallerstein 2008:170f).

"Cores" and "peripheries" can be correlated with other terms such as "developed" and "developing" countries, "First World" and "Third World" countries, "Western" and "Eastern" countries, as well as the "North" and "South". Therefore, the world-systems theory has often been correlated with the dependency theory which emphasises the dependence of peripheries on cores (cf. Wallerstein 2008:168,170). The USA, Western Europe, Japan and Australia represent the cores, and developing countries such as many African and Latin American countries represent peripheries. There are also semi-peripheral countries, such as the BRIC-countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which are being dominated by other countries at the same time as they are dominating other countries themselves. It is also important to note that the world-systems theory is a dynamic system, implying, for instance, peripheries turning into semi-peripheries and vice versa (cf. ibid.:185).

The world-systems theory has similarities not only with the dependency theory but also with the theory of neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism "refers to the theory that former or existing economic relationships - the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Central American Free Trade Agreement - are used to maintain control of former colonies after formal independence was achieved" (Boundless 2013:532). In other words, the politics of neo-colonialism aim to maintain the power relationship between "North" and "South" through economic and indirect political dependence of the developing countries. Instead of direct rule, this power relation is being kept by other means such as trade treaties, credits, tied development aid etc. "In this sense, neo-colonialism implies a form of economic imperialism" (ibid.). Because of the fact that colonialism took place mostly in the countries of Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia, the focus of the approach to neo-colonialism lies in these regions. Nevertheless, as the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina shows, politics of neo-colonialism are also being applied to countries which were not former Western colonies.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is interesting to explore its long-standing status as a protectorate which hinders its sovereignty. In 1996, this protectorate was created by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-led Implementation Force Mission as an outcome of the DPA. This mission's successors were the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) followed

by the still present European Union Force (EUFOR). At the same time, the country has a HR - employed by the UN - who cooperates with the international community and has executive powers in all civilian matters, with the right to overrule the governments of the two entities (cf. Chossudovsky 1997:380). Herd and Tracy state: "The protectorate is usually a multinational organisation, the United Nations or a group of lead states, which creates a 'transitional political authority', 'interim international administration', or 'complex peace operation'" (Herd, Tracy 2006:550). Furthermore, scholars have analysed the phenomenon of peace-keeping and its transcending in a concealed form of imperialism. Roland Paris outlines that peace-building and imperialism are comparable. He notes that peace-building constitutes a distinctive Western model of liberal and economic relations between the core and its periphery. This model can be embedded in different ways; for instance, through peace treaties, which require the periphery to accept certain conditionality in order to gain recognition of the international community, and also external actors, which influence the domestic functions and institutions of the local "proxy government" (Paris 2002:643f, 650). In this sense, Paris affirms that "all peacebuilding missions involve a measure of foreign intrusion in domestic affairs" (Paris 2010:348). These political principles of peace-building can be compared with European colonisation, where the European powers imposed their will and interests on the territories of their colonies (cf. Cunliffe 2012:428). In this context, Ignatieff points out that the US interventions abroad correspond to "an attempt to permanently order the world of states and markets according to its national interests" (Ignatieff 2003:2) undertaken "for imperial reasons; to consolidate its global hegemony, to assert and maintain its leadership and to ensure stability in those zones essential to the security of itself or its allies" (ibid.:3). Correspondingly, Paris criticises the UN and states that it reflects the interests of the world's most powerful countries (Paris 2010:349f). The Security Council which controls the UN peacekeeping operations is led by three Western states, namely the USA, the UK and France. Additionally, the UN peace-keeping force is predominantly financed by Western states (Cunliffe 2012:432). Johanna Damboeck has a similar conclusion in her paper on humanitarian interventions in Darfur, stating that "the USA, the UK and France were the key players of the debate and the ones with the most interests at stake" (Damboeck 2012:298). The former HR for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lord Paddy Ashdown, confirms the above-portrayed hegemonic world system with his statement: "What we have [in Bosnia] is near-imperialism" (Cunliffe 2012:428). Also Michel Chossudovsky points out that "the USA and the European Union have installed a fully fledged colonial administration in Bosnia" (Chossudovsky 1997:380).

A further supporting comparison to imperialism are the economic factors which were used

as colonial powers aimed at "capturing economic spheres of influence, establishing privileged trading zones from which one could exclude one's economic rivals and taxing local populations" (Cunliffe 2012:431). Similarly, peace-building operations assist in integrating societies into the global capitalist economy (ibid.). Dragoljub Stojanov calls this integration a "shock therapy" and criticises Western institutions for demanding that East and South-East European countries quickly adapt themselves into the market economy. He states that the Western countries themselves had gone through a slow liberalisation process and that likewise the best way for Bosnia-Herzegovina would have been a gradual liberalisation process (Stojanov 2000). In his paper: "Dismantling former Yugoslavia, Recolonising Bosnia", Michel Chossudovsky criticises the (neo)colonial rebuilding of Bosnia-Herzegovina:

> "Behind the democratic façade, actual political power rests in the hands of a 'parallel government', headed by the HR and staffed by expatriate advisers. Moreover, the Constitution agreed in Dayton hands over the reins of economic policy to the Bretton Woods institutions and the London-based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Article VII stipulates that the first Governor of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be appointed by the IMF and 'shall not be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a neighbouring State'. Just as the Governor of the Central Bank is an IMF appointee, the Central Bank will not be allowed under the Constitution to function as a Central Bank: 'For the first six years ... it may not extend credit by creating money, operating in this respect as a currency board' (Article VII). Neither will the new 'sovereign' successor State be allowed to have its own currency (issuing paper money only when there is full foreign-exchange backing), nor permitted to mobilise its internal resources. As in the other successor republics, its ability to self-finance its reconstruction (without massively increasing its external debt) is blunted from the outset. The tasks of managing the Bosnian economy have been carefully divided among donor agencies: while the central Bank is under IMF custody, the EBRD heads the Commission on Public Corporations, which supervises operations of all public-sector enterprises including energy, water, postal services, roads and railways [...]" (Chossudovsky 1997:380f).

Furthermore, Chossudovsky made clear that "the process of reconstruction based on debt rescheduling is more likely to plunge Bosnia-Herzegovina [...] into the status of a Third World country".

The EU represents another core according to the world-systems theory as well as in

the Bosnian context. In his book "EU-Osterweiterung. Historische Basis - ökonomische Triebkräfte - soziale Folgen" (Eng. EU Eastern Expansion. Historical Basis - Economic Driving Forces - Social Outcomes), Hannes Hofbauer depicts the strategy behind the EU's interests in Eastern Europe which go along with capitalist motives. One key aspect is associated with the productivity of large Western enterprises which seek facilities in the peripheries for accumulation reasons. Most East European companies were and are not in the position to open up for Western markets, which is the reason that they are now the property of Western investors (Hofbauer 2007:254). As a result, the East European economies have to position themselves in accordance with the needs of the Western markets. The outcomes of such hierarchical relations for peripheries are social impoverishment and dependence on the European cores. Moreover, through the various conditions of the EU, Bosnia-Herzegovina has to adapt and implement many regulations which are in accordance with the European capitalist system and its values.

To sum up, the capitalistic system which dominates most societies worldwide represents the structure of our world system. In the capitalist world, the accumulation of money and profit are the most crucial ambitions. The capitalist system emerged in Western Europe and was gradually integrated worldwide in the course of history. Furthermore, capitalism deepens the cleft between developed and developing countries. As a result, a hierarchical structure is formed, involving cores, semi-peripheries and peripheries. Not only do the most developed (Western) countries represent the cores, but international institutions and organisations, such as the EU, UN, NATO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which are dominated by the Western powers, embody the cores. Bosnia-Herzegovina is still under foreign administration, being a protectorate of the UN, and is constantly influenced by the EU and other institutions and organisations. Bea De Abreu Fialho Gomes makes clear that the bigger the dependence of the recipients on development aid, the more significant is the development impact of the donor community and the outcomes of the unequal power dynamics (Gomes 2006:12).

It is also important to note that the western world is not only perceived to be superior in political and economic terms, but also in social terms. Western culture is perceived as "better" and thus "superior" in relation to peripheral cultres. Through the many EU regulations, the societies and the populations of the European peripheries are being marginalised, especially in social matters. In this context, Petritsch states: "What should be avoided under any circumstances is the creation of a kind of 'Balkans ghetto' or European banlieue, comprising most of the region's Serbs, Albanians, and Bosnia's Muslims, concentrated be-

hind ever-growing visa hurdles, preventing them from travelling to the better off member states of the EU" (Petritsch 2009b:268).

4 Historical Context

4.1 Some Crucial Aspects of Bosnian History

This chapter aims to highlight some occurrences and aspects of Bosnia's history until 1995 which will provide a better understanding of the further analyses for the reader. Due to the limited scope of this diploma thesis, the very interesting underlying causes and triggers of the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995 as well as its events shall not be portrayed in detail. The history of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the point at which Slavs settled down in the Balkan Peninsula in the 6^{th} century until the emergence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the latest Bosnian war has already been explored by many scientists.

For centuries, various ethno-cultural peoples have lived together in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The country has become a model of a multicultural society, whose inherent logic and nature, however, resulted in total decay in the 1990s. Since the Middle Ages there have been several persuasions on the Bosnian territory as an outcome of different cultural and political influences: the extinct Bosnian Church, the Roman Catholic and Serbian Orthodox Church and also Islam. There were occasionally hostile confrontations between these religious groups; however, they never ended in a civil or religious war. These religious groups were rather applied as a means of rejection or support of the leadership (Cudic 2001:15,107f). Furthermore, foreign rule dominated most centuries in the Bosnian history: at the beginning of the 10^{th} century, Bosnia fell under the rule of the Croatian King Tomislav; in 930, the Bosnian territory was conquered by the Serbian ruler Caslav; then by the Croatian King Kresimir II; afterwards by the Bulgarian King Samuel; in 1018, it fell under Byzantine rule; later it was a part of Croatia, Montenegro and Hungary; and in 1167 it was under Byzantine rule. In 1189, Bosnia was for the first time mentioned as an independent

unit. Shortly before the Ottoman conquest in the 15^{th} century, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most powerful state in the Balkans (ibid.:111). In 1463, Bosnia was conquered by the Ottoman Empire and in the 19^{th} century it became a province of Austria-Hungary. In the course of history, certainly since the middle ages, no homogeneous ethnicity existed in Bosnia, not even at the province level. Therefore, no supra-regional Bosnian identity could be formed. Nonetheless, the many years of multi-religiosity allowed a tradition of religious tolerance in Bosnia (ibid.:123ff). As an outcome of the Ottoman conquest, the potential carriers of Bosnian identity disappeared from the historical scene: the Bosnian king was executed, the nobles were replaced by the Ottoman feudal system, and the Bosnian Church was completely disintegrated due to many years of persecution. Since there was no central authority in Bosnia that represented common cultural characteristics, foreign centres in Serbia and Croatia, which were keen to promote differences, were able to do this unhindered (ibid.:124).

Nationalist movements in the Balkans in the 19^{th} century emerged from liberation efforts against the Ottomans and later against the Austrians. Thus, the nationalist movements were initially directed against foreign rule and not against other ethnic groups. However, the influences from Croatia and Serbia were visible because religious communities in Bosnia could identify themselves with their respective religious centres. Consequently, Bosnian Catholics became Croats and Orthodox Bosnians became Serbs. This ethnic identification was not based on semantics, ancestry or political affiliation in the sense of citizenship, but rather on merely religious belonging. Sanda Cudic notes that the religious identity was thereby transformed into ethnic identity (Cudic 2001:128). Nevertheless, the Bosnian Muslims did not have an autonomous political external centre, as Bosnian Croats and Serbs did, with which they could orient their political development strategies. Therefore, till the 1990s, Bosniak politicians tried to participate in stable political coalitions that would protect the multicultural environment and represent a counterpoint to the centrifugal forces of Croatian and Serbian nationalism (ibid.:135).

After the fall of the Habsburg monarchy after the First World War, national emancipation emerged in the former Yugoslavia - much later than in other European countries. The small Balkan states were not viable in the economic and military sense after the First World War. For fear of being quickly and easily re-conquered by the larger neighbouring nations, and because of the belief in an ethnic and cultural kinship, the south Slavic peoples established a new joint state in 1918. Thus, on 1^{st} December 1918 the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" was proclaimed under the Serbian dynasty Karadjordjevic. The new

Yugoslav state was built on ethnic nations of which only Serbia and Montenegro were, since the Congress of Berlin in 1878, internationally recognised as states (Dzihic 2009:121; Cudic 2001:137). Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were, until the First World War, provinces of Austria-Hungary.

During the Second World War, Belgrade was attacked by Germany, and Bosnia-Herzegovina became part of the Independent State of Croatia (Cudic 2001:145). During this time, Serbian and Croatian ideologies and movements also triumphed: the Croatian fascist movement Ustase strived for a Great Croatia including Bosnian Muslims because they were perceived as Catholics who had converted to Islam; and the Serbian nationalist Chetnik movement strived for a Great Serbia including Bosniaks. In other words, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a point of contention between Croatia and Serbia (Cudic 2001:146f; Dzihic 2009:124). However, Josip Broz Tito and his partisans conquered the Yugoslav states and communism ruled until the end of the 1980s. The National Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established on the 25^{th} of November 1943 as an arm of the political umbrella organisation of the Yugoslav Partisans, declaring Bosnia and Herzegovina to be an equal community of Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. This declaration aimed at strengthening a supranational Bosnian awareness and may constitute the birth of modern Bosnian-Herzegovinian statehood. The 25^{th} of November is the National Day of Bosnia-Herzegovina but is, however, celebrated only within the Federation, because the RS leaders deny the importance of this historical event (Attila 2007:29; Dzihic 2009:126f). In Tito's Yugoslavia, religious identity was reversed. Religion was considered as a threat, therefore most communists were atheists. Thus, Tito could hold the three ethnic groups together (Cudic 2001:151). Bosnia-Herzegovina within the socialist Yugoslavia was the only republic which was not drafted as a national state of a Yugoslav people; rather it was a "small Yugoslavia" (Dzihic 2009:129).

After Tito's death in 1980, a collective leadership of the state and the party was introduced, but this joint system worked only for a limited time. In the 1980s, Yugoslavia had gone through severe economic crises and the complicated national balance was destabilised. Nevertheless, it can be noted that solidarity or the feeling of togetherness existed only when external threat was present. Thus, the need for protection and cohesion of the South Slavic peoples disappeared at the end of the 20^{th} century. The nationalistic movements from Croatia and Serbia influenced the ethnic groups in Bosnia to a large extent. Consequently, the shifting from factual politics to politics based on ethnic belonging mobilised voters and became the political norm at the end of the 1980s. The nationalistic

politicians constructed fears of the other ethnic groups and sought after fictive statements in history that confirmed the necessity of protecting their own national interests. In the first free elections in 1990, mostly nationally oriented parties won. The three nationalistic parties formed a coalition government and the most important ministries were strictly divided between the three parties. However, the coalition was doomed to fail because each party's interests were diametrically opposed to the political goals of the other parties. Bosnian and Croatian nationalistic parties saw danger in Slobodan Milosevic's politics while the Serbian political party supported his nationalistic politics and the dominance of Serbs (Attila 2007:347; Dzihic 2009:145; Cudic 2001:152). In March 1991, Franjo Tudman and Slobodan Milosevic met in Karadordevo and discussed a potential division of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia (Dzihic 2009:146).

In November 1991, the majority of Bosnian Serbs voted for the formation of a Serbian Republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina if the country were to separate from Yugoslavia. In October 1991, Bosnia declared its independence and in January 1992 the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed the RS and stated that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer existed. Similarly, the Bosnian Croats formed autonomous structures within the country and in November 1991, the Croatian community "Herceg-Bosna" was established (Dzihic 2009:148). In February/March 1992, in a referendum in which 63.4% of the voting population took part, 99.7% of the votes were for Bosnia's independence; most voters were Croats and Bosniaks because the majority of Serbs boycotted the referendum. One month later, in April 1992, Bosnia received international recognition of its independence. Subsequently, the Bosnian war began (Cudic 2001:152; Dzihic 2009:147). The majority of Bosnian Croats and Muslims wanted an independent Bosnia because they feared Serbian dominance since Slovenia and Croatia had abandoned the Yugoslav state. Bosnian Serbs supported the Yugoslav People's Army that began the first military actions, directed from Belgrade. The differences between the ethnic groups, coming to the fore, prevented a further peaceful coexistence based on mutual tolerance. Cudic notes: "fellow citizens became combatants; combatants became enemies" (Cudic 2001:15f - own translation into Eng.).

It is also important to note that there were different movements and groups among the Bosnian citizens, especially in the urban centres, promoting a multiethnic state. However, these ideas were marginalised in the course of the war due to the swings in the politics of the Bosniak political party, initially representing the interests of a multiethnic and united Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout the dynamics of war (Dzihic 2009:151).

According to the census of 1991, 4.37 million inhabitants were living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of whom 43.5% were Muslims, 31.2% Serbs and 17.4% Croats (Calic 2010:311). Furthermore, Bosnian Serbs were distributed in 94.5% of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosniaks in 94% and Croats in 70%. In other words, no area was ethnically homogeneous. This indicated that any attempts at creating ethnically homogeneous areas and destructing historically grown "organic unity" would lead to brutality, human violation and numerous victims (Dzihic 2009:145f). Nevertheless, in 1991, the leader of the Serbian nationalistic party in Bosnia publically stated that they would defeat Muslims in the country (Dzihic 2009:146; Calic 2010:312). Ethnic cleansing as an instrument and aim of war was applied by Serbian and Croatian armies - rarely by Bosniak armies - in order to gain territory and power for their own ethnic groups (Dzihic 2009:152). As an outcome of ethnic cleansing, autonomous areas were formed within the Bosnian territory. The biggest systematic process of ethnic cleansing occurred in July 1995 in Srebrenica, where 8000 Bosniak men and youth were massacred by the Serbian army (ibid.:156). The massacre in Srebrenica was also a turning point for the international community which thereafter took a more active role in the peace-building process and was able to negotiate a peace agreement at the end of 1995.

Today, there are various explanations and perspectives of the war. For the majority of the Bosnian Serbs, it was a civil war, where everyone was a victim and Serbs had to defend themselves from Bosniaks and Croats. From the Bosniak point of view, it was a war of aggression on the part of Serbs and Croats who fought against Bosniaks and the internationally recognised Bosnian state. Bosniaks underpin this statement with reference to the internationally controversial fact that they were the biggest victims of the war with regard to the extent, nature and intensity of the war crimes. According to Croats, the war was caused by the aggression of Serbs, and Bosniaks also fought against Croats because they wanted to dominate. Dzihic points out that these radically contradictory interpretations of the war, confirmed by the Dayton constitution, block the process of dealing with the past and the path to reconciliation (Dzihic 2009:157).

4.2 Washington Agreement

The Washington Agreement, initiated by the USA due to the pressure of the public opinion in that country, was signed on the 18^{th} of March 1994 between Croats and Bosniaks. The Agreement implied the establishment of the Federation and subsequently the battles

between Croats and Bosniaks ended (Dzihic 2009:159). From the USA's point of view, the association between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks had several strategic advantages: firstly, the formation of a small Muslim state could be prevented; secondly, the problem regarding the territorial distinction between these two parties could be solved; and thirdly, the Bosniak's desired access to the Adriatic Sea was elegantly overridden, as the city of Neum was mainly populated with Croats (ibid.:159f). The Washington Agreement also led to a military cooperation between the Bosniak and Croatian armies against the Serbian troops. In addition, this agreement was also a pre-condition of the peace talks in Dayton (ibid.:160).

The new established Federation with its capital city Sarajevo was based on a system of ten cantons, containing the bigger territories of Bosnia where the majority of Bosniak and Croatian citizens lived before the war. The cantons are, however, ethnically dominated by either Croats or Bosniaks as the boundaries between the cantons constitute the former Bosniak-Croatian front lines. Thereby, the Croatian identification with the Croatian-dominated cantons is stronger than with the central government (Dzihic 2009:162). The agreement involved determinations on the division of responsibilities between the central government and the cantons. While the government in Sarajevo has a common character, the cantons are responsible for the execution of federal laws and thus act as a quasi-legislative power (United States Institute of Peace 2004; Dzihic 2009:161). In this context, Vedran Dzihic interprets that the Washington Agreement represents the first undertaken constitutional anchoring of the ethnic principle, as a consequence of the war and the passive stance of the international community to the events of the war. Moreover, he stresses that it was also a significant first political distancing from the declared aim to restore Bosnia as a multiethnic and multicultural community (Dzihic 2009:160). The status of the cantons as a significant administrative unit led to the establishment of an enormous bureaucratic apparatus. Consequently, in each canton local ministries were formed, imposing massive financial burdens on the Federation (ibid.:162).

4.3 Dayton Peace Agreement

As a result of the significant pressure of the USA, the three parties participated in the peace negotiations at the end of 1995. The negotiations in Dayton were conducted by representatives of the USA and of the contact group containing representatives from the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia. Richard Holbrook was the main negotiator

and is today perceived as the architect of the DPA. The main participators on the part of the Bosnian peoples were the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic (representing Bosnian Serbs); the President of Croatia, Franjo Tudman (representing Bosnian Croats); and the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic (representing Bosniaks). The international negotiators applied major pressure on the representatives of the Bosnian ethnic groups and tried to reach a long-term solution involving a consensus of the Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian peoples. Nevertheless, the three parties had to deviate from their maximal requirements and could only partially enforce their interests (Dzihic 2009:163f). The DPA was initialled in Dayton on the 21^{st} of November 1995 and signed in Paris on the 14^{th} of December the same year.

The main controversial points during the negotiation process were the issues on territorial division of the country, especially the status of the capital city Sarajevo, the Bosnian enclave Gorazde in the east of the country, and the Posavina Corridor and the associated town Brcko. As a result of the agreement, the country was divided into two entities, namely the Federation, where mostly Bosniaks and Croats live, and the RS, where mostly Serbs live. The division of the Bosnian territory between the two entities was based on the front-lines of 1995, namely 51% of the territory was assigned to the Federation and 49% to the RS. Bosniaks and Croats were able to gain this proportion of the territory, shortly before the peace negotiations, due to the NATO air attacks in 1995 and therefore numerous territorial defeats of Bosnian Serbs (Dzihic 2009:162f, 174). The final decision on the status of Brcko was postponed. In March 2000 Brcko District became an autonomous and self-governing district (ibid.:170f, 175). The following map shows this division:

Figure 1: Map of Bosnia-Herzegovina (My Geo 2013)

Another main controversial issue was the constitution of the country, particularly the distribution of powers between the entities and the weight of the entire Bosnian institutions (Dzihic 2009:169). Bosniaks advocated the maintenance of a strong Bosnian central state and required strong state level institutions, whereas Croats and Serbs strived for the opposite, namely a weak or no connection between the entities and the central state in order to be able to link their territory to Croatia and Serbia, respectively (ibid.:166,169f). A compromise of these controversial demands could be agreed: the entities were given autonomy to a large extent but were at the same time connected to the state level structures, which had only symbolic competences (Riegler 1999:16). Furthermore, as a result of the only partially gained wishes, the war parties were deeply unsatisfied with the compromise. As Michael Thumann stated, no one had won a clear victory and no one was clearly defeated (Thumann 1998:28).

The agreed compromise involved fulfilments and non-fulfilments of the demands of each Bosnian representative. Bosniaks did not gain a strong central state; however, the legal existence of the sovereign state Bosnia and Herzegovina - recognised by the UN since 1992 - was approved. Furthermore, the right of return for refugees was incorporated and the

Bosnian army was able to rearm. Bosnian Serbs could retain the name of their entity "Republika Srpska" and were able to assert the Sava Corridor as a link between the eastern part of the RS and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serbs, however, had to abandon the capital city Sarajevo and the town Gorazde. They also agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of suspected war criminals and the return of refugees and displaced persons which, in their point of view, is a threat to the results of ethnic cleansing. Bosnian Croats, like the Serbs, could fulfil their demands of establishing a weak central state and strong entities and hence enable the opportunity to establish "special relations" with the neighbouring countries. This determination to complete treaties with other states and organisations represents a constitutional attribute of the entities. Croats also had to agree to cooperate in the prosecution of war criminals and accept further compromises within the Federation (Dzihic 2009:170f, 175).

Bosnian state-level institutions were attributed the following responsibilities: "a) foreign policy; b) foreign trade policy; c) customs policy; d) monetary policy [...]; e) finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina; f) immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation; g) international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with Interpol; h) establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities; i) regulation of inter-Entity transportation; j) air traffic control" (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995). The entity-level institutions had all other authorities.

A further outcome of the DPA was the OHR for Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim to oversee the civilian implementation and coordination of the peace agreement. The HR and his office represent hereby the international community through the UN. Some of the most important duties of the HR are to monitor the peace agreement, strengthen the civilian part of the agreement, participate in donor conferences, and also report on the progress of the peace process. All contract parties are obligated to fully cooperate with the HR and the international organisations and agencies (Blockmans 2007:64f; Dzihic 2009:178). The mandate of the HR was established in order to monitor the unstable environment, intervene when necessary and head off threats to public order. It was then planned to depose the office of the HR as soon as the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was perceived as stable, something which has not been the case yet. So far, all incumbents have come from EU Member States: Carl Bildt (1995-1997, Sweden); Carlos Westendorp (1997-1999, Spain); Wolfgang Petritsch (1999-2002, Austria); Paddy Ashdown (2002-2006, United Kingdom); Christian Schwarz-Schilling (2006-2007, Germany); Miroslav Lajcak (2007-2009, Slovakia)

and the current HR is Valentin Inzko (2009-?) (cf. Blockmans 2007:64f; Dzihic 2009:179).

The DPA was based on the ethnical principle, not only because it was signed by political representatives who led the acts of war. Moreover, the central problems and consequences of the compromise of the peace agreement still have a negative impact on the post-war development of the country today (Dzihic 2009:165,170,179). The constitution of the post-war Bosnian state is an unusual one because it is part of a peace agreement and was co-designed by its neighbouring states which at the same time were guarantors of the implementations of the agreement (ibid.:179). The International Crisis Group (ICG) also questioned the unique creation of the new Bosnian state and especially the categories "Republic" and "Federation" as entities within a state:

> "The Bosnia and Herzegovina created at Dayton formulated a concept relatively new to international law, an 'entity'. BiH as a State consists of two entities which have been both given names that are well established categories of international constitutional law: 'republic' and 'federation'. Bosnia and Herzegovina is possibly the only state in the world where a Republic (Republika Srpska) is a constituent part of a state that does not call itself or identify itself as a federation of republics, states, territories, cantons, provinces or other such bodies. The irony is that DPA's BiH actually is a very loose federation, and as such should logically be called 'The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina'. However, today's Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a state, but an entity, within a BiH state with 'constituent peoples'. Therefore, the entire question of BiH statehood is thrown into question" (International Crises Group 1999).

Thus, the peace agreement has been criticised by many scientists. Furthermore, the manning of the posts in the state-level institutions is also based on the ethnical principle and an ethnical accordance system was introduced allowing equal distribution of power between the three ethnic groups. This schematically designed political structure implied a rotating three-head presidency, representing each ethnic group; 14 Serbs and 28 Bosniaks and Croats in the House of Deputies, and also five Serbs, five Croats and five Bosniaks in the people's assembly. The same principle was applied to the ministries (Petritsch 2009b:59). Thereby, minorities and "new minorities" such as children of mixed marriages or people, who do not want to declare an ethnical belonging but rather identify themselves as citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are being discriminated against. They are, in other words, excluded from such posts. Subsequently, collective and national rights of groups were manifested instead of human rights (Dzihic 2009:185,201). As a result of the new Dayton constitution based

on the ethnical principle, the war continued in other terms. The thinking in ethnical terms created a division between "us" and "the others" which in turn contributed to the difficulty of rebuilding the Bosnian statehood (ibid.:188f). Subsequent to the establishment of the entities and the division of territory, the division of the population is also still based on this principle today. Hence, ethnical shifting of some Bosnian cities occurred. In the RS, for instance, cities such as Srebrenica, Visegrad and Zvornik, had a Bosniak majority of the population in the pre-war period and in the post-war era; the majority of the citizens are now Serbs. The following chart shows the structure of the population in the RS in 1991 and 1997:

	1991	**1997**
Serbs	54.30%	96.79%
Bosniaks	28.77%	2.19%
Croats	9.39%	1.02%
Others	7.53%	0.00%

Table 1: Structure of the Population in the RS in 1991 and 1997 (Dzihic 2009:200)

Furthermore, the Dayton constitution involves concurrent decision-making and veto rights when it comes to crucial national interests. Due to the fact that no consensus exists concerning the statehood and the political system between the three ethnic groups, this "consociational democracy" still hinders effective law enforcements and decision-making in Bosnia-Herzegovina today (Dzihic 2009:201). Furthermore, the very bureaucratic administration of the country with its state-level institutions, entities, cantons, autonomous district Brcko and communities has proved to be inefficient, expensive, non-transparent and reform resistant. This disproportionate state apparatus has 13 minister presidents, nine state-level and 32 entity-level ministers (16 in the Federation and 16 in the RS), and also 130 ministries at the cantonal level. Additionally, the Bosnian state has 750 legislators as well as 1200 judges and public prosecutors. As a result, almost every second employee in Bosnia-Herzegovina is paid out of the state coffers. The DPA, as a compromise, was intended to achieve an administrative structure which covers the interests of all ethnic groups, but has turned out to be a major obstacle to the stabilisation of the Bosnian statehood (ibid.:201ff).

To conclude, the DPA has proceeded and confirmed the ethno-politics because it is based on ethno-national structures. The complicated administrative system of the country anchored in ethno-nationalism has resulted in a slow development of the country. The state-level administration is very weak and some responsibility elements are uncertain. Therefore, the country has to fight with its structural and constitutional problems.

4.4 Political Development between 1995 and 2009

4.4.1 The First Post-War Years

Instead of the hoped-for stabilisation of the country and repression of ethno-political disputes, the two post-war years were characterised by internal social gaps between the three ethnic groups and the final establishment of ethno-politics as a legitimate and formally democratically sanctioned practice in the country's politics. The permanent crises in the Bosnian state-hood were caused by the contradictions of the DPA, the failures of the international community, as well as the ethno-nationalistic argumentation patterns which are still being received today by the Bosnian citizens living in difficult post-war conditions (Dzihic 2009:219). The first post-war years were also characterised by a huge presence of international organisations and institutions in the country. Some examples are the HR and his office, the NATO mission aimed to implement the military determinations of the DPA, and the UN with its special organisations and programmes. One of the most significant international missions in the post-Dyton era is the PIC with the aim to strengthen and enhance the peace process (ibid.:192f).

The first national elections since the end of the war were held in September 1996. Alija Izetbegovic, former Bosniak president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became the first chairman of the new rotating three-member presidency. The first Serbian member was Momcilo Krajisnik and the Croatian member Kresimir Zubak (Blockmans 2007:346-366). The three strongest ethno-nationalistic parties won the elections: Izetbegovic's "Stranka demokratske akcije" (SDA) (Eng. Party of Democratic Action); Zubak's "Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine (HDZ BiH) (Eng. Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina); and Krajisnik's "Srpska demokratska stranka" (SDS) (Eng. Serbian Democratic Party). Thus, the ethno-nationalistic conflicts were relocated to the state institutions. The severe consequences of the war in all spheres of political, social and economic life indicated a difficult collaboration of the three Bosnian peoples in order to foster the interests of the common states. These circumstances were intensified by the ethno-nationalistic political elite striving only for the interests of their own ethnic group. Hence, the establishment of new joint government bodies turned out to be a drawn-out process. Not until in January 1997 did the council of ministers and the second chamber of the parliament come into force. The council of ministers was also formed by the ethnic principle (cf. Dzihic 2009:214f).

Initially, some formal decisions were concluded but as the future of the country was put on the agenda, no cooperation or compromises could be achieved. Therefore, the international community had to intervene in order for the country to implement the first necessary regulations for a functioning state, such as economic and fiscal policy, customs, foreign investments and citizenship (Petritsch 2001:81ff; Bideleux, Ian 2007:362ff).

As of January 1997, the HDZ representatives boycotted the work of the representatives' chamber of the Federation and the government. Instead, they worked to strengthen the parallel structures in the Croatian-populated areas. With assistance from Croatia, they launched in May 1997 the so-called "Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna" striving for an annexation to the mother country. However, this para-state formation was in fact a prosecution of the "Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosna" which was dissolved after an intervention by the USA in August 1996. As a result, the Federation was certainly only a "purpose alliance" between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks subsequent to the US intervention in 1994 and the signing of the Washington Agreement. In contrast to the multinational and multiethnic character of the Federation, as defined in the Washington Agreement, the relations between Croats and Bosniaks were, for the most part, characterised by ethno-nationalism and mutual distrust. Nonetheless, Bosniaks' and Croats' perceptions of the Bosnian statehood structure were diametrically diverse (Dzihic 2009:215f).

The diametrically diverse perceptions of the Bosnian state-hood structure can be portrayed by an opinion poll conducted at the beginning of 1997. Accordingly, 94% of the Bosnian-Serbian respondents favoured an annexation to Serbia, 79% of the Bosnian-Croatian respondents supported integration with Croatia, and 99% of the Bosniaks preferred a united Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gromes 2007:209). The first municipal elections were held in September 1997, the ethnic-nationalistic parties SDA, SDS and HDZ won. Multiethnic parties and parties stressing concrete political issues received only 6% of the votes: 12% in the Federation and 2% in the RS (Dzihic 2009:218).

The first post-war years in the RS were led by obstructive politics declining their relation to the Bosnian state level. Moreover, the Dayton Agreement was radically refused. The political situation in the RS was, however, not stable due to the political power struggle between Radovan Karadzic in Pale, on the one hand, and the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, on the other hand. Karadzic felt betrayed by Milosevic due to the agreements in Dayton and therefore he blocked the implementations of the peace agreement. Soon a polarisation arose between the politics in Pale with Biljana Plavsic on the head and the

supported politics by Belgrade in Banja Luka led by Momcilo Krajisnik. There were no fundamental distinctions between these two political poles but rather the division of goods and sphere of influence played a crucial role. At first, Plavsic was able to win support by the international community and prevail the power struggle through her public criticism on the criminal actions of Karadzic and Mladic who controlled the smuggling and the black market in the RS (Dzihic 2009:216). In October 2002, however, Biljana Plavsic confessed to committing crimes against humanity against Croats and Bosniaks during the Bosnian war (Blockmans 2007:346-366).

Due to massive obstructionism of the political process in the two post-war years, the PIC, consisting of fifty-five countries and international organisations sponsoring and directing the peace implementation process, organised a meeting in Bonn. In the final document of the Bonn session on 9^{th} and 10^{th} of December 1997, the following issues were concluded: poor functioning of the state level institutions, the customs and the fiscal system; disbandment of illegal para-state structures; lack of multiethnic parties; low rate of minority return; and the lack of guarantees of human rights. Due to these issues, it was concluded that further concrete deadlines had to be set in order to implement the DPA and that the proceedings of the inefficient politics needed to be stopped. Additionally, the Bonn session gave the OHR new authorities, namely the "Bonn powers" (OHR 1997). With the Bonn powers, the HR could take binding decisions to resolve disputes between political parties, politicians and persons practicing obstructive politics against the determinations in the Dayton Agreement. The expanded authority also enabled him to dismiss officials and impose laws if necessary. This authority of the HR, amounting almost to full governmental power in certain areas, is still controversially discussed today (Blockmans 2007:68; Dzihic 2009:221). In this context, Vedran Dzihic points out that this strengthened role of the international community turned Bosnia-Herzegovina into a "half-protectorate" or a form of "controlled democracy" (Dzihic 2009:221).

Immediately after the determinations of the Bonn session came into force, the HR Carlos Westendorp took a few steps which led to noticeable practical progress for Bosnian citizens. For instance, consistent license numbers were introduced which brought significant improvements in the freedom of movement. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1998, Westendorp adopted a new citizenship law, introduced a consistent currency on the basis of the German mark, namely the convertible mark (KM), and introduced new state symbols such as a flag and an anthem for the country. Additionally, numerous politicians were deposed who blocked the implementation of Dayton. Thus, in March 1998, the Croatian

mayor Stolac was dismissed due to his resistance to the return of Bosniak refugees. The international community also questioned the functionality of the Bonn powers and feared that the local stakeholders and structures would be less prepared to take independent decisions and would leave difficult decisions to the HR (Dzihic 2009:221). Additionally, the international community also realised that a serious intervention of the HR without legitimate democracy could result in major criticism on the maintenance of the protectorate. Hence, a fundamental dilemma of the international community emerged which is still a current issue today. This dilemma concerns the position of the international community: one the one hand, an interventionist policy provokes criticism on the protectorate, and on the other hand, a reluctant policy leads to political progress blockades and standstill due to ethno-nationalism. However, in the era of Westendorp an interventionist policy was driven, resulting in the stabilisation of the country. During a conference of the PIC in December 1998, the mandate of the HR was once again confirmed as being the highest authority by the interpretation of the civil parts of the Dayton Agreement. Additionally, the drastic measures of Carlos Westendorp were clearly supported (ibid.:212f). Due to the Bonn powers and the dominant power position of the OHR, a "dependency syndrome" of the Bosnian state was obvious. The former HR, Wolfgang Petritsch, describes the "dependency syndrome" in Bosnian politics as follows:

> "I have identified what I call the 'dependency syndrome': this means that every piece of legislation that I impose with my authority as the High Representative, gives politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina a perfect excuse not to do their job properly. And every dollar of aid has encouraged some to believe that the International Community will pay for everything - and forever" (Petritsch 1999).

Furthermore, political responsibility is still being reduced in terms of the protection against the threats of the other ethnic groups and in terms of the coverage of the national interests of the each ethnic group. The focus on the ethno-politics ensures the mobilisation of voters on the one hand, but on the other hand it leads to the irresponsibility of the ethno-nationalistic politicians concerning economic and social questions which in turn prolongs the difficult situation of Bosnian citizens such as the low standard of living, high poverty and a significantly high unemployment rate. Development aid from the international community of states contributed to the emergence of a "retiree economy" in the country; however, it interacted with the war and robbery economic structures dominated by the ethno-nationalistic elites (Dzihic 2009:223f).

Due to the blockades of the state level institutions, especially on the part of Serbian and

Croatian politicians, the international community had to intervene. In early 1997, the USA applied pressure through clear requirements and concrete deadlines, in order for the local stakeholders to implement the determinations of the DPA. The former Secretary of State of the USA, Madeleine Albright, took the leading role. She pointed out that "there is no alternative to Dayton except for the horrors that Dayton ended" and moreover, that there is no alternative to a united Bosnia-Herzegovina except a resurgence of violence leading to collapse. Albright made it clear that Dayton was an agreement between the international community and the Bosnian parties and that the international community was determined to meet its commitment (Albright 1997).

The election campaign in 1998 was dominated by the measures taken by the international community and the continued supremacy of ethno-politics in the country. However, some Croatian and Serbian ethno-nationalistic parties split and new parties were formed. In the RS, three new political parties were created, namely the "Srpski narodni savez" (SNS) (Eng. Serb National Alliance), "Socijalisticka partija Republike Srpske" (SPRS) (Eng. Socialist Party of Republika Srpska); and "Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata" (SNSD) (Eng. Alliance of Independent Social Democrats). Kresimir Zubak, a member of the state level chair from HDZ, left his old party and founded the "Nezavisna hrvatska inicijativa" (NHI) (Eng. Independent Croatian Initiative). In the predominantly Bosniak part of the Federation, a coalition for a united and democratic Bosnia-Herzegovina was formed consisting of SDA, "Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu" (SBiH) (Eng. Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Liberal Party and the Civic Democratic Party. This plurality of the political scene increased the political competition and contributed to a more offensive campaign by the ethno-nationalistic parties. Again the three ethno-nationalistic parties - SDA, HDZ and SDS - won with the majority of the votes in the elections of 1998; however, the non-nationalistic parties received more votes in comparison to the ballot in 1996 (Dzihic 2009:226ff). After the election in 1998, the opposition parties, non-nationalistic forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and also particular representatives from the international community demanded and discussed the adoption of a permanent election law for the country. This reform of the election system implied a plurality of the political contest and a release of the dominant ethnic bias. The aim was to steer the political competition to a level where factual issues such as economics should be in the centre stage and thus, Bosnian citizens should vote independently of their ethnic belonging. As a result of the reduction of the nationalistic parties' impacts, a stronger commitment and direct responsibility of the parliamentary deputies to their voters would be achieved (ibid.:229). Nonetheless, the ethno-nationalistic parties are still dominant today.

In 1998, a gradual economic cooperation at a micro-level between the entities was present. Bosnian citizens realised that an economic cooperation between the ethnic groups, at least in a small framework, was needed in order to improve their own economic situation. Examples of such cooperation procedures were the shopping sprees by people from the Federation in the RS and vice versa and milk farmers from the RS selling their milk in the Federation due to the increased sale price in the other entity. The so-called "Arizona Market" existed until 2005. It involved sellers and buyers from all ethnic groups and was managed without difficulties because economic interests prevailed (Radio Most 1998). Boyd points out that: "The ethnic hatred all share is put aside in the interests of need and economic gain [...]. In the microcosm Arizona market represents may lie a clue to building a functioning multiethnic society in Bosnia" (Boyd 1998:52). An opinion poll in 2001 conducted by the World Value Survey also reveals that the majority of the Bosnian citizens share the same opinion concerning the main aim of the country, namely to reach a high level of economic growth:



Figure 2: Aims of Country: First Choice (World Value Survey 2001b)

This common denominator will be discussed in the later analysis. Despite the progress of economic cooperation at the micro-level, mutual economic efforts at the macro-level were lacking until 2000 due to the ethno-political differences in fundamental questions such as the future political constitution of the country (cf. Dzihic 2009:244).

4.4.2 New Era in the Bosnian Leadership

It was a turning point for Bosnia-Herzegovina when the Croatian president Franjo Tudman died in 1999 and the Croatian government changed; Serbia too experienced a "revolution" in October of the following year. Subsequently, Slobodan Milosevic was fallen. Thereafter, Bosnian-Croatian and Bosnian-Serbian politicians were not subject to the same pressure from political leaders of their mother countries as in the pre-war and war era. Subsequently, a more successful peace process and a better and more positive climate were established. Nonetheless, the Bosniak leader, Alija Izetbegovic, stepped down from the joint presidency in 2000 for health reasons and died three years later. The former HR Wolfgang Petritsch tried to use this climate in order to initiate and conduct reforms. Additionally, he tried to learn from the faults of the previous years and to develop new concepts for frameworks. One of these new commitments implied a more intense operation of the Bonn powers which were, however, still highly criticised in the era of Wolfgang Petritsch. He used the Bonn powers more often with the statement that the reforms needed to be advanced. In 2001, the Bonn powers were used 54 times and in 2002 153 times. Until the end of 2002, more than 100 persons were released from their political posts because of filibusters on the implementations of Dayton assignations. At the same time, he postulated that the Bonn powers needed to be more consequently and systematically used in order to reduce the negative effects of the political barrier and stagnancy caused by the ethnically driven politics. Unfortunately, the effects of ethno-politics were not diminished in the era of Petritsch and the local structures remained dependent on the international community (Dzihic 2009:254f; Petritsch 2009b:218).

A further concept promoted in the Petritsch era was "ownership". Through the concept of "ownership" the political leaders but also the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina would strengthen their sense of responsibility. Additionally, a transformation from an "aid-driven" to an "investment-driven economy" would be reached through a "master plan". Hence, initiatives to fight corruption, re-establish a common economic sphere, privatise and increase the private economy were initiated (Dzihic 2009:246; Petritsch 2001:123ff). At the same time as the concept of "ownership" was promoted, a big proportion of the citizens of

Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the multiethnic thinking part, criticised the DPA and the passive position on the part of the international community in dealing with the behaviour and impacts of the ethno-national elites. Petritsch described this situation as follows:

> "I must admit, it took me a long time to make my concept of Bosnian 'ownership' understandable. It implies fundamental changes from the 'rule of power' to the 'rule of law', where the people are no longer subjects, but citizens. To demand this transition was a watershed experience, particularly for Bosnian intellectuals, but also for international observers. Aware of the powers of the High Representative to impose laws and remove from office obstructive officials, they both demanded that I extensively use such powers. Bosnian intellectuals even asked for a fully-fledged protectorate. 'You have to impose the right solutions', was what I heard over and over again. But to my mind, 'imposing' democracy and civil society seemed a contradiction in terms. However, during the first one and a half years of my mandate, I indeed had to act as the most interventionist High Representative ever. Ownership is a process that requires a framework, and I first had to lay solid foundations to het this process going and create the conditions for ownership to take root. I set three priorities: strengthening the state institutions, which were barely functioning at the time, getting economic reform under way, and finally - and maybe most importantly - ensuring that the refugees and displaced persons could go back home. If we succeeded in these three areas, everything else would fall into place much more easily" (Petritsch 2009b:199).

According to an opinion poll by the World Value Survey in 2001, most of the respondents indicated that only the UN or the UN together with the national governments should decide:



Figure 3: Who Should Decide? (World Value Survey 2001a)

This desire of many Bosnian citizens is still present today. The response from the international community, including the OHR, was and still is that there had been a great deal of progress due to the proceedings of the international community, but that a radical change can only occur through the actions of Bosnian citizens. In this regard, the international community would give guidelines to the Bosnian citizens but the job had to be completed by themselves. However, until now the international community had shown that the essential framework for the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be done from outside. Vedran Dzihic stresses that the ethno-national politicians could benefit from this situation by giving the responsibility for their own ineffectiveness to the international community. The inability of the international community to deal with these circumstances led to a further stagnation of the country's development (Dzihic 2009:252).

For the first time since Dayton, the election results in November 2000 showed a decrease in the popularity of the ethno-national parties. Thus, the political constellation was shifted and a relatively moderate political climate could be reached (Dzihic 2009:253). The above-mentioned developments in Croatia and Serbia contributed to these results. Furthermore,

the representatives from the international community and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which were responsible for the execution of the elections, took actions to clarify to the Bosnian citizens that the governing ethno-national parties were responsible for the stagnation of the country and that a change was crucial. OSCE promoted participation in the local government elections with the slogan "Vote for change". The HR Petritsch also emphasised repeatedly that no progress is to be expected from the old political elite and highlighted the significance of real issues such as economy, prospects for the youth etc. A further newness in the elections of 2000 was the "open list" meaning that citizens could also choose individuals from parties rather than only political parties. Still, the elections were dominated by the populist politics of the ethno-nationalistic parties. However, the opposition from the Federation and the RS was able to break through with themes on real issues such as economics. The social democrats under the direction of Zlatko Lagumdzija broached the issue of the high unemployment rate, high levels of corruption and low standards of living. Nevertheless, the SNSD with Milorad Dodik at its head and the new party "Partija demokratskog progresa" (PDP) (Eng. Party of Democratic Progress) in RS also started to highlight economic issues in their election campaigns (Dzihic 2009:253f). At the beginning of his post-Dayton political career, Dodik stressed his willingness and readiness for reform. This presented position of Dodik took a change as he realised that in order to mobilise voters he had to induce ethno-politics, which he initiated in the following years (Gromes 2007:256).

In the Federation, SBiH led by Haris Silajdzic dissolved the coalition with SDA and competed as an independent party during the election campaign. SBiH promoted a Bosnia-Herzegovina without ethnicities and was open for a closure of the RS. The ethno-oriented SDA, however, came forth with election slogans such as "Vote for your own people". On the Croatian side, the framework for the HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina changed, as a result of the defeat of HDZ in Croatia in January 2000. The new Prime Minister Racan and the new President Mesic in Croatia made clear that the Bosnian Croats should not count on the same support and financial assistance from Zagreb as during the era of Tudman (Dzihic 2009:255).

On the general government level in the Federation, a "Democratic Alliance for Change" was achieved through the pressure of the international community. The alliance consisted of the SDP, SBiH, the Croatian NHI, the Democratic Retirees' Party and the "Bosanskohercegovacka patroitska stranka-Sefer Halilovic" (BPS) (Eng. Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party-Sefer Halilovic). For the first time since Dayton, HDZ and SDA were in

opposition (Dzihic 2009:255f). However, this position gave them the opportunity to assert criticism and attack the unstable non-nationalistic government. Although the elections in 2000 can be considered as a success for multiethnic politics, the ethno-nationalistic oriented politics by no means declined (ibid.:255ff). Unfortunately, the alliance for change with its weak majority could not initiate a structural transformation of the Bosnian statehood during its short period in government between 2000 and 2002. The election results in 2002, on the other hand, gave the power back to ethno-nationalistic parties (ibid.:257).

The HDZ with Ante Jelavic as its leader did not diminish its ethno-nationalistic politics after the fall of the HDZ in Croatia in 2000. In fact, the requirements for a third entity "Herceg-Bosna" with a Croatian autonomy was promoted. As a reaction to the blockades of the state institutions and to the obstruction of the DPA on the part of Jelavic and other HDZ-politicians, Petritsch deposed them. As a result, the situation escalated. Croatian soldiers and policemen called up to quit their services and armed hostilities could barely be avoided in Kiseljak between the separatist followers and the loyal followers of the Federation's government (Dzihic 2009:259). After the dismissal of Ante Jelavic, the HR Petritsch took a further measure against the separatist structures. He sent SFOR troops to the Croatian self-administration, namely the Herzegovinian Bank, by which the leaders of the separatist movement are financed. In the following years, the parallel Croatian structures were gradually pushed back. However, the establishment of a third entity and therefore the achievement of Croatian self-governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still one of the central political requirements of the HDZ today (ibid.:259).

Shortly after the crises around the Croatian self-governing region, escalations took place between Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks in the RS. The rebuilding of the Ferhadija-mosque in Banja Luka is an example. One hour before the official appointment of the stakeholders of the rebuilding process, Serbs gathered at the meeting point and sang Chetnik songs. Afterward, around 4000 Serbs began to stone some 300 Bosniaks and representatives from the international community. Eight persons were injured and one person died some weeks later from head injuries. Some years later, the actual rebuilding work could begin (Dzihic 2009:260). The above-mentioned escalations, six years after Dayton, on the part of the three constitutional groups, show that ethno-nationalism was still strongly present in the country. Accordingly, criticism on the post-Dayton state structures and the associated supremacy of the ethno-nationalistic political powers increased, also on the part of the international community (Dzihic 2009:261). In a report from November 2001, the ICG criticised the Dayton-shaped state structure:

> "Unfortunately, the Dayton Agreement was not designed to fulfill these objectives [these imply: 'to establish a democratic, secure and economically viable state that can cease to be an international semi-protectorate without collapsing; and to usher this state in the direction of eventual membership in the European Union' (ICG 2001:20)]. Effective as an armistice in 1995, it has failed to provide a foundation for a functional state. Its constitutional machinery - with a weak central government required to wrestle with a structure deeply divided into two entities, three constitutive peoples, ten disparate cantons in one half of the country, and effectively three armies - is unworkable and self defeating" (ICG 2001:20).

In the same report, five main problems with the international community are mentioned: "lack of shared strategic vision; uncoordinated leadership; duplication and lack of communication; personality clashes and cross-cutting institutional interests; and ineffectual management of economic reform" (ICG 2001:i). For the first time, the necessity to reform the DPA was officially considered. If the implementation of Dayton was to fail, the ICG would develop a "more workable and democratic" model of the DPA (ibid.:i).

The first discussions on constitutional reform began in 2000, subsequent to a declaration from the constitutional court of the country proclaiming that each ethnic group was discriminated against in the constitution of the other entity. The constitutional court demanded an acclimatisation of the two entities' constitution to the constitution of the Bosnian state level. Additionally, the constitutional court demanded the enforcement of the rule concerning equal rights for all peoples as state-carrying units in the entities' constitutions. Therewith, the first amendments of the Dayton constitution were about to take place. After a long internal transformation process under the direction of the HR, the "Alliance for change" (SDP, SBiH and NHI) and SDS, SNSD, PDP and SPRS could agree on a reform in March 2002, although the last-mentioned parties negotiated with reserve. Some days later, however, the parliament of the RS enacted some endorsements to the constitution which were not in line with the decisions made by the constitutional court. Consequently, the HR Petritsch used his mandate to resolve the constitutional changes. As a result of the new entity constitutions, the three ethnic groups are now represented in both entities at all levels of government and public administration. This is being regulated by exact quotas. Yet, the implemented constitution reform implied a strengthening between territory and ethnicity. In other words, the principal of ethnicity was defined in a new form (Dzihic 2009:263f; Petritsch 2009b:195).

In the forefront of the elections in 2002, Bosnia-Herzegovina had gone through some posi-

tive developments. In April 2002, the country became a member of the Council of Europe. Furthermore, new advances in agreement were achieved dealing with property restitution and minority return. Additionally, the new election law permitted, for the first time after the war, elections without the organisation by the OSCE, but by a newly established Bosnian election commission. The period of office was also extended to four years, meaning that the elections in 2002 would have a particular impact (Dzihic 2009:265).

Petritsch' successor, Paddy Ashdown, entered his mandate in May 2002. In contrast to Petritsch, he did not support any particular parties or politicians during the election campaign. From his point of view, ethno-nationalistic parties could also be reform-oriented. Moreover, he saw danger for the country's development in criminality and corruption and the associated weak economic structures. Instead of the concept of "ownership", the concept of "Europeanisation" was propagated. The election results showed a renewed victory for the ethno-nationalistic parties - SDS, HDZ and SDA - and a defeat of the "alliance for change" (Dzihic 2009:266). The victory of the ethno-nationalistic parties can also be ascribed to the weak economic and social situation as well as the disappointment on minor reform implementations (cf. ibid.:267).

Ashdown called for reforms; however, the attributes of the new government proved to be individual interests on the part of the political elite, corruption, a slow reform process and an obvious interest in prolonging the status quo. The effects of the ethno-politics and ethno-nationalism still create difficulties in establishing a functioning Bosnian state. The ethno-national coalition in power and the defenceless, disorganised opposition turned out to be a new low-point in many people's eyes (Dzihic 2009:267f). Nevertheless, according to an opinion poll by the UNDP from 2002, 28.7% of Bosnian Serbs supported an independent RS and 26.9% the alignment on the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 31.1% of Bosnian Croats preferred three entities and 18.6% supported the illegal community "Herceg-Bosna"; compared to Serbs and Croats, most Bosniaks referred to a united state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The absolute majority of the Bosnian respondents described the economic situation as bad. Subsequently, more than 40% of the people in the Federation and more than 50% in the RS indicated that they would leave the country immediately if they had the opportunity (UNDP 2003:20,29).

Due to the harsh criticism on the OHR, especially during his own period, Paddy Ashdown defended the mandate and the authority of the OHR in his finial speech as HR, on the 31^{st} of January 2006, by pointing out his achievements:

"Few predicted that we could successfully unite two suspicious entity armies into a single coherent state level military force. Or that with the introduction of VAT we would have a single system of indirect taxation by the first of January this year. Or a single state level intelligence service. Or a fully operational State Investigation and Protection Agency and State Border Service. Or an effective Council of Ministers with a non rotating Prime Minister. Or a single state customs service. Or a single judiciary operating under a single state law. Or a re-united Mostar City Administration. Or the basis for a single state structure, for BiH's fractured and broken police system. Or, that Bosnia would have, in such a short time open the negotiations that will lead to a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. Or that perhaps finally, after 10 years of failure to deliver even a single war criminal to the Hague, Banja Luka and Belgrade would have in the last year transferred 11 of Karadzic's henchmen to the International Criminal Tribunal. My only regret is that Karadzic and Mladic themselves are not amongst them. Whatever our successes, this is a failure. And the job will not be over until the two primary architects of Bosnia's pain and major war crimes face justice in the Hague. Notwithstanding this, a huge amount has been achieved in the last four years. [...]. But the job is not over. [...]. The next task it to make these institutions functional and reform the constitution so as to better serve the citizens of BiH. The peace stabilisation phase of BiH's journey is now drawing to a close - and the second phase, BiH's long journey to European statehood, has begun. The era of Dayton is ending and the era of Brussels is opening. And that also has a consequence for the International Community's engagement here. In that first speech in May 2002 I said that one of my jobs was to get rid of my job - that success or failure would be measured by how close we could get to the point where BiH did not need a High Representative. Well that point is now clearly visible. It is within reach" (OHR 2006).

4.4.3 First Steps towards the EU Integration Process

The period between 2003 and 2005 is characterised by reform attempts and a slow transformation process towards Brussels. The EU mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was launched in 1996, when the Delegation of the EU to Bosnia-Herzegovina was established on the 10^{th} of July 1996. This engagement proved to be a slow one as well: "We went from not doing anything, then to doing something, and then doing a little bit more, and then finally we started to get it right", the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) and chief of the EU Delegation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Peter Sorensen, stated during a conference at

the Institute of International and European Affairs, on 27^{th} of March 2012. The "Regional Approach" was established in 1997 with the political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations. In 1999, the EU proposed a new Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for five countries in South-Eastern Europe, including Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the following year, the European Council declared that all SAA countries are "potential candidates" for EU membership (DelBiH 2013a).

The SAP was built on the EU's Regional Approach and serves as a framework for the EU-negotiations of the potential candidate and has three aims: the stabilisation of the country and the transformation to a market economy; regional cooperation; as well as the preparation for the EU-membership. In other words, the SAP as a tool is an offer to the states in the Western Balkan to approximate to the EU-standards. Nevertheless, in the first face of the SAP the fundamental elements of the agreement are on the agenda and subsequently the remaining steps are to be implemented (DelBiH 2013c). The SAA is the contractual relation between the country and the EU. The key elements of the SAA are: to promote the free movement of goods, to develop efficient institutions and market economy, to reduce crimes and corruption, to promote reforms of higher education, to develop democracy, human rights and independent medias, and to improve the regional traffic infrastructure (DelBiH 2013c; Blockmans 2007:251).

In 2000, an "EU Road Map" was produced for the country outlining steps to be taken in order to launch a feasibility study. The compliance with the Road Map terms served as a yardstick for the political incentive to solve a number of political, economic and constitutional issues. The implementation process of the demanded terms was unsuccessful and the HR Petritsch had to intervene. In September 2002, the European Commission announced that the "Road Map" was largely completed (Dzihic 2009:269).

As a result of the mutual affirmation of the SAP, the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) Programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina was introduced, designed specifically for SAA countries. The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 was a significant occasion in the history of the EU engagement in the Balkans because the SAP was confirmed as an EU policy framework for the Western Balkans. Furthermore, Bosnia-Herzegovina was confirmed as being a potential candidate for joining the EU. Thus, the EU perspective on the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina was confirmed as well. Nonetheless, during the congress in Thessaloniki, the slow reform process in Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding several areas such as the visa reform was emphasised. As an effect of the slow reform

process, an enhanced access to EU funds and more financial support from the CARDS-Programme could not be gained (Dzihic 2009:271). A few months after the Summit, a feasibility study was completed by the EC with the aim of assessing the country's capacity regarding negotiations for a future SAA. Due to structural shortcomings, the study concluded that SAA negotiations could begin once the country had made progress in addressing sixteen key priorities, such as completing the remaining requirements of the Road Map and implementing further economic and political reforms. For instance, the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was declared less than satisfactory on the part of each ethnic group. RS was criticised on its failure to locate or arrest even a single accused escapee (European Commission 2005:2ff; Blockmans 2007:258f).

Since the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, the EU-Delegation in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been more active in the country. The role of the EU-Delegation is to present, explain and implement EU guidelines; analyse and report on the development of the country and its institutions; and conduct negotiations in accordance with a certain mandate (DelBiH 2013b). Latest since the Thessaloniki Summit, Bosnia-Herzegovina experiences a transformation from Dayton to Brussels. Hereby, the EU has become the main political actor in the country. In December 2004, NATO's SFOR protection force was replaced by a European peacekeeping force. Prior to that, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of the UN was also replaced by a European one. Nevertheless, this policy served the "rule of law" strategy in the country and in its region. The next big step was the signing of the SAA with the EU (cf. Brlavac 2011).

The Bosnian government adopted an "Action Plan for Priority Reform" for the period between August 2003 and May 2004. This action plan addressed concrete laws and institutional implementations which the country had to adopt. Additionally, a consolidated state level government work plan corresponding policy priorities with budgetary resources was established by the Bosnian authority for European integration and was approved and supported by all political parties in the country. For the first time since Dayton, a consensus between the ethno-nationalistic and non-nationalistic parties was present, supporting the country's EU-approximation. Similarly, it became evident that the EU approximation process and the ethno-nationalistic process do not necessarily have to exclude one another (Dzihic 2009:270ff). In November 2005, the European Commission considered Bosnia-Herzegovina's progress in addressing the sixteen priorities as significant and therefore recommended the European Council to start SAA negotiations with the country. In

the following month, the SAA negotiations were officially launched with the requirement that the State Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina should endorse the agreement on police and broadcasting restructuring and establishment of a single economic space (DelBiH 2013a; European Commission 2005:5; Blockmans 2007:258f).

The above-portrayed developments of and achievements by Bosnia-Herzegovina on its EU path were characterised by considerable internal challenges. Reports by the European Commission from 2004 on the progress of the reform implementation depict these circumstances:

> "Government at State level remains under-developed, while tensions between State and Entities still affect government business and reform" (European Commission 2004a).

> "The constitutional order, as defined by the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreements, is complicated, costly and does not facilitate reform. However, reforms in the areas of defence and taxation show that incremental and politically acceptable change is possible. One of the main challenges for BiH today is to address remaining structural weakness and become a self-sustaining state able to maintain closer relations with the European Union. This may require a strengthening of the powers and capacity of central government and an appropriate division of responsibilities between State and Entities. The High Representative has played an important role in pushing through reforms. The Government of BiH now needs to take more direct responsibility for the reform process" (European Commission 2004b:12f).

On the technical-structural level, the problems implied ineffectiveness in implementing laws decided by the Parliamentary Assembly and the non-functioning of the, at that time, newly established institutions. Furthermore, the new institutions were formally instituted but they remained weakly manned and therefore inefficient. Weak institutions and inefficient public administration are still prevailing problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. However, in order for the country to meet the complex and diverse demands of the EU and accordingly approximate an EU membership, an efficient and functioning administration is needed (Dzihic 2009:272). The reason why adequate solutions to a functioning of the administration cannot be found can be ascribed to the diametrically opposed perceptions of the Bosnian statehood constitution by each ethno-nationalistic party of the three ethnic groups: Bosniaks aim to strengthen the state level, Bosnian Serbs support the status quo and Bosnian Croats intend to create a third entity (Dzihic 2009:272).

In December 2006, EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina successfully completed the SAA technical negotiations. Due to a lack of progress on the police reform, the agreement could not be initialled and formally concluded. As an outcome of the international community's pressure in April 2008, a compromise of the police reform was agreed. Thus, the former commissioner for enlargement, Olli Rehn, assessed that Bosnian political leaders could agree on reforms and the SAA with Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed in June 2008 (DelBiH 2013a). However, concrete implementation plans of the police reform are still missing today (cf. Dzihic 2009:18).

4.4.4 Reform Failures and Achievements

At the end of 2003, a group of 24 prominent European politicians, including amongst others a member of the European Parliament, Doris Pack, and the former UN Special Rapporteur for human rights in former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, requested an amendment of the DPA and demanded a constitutional amendment with the objective of accelerating Bosnia-Herzegovina's path towards the EU. The European Stability Initiative (ESI) presented a plan for abolishing the entities and establishing twelve equal cantons according to the Swiss model. In the following two years, the debate about a constitutional reform took centre stage. The so-called Venice Commission of the European Council proposed a constitutional change in March 2005 and correspondingly, a reduction of the Bonn powers would be achieved. According to the Venice Commission, a Bosnian integration into the EU is not possible with the present Dayton constitution. Furthermore, the Venice Commission described the current Bosnian constitution as "anachronistic". The proposed solution implied a strengthening of the state level and therefore a weakening of the entity level. The reactions to the proposal were, as in previous times, conflicting. The proposal found its supporters among Bosniaks and its opponents among Bosnian Croats and Serbs (Dzihic 2009:274). Bosnian Serbs compromised at first under strong pressure from the international community, but as the existence of the RS was threatened, no compromises could be found (ibid.:275).

However, some compromises of a constitutional reform were found. A reform of the national defence at the state level could be agreed. This implied a closure of the defence ministries in the entities, which took place at the beginning of 2006. Similar adjustments were made in the field of judiciary and security. In addition to the defence ministry, ministries for

agriculture, science, technology and the environment could be established at the state level. Instead of the three rotating chairmen of the Bosnian presidency, a single president and two vice-presidents were introduced, representing one of the country's main ethnic groups. Also, the House of Representatives was enhanced through an increased number of deputies. It could also be agreed that the members of the presidency would be elected by the national parliament and not by direct vote. However, a crucial police force reform concerning a consistent police force at the state level was not approved by the ethno-nationalistic Bosnian Serbs, because it was perceived as a lost guarantee of the sovereignty of the RS. Bosnian ethno-nationalistic Croats shared a similar position as Bosnian ethno-nationalistic Serbs and demanded an equal status for all ethnic groups (Dzihic 2009:275,288f; Blockmans 2007:328).

The following table from 2005 shows the constitutional division between the state level and the entity level of political fields in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Political Fields	**BiH**	**Federation**			**RS**	
		Entity	Cantons	Communities	Entity	Communities
Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade	E					
Monetary Policy	E					
Immigration	E					
International Law and Law Enforcement between the Entities	E					
Telecommunication, Transport between the Entities	E					
Defence	E					
Citizenship		E			E	
Economic and Fiscal Policy		E			E	
Agriculture		S	S		E	
Energy		S	S		E	
Natural Resources		S	S		E	
Environment		S	S		E	
Telecommunication and Transport		S	S		E	
Infrastructure						
Health		S	S	should exercise self-government in local matters	E	
Land use			E		S	S
Habitation			E			E
Local Work / Energy Production			E			E
Public Service			E			E

Explanation: E - exclusive responsibility, S - shared responsibility

Table 2: Constitutional Division (Solioz 2005:108 - own translation into English)

On the 18^{th} of March 2006, the main political parties were able to agree on a constitutional reform of the country. In the following month, however, the Parliament failed to adopt the proposed constitutional amendments. Subsequently, the political elements of the RS called once again for independence (Blockmans 2007:346-366). The former HR Christian Schwarz-Schilling identified that the reform process was in a "dangerous situation". His deputy, Peter Bas-Backer, commented on the decline of the constitutional reform in a speech to the opening session of the inter-parliamentary meeting as follows:

> "Just in the last few days the parliament of BiH, by a narrow margin and after months of detailed and constructive debate, failed to endorse a package of constitutional changes that would have equipped the BiH authorities to serve citizens more efficiently and would also have equipped the country to meet the demands of EU integration, particularly the very strenuous legislative demands. The International Community argued vigorously and with one voice in favour of the constitutional amendments. The International Community stands ready to offer its support when the issue of constitutional reform is taken up again - and it must be addressed if BiH is to progress further and faster along the road to European integration - but it is now up to the citizens of BiH to consider this new situation and to make up their minds about how their political representatives acted, about constitutional reforms and other reforms and to express their views at the elections. This, too, is a matter of ownership" (Bas-Backer 2006).

After the failure to implement a constitutional reform, Haris Silajdzic from the SBiH argued that a reshaping of the system in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina was essential and that the RS needed to be dissolved. With this position he could ensure his leading political post among the Bosniaks (Dzihic 2009:291). In the RS, however, the old government with SDS at its head was fallen and Milorad Dodik from the SNSD was elected as the new prime minister in February 2006. The coalition consisted of SNSD, PDP, SBiH, "Demokratski narodni savez" (DNS) (Eng. Democratic People's Alliance), SPRS and SDA. Milorad Dodik was able to benefit from his new political position in the elections in October 2006 (ibid.:290f). Dodik could increase his power and mobilise more people due to his populist politics, emphasis on ethno-nationalism and an independent RS. Due to the diametrically opposed conceptions of Silajdzic and Dodik on the constitutional structure, conflicts between Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs caused new crises in the country. The HR and the international community were at a loss and resigned to force reform efforts. The new HR Christian Schwarz-Schilling and the international community changed strategy, from

pushing reforms and repeatedly using the Bonn powers to avoiding intervening and advocating the principle of "ownership" (ibid.:291). Christian Schwarz-Schilling frequently addressed the importance of self-dependency and sole responsibility. He believed that the ethno-nationalistic patterns of thinking and acting would change and that a new discussion process would be initiated after the elections in October 2006. As a result of the gradually reduced interventions and activities of the OHR, in accordance with the plan, Christian Schwarz-Schilling would be the last HR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the plan failed. These withdrawal plans of the international community demonstrate that the strength of the ethno-politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina was underestimated (ibid.:292).

Dodik from SNSD and Silajdzic from SBiH took centre stage during the election campaign in 2006. Dodik ensured his popularity by emphasizing the importance of an independent RS, criticised the centralistic state as well as the international community, and portrayed the other ethnic groups as a threat to the own Serbian people. Subsequent to Montenegro's declaration of independence in June 2006, Dodik compared the Montenegrin case with the Bosnian and threatened with a referendum for the separation of the RS from Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the case that Bosniaks or the international community try to weaken the authority of the RS. Silajdzic supported the perception that a constitutional reform is urgently needed and similarly to Dodik's argument, he depicted the other ethnic groups as a threat to the own group. At the same time, their statements homogenised Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs and an artificial atmosphere was created wherein an image of "us" in contrast to the "others" was constructed. Other issues such as employment, economic reforms etc. were eclipsed (Dzihic 2009:292f; Vuletic, Bukovac 2006:3). HDZ and its splinter faction "Hrvatska demokratska zajednica 1990" (HDZ 1990) (Eng. Croatian Democratic Union 1990) were the two Croatian parties during the election campaign. HDZ 1990 split from HDZ as a protest against the HDZ president Dragan Covic, who was assured by Dodik's position because of his own interest in not strengthening the state level. HDZ 1990 supported SBiH in implementing a constitution reform; however, it promoted, similar to HDZ, a third Croatian entity (Dzihic 2009:295).

At the end of May 2006, clear support arrived from Belgrade concerning Dodik's statements regarding a referendum for the separation of the RS. At this time, the Serbian NGO "Srpski nardoni pokret - izbor je nas" (Eng. Serbian Grass Root Movement - It is our choice) had 50,000 votes for the separation of the RS and therefore constantly pressured the government of the RS (Dzihic 2009:293f). In September 2006, a new special relationship treaty was signed in Banja Luka between the RS and Serbia embodying stronger

economic cooperation. The government of Serbia promised to invest 100 million euro in infrastructure and the promotion of culture, sport and education facilities in the RS (Dzihic 2009:295).

The elections in 2006 were for the first time held by Bosnia's own institutions and were mostly in accordance with international standards (Blockmans 2007:346-366). The low turnout of voters, similar to the previous ballots, was 54.5% during the elections in October 2006. In the election for the Bosniak member of the Bosnian tripartite presidency, Haris Siljadzic was able to assert himself with 62.8% of the votes while Sulejman Tihic from the SDA received 27.5%. Siljadzic's confrontational election campaign against Dodik was therefore worthwhile. In the election for the Serbian member of the Bosnian presidency, Nebojsa Radmanovic from SNSD won with 53.3%. On the Croatian side, the non-nationalistic Bosniak Zeljko Komsic from the SDP won with 36.9% and Ivo Miro Jovic from HDZ received 26.1% of the votes (Dzihic 2009:295).

Dodik's SNSD received the most votes in the RS, namely 43.3%, and accordingly 41 seats in the parliament. On the state level, SNSD gained 46.9% from the RS and seven seats in the parliament. SDS achieved only 17 seats in the RS parliament and three on the state level. In the Federation, the SDA was the strongest party with 25.5% of the votes followed by SBiH with 22.2% of the votes. HDZ and HDZ 1990 were given, on the whole, the same number of votes (Dzihic 2009:296).

Dodik, as the re-elected prime minister of the RS, formed a new government where he could exercise almost unlimited power. His party withdrew the acceptance of a police reform and continued to maintain the autonomous police force in the RS. On 11^{th} January 2007, a new government on the state level was formed with Nikola Spiric from the SNSD as prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was not until February that the council of ministers was fully manned on the state level subsequent to the final agreement of SBiH, SNSD, SDA and the both HDZ-parties on the distribution of the ministerial posts. In February, a further round of negotiations took place concerning the police reform, unfortunately this time again without results (Dzihic 2009:296).

4.4.5 Prolonged Political, Social and Economic Crises

The political climate in Bosnia-Herzegovina tightened in February 2007 following the decision by the International Court of Justice on Srebrenica. The incidences in Srebrenica in July 1995 were indeed classified as genocide and accountability was given to the police force of the RS; however, a condemnation of Serbia regarding its involvement in the genocide was declined. The Bosniak parties and especially Haris Siljadzic reinforced their demand to abolish the RS and its police force. As a reaction, Milorad Dodik and other Serbian parties intensified their ethno-nationalistic rhetoric, threatened with a referendum once again, and stirred up anxiety for Bosniaks. The international community warned about an escalation of the situation but these warnings were ignored. Dodik consciously supported the Croatian demand for a third entity. His argumentation invoked the principle of justice and equity of power in the Bosnian territory (Dzihic 2009:297f). In the following months, Dodik demanded the withdrawal of the decisions on shifting authorities of the RS to the state level. He argued that the shifting did not prove to be more efficient and that the country had not become politically more stable. The Bosniak parties and the SDP reacted strongly and condemned Dodik's populist and nationalistic motives (ibid.:298).

The strategic plan of the international community in shifting the focus from the OHR to the EU's representative was failed. The criticism on the passive position of Schwarz-Schilling grew stronger, resulting in an announcement in January 2007 that he would withdraw his mandate in June 2007. His successor was Miroslav Lajcak, a Slovakian diplomat with excellent Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language skills. With the new HR, the strategy of the international community also changed into a more intervening one and the HR could now, if required, fully use the Bonn powers. Subsequently, the ethno-nationalistic Bosnian politicians were once again pressured by the international community. The USA, represented by the ambassador in Sarajevo, also interfered in the internal political debates after the elections and applied pressure on the ethno-nationalistic politicians. The political development stagnated and so did the Bosnian Europeanisation process. As an effect, the Bosnian citizens underwent serious economic and social crisis (Dzihic 2009:298f). According to the UNDP, the majority of Bosnian citizens saw the weakness of the Bosnian state as being manifested in its unemployment (21%), corruption (16%), politicians (14%) and politics (8%) (UNDP 2007:38).

In this context, the results of the UNDP poll conducted at the end of 2008 are interesting. According to the poll, most Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnians Serbs are markedly or

generally proud of their own ethnic group (91.3% of Bosniaks, 90.9% of Croats and 93.9% of Serbs). Concerning the question about the authority of the OHR, 62.8% of Bosniaks advocated the expansion or the maintenance of the Bonn powers, whereas 28.9% of Croats and 71.6% of Serbs argued for a reduction of these (UNDP 2008:11,42). As an interpretation of these poll results, the Bosniaks demanded measures by the HR to prosecute Dodik, the Croats were afraid of a refusal of a third entity by the HR and the Serbs supported Dodik's critics on the Bonn powers (Dzihic 2009:300).

The new HR, Miroslac Lajcak, dismissed the deputy director of the RS police force, Dragomir Andan. Lajcak's statement was that Andan assisted wanted war criminals. Except for Andan, 35 other employees of the RS police force were dismissed. Furthermore, Lajcak applied deadlines for the agreement of the police reform and issued an ultimatum for the formation of the government in the canton of Herzegovina-Neretva, where Bosniaks and Croats could not agree on a new cantonal government almost ten months after the election. However, the ethno-nationalistic politicians in the RS, especially Dodik, proceeded with their refusal of reform. At the end of August, Dodik demanded yet again the withdrawal of the RS authorities which were transferred to the state level. The ethno-nationalistic Croats proceeded with their politics as well and demanded a third entity (Dzihic 2009:301).

In September 2007, HR Lajcak again called for a police reform. This time, Salajdzic and Dodik could agree on a compromise involving only a declaration of intent with vague proposals. However, the SDA and SDP declined the proposed reform for the reason that the reform decision would only strengthen Dodik and the RS. Consequently, Lajcak promulgated sanctions against Dodik and the RS but Dodik, however, threatened with boycotts of the state level institutions. Subsequently, the situation escalated in November 2007. In October, the HR changed the work procedure of the council of ministers. Dodik and other representatives of the RS felt assaulted and threatened with a blockade of the state level institutions which the majority of the citizens in the RS supported. On 1^{st} November 2007, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian premier minister from Dodik's party, Nikola Spiric, resigned from his position, and subsequently the state level government work came to a deadlock. At the end of 2007, the issue of the police reform could be temporarily solved due to the strong pressure from the international community. The "Declaration of Mostar" constituted a commitment to the police reform based on the three EU principles and to the police force legislation process (Dzihic 2009:302). As an effect of the agreement on a police reform, the EU initialled the SAA with Bosnia-Herzegovina. This file, however, was not binding or legitimate. It constituted only a pre-stage to the signing of the SAA. In

other words, the SAA was initialled due to the strong pressure of the international community and without any operation-binding effects. Nevertheless, shortly after the SAA was initialled the old ethno-nationalistic rhetoric of the Bosnian politicians was back on board again: Milorad Dodik and the Serbian parties insisted on a strong RS in a ethnically territorialised Bosnia-Herzegovina; the two HDZ parties aimed to achieve a third ethnically territorialised unity for the Bosnian Croats; and Haris Silajdzic with his "party for BiH" as well as the SDA strived for the strengthening of the state level. Thus, the agreement on the police reform did not correspond to the will and intention of the political representatives of the Bosnian citizens. At the beginning of February 2008, new round table talks on the police reform and on the process of the constitutional reform ended in reciprocal accusations (Dzihic 2009:303). Vedran Dzihic describes the political situation as follows:

> „Insgesamt zeigte sich damit, dass die Einigung vom November 2007 nicht mehr als eines der vielen Täuschungsmanöver der politischen Entscheidungsträger war, so wie sie seit 1996 permanent stattfinden. Zum wiederholten Mal schrieben alle Zeitungen von [der] Krise, die EU ermahnte die führenden Politiker der ethnonationalen Parteien, die Reformen umzusetzen und drohte mit dem Einsatz von Bonn-Powers, die verantwortlichen Politiker beschuldigten wiederum einander bzw. den damaligen OHR-Chef Lajčak, usw. Im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen dem externen Druck und dem Bedienen der Interessen der eigenen Klientel entlang der Prinzipien der exklusiven Ethnopolitik setzten sie wieder auf die Doppeltaktik: Wird der Druck der internationalen Gemeinschaft und der EU zu groß, wird in allerletzter Sekunde ein Kompromiss aus dem Hut gezaubert und mit Europäisierungsrhetorik versüßt, um sofort danach zum politischen Alltag zurückzukehren und so zu tun, als ob sie mit dem erzielten Kompromiss wenig bis gar nicht zu tun hätten. Im politischen und von Ethnopolitik geprägten Alltag herrschen weiterhin die ethnischen und persönlichen Interessen. Die politische Verantwortung wird mit dem Freibrief für beliebige Usurpierung der Macht für eigene Zwecke verwechselt" (Dzihic 2009:304).[2]

[2]Own translation: "Overall, it turned out that the agreement of November 2007 was not more than one of the many deception manoeuvres of the decision-makers, as they permanently take place since 1996. Once again, all newspapers wrote about the crises which exhorted leading politicians from ethno-nationalistic parties to implement the reforms and threatened to apply the Bonn powers. The politicians in charge, however, accused one another as well as the former OHR chief Lajcak and others. In the tension between the external pressure and the service of the interests of their own clientele along with the principles of the exclusive ethno-politics, they used the double tactic again: As the pressure of the international community and the EU got high, a compromise was pulled out of the hat in the last second and was sweetened with rhetoric on Europeanisation, and shortly after it returned to the normal course of politics and they pretended as if they had little or nothing to do with the compromise they achieved. In the political and by ethno-politics influenced everyday life, the ethnical and personal interests still prevail. The political responsibility is being mistaken for the charter for any usurpation of power for their own purposes".

Dzihic emphasises, on the one hand, the beguilement of compromise on the part of the Bosnian ethno-nationalistic politicians as the pressure from the international community grows, and on the other hand, the everyday political life involving ethno-nationalistic and personal interests (cf. Dzihic 2009:304).

The crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not only caused by the unwillingness for reform and the threats of the ethno-nationalistic politicians - in addition there are indications of conscious attempts to prohibit critics of the existing political structures. "Lists of unwanted" ("Liste nepozeljenjih") in the RS are an example. According to journalist information, these lists are compiled by the staff of the RS Prime Minister Dodik. Unwanted people on these lists are detractors of Dodik's politics, for instance the director of Transparency International for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the economic evaluator Damir Miljevic, the former finance minister in the RS Svetlana Cenic, the chief editor of the newspaper "Patrio" Slobodan Vaskovic, as well as the political commentator of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Tanja Topic. Slobodan Vaskovic reported that his friends in the streets of Banja Luka do not salute him anymore and that he has had to close his magazine because of the pressure. In this context, Vaskovic referred to a "Stalinist situation" in the RS. Tanja Topic stresses that if criticism and opinions cannot be openly expressed, the society is far away from democracy (Dzihic 2009:304f). In the Federation, there are also consistently reports about the pressure of political opponents, steered media campaigns against certain persons and attempts to contaminate of freedom of opinion (ibid.:305).

Kosovo's official declaration of independence on 17^{th} of February 2008 led to new disputes between the Bosnian politicians. Since 2006, Dodik has been clear about his political position in not recognising Kosovo's independence and threatens that if Kosovo gets recognised by the Western states, then the RS would also declare itself as independent. Subsequent to Kosovo's official declaration of independence, the president of the RS, Rajko Kuzmanovic, the president of the parliament, Igor Radojcic, and the RS prime minister, Milorad Dodik, announced that the Kosovar independence declaration is adverse to the international law and that it should be internationally declined (Dzihic 2009:307). Kuzmanovic declared it to be "unfair" and claimed that it was an "attack against the Serbian state". Radojcic confirmed that the RS would not allow the official institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina to recognise Kosovo. On the following day, people in the RS, mostly students and middle-school pupils, demonstrated against the independence of Kosovo. In Krajina, the flags of the EU and the USA were demonstratively burnt. The riots led to numerous violations. Dzihic stresses that the partially violent protests are an indication of the sad situation of

the youth in the Balkans due to the "ghettoisation" in their own countries because of visa requirements and everyday frustration with almost non-existent employment opportunities and future prospects (ibid.:307f).

The Croatian and Bosniakian parties announced that it was crucial to maintain stability and security in the country. The HR and the representatives of the EUFOR strived to calm down the situation. Sulejman Tihic declared that the country would not recognise Kosovo until the internal relations between the Bosnian constitutional people are conclusively resolved (Dzihic 2009:308f). Furthermore, a special session of the RS parliament on 21^{st} of February 2008 involved the damnation of the Kosovar independence and the threat that the RS would conduct a referendum for the separation of the RS with the full support of the "Serbian movement of NGOs" ("Srpski pokret nevladnih asocijacija" - SPONA). Dodik described the independence of the RS as a "democratic revolt" (Dzihic 2009:308). The Bosniak politicians reacted to the threats of the RS with the abolishment of the RS because the Serbian entity - according to Haris Silajdzic - relies on the results of the war, namely ethnic cleansing and genocide, and additionally, the RS decelerates the Bosnian path towards the EU. The populist and nationalistic disputes between Dodik and the Bosniak politicians were herewith continued and once again at the expense of concrete reforms and progress in the Bosnian Europeanisation process (ibid.:309).

Subsequent to the settle-down of the turbulences around the independency of Kosovo, new attempts to conclude a police reform were initiated in the Bosnian parliament. Finally, in April 2008, the requirements for an alleviated police reform could be concluded. In the House of People, 22 deputies voted for the reform and 19 against it. The parties voting against the police reform in its compromised form were the SDA, SDP, SDS, BPS and DNS. The SDA and SPD declined the reform because its determinations were perceived as inadequate constituting an indirect affirmation and maintenance of the police structures in the RS (Dzihic 2009:309f). The SDS, on the other side, denounced Dodik's compliance to a reform because it betrayed the interest of the RS. Accordingly, a police reform was agreed but without adequate contents leading Bosnia-Herzegovina to the signing of the SAA. The fundamental problems around the Bosnian state-hood, however, could not be solved (ibid.:310). The decision on a police reform and the forthcoming signing of the SAA was perceived as a "bright European future" for the country by many local politicians and especially the international community. Nonetheless, the agreement on a compromise was a long process; the compromise implied only vague regulations and would not be possible without the intervention of the HR (cf. Dzihic 2009:210).

The increasingly difficult social situation of Bosnian citizens involves a low standard of living, increasing inflation, poverty and low wages. The world economic crisis also had a lasting, severe impact on the devastating social and economic situation of the majority of Bosnian citizens. The extent of the foreign direct investment declined rapidly. However, the Federation could be saved from bankruptcy by a short-term loan from the IMF. In 2009, the unemployment rate was 40%. 50,000 retirees receive on average a pension of 300 KM (around 150 euro). The average wage in the Federation is 694 KM. However, the consumer basket is also around 694 KM. Critics of the politicians imply their incapacity and unwillingness to improve the economic and social situation of the country. A huge problem lies in the social spending disbursement of veteran soldiers' aid (Dzihic 2009:311ff, 20f). According to the UNDP, 1/3 of the total expenditures on non-insurance type cash benefits are being transferred to war veterans. However, only 15% of the veteran soldiers' aid are received by the poorest population fraction, while 27% are transferred to the richest population portion (UNDP 2010:11). The veterans, on the other hand, play a crucial role for the voter potential of ethno-nationalistic parties. These disbursements proved to be a huge obstacle for conducting urgent reforms (Dzihic 2009:311ff, 20f). The following diagram by the World Bank shows the absolute poverty rates for the years of 2001, 2004 and 2007, as well as the estimated rate for 2010 and the Millennium Development Goal for 2015. It is also evident that the poverty rate is higher among the rural population.



Figure 4: Absolute Poverty Rates in BiH (UNDP 2010:12)

Roughly summarised, the efforts to achieve constitutional reform are recurring but consistently without success. An example of these attempts took place at the end of 2008 in Prud, in Brcko District, where Milorad Dodik, Sulejman Tihic and Dragan Covic met in order to discuss the future constitutional reform process, state property, population census and the status of the Brcko District. An agreement with vague contents was concluded; however, as soon as it was publicly announced, it was strongly criticised. The ethno-nationalistic Bosniaks blamed Tihic for advancing Dodik whereas Serbs in the RS accused Dodik's will to compromise. Thus, the Prud document was annulled. Because of the fact that the particular interests of each ethno-nationalistic group are mutually contradictory, no consensus on the fundamental constitutional structure can be found. Dzihic points out that the way the Prud debate has been preformed and what arguments were used demonstrate very clearly the fundamental dilemma of Bosnian statehood and its self-referential captivity within the ethnic paradigm: as long as the ethnic groups insist on their own statehood and sovereignty within the Bosnian state, no adequate reform of the weak ventral state would be possible (Dzihic 2009:314f). The international community, on the other hand, was caught in its own dilemma of intervening or promoting the principle of ownership and did not meet any crucial measures until autumn 2009. Lajcak left his post prematurely in March 2009 (ibid.:216) and the Austrian Valentin Inzko took over and is still (December 2013) the current HR today.

In October 2008, the chief architect of the DPA, Richard Holbrook, and the former HR, Paddy Ashdown, warned in an article about a collapse of the Bosnian country. They accused Dodik and Silajdzic of tensioning the political situation since the elections in 2006. Subsequently, an unhealthy and destructive dynamic was accelerating and increasing the ethno-nationalism in the country. Holbrooke and Ashdown also criticised the "distracted international community" and blamed U.S. President George W. Bush's administration for its passivity and the EU for failing to develop an adequate strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Holbrooke, Ashdown 2008).

During the summer and in the early autumn of 2009, it became clearer that the political situation continued to blockade and escalate also through provocation from Dodik especially. The Bosnian-Serbian prime minister, who was confronted with accusations of corruption from the Bosnian justice system, repeatedly threatened the Federation with a secession of the RS with public statements such as: "If someone touches Dayton, the end of Bosnia will come" (Dzihic 2009:216). Wolfgang Petritsch commented on this political form in September 2009 as follows:

> „Die Politik von Dodik ist egozentrisch, er selbst ist nur am Status Quo interessiert. Es wäre besser, in die Zukunft zu schauen, Richtung Brüssel und Europa, und nicht blind an der Politik festzuhalten, die aus Pale promoviert wurde und nicht nur den Serben nichts Gutes gebracht hat. [...] Dieses unproduktive Spiel und Tauziehen muss endlich aufhören. Die Welt ist von einer schwierigen Wirtschaftskrise getroffen und alle sollten sich den Reformen und den Integrationsprozessen zuwenden, anstatt die Spielchen zu spielen. Falls die Regierung der RS ernsthaft für eine Klage gegen die Hohen Repräsentanten entschieden sollte, wird (werden) sie das OHR nie loswerden" (Dzihic 2009:216).[3]

Tensions between Croats and Bosniaks were also present; for instance in autumn 2009 when violent disputes took place between Bosniakian and Croatian fans after a football match. This tragic event also indicates the catastrophic Bosnian society (Dzihic 2009:216f). Until now it had to be clear to every international representative that the filibuster politics together with the passive position of the international community threaten the stability of the country (ibid.:317). In October 2009, talks were held between the international community and the Bosnian political elite, with the aim to find solutions to the vicious circle and achieve reforms for the Europeanisation process. Nonetheless, the negotiations ended without results (ibid.:317).

In 2007, Judy Batt analysed the state-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and described the Bosnian politics as "war by other means". She clearly portrayed the very complex political situation in Bosnia as follows:

> "The eruption of the long-simmering political crises in BiH has painfully exposed the failure of the mist intensive effort ever at internationally-supervised state-building. Twelve years' investment of human and financial resources has not succeeded in supplanting the ethno-nationalist obsessions that drove the 19992-95 war. Politics today is 'war by other means', still focused on the issues that Dayton failed to resolve. Politicians are mobilizing people's fears of each other and mistrust of the EU in order to resist reforms, and BiH's path to EU integration is blocked. The EU's much-bruited

[3]Own translation into English: "The politics of Dodik are egocentric and he is only interested in the status quo. It would be better to look ahead, towards Brussels and Europe, and not to blindly adhere to the politics which were directed from Pale and were unprofitable not only for the Serbs. [...]. This unproductive game and tug of war must finally find an end. The world is hit by a difficult economic crisis and everyone should focus on the reforms and the integration processes, rather than playing games. If the government of the RS seriously decides to take actions against the High Representative, it will never get rid of the OHR".

> 'soft power' is not working. The EU perspective has simply not proved sufficiently powerful to reorient the BiH political agenda. Although all political leaders profess commitment to EU integration, they have deliberately escalated confrontational nationalist rhetoric and obstructed reform wherever these challenge their power bases. Despite the fact that EU integration is supported by almost 70% of public opinion, and although politicians are almost universally despised and mistrusted, their sectarian nationalist rhetoric finds a ready response among the people. Moreover, the legitimacy and credibility of the OHR have been seriously weakened: first by the premature experiment of 2005-06 in transition to 'local ownership', which only succeeded in reviving the dominant struggle over precisely who owns what in BiH; and more recently, by division within the International Community and Russian political contestation of the OHR's use of the Bonn Powers. With 'Leviathan' in question, BiH risks descending once again into a Hobbesian 'state of nature' - a condition of 'war of all against all where lift is 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Batt 2007:65).

Judy Batt points out that, politicians are mobilising people's fears in order to prevent reforms and block the Bosnian EU integration. Nicole Renvert also states that many Bosnian politicians instrumentalise the fears which emerged during the war and that they for this reason block the development of the country (SWP 2010:1). Vedran Dzihic clarifies that these fears involve each ethnic group's perception of being a victim of the other ethnic groups (Dzihic 2009:333). Furthermore, the fears of Serbs lay in the solution of the RS which is being perceived as a shelter against the unitary tendencies and domination by the Bosniaks. The Croats fear the supremacy of the two bigger ethnic groups in the country, which is triggering the offensive Croatian politics in strengthening the Croatian identity through a third entity. The Bosniaks' fear related to the war and its results and therefore they fear that they will once again end up as victims of Serbs and Croats. In this sense, Dzihic stresses that in such a "fear-landscape", the prospects for strengthening the state level, weakening the ethnic-nationalism and improving the internal ethnic relations are very dark (ibid.:335f).

Another crucial issue involved in the formal ethno-political structures is the various informal networks hindering the positive development of the Bosnian statehood. Donais and Pickel indicate that the three main ethnic power blocks in Bosnia-Herzegovina are operating with state-owned enterprises, the financial system, para-militarised veterans' groups, and powerful elements within Bosnia's underground economy since the beginning of the Yugoslavian breakup in the late 1980s. Thus, the ethnic cleansing on the Serbian part was

an economic as well as a political practice strengthening the bonds between political elites and criminal elements. As a result, "political parties are now inseparable from criminal organizations" (Donais, Pickel 2002:16). These networks profited from the development aid and resources from the international community. They still profit from the slow development of the country due to the persisting dominance of ethno-nationalism, the weakness of the justice system and the lack of "rule of law". Hence, they are striving to maintain the status quo (Dzihic 2009:341f). Therefore, a clear correlation is evident between the strength of the informal networks and the weakness of the Bosnian statehood (cf. Dzihic 2009:343). Other forms of corruption and enrichment are also present in the Bosnian state, and politicians are often accused of being involved in corruptive actions in order to enrich themselves. Kemal Kurspahic, however, points out that the politicians do not bear any moral or juridical consequences of their criminal acts due to the passivity of the Bosnian community (Dzihic 2009:350).

According to Transparency International, Bosnia-Herzegovina is ranked 72^{nd} of 176 countries in the world in terms of corruption, in comparison to Croatia 62^{nd}, Austria 25^{th}, and the USA 19^{th} (Transparency International 2013a). Due to the complex legal framework of the country, there is a lack of transparency and accountability, meaning that it is vulnerable to corruption. The absence of enforcement of the law has a negative impact on institutions and citizens, leading to an outweighing of corruption gains. Moreover, statistics show that few cases of corruption result in criminal convictions and even fewer end in final verdicts. Transparency International indicates that a crucial first step to reduce corruption is political will and that the case of the Bosnian country shows the opposite (Transparency International 2013b).

4.4.6 Bosnia-Herzegovina's Path to EU Integration

Bosnia-Herzegovina's current status in the Europeanisation process represents a slow development or rather a standstill due to the discrepancies on reform agreement and implementation (DelBiH 2013c). The Annual Progress Report by the European Commission revealed that in the first half-year of 2009, only 9% of the planned law reforms were implemented and most of them were not directly involved in the Europeanisation process. Furthermore, the promises of the politicians, for instance concerning reform implementation and strengthening of the institutions, are being neglected (Dzihic 2009:366, 373). Some of the failed reforms are the laws on subvention and human rights. This last-mentioned

reform has become the focus of international attention through the "Sejdic-Finci case" (DelBiH 2013c), involving discrimination of minority groups. According to the present Bosnian law, minority or ethnic groups not belonging to one of the three biggest ethnic groups are not permitted to be candidates for the House of People or for the mandate of the Minister President on the state level (cf. Sorensen 2012). Roma, Jews or members of other minorities may seek candidacy only if they specify in the application that they are an applicant from one of the three main ethnic groups. The Bosnian Jew Jakob Finci and the Bosnian Rom Dervo Sejdic filed a lawsuit to the European Court of Justice for Human Rights in Strasbourg in December 2009 and won the case (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2013).

The approximation of the EU judiciary standards is in general conducted through an integration program and has to be agreed between both parties. This integration program should present the commitments harmonising with the EU laws on every government level. The formation of such an integration program for Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet been attainable (DelBiH 2013c). The main obstacle to the country's development is the constitutional structure, consisting of a government at the state level, two entities, Brcko District and 10 cantons in the Federation. All these components of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state have legislative power and budget claims. Thereby, the budget agenda in the country's state-level government is always drawn out and edgily discussed regarding each segment's percentage from it (cf. Sorensen 2012). The country, with its many government levels and often oversised bureaucracy, has an enormously expensive administration consuming large amounts of the state budget (cf. Dzihic 2009:362). Furthermore, the EU aims to initiate an internal solution in the country for the previous failures on a constitutional reform (cf. Sorensen 2012).

The previous path towards the EU was not without obstacles. As an example, several leading Bosnian politicians can be mentioned who have aggravated this path. The populist leader of the Serb SNSD and Prime Minister of the RS, Milorad Dodik, provided obvious signals for unclear, vague and complex relations between Bosnia and the EU. At a meeting with the EU delegation chief, Peter Sorensen, Dodik pointed out that the RS has its own measures and that conditions for cooperation with the EU and therefore collaboration with the RS would only be possible if the solutions to the Bosnian problem do not emerge via the international community. Bedrudin Brljavac indicates that this is an unacceptable and paradoxical situation, since the EU, as a superior actor, sets the standards. Furthermore, a number of local politicians from each ethnic group interpret the respective EU standards

and criteria according to their own particularistic ideological interests. Because of the minor effects of the recent Europeanisation process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which the Bosnian politicians are responsible for, the credibility of the European mission in the country is being criticised, especially on the part of the Bosnian politicians themselves (Brljavac 2011). Most attempts at the implementation of EU standards in Bosnia-Herzegovina have failed; exceptions are the police and visa reform, which have been implemented but again not without dead ends as they were EU impositions. The populist and particularistic politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina also imply emotionally inciting politics, which in turn increase the polarisation and the inter-ethnic conflicts in the country. The majority of the political elite do not pursues the interests of the general population but their own, under which the Bosnian population has to suffer (cf. Brljavac 2011). As a result, the EU integration agenda is ignored. In addition, it can be noted that the Europeanisation process so far has not been able to reduce the ethno-nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As is evident in practice, the EU agenda is not relevant in most of the political discussions amongst the Bosnian politicians, even though they now and then claim its relevance. Accordingly, it has become evident that the offer based on the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 - that the states in the Western Balkans can perceive an EU integration process and thus are potential candidates for the EU membership - is no sufficient tool for Bosnia's development, something that the current EU Delegation chief for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Peter Sorensen, claimed to be the most powerful tool for this purpose.

Besides the need for a constitutional change, the main challenging problem for the country is its transformation from its current status as a protectorate due to the Bonn powers to a sustainable sovereign state guided by the EU integration process. On the one hand, the mandate of the HR is needed for a stable democratisation and development process; on the other hand the activity and power of the HR continue to dominate the country's politics. Thus, the development of self-government, which is a precondition to become an EU candidate state, is blocked. Because of the relatively violated and unstable situation in the country, the PIC decided to prolong the mandate of the HR. Subsequently, the plan of the international community was to reinforce the office of the EUSR for Bosnia-Herzegovina, guaranteeing the smooth transition from the "caretaker role" of the international community to the "supporter role" of the EU for future reforms with the principle of ownership. The EUSR for Bosnia-Herzegovina and his office are assigned to politically assist the EU guidelines in the country. This involves supporting the already initiated SAP with regards to a stable, viable, peaceful, multiethnic and united Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the EUSR for Bosnia-Herzegovina as the overall coordinator of the EU's activities in the coun-

try would work alongside the Commission's delegation in Sarajevo (Blockmans 2007:328ff).

The future prospect for Bosnia-Herzegovina's EU integration is a major hope for the political, economic and social development of the country. Moreover, the Bosnian political elite, with the exception of Milorad Dodik's recent political position, see the country's future in the EU. This path, as already evident, is a long process involving efforts by the EU and especially by the integration-willing country itself. Furthermore, the EU perceives its eastward expansion as a continuing peace project. The eastern integration into the European sphere should incorporate a stable and peaceful region which is in the interest of the Union. However, the efforts of the potential EU member country are determining. Vedran Dzihic discusses a rash of reasons hindering a rapid Bosnian path into the EU, namely issues of the political culture or mentality conditions, the effects of the continuing ethno-nationalistic thinking and acting, and the associated problems in terms of inadequate statehood and the outcomes of the war (Dzihic 2009:359f, 362; Pridham 2002:224).

Although the EU is not understood in its exact functioning and meaning by most people in the country, there is a strong consensus that the EU path is the solution to the major social and economic questions of the post-Dayton Bosnia. Thus, Europe - that is membership of the EU - has become a central topic of the country's social development. The Europeanisation process involves on the one hand a technical-formal side consisting of the implementation of the SAP, and on the other hand a substantial side, consisting of an "ad hoc democratisation" of the country. The political elites have so far not been able to implement self-supporting reform because of their strong roots in exclusive ethnic and particularistic thinking. Consequently, the Europeanisation process in the country as a whole has not been able to effect a substantial transformation of ethno-nationalism and thus a strengthening of the entire Bosnian statehood (Dzihic 2009:360,363). Nonetheless, the internal political crises are not the only cause of the country's standstill in the Europeanisation process. In fact, the EU's passivity and the backwardness of its own expansion strategy since the Thessaloniki summit are to be related with the failures of the country (ibid.:363). In this context, Sofia Sebastian stresses that the EU has failed in its exercise of power to strengthen the incentives of an EU membership for the Bosnian country (Sebastian 2009:344).

The following figure shows the impacts of the Europeanisation process on the domestic structural changes of a country:



Figure 5: Impacts of the Europeanisation Process on Domestic Structural Change (Risse, Cowles, Coporaso 2001:6)

However, many of the EU's non-negotiable commitments are rarely in accordance with the domestic laws and regulations (Domm 2011:58). Even though the demands from the EU can have a strong and positive influence on the democratisation and development of the country, success is also based on factors such as the determination of the local government, public support for EU accession, as well as mutual political support from Brussels (Pridham 2002:224). Brljavac points out that, in the context of the EU's influence on the applying country, it is of great relevance that stable methods are developed with respect to the dissemination of rules and commitments of the EU as an overarching concept, in order to avoid the reluctance of the applicant state (Brljavac 2011). Christopher Hill has analysed the international role of the EU, noting that there is a "capability-expectations gap" between what the EU does in theory and what is actually done in practice. Furthermore, the reasons for the gap can be related to three factors, namely integration capability, availability of resources and EU instruments (Hill 1993:315). Toje indicates that the EU, as a superior stakeholder, needs to bring targeted services in order to achieve the desired results (Toje 2008:124).

In accordance with the statement of the EU delegation chief for Bosnia and Herzegovina - that the EU integration process is the greatest tool for the development of Bosnia towards the EU (cf. The Institute of International and European Affairs 2012) - the EU conditionality can be noted as a tool for domestic reforms (cf. Domm 2007:3). This condi-

tionality, which is based on the Copenhagen Criteria, must be met in order for the nominee or potential candidate country to join the EU. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier indicate that the dominant logic of the EU's conditionality involves a negotiation strategy, whereas the EU produces an external incentive through the conditionality, and due to the fulfillment of the conditions the applying country enjoys its reward, namely membership or an approximation of it (Schimmelfenning, Sedelmeier 2004:670). The EU conditionality includes the following points: 1) the Copenhagen criteria, provided for all candidates and potential candidates; 2) the Regional Approach of 1997 and the SAP of 1999; 3) the country-specific conditions must be met before the negotiation phase of the SAA, its associated framework and the CARDS; 4) conditions related to individual projects and granting of development aid, as well as grants and loans; 5) conditions that have arisen from peace treaties and political agreements (for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the DPA etc. (Anastasakis, Bechev 2003:8). However, the EU conditionality does not inevitably mean that the local government of the applying country implements the required EU agenda (cf. Sebastian 2009:344).

As indicated above, the EU as a stakeholder has to apply a more stimulating strategy for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to exert more influence on the country's political elite and thereby enable it to achieve success in its Europeanisation process. This failure of the EU to achieve such progress is being frequently criticised by scientists, for instance by Sofia Sebastian. She criticises the failure of the EU to steer its power and the incentives of the EU conditionality concerning the constitutional reform (Sebastian 2009:344). In this context, Rory Domm recommends that the EU should keep its guidelines to Bosnia-Herzegovina coherently and politely (Domm 2011:64). In addition, Anastasakis and Bechev argue that the criteria and benefits of the EU conditionality have to be proclaimed, not only to the political elite, but rather for the Bosnian citizens, in order to achieve a driving force for the reform implementation (Anastaskis, Bechec 2003:5). Dzihic points out that, because of the false expectations and perceptions of the Europeanisation process due to deficient information, the majority of the Bosnian citizens are disappointed with the outcomes of the EU integration process so far (Dzihic 2009:368). Moreover, if the EU guidelines are presented more clearly, the politicians will not be able to manipulate them. Brljavac also claims that the strategies for the Bosnian politicians need to be more attractive (Brljavac 2011). From today's view, the Bosniaks want to join the EU with a strongly held state-level government; the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, on the other side, want to join the EU as a weak central state and strong entities.

The EU's financial development aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina has not proved to be a sufficiently motivating influence for the Bosnian political elite to implement the required measures. Between 2007 and 2011, the European Commission has provided 440 million euro through the "Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance" (IPA) to support the Bosnian state. However, due to the slow reform process, the EU has in some cases cut off its financial support (Brljavac 2011). Furthermore, the EUSR has so far not been able to influence the nationalism in the country, since its role, according to Brljavic, has been unclear and ambivalent. However, the operation of the EUSR in forcing the police reform led to a dissolving of the former standstill. Criticism of this operation of the EUSR implies that it was a forced Europeanisation reform (ibid.). In this regard, the former HR Wolfgang Petritsch stated that the country was treated as an object (Petritsch 2009a:4). Another problem is that the EU Member States are taking no consistent position on the necessary constitutional reforms of the country. Moreover, the needed constitutional reform was conceived as an informal conditionality. Also the advantages or disadvantages for the Bosnian politicians are not clearly identified (Brljavac 2011).

With regard to the above-mentioned analysis, the following question is posed: where does the boundary go between the imposed EU operation and Bosnia-Herzegovinian ownership? According to an opinion poll by the World Value Survey in 2001, most of the Bosnian respondents indicated that the international community - in this example the UN - should have the whole or a part of the role in the country's decision making (World Value Survey 2001a). In order words, the external impacts - forced or unforced - in order for the country to progress its development process, is perceived as needed by the Bosnian citizens. The previous attempt to apply incentives through the biggest tool of the EU, namely the EU conditionality, has proved to be insufficient for reform implementation and for the ethno-nationalistic structures (cf. Bieber 2013:9). Furthermore, this perception of the EU implies a simplified view of the complicated political and social situation of the country. The happy medium would be that the EU applies a new strategy in order to be a driving and motivating force - without, however, applying direct enforcement, in order to foster the principle of ownership. Vedran Dzihic and Angela Wieser point out that "the politics of EU conditionality can only bring about changes in a target state when the elites seek the reward of accession and when all key political parties do not consider the EU conditions a threat to their vital interests" (Dzihic, Wieser 2013:36).

5 Present Political Situation

The following chapter aims to review and outline the fundamental problems in the present political situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and analyse the main political events since 2010, which exemplify the outcomes of ethno-politics and which have led to the standstill in the political development and cooperation, especially regarding the EU integration process.

5.1 Briefing of the Fundamental Political Problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The DPA is based on the ethnic principle and thus it implies a prolonging of the war footing. Furthermore, the Bosnian political and administrative system relies on ethnic structures. The political posts are equally divided between the three ethnic groups, for instance the tripartite presidency. The territory of the country is divided into two entities, constituting for the most part the war results. While the population in the RS are mostly Serbs, most cantons in the Federation have a majority of either Bosniaks or Croats. Nevertheless, each entity has its own constitution, parliament, government and ministries, and thus executive power to decide on a whole range of political matters for its own region. The state-level institutions have only a certain range of responsibilities, such as foreign affairs, foreign trade, human rights and also defence and security. As a result of the overblown political system, the country has 13 prime ministers, 145 ministers, 14 governments etc. Furthermore, the Federation and the RS are divided into 79 and 62 municipalities, respectively (cf. Dzihic 2009:405; Lubic 2010:49ff). The following tables show the political and administrative system of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the state and entity level:

Political and Administrative System at the State Level

Tripartite Presidency (Mandated: 4 years, rotation every eight months; elected through direct votes)	**1 Chairman, 2 Members**	
Legislative Branch **(Parliamentary Assembly)**	**House of Representatives** 42 Delegates (14 from the RS; 28 from the Federation) 1 Chairman, 1^{st} Deputy, 2^{nd} Deputy	**House of Peoples** 15 Delegates (5 Bosniaks, 5 Croats, 5 Serbs); 1 Chairman, 1^{st} Deputy, 2^{nd} Deputy
Executive Branch **(Council of Ministers)**	**Chairman**(Prime Minister); 1^{st} Deputy Prime Minister, 2^{nd} Deputy Prime Minister	**9 Ministries** Foreign Affairs; Security; Foreign Trade and Economic Relations; Finance and Treasury; Transport and Communication; Civil Affairs; Human Rights and Refugees; Justice; Defence (Mandated: four years, no rotation)
Judicial Branch	**Constitutional Court** 9 Judges (3 International Judges appointed by the EU Court of Human Rights, 2 Croatian Judges, 2 Serbian Judges, 2 Bosniak Judges)	**Court and Prosecution Council** (International and National Judges and Prosecutors)

Table 3: Political and Administrative System at the State Level (UNDP 2009)

Political and Administrative System at the Entity Level

	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	**Republika Srpska**
Presidency	1 President, 2 Vice Presidents	1 President, 2 Vice Presidents
Parliament	House of Representatives (98 Members, 1 Chairman, 2 Deputies)	Council of Peoples (28 Members: 8 Bosniaks, 8 Croats, 8 Serbs and 4 others, 1 Chairman, 3 Deputies)
	House of Peoples (58 Members: 17 Bosniaks, 17 Croats, 17 Serbs and 7 others; 1 Chairman and 2 Deputies)	National Assembly (83 Members - proportional by party); 1 Chairman and 2 Deputies
Government	**1 Prime Minister**, 1 Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, 1 Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Sports and 14 other ministries	**1 Prime Minister** 16 Ministries
Cantons	10 Cantons, 10 Prime Ministers, 95 Ministers	

Table 4: Political and Administrative System at the Entity Level (UNDP 2009)

District Brcko also has its own parliament, government and departments. This oversised political and administrative structure of the country devours almost two thirds of the national budget and a constitutional reform is urgently needed (Petritsch 2009b:226f). Each ethno-nationalistic party as well as the multiethnic parties have different interests concerning the constitutional form and therefore a reform has to date not been achievable. Only a few regulations have been implemented due to the executive power of the HR. The majority of Bosnian Serbs strive for the status quo, which means a weak central state and strong entities, most Bosnian Croats aim to establish a third Croatian entity, while Bosniaks and the multiethnic population mainly strive for a strong central state and weak entities or else the abolishment of the entities.

Due to the fact that the political system relies on the ethnic principle of the constitutive peoples, all other ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina are being discriminated against because political posts are given only to people declaring themselves to be either Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs. The marginalised people include minorities, children of "mixed marriages" or people who declare themselves simply as "Bosnians". Furthermore, ethno-nationalism constitutes a major problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina because on the one hand, the interests and prospects of each ethnic group, concerning not only the statehood and the political system but almost every political matter, are diametrically diverse and thus decision-making and the implementation processes become inefficient and sometimes impossible due to the veto rights of each party; and on the other hand, ethno-nationalism implies a means of power and coverage of the interests of the ethno-national political leadership. Vedran Dzihic calls it the "exclusion principle" and sees it as a successful tool in order to deepen the differences with ethno-national arguments and thus ensure the interests of the political elite. As a result, the Bosnian statehood and the country's development are being blocked. Ethno-nationalism is, in other words, the biggest threat to democracy. Bosnia-Herzegovina is still facing low standards of living and high poverty and unemployment rates today (cf. Dzihic 2009:390ff, 405f).

The ethno-politics are still being supported by a large proportion of the Bosnian population today, who identify themselves exclusively in ethnic terms. The strongest parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina are the Serbian SNSD, SDS, DNS and PDP; the Croatian HDZ BiH and HDZ 1990; the Bosniak SDA and "Savez za bolju buducnost BiH" (SBB BiH) (Eng. Union for a Better Future of BiH), and the multiethnic parties SDP and SBiH. Furthermore, the politics are being reduced to ethno-politics, meaning that crucial political matters such as economics and social issues are being eclipsed. In other words, the ethno-

nationalistic parties scale their political responsibility down to mainly the protection of the national interests from the (constructed) threats of the other ethnic groups (cf. Dzihic 2009:406).

Another problematic issue in Bosnian society is that of identity:

> "Bosnia and Herzegovina [...] seems to be 'a country that nobody wants', meaning that it is rejected by its own citizens. [...] [In Bosnia and Herzegovina] the citizens do not identify with the state. There is a 'national' concept of identification and an 'ethnic' one, but there is no 'civic' concept of the state. Therefore, if we want to be successful in assisting the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if we want to strengthen it, we have to broaden the concept of 'belonging' and of a citizen's own 'identity'. One cannot nor should not get rid of the 'ethnic' paradigm. It needs to remain part of the complex identity of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina - but not only of the part of it. I have said it time and again: it has to be possible that a patriotic Serb - or Croat for that matter - is at the same time a loyal citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And for the Bosniacs it is important to realize that their state is not an exclusively Bosniac state" (Petritsch 2009b:198).

Furthermore, the international community plays a crucial role in Bosnia's development process and on its path towards EU integration as well. However, the international community is being criticised for its inconsequent and double-minded strategy, which has contributed to the failure of the country's development process. As an example, Petritsch states that the transfer of the police mission from the UN International Police Task Force to the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) was not the optimal decision. The European Commission is responsible for the institutional part whereas the European Council answers to the "political" part, such as crisis management. These divided responsibilities lead to drawn-out discussions and compromises on necessities (Petritsch 2009b:171). A further example regarding the inconsistent role of the international community involves its split positions on the constitutional reform.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is still under international administration, with the HR on the top having executive power in the form of the Bonn powers. Ethno-politics in Bosnia have a negative impact on democracy and on the development of the country, which is the reason why the HR is still needed. The goal of the international community is the transformation of the country's current status as a protectorate to a sustainable sovereign state guided by the EUSR.

5.2 Main Political Events since 2010

In the presidential election in October 2010, the Bosnian-Croatian member Zeljko Komsic, the Bosniak member Bakir Izetbegovic and the Bosnian-Serbian member Nebojsa Radmanovic were elected to the state presidency (CNN 2010). Zeljko Komsic from the multiethnic party SDP received more votes than his Croatian ethno-nationalistic competitors from HDZ BiH and HDZ 1990.

In the parliamentary election at the state level, the multiethnic SDP (17.33%), the Serbian SNSD (16.92%), the Bosniak SDA (13.06%), the Serbian SDS (8.39%), the multiethnic SBB BiH (7.95%) and the Croatian HDZ BiH (6.97%) received the most votes (Centralna izborna komisija Bosne i Hercegovine 2010). These election results as well as the associated election campaign reveal that ethnic rivalry is still strongly present in the country (cf. Dzihic, Wieser 2013:29). During the campaign, Dodik denied that the massacre in Srebrenica constituted genocide and supported the secession of the RS. He also said that the country "was being kept alive by foreigners" and that "a functioning Bosnia was a 'mirage'" (Woehrel 2012:4). Most Bosniaks and many Croats supported a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, Croatian nationalists supported a third independent Croatian entity and cooperated with Serbian nationalists, striving for the same goal of strengthening the entity level.

In the RS, Dodik's party SNSD received the most votes and he was able to continue in his post as Minister President of the RS. In the Federation, the SDP received the most votes and formed a coalition in February 2011 which includes small Croatian parties but not the HDZ BiH or the HDZ 1990. This government, which was approved by the parliament of the Federation in March 2011, was claimed by the two HDZ parties to be formed illegally. The Central Election Commission of the country confirmed the claim of the two parties, but the HR annulled this decision and allowed the new government to continue working. The two Croatian parties do not recognise the new government because they claim that it does not represent Croatian interests since they have received the most Croatian votes and are not represented in the new government. Steven Woehrel notes that these two parties founded a "Croat National Assembly" of municipalities and cantons with a Croatian majority. Furthermore, this organisation, which is being denied by the Croats, could become a parallel government which in turn would weaken the country's cohesion (Woehrel 2012:4). Moreover, Woehrel correlates these political events and developments with the fundamental problems of the Federation's and the country's political system:

> "Infighting between Bosniak and Croat leaders and the complicated division of powers and bureaucratic overlap between the Federation government and the 10 canton governments within the Federation has created a dysfunctional situation that has hindered the Federation's economic development and threatens the fiscal collapse of Bosnia as a whole. A report by the International Crisis Group suggests that constitutional reform at the Federation level would not only improve the dire situation in the Federation itself, but provide momentum for reform at the central government level" (Woehrel 2012:4).

In an opinion poll by the NDI shortly before the elections in 2010, 87% of the respondents said that the country was moving in the wrong direction and only 12% of the respondents said that their lives had improved in the past four years (Woehrel 2012:5). The election results of 2010, however, showed that the ethno-national parties were returned to power. As Woehrel points out, this paradox may be viewed as the nature of the post-Dayton Bosnia and its election laws, favouring ethnically based politics. This contradiction may also be correlated with the reflexive distrust of the other ethnic groups, which is a long-lasting outcome of the war (ibid.:5).

Nevertheless, it was not until February that the new government was formed. In other words, it took 16 months for the winning parties of the election in 2010 to create a government. Vjekoslav Bevanda was elected as the new chairman of the Council of Ministers. On the 31^{st} of May 2012, the budget was completed and the new government was supposed to start working the following day. However, some organisational issues emerged and finally, in November 2012, the new government was able to begin the concrete work (Gadzo 2012; Woehrel 2012:3). These happenings around the formation and organisation of the new government are a further example of the problematic outcomes of ethno-politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 2012 did not prove to be the turning year for Bosnia-Herzegovina - as the current HR Valentin Inzko and the international community believed. At the end of 2012, Inzko stated in an interview with Sanela Prasovic Gadzo that the international community was expecting that 2013 would be the turning year for the country, involving significant changes for the country in order to achieve the status of a "candidate" for membership of the EU (Gradzo 2012). However, 2013 has also not proved to be the turning year. Bosnia-Herzegovina's neighbouring countries have already received the status of "candidate", Serbia as well as Montenegro, and Croatia has been member of the EU since the 1^{st} of July 2013.

Milorad Dodik has continued to block efforts to make Bosnia's central government more effective. His ethno-politics continued to threaten the secession of the RS, not only verbally, but also with two concrete initiatives in the parliament: namely to abolish two state-level institutions, the defence and the court. In 2011, Dodik wanted to conduct a referendum in the RS and the international community was strongly against this decision. Instead of applying the Bonn powers, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the European Union, Catherine Ashton, was sent to Banja Luka to meet Dodik and subsequently, it was possible to prevent the referendum (Gradzo 2012; Woehrel 2012:7).

On the 23^{rd} of May 2012, the HR announced that the supervisor of District Brcko would suspend his functions on the 31^{st} of August of the same year. Therewith, local leaders took over full responsibility for the management of District's affairs. The international community, however, continues to support the district. The supervisor underscored that "the International Community recognises that the people of the District continue to face many challenges - including poverty, unemployment, corruption, and many others - but that it also believes that the District's institutions now have the capacity to address these challenges on their own" (OHR 2012). This news is major evidence for Bosnian citizens of what can be achieved in the country. In District Brcko, multiethnic institutions exist and the cooperation between all ethnic groups has proved to be efficient. Furthermore, District Brcko has become a role model for the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs have found common interests, namely to "govern honestly, transparently, and in the interest of the whole community" (OHR 2012) and also to govern independently and solve problems on their own.

The international community has urged the Bosnian politicians to conduct a constitutional reform in order to make Bosnia's state-level government institutions more effective and thus for the country to become "a better candidate for eventual NATO and EU membership" (Woehrel 2012). In April 2010, Bosnia was permitted and invited by the NATO foreign ministers to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program, which is the prestage of NATO membership. However, NATO required that the defence of the Bosnian country must be the property of the state-level government - something which Dodik continues to reject (ibid.). The EU has repeatedly set deadlines for Bosnia-Herzegovina to conduct a constitutional reform that would end the discrimination against minorities. The latest deadline was the 11^{th} of April 2013. The Bosnian politicians have, however, not been able to agree on this issue. This failure of the Bosnian politicians to adopt this human right

has led to a deadlock in the country's EU integration process (Der Standard 2013a). This reform, which has attracted international attention through the Sejdic-Finci case, is at the same time the next step for the country to approximate EU membership. Furthermore, the SAA with the EU will not come into force and negotiations for membership of the EU continue to be refused. This failure of the Bosnian politicians has been manifoldly criticised due to their refusal to adopt a legal decision of the European Human Rights Court and also to accept the associated consequence, namely the curtailing of EU financial aid (cf. FAZ 2013). After Catherine Ashton's visit in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 2013, she said that she was disappointed by the lack of progress in the country's politics. She also said that "it is important to look beyond domestic divisions, beyond political rivalries and vested interests [...] otherwise, this country will be left behind by other countries in the region" (Balkan Insight 2013). Nevertheless, the international community, including the EU, still bears responsibility for overcoming the undemocratic and discriminating Bosnian constitution since it co-designed the DPA (cf. FAZ 2013).

Dzihic and Wieser refer to the general political deadlock of recent years not only as a major obstacle for European reforms, but moreover as constituting structural defects in the country's democracy. These defects are to be correlated with the illiberal character of the Dayton state structure. Moreover, "the Dayton Peace Agreement can be seen as an example of a peace agreement that formally ended the war, but did not address the underpinning conflict. We still face continuing structural violence and a negative peace understood merely as an absence of hostilities" (Dzihic, Wieser 2013:36f).

In June 2013, the so-called "baby revolution" occurred as an outcome of the demand for a new law to be passed in order for newborns to get national identity numbers, which are needed to obtain passports and other documents. Initially, a group of parents, pushing strollers in front of the parliament in Sarajevo, protested; eventually thousands of people from the whole country, including those who were not directly affected, participated in the protests. The old law lapsed in February 2013 and the Bosnian politicians could not agree on a realignment. The Serbian politicians wanted their own identity numbers for the Bosnian citizens living in the RS; the politicians from the Federation, however, wanted a unified system of identity numbers, as has been the case so far. As a result of the intervention by the HR, a temporary law could be applied which expires in December 2013. The Bosnian citizens are, however, not satisfied; they want a long-term solution. One demonstrator, Emir Hodzic, pointed out that the baby revolution is the beginning of a break-up. Some people even call it a "Bosnian spring". Hodzic stressed that this case

shows that the Bosnian population is waking up and that they are angry at the politicians and their politics of fear (Der Standard 2013b).

The structure of the Bosnian state officials reflects the national population structure of the three constitutive people of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the census of 1991. The international community wanted to delay a post-war census until the process of the returning of displaced persons, especially in the territory of the RS, was perceived as completed. An earlier census was seen as an affirmation of the ethnic cleansing (Petritsch 2009b:222f). The first post-war census was conducted between the 1^{st} and the 15^{th} of October 2013. Ethno-nationalistic parties, associations, clubs but also churches and mosques wanted to convince every member of the same ethnic group to specify their nationality as either Bosniak, Croat or Serb. People declaring themselves simply as "Bosnians" without an ethnic belonging would decrease the power of the ethno-nationalists: if the other ethnic groups contain more members than one's own, they then constitute a bigger threat and are superior in terms of quantity. Bosniak nationalists in particular feared that people would not declare themselves as "Bosniaks" but rather as "Muslims" or "Bosnians", because most Bosniaks identify themselves as "Bosnians". It is not foreseen that the present quota regulation should be changed through the new census; however, if the gap is large between these two censuses, the old quota will probably not be maintained. Besides the question of nationality or ethnic belonging, questions about religion and language were also asked (Der Standard 2013c). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the language and religion of a person in most cases reveal the person's ethnic belonging. The following graphs refer to an opinion poll conducted by the World Value Survey and confirm these claims:



Figure 6: What Language do you Speak at Home? (World Value Survey 2001c)



Figure 7: Which of the following Best Describes you? (World Value Survey 2001d)

Thus, most Bosnian Muslims say that they speak Bosnian and that they are Bosniaks, the majority of Catholics in Bosnia say that they speak Croatian and are Croats, and most Orthodox in Bosnia say that they speak Serbian and that they are Serbs. Nevertheless, the performance of the census in October 2013 has been criticised because of the lack of professionalism and therefore the results might be questionable. The main problem is that there is no data protection because no rooms in which to securely store the questionnaires were rented and the census collectors had to bring the data papers home. A further problem is that one family member can answer for the other family members (Der Standard 2013d). The results are expected in January 2014 (Der Standard 2013c).

On the 1^{st} and 10^{th} of October 2013, meetings in Brussels involving representatives of the European Commission and institutional and political Bosnian leaders took place with the intention of solving pressing issues, such as the Sejdic-Finci case and the management of the SAA, in order to overcome the political deadlock in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the country to proceed in the Europeanisation process. The European Commission made clear that the consequences of a failure to find a solution would result in sanctions of the funding (European Commission 2013a). On the 1^{st} of October, Milorad Dodik commented on this, saying that the IPA funds are not needed if they are to be used for the facilitation and establishment of state-level institutions and that the central state is not essential for the RS because it does not deliver results (Oslobodjenje 2013a). Nevertheless, these meetings did not bring any final results on the issues of either the Sejdic-Finci case or the adaptation of the SAA. In the report from the 10^{th} of October, the European Commission made clear that it would conduct official consultations with the country with the intention of finding a solution for the SAA adaptation. It also "remains committed to continue facilitating the efforts of the political leaders to find a solution to the Sejdic/Finci issue, and believes that a sustainable agreement can be reached, provided there is sufficient political will and willingness to compromise among all stakeholders" (Europen Commission 2013b). Subsequently, the European Commission could merely state any progress of Bosnia-Herzegovina in meeting the EU accession criteria in the latest progress report (16.10.2013).

6 Prospects for the Political Development

6.1 The Issue of Ethno-Nationalism

The first eleven years since Dayton are being perceived as successful years for Bosnia-Herzegovina on its path towards the state of peace and transformation towards a market economy and also in reaching the first steps towards a democratic and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, since 2006, the country has suffered from stagnation: no big projects have been conducted, no institutions have been established and no crucial laws have been passed (cf. Der Standard 2013e). Ethno-nationalism and ethno-politics are still the dominating power techniques and forms of government of the nationalist elite today (cf. Dzihic 2009:22). According to the present HR, Valentin Inzko, the "baby revolution" has been the straw that broke the camel's back, meaning that the people who demonstrated have put their fears aside and have shown in a democratic way that they have had enough of the stagnation (cf. Der Standard 2013e; OHR 2013a). The political elite, however, has responded with little interest in either the protests or the message of the people which is that there has been enough obstruction and posturing and that politics cannot continue as it has until now (OHR 2013a).

Valentin Inzko stresses that the negative developments of the country are clearly the results of an "unwillingness, or an inability on the part of the political establishment to change its mindset and its approach to politics" (OHR 2013b). Also the NDI confirms that the dissatisfaction among the Bosnian citizens is palpable concerning the government's performance when dealing with the country's problems (NDI 2010:20). Furthermore, the only given priority of the political elite is power and also "there is no sense for compromise, for

dialogue, or for tolerance, which were the founding policies of the European Union" (OHR 2013b). The present HR has compared the Bosnian case with the Serbian and Kosovarian question, stating that the politicians in Serbia and Kosovo have found compromises and solutions to an issue which is much harder to solve than the Bosnian case. The current issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina such as the Sejdic-Finci case, the City Council question in Mostar and the ownership of military property are in other words much easier to overcome than the situation between Serbia and Kosovo which is however being successfully resolved. Inzko asserts that the Bosnian leaders have resolutely demonstrated that they do not want to overcome these challenges: "Failure has not happened by accident. It has happened by design" (ibid.).

Moreover, Bosnian citizens want to join the EU but their political leaders are ambivalent and merely pay lip-service. In this sense, the views of the people and the views of their political leadership deviate. Valentin Inzko points out that: "Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot integrate into the EU if mainstream politicians inside the country are seeking to drive it towards disintegration" (cf. OHR 2013b). Inzko sees no future developments towards EU integration with the current ethno-politics. The only solution is a radical change of the political leadership. He compares the current ethno-politics with the patterns in the war era, but today they are carried out by other means. "It is a prosecution of the war by political and psychological means" (OHR 2013a - own translation into Eng).

The views and interests of the Bosnian ethno-nationalistic political elites are diametrically diverse and each ethno-nationalistic political party is claiming that it defends the political interests of its own ethnic group. Bosniaks strive to re-establish a joint Bosnian statehood and therefore to eliminate the DPA and the two entities. From their point of view, the RS is a "genocidal" territorial form which needs to be abolished immediately. Hence, the Bosniak wish goes hand in hand with the EU's requirement to strengthen the state level. Similarly, the Bosniak aim to reform the DPA is aligned with the position of a number of European stakeholders such as the Venice Commission of the European Council, the European Parliament, the European Commission and also many European intellectuals (Dzihic 2009:372). Ethno-nationalistic Croats and Serbs do not have in sight a reformation of the DPA which would involve the strengthening of the state level because they fear Bosniak dominance. Therefore, Serbian politicians are interested in maintaining the status quo and Croatian politicians strive for establishing a third Croatian entity even though the present government in Croatia advocates the maintenance of the state-level Bosnia-Herzegovina. The following chart shows the attitudes of the Bosnian citizens ac-

cording to their ethnical belonging about the territorial arrangement in their country:



Figure 8: Attitude about Territorial Arrangement (NDI 2010:42)

The Serbian side, as well as the Croatian, argues that the country's integration into the EU is possible only if an equal representation of the three ethnic groups at the state level in the form of an ethnic consociational democracy is given (Dzihic 2009:373,18f). Nevertheless, the current form of a consociational democracy has not turned out to be an effective and functional form of government because the interests of each party are inconsistent with the interests of the other parties (cf. Marko 2007:208). Additionally, the reason why the Bosnian political elite cannot agree on compromises can be speculated. Wolfgang Petritsch has one explanation to this issue:

> "During the negotiations, we were confronted with one of the crucial political problems of the region: the lack of a culture of political compromise. Compromise is perceived negatively in the region - it is seen to mean giving in to the oppressor. I have noticed that politicians in the former Yugoslavia are still aiming for 'win-or-lose' scenarios. They would rather be defeated than compromise" (Petritsch 2009b:194).

In the course of the post-war era, the RS has found support from many Serbian politicians. However, an affiliation with Serbia is from today's point of view not realistic because Ser-

bia rejects an annexation (cf. Der Standard 2013f). A more likely scenario is that the RS declares itself as independent. This declaration would not be met with violence, but it would rather generate domestic and international outrage. Furthermore, the EU would reject to recognise the new para-state and would impose various sanctions (Parish 2010:27). The territory of the RS alone would not be able to join the EU because only states are permitted membership (Petritsch 2009b:321ff). Matthew Parish points out that a potential declaration of independence on the part of the RS, as well as a Croatian declaration of indpendence, would prolong the Bosnian impoverishment: "The political fractures such an event would cause (and the likely Croat pursuit of an equivalent course) keep Bosnia indefinitely impoverished. Investors are deterred, and domestic politics remains perpetually poisoned by inter-ethnic animosity such that voters fail to use their electoral powers to give politicians an incentive to promote economic reform" (Parish 2010:27f).

The president of the RS since 2010, Milorad Dodik, still threatens to hold a referendum as soon as the independence of the RS is put into question. The parliament of the RS strives for reviewing all powers which have been transferred to the state-level government. A resolution which was passed by the RS parliament in 2009 on this issue was, however, annulled by the HR (Woehrel 2012:7). Dodik criticises all politicians who want to reform the DPA, because the DPA is a legal guarantee for a strong RS. Therefore, reforms of the DPA, transformation of powers to the state-level government or any other modification that would imply a weakening of the RS autonomy is not realistic as long as Dodik remains in power. In the media, Dodik has frequently clarified that he has no interest in the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that he strives for the independence of the RS (cf. Dzihic 2009:19). Thus, disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two or more states is possible as long as Dodik and other ethno-nationalistic politicians remain in power (cf. Parish 2010:26). Parish indicates that the Croatian politicians in Bosnia are in general quiter about their goals, in comparison to Dodik's political performance, but their secessionist project is more advanced: "In areas of Croat Herzegovina the Croatian currency (the Kuna) is used, parallel administrations exist based upon the Croatian political model and border posts between Bosnia and Croatia are sparsely manned" (ibid.).

A further scenario is that the Bosnian political elite agree on a model for radical decentralisation of the state level into a range of ethnically homogenous federal regions. In this case, Croats and Serbs would gain their desired autonomous homogenous regions, but in exchange they would agree on formally preserving the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In such a case, the tensions between Bosniac politics might be resolved: multicultural Bosni-

acs would be relieved of competition with ethno-nationalistic Bosniacs because they would gain their own regions. This confederal system would probably be formed over decades - as in the case of the Swiss model (ibid.). However, as long as the international community maintains its vision of promoting an effective, functioning and united state level Bosnia-Herzegovina, this scenario is rather unlikely to occur. Nevertheless, this scenario would comprehend the most optimistic course for achieveing a form of stability in the country's political scene (ibid.).

Wolfgang Petritsch points out that ethno-nationalism can be reduced if people are cajoled into communication, because they will then realise that they have more in common than what separates them:

> "In a way, the people in Banja Luka who threw stones at those who participated in the ceremony marking the rebuilding of the Ferhadija mosque in May 2001 were driven by similar fears; they had been made to believe that the Serbs will lose their 'identity' if they allow this mosque to be rebuilt. Therefore, we need to cajole these people 'into communications'. Ethnic nationalists are successful because they succeed in stopping communication and telling their own exclusivist story over and over again. But once a Serb meets a Croat or Bosniac returnee and they start talking to each other again, they usually realize that they have much more in common than separates them. They all want a decent job and opportunities for their kids; they all dream of a happy family life; in short, they are not so different after all" (Solioz, Dizdarevic 2003:25-44; Petritsch 2009b:214).

Charles Boyd also stresses that a common denominator such as economics can abolish the ethnic principle (cf. Boyd 1998:52). Many ethno-nationalistic Croats and Serbs, however, reject these proposals due to what they believe to be the hidden desire of Bosniaks to achieve a centralised political system and to dominate in the country (cf. Dzihic 2009:315). Nevertheless, the economic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is devastating; 40% of the population are unemployed, the poverty rate is high, the standard of living is low and the majority of the Bosnian politicians have only their personal interests in mind or at best the national interests of their ethnic group (cf. OHR 2013a). The following two charts reveal that economic development and unemployment are the biggest problems for the Bosnian citizens and that the politicians talk too much about nationalism, their own interests and other issues:



Figure 9: Most important for Improving the Lives of Citizens (NDI 2010:10)



Figure 10: Biggest Problems Facing BiH today (NDI 2010:9)



Figure 11: Problems that BiH Politicians Talk too Much and too Little About (NDI 2010:11)

A form of socio-political maturity among the Bosnian citizens is needed in order for the population to react and demand "proper politics". The peaceful demonstrations along with the "baby revolution" in June 2013 were the first indications of maturity in the Bosnian population. Valentin Inzko commented on this event as follows:

> "As happens in any society, the people reach a point where they say enough. I am surprised this did not happen earlier, but now we are seeing citizens across the country expressing their frustration and dissatisfaction by taking to the streets. Their indignation has found a voice and they want politicians in this country to listen to them. They want them address their problems by taking the decisions that they are paid to make by the taxpayer" (OHR 2013a).

Wolfgang Petritsch also points out that change is possible through the awareness of citizens: "It now seems that only generational change and a resulting perceptional shift will help forge a consensus on democracy, ushering in a more realistic 'age of diminished expectations'" (Petritisch 2009b:265). Moreover, Inzko states that the Bosnian citizens have the power to decide by choosing their representatives and therefore to change the miserable situation in the country (Gadzo 2012).

In his book "Bosnien und Herzegovina fünf Jahre nach Dayton. Hat der Friede eine Chance?" (Eng.: "Bosnia and Herzegovina five years after Dayton. Does peace have a chance?"), Wolfgang Petritsch makes clear that when Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs perceive themselves first and foremost as citizens of their state and then as a part of their ethnic group, and when ethnic belonging is no longer a dominant and exclusive category in the country's politics, a paradigm shift will occur towards a modern European state (Petritsch 2001:196).

6.2 Constitutional Reform

A constitutional reform implies a reform of the DPA. As already asserted, the present Serbian and Croatian ethno-nationalistic politicians are not supporting this kind of reform. Joseph Marko affirms that the constitutional framework according to the DPA was an instrument to stop the war, but not to create a functioning state (Marko 2007:208). This model of democracy does not work, because the three ethnic groups have formed "an

ethnocratic power cartel based on negative consensus to block each other in the decision-making process" (ibid.). The current constitutional system is not only inefficient and non-functioning, it is also very costly. The entity and the cantonal levels alone swallow 65% of the state budget. Additionally, the state is still aid-dependent instead of investment-driven (Marko 2007:211). Finally, one can conclude that the Dayton constitution is the main barrier for Bosnia's development process. Joseph Marko states that "only a total revision or 'Dayton II' could help to resolve the problems of BiH as a 'weak' or even 'failing state' in the heart of Europe" (ibid.:212).

In this context, the international community, especially the OHR and the EU, have been manifoldly criticised for Bosnia's failure. Vedran Dzihic asserts this issue as follows:

> „Daraus ergibt sich auch der Umstand, dass man zu stark auf die alleinige internationale militärische und zivile Präsenz und den Glauben an einen gewissen Automatismus in der Entwicklung der bosnischen Gesellschaft gesetzt hat und so die interne politische Dynamik und die Stärke bzw. Persistenz des Ethnonationalismus unterschätzt hat. Vor dem Hintergrund einer solchen naiven Haltung könnte auch die Strategie vom Hohen Repräsentanten Paddy Ashdown interpretiert werden, der die ethnonationalen Parteien als Partner beim Aufbau der bosnischen Staatlichkeit bezeichnet hat, dabei scheinbar daran glaubend, dass das bloße Vorhandensein formaldemokratischer Institutionen und eines formalen staatlichen Rahmens ausreichen wird, um die lokalen politischen Akteure von den Vorzügen der Demokratie zu überzeugen. Auch der in der Amtszeit der Hohen Repräsentanten Christian Schwarz-Schilling dominante Glaube, dass die Dynamik des Europäisierungsprozesses allein zu mehr Kooperation und Zusammenarbeit auf der gesamtstaatlichen Ebene und zu einer Minimierung der Wirkung der ethnonationalen Politiken führen wird, erwies sich im Nachhinein als unrealistisch" (Dzihic 2009:354f).[4]

[4]Own translation into English: "This also results in the fact that it was strongly believed that the mere international military and civilian presence and also a certain automatism in the development of the Bosnian society would suffice. Furthermore, the internal political dynamics and the strength or the persistence of ethno-nationalism were underestimated. Against the background of such a naive stance, the strategy of the High Representative Paddy Ashdown could be interpreted: he denominated the ethno-national parties as partners in the Bosnian state building. Thereby, he apparently believed that the mere existence of formal democratic institutions and a formal state framework would suffice in order to convince the local political stakeholders of the advantages of democracy. Similarly, the dominant belief during the tenure of the High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling, involving that the dynamics of the mere Europeanisation process would lead to more cooperation and collaboration at the state level and also to a minimisation of the impact of the ethno-national politics, also turned out to be unrealistic in retrospect".

The international community has not been able to push back the ethno-nationalism and the ethno-politics in the country. Thus, the HR together with the international community is considering a new approach and strategy towards the Bosnian-Herzegovinian case. Inzko exposes some ideas for the yet informal new strategy of the international community:

> "When rethinking our strategy, we should consider a number of tools for pushing change more forcefully, while still maintaining the central role of the institutions of the European Union in the country. These might include some or all of the following:
>
> - Linking financial assistance policies more closely to political progress:
> - Confronting more directly political parties and actors who block or undermine reforms and who promote division.
> - Preventing a roll-back of previous actions by reaffirming the role of the OHR and EUFOR in maintaining the progress achieved in the post-Dayton period" (OHR 2013b).

Thus, the international community has to coordinate the development aid more adequately and also set better conditionality. Consideration has also been given to applying the Bonn powers more regularly (Der Standard 2013e). However, the international community has so far not set any new, formal strategies because it has preferred local processes. If the deadlock remains unresolved until spring 2014, which is the new deadline for resolving the Sejdic-Finci case (Der Standard 2013g), the international community will probably apply a new strategy. Another possible scenario is for the international community to await the general election in autumn 2014 and hope for a new government which would contain a bigger proportion of multicultural parties.

6.3 The Role of the Civil Society

The role of the civil society is probably the most essential factor for the political, economic and social development of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The concept of the civil society involves not only non-governmental organisations and various independent associations, clubs, groups etc., but also individuals. Furthermore, it is "an important part of every democratic society. Civil society generates local initiatives and is also functioning as 'watch dogs' which keep track of corruption and mismanagement" (Sida 2011). Civil society is also a tool for awareness-raising, which is crucial in the Bosnian context: when the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are aware of the real problematic and complex issues of the present

political situation and also of their role in this context, they will make a difference. In this contest, Wolfgang Petritsch emphasises the essential role of the civil society:

> "State-building in Bosnia will ultimately fail unless a much leaner and more efficient system of governance is established. This, however, cannot be imposed from above - or indeed outside. What is needed is a civil society-inspired grass roots-movements, a broad domestic coalition of the likeminded - the stakeholders of Bosnia's future - who genuinely strive for a place in modern Europe. But to achieve this, a new generation of responsible leaders needs to come to the fore. The leadership issue, at the core of any governance discourse, is of particular sensitivity in this multiethnic country. Voter apathy, a generalized passivity, and the tendency of elites to defer to the international community wherever opportune, all need to be decisively replaced by local initiatives" (Petritsch 2009b:219f).

Albert Rohan points out that coming to terms with the past and reconciliation are essential factors for the future coexistence of the ethnic groups in the Balkans. He compares this process with that of the post-Second World War era in Europe. Hereafter, time will tell. The process of coming to terms with the past and reconciliation is still ongoing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This process has however been decelerating due to ethno-politics and propaganda which impart only a national view of the occurrences around the Bosnian war. Rohan emphasises that efforts to objectify history and also history lessons are crucial in order to avoid indoctrination of the future generation. Additionally, Rohan asserts that the perception of collective guilt needs to disappear; rather than blaming every member of an ethnic group, the individuals, who actually committed war crimes, should be blamed. It is important for every ethnic group that all war criminals are prosecuted because it is an important part of the healing process. In this context, the civil society plays an important role in the enlightenment of history and facts, reconciliation, how to come to terms with the past and also in assigning responsibilities (Rohan 2011:64f). Wolfgang Petritsch stressed in an interview with Solioz and Dizdarevic from 2003 that it was to early for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina "to lock back dispassionately" because history served and still serves "as an instrument for self-legitimization and the passing of guilt to the other". Furthermore, "the 'blame game' is still in full swing [...]. This is the nature of history when is serves an ideology. But I believe that in order to reconcile with yourself, you also have to reconcile yourself with your past. And this is what Bosnia and Herzegovina is far from achieving" (Solioz, Dizdarevic 2003:25-44; Petritsch 2009b:208f). 10 years after this statement by the former HR, Wolfgang Petritsch, was asserted, one can tell that it is still applicable on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. Arben Hajrullahu stresses

that coming to terms with the past and reconciliation is essential for the integration of all countries in the Western Balkans into the EU:

> „die Integration aller Westbalkanländer in die EU und die Etablierung des langfristigen Friedens erst dann möglich sein werden, wenn die Akteure zu einem pragmatischen Umgang mit der ‚integrationsbelastenen' Vergangenheit finden und wenn sie eine Aufarbeitung dieser Vergangenheit im Dienste einer gemeinsamen europäischen Zukunftsgestaltung vornehmen. Jeder Versuch, die Geschichte zu ‚vergessen', statt sie objektiv zu erforschen und aus ihr Lehren im Sinne einer Wiederholungsvermeidungsstrategie zu ziehen, wird mit höchster Wahrscheinlichkeit den Rechtsstaatsbildungsprozess und somit auch den EU-Integrationsprozess behindern. Eine nichtnationalistische und auf historische Tatsachen fundierte Geschichtsbeschreibung ist die Grundlage des Prozesses der Neutralisierung desintegrativer Ethno-Nationalismen, den ich als De-Nationalisierung der historischen Wahrnehmung bezeichne" (Hajrullahu 2004:14f).[5]

To give a great example of an already existing association which deals with history, the Coalition for RECOM should be mentioned. This is a non-political regional gathering of organisations from the civil society which has established a commission for ascertaining the truth about the conflicts between 1991 and 2001. This commission aims to transparently determine facts about war crimes, violations of human rights and also the fate of more than 16,000 missed persons. The associated organisations and personalities from all regions of former Yugoslavia are sure that the objective perception of the facts will represent a first condition for reconciliation (Rohan 2011:66).

The number of projects and activities carried out by the civil society is high. Klepsidra, for instance, is an association in Sarajevo for the protection of culture and cultural heritage. This independent association is a great example of an element in the civil society which takes an active and responsible role to foster multicultural societies (Klepsidra 2012). A further example is the Pontanima choir that consists of Croats, Serbs, Muslims and Jews from Bosnia-Herzegovina, singing religious songs. This musical conciliation and peace

[5]Own translation into English: "the integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU and the establishment of a long-term peace will only be possible when the stakeholders find ways of pragmatically coping with the 'integration impacted' past and also when they come to terms with the past in the interest of a common European future structure. Any attempt to 'forget' the history - instead of studying it objectively and learning from it in terms of avoiding its recurrence - is most likely to hinder the legal state building process and thus the EU integration process. A non-nationalistic and on historical facts founded history description is the basis of the neutralisation process of ethno-nationalisms, which I call the 'denationalisation of the historical perception'".

project has won the first prize at the international choral contest in Rome in 2007 (von Kohl 2011:69). "Centar za nenasilnu akciju" (Eng. Centre for nonviolent action) is a civic mission that strives for sustainable peace in former Yugoslavia. Through diverse activism, they promote non-violence, dialogue and also constructive dealing with the past (von Kohl 2011:71). "Nasa stranka" (Eng. Our Party) is a grassroots political party in Bosnia-Herzegovina which was established in 2008. This multicultural party was founded by, among others, the famous Bosnian film director Danis Tanovic, who produced the Oscar-winning film "No Man's Land". This new party has aroused various reactions among the Bosnian citizens; some have gained new hope for a better future while others have been more critical towards its success in the present ethno-political scene. Nevertheless, this political novelty demonstrated a civic awareness and responsibility (Dzihic 2009:398f). In the general election of 2010, the new party was, however, not able to break through. To sum up, movements that express resistance towards the prevailing ethno-politics and promote peace and equity, and that are ready for a better future are crucial for the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The "baby revolution" in June 2013 can be mentioned as a positive grass-roots development in the country. However, football games are still an example of negative progress. Many football games between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia or Croatia still end in violence. It is to be noted that mostly youth provoke such violence which can be seen as an outcome of the high unemployment rate among the youth in the country (cf. Dzihic 2009:311). Football games often have connective effects but this is not the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the Bosnian qualification success for the world championship in October 2013 has shown. While Bosniaks celebrated this victory, the feelings among Bosnian Croats and Serbs were rather limited (cf. Der Standard 2013h).

6.4 Sovereignty vs. Protectorate

The prospects for political development in Bosnia-Herzegovina also concern the question of the country's sovereignty. The strategy of the international community in recent years has been to take a more reserved role in order to foster local processes and the principal of ownership and own responsibility. This strategy has, however, not been very successful, which is the reason why the OHR is still needed in the country. Bosnia's political status as

a protectorate has been manifoldly criticised. In fact, "a nation - as a social and political compact" - cannot be built by outsiders, but "the best that outsiders can do is assist in building or reforming an institutional framework" (Petritsch 2009b:85). In this sense, the role of the international community to co-construct a "new and better" Bosnia-Herzegovina is limited: "We can decree the best legislation that is possible to devise, but if 'ownership' does not occur, it will never be effective" (Petritsch 2009b:200). Through its involvement, the international community assumes its share of responsibility for the future of the country. At the same time it also brings "Western values" to the country, but Wolfgang Petritsch clarifies that "the end result must not be a Western clone in the Balkans. Ideally, the end result should be a country that has found its own modern identity" (Solioz, Dizdarevic 2003:25-44; Petritsch 2009b:206f). Nevertheless, Vedran Dzihic stresses that the international community has never had a consistent strategy to reduce the negative effects of ethno-politics. He points out that the international community was not able or did not dare to apply modifications or adjustments to the DPA and therefore was predominantly restricted to its reactive protectorate politics (Dzihic 2009:252). Furthermore, the status of protectorate comprehends Bosnia's dependence on Western institutions and organisations. In order to overcome this "dependency syndrome", Petritsch stresses that ownership and enhanced local responsibility and accountability have to be fostered and also reforms need to be advanced. Moreover, "ownership means taking on the challenges and resolving the problems yourself. Success will in turn strengthen self-confidence and, eventually, dependency will fade away" (Solioz, Dizarevic 2003:25-44; Petritsch 2009b:203f). The issue of the Bonn powers, as a threat to Bosnia's sovereignty, is according to Petritsch indispensable. It is a strategic tool for the international community which is being perceived as a pre-condition to success in order to build a functioning and democratic Bosnian state (Petritsch 2001:124f).

Bosnia's sovereignty depends on the political development of the country's political elite which has been failing for the last seven years, and also on the role of the international community. Once again, the strategy of the international community is put into question. Petritsch points out that the international community needs to find ways to encourage Bosnian politicians to act with responsibility and to strongly integrate the Bosnian citizens into the peace process, as well as to replace the nationalistic discourse with a debate about the real problems that the country faces, namely the terrible economic situation which has led to the emigration of the country's intellectual elite; the education system; the repression of a free exchange of ideas and so forth (Petritsch 2001:123f). Bosnia's status as a protectorate hinders the country's joining NATO and the EU. The PIC has,

however, agreed to close the OHR as soon as five objectives have been met, namely: "a decision on ownership of state property; a decision on defense property; implementing the Brcko Final Award (which made the town of Brcko a self-governing unit within Bosnia); ensuring fiscal sustainability; and entrenching the rule of law" (Woehrel 2012:6). In addition, a positive assessment of the situation in the country by the PIC has to be given (ibid.).

Fulfilling all of these conditions will be a long process for Bosnia-Herzegovina and especially under the present political constellation. The decision on defence property, for instance, is almost unrealistic as long as Milorad Dodik is in power. From his point of view, the defence as state property would imply a loss of sovereignty for the RS, something which is contradictory to his ethno-nationalistic principles. The objective of rule of law involves a lengthy process. Valentin Inzko points out that corruption is not just an everyday occurrence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it is also everywhere; in schools, hospitals, universities etc. Furthermore, he states that it is present to an extent that is unimaginable and that the struggle against corruption is still in its start-up phase (Der Standard 2013e).

6.5 Bosnia-Herzegovina's Future lies in the EU

During the Summits in Zagreb in 2000 and in Thessaloniki in 2003, and also during the foreign minister's conference in Salzburg in 2006, the accession prospects of the Balkan states were formally confirmed (Porias, Schnoell 2007:185f; Rohan 2011:66f). The EU has multiple interests in the prosecution of its expansion process. For instance, its interest involves a European zone of peace, prosperity, democracy and rule of law. Additionally, the EU needs to tap its full potential in order to be able to subsist among giants such as China and India, the economic powers such as the USA and Japan and the landmass of Russia (Rohan 2011:66f). Hanns Porias and Thomas Schnoell also confirm EU's interests in the Western Balkans: "We have to make sure that the region joins us on our road. A dynamic and integrated Europe is important for both the EU and the region. We cannot afford a black hole in this part of Europe" (Porias, Schnoell 2007:190). Bosnia-Herzegovina has formally shown its interest in joining the EU by signing the SAA in 2008 but has done very little to proceed in this direction. This failure of Bosnia-Herzegovina is on the one hand the result of the prevailing ethno-politics in the country and on the other hand the inadequate strategy on the part of the EU towards the "special case" of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the current EUSR to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Peter Sorensen, the EU conditionality is the greatest tool for the country's development. However, this has not turned

out to be the case. The EU conditionality has provoked some reforms in the country, such as the police and visa reform. These reforms were, however, always achieved with strong pressure from the international community. Vedran Dzihic stresses that the EU and its conditionality is no guarantee for conducting necessary reforms. Furthermore, when the domestic stakeholders perceive the benefits of the Europeanisation process as minimal or if their interests are not met, negative effects emerge which can in turn intensify the already existing antagonisms (Dzihic 2009:94f). The EU has so far not found an adequate alternative tool.

The constitutional reform is perceived as a pre-condition for the accession by the EU and also by the Venice Commission. The constitutional reform has, however, not been formally required by the EU, but it is urgently needed for the establishment of an effective and functioning state structure and thus, the EU integration process would be feasible. Additionally, a constitutional reform is required for the abolishment of discriminatory principles which are contained in the current constitution - catchword: the Sejdic-Finci case - and to create a constitution which is based on democratic processes. All attempts to reform the constitution have failed, for instance, the "April Package" in 2006 because it did not gain the required two-thirds majority of votes in the House of Representatives (Dzihic, Wieser 2013:41). Prevailing ethno-nationalist arguments and mutual accusations between the three parties and especially between Serbian and Bosniak politicians hinder reforms (ibid.:42). Also the attempts in Butmir in 2009 failed even though they contained minimal changes to the Dayton constitution. Also at this time, the ethno-nationalistic politicians, especially Milorad Dodik and Haris Silajdzic, made mutual accusations and required maximalist demands. For Dodik the Butmir event was "an unnecessary adventure" and the international stakeholders once again did not manage to provoke reform in order to make the country more functional (ibid.:43).

Florian Bieber explains the reasons for the failures of the EU in the Bosnian Europeanisation process as follows:

> "The problem of state-building conditionality is twofold: first, the EU lacks rules in the sphere of state building and has struggles to impose these and other conditions clearly; and second, the EU remains divided in regard to state building between different Union institutions and member states. The first obstacle to EU state building in the region has been the absence of clear criteria. The acquis communitaire is weak on the nature of the state that is required and the Copenhagen Criteria focus on democracy, market economy and human rights, but provide little guidance on

> the nature of the state. As Schwellus [...] outlined in a study of non-discrimination conditionality, the effectiveness of conditionality is severely impaired if the EU lacks clear rules in the policy area and if clear conditions are absent" (Bieber 2013:19).

Bedrudin Brljavac also criticises the divided messages of the EU. The member states and stakeholders of the EU share different views and opinions on the constitutional framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Brljavac 2011). Bieber shares the same view: "there has not been a single policy by the EU towards the region but rather a number of different policies carried out by a host of different institutions and ad hoc bodies of the EU" (Bieber 2013:2). Furthermore, "[...] in BiH and Kosovo, the EU has been present through a plethora of different institutions, often forming a cacophony of voices" (ibid.). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU is present in four different shapes, namely through the EUFOR, EUPM, EUSR and the Delegation of the Commission (ibid.). Furthermore, the EU has not been clear about the various requirements. Brjavac states that "the EU member states are as divided as the local politicians are over the design and shape of the future Bosnian constitution" (Brljavac 2011). This failure of the EU can also be related to the issue that Bosnia-Herzegovina has been "treated" as all other aspirant countries. However, Bosnia is indeed a "special case" because of the recent brutal war, shifting borders, inter-ethnic conflicts and its long history as an international protectorate (ibid.) and therefore a more customised strategy should be applied.

According to a poll conducted by the Bosnian Agency for European Integration, nine in ten Bosnians want EU membership. 93% of the respondents said that the government should accelerate the reforms needed for the EU integration process (EUbusiness 2011; cf. NDI 2010:35). However, even though the Bosnian politicians declare that EU membership is their priority, they do not meet the requirements in order to fulfil this wish of their voters (cf. Dzihic, Wieser 2013:44). On the other hand, voters who are unsatisfied with the achievements of the politicians concerning not only the developments towards EU integration but also economic and social circumstances (cf. NDI 2010) continue to vote for the same (ethno-nationalistic) politicians. In this context, Valentin Inzko stresses that the Bosnian citizens have the power in their hands, by voting for (non-nationalistic) politicians and parties (Inzko 2012).

Nevertheless, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a potential candidate for EU membership. Bosnian EU membership is no longer a matter of question, but rather a matter of time (cf. Petritsch 2009b:323). The current political constellation prolongs the country's Europeanisation process. A successful and effective Bosnian EU integration process requires a cocktail of

factors such as: constitutional reforms which would enable an efficient state structure and also solve the Sejdic-Finci case; an appropriate strategy by the EU; reconciliation among the Bosnian citizens which would promote a multicultural society; fostering the principle of rule of law etc. Bosnia-Herzegovina is being affected by its neighbouring countries which are proceeding on their path towards EU membership. Croatia is since the 1^{st} of July 2013 a member of the European Union. Serbia has become the new "reform and expansion locomotive" in the Balkans. It has already gained the status of candidate and will begin the accession negotiations with the EU in January 2014. Macedonia has already begun the negotiation talks; Kosovo is ready to begin the negotiation process; Albania has been praised for its democratic elections and is recommended for the status of candidate (Der Standard 2013g). The international community is failing in making the state-level government institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina more effective and also in encouraging further political and economic reforms. Another possible scenario is that the EU decides to advance the country's candidacy even in the absence of clear improvements in the hope that such developments would then stabilise the country (Woehrel 2012:12).

7 Resume

7.1 Conclusion

The aim of this diploma thesis was to define the fundamental issues which hinder the political, economic and social development of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to analyse the recent political development of the country in order to discuss the prospects for its political development.

The country stands in a 'triple transition': from the state of war to the state of peace; from a communist system to democracy and a market economy; and from dependency on the international community to self-sustainability (Petritsch 2009b:197). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethno-nationalism is not only present in everyday life - for instance, most children go to schools where only their own language and version of history are taught, and ethnic denomination decides a person's job opportunities - but moreover ethno-nationalism is anchored in the constitution of the country, which affirms that the three constitutive peoples have equal rights. However, people not belonging to one of these three ethnic groups, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, are being discriminated against. This group of people contains not only minorities such as Jews and Roma, but also people who merely define themselves as "Bosnians" and children from mixed marriages. Furthermore, ethno-nationalism is a means of power to mobilise people, stabilise power and also cover the interests of ethno-nationalistic politicians. In this regard, subjective history and constructed fears are being used to legitimise the power of the ethno-political leadership.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is being maintained as a protectorate by the international community which bears its share of responsibility for the ineffective and non-functioning Bosnian

state. The international community has co-designed the DPA and accordingly the country's constitution. The DPA was an effective instrument in ending the Bosnian war but not, however, to create a functioning state. The EU has become the most active external stakeholder in the Western Balkans and is assisting the country on its path towards EU integration. Furthermore, the EU integration process is being perceived as the only hope for the country's democratisation and transformation process. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been at a standstill in its Europeanisation process since spring 2013. In this respect, the EU is being criticised for its inadequate strategy towards the country. According to the present EUSR, the EU conditionality alone is the biggest tool for triggering reforms in the country. Taken together, the analyses show that in order for Bosnia-Herzegovina to succeed on its path towards membership of the EU, comprehending the political, economic as well as social development of the country, the international community has to change its strategy towards this "special case".

The findings of this diploma thesis show that Bosnia-Herzegovina will not join the EU with the present political constellation because the majority of the current political elite are not devoted to this proceeding even though the Bosnian citizens are clear about their stance. The interests of the political elite are diametrically diverse: Bosniaks strive for a united and centralised state while Croats aspire to create a third Croatian entity and Serbs intend to maintain the status quo. In order for the country to proceed on its Europeanisation path, reforms of the constitution are required, for instance, in solving the Sejdic-Finci case. The Serbian political elite perceives constitutional reforms as a threat to the sovereignty of the RS and are not willing to find compromises on this issue. As soon as the sovereignty of the RS is put into question, Milorad Dodik threatens to hold a referendum for secession. An annexation of the RS to Serbia is from today's point of view not realistic because the EU would not recognise the RS and Serbia would not be able to proceed on its EU integration path. Similarly, the Croatian political elite fear Bosniak and Serbian domination in a new constitutional constellation - which is the reason why the Croatian politicians are not willing to compromise. Many Bosniak politicians, on the other hand, are not willing to accept half-hearted resolutions.

The general election in October 2014 is the new hope for the international community because a new and less ethno-nationalistic government would probably leverage the Bosnian EU integration process. If this turns out not to be the case, another possible scenario would be that the EU decides to advance the country's candidacy even in the absence of clear improvements in the hope that such developments would then stabilise the country. The

findings also show that the international community will have to change strategy because local processes have not been effective. The international community has to coordinate the development aid more adequately and also set better conditionality. Doris Pack, member of the European Parliament, comments on the deadlock in Bosnia-Herzegovina by asserting that the EU has no instruments for sanctions because until now sanctions were not needed when it comes to politicians (Oslobodjenje 2013b). In this context, the high corruption rate of the country should be mentioned. Many members of the political elite have also been criticised for organised corruptive and criminal acts.

Furthermore, the claims have shown that a generational change and perceptional shift is needed to forge a consensus on democracy. In other words, the only solution is a radical change of the political leadership. Nicole Renvert points out that a generational change has already taken place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, a new political elite in the country is emerging, which does not perceive its neighbours as enemies but rather as political and economic partners (SWP 2010:4f). In this sense, the civil society plays a crucial role. Many non-governmental organisations and associations are contributing to the process of coming to terms with the past and reconciliation. The "baby revolution" in June 2013 has indicated a first socio-political maturity among the Bosnian citizens, demonstrating against the country's stagnation and forcing politicians to do their jobs. Doris Pack states that Bosnian citizens should pressure domestic politicians and demand "proper politics" rather than address themselves to the international community (Oslobodjenje 2013b). The prospects for establishing a new political power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would seek to strengthen the functioning of the Bosnian state beyond the ethno-national paradigm, are at the moment bleak (cf. Dzihic 2009:397). Wolfgang Petritsch indicates that "democracy, good governance, political maturity and a civil society can neither be arranged nor adopted by decree; these can only be reached in the course of a process. Democratic and civic virtues must be learned" (Petritsch 2001:237ff - own translation into Eng.) In other words, democratisation cannot be born over night; rather it is a lengthy process. Due to the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina was hit the hardest during the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s, it will take the longest to integrate into the EU. Furthermore, for Bosnia-Herzegovina EU integration is no longer in question, but is rather a matter of time. This suggests that the role of the international community will be crucial for the future of the political development in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7.2 Discussion

The limitation of this study was the restricted research on the domestic politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most politicians have declared their aspiration to an EU membership, especially prior to elections; however, these declarations have not been put into practice. Milorad Dodik's stance is the most evident among the Bosnian politicians because he has been and still is open and apparent about it in the public sphere. In various broadcast interviews, he has stated that he has no interest in the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that he is only defending Serbian interests and that no reforms which would transfer entity level competences to the state level and imply the loss of sovereignty of the RS come into question and so forth. In contrast to Milorad Dodik, other politicians have not been as clear about their stance, for instance on how to solve the Sejdic-Finci case. Zlatko Lagumdzija, the head of the multiethnic SDP and the present foreign minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has, for instance, avoided interviews on public television in recent years. However, since August 2013, he has appeared on a number of broadcast programs, for instance, on the well-known Bosnian Face TV with the host Senad Hadzifejzovic. In this "Face to Face" interview, accusations have been brought up, accusing Lagumdzija of cooperating with Milorad Dodik and committing corruptive and organised criminal acts (Face TV 2013). Other members of the political elite have also been accused of committing such acts, for instance, Dragan Covic (HDZ BiH), Bakir Izetbegovic (SDA), Fahrudin Radoncic (SBB), Milorad Dodik (SNSD) and others (cf. Face TV 2013; RTV BN 2013). These cases have not yet been fully investigated but it would be interesting to explore these cases and the role of the international community in dealing with these in future studies. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that corruption and criminal acts have no nationality.

In this regard, it is also interesting to seize on Zeljko Komsic's observation on Bosnian politics. Komsic, who is the current Croat member of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the head of the new multiethnic party DF, states that the political scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a war between political parties to control and dispose the material resources of the country, for instance, energy, state budget and telecommunications. The evidence for this observation, he stresses, lies in the triggers of every conflict between Bosnian politicians (TV1 2013). Correlating Komsic's observation with the organised criminal acts of the political elite, one may conclude that these two issues are consistent or supplementary. Furthermore, when applying the approach to nationalism on these issues, it is palpable that the "fair landscape" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is being constantly reproduced by the ethno-nationalistic political elite and which is advantageous in the severe social and

economic crisis of the country, is a powerful and efficient means of mobilising people and hence of ensuring power positions. As a result, a vicious circle is apparent: the spread of fear mobilises people to vote for their ethno-nationalistic political parties and politicians, who in turn commit corruptive and criminal acts at the cost of their voters.

It would also be interesting to explore concrete measures which could be met by the international community, for instance, Christine von Kohl's proposal to call a "Balkan conference" which addresses only the region's future. More importantly, the participants should consist not only of politicians, but also of young intellectuals and interested persons from all population strata. Moreover, the international community would not act as a "teacher" but merely as a mediator (von Kohl 2011:80). Another proposal, following Dina Francesca Haynes' point of view, is that the international community should take measures in changing public opinion:

> "The IC [International Community] failed to recognize that the ideal of future security was grounded not only on removal of landmines and removal of obstructionist officials, but on access to schools, jobs, health care and society, all suffused within the broad context of nondiscrimination. Or perhaps it simply did not have the wherewithal to implement full-blown nondiscrimination programs, which are more abstract and may require a long term sustained effort. Changing public opinion on any matter, from smoking, to the effectiveness of wearing seatbelts, to tolerating the neighbors you recently wanted to kill, requires a sustained public information campaign and international administrator are simply not in that business" (Haynes 2008:28).

The international community may also find measures in changing public opinions by promoting the common denominators of the Bosnian citizens. As an example, economic development and prosperity are a common denominator of the Bosnian population. The Arizona market in Brcko District has shown that ethno-nationalism is irrelevant when it comes to economics. Social denominators, such as the gay community, are a further example of where nationality does not matter. A further interesting phenomenon is that a large proportion of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina would leave the country if they had the opportunity (cf. UNDP 2003:20,29); however, "in the wealthy world", for instance, in Austria, Germany or Sweden, liberalism prevails and individual rights are protected. In other words, it is contradictory that the ethno-nationalistic population in Bosnia-Herzegovina supports an ethnically divided territory and exclusive rights for the collectivity but abroad they have no problems living with the opposite picture.

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Summary

The first eleven years since Dayton are being perceived as successful years for Bosnia-Herzegovina on its path towards the state of peace and transformation towards a market economy and also in reaching the first steps towards a democratic and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, since 2006, the country has suffered from stagnation: no big projects have been conducted, no institutions have been established and no crucial laws have been passed. Ethno-nationalism constitutes a major problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina because on the one hand, the interests and prospects of each ethnic group, concerning not only the statehood and the political system but almost every political matter, are diametrically diverse and thus decision-making and the implementation processes become inefficient and sometimes impossible due to the veto rights of each party; and on the other hand, ethno-nationalism implies a means of power and coverage of the interests of the ethno-national political leadership. As a result, the Bosnian statehood and the country's development are being blocked. Ethno-nationalism is, in other words, the biggest threat to democracy. The country is still facing low standards of living and high poverty and unemployment rates today. The current High Representative sees no future developments towards EU integration with the current ethno-politics. The only solution is a radical change of the political leadership. He compares the current ethno-politics with the patterns in the war era, but today they are carried out by other means. The "baby revolution" in June 2013 has indicated a first socio-political maturity among the Bosnian citizens, demonstrating against the country's stagnation and forcing politicians to do their jobs. The prospects for establishing a new political power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would seek to strengthen the functioning of the Bosnian state beyond the ethno-national paradigm, are at the moment bleak. Nevertheless, democratisation cannot be born over night, rather it is a lengthy process. Due to the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina was hit the hardest during the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s, it will take the longest to integrate into the EU. Furthermore, for Bosnia-Herzegovina EU integration is no longer in question, but is rather a matter of time. This suggests that the role of the international community will be crucial for the future of the political development in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Taken together, the analyses show that in order for Bosnia-Herzegovina to succeed on its path towards membership of the EU, comprehending the political, economic as well as social development of the country, the international community has to change its strategy towards this "special case".

Zusammenfassung

Die ersten elf Jahre seit Dayton waren erfolgreiche Jahre für Bosnien-Herzegowina auf seinem Weg zum Friedenszustand und Übergang zu einer Marktwirtschaft sowie die ersten Schritte hin zu einem demokratischen und unabhängigen Staat. Dennoch hat das Land seit 2006, durch die Stagnation, gelitten: keine großen Projekte wurden durchgeführt, keine neuen Institutionen gegründet und keine entscheidenden Gesetze verabschiedet. Ethnonationalismus stellt ein großes Problem für das Land dar: einerseits sind die Interessen und Perspektiven jeder ethnischen Gruppe, bezüglich sowohl der Staatlichkeit und des politischen Systems als auch jeder politischen Angelegenheit, diametral entgegengesetzt und darüber hinaus ist die Beschlussfassung und der Implementierungsprozess ineffizient und manchmal sogar unmöglich aufgrund des Vetorechts jeder Partie; und andererseits impliziert Ethnonationalismus ein Mittel zum Macht und Abdeckung der Interessen der ethnonationalen politischen Elite. Demzufolge werden die bosnische Staatlichkeit und die Entwicklung des Landes blockiert. Mit anderen Worten ist Ethnonationalismus das größte Hindernis für Demokratie. Das Land ist nach wie vor von niedrigem Lebensstandard und hoher Armuts- und Arbeitslosenrate betroffen. Der jetzige Hohe Repräsentant für Bosnien-Herzegowina sieht keine Entwicklungen oder Fortschritte Richtung EU-Integration mit der gegenwärtigen Ethnopolitik. Weiters ist die einzige Lösung eine radikale Veränderung der politischen Führung. Er vergleicht die aktuellen Ethnopolitik mit den Mustern in der Kriegsära und stellt fest, dass dieser Krieg mit anderen Mitteln durgeführt wird. Die „Babyrevolution" im Juni 2013 hat eine erste soziopolitische Reife der bosnischen StaatsbürgerInnen angedeutet, welche gegen die Stagnation des Landes demonstriert haben und die PolitikerInnen aufgefordert haben, ihre Arbeit durchzubringen. Die Aussichten der Gründung einer neuen politischen Macht in Bosnien-Herzegowina, welche das Funktionieren des bosnischen Staates jenseits des ethnonationalistisches Paradigmas suchen würden, sind zurzeit düster. Dennoch kann Demokratisierung nicht über Nacht geboren werden, sie ist vielmehr ein langwieriger Prozess. Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass Bosnien-Herzegowina am härtesten während der Jugoslawienkriege in den 1990er Jahren betroffen wurde, wird es am längsten benötigen, um sich in die EU zu integrieren. Außerdem steht die EU-Integration für das Land nicht mehr in Frage, sondern sie ist vielmehr eine Frage der Zeit. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass die Rolle der internationalen Gemeinschaft von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Zukunft der politischen Entwicklung von Bosnien-Herzegowina ist. Zusammengefasst zeigen die Analysen, dass für einen erfolgreichen Weg in die EU, für welchen die politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung des Landes eine Voraussetzung darstellt, die internationale Gemeinschaft ihre Strategie gegenüber dem „Sonderfall" Bosnien-Herzegowina ändern muss.

Curriculum Vitae

Personal Details

Name:	Nada Cosic
Date of Birth:	15.08.1988
Nationality:	Sweden
Martial Status:	unmarried

Work Experiance

June 2010 - Dec. 2013	**Be-mom, Vienna** Salesperson
April 2012 - April 2013	**Vieconsult, Vienna** Translator (English/German - Swedish, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian)
Jan. 2012 Feb. 2012	**United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime** Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Section Internship, Vienna
Feb. 2006 - June 2007	**Audionord AB, Stockholm** Assistant
Aug. 2004 - Sep. 2007	**Lindex AB, Stockholm** Salesperson

Education

Since Oct. 2011	Slavic Studies, University of Vienna
Oct. 2008 - April 2014	International Development, University of Vienna
Aug. 2004 - June 2007	Social Studies Program, Varmdo Gymnasium, Stockholm
1995 - 2004	Primary School, Stockholm

Language Skills

German	- fluently
English	- fluently
Swedish	- fluently
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian	- fluently

Computer Skills

MS-Office, SPCS