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Can the Kosovo Approach be a Role Model for Palestine?“

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Scope and Focus

The present analysis of the way to statehood of Kosovo and Palestine and especially the question whether the former can be a role model for the latter is inspired by a previous public discussion about the analogy of the cases.

Although the international importance of the conflicts is beyond dispute since Kosovo is situated in the heart of Europe and Palestine is not only of regional but also international strategic importance and subject of the probably most long lasting territorial conflict in world history, it still seems pointless to compare two such historically dissimilar cases at first sight. Central distinctions between Kosovo and Palestine are on the one hand the origin of the two contested entities and on the other hand the international recognition of their rights to statehood.

Kosovo became a de facto state through secession from Serbia motivated by the Kosovo Albanian ethnic minority's desire to get rid of longstanding repression, discrimination and even attempts of extermination. But in general, international law and the practices of states condemn secession since it is perceived as unilateral act that harms the territorial integrity of the central state which by definition is not in a position to accept this step. Therefore, secession is often accompanied by violence and only seldom leads to a successful transformation to generally recognised sovereign independence. But the Kosovo Albanians managed to make Kosovo, which had long stayed under international trusteeship, a case of internationally supervised transition to conditional independence which was finally declared in 2008.

Palestine in contrast is a unique case because its right to statehood is widely recognised by the International Community based on the UN-Partition Plan of 1947 and it declared itself independent in 1988, but until today this declaration could not be converted into political reality. Although the Oslo Accords concluded by the Palestinians and their adversary Israel enabled the Palestinians to establish governing institutions, they only exercise limited sovereignty over the territory and the key issues of the conflict are still to be solved by the conflict parties as a precondition to the establishment of an independent sovereign State of Palestine. (cp. Geldenhuys, 2009, pp. 235-238)

The only obvious common characteristic of the conflicts is the delayed statehood of Kosovo and Palestine after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire due to the International Community's refusal to grant the majority populations on the territory the right to establish nation states or to affiliate with other existing entitites with the same ethnic majority. Instead, minorities were created that faced decades of ethnic conflict and persecution. In Kosovo as well as in Palestine the discriminated ethnic group pushes for autonomy in a historically shared territory in which it currently constitutes the majority. And in both conflicts, highly symbolic national interests, including the sacralisation of the disputed territory, are at stake. Thus, it can be summarised that both conflicts are so-called "protracted ethnic conflicts" definded as

"[...] hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequence and intensity [..] they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination [..] one cannot expect these conflicts to be terminated by explicit decision [..] protracted conflict are not specific events or even cluster of events at a point in time, they are processes". (Azar, 1978 cited in Di Mauro, 2007, p. 4)

However, only the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 established a direct link between the cases and initiated a political and academic debate about the question which implications the unilateral step of Kosovo could have for Palestine. A high ranking official of the Palestine National Authority and advisor to the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Yasser Abed Rabbo, publicly assessed the following: *"Kosovo is not better than us. We deserve independence even before Kosovo, and we ask for the backing of the United States and the European Union for our independence."* (BBC News, 20/02/2008) In an interview Rabbo proposed to declare "Kosovo style independence" and added that the example of Kosovo had unveiled new options for Palestine. Although this idea was supported by several Palestinian officials, it was rejected by most members of the Palestinian leadership including President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Chief Negotiator Saeb Erekat, who, on the other hand, commented the discussion with the clear statement, *"We are not Kosovo"*. (Infolive.tv, 20/02/2008) Notwithstanding, several political commentators and scholars seized the opportunity for a broader debate about the relevance of drawing an analogy of the strategies applied in Kosovo and Palestine for which reason it seems worth conducting a

detailed academic analysis of the relevant factors that led to today's status of the two entities.

Despite the academic partition of the Balkans and the Middle East into so-called area studies that were established according to political interests and are perceived as separate problem areas, Karl Kaser argues that no other world region shares such an interrelated history with regard to its incorporation into superior power structures. During 2000 years of shared history there has always been significant cultural exchange, but only the turbulent period after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, including colonialism, post-colonialism, socialism and the establishment of the European Union, initiated a reorientation. While the countries at the Balkans together with Turkey established closer ties with European countries, the Arab countries intensified mutual cooperation. So today only little literature exists that deals with both, the Balkans as well as the Middle East. (cp. Kaser, 2011, pp. 12-17) Florian Bieber made an important contribution to comparative conflict studies with regard to both regions with his book "Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon in Comparison. Historical Developments and Political System before the Civil War". Other comparative works that explicitly take into account Kosovo and Palestine generally focus on the description of a multitude of cases of contested statehood and compare their historical development and the ensuing status of the entities. This applies to works such as the study "De Facto States. The Quest for Sovereignty" by Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik or Deon Geldenhuys' "Contested States in World Politics". Maria J. Stephan contributed an interesting work to strategy research called "Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination Movements", in which she examines the non-violent civilian-based component of the strategies applied by movements in their struggle for statehood.

Besides the valuable contribution of the above-mentioned works to the academic research about contested territories respectively non-recognised states this field is still insufficiently studied. There is only sparse literature about the analysis of strategies of national movements aiming at statehood and until today there are no scholarly studies applying a comparative method to comprehensive strategies of non-state actors in a territorial conflict. The strategy approach systematically analyses all relevant factors that need to be addressed when examining a national movement's way to statehood and the

comparative method will bring new insights about the purpose and limits of analogy for which reason the present work will be an important contribution to this research field.

The present dissertation is divided into six substantial chapters whereby chapter one provides an INTRODUCTION that deals with the academic approach to the subject. This includes an explanation of scope and focus of the work as well as the research topics and questions, the hypothesis, the research methodology and the contextualisation of the most relevant terms. Chapter two deals with the THEORETICAL APPROACH of the work which is primarily based on the theory of strategy. Thus, it provides a framework for the structuring of the ensuing empirical chapters by defining the strategic elements including interests, goals, objectives, internal and external environment and concepts which are in detail described in chapter three that is consequently called THE CASES AND THEIR STRATEGIC ELEMENTS. This chapter is subdivided into the descriptions of the two case studies, Kosovo and Palestine. The first section of each of the two descriptive sub-chapters deals with the historical development of the conflicts. After having explained the evolution of the territorial disputes as well as the issues and interests at stake, the two sub-chapters examine the strategic environment and concepts of the respective national movements. Each of the sub-chapters about Kosovo and Palestine closes with an evaluation of the strategy of the national movements in order to lay the groundwork for chapter four which aims at a COMPARISON OF THE STRATEGIES APPLIED IN KOSOVO AND PALESTINE. Chapter five finally provides an overview of the main findings and CONCLUSIONS and chapter six consists of the English and German SUMMARY of the present work.

2. Research Topics and Questions

The **main research question** corresponds to the title of the recent work and demands the scrutinising of the following issue:

- Can Kosovo be a role model for Palestine?

Therefore, this work will examine the similarities and differences between the strategies applied by the national movements in the two conflicts and extract lessons that can be learned.

Hence, this question implies the imperative to conduct a detailed examination of the following research topics:

Questions with regard to the analysis of the strategic elements in the conflicts:

- Which historic differences and parallels existed in the **conflict conditions** of the Kosovo Albanians respectively the Palestinians?

- Which differences and parallels existed in the **strategic interests, goals and objectives** involved in the conflicts and were they realistic?

- Which role did the **strategic environment** play in the territorial conflicts? How did it influence the behaviour of the national movements?
  - Which national movements dominated the **internal environment** of the ethnic group seeking autonomy and in which conflict phase were they institutionalised? Which ideologies and power constellations influenced the proceeding of the national movements? Did all national movements cooperate for their common goal and keep up a united image towards the International Community or did some act as spoilers? Were the national movements led by internal decisions or by heteronomy?
  - Which **adversaries** opposed the self-determination of the people seeking statehood and for what reason? Did the adversaries occupy/incorporate and successfully colonise the disputed territory? Where the adversaries' claims legal according to international law? Did the adversaries enjoy a strong international backing?
  - Which international actors belonged to the strategic **external environment** in the conflicts? Which interests of the external environement were involved and how was their attitude towards the territorial claims of the antagonists? How much and which kind of support did the external actors provide to the antagonists? Which kind of international intervention into the conflict took place?

- Which **strategic concepts** were applied by the national movements and why? Did the national movements focus solely on non-cooperative approaches in the course of the conflict or did they show a united readiness to cooperate with the adversary to find a compromise at a certain point?

Questions with regard to the overall strategies of the national movements:

- Which **strategies** resulted from the strategic settings of the national movements and were applied in the territorial conflicts? Which factors have dominated the strategies?

- How successful were the strategies and did they **result** in statehood? Which factors were crucial for the outcome of the respective strategies?

- Which **similarities and differences** existed between the strategies?

3. Hypotheses

In the public discussion about the usefulness of the so-called "Kosovo Strategy" for the Palestinian case, several arguments gained centre stage. On the one hand, similarities of the cases were enumerated in order to justify the mere idea of drawing an analogy, such as the ethnic component of both conflicts, persecution and dispersal, the push for self-determination of suppressed people in a historically shared territory, declarations of independence as means of struggle and the strong engagement of the powerful Western states with the USA leading the way. On the other hand, a debate over the obvious differences in the strategic situation of the respective national movements took place. These differences were widely acknowledged as decisive for the different outcome of the

conflicts and perceived as central argument against an applicability of the same strategy in both conflicts. Hence, they will concurrently serve as hypotheses for the recent work[1]:

The majority of the contributions had a clear focus on the role of the external actors in the conflict including the following essence:

- Although most actors of the International Community recognised the Palestinian right to independence and there was less international agreement about the independence of Kosovo, there was a stronger international determination to solve a conflict that takes place in Europe. The will of the International Community and especially the world's most powerful country, the USA, to intervene on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians, including on a military basis, and to install a foreign protectorate that backed Kosovo Albanian independence, was decisive for the realisation of self-determination. In contrast, the Internatonal Community denied a military intervention in Palestine for which reason it has stayed under foreign occupation that tried to prevent their self-determination for decades.

Only few comments took into account the important role of the internal constellation of forces within the societies and the national movements:

- The Kosovo Albanian national movements pursued the common goal of indendence of a determined territory and acted homogenously vis-à-vis the International Community, while there has been a deep ideological rift within the Palestinian political sphere that prevented their unity.

However, the analysis of the debate revealed no explicit discussion about exported violence.

Based on the above-mentioned considerations, it can be concluded that the factual support of the external strategic environment (in contrast to sole diplomatic testimonies)

[1] A list of contributions to the public discussion about the applicability of the Kosovo strategy on the case of Palestine attached in the Appendix of this work, includes papers, online articles and blog statements that provide an overview of the reasons that came to the fore in the course of the debate and served as basis to filter out the central arguments.

is the most important factor in a strategy towards statehood, while internal factors within the political sphere of the society seeking statehood would also require more consideration than usually devoted to them. Thus, the importance of these assumptions for the outcome of the conflicts will be subject to verification or falsification within the framework of the present study.

4. Research Methodology

The present work is based on a combination of empirical methods. While the comparative approach is utilised to analyse the strategies applied by national movements in order to acquire statehood, the qualitative literature research of primary and secondary resources and unstructured expert interviews served as means to generate the necessary information.

Primary sources included the relevant official documents such as government documents, charters of the national movements as well as resolutions, regulations and advisory opinions of international organisations.

The huge load of **secondary literature** on the two cases required a long phase of literature analysis in order to sort out the relevant works, which was followed by a detailed qualitative research.

Additional information was gathered through **unstructured face-to-face interviews** conducted with political representatives, activists, journalists and members of international organisations as well as with normal citizens during research stays in Serbia and Kosovo in January 2010 and July 2012, respectively in the West Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon in August and September 2010. Interviews were conducted in either English or German or translated by interpreters during the interview.

The **comparative method** is the only viable approach to a research question that focuses on a phenomenon materialised in two different cases. Comparison is defined as a basic cognitive activity that serves the advances in knowledge and the identification of differences reveals the special characteristics of objects and allows drawing conclusions. (cp. Stykow, 2007, p. 35) There are four main reasons to conduct comparisons:

contextual description, classification, hypothesis-testing and theory-building and *prediction*. A detailed *contextual description* is the basis for the analysis that aims at reaching higher levels of explanation. *Classification*, which means the categorisation of the cases according to identifiable and shared characteristics or key features, is needed in order to simplify the more complex reality. Comparison of cases is also important for *hypothesis-testing* because it enables the researcher to rule out rival explanations and verify applicable hypotheses by testing empirical relationships among variables. *Prediction* is the logical extension of hypothesis-testing by generalisation from the initial comparison or by making claims about future political outcomes. (cp. Landman, 2005, pp. 3-10) Comparison aims at the identification and explanation of the characteristics of the objects of inquiry for which reason a focus on a small number of cases is necessary. The comparative analysis can be conducted at the micro/individual level or at the macro/system level. Micro level analysis focuses on the examination of the political activity of individuals whereas the macro-political analysis examines groups of individuals, structures of power, social classes, economic processes and the interaction of nation states for which reason this level of analysis will be applied in the recent work.

In order to conduct a systematic research, it is inevitable to subdivide the research project into different items of analysis. ***Cases*** are the countries that will be compared. In the present work, the cases are the entities struggling for statehood, that is Kosovo and Palestine. ***Units of analysis*** are the objects on which the researcher collects data. The recent comparison will focus on the national movements as units of analysis. ***Variables*** are concepts of which values change over a given set of units. Dependent variables denote the political outcomes that the research aims to explain, while independent variables serve the explanation of the dependent variables. The dependent variables applicable in the comparison of the national movements in Kosovo and Palestine will be the strategies leading to statehood while its sub-categories strategic interests, strategic environment and strategic concepts are independent variables. ***Observations*** are the values of the variables for each unit which in the recent study amounts to the value of the strategy variables for a given movement in a given case. (cp. Landman, 2005, pp. 17-19)

For the purpose of strategy evaluation in both cases it seems useful to derive criteria from the field of economic sciences, since no well-known methodology for the evaluation of strategies in conflict studies, and especially with regard to the performance of non-state

actors in territorial conflicts, exists. Richard P. Rumelt characterises business strategy as a set of objectives, policies and plans that define the scope of an economic enterprise and its approach to survival and success. Thus, he elaborated three main questions that needed to be answered in order to conduct a proper business strategy evaluation. He set his focus on objectives, major policies and plans and on the expressiveness of results with regard to the confirmation or the refutation of critical assumptions about the strategy. If we adapt his questions for the evaluation of economic strategies to the conflict cases of the current work, the questions might entail the following:

- Are the goals, objectives and aims of the national movements appropriate?
- Are the overall approaches and plans of the national movements (in due consideration of the strategic environment and the strategic concepts) appropriate?
- Do the results obtained to date confirm or refute critical assumptions on which the strategy of the national movements rests? (cp. Rumelt, 1993, pp. 1-2)

Furthermore, Rumelt lists broad criteria on which most tests of strategies are based:

- *"Consistency: The strategy must not present mutually inconsistent goals and policies.*
- *Consonance: The strategy must represent an adaptive response to the external environment and to the critical changes occurring within it.*
- *Advantage: The strategy must provide for the creation and/or maintenance of a competitive advantage in the selected area of activity.*
- *Feasibility: The strategy must neither overtax available resources nor create unsolvable sub problems."* (Rumelt, 1993, p. 2)

Case-oriented studies often focus on the identification of similarities and differences among the cases in order to examine which factors account for the observed political outcome. The basic consideration regarding the selection of cases worth to be compared goes back to John Stuart Mill and was translated into two main research designs by Adam Prezworski and Henry Teune. The underlying presumption is the following: Different effects have different causes whereas similar effects have similar causes. (cp. Stykow, 2007, p. 42) The "most similar systems design" compares political systems that share many common features in order to neutralise some of the differences while highlighting others. The discovered different key features among similar cases are held accountable

for the different outcomes. The "most different systems design" compares cases that do not share any common features except of the equal political outcome that shall be explained and therefore tries to identify the factors relevant for the same outcome. (cp. Landman, 2005, pp. 27-28; Berg-Schlosser/Müller-Rommel, 2006, pp. 114-116) Since the conflicts in Kosovo and Palestine do not have a very similar background, despite their common origin, and the strategies applied by the respective groups did not produce an equal political outcome, neither of the two comparative methods are relevant for the study of these cases at first sight. Therefore, an academic sub-goal of this study is to examine whether the analogy drawn between the cases in the political and academic debate is legitimate although the comparison of the two conflicts neither properly applies to the "most similar systems design" nor to the "most different systems design". As Stykow asserts:

"Whether 'apples' and 'kangaroos' shall indeed be compared [...] cannot be decided abstract and definitely. Whether it is useful and purposive depends on the one side on the research question and on the other whether it is possible to conceptualise similarities besides the undeniable differences between the cases that are relevant for a theory based comparison." (Stykow, 2007, p. 44)

5. Contextualisation of Terms

When conducting a study about ways to statehood, it is indispensable to take a closer look at the definition of the **state** respectively statehood itself. The best-known description of the state defines it as unity of public institutions that guarantee the cohabitation of people in a polity that comprises three elements: state territory, state nation and state authority. In order to enforce its decisions, the state has an inwards monopoly on legitimate violence on its territory and outwards sovereignty. The central tasks of the state can be divided into the following categories:

1. guarantee of internal and external security, assurance of individual civil rights and a state of law;
2. assurance of political participation and cultural integration of citizens;
3. provision of an economic framework for peaceful economic competition and allocation of infrastructure;
4. fulfilment of social requirements for individual freedom through the welfare state;

5. preservation of the natural basis of life and sustainable development;
6. creation of knowledge based infrastructure for the avoidance of uncontrollable risks. (cp. Nohlen/Schultze, 2005, pp. 944-945)

Statehood therefore is the status of being a state and the fulfilment of its functions rather than a territory. Normally, the **de jure** and the **de facto** existence of sovereign states overlap which means that they are states not only by law but also in reality. A comprehensive study about de facto states defines them as follows:

"De facto states are a result of a strong secessionist bid, on the one hand, and the unwillingness of the international system to condone secession on the other. They are regions which carry out the normal functions of the state on their territory, and which are generally supported by significant proportions of their population. They are not 'de jure states', because they are not sanctioned by the international order. Instead, other states and inter-state organizations, […], continue to recognise the authority of the state from which the secession occurred, even though its writ no longer runs in the breakaway region, and though its legitimacy is rejected by the region's population." (Bahcheli/Bartmann/Srebrnik, 2004, p. x)

De jure states are those entities, which were recognised by other states through formal statements (such as congratulations on the occasion of the independence of the state), official letters to the newly recognised state, declarations in front of a national court or the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Thus, there exists partial recognition by a minority of the existing states as well as collective recognition extended by intergovernmental organisations of which the UNO as universal forum of states is most significant. Hence, membership in the UNO is tantamount to unquestioned collective de jure recognition. (cp. Geldenhuys, 2009, pp. 21-25)

De facto states adhere to their **right to self-determination** that is enshrined in the Charta of the United Nations as well as in the United Nations Human Rights packages and applies to "all people" without concrete explanation of their nature. **Internal self-determination** is the right of the nation to free choice of the system of government, on the one hand, and the right of a people respectively an ethnic group to free choice of its political status and its economic development within the state federation it belongs to, on the other. The latter right applies to minority groups within a state whose right to

self-determination can only be assured through a special territorial status that does not necessarily lead to complete sovereignty. The classical type of realisation of this right is through ***autonomy*** which is a constitutionally granted status that ensures a maximum of self-determination for the minority group and a minimum of heteronomy by the majority population. **External self-determination** is the right of all people to decide freely about the status of their area of settlement in relation to other people and states. This includes the following options: foundation of national independence, merging of different peoples to a centralised or federal state, affiliation to an existing state or the confirmation of the affiliation to a certain state and concurrent establishment of self-government within the state federation. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 164-194)

Due to the fact that the establishment of a sovereign state or the affiliation to another state in most cases presupposes **secession** from the side of the minority group, which means their withdrawal from a certain political entity, there is a sharp contradiction between the right of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of sovereign states respectively the non-destruction of the political unity of the existing state. The basis for intrastate relations is sovereignty, which means that states claim power inwards and outwards and at the same time commit themselves to respect the territorial integrity and independence of other states and refrain from interference into their internal affairs. These antagonistic principles collide when third countries support the secessionist efforts of a certain group within another state. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 164-194) Such territorial conflicts normally result *"[...] from the capture of the state by one nation*[2]*, which uses its power to oppress others, to involuntarily assimilate them, to expel them or to wipe them out."* (Bahcheli/Bartmann/Srebrnik, 2004, p. ix)

Territorial conflicts can also lead to a status of **occupation** which then constitutes the initial point for the struggle for national independence. The regulations annexed to the IV Hague Convention of 1907, the so-called Hague Regulations, include central parts of the law of occupation. The definition of occupation according to the Hague Regulations can be summarised as follows: *"[...] occupation exists when the territory is brought under the effective control of a party to an international conflict by means of that party's military presence. Control is considered effective under the Hague Regulations when the*

[2] Here the term „nation"can be understood in the sense of an ethnic people.

occupant exerts control over the government functions." (Dikker Hupkes, 2008, p. 51)[3] The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 extended the law of occupation since many provisions of Section III: Occupied Territories are relevant to protected persons in occupied territories which at the same time imply restrictions of territorial gains by war. The definition of occupation compliant with the Fourth Geneva Convention says that *"[...] occupation exists when the population of a territory is brought under effective control of a party to an international conflict by means of that party's military presence. Control is considered effective under the Fourth Geneva Convention when the people of a territory are in fact under such control, that the protection of the law of occupation as laid down in the Fourth Geneva Convention is warranted."* (Dikker Hupkes, 2008, p. 52)[4] Important provisions of the law of occupation stipulate that *"[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. […] The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies."* (Convention (IV), 12/08/1949, Section III, Art. 49) *"Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."* (Convention (IV), 12/08/1949, Section III, Art. 53) *"Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory."* (Convention (IV), 12/08/1949, Section III, Art. 47) **Annexation** is a unilateral formal act through which a state proclaims its sovereignty over a certain territory that is located outside its domain. It becomes effective through actual possession and legitimised by general recognition, while annexation based on the illegal use of force

[3] See also Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. In: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument

[4] See also Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949. In: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/380

is condemned in the Charter of the United Nations.[5] (cp. Encyclopædia Britannica: Annexion)

National Liberation Movements are those anti-colonial and anti-imperialist organisations that lead the struggle of peoples against all forms colonial, alien or racist domination. (cp. Nohlen/Schultze, 2005, pp. 66-67; Boczek, 2005, p. 86) In the terminology of the UNO, national liberation movements are defined as organisations that fight for independence by force of arms, while other definitions include a wider range of means of struggle comprising not only armed violence (guerrilla warfare) and terrorism but also peaceful resistance. The number of National Liberations Movements decreased drastically after the completion of the decolonisation process although several recent organisations struggling for national independence also use that denomination. Their international legal status has been highly controversial and only few have been recognised by the UNO and achieved the right to participate in UN institutions as observer. (cp. Nohlen/Schultze, 2005, pp. 66-67; Boczek, 2005, p. 86) In the recent work, the term "**National Movement**" will apply to all groups that represent a certain people and lead its struggle for statehood including organisations also referred to as "National Liberation Movements", "Nationalist Movements", "Ethnic Nationalist Organisations" or "Self-Determination Movements" in common literature.

5 See UN Charta Chapter I: Purposes and Principles: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml

II. THEORETICAL APPROACH

The theoretical approach to strategy described in the following chapters is primarily based on the works of Joachim Raschke and Ralf Tils as well as on Harry R. Yarger's publication "Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy". Raschke and Tilfs lay a systematic groundwork for the theory on political strategy by offering a comprehensive definition of strategy as well as detailed descriptions of the strategic elements. Yarger also provides us with a sophisticated analysis of strategy and its elements with focus on the nation-state while he explicitly declares that his theory may also apply to the strategy of non-state actors and institutions. His premises of a theory of strategy offer important parameters for the evaluation of the strategies of the national movements described in the case studies. As we will see, Raschke and Tilfs focus on a constructivist approach on the one side, and stress the importance of rational choice on the other. Thomas C. Schelling refers to the famous Game Theory in his book "The Strategy of Conflict", which illustrates that actors in a conflict can choose between cooperative and non-cooperative strategies because besides the conflicting interests also common ones can arise. Anatole Ayissi elaborates on these considerations in the study "Territorial Conflicts: Claiming the Land" that provides a practical framework for the categorisation of conflicts according to their issues at stake and their probability of compromise.

1. Theory on Strategy Applicable to Conflict Studies

Joachim Raschke and Ralf Tils **define strategies** as *"success-oriented constructs that are based on aim-means-environment calculations"*. (Raschke/Tils, 2007, p. 12) Harry R. Yarger has a similar approach to strategy and describes it as *"calculation of objectives, concepts and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favourable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of others."* (Yarger, 2006, p. 1) Thus, strategy seeks to bridge the gap between the current reality and the desired future. Yarger therefore argues that strategists have to analyse the environment in order to develop a strategy that takes into account objectives (ends), concepts (ways) and resources (means) of the strategic actor required to pursue his goal established by policy and includes the consideration of the relation of how to apply resources to achieve preferred outcomes in a specific strategic environment over time. By employing definite

instruments of power (diplomatic/political, informational, military and economical) the strategic actor aims at achieving his political objectives in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own goals. In the words of Kissinger, the "task of the strategic doctrine is to translate power into policy". (Kissinger, 1959, p. 7) In this context, strategy is subordinate to the nature of the emerging, dynamic and competitive strategic environment and limited by the criteria of suitability, feasibility and acceptability. Strategy aims at influencing the future environment instead of merely reacting to it. (cp. Yarger, 2006, pp. 1-6) In sum, *"the strategic process is all about how (concept or way) leadership will use the power (resources or means) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) in accordance with state policy".* (Yarger, 2006, p. 6) Although this definition centres on the strategic process of states, it is also applicable to national movements when keeping in mind James McGregor Burns' suggestion that the leadership is in permanent interaction with followers and thus its ends are in accordance with or based on the wishes of the members and supporters of the movement.

Harry R. Yarger set up the following list of **premises of a theory of strategy**:

- Strategy is holistic in outlook and thus demands comprehensive consideration.
- Strategy provides a proper balance among objectives, methods used to achieve them and the resources available. Ends, ways and means work synergistically in order to achieve strategic effects.
- Strategy is dominated by political purpose that is stated in policy and thus, policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the desired end state and its guidance regarding considerations like limitations of actions.
- Strategy is grounded in the desired or preferred end state.
- Strategy is hierarchical because the political leadership holds control over the instruments of power and therefore grand strategy originates at the top, while lower levels only develop subordinate strategies.
- Strategy is subordinate to the character of the strategic environment.
- Strategy has to face friction, which is the difference between the ideal and the applied strategy as a consequence of the chaotic and complex nature of the strategic environment, chance and human frailty.
- Strategy is an inherently human endeavour and not only a consideration of objective factors; it involves human passions, values, worldviews, believes and

cultural perceptions and has to meet the criteria of acceptability within the domestic as well as the external environment.

- Strategy creates a security dilemma because it always introduces change into the strategic environment; therefore it must be determined whether the achievement of a specific end justifies the risk of taking action given the uncertain reaction of other actors.
- Strategy is anticipatory and proactive but not predictive.
- Strategy focuses on root causes and purposes which allow strategy to be adaptable and flexible. It requires learning from experience and adaption to shifting conditions like unfolding events or adversaries' countermoves.
- Strategy has a symbiotic relationship with time and therefore a key strategic competency is the ability to foresee continuity of strategic choices with the past and the consequences of their effects in the future, thus the timing of undertaking a strategy can be crucial to its success.
- Strategy is cumulative which means that its effects inexorably become part of the ongoing play of continuity and change.
- Strategy subordinates efficiency to effectiveness because its essential purpose is the creation of strategic effects.
- Strategy always faces risk that is inherent in all activity for which reason the creation of a favourable balance against failure is crucial. (cp. Yarger, 2006, pp. 6-16)

In order to facilitate the understanding of the theory of strategy, a precise definition of the **elements of strategy** is indispensable:

Strategic actors (such as national movements) pursue their ***aspirations*** which comprise the following levels:

- ***Strategic interests*** are desired end states categorised in terms of survival, favourable world order, enduring national or group values or economic well-being. Interests are derived from these broad categories. (cp. Yarger, 2006, p. 5)

- ***Strategic goals*** are defined as desired condition (desired end state) within a certain time frame (desired end date). These desired end

states are always formulated in reference to the present state. Strategic goals have to be in conformity with the identity, political aims and shall respect the canon of values of the represented group and followers in order to assure its legitimacy. (cp. Raschke/Tils, 2010, pp. 25-26) The desired end state is expressed through policy. Thus, policy is a clear articulation of guidance for the employment of instruments of power towards the achievement of end states and its subordinate objectives. Policy must be adapted to the realities of the strategic environment and the limits of power and therefore ensures that strategy pursues appropriate aims.

- ***Strategic objectives*** can be identified through the analysis of the end state and guidance. They provide purpose, focus and justification for actions and their achievement creates strategic effects that contribute to the desired end state.

The ***Strategic environment*** consists of an external as well as an internal or domestic component and its nature is characterised as interactive, chaotic, complex, uncertain, ambiguous and volatile.

- The ***external*** environment consisting of the physical geographic environment, the international system (also referred to as International Community) and other external actors including their cultures, believes and actions belong to the first category and is by nature multifaceted.

- The ***internal*** environment comprises internal physical realities, internal actors, constituencies, institutions and organisational roles of the strategic actor. The internal conditions can be more complex than expected at first sight because not all groups or individuals subsumed as one strategic actor share the same worldview. (cp. Yarger, 2006, p. 7)

In order to understand the internal environment of national movements, which are the central actors analysed in this work, it is necessary to examine their function and structure and to be aware of internal power disputes.

An important consideration can be derived from Miroslav Hroch's studies about national movements. Although he focuses mainly on the question of the social composition of national movements, Hroch reminds us of the necessity to take into consideration the social background and traditional loyalties of members of such groups.[6]

It also seems indispensable to refer to certain aspects of leadership and followership theories at this point. The leadership researcher Joseph C. Rost defines leadership as *"[...] an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes".* (Rost, 1993, p. 102 cited in Bacher, 2011, p. 22) One of the most influential concepts about leadership was introduced by James MacGregor Burns because he stressed the importance of the mutual relationship between the leaders and their followers and distinguished between transactional and transformational leadership. Transactional leadership *"occurs when one person takes the initiative making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things. The exchange could be economic or political or psychological in nature [...]".* (Burns, 1978, p. 19) In this relationship, the leader secures benefits for followers and in return is granted authority and legitimacy. But the bargainers have no enduring purpose that connects them for which reason the relationship between leader and followers is a kind of business arrangement. (cp. Goethals/Sorenson/Burns, 2004, p. 870) Transformational leadership on the other hand *"[...] occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality. [...] Their purposes, which might have started out as separate but related, as in the case of transactional leadership, become fused. Power bases are linked not as counterweights but as mutual support for common purpose. [...] But transforming leadership ultimately becomes moral in that it raises the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led, and thus it has a transforming effect on both."* (Burns, 1978, p. 20, italics in original) Hence, transformational leadership gains momentum in times of crisis because it exceeds the satisfaction of elementary needs due to its strong moral dimension. The charismatic leader represents ambitious aims like the vision of a better future as well as fundamental values such as freedom, equality and justice. (cp. Bacher, 2011, p. 29) Therefore, individuals may follow leaders in order to satisfy their need for safety and security as well as their need for identification. Leaders

[6] See Hroch, Miroslav (1985): Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. University Press, Cambridge

promote a collective identity that triggers strong emotions among their followers. (cp. Bacher, 2011, p. 31; Goethals/Sorenson/Burns, 2004, pp. 502-503)

As Miroslav Hroch noted in his study "Europe of the Nations"[7], national movements play a central role in nation respectively identity building because *"[...] there exists almost a common consensus within science that nations did not develop through the interference of anonymous forces of nature but through the efforts of human beings."* (Hroch, 2005, p. 119)

David Romano also focuses on the question how people are mobilised into ethnic nationalist organisations and thus identifies the following three essential components for his analysis of the Kurdish National Movement: the structural political context, mobilisation methods of movements and their identity politics. The instillation and maintenance of ethnic identity are regarded as an important task of national movements. This identity has to be politicised which means that is it used as a basis for making claims towards a state. Thus, Romano delivers an extensive explanation of ethnicity and collective identity which is noteworthy and will be referred to, but a detailed elaboration will be omitted in this work due to the complexity of the issue. (cp. Romano, 2006, pp. 2-8)

Besides this important reference to the role of leadership and identity within national movements, it is also crucial to take into consideration that there exist contradicting interests among different movements as well as within them. Thus, Wendy Pearlman wrote about internal political power contestations in her paper "Spoiling Inside and Out". In this paper, Pearlman highlights the crucial influence of internal power balances on foreign policy decision making of national movements which will be referred to below (cp. Pearlman, 2009, p. 81)

Strategic Concepts explain how objectives are to be accomplished by the employment of the instruments of power, which corresponds to the manifestation of the resources. They link resources to objectives and explain their achievement by defining who is responsible for what, where, when and why.

- Yarger terms the resources ***strategic means*** that determine the types and levels of resources necessary to support the concepts of the strategy. Thereby, they link

7 See Hroch, Miroslav (2005): Das Europa der Nationen. Die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen

environment and goals. (cp. Yarger, 2006, pp. 55-60) Resources include all potential mobilisable tangible (e.g. forces, infrastructure or money) and intangible (e.g. national will or fanaticism) auxiliary means of action. Intangible resources like strategic knowledge, information, organisational characteristics and psychological abilities such as motivation and endurance are often more critical than tangible resources. (cp. Raschke/Tils, 2007, p. 130)

- Yarger uses the term "way" to refer to strategic concepts as a whole. However, it seems more useful for the purpose of the recent work to limit the term ***"strategic ways"*** to the opportunities of action that facilitate the attainment of political goals which Raschke and Tils, on the other hand, subsume as "strategic means". (cp. Raschke/Tils, 2007, p. 129) In common literature, strategic ways are also referred to as tactics.

With regard to the opportunities of action, spoiling has to be taken into consideration. Wendy Pearlman argues that conventional explanations of conflict resolution assume that actors tend to act cooperative or non-cooperative to achieve objectives vis-à-vis their adversary, but thereby fail to take into consideration the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy decisionmaking. Hence, actors turn to negotiating with the adversary or spoiling a peace process to contest not only the proposed settlement but also who has the power to decide and to represent the community. The actors might strive for organisational, personal or political advantage. Pearlman concludes that internal contestation based on negotiating or spoiling is more likely when at least one party in the conflict lacks an institutionalised system of legitimate representation. In this case, the faction continually attempts to influence the process of policymaking and thus might apply spoiling action.The probability of actors to draw on cooperative or subversive measures in a peace process depends not only on their political preferences, but also on the balance of power within their community. Hence, it has to be taken into consideration that spoilers might be aiming to coerce rivals within their own community instead of focussing on maximising their political gains vis-à-vis their adversary. As a consequence, leaders of dominant factions tendentially have most to gain from a peace process because it enables them to take part in negotiations, which approves their political role. Furthermore, it might increases their access to material resources and institutional power over rival movements. Subordinate factions, on the other hand, are more likely to

undertake subversive behaviour in a peace process in order to enhance their role and downplay that of the dominant party. Another important consideration is that spoilers aim at affecting public opinion within their own community and thereby increase their popularity. Marginal factions may also adapt their stance towards cooperative or non-cooperative measures to that of powerful patrons, who offer mental and material support. Furthermore negotiators or spoilers may try to influence leaders of their own faction by demonstrating their ability to make or break the peace process and hence, illustrate the costs of ignoring them. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, pp. 79-86)

The above described theory implies a **constructivist approach** to reality because it assumes that specific perceptions of the actors lead to the development of conceptual constructs that guide the actors' political behaviour. Strategic actors draw back on certain constructions of reality, which are classifiable into different interpretative choice levels. The first level includes central perceptions about the characteristics and functionality of the political system, also-called worldview. The second level comprises an orientation framework that lays the basis for the selection of relevant strategy parameter, while the third level offers a basis for the choice of concrete alternatives of action. (cp. Raschke/Tils, 2007, pp. 128)

Max Weber introduced another important aspect with regard to the theory of strategy which is success-oriented purposive rationality (**Zweckrationalität**). Purposive rationality implies that the behaviour of actors is guided by the principles of purpose, means and side effects and that actors weigh these principles against each other. (cp. Raschke/Tils, 2007, p. 156) The ideal case assumes that strategic actors are able to conduct a selection process between choices based on rational criteria and thus, choose the optimal alternative and implement it accurately in practice. But there are various arguments against objective rational choice like limited cognitive and physiological resources or limited information of actors. Strategists subconsciously follow individual intentions that are not necessarily based on the logic of applying the best possible instruments in order to achieve the goal. Further, there is a substantial risk of communicative failure and different culture-specific interpretation contexts. During the process of implementation institutional interests can develop their own dynamics and possibly prevail over the intentional strategic goals.

The most important theory of rational strategic decision is the **Game Theory** that developed a theory of social interaction by mathematical means. It analyses the strategic

decision calculations of actors that interact while pursuing their independent goals and evaluate different possible outcomes of the game. Depending on their favourite outcome, actors choose between cooperative or non-cooperative strategies. Non-cooperative strategies are associated with a Zero-Sum Situation in which the gain of one actor corresponds exactly to the loss of the other. (cp. Raschke/Tils, 2010, pp. 32-40) The classification of strategies according to their cooperative respectively non-cooperative approach seems practicable to analyse conflict situations for which reason Thomas C. Schelling also drew back on Game Theory in his book "The Strategy of Conflict". Schelling makes the important remark that there are not only conflicting interests among the adversaries but also common ones. In international affairs there is opposition as well as mutual dependence, and therefore pure conflict, in which interests involved are diametrically opposed, is an exception. Therefore, winning in a conflict is not relative to one's adversary but relative to one's own value system and may be achieved through bargaining, mutual accommodation and avoidance of mutually damaging behaviour. (cp. Schelling, 1963, pp. 4-5) Schelling outlines, *"In the terminology of game theory, most interesting international conflicts are not 'constant-sum games' but 'variable-sum games': the sum of the gains of the participants involved is not fixed so that more for one inexorably means less for the other. There is a common interest in reaching outcomes that are mutually advantageous".* (Schelling, 1963, pp. 4-5) David Romano, on the other hand, objects that the rational actor, and interest maximising behaviour are able to account for the dynamic nature of people's identity, for which reason cultural framing becomes an important factor of analysis. (cp. Romano, 2006, p. 2) Anatole Ayissi applies the above-mentioned theoretical approaches in a study about territorial conflicts and links it with the three basic human needs: security, prosperity and identity. Thus, Ayissi adopts the following categorisations:

- **Hard Zero-Sum Situation:** is a conflict about **security** and a situation in which the very survival of the claiming group is considered to be at stake. The conflict is perceived as a matter of life and death and since territory cannot be multiplied or enlarged, accommodation and compromise are very unlikely.
- **Soft Zero-Sum Situation:** is a situation in which **prosperity** is contested. A constructive and mutually rewarding solution is probable through the promotion of economic and social prosperity in the claimed region, for which reason chances for accommodation and compromise are given.

- **Grey-Zone Situation:** is an issue of **identity** but can also overlap with the other two needs, security and prosperity. These disputes include a high potential for escalation especially when territory itself becomes an important source of identity and the satisfaction of the other two basic needs is also at stake. Since the glorification of the claiming group's prestige is relative and stakes are mainly symbolic, they are often less compromisable than quantifiable disputes. On the other hand, if the conflict is exclusively a matter of identity, there is a high probability that it does not escalate beyond the level of a constitutional confrontation. (cp. Ayissi, 2001, pp. 44-49)

Based on the above described theory, the following chart will show the most reasonable approach for the present comparative case study.

2. Systems Theoretical Approach to Strategy aimed at the Realisation of Self-Determination of Peoples in Territorial Conflicts



Image 1: Illustration of Systems Theoretical Approach to Strategy

III. THE CASES AND THEIR STRATEGIC ELEMENTS

Part III is subdivided into several chapters dealing with the historical introduction to the conflicts as well as with the detailed description of the strategic elements of the two cases.

The chapters that provide a historical overview of the development of the territorial conflicts are structured chronologically and subdivided into special categories. These include the phases of identity building of the ethnic groups, the stages of contesting aspirations and subsequent disputes, and the resulting changes in the status of the disputed territories as well as of the national movements.

The description and analysis of the strategic elements and the resulting strategies in the conflicts will be conducted from the perspective of the national movements struggling for self-determination and will focus on the strategically most relevant conflict phases. As we will see, a main focus of the study will lie on Kosovo after the abolishment of its autonomy within Yugoslavia in 1989 and on Palestine starting from the incisive war in 1948 respectively the change in the strategic condition through the occupation of the Palestinian Territories by Israel in 1967.

III.I. KOSOVO

Map 1: Kosovo (Malcolm, 1998, p. xvii)

1. Historical Development of the Territorial Conflict

In the course of Kosovo's history, many disputed events, historical falsifications and misinterpretations occurred which led to controversial standpoints among the involved parties. As we will see, the historical development has led to a situation in which Kosovo has been of crucial importance for at least the two dominating ethnic groups on the territory, the Serbs and the Albanians. For the Serbs, Kosovo is the cradle of their nation, while Albanians regard themselves as the native inhabitants of the region, and today pose the demographic majority. Hence, both ethnic groups have laid claim on Kosovo and came into conflict with each other.

1.1. Emerging States and National Awareness at the Balkans

1.1.1. Antecedents Relevant for Serbian and Albanian National Identity-Building

The territory of today's Kosovo was originally inhabited by Illyrian tribes and over time was conquered by Rome as well as by the Byzantine Empire. Slavic migration reached Kosovo only in the sixth and seventh century, but almost no assimilation of the local population took place. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 13-15)

In the seventh century, there emerged Serbian chiefdoms in Rascia (today's territory of Montenegro, Bosnia and Albania) which could not manage to develop a state before about 1200. A dynasty known as Nemanja founded the state (which from now on can be referred to as "Serbia") and expanded it, thus Kosovo got under Serbian rule for the first time. In 1217, Stefan Dusan became the first King of the Serbs and further expanded the empire. Due to its geographical position and richness in natural resources, Kosovo became the political as well as economic centre of the kingdom. With the erection of the Patriarchate of Pec, Kosovo even became the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church. At this time, the ethnic identity of the majority of Kosovo's inhabitants (defined through language) was Serbian, while the smaller group of Albanians lived in the mountains of that area. (cp. Schmidl, 2000, pp. 11-13 ; Demaj, 2003, pp. 15-16) After Stefan Dusan's death in 1355, the Serbian Empire resolved into a number of powerful princedoms. Albanian feudal states developed on the territory of the former Serbian Kingdom, while Kosovo stayed under Serbian predominance. (cp. Demaj, 2003, p. 17)

The Turkish victory over the Serbian army in 1371 marked the starting point of the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans although the Battle of Kosovo, which took place in 1389, played a more important historic-mythological role for the Serbs. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, p. 58) In this battle, an alliance of Serbian, Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian troops as well as fighters of the Albanian population fought unsuccessfully against the Ottomans. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 17-18) The battle ended with another victory for the Ottomans and underpinned the Ottoman suzerainty in the region. This incidence laid the foundation for the Serbian myth of the fateful Battle of Kosovo that marked the breakup of the Serbian Empire which in reality had collapsed years before. (cp. Braun, 1937, pp. 1-5) Two Hungarian campaigns against the Ottomans in 1444 and 1448 also ended with defeat but were an initial point for the revolt of the Albanian nobleman, Gjergj Kastriot "Skanderbeg", against the Ottoman rule from 1443 until his death in 1468, which later became part of the Albanian mythology. (cp. Schmidl, 2000, p. 14)

1.1.2. The Emergence of Serbian and Albanian National Awareness under Ottoman Rule

When the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, they decided to make an end to their indirect rule at the Balkans and brought Kosovo and the Northern parts of Serbia under direct Ottoman leadership in 1455 and 1459. (cp. Schmidl, 2000, p. 14) Although there were some restrictions for non-Muslims, the Ottomans exerted little influence on the social life of subordinated peoples. The strongest argument in favour of the conversion of the Albanians in Kosovo to Islam was the better social and economic status of Muslims. Only the last two centuries of Ottoman rule were more dominated by repression and violence against the local population. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, pp. 91-107)

Since the fifteenth and sixteenth century, the Balkans had been dominated by the struggle for power between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary (respectively the Habsburg Empire since 1526). In 1689, Habsburg troops pushed forward into Kosovo and were supported by the Serbian as well as by the Albanian population due to increased taxation and newly introduced religious repression under the Ottomans. But already in 1690, the Habsburg troops were forced to leave Kosovo and with them, a large part of the Christian population. A second defeat of imperial troops by the Ottomans occurred in

1737 and had similar effects. Afterwards, Albanians from the mountains immigrated to the lowlands of Kosovo and also converted to Islam due to fiscal advantages. Based on a disproportionate deliverance of the numbers of emigrants this population movements later became known as the "Depopulation of Kosovo". (cp. Schmidl, 2000, pp. 14-15)

Tendencies of raising national awareness at the Balkans were strengthened by the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 that initiated important power and socio-political changes, like the rising of national awareness all over Europe, that challenged the existing empires. In order to react to these developments, the Ottomans tried to turn the empire into a modern state. Therefore, they introduced a set of reforms in the military and educational sector as well as the judicial equalisation of non-Muslims, but the concurrent administrative shift to centralised power led to the disempowerment of local strongmen and to brutal oppression of all ethnic groups. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, p. 181)

1.1.2.1. The Emergence of Serbian National Awareness

A Serbian revolt of 1804 following the refusals of Ottoman officers to carry out pro-Serbian reforms was a clear manifestation of a new Serbian national identity. The nationalist ideas advocated a new solution, namely to bring the Ottoman rule to an end and to establish a national state. For the Muslim population at the Balkans, this solution was out of question because they were afraid of getting subordinated, ejected or killed in a Christian state. The anti-Muslim policies of nationalist movements led to increasing displacements of the Muslim population. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, p. 182)

In the course of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, Serbia reached gradually increasing autonomy. This process started with the Russian-Turkish peace treaty in 1812 that concluded one of several wars between the Russian and the Ottoman Empire and strengthened Russia's position at the Balkans. In 1817, the area around Belgrade became a principality and after Russia together with Serbia and Romania defeated the Ottomans in another Russian-Turkish war in 1877/78, Serbia became an independent kingdom and huge numbers of Albanians were displaced from the territory of the new state. The new order at the Balkans that resulted from this war touched the interests of the European Great Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia), for which reason their representatives and leading statesmen of the Ottoman Empire

convened in the Congress of Berlin in summer 1878 in order to rearrange the partition of the former Ottoman territories at the Balkans. The newly established independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania was confirmed while Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina and became the protecting power of Serbia until the regicide in Belgrade in 1903, when Serbia changed into the Russian sphere of control. Albanian inhabited territories were divided between the newly established states or partly remained under Ottoman dominance. (cp. Schmidl, 2000, pp. 15-16; Schmitt, 2008, p. 170)

1.1.2.2. The Emergence of (Kosovo) Albanian National Awareness

Although there raised a first flare of Albanian national awareness in 1785 when the Illyrian Confederation was established in North Albania and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, a stronger Muslim-Albanian identity only emerged against Greek, Serbian and Montenegrin territorial claims and manifested itself through the establishment of the League of Prizren in 1878. Due to the fact that especially the new Slavic conqueror acted brutally against the Muslim population, the league advocated the continuance of Ottoman rule over Albanian inhabited areas and demanded the restoration of the status quo before the recent war as well as the privileging of Muslims over Christians. At the time of its establishment, the league was a regional pool of Muslim interests and therefore did not pursue pure ethno-national ambitions.

The national program of reaching Albanian autonomy within the Ottoman Empire developed later and was supported by the Muslims in Kosovo only in order to avert Serbia and to defend Islam and local interests but they never took over a leading role in these ambitions. Among the biggest problems of the Albanians was the absence of a unifying national church which was a reason for the further fragmentation of Albanian centres of power and a lack of alliance partners. (cp. Schmidl, 2000, pp. 15-16; Schmitt, 2008, pp. 170-171) But against the threat of getting completely absorbed by the neighbouring states, the League of Prizren started to realise its aims with military action. By 1881, the whole Albanian territory was under its rule and the leadership of the League named itself provisional government. The Albanian troops successfully defended the North Albanian cities at the coast that were envisaged to be handed over to Montenegro. This led to an Ottoman military major offensive against the Albanians and to the installation of a rule of terror in order to repress any strives for independence. After this

setback, the League was rebuilt in 1899 and named League of Pej which deployed new troops to fight the repressive Ottoman rule. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 21-22)

At that time, the Ottoman Empire was weakened not only by Albanian resistance but also by a large-scale mutiny initiated by a number of secret movements among the young Ottoman officers, known as the "Young Turks". Their main aim was the modernisation and unification of the empire on the basis of Ottoman nationalism. Against this background, the League of Pej conducted further huge revolts against the Ottoman Empire in 1909 and 1911 which expanded from Kosovo all over Albanian territory. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, pp. 236-243)

Nevertheless it has to be mentioned that the transformation from a Muslim-Albanian towards a national-Albanian identity did not take place before 1945. The new identity strengthened in the 1980s and was finalised only during the crisis in the 1990s. Thus, the emergence of a particular Kosovo Albanian national identity can be regarded as the unintended result of the Serbian Kosovo policy. (cp. Schmitt, 2008, p. 159)

1.2. Kosovo's Disputed Territory and the Albanian Struggle for a Common Nation State

1.2.1. Kosovo as Part of the Self-Declared Albanian State during the First Balkan War

The Ottomans were forced to acknowledge the Albanian nation in August 1912 and to grant the Albanians the construction of an autonomous state. But this concession was made too late because the First Balkan War already started in October that year when a Serbian, Bulgarian, Montenegrin and Greek coalition under the leadership of the Russian Empire declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Albanian national assembly decided the secession from the Ottoman Empire and proclaimed its independence on 28 November 1912. Ismail Qemajli built the first provisional government and declared Albania's neutrality in the Balkan war. (cp. Demaj, 2003, p. 22)

1.2.2. Kosovo Conquered by and Affiliated to the Kingdom of Serbia as a Consequence of the First Balkan War

The Ottoman Empire was defeated in the war and its troops had to leave the Balkans while the Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek troops conquered large parts of Albania including Kosovo. During the war, the alliance fought not only against Ottoman troops but also against the Albanian population which caused enormous outrages and humanitarian tragedies. In the peace treaty, the Ottoman Empire assigned all occupied territory at the Balkans to the signatory states except the Albanian inhabited provinces. Among the former allies, there were enormous disputes about the partition of the new obtained territory.

So delegates from the Balkan allies including Greece and from the Ottoman Empire met at the London Peace Conference which had its initial meeting in December 1912 and follow-up sessions until May 1913. Parallel, a Conference of Ambassadors of the European Great Powers took place to defend their own interests. The Conference of Ambassadors acknowledged the disentanglement of Albania from the Ottoman Empire but without determining concrete borders.

During the time of the conference sessions, Serbia committed ethnic cleansing among the Albanians who constituted the unquestioned majority in Kosovo with about 92 per cent of the inhabitants in order to improve its chances for an international recognition of its occupation of Kosovo. Between 1912 and 1913, about 20,000 people were killed and around 1,000 were displaced. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 22-24)

During the London Conference of 30 May 1913, the war parties signed the Treaty of London that was accomplished under the mediation of the Great Powers which in their own interest did not take into consideration the needs of the local population. Among other treaty provisions, Albania became an independent state while Kosovo became a part of Serbia despite its Albanian majority population. This drawing of borders became a trauma in the Albanian conception of history known as the fragmentation of the Albanian territories and laid the basis of today's Kosovo question. (cp. Schmitt, 2008, pp. 179-180; Schmidl, 2000, p. 19)

Furthermore, the un-acceptance of the peace settlement by the dissatisfied Balkan countries led to a new round of disputes in the region, the Second Balkan War that started already in June 1913 and lasted several months.

1.2.3. Kosovo under Occupation in World War I

The First World War, which was a confrontation of the Central Powers, the German Empire and Austria-Hungary, on one side, and the Entente, France, Great Britain and Russia with its allies (Serbia, Montenegro et al.) on the other, started in 1914. Their struggle for power also reached Albania, which became again occupied by troops of its neighbouring countries. The Serbian Kingdom was destroyed by the Central Powers, and Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria conquered also parts of Kosovo in 1916 and announced Albania's autonomy and held out the prospect of independence. The Kosovo-Albanians demanded the reunification of all Albanian inhabited territories to an independent Albanian state. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 25-26) But when Austria-Hungary collapsed during the last phase of the First World War in 1918, Serbian forces returned to Kosovo and repressed its Albanian inhabitants. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, p. 264) As reaction to these occurrences, the Kosovo defence organisation, called Mbrojtija Kombetare e Kosoves, was formed with the aim to liberate all occupied Albanian territories. (cp. Demaj, 2003, p. 55)

1.2.4. Kosovo as Heteronomous Entity within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes respectively the Kingdom of Yugoslavia

In November 1918, World War I ended with the defeat of the Central Powers and dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman and Russian Empire.

The rearrangement of the Balkans in the immediate aftermath of the war led to the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that was proclaimed on 1 December 1918 (later renamed into "Kingdom of Yugoslavia") and brought together today's Republics of Serbia (including Kosovo which was regarded as an integral part of Serbia), Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. Due to its size and victorious army, Serbia became dominant in the new state which was therefore ruled by the Serbian Crown Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevic. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, p.

264) The Serbian government forced a colonisation programme aiming at changing the national composition of the population of Kosovo by encouraging Serbian and Montenegrin settlers to move along strategically important communication routes as well as to the sensitive border area to Albania. Although first colonising efforts had already been made before World War I, the settlement program gained in importance only after the re-conquest of Kosovo in 1918. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, pp. 278-279)

In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference held its first session with the task to frame the conditions for peace after the end of hostilities in 1918 and decided the establishment of the League of Nations in order to prevent another World War.

In 1920, the proclamation of Albanian independence took place and its own demarcation followed ethnic criteria for which reason Kosovo was considered as part of the Albanian state. But the fate of this new state was also subject to the Paris Peace Conference. On 9 November 1921, the victorious powers determined the Albanian borders according to the former Great Powers' decision of 1913 which meant that Kosovo was again officially awarded to Serbia.

The government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes did not grant any autonomous rights to Kosovo in its constitution of 1921 nor respected the League of Nations' contract for the protection of minorities that the kingdom was forced to sign. The state's policy was oriented towards assimilation or liquidation of Albanians. Due to its violent protest against the new constitution, the existence of the Communist Party within the kingdom was banned by law and the old ethnic and religious tensions between the peoples continued. In 1929, King Aleksandar took control over the situation and annulled the constitution, declared himself the absolute ruler and renamed the state into Kingdom of Yugoslavia. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 26-32) Although King Aleksandar eased up on his absolute power over Yugoslavia and announced a more liberal constitution in 1931, he was assassinated in 1934 by an ultra-nationalist Croat, a member of the so-called Ustasa. The Ustasa closely cooperated with Germany and Italy, which in 1941 conquered and abolished the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. (cp. Schuman, 2004, pp. 22-25)

1.2.5. Kosovo's Reunion with Albania under Foreign Occupation in World War II

Croatia together with Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent state pursuing anti-Serbian policy under the Ustasa regime of Ante Pavelic. With the beginning of World War II, the regime acted brutally against Serbs, Jews and Roma and executed genocide.

In Serbia and Kosovo, an enormous change in the proportion of power took place. This resulted from the fact that the majority of the Albanian settlement areas in Kosovo, West Macedonia and Montenegro were merged with Albania which had been an Italian zone of occupation. All its inhabitants were declared Albanian citizen under Albanian administration and institutions. During that time, there occurred acts of revenge against the Serbian population in this area which led to the displacement of thousands of Serbian settlers. This tendency was intensified after the German takeover of Albania that followed the capitulation of Italy in 1943. The German acknowledgement of Albania led to the solidarity of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia with the occupier.

In the occupied territory of Serbia, the nationalist and anti-communist Cetniks acted as resistance force against the fascist regimes. Another opposition on the territory of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia were the communist partisans led by Josip Broz Tito. Their vision of post-war Yugoslavia was a multinational federation. The partisans initiated the foundation of the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia in Jajce on 29 November 1943 that laid the corner stone for the eventual establishment of the Federation of South Slav peoples under the rule of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 32- 35; Vickers, 1998, pp. 146-162)

Due to the repression under the Serbian regime and the better conditions under the German occupation, it was not easy for the communist partisans to gain support among the Albanian population which was only granted due to a concession of sovereignty. Hoping for a definite liberation from Serbian rule, the Albanians in Kosovo built up their own partisan troops that had reached the strength of more than 50,000 fighters by 1944. Through the establishment of a military commandership, an independent provincial council and other state institutions, Kosovo was able to bypass the Serbian institutions and was connected directly with the central Yugoslav bodies. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp.38-40)

In January 1944, local committees of the Communist Party agreed upon the Bujan-Resolution which envisioned the right of Kosovo Albanians to unite with Albania after the deployment of German troops. But this resolution was opposed by Tito and therefore did not enter into force when the Germans left the Balkans in October that year after they had been defeated by the partisans and the Allies, particularly the Soviet Union's Red Army. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 36-37)

1.3. Kosovo's Disputed Status and the Kosovo Albanian Struggle for Self-Determination within the Context of Yugoslavia

1.3.1. The Kosovo Albanian Struggle for Autonomy within Socialist Yugoslavia

1.3.1.1. Kosovo as Autonomous Region of Serbia within the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia under the Constitution of 1946

Between 1944 and 1945, the Communist National Liberation Army took over power and established a military administration in Kosovo. Under this regime, imprisonments and mass executions were committed causing thousands of Albanian deaths. At the Prizren Conference in July 1945, the representatives of Kosovo-Metohija[8] were forced to affiliate Kosovo to Serbia with the status of an autonomous region. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 37-38) After the conclusion of World War II, the new state, Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, with Tito as Prime Minister was established. Its main state institutions were the Interim Government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia and the Interim National Assembly. In November 1945, elections for the bicameral Constituent Assembly took place and its first act was the Declaration on the Proclamation of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia that finally abolished the former monarchy. (cp. Imamovic, 2006, pp. 361-368)

The new constitution of 1946 confirmed the federal structure of the state with six Socialistic Republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia), one "autonomous province", the Vojvodina, and one "autonomous region", Kosovo, that had lesser competencies than the autonomous province. At that time, the autonomous province as well as the autonomous region was not subordinated to the Republic of Serbia which changed only with the subsequent constitution. (cp. Vickers,

[8] The term „Kosovo-Metohija" is the official denomination for the province which is often abbreviated „Kosmet".

1998, pp. 146-148) The constitution did not specify the peoples of the Republic Yugoslavia, but it assured equal rights to every citizen which also included members of national minorities. (cp. Imamovic, 2006, pp. 369-370)

Map 2: Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1991 (Malcolm, 1998, p. xxv)

1.3.1.2. Kosovo as an Autonomous Province of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the Constitution of 1963

On 7 April 1963, Yugoslavia's new constitution was adopted which renamed the state into Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and upgraded Kosovo to the status of an autonomous province while at the same time subordinating Kosovo and the Vojvodina to the Republic of Serbia. (cp. Vickers, 1998, pp. 160-162) In 1971, Yugoslavia was transformed from a federal into a con-federal state by constitutional amendments. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, p. 327) Despite these formal changes, Serbia still centrally administered Kosovo and Vijvodina. But the more crucial innovation was that the new constitution created Kosovo as administrative unit in today's borders, and the right to exist of Albanians in Yugoslavia was officially recognised for the first time. (cp. Schmitt, 2008, p. 228)

1.3.1.3. Kosovo's Upgrading to the Status of a Socialist Autonomous Province within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the Constitution of 1974

The next major constitutional change, which would remain valid until the break-up of Yugoslavia, was realised in 1974. The constitution permitted greater self-rule in the six republics and substantially increased the autonomy of Kosovo and the Vojvodina as

autonomous provinces of Serbia. Tito became Yugoslav President for life time. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, p. 327) These amendments brought equalisation for the autonomous provinces with the republics concerning their competencies, their political structure and their decision-making process. Therewith, Kosovo got the competences for its own legislation and budget planning. The only difference between the status of republics in comparison to that of the "autonomous provinces" was that the provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, had no right of secession. With this constitutional upgrading of Kosovo, the interethnic tensions within the province rose and the Serbs and Montenegrins who lived within Kosovo experienced increasing marginalisation. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 39-41)

The constitutional changes originally were a reaction to a serious political crisis caused by economic problems and tendencies of separatism of Croatia. In the 1960s, the Croatian Adriatic had become the most profitable region within the state due to the emerging tourist industry. This led to the wish of Croatian politicians to gather more control over the incomes. Polarisation and provocations caused a conflict that arose along Croatian-Serbian lines and provided possibilities for mass political mobilisation for the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation with greater self-rule for its six republics. The constitution ensured the right of self-management, socio-political activity and socio-economic as well as individual rights and freedoms for all citizens. (cp. Imamovic, 2006, pp. 380-384) The disadvantage of the self-management system was that it proved as a type of democracy, which was incompatible with efficiency. Citizens were not capable of macro-economic decisions or control and due to its high level of bureaucratisation the system was partly responsible for the country's economic downturn. (cp. Koyama, 2003, pp. 11-13; Imamovic, 2006, p. 385) However, the main catalyst of the economic problems was that Yugoslavia borrowed high amounts of money from Western countries in the 1970s to stimulate its economic growth. This should assure the country's economic and political viability until Tito's death in 1980, but later led to a high financial deficit. The economic problems were without a doubt among the main reasons for the political destabilisation of Yugoslavia. (cp. Čuvalo, 1997, p. 37)

1.3.1.4. Kosovo's Abolished Autonomy in Times of Rising Ethno-Nationalism within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia according to the Constitution of Serbia of 1989

In order to find a way out of the acute economic problems, the six republics identified different solutions that stood in opposition to each other: Croatia and Slovenia pushed for more decentralisation while Serbia preferred recentralisation.

Tito had created a system of government for Yugoslavia that should govern the country without just one national leading figure. It foresaw a rotating presidency among the representatives of the six republics and the two autonomous provinces. This government ordered a study of the Yugoslav political and economic system which came to the conclusion that a free market system had to be introduced. But this reform failed due to the fact that communist authorities did not want to give up their power which led to a significant increase of nationalism in all constituent entities of Yugoslavia. (cp. Schöningh, 2007, pp. 188-189; Čuvalo, 1997, pp. 38-39)

In 1981, when a demonstration of students of the University of Prishtina against bad economic and social conditions in Kosovo and especially at the university turned into heavy revolts, the government reacted with repression. There were mass imprisonments and the state of emergency was declared. The violent crushing of the protests led to a further polarisation of the Serbian and the Albanian population in Kosovo and therewith to the worsening of inter-ethnic relationships. Not economic or social aspects dominated the discourse but ethnic criteria that were politicised to a high degree. The revolts can be seen as the initial point of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

One could see how distinctive the nationalistic character of the interethnic confrontation in Kosovo was when the funeral of the former Serbian Minister of Interior, Aleksandar Rankovic, in 1983 turned into a manifestation of Serbian nationalism. During his term in office between 1946 and 1966, a policy of repression and Serbisation was conducted for which reason Rankovic was celebrated as the protector of Serbian culture. In the mass demonstration following the funeral, thousands of Serbs complained about their alleged discrimination within Yugoslavia and claimed the strengthening of Serbia as it had been pursued by Rankovic's policy. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 41-45)

The first organised Kosovo Serbian protest was a petition against Albanian nationalism and separatism signed by 2,000 citizens of Kosovo Polje and published in a newspaper in

January 1986. (cp. Vickers, 1998, p. 221) This petition was followed by the publication of a more important document, the draft Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Extracts of the Memorandum were published on 24 and 25 September 1986 in the newspaper Vecernje Novosti and officially opened the debate about the so-called "Serbian Question", the living conditions and status of Serbs in Yugoslavia. The memorandum contained a list of complaints about the alleged discrimination of Serbs within Yugoslavia. (cp. Judah, 2000, p. 48; Vickers, 1998, p. 222) Tito's policy and the constitution of 1974 had been heavily criticised because it was accused of carving Serbia into three parts (which refers to the status of Kosovo and Vojvodina). The memorandum demanded the abolishment of the constitution and therewith the autonomous status of Kosovo. Another accusation was that since 1981, the Kosovo Albanians had made war against the Serbs with means of physical, political, cultural and juridical "genocide". Therefore, the memorandum demanded governmental action in order to improve the situation of Serbs all over Yugoslavia.

Slobodan Milosevic became a prominent figure in Serbian politics by further exploiting the Kosovo issue. In his speeches he referred to the non-proved Albanian policy of genocide against the Serbs in Kosovo. As the emerging national leader, he quickly took over the Communist Party and replaced Ivan Stambolic, the President of the Serbian League of Communists. His main sources of support were, on one hand, Radio Television Belgrade and, on the other, hard-line activists in Kosovo. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, pp. 340-342) Milosevic's strategy for mass mobilisation was a mix of Serbian nationalism and social populism that also assured him the support of the media, intellectuals, party members as well as of the Orthodox Church.

Milosevic's immediate aim was the abolition of the autonomy of the two Yugoslavian provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina and a change in the political leadership of Montenegro. By organising demonstrations, he put pressure on the respective leaderships. As a result, the leaderships of Vojvodina and Montenegro resigned in 1988 and 1989 and were replaced by supporters of the Serbian regime.

The first step towards the realisation of Milosevic's Kosovo agenda was the displacement of the two leading Albanian politicians in Kosovo. As a reaction, demonstrations were organised like that in November 1988 when 3,000 mine workers went on strike and marched 50 kilometres from Trepca to Prishtina. In further demonstrations 300,000

Kosovo Albanian protestors participated who revolted against a Serbian takeover but did not make use of any Albanian nationalistic or secessionist slogans. In February 1989, the Serbs in Belgrade reacted with the greatest demonstration ever performed in Yugoslavia with about one million participants who called for drastic measures in order to repress the revolts in Kosovo.

Diverse amendments of the Serbian constitution gradually abolished the autonomy of the provinces which was the first legal step towards their complete subordination to Serbia. This led to a general strike in Kosovo which was again initiated by the mine workers. Milosevic answered by stationing military troops and declaring the state of emergency upon Kosovo. Under heavy pressure from the military and the secret police, the necessary amendments of the constitution for the actual repeal of the autonomy passed the parliament of Kosovo on 23 March 1989. The consequential demonstrations were brutally oppressed and protestors as well as the economic and political ruling class of Kosovo were imprisoned.

Myths about Kosovo as the historical and cultural cradle of the Serbs and the centre of Serbian identity were revived. On 28 June 1989, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo was celebrated, and Milosevic held a speech that was heard by one million people. He announced that Serbia was again facing battles and admitted that although the battles were not armed ones, they could not be excluded. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, p. 54-59)

1.3.2. The Kosovo Albanian Struggle for Independence

1.3.2.1. The Kosovo Albanian Strive for Independence from Serbia and Recognition as a Republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The Kosovo Albanians refused to accept the legality of the Serbian state. The impulse for a civil resistance movement came from the side of Kosovo Albanian intellectuals who organised the establishment of parallel structures within Kosovo and established a party called Democratic League of Kosovo, Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves (LDK), in December 1989. Ibrahim Rugova became the leader of this organisation that promoted campaigns for democracy and against violence in order to prove the falsehood of Serbian propaganda and to gain the support of Western countries. (cp. Judah, 2000, p. 64)

The year 1990 began with clashes that erupted in the course of initially peaceful demonstrations, between Albanian protestors and Serbian security forces. Thus, Serbia was forced to make concessions in order to calm down the situation as well as the condemnation of the violent crackdowns by the international media. So Adem Demaci, a popular Albanian political activist, was released from prison after twenty-eight years. (cp. Vickers, 1998, pp. 242-243) He *"[...] had now become something of a spiritual patriarch for the 3 million Albanians in Yugoslavia. After his release he continually stressed the need for a peaceful solution to the present political crisis, with at most passive resistance [...]"*.(Vickers, 1998, p. 243) Indeed Albanians abandoned violence and adopted the concept of passive resistance starting from spring 1990. In July that year, the Serbian government went on depriving the provincial authorities of their power and prevented the now illegal parliament of Kosovo from meeting by barring the building through security forces. So the Albanian parliamentarians assembled on the steps outside the parliament on 2 July 1990 and proclaimed the sovereign Republic of Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation and its secession from Serbia.

Serbia reacted by dissolving the government and the parliament and declared the permanent state of emergency over Kosovo. The Serbian and Yugoslav authorities declared Kosovo's proclamation of independence invalid and the Serbian National Assembly took administrative and executive control of the province. On 11 July, the Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia held a session in which it supported Serbia's decision and thus, finally removed the legal basis for the autonomy of Kosovo.

In reaction, the Albanian representatives adopted the constitution of the Republic of Kosovo on 7 September 1990 that declared Kosovo an independent and sovereign republic.

The Serbs ignored this announcement and adopted a new constitution on 28 September that effectively abolished the autonomous status of both provinces within Yugoslavia by defining them as regions within the Serbian Republic. With the loyal votes of Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo, Serbia possessed as much power in the federal institutions of Yugoslavia as the other four republics together.

The Serbian takeover in Kosovo was followed by a deliberate process of Serbisation which led to the dismissal of Albanians in public institutions and the transfer of competencies into the hands of Serbs respectively the absorption of political functions by the government in Belgrade. Migration of Serbs to Kosovo was promoted and in the educational sector, Serbian curricula were used. Serbo-Croatian became the official language and an ethnic proportion for employment was adopted. Informal, institutional and ideological discrimination of Albanians was accompanied by violent repressions. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, p. 59-63; Vickers, 1998, pp. 243-245)

1.3.2.2. The Kosovo Albanian Quest for Independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Context of the Dissolution of the Yugoslav State

The end of communism in the Soviet bloc was marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the resignation of communist governments under the pressure of their citizens. But in Yugoslavia, there were no revolutionary movements and the system had collapsed slowly. The state's main pillars, the Communist Party and the Yugoslav People's Army, Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija (JNA), successively disintegrated and lost their original function. While the Communist Party broke up into different parties for each republic, the JNA got increasingly under Serbian hegemony. (cp. Čuvalo, 1997, pp. 37-39)

The collapse of the Yugoslav state and the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence in 1991[9] were the starting point for the armed conflict at the Balkans. When the non-Serb republics except of Montenegro seceded from Yugoslavia, the Serbs planned the establishment of a Greater Serbia and armed conflicts between the territorial defence units of Slovenia and Croatia and the JNA took place. (cp. Schöningh, 2007, p. 75)

In Kosovo, Albanians as well as Serbs were accusing each other of establishing a "second war front" in Yugoslavia. Against this background, Serbia armed Serbian and Montenegrin civilians in Kosovo while police forces collected arms from Albanians. Meanwhile, the Albanian parties in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro built a joint

[9] The Macedonian declaration of independence followed those of Croatia and Slovenia shortly afterwards in 1991.

committee under the chairmanship of Ibrahim Rugova in order to coordinate antagonistic activities.

Although the constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was declared invalid by Serbia and the parliament of Kosovo was regarded as illegal, the parliamentarians adopted the Resolution on Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo on 22 September 1991. In a referendum, 99.87 per cent of the eligible voters in Kosovo voted in favour of the proclamation of independence from Yugoslavia. Consequentially, the constitution was amended and the independence of Kosovo was declared on 19 October 1991. Serbian authorities also condemned these steps as illegal. JNA units were deployed in Kosovo and Serbian reservist forces were stationed at the Albanian border. A total ethnic segregation of Albanians and Slavs took place in Kosovo and paralysed its economic, political and social institutions. (cp. Vickers, 1998, pp. 250-253)

In January 1992, the International Community decided to accept the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. When the multi-cultural republic Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence from Yugoslavia in March 1992, a civil war between the ethnic groups erupted. (cp. Imamovic, 2006, pp. 392-393)

1.3.2.3. The Kosovo Albanian Struggle for the Realisation of a Sovereign and Independent Statehood

While Serbia together with Montenegro proclaimed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in April 1992, Kosovo consolidated its parallel state structure. The Albanian political parties tempted to consolidate the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo and tried to present themselves to the International Community as coherent and unified state in the making. Thus, they held parliamentary and presidential elections in May 1992 that resulted in a huge success for the LDK and its leader, Ibrahim Rugova, who subsequently became President of Kosovo. (cp. Vickers, 1998, pp. 259-261)

In summer that year, an international conference in London took place which dealt with the conflict at the Balkans, but despite a condemnation of mass displacements there was no concrete outcome. But the situation on the ground even exacerbated after the Serbian elections in December 1992. Milosevic's party won the majority but Serbian ultra-nationalists under the leadership of Vojislav Seselj gained almost half of the seats in

the federal parliament and the radical party demanded the expulsion of all Albanians from Kosovo. (cp. Vickers, 1998, pp. 266-267)

In 1993, an international conference took place in Geneva that, like the conference in London, did not grant full participant status to the Kosovo Albanian representatives. This ignorance of the International Community led to the uprising of radical militants within Rugova's movement who promoted a military solution. The growing number of extreme nationalist militias and deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Kosovo led to an emigration flow of Kosovo Albanians. (cp. Vickers, 1998, pp. 271-273)

In 1994, most supporters of Rugova and the LDK realised that the concept of peaceful resistance had failed to bring a solution to the Albanian question. This led to tensions within the party and to the establishment of the UCK as kind of parallel state institution in the military sector. (cp. Vickers, 1998, p. 281)

In August 1995, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina escalated. The escalation led to a NATO intervention as well as to a roll-back of the Serbs and at last to the readiness of all sides to negotiate a peace agreement. (cp. Schöningh, 2007, p. 75) Against this background, the situation in Kosovo grew more acute due to the colonisation policy of Serbia which was confronted with 700,000 Serbian war refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. 15,000 Serbs who had fled from the Krajina were sent to Kosovo in order to create an ethnic balance. The settlement of Serbs should compensate the high fertility rates of the Kosovo Albanians. The Kosovo Albanians and especially the members of the UCK reacted with a wave of terrorism against the Serbian refugees in order to discourage further colonisation. (cp. Hofbauer, 2001, p. 94)

In October, the atmosphere in Kosovo got more optimistic because of the expectation that the war in former Yugoslavia would finally come to an end. The leadership in Kosovo hoped that its status would be part of the comprehensive peace settlement but this wish had to be abandoned. The International Community was not able to solve the Kosovo question because it needed Serbian support to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as Dayton Agreement. The agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 by the representatives of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and marked the formal end of the war. Bosnian Serbs got their own republic within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina but the solution of the

Albanian question in Kosovo did not become a condition for the removal of United Nations' sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. The independence of Kosovo was not part of the peace talks at all. Also its former ally, the Albanian President Berisha, called for a solution of the Albanian question within Serbia instead of demanding an Albanian unification. Thus, these developments brought a bitter disillusion for the Kosovo Albanians. (cp. Vickers, 1998, pp. 286-287)

The Kosovo Albanians recognised that the International Community would not intervene in favour of their independence, although most of them were not willing to accept the status quo. They increasingly rejected peaceful policies due to their frustration and disappointment about the International Community's ignorance of their situation.

In 1996, the national movement for the Liberation of Kosovo, Levizja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves (LKCK), committed some attacks on Serbian refugees that were followed by a UCK campaign against individual Serbs as well as against Serbian police and soldiers. When member states of the European Union recognised the FRY with Kosovo as a part of it, a well-planned strategy to destabilise Kosovo began. The UCK publicised a bulletin in which it declared itself responsible for the terrorist attacks. Serbs responded with attacks against Kosovo Albanians and with governmental repression measures. (cp. Vickers, 1998, pp. 290-292)

In November 1996, local elections were held in Serbia and were as usually boycotted by the Kosovo Albanians. It soon became clear that the opposition parties had won a lot of votes but when the results were announced it appeared that the regime of Slobodan Milosevic had manipulated the elections in order to remain in control of the municipalities. As a result, there were daily marches and protests against the regime in Serbia aiming at weakening its position. (cp. Judah, 2000, pp. 132-133) While the LDK leadership paid no political attention to the happenings in Serbia, some Kosovo Albanian officials like Berisha and Demaci welcomed the pressure for democratisation and showed their support for the Serbian protestors. (cp. Clark, 2000, p. 126)

Despite the first public appearance of the UCK on 28 November 1997, when hummed UCK fighters held a speech at a funeral of an Albanian teacher that had been shot by Serbs and granted him the status of a martyr, Rugova labelled the UCK a Serbian fiction until the beginning of 1998. According to Rugova, this Serbian brainchild aimed at

justifying the brutal actions of Serbian security forces against Albanians. At a press conference of the JNA in January 1998, a general warned that Serbia will no longer tolerate threats against the territorial integrity of the state. Although the International Court of Justice tried to mediate between both sides in order to negotiate the future status of Kosovo, a violent major offensive against the UCK and Albanian civilians started. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 101-102)

1.3.2.4. The Kosovo War

The *first phase* of the military confrontation between the Serbian security forces and the UCK between the end of February and mid March 1998 comprised mainly the fighting in the Drenica region. After four Serbian police men were killed by UCK fighters, the Serbian forces committed the infamous Drenica massacre in which whole family clans were exterminated. (cp. Reuter, 2000 II, p. 174)

Against this background, the International Community reactivated the Contact Group which had been established during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to coordinate the policy of the USA, the European countries and the Russian Federation for an effective crisis intervention. On 9 March 1998, the Contact Group proclaimed a statement demanding the withdrawal of Serbian special police forces from Kosovo, the authorisation of the deployment of international organisations and the expression of readiness for dialogue. An arms embargo, a moratorium for governmental financing and a prohibition for visas for the Yugoslav leadership were imposed. The Contact Group further asked for the delegation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights and the redeployment of the long-term mission of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that was already deployed in Kosovo from 1992 until 1993. Serbian parties postulated that they would not tolerate external interference but they offered an open dialogue with the Albanian national minority. However, Kosovo Albanians were unable to accept the offer because that would have been tantamount to an acknowledgement of their national minority status. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 107-109)

The *second phase* of the violent struggle between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians from mid March until May 1998 had been characterised by brutal acts of revenge from the side

of the Serbian forces that were partly provoked by the UCK. This resulted in an enormous increase in the number of UCK fighters who joined the organisation after having lost their properties through Serbian attacks on their villages. (cp. Reuter, 2000 II, pp. 174-175)

Although the humanitarian situation on the ground became more pressing, Russia and China signalled within the UN Security Council that they would not tolerate an international interference and Javier Solana, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), emphasised that a military intervention would not be adequate at this point. The Contact Group was also discordant about the further steps but demanded a UN-resolution. With the decision on the UN-resolution 1160, an arms embargo was declared on both parties: the JNA as well as the paramilitary forces of the Kosovo Albanians. The government of the FRY condemned the decision because it allegedly aimed at promoting secession.

The International Community still made efforts to initiate negotiations and was able to arrange a meeting between Rugova and Milosevic. Instead of stabilising the situation, the efforts were interpreted by Kosovo Albanians as concessions to Serbia and resulted even in increasing support for the UCK. When Rugova went to Washington at the end of May 1998 to meet US President Clinton, Milosevic ordered a counteroffensive against the UCK with the aim to recapture control over Kosovo. At that point, the Kosovo Albanians cancelled the negotiations with Serbia and the military conflict in the region went into a new phase. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 112-116)

The *third phase* from the end of May to mid June 1998 was marked by Serbian offensives in the Decan region after the UCK tried to seize control over strategic important streets through attacking Serbian police stations and blocking roads. Serbian forces reacted by burning down villages along these roads, bombing the UCK stronghold in Junik and mining the Kosovo border regions to Albania and Montenegro.

The *fourth phase* from mid June to mid July 1998 brought several successes for the UCK which was temporarily in control of important infrastructure and occasionally opened up new fronts by dispersing Serbs from their villages. The organisation was recognised as the legitimate army of Kosovo by its unofficial parliament. The liberation army now had become a symbol of Albanian resistance and thus the International Community perceived the UCK as important factor in all approaches to the problem. But the UCK's actions

were not coordinated and therefore were not part of an overall strategic plan and, maybe more important, it did not stick to the basic rule of all partisan movements. Instead of applying hit-and-run tactics and being invisible after operations, the UCK took up position in different villages and tried to defend its control over certain parts of infrastructure. The fighters were too quick in announcing "liberated territories" which made them an easy target for the military superior Serbian forces. (cp. Reuter, 2000 II, pp. 174-176)

These heavy fights between the UCK and the JNA led to the displacement and death of thousands of people and thus, a NATO operation under the leadership of the USA was planned. Although an intervention was refused by the Russian Federation, a manoeuvre in Albanian and Macedonian airspace took place on 15 June. Milosevic and the Russian President Jelzin negotiated an agreement which contained diplomatic concessions and assured the Russian veto against a military NATO initiative against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Against this background, the Kosovo Diplomatic Observers Mission was installed in order to assure a continuous observation and documentation of the happenings that had great influence on the development of the engagement of the International Community. But the Yugoslav government seized the opportunity to start another major offensive against the UCK knowing that there would not be a NATO intervention. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 119-122)

In the *fifth phase* from mid July to mid August, Serbian forces conducted their final offensive in order to abolish the UCK bases, barriers as well as its strongholds.

During the *last phase* from mid August until the beginning of October, when Richard Holbrooke, US Special Envoy to the Balkans, and Milosevic agreed on a truce, Serbian forces tried to clear the territories from UCK enclaves and its fighters. But in reality the forces only managed to expel them to Northern Albania. Although the UCK lost 1,000 fighters in the confrontations, its bigger problem was the loss of prestige among the population that did no longer believe in the invincibility of the Kosovo army. (cp. Reuter, 2000 II, pp. 176-177)

In the course of the fighting, the humanitarian situation in Kosovo had further deteriorated and the International Community tried to put pressure on the Yugoslav government to negotiate.

In September, the UN Security Council enacted resolution 1199 in which it expressed its concern about the situation. The following day, the NATO adopted the so-called Activation Warning which contained possible restricted airstrikes against the FRY. The UN-resolution, however, did not comprise a mandate for this operation because of the blockade of Russia and China in the Security Council. In October, an agreement between Milosevic and Richard Holbrook was signed. It contained a ceasefire as well as the following concessions: Milosevic should reduce the armed forces in Kosovo, 2,000 unarmed OSCE observers should be stationed in the region, and NATO control flights should be allowed. The agreement further comprised a catalogue of eleven principles for a political solution of the conflict. The UN-resolution 1203 supported the following agreements that were adopted in order to fulfil the concessions. The main weakness of the agreement was that the Albanian side had not even been considered and the UCK was not obliged to comply with the ceasefire. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 122-141)

In January 1999, a critical escalation of violence occurred when members of the UCK murdered four Serbian policemen and the Yugoslav forces together with some paramilitary groups killed 45 Kosovo Albanians in a village named Racak in revenge. This incident marked a turning point in the policy of the International Community because it was obvious that previous efforts of pacification had failed. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 159-165)

These brutal actions put the International Community under stress to find a quick solution to the Kosovo conflict and therefore it hosted a conference in Rambouillet which started on 6 February 1999. Both parties were put under pressure to agree within 14 days to an arrangement about the autonomy of Kosovo which should be valid for three years. The draft agreement was based on the constitution of 1974 that defined Kosovo as an independent unit within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but neither of the two parties was ready to sign it. During the conference, 40,000 Yugoslav soldiers were stationed in Kosovo in order to displace Albanian civilians. After some amendments of the first draft, the Kosovo Albanian representatives accepted to sign the so-called Rambouillet Agreement under considerable US-pressure, which would have assured Kosovo a high degree of autonomy controlled by the OSCE. An annex stated that the final status of Kosovo should be up to a referendum among its inhabitants. The Serbian side completely refused the agreement because it was not ready to accept such a high level of autonomy

for Kosovo and did not consent to the envisaged stationing of armed NATO troops in the region mentioned in Appendix B[10]. The troops would have enjoyed complete freedom of movement and immunity within the territory of the FRY.

Under these circumstances, the NATO started its intervention with the official objective of stopping the violence and protecting Albanian civilians in Kosovo. The NATO airstrikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia started on 24 March 1999 and effectively still aimed at forcing its government to sign the agreement. The mission called "Operation Allied Force" was based on a resolution of the NATO Council because three foregoing resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council did not mandate a military intervention but only called on the FRY to find a political solution and stop violence against civilians. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 138-140)

During the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the UCK fighters were mainly active in the mountainous region and prevented civilians from getting expelled from their villages. But the limited scope of action of the Serbian army that resulted from the NATO campaigns enabled the UCK to conduct operations against small Serbian formations and against single vehicles. Although the leadership of the UCK repeatedly offered to act as alternative to NATO ground forces, the international alliance officially rejected the proposal. But the reality on the ground made this cooperation unavoidable because Serbian troop concentrations around UCK strongholds automatically became targets of NATO aerial attacks, especially when UCK fighters managed to break through the border of Albania in May and June 1999 and entered the Western part of Kosovo. (cp. Feichtinger, 2000, p. 115-116)

After six weeks of NATO airstrikes against military as well as economic targets in Kosovo and Serbia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia capitulated. Instead of bringing an end to the fighting in Kosovo, immediately after the NATO airstrikes, further human rights abuses occurred. These included displacements, massacres, rapes, disappearances, torture, demolitions, looting as well as the destruction of cultural and social heritage. On

[10] See Rambouillet Agreement (1999): Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html

9 June 1999, the so-called Military Technical Agreement of Kumanovo between the Yugoslav government, the Republic of Serbia and the NATO was concluded. It envisioned the withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian regular as well as paramilitary troops and the deployment of an international security presence, the Kosovo Force (KFOR). This international security presence was confirmed by the UN Security Council resolution 1244 that was adopted on 12 June 1999 and also envisaged a civilian mission in order to install an interim regime to guarantee autonomy and self-government for Kosovo within the FRY. On 20 June 1999, the KFOR and the UCK signed an agreement for the demilitarisation of the organisation. (cp. Demaj, 2003, pp. 148-149)

1.4. Kosovo's Stride towards Statehood

1.4.1. Kosovo as Protectorate under UN Administration

UN Security Council provided a basis for the international civil presence, called United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), controlled by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), as well as for the international security presence, the KFOR. Besides some paragraphs that should assure the compliance of both parties either to withdraw or demilitarise, to allow access to the region by humanitarian aid deliveries and to grant a safe return of refugees, the resolution defined responsibilities of the civil administration of the UNMIK and the security presence of the KFOR. (cp. UN Resolution 1244, 1999, pp. 1-4)

One of the most important priorities of the UN-administration was the establishment of an effective administration through local institutions under the patronage of the United Nations which assured that Kosovo would enjoy substantial autonomy while remaining part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (cp. UN Resolution 1244, 1999, pp. 3-4) Resolution 1244 does not explicitly refer to the final status of Kosovo but it reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia while demanding a substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo. Further, UNMIK is tasked with *"facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords"* (UN Resolution 1244, 1999, p. 4) This reference to the Rambouillet Agreement which Serbia had refused to sign leaves room for interpretation regarding the solution of the status question based

on the will of the people. Thus, the following paragraph was read by the Kosovo Albanian side as option for a referendum about independence, *"Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, […]"* (Rambouillet Agreement, 1999, Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and Final Clauses, Article I.3.)

A main weakness of the interim regime was the lack of clear division of authority between the UN administration and the emerging institution of self-government in Kosovo. The same applied to the sharing of responsibilities among the about 500 non-governmental organisations with partly conflicting interests.

Also in international political spheres, new disputes between Russia and the Western powers arose. Russia announced that the security situation in Kosovo had worsened since the NATO intervention and accused the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of not investigating crimes committed by the UCK against the non-Albanian population. Due to the bad economic situation, Russia demanded the end of the sanctions against the FRY.

In the first phase of the UN administration, NATO troops moved into Kosovo, established their headquarters in Prishtina and divided Kosovo into five zones under the control of different member states.

Map 3: Division of Kosovo into five zones of international control (http://content.grin.com/binary/wi24/109901/2.gif)

Meanwhile, Yugoslav forces withdrew. The main challenge in Kosovo was that the administration of the province had collapsed and there were no provisions for an administrative infrastructure that could be divided along ethnic lines as it was arranged in the Bosnian constitution. Two different polities filled the vacuum of power at that time with a large potential for an intra-Albanian conflict. The Government of the Republic of Kosovo led by Rugova and his party LDK, which was elected unofficially in the early 1990s, on the one hand, and the Provisional Government of Kosovo with Prime Minister Hashim Thaci of the UCK [11] who was part of the Albanian representatives in Rambouillet, on the other.

Another problem was that Kosovo Serbians became targets of revenge attacks which led to their displacement while the KFOR was not prepared to intervene. Civil law and order was envisaged to be maintained by an international police force but mainly through the establishment of a local police. (cp. Report 1, 2000, pp. 100-106)

Within the first year, progress had been made, but UNMIK was criticised for its initial inactivity. Still there was a bad security situation because it was extremely difficult to prevent inter-ethnic violence. Over 90 per cent of the population were Kosovo Albanians who had suffered from repression and discrimination for many years and now had the wish to ensure that their region would become mono-ethnic. At that time, Kosovo still lacked an effective and fair judicial system to prosecute crimes. To impose law and order in the region, the Special Representative decided to transfer the executive and legislative authority as well as the judiciary administration to him. With this act, the parallel state structures were dismantled.

As a first step towards self-government, the Kosovo Transition Council was established which was a committee of leading politicians in Kosovo with advisory and consultative function. The Joint Interim Administrative Council acted as executive board until it was replaced by the coming into effect of the framework of a Kosovo constitution and an elected government. Also new administrative bodies within the municipalities were set up.

[11] In 1999, the UCK was joined by the Party of Democratic Union, Partia e Bashkimit Demokratik (PBD), and later renamed into Democratic Party of Kosovo, Partia Demokratike e Kosoves (PDK). Another political party which arose from the former UCK in 2000 was the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, Aleanca per Ardhmerine e Kosoves (AAK). (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 292-296)

The Serbian National Council for Kosovo and Metohija was established and tasked with the protection of Serbs and the return of refugees. An Institute for Civil Administration served as a training institution for public administration but as a protectorate, Kosovo still had a non-democratic form of governance. (cp. Report 1, 2000, pp. 106-117)

The defeat in the war in Kosovo weakened Milosevic's regime and when the Yugoslav government tried to manipulate the Presidential elections, which took place on 24 September 2000, long-term mass protests arose. On 5 October 2000, Milosevic was overthrown[12] and his opponent, Vojislav Kostunica from the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, Demokratska Opozicija Srbije (DOS), became the legally elected President of the FRY.

Also in October, first elections for the newly built state institutions took place in Kosovo. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 300-302) Among the most important actions since the deployment of the UN administration was the adoption of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo on 15 May 2001. In this document, the self-government institutions, the authority of the Special Representative, the rights of ethnic groups and the system of justice were defined. (cp. Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, 2001, pp. 9-31) In November that year, an agreement between the UNMIK and the Serbian Special Deputy for Kosovo was signed in order to assure that Kosovo Serbs would take part in the creation of a multi-ethnic Kosovo.

With the establishment of a democratically elected government, one of the main aims of the UN administration was reached and the competencies for the leading of the governmental functions could be transferred to locals step by step. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 316-324)

Meanwhile, an inner-state conflict arose in Macedonia in 2001 when the UCK was pressing for more rights for the Albanian minority through violent attacks on state institutions. In order to avoid further escalation, a compromise could be found.

[12] Milosevic was imprisoned in 2001 and delivered to the ICTY in The Hague where he was accused of committing crime against humanity. Milosevic died in The Hague in 2006.

1.4.2. Kosovo Status Negotiations

In 2002, the then SRSG, Michael Steiner, launched a new strategy called "standards before status" which envisaged the fulfilment of political and social development criteria as precondition for negotiations on the status of Kosovo. The standards defined for Kosovo were too vague, and almost none of them could be fulfilled by the Kosovo government. Violent revolts in 2004 were an enormous setback for the peaceful coexistence of the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. A group of Kosovo Albanians revenged an alleged murder of Albanian children and killed Serbs as well as other minorities and destroyed their property. These incidents again laid the focus on the discussion about the further status of the region. When Søren Jessen-Petersen took over the function of the SRSG, he shifted from his predecessor's to the new strategy "standards and status". (cp. Dzihic/Kramer, 2009, p. 3)

Since 2005, the policy of the International Community as well as of the political actors in Kosovo concentrated on a quick start of negotiations on the status of Kosovo. There was no consensus among any of the actors involved in the discussion – neither within the European Union nor the UN Security Council nor within Serbia and Montenegro[13] a common policy could be found. In Kosovo itself, there was a strong polarisation: while 94.4 per cent of the Albanians preferred independence, 92.5 per cent of the Serbs favoured the status as an autonomous province within the FRY. (cp. Dzihic/Kramer, 2006, pp. 163-169)

In October 2005, a comprehensive report on the situation in Kosovo by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General, the Norwegian Kai Eide, advised the clarification of the status question. Therefore, the former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, was appointed by the UN Secretary General and the UN Security Council Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo and tasked with finding a solution. After one year of negotiations, there was still no compromise due to the mutual mistrust between Prishtina and Belgrade and the extremely controversial standpoints. While Kosovo demanded its independence, Serbia was only ready to grant "continuing autonomy" which would have been more than autonomy but less than independence. Due to the incompatibility of the conceptions of both parties, Ahtisaari presented his final report and the Comprehensive

[13] The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was renamed into Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. In 2006, after the declaration of independence of Montenegro, Serbia also became an independent republic.

Proposal for a Kosovo Status Settlement in February 2007. (cp. Dzihic/Kramer, 2009, p. 3)

In March 2007, the proposal was presented to the UN Security Council. It included a plan (later referred to as Ahtisaari Plan) in which the special envoy envisaged the following, *"The time has come to resolve Kosovo's status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo's recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community."* (Report 6, 2007, p. 2) But due to Serbia's refusal of the plan, there was no progress until the end of 2007.

1.4.3. Kosovo's Unilateral Declaration of Independence

Map 4: Republic of Kosovo (http://www.welt-atlas.de/datenbank/karten/karte-1-795.gif)

After more than two years of unsuccessful negotiations on the international status of Kosovo, the unilateral declaration of independence was announced on 17 February 2008. The UN administration did not annul the constitution that was enacted by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. The independence as well as the new constitution were based

on the Ahtisaari Plan and recognised by 53 UN states[14]. Serbia demanded the International Court of Justice in The Hague to examine the legality of the declaration of independence and was backed by Russia which also considered that step illegal. Serbia obtained a majority for a review on Kosovo's independence in the UN General Assembly. (cp. Deimel/Garcia-Schmidt, 2009, pp. 2-3) On 22 July 2010, the court delivered an advisory opinion affirming that *"General international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence - Declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law."*[15] (Legal Opinion 1, 23/05/2010) But until today, Kosovo has not been recognised as a member of the UNO, but a breakthrough for Kosovo was its membership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in May and June 2009. (cp. Deimel/Garcia-Schmidt, 2009, pp. 1-3)

Since the declaration of independence of Kosovo Serbia's strategy has been directed towards the consolidation of control over the Northern part of Kosovo and towards the undermining of the authority of the governmental institutions of Kosovo. Under pressure from Serbia and radical Serbian nationalists in Northern Kosovo, Serbian policemen in the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and Serbian officials stood down their posts. In May 2008, elections were held in the Serbian controlled North of Kosovo simultaneously to the parliamentary elections in Serbia. In June and July, parallel Serb municipal councils and the so-called Kosovo Serb Assembly were established according to the election results. These steps led to the de facto self-government of regions in Kosovo which are inhabited by a Serbian majority and thus to the de facto partition of the country. (cp. Dzihic/Kramer, 2009, pp. 6-13)

In accordance to the Ahtisaari Plan, the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) and the International Civilian Office (ICO) were established. The EULEX should assist Kosovo authorities in the area of rule of law with a focus on policing, justice and customs by monitoring, mentoring and advising. The ICO should ensure full implementation of the status settlement and promote the country's European integration. At the time these

[14] Until the end of 2009, the number of states acknowledging Kosovo's independences had risen to 63. Among the countries that did not recognise Kosovo were many Latin American states, Islamic states and also five EU countries (Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Romania and Slovakia).

[15] For further information see "Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo": http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf (Legal Opinion 1)

institutions were built, the EU created the position of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) to implement the aims of the EU in Kosovo. The primary function of the EUSR was the coordination of the EU presence in Kosovo and the supply of political guidance to local authorities. Pieter Feith was appointed to this position and has been holding a double mandate since as he also heads the ICO as the International Civilian Representative (ICR). (cp. Marmsoler, 2008, pp. 107-109)

The Republic of Serbia refused the EULEX as well as the ICO. In order to win Serbia's support, UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, tried to negotiate with Serbia on its right of having a say in this case. A significant concession was made to Serbia and Russia concerning EULEX's legal basis. The government of Kosovo was not involved in the negotiation and therefore refused its outcome, the so-called Six-Point Plan, with the argument that it would undermine Kosovo's sovereignty as a state. The situation was extremely difficult because the UNMIK was the only mission that was acknowledged by Serbia but it was not mentioned in Kosovo's constitution. Therefore the UN Security Council decided that the EULEX mission would operate within the framework of the UN resolution 1244 and placed it under the patronage of the UNMIK which kept some competencies especially within the Serbian enclaves. With this compromise, Kosovo's independence has not been formally recognised and the full transfer of competencies form the UNMIK to the EULEX still depends on Serbia's acceptance. (cp. Deimel/Garcia-Schmidt, 2009, pp. 3-5)

Until today, the situation in Kosovo is very unstable particularly with regard to the rule of law (mainly due to corruption and the high influence of the mafia), the social and economic situation as well as the interethnic relations.

Although it has been possible to conduct parliamentary and municipal elections and establish well-functioning state institutions, the democratic culture is not yet well developed. The political system is dominated by clientelism and ethno-nationalism, there is often a linkage between politicians and organised crime, and women are marginalised in the political sphere. The democracy-building efforts by the UNMIK, the OSCE and the EU have not been very successful because these institutions are perceived as representatives of the protectorate structure. Their right to intervene undermines the autonomy of the political leaders in Kosovo. The local political actors on the other hand had to face unrealistic expectations which were linked to the declaration of independence.

People in Kosovo thought that rapid progress in the fields of economic and social development would be achieved what proved to be wrong. Due to its serious budget deficit and high unemployment, Kosovo is still dependent upon foreign aid. All macroeconomic indicators reference the weakness of the economic system in Kosovo which is additionally undermined by corruption and organised crime.

Concerning the interethnic relations, it has to be said that the declaration of independence had enormous consequences for the Serbian population in Kosovo. The subsequent de facto partition of the country has led to the development of two "separate worlds", a Kosovo Serbian in the North and a Kosovo Albanian in the South. The return of former Serbian refugees has almost come to a standstill. On the other hand, Serbs within the Southern enclaves increasingly tend to a cooperative attitude towards the state institutions of Kosovo. One of the most important reasons is that Serbia does not have the economic resources to support these enclaves. In these parts, people start to accept that Kosovo will not be restored to Serbia. (cp. Dzihic/Kramer, 2009, pp. 6-13)

The EU's strategy for the stabilisation of post-war countries at the Balkans, the so-called Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), cannot be applied to Kosovo because some EU member states still deny the recognition of Kosovo's independence. On the other hand, a final answer to the status question will have to be found if Serbia aspires a future within the European Union. Thus, the Serbian and the Kosovo government have to change their uncooperative attitudes and work together. (cp. Dzihic/Kramer, 2009, pp. 19-21) In 2011, the governments of Serbia and Kosovo started a political dialogue about factual issues. On 24 January 2012, the International Steering Group (ISG), which is made up of 25 states that should guide the democratic development of Kosovo and appoint and oversee the International Civilian Representative, concluded *"that Kosovo now was in the final stages of implementing the Comprehensive Status Proposal, allowing for preparing for an organized end to supervised independence and the closure of the ICO by the end of 2012."* (Homepage of the ICO, 10/09/2012) Thus, the institutions of Kosovo were authorised to adopt the necessary constitutional and legislative amendments and their approval enabled the ISG to declare the end of supervised independence of Kosovo and the end of the mandate of the ICR with immediate effect in its final meeting on 10 September 2012. (cp. Homepage of the ICO, 10/09/2012)

2. Issues and Interests at Stake

2.1. Strategic National Interests, Goals and Objectives of the Main Adversaries in the Conflict

2.1.1. Serbian Aspirations

Serbian national interests regarding Kosovo are based on a question of ***identity***. Serbs perceive Kosovo as the cradle of their nation and a place closely connected to their national narratives (like the battle of Kosovo Polje) and their religious-cultural goods. Serbian claims on Kosovo have been based on the historical precedence of a medieval Serbian kingdom as well as on the inclusion of Kosovo into the modern Serbian state even though it had been accomplished by force. (cp. Pavlakovic/Ramet, 2004, p. 91) As Vuk Jeremic, the Serbian Foreign Minister, described it, *"Kosovo has deep historical and spiritual meaning for the people of Serbia. In a certain sense, it is our Jerusalem."* (Jeremic, 31/05/2010) There was a general perception in Serbia that it could not exist without Kosovo and the policy of Serbisation of Kosovo might be indicative of the Serbian wish to maintain the territory of Kosovo but without its Albanian inhabitants. (cp. Pavlakovic/Ramet, 2004, p. 91) According to Anatole Ayissi's categorisation of national aspirations, these identificatory interests imply that the conflict is a ***Grey-Zone Situation*** in which stakes are symbolic and therefore less open to compromises than quantifiable claims. But one must not forget that before and during the times of open conflict, a fiction of the discrimination against Serbs within Yugoslavia and of the cultural, political, juridical and physical "genocide" of Serbs committed by Albanians was constructed. The Serbian nation was portrayed as victim. Thus, the conflict also had a strong ***security*** component from Serbia's point of view and especially for the Serbian minority in Kosovo. Thus it also included important tendencies of a ***Hard Zero-Sum-Situation***.

Therefore, Serbia's **goal** has always been ***Kosovo's incorporation*** as part of Serbia.

Political objectives that derived from this goal included the following:
When the socialist system of Yugoslavia began to totter and ethno-nationalist aspirations were on the rise, Serbia adopted the idea of ***Greater Serbia*** that aimed at the incorporation of all Serbian inhabited territories within Yugoslavia. Especially Kosovo became a focus point of Serbian national memory. Thus, the Republic of Serbia abolished Kosovo's autonomy and promoted the Serbisation on the territory. (cp. Pavlakovic/Ramet, 2004, p. 93)

As a consequence of the Kosovo Albanian resistance to this step, which led to a violent dispute, Serbia agreed to re-establish Kosovo autonomy but refused the high degree of autonomy that was proposed for Kosovo at the Rambouillet Conference in 1999. Even after the consequent NATO intervention, Serbia still regarded ***Kosovo as integral part of Serbia*** and claimed that the intervention only temporarily removed Kosovo from its direct control. In November 2007 Serbia outlined its proposal for the future status of Kosovo, which envisioned substantial autonomy for Kosovo according to the formula "more than autonomy, less than independence", but the Kosovo Albanian side refused this proposal.

Since the Kosovo Albanians declared independence in 2008, Serbia has refused to recognise its legitimacy and tries to apply political pressure in opposition to Kosovo's independence in the diplomatic sphere. Serbia has focused on ***controlling the Northern Kosovo*** inhabited by a Serbian majority population, which led to the de facto self-government of the region under Serbian control. Today, nationalists in Serbia advocate the partition of Kosovo. Since 2011, there have been new technical negotiations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo in which Belgrade aims at discussing the status of Northern Kosovo, while Prishtina refuses any reference to the status question and focuses on technical issues.

Hence, the Serbia diminished the extent of its demand over time from total control over Kosovo to autonomy respectively "more than autonomy, less than independence" and finally to the claim to keep at least a part of Kosovo that is inhabited by a Serbian majority.

2.1.2. Kosovo Albanian Aspirations

The **Kosovo Albanian national interests** had a main focus on the mere ***security*** of the ethnic group that was regarded as being threatened from cultural and even physical elimination although issues of *prosperity* and *identity* had also played a role as in most territorial conflicts. Applying Ayissi's scheme to the Kosovo Albanian struggle for survival, the conflict has to be regarded as a ***Hard Zero-Sum-Situation*** in which compromise with the Serbian side is unlikely and the chance for escalation is extremely high.

Thus, the Kosovo Albanians pursued the **goal** of reaching ***self-determination*** as a people. Although the Kosovo Albanians were clearly not able or willing to compromise on their national interests and the subsequent goal, they pursued them without making the elimination of Serbs a precondition for their own survival.[16]

Kosovo Albanian objectives had to be adapted to the circumstances at the respective time and comprised different types of self-determination.

Since Kosovo was granted full autonomy as province of Serbia by the constitution of 1974, the Kosovo Albanians aimed at the enhancement of its status to that of a republic. Especially after the abolishment of the autonomy in 1989, the objective to gain independence from Serbia and create an ***Albanian Republic within Yugoslavia*** gained centre stage.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia brought along the quest for a ***sovereign and independent State of Kosovo*** that was proclaimed in 1991, although a gradual unification with Albania was popular among the Kosovo Albanians at that time. (cp. Vickers, 1998, p. 261) However, after a short period of debates among Albanian intellectuals in Albania and in Kosovo about a national unification, the idea failed, because it was widely perceived as pretence for former functionaries of the Albanian regime to whitewash their reputation. At the time when it became obvious that the LDK's approach did not bring about independence, Adem Demaci, a well-known political activist and long-time prisoner, suggested another alternative to independence. He promoted the idea of establishing a confederation called "Balkanija" consisting of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. In contrast to Rugova, he was willing to accept a status below independence, but pled for a more active non-violent procedure. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 97-99) Despite these notions, the establishment of an independent and sovereign state remained the central objective of the majority of the Kosovo Albanians. (cp. Vickers, 1998, pp. 257-258; Reuter, 2000 I, p. 160; Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 97-99) The Kosovo Albanian claim to sovereignty was based on the actual situation on the ground and on the will of the people. Historically, Kosovo had never existed as a sovereign entity and although the Kosovo Albanians had never had their own state, they had a long historical tradition of trying to

[16] Sabri Kiqmari, former spokesperson of the UCK for the German speaking countries, admits that there has never been the idea that the presence of Serbs in the territory of Kosovo contradicts the realisation of this objective. According to his knowledge, not even the more radical groups within the Kosovo Albanian society perceived the Serbian inhabitants of Kosovo as threat to Kosovo Albanian self-determination. (cp. Kiqmari, 03/07/2012)

achieve independence. (cp. Pavlakovic/Ramet, 2004, p. 92) When status negotiations with Serbia in the aftermath of the Kosovo war reached an impasse, independence was declared in 2008 and since then, Kosovo Albanians aim at the ***international recognition*** of their independent state, the ***maintenance of the country's territorial unity*** and its ***economic viability***.

2.2. Conflict Issues

2.2.1. Territory and Borders

Today's contested Kosovo did not exist as an administrative unit before the 1870s and received its current borders only in 1945. But the Albanian as well as the Serbian side ground its claims on their nations' history as well as on the ethno structure of Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanians regard themselves as descendents of the Illyrians and thus as native population entitled to inherit the territory where it has always posed the majority population. The Serbs, on the other hand, focus on their state tradition as well as on their supposed majority population in Kosovo until the late 19th or even 20th century. This assumption implies that the actual Albanian majority was an outcome of violent intrusions in recent times. (cp. Clewing/Reuter, 2000, pp. 17-22)

This dispute as well as the ethnic cleansing that was committed in Kosovo against both ethnic groups implies that the conflict is also about the legitimacy to inhabit the territory.

The unilateral declaration of independence, which was not recognised by Serbia, led to a de facto partition of the country into a Kosovo Serbian dominated North that demands the unification with Serbia respectively autonomy, and a Kosovo Albanian South. Due to Serbia's refusal to recognise Kosovo's borders, there is no effective frontier control in North Kosovo.

2.2.2. Statehood or Autonomy

After the abolishment of Kosovo's autonomy within the Yugoslav state, the Kosovo Albanian national identity gained strength. The establishment of shadow state structures followed, but its institutions did not gain international recognition.

Only after the international intervention in the conflict, internationally recognised self-governing institutions of Kosovo were developed but despite the unilateral declaration of independence, Kosovo has not been recognised by the majority of the International Community as a sovereign state until today.

Due to the fact that there is no consensus on a two-state solution until today, Serbia still regards Kosovo as part of its state territory and aims at negotiating a substantial autonomy or its partition.

2.2.3. Resources and Economy

Until today, Belgrade tries to isolate Kosovo economically, for example by preventing its farmers to sell products in their natural market in South Serbia or even to transport them to other European countries. But if the relations between Serbia and Kosovo normalised, it can be assumed that Kosovo would have the potential to develop an economy that is able to absorb the high unemployment in the country. Rare earths have been discovered in Kosovo, which are an important element in the making of modern components, for which reason Kosovo could become an interesting business partner for new rising economic powers like China.

Serbian tax authorities refused to issue certificates to Kosovo Albanian firms that enable them to export their goods to Serbia and only shortly recognised the custom stamps of the Kosovo authorities. This slow rapproachment between the governments in Serbia and Kosovo has also negative implications on the criminality in the border region, since it creates a zone of lawlessness, in which mafia groups conduct their business. (cp. MacShane, 2011, pp. 86-96)

2.2.4. Minorities on the Territory of Kosovo and the Return of Serbian Refugees

While the Serbs in North Kosovo refuse to recognise the legitimacy of Kosovo's governing institutions and regard the territory as part of Serbia, Serbs within the Southern enclaves on pragmatic grounds started to adopt a more cooperative attitude towards the

state institutions of Kosovo due to Serbia's economic inability to offer them support. But the return of former Serbian refugees to Kosovo has almost come to a standstill.

2.2.5. National and Religious Monuments in Kosovo and the Identificatory Meaning of the Territory

Kosovo has become a symbol of nationalist aspirations for the Kosovo Albanians as well as for the Serbs. While the Kosovo Albanians underline their claims on Kosovo by stressing their ethnic majority and their historical rights as native population, for the Serbs Kosovo is perceived as cradle of the Serbian nation and as holy place where fateful battles took place. Kosovo accommodates important holy sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church like historical monasteries.

3. Strategic Environment

3.1. Internal Environment: The National Movements in Kosovo

In the Kosovo Albanian political sphere, several movements developed over time such as the Popular Movement (for the Republic) of Kosovo (Levizja Popullore (per Republicken) e Kosoves, LPK), the Group of Llop (Ceta e Llapit), the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (Levizja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves, LKCK) or the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (Forcat e Armatosura te Republikes se Kosoves, FARK) but only two main strategic actors gained importance for Kosovo's way to independence, namely the below described organisations LDK and UCK.

3.1.1. Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves, LDK)

3.1.1.1. Context of Establishment

Due to its poverty and its economic dependence from federal subsidies, Kosovo had always been in a weak position within Yugoslavia. When the communist system in Yugoslavia increasingly faced troubles, Kosovo's main ally, Slovenia, was engaged in expanding its own democracy and tried to protect itself from federal interference. But the

power vacuum caused by the continuing disintegration of the Communist Party created space for new initiatives in favour of pluralism and democracy.

A strong impulse for non-violent resistance against the Serbian aspirations to create a centre of power to dominate Yugoslavia was initiated by the Kosovo Albanian civil society. Actions like the march of the Trepca miners or protests all over Kosovo in 1989 were commonly compared with the First Palestinian Intifada.

At the federal level of Yugoslavia, the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative promoted non-nationalist ideas and dialogue between the ethnic groups but its branch in Prishtina failed to gain multinational membership. Another influential centre of Albanian opposition in Kosovo was the Writers Association. After the resignation of its Serbian members it aligned itself not only with intellectual freedom but also with Albanian national aspirations. Its President, Ibrahim Rugova, became one of the main spokespersons of Kosovo to the international and domestic media.

The period from December 1989 until February 1990 was characterised by the establishment of different organisations in Kosovo among which the LDK, established on 23 December 1989, became the dominant force on the political scene for the years ahead. Its founders decided to appoint the LDK President from outside their own circle and chose a prominent figure, Ibrahim Rugova. The recruitment to the organisation was enormous, but did not correspond to a classical party membership. The LDK membership was more of a political statement and the party was a product of the popular response to Serbian repression. The LDK was initially designed to express public sentiment rather than to direct it although it quickly established a strong network with political influence throughout Kosovo and the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in Europe and the USA. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 46-57)

3.1.1.2. Strategic Objectives and Ideological Orientation

Under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, the central strategic goal of the LDK was the self-determination of Kosovo-Albanians to ensure their central national interest, which was their survival. Therefore, the main objective of the LDK was the establishment of a formally recognised Republic of Kosovo. Thus, the LDK categorically refused a return to the autonomous province of Kosovo. (cp. Jurekovic, 2000, p. 40)

Serbia was perceived to be "genocidal" and seemed to provoke a military confrontation, so a non-violent approach was adopted. Strategic aims like the avoidance to offer a pretence for Serbian military action, the emphasis on drawing international attention to the violence committed by Serbs and the denial of the legitimacy of its rule, the undermining of Serbian predominance and the search for international support were important step stones on the way to independence.

In some respect, the LDK also functioned as a movement for change, namely in the transformation from communism to democracy and pluralism within the Kosovo Albanian society. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 66-69 & 122-123) In the course of the conflict, a new Kosovo Albanian ethnic identity had been constructed that was explicitly based on the alienation of the adversarial illustration of Kosovo Albanians by Serbian propaganda. Hence, the Kosovo Albanians tried to create an image of progressiveness and Western orientation. However, these efforts were not just a mere self-portrayal to the outside but were based on a secular, open-minded and progressive ideology. The new Kosovo Albanian identity could emphasise inclusive values, and the objective of independence or liberation was not a form of introversion but the starting point for participation in the world. Values like reluctance, self-discipline, control of affects and patience became central characteristics of this identity [17]. But it has to be mentioned that the implementation of these values in the form of non-violence was not mainly based on a pacifist attitude but rather had been a pragmatic choice. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 69-70; Clark, 2000, pp. 68)

In the course of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the LDK adapted its objective and thus, declared Kosovo's independence from Yugoslavia. Afterwards, the Coordinating Committee of Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia that was headed by Rugova identified three possible answers to the so-called Albanian question mentioned in its declaration of October 1991:

- *"(1) If the external and internal borders of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were to remain unaltered, the status of a sovereign and independent state with the right of association in a new community of sovereign Yugoslav states, was demanded. Ethnic Albanians within Serbia, Macedonia and*

[17] In analogy to Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's concept of non-violence that was applied in the Indian struggle for independence, there was a common labeling of Rugova as "Gandhi of the Balkans".

Montenegro should enjoy the status of a nation and not be a national minority within it[18].

- *(2) Should only the internal borders of the SFRY be changed and not the external ones, the founding of an Albanian Republic was called for, incorporating, apart from Kosovo, those territories in central Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia inhabited by Albanians.*
- *(3) In the event of the external borders being changed, the Albanians would by referendum and a general declaration, proclaim territorial unification with Albania and the creation of an "undivided Albanian state in the Balkans with Albanian ethnic boundaries", namely, within the boundaries proclaimed by the First Prizren League in 1978."* (Vickers, 1998, p. 253)

The secession from Serbia whatsoever remained Rugova's unchanged objective and it was planned to be reached through the establishment of an UN protectorate as interim solution. (cp. Prorok, 2002, p. 82) Edita Tahiri, the LDK Foreign Minister from 1991 until 2000, summarised the movement's efforts: *"First, we wanted to ensure cultural survival and prevent ethnic cleansing. Second, we wanted to create a parallel system and build an independent democratic state. Third, we wanted to win international support for independence."* (Tahiri, 2004 cited in Stephan, 2006, p. 72)[19]

3.1.1.3. Internal Structure and Mobilisation Capacity

The roots of the LDK were not primarily based on the old political class of functionaries in the Titoist system, but even more on the urban intellectual circles that evolved around the University of Pristina in the 1980s. The two key organisations were the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo that developed into a centre of intellectual protest against the Serbian policy and the Association of Writers of Kosovo that after the mass resignation of its Serb members in 1988 presented a statement of Albanian national political aims. Thus, it gained wide support and turned into a nucleus of a popular

[18] This paragraph refers to a distinction made by the constitution of Socialist Yugoslavia which distinguished between the six nations of Yugoslavia that had their republics (called narod) and the national minorities (narodnost) which had no right to statehood.

[19] Edita Tahiri, interviewed by Maria J. Stephan on 19 May 2004

movement that served as basis for the political party LDK. (cp. Malcolm, 1998, p. 347-348)

Soon after its establishment, the LDK under the charismatic leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, advanced to the most important political collective movement for all layers of the Kosovo Albanian population. Within the first two month, the LDK gained 200,000 new followers and was deeply embedded into the traditionally rural structures. The LDK established a network of branches among the Albanians living in Diaspora in Europe and in the USA that played an important role in the funding of parallel structures in Kosovo.

Among all parties in Kosovo, the LDK had the best initial position because at the time of the establishment of most other parties, it was already in possession of a well functioning infrastructure and a huge number of supporters. Its official membership was indicated with 700,000. By claiming to be a political collective movement, it managed to monopolise the political power and regarded itself as the representative of Kosovo Albanian interests. Thus, the LDK showed little interest in the establishment of a common political platform for all democratic parties. But over time it became necessary to assure political unity among all Albanian parties and organisations in Yugoslavia as well as in the Diaspora in order to appear homogenous in front of the International Community. Therefore, the Coordinating Committee of Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia under Rugova's leadership was established. In 1992, parliamentary and presidential elections for the Kosovo Albanian parallel institutions took place. Rugova became president of the self-proclaimed republic and the elected LDK government went into exile in Bonn and became the responsible institution for the coordination and financing of the parallel structures in Kosovo.(cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 64-78) As a reaction to the emergence of the rival organisation, the UCK, Bujar Bukoshi, the LDK Prime Minister-in-exile, tried to establish separate military forces called FARK in 1998 that should have functioned as army of Kosovo. The FARK had few hundred soldiers, which were loyal to President Rugova. Hence, the FARK was perceived as potential rival by the UCK and therefore, its leaders were allegedly killed by members of the UCK. (cp. Schmitt, 2008, p. 325)

Although Ibrahim Rugova exerted a rather passive form of transformational leadership and lost his monopoly over Kosovo Albanian politics after the empowerment of UCK, he

became a symbol of Kosovo Albanian resistance. Therefore, he stayed in office as President of Kosovo until his death. (cp. Prorok, 2002, pp. 92-100)

3.1.1.4. Infrastructure and Resources

Due to the fact that the LDK promoted a non-violent resistance, there was no need for the acquisition of military resources. Although there had been secret discussions among the LDK leadership to strengthen the military defence capacities of Kosovo (e.g. with the establishment of FARK) and reports about military training camps for Kosovo Albanians in Albania were published, Ibrahim Rugova officially demanded that the independence of Kosovo should be combined with demilitarisation. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 64-65)

The financing of the parallel state system in Kosovo was organised by the Kosovo government-in-exile and funded by a network of Kosovo Albanian migrants as well as through domestic taxation. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, p. 71)

3.1.1.5. Employable Concepts

A viable way for the LDK to realise its objectives that was in line with its ideology, fears and resources was non-violence. It included the refusal of being provoked by Serbia which gave Kosovo Albanians the moral upper hand, the maintenance of parallel structures to demonstrate the capacity for self-organisation and to keep up Albanian life in Kosovo, as well as the struggle for international support. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 128-129)

The establishment of political and social parallel structures in which the LDK took a central role served as the basis for the organisation of the Kosovo Albanian society after the abolishment of autonomy. This step was a new dimension of resistance by allowing people who felt politically powerless to engage actively and show their solidarity. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 70-71) Rather than organising huge demonstrations, the LDK applied semi-resistance which included activities that strengthened the morale and the unity of the Kosovo Albanians. These actions were threatened only by little risk and were suitable to be conducted during everyday life. They included activities like five-minute protests or symbolic forms of semi-resistance like placing candles into windows. There emerged a set of methods that aimed at identifying violence with the Serbian oppressor,

avoiding counter-violence, strengthening social solidarity and motivating Kosovo Albanians to use alternative ways to communicate their defiance. The movement even proceeded against internal violence like the traditional blood feuds. In the international political sphere, Rugova promoted the policy of non-violence to gain international support which was necessary due to the fact that the LDK was not able to make allies within the FRY because Serbia initially mobilised opinion against the Kosovo Albanians within Yugoslavia. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 57-65)

In 1995, by the time of the Dayton Accords, hopes rose that the International Community would also deal with the Kosovo question but criticism of the passivity of the LDK leadership began to rise. When it became clear that there would be no international support for the independence of Kosovo, critical advisories aimed at ending the LDK's political monopoly in Kosovo and adopted ideas like the new concept of "active non-violence" instead of the old notion of "passive non-violence". This implied that the existing strategy should be enhanced by greater willingness to risk confrontation and raised persistence. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 122-130)

Only after a period of violent escalation in the conflict, initiated by the UCK, the LDK and the UCK agreed on a cooperative approach and took part in peace negotiations in order not to risk its marginalisation within the Kosovo Albanian political sphere.

3.1.1.6. Assessment of the National Movement's Representative Function

Between 1990 and 1997, the LDK was the only comprehensive political representation of the Kosovo Albanians and thus, was recognised as most important political factor. Until the mid 1990s, the LDK advocated the political position of the majority of their ethnic community. (cp. Jurekovic, 2000, p. 40) At that time, the LDK was not only a party but a popular movement and there was no second wing that would have questioned the movement's central representative function. (cp. Bukoshi, 25/07/2012)

Only when it became clear that the LDK could not boast achievements in reaching independence, pressure and criticism on the organisation rose. Critics claimed that the LDK failed to gain international support and therefore asked for a more active approach. But the nascent political discord within the political elite was overshadowed by the emergence of a new political player called UCK which shifted the balance of power

within Kosovo. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 97-99) Hence, the LDK lost popular support for the benefit of UCK in that period but regained support during the peace negotiations.

3.1.2. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, UCK)

3.1.2.1. Context of Establishment

The UCK had its roots in diverse underground organisations established in the 1970s with nationalist or national communist attitude. Those groups united in 1982 and formed an organisation called Popular Movement for the Republic of Kosovo (Levizja Popullore per Republiken e Kosoves, LPRK).

At the beginning of the 1990s, it split up into the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (Levizja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves, LKCK), which was not willing to abandon its communist ideas that should be implemented through a popular uprising ("Intifada"), and into the successor organisation Popular Movement of Kosovo (Levizja Popullore e Kosoves, LPK) that favoured conducting a guerrilla war to reach Kosovo's independence. Therefore, the LPK played an important role in the formation of armed forces in Kosovo. The resultant military organisation received its name, UCK, in December 1993 but it was not made public before 1995. (cp. Judah, 2000, p. 115)

Until 1995, the LPK had been a radical party at the edge of the spectrum of political standpoints of the Kosovo Albanians and thus was backed only by a small number of followers. People were still shocked by the cruelties that had happened during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and therefore hoped for a peaceful solution of the Kosovo question.

But when the Dayton Agreement was signed in November 1995, the general public in Kosovo realised that it had been ignored by the International Community. The message for the Kosovo Albanians was clear: peaceful resistance had not brought any success but Serbia, which had committed brutal actions against member of other ethnic groups within Yugoslavia, was rewarded with the establishment of the Republica Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The lesson could be learnt that non-violence did not pay off while violence creates universally acknowledged realities on the ground. This argument was in favour of the LPK's policy and therefore the party suddenly enjoyed great support. Also

the important question on where to acquire the necessary military equipment could easily be solved by chance through changes in the external environment of Kosovo. When Albania almost slipped into anarchy in spring 1997 after the break down of a financial pyramid system, the smuggling in arms across the borders to Kosovo became a major source of the UCK's equipment. (cp. Reuter, 2000 II, p. 171)

Since the establishment of the UCK, different groups had coalesced and then comprised Enverist radicals who took already part in the demonstrations in 1981 and experienced time in jail as well as a new generation of activists like Hashim Thaci or Pleurat Sejdiu. Those young men were linked to the LPRK respectively the LPK not only by membership and identification but also by the financial support they received for their studies abroad which created a certain kind of loyalty.

Starting from autumn 1997, the UCK became active and earned reputation by conducting major attacks against the Serbian police as well as against alleged collaborators. But still the LPK faced problems in persuading people to abandon the concept of passive resistance. First, its Enverist roots made it unpopular due to the fact that Albania had not been a land of people's dreams anymore and although the organisation renounced Marxist ideas, people still associated the organisation with this ideology. And second, Ibrahim Rugova long disowned the UCK and declared it a Serbian conspiracy. (cp. Judah, 2000, pp. 117- 137)

3.1.2.2. Strategic Objectives and Ideological Orientation

The LPK/UCK, too, pursued the goal of self-determination and thus, its central strategic objective was also the independence of Kosovo. As outlined above, the organisation was convinced that this could only be reached trough active engagement and the use of violence as reaction to Serbian repression. Although some of its members still believed in communist, Enverist, Maoist, Marxist or Leninist ideologies, the LPK officially renounced these attitudes. (cp. Judah, 2000, pp. 115- 118) Due to the fact that religion did not play an important role in the construction of Kosovo Albanian national identity that was mainly secular, Islamist ideologies had no relevance in the UCK's struggle for sovereignty. (cp. Bieber/Daskalovski, 2003, p. 188)

The aspirations of the UCK at the end of the 1990s, when it had already gained strength and popular support through the publishing of so-called communiqués that were regularly released, can be summarised as follows: The declared ideological aim of the UCK was the acknowledgement of the Kosovo Albanian demand to be recognised as separate ethnic group instead of being perceived as minority population. But the organisation did not only focus on the Albanian question in Kosovo but also on the rights of Albanian minorities in Macedonia and Montenegro. (cp. Blankenbichler, 2003, pp. 24-43) The UCK, however, never aimed at the establishment of a Grater Albanian state although a misinterpretation of an interview of the spokesperson of the General Staff of the UCK led to the common perception that the UCK pursued such an objective. Instead, the UCK demanded the establishment of an independent State of Kosovo. (cp. Kiqmari, 03/07/2012) Any other even temporarily solution than the independence of the Republic of Kosovo was considered inacceptable and perceived as betrayal of the Albanian people. (cp. Blankenbichler, 2003, pp. 42-43) The UCK's uncompromising policy was based on the consideration that it would accept anything that was in favour of independence and refuses anything that was not until the participation of its delegation at the Rambouillet conference. (cp. Kiqmari, 03/07/2012)

3.1.2.3. Internal Structure and Mobilisation Capacity

The highest decision-making body of the LPRK was its Collective Council and the LPRK had important member organisations in Western European countries which were subordinated to the Collective Council for Foreign Affairs situated in Lucerne, Switzerland. Since its foundation in 1982, the LPRK used its newspaper "Zeri i Kosoves" which was irregularly published in Switzerland as propaganda instrument. After the establishment of the UCK, the renamed successor organisation LPK admitted its close ties with the military organisation and called for its financial support. (cp. Eichenseder, 2000, p. 35)

One of the main characteristics of the UCK was that it had never been directed from outside but was grounded on the idea of Kosovo Albanian armed resistance against Serbian repression as only promising means to achieve independence. In the course of time, this conviction was shared by a huge part of the Kosovo Albanians. Clan structures based especially in the rural areas of Kosovo served as foundation pillar of the UCK and

posed the basis for the linkage between the organisation and the population and later made crucial contributions to the leap in the number of recruits. But among the different clans there was no hierarchy, certain structure or even mutual consent, for which reason most of them also struggled for more influence for themselves. Hence, a report published by the International Crisis Group described the organisation as being more an association of clans than a hierarchical military force. (cp. Blankenbichler, 2003, p. 37)

The first units that later became part of the UCK emerged in 1991 out of those police and military forces that were established within the institutions of the self-proclaimed "Republic of Kosovo" and were also based on these clan structures. Even former regular officers and soldiers of the Yugoslav army with experience at the front in Croatia were members in these groups and later became part of the leadership of the UCK. Starting from 1994, the so-called Drenica Group attained a kind of a leadership role among the UCK units due to the good contacts abroad of some of its members like Hashim Thaci or Xhavit Haliti. (cp. Blankenbichler, 2003, p. 49)

Until winter 1998/99, the UCK had not had the structure of a regular army due to the fact that it had only been active in conspiration. The organisation was split among various regional commanders subordinated to the Central Staff of the Liberation Army. In Northern Albania there existed centres for recruiting and training as well as support bases. Strongholds of the UCK had been in the districts of Skenderaj and Gllogovc in the Drenica region where civil municipality guards and militias, which were partly incorporated into UCK command structures, had been active. According to UCK officers, the troop strength at that time comprised about 8,000 which was an enormous rise in comparison to the year before when the organisation had only 200 to 300 members. A huge number of the new fighters could be recruited in the regions where it came to heavy fights between the Serbian security forces and the UCK after their property had been destroyed.

The core of the UCK consisted of former political prisoners, activists as well as intellectuals, while the fighters were mainly young men or women from those areas where the UCK was active. The majority participated on a voluntary base and some of them were even so-called "weekend fighters" that pursued a normal profession during the weekdays and participated in operations in their free time. The UCK even made use of local newspaper ads to call upon all men between 18 and 55 to participate actively in the

struggle for independence and recruited fighters in the Diaspora. At the end of winter 1998/99 the UCK counted about 24,000 fighters which required a restructuring of its forces that was performed partly with foreign assistance. (cp. Eichenseder, 2000, pp. 44-45)

Thus, the UCK used the Swiss army as a role model for its re-organisation and made use of its practice of territorial segmentation into zones for defence fights. Several private security companies from abroad provided training in anti-terror operations. (cp. Blankenbichler, 2003, p. 49) The general staff consisted of Suleijman Selimi and Bistlim Zyrapi who held the superior military positions, Azem Syla responsible for arms supply from Albania, Fatmir Limaj and Hashim Thaci who were in charge of internal organisation and police matters as well as the speaker, the public relations officer, the political representative, the financial coordinator with Albania, the coordinator with Western Europe, the responsible for recruiting, the personnel manager, the inspector general, the coordinator with foreign volunteers, the political commissioner and the responsible for military training. At the next level, there were different departments for operations, policy, administration, public relations, logistics, social matters, health, finance, communication and security. The military police, the military academy and the staff surgeon were located at the same level. The combat area was divided into six, later seven zones in which the different brigades were active. (cp. Eichenseder, 2000, pp. 45-46) In May 1999, Suleijman Selimi was replaced by Agim Ceku as new chief of staff, who introduced a new vertical chain of command. He graduated from the military academy in Belgrade and deserted in 1991 from the JNA in order to join the Croat army. Thus, he had excellent knowledge of Serbian military tactics. (cp. Reuter, 2000 II, p. 178-179)

The UCK received personnel support from around 1,000 mercenary soldiers from countries like Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia or Yemen, and British, German, Iranian, Sudanese and Chechen military instructors helped to train the forces. The UCK even accepted the participation of radical Islamists in the fights and profited from arms they smuggled into Kosovo, although the UCK did not share their ideology. Even foreign intelligence services like the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) or the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported the UCK in order to prepare a future NATO operation. Vacant NATO bases in

Germany served as training camps while the camps in Albania were built in order to practice guerrilla tactics and terrorist warfare. The CIA and the British Special Air Service (SAS) shall even have played a role in training the UCK forces in guerrilla warfare and sabotage. This comprised the capping of telephone lines, the blasting of buildings, the contamination of fuel tanks or food in order to undermine public support for the Serbian leadership and the destruction of Yugoslav aims that could not be reached via air attacks. (cp. Eichenseder, 2000, pp. 49-51)

A report published by the International Crisis Group in spring 1999 describes the development of the UCK as follows: *"Over the past year of conflict, the armed rebel movement the UCK (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves) or Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has transformed itself from a highly decentralised, uncoordinated farmers' rebellion led by a few hundred core members into a more professional, trained guerrilla movement reported to include 7,000 trained military members and some 35,000 irregulars. The KLA has also transformed Kosovo's political landscape, becoming a major political force in its own right, and challenging the pacifist politics of Kosovo Albanians' long-serving leader, Ibrahim Rugova."* (Report 4, 1999, p. 16)

In June 1999, after the NATO intervention, the political speaker of the UCK, Hashim Thaci, signed an agreement with the KFOR in which UCK's demilitarisation and transformation into police or military forces of Kosovo were determined. In July 1999, the UCK members Salihu, Sejdiu and Syla established the first successor party, the PBD (now called LPK) and in October that year, Hashim Thaci founded his party PDK. The UCK established structures which should protect its power even after the war and therefore installed an unofficial administration and took control over important objects in production, trade and in the hospitality industry. Thus, the new interim government of Kosovo, which was almost identical with the former UCK leadership, sealed economic power which offered a big advantage in future elections. (cp. Reuter, 2000 II, p. 180-186)

3.1.2.4. Infrastructure and Resources

There exists contradictory information about the origins of UCK's financial assets that include the following possible sources: Among the most important financial sources for Kosovo was without a doubt the three-per cent tax on incomes of Kosovo Albanians

working abroad that was designated to the financing of the parallel structures in Kosovo and collected by an endowment headed by Bujar Bukoshi, the LDK prime minister-in-exile. There were indications that a kind of special tax was raised in the course of this tax collection that was used to obtain weapons for the UCK. Allegedly, Bukoshi was also the head of a network consisting of sham firms in 14 European countries that made part of its profit through trafficking in drugs. However, also other business men living in Diaspora transferred huge amounts to diverse UCK zone commanders. (cp. Blankenbichler, 2003, pp. 45-47) Supposedly, illegal activities like the smuggling of drugs and weapons and the UCK's alleged collaboration with the Albanian mafia were important sources of income for the organisation. Further, Albanians in exile donated huge amounts of money for the financing of the armed resistance against Serbia. There are even experts who admit that humanitarian aid sent by Western countries was used to buy modern arms. (cp. Eichenseder, 2000, p. 48) Although the involvement of Islamist groups in the conflict did not play a vital strategic or military role, they promoted Islamic financial support for the UCK. (cp. Hedges, 1999, p. 39)

Since the establishment of the first UCK groups, the supply with arms and equipment was mainly managed through Albanians. But the UCK also received other forms of support by its neighbouring country. Kosovo Albanians established contact with public service departments, police and customs authorities and tried to engage army officers and soldiers in the military training of the UCK troops. The anarchic situation in Albania in 1997 had positive effects on the acquisition of weapons because the country served as a transhipment point for weapons at that time. Kosovo Albanians from abroad (like Ramush Haradinaj who resided in Switzerland) organised the transport of weapons and other equipment from Switzerland to Albania and from there to Kosovo. The Albanian crisis even enabled Kosovo Albanians to smuggle automatic weapons, mortars, machine guns, sniper rifles and explosives from different countries into Kosovo which enabled them to conduct a bigger series of raids. Even barracks of the Albanian army were ransacked and arms were trafficked into Kosovo, but official support from the side of the state was absent. Political parties in Albania were at strife for which reason support could only be granted by individual persons. Also the bad Albanian infrastructure did not offer useful options for a concentration of Kosovo Albanian troops on the territory. (cp. Blankenbichler, 2003, pp. 44-45) Even before the start of the armed dispute, Serbian authorities estimated that Kosovo Albanians, famous for their traditional weapons

culture, were in possession of about 75,000 rifles. At the beginning of the fighting mainly arms from the JNA and even the old ones from the Second World War were used because Kosovo Albanians had to use any kind of weapon available. Until winter 1998, the UCK owned only about 100,000 light arms. But already one year later, the smuggling efforts proved successful and the organisation possessed armour-piercing weapons and portable anti-aircraft missiles but in order to maintain its mobility, the UCK refrained from buying heavy artillery. (cp. Eichenseder, 2000, p. 47)

3.1.2.5. Employable Concepts

Due to the fact that the members of the UCK did not believe in the non-violen approach to reach independence, the organisation preferred to apply guerrilla tactics against Serbian institutions and refugees. Thus, the UCK clearly stated that the struggle of the PLO served as its role model, but in reality the organisation did not only function as liberation army. It also deliberately provoked acts of repression by the Yugoslav forces directed against Kosovo Albanians in order to "produce" a humanitarian catastrophe to activate the International Community, respectively the NATO, to intervene.

At the beginning of UCK's operations, the organisation aimed at attacking Serbian security forces and police outposts in the mountainous area of Kosovo. The offences were conducted at night in rough terrain, on bridges or narrow streets. Due to the low firepower of the fighters, they used the hit-and-run tactic. Starting from 1998, the UCK enlarged its terrorist repertoire in accordance with its new technical equipment, namely car bombs or weapons to attack civil flights. (cp. Eichenseder, 2000, pp. 52-53)

During the open military confrontation with Serbian security forces, the UCK first stuck to its guerrilla strategy. Due to initial successes, the organisation was recognised by the unofficial Kosovo parliament as legitimate army and became a symbol of active Albanian resistance. Thus, the organisation also conducted conventional operations and tried to obtain permanent control over villages and infrastructure in so called "liberated territories". Thus, the UCK offered the Serbian forces targets in their conventional war and was soon defeated.

The ceasefire agreement between Milosevic and Holbrooke in October 1998 and the stationing of OSCE observers in Kosovo limited Serbia's as well as the UCK's scope of

military action although the Kosovo Albanians had not been considered as a party of the truce. Thus, the few violent actions of the UCK were answered by heavy retaliation from the Serbian side without international intervention.

When the International Community forced Serbia as well as the Kosovo Albanians to take part in the peace conference in Rambouillet, the UCK initially refused to participate but soon recognised that this would lead to its political marginalisation. Therefore, it agreed to take part in negotiations and the political director of the UCK, Hashim Thaci, became head of the Kosovo Albanian delegation. Notwithstanding, the cooperative approach posed a major problem for the UCK because an agreement on the stationing of NATO troops in Kosovo threatened the liberation movement of an identity crisis since it would have durably limited its ability to fight for independence. Therefore, the representatives refused an agreement with Serbia in Rambouillet and waited until the follow-up conference in Paris to sign the peace treaty at the last moment in the hope that Serbia would refuse the agreement and that the NATO would go to war against Serbia. The UCK only tactically agreed to a compromise despite the risk that its military units would not accept the compromise with Serbia. After the anticipated international intervention, UCK members took over the important positions within the interim government of Kosovo and the organisation was transformed into legitimate security forces. (cp. Reuter, 2000 II, pp. 174-180)

3.1.2.6. Assessment of the National Movement's Representative Function

The UCK gained relevance in the Kosovo Albanian political sphere when Rugova's popularity started to shrink after his meeting with Milosevic in May 1998. Since the LPK/UCK was eager to pose a counterweight to the LDK's and Rugova's concept of peaceful resistance, its identity was based on active struggle for independence. Due to the fact that the UCK increasingly became a symbol for Albanian military resistance, it gained increasing support from all parts of the Kosovo Albanian population.

Only when the organisation suffered major setbacks because of its military inferiority vis-à-vis the Serbian regular forces it lost internal support. Notwithstanding this setback, the UCK managed to establish itself as important factor in the conflict and thus, participated in the Kosovo Albanian delegation in peace negotiations.

After the NATO intervention, the UCK managed to transform itself into different successor organisations and institutions, which made significant contributions to the process that led to the declaration of independence of Kosovo and enjoyed significant popular support in elections.

3.1.3. Power Structure within the Internal Environment

The configuration of power in the Kosovo Albanian political sphere that had been dominated by the LDK since its establishment in 1989 was rearranged after the public appearance of the UCK in the mid 1990s and led to a polarisation among the political fractions. After the UCK had conducted major operations in the course of the year 1998, representatives of the LDK heavily criticised the violent approach and blamed it for risking the lives of civilians. Furthermore, the UCK was blamed for the murder of high ranked FARK members. Thus, the conflict between the urban intellectual LDK and the rural UCK elite within Kosovo further escalated and Hashim Thaci even uttered threats against Bukoshi and Rugova. (cp. Schmitt, 2008, p. 325)

The UCK gained support when Rugova took part in an internationally mediated meeting with Milosevic. And in October 1998, the United Democratic Movement ((UDM), Levizja e Bashkuar Demokratike (LBD)), was established as collective movement of opposition parties under the leadership of Rexhep Qosja.

It soon became obvious that successful peace negotiations with Serbia would require the involvement of all relevant actors in Kosovo. Thus, the International Community had to encourage the participation of representatives of all three prevailing groups at that time. Therefore, the delegation at the Rambouillet Conference consisted of representatives of various parties. The two strongest fractions were the UCK, which was represented by the UCK wing that was willing to compromise headed by Hashim Thaci, and the LDK delegation headed by Ibrahim Rugova. The third party that was represented at the conference was the newly established LBD represented by Rexhep Qosja. Two newspaper editors served as non-partisan representatives. Hasim Thaci, the chief of the political directorate of the UCK, became head of the delegation with Rugova and Qosja as deputies. Due to the heterogeneity of the Kosovo Albanian delegation, the transformation into a functioning negotiations team had taken some time. The LDK had

to accept Thaci's leading role in the negotiations and an agreement that was signed by the three above-mentioned parties in Rambouillet on 23 February 1999 stipulated that the LDK was only one of three political parties that shall be responsible for the formation of a future government. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, p. 172 & p. 177)

After the failure of the negotiations and the subsequent international intervention, the Kosovo Albanian landscape of political parties again became highly fragmented. On 2 April 1999, Hashim Thaci announced the establishment of a transitional government under his leadership. The LBD took over the granted ministerial posts, while the LDK boycotted the institution.

In May 2000, UNMIK established the Kosovo Transitional Council with consultative function in which the UCK, the LBD, the LDK and non-partisan members as well as members of the minorities were represented. In September that year, UNMIK and the UCK agreed on a transformation of the former guerrilla organisation into a political party that later became an important political force under the leadership of Thaci, known as PDK. However, with the arrogance of a winner, Thaci's party lost its popular support. In December, the parallel structures in Kosovo were abolished according to an agreement between UNMIK and the Kosovo Albanian political parties. Thus, Hashim Thaci and Ibrahim Rugova lost their posts as Prime Minister respectively President of Kosovo. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 290-294)

The most important step towards the establishment of a democratic political structure was the adoption of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo in 2001. In the first elections for a parliament in Kosovo, the liberal conservative LDK under its leader Ibrahim Rugova became the strongest party. The second strongest force was the social democratic PDK under Hashim Thaci followed by the Serbian electoral coalition Povratak (which means return), the right wing party AAK under Ramush Haradinaj and several smaller parties. The prolonged conflict about the formation of the government took until 2002 when Bajram Rexhepi from the PDK became Prime Minister of a coalition of the LDK, the PDK, the AAK and the Bosnian-Muslim coalition Vatan. Ibrahim Rugova once again became President of Kosovo until his death in 2006. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 320-322)

Until the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008, another two Kosovo wide parliamentary elections were held in 2004 and 2007 in which the above-mentioned parties took part. A new party within the Kosovo Albanian political landscape was the liberal Alliance for a New Kosovo (Aleanca Kosova e Re, AKR) established in 2006 under the leadership of Behgjet Pacolli. (cp. Report 7, 2008) The election of 2004 resulted in in a governing coalition of the LDK and the AAK and that of 2007 in a coalition of the PDK and the LDK.

The first elections after Kosovo's independence took place in December 2010 and resulted in an election victory of the PDK with 34 parliamentary seats followed by the LDK with 27 seats. The liberal nationalist people's movement Self-Determination (Vetevendosje!) under the leadership of Albin Kurti took part in elections for the first time as a political party and received 14 seats in the parliament. The AAK reached 12 seats and the AKR 8. Hashim Thaci of the PDK now forms a coalition with the AKR party. (cp. The Telegraph, 13/12/2010) On 7 April 2011, Atifete Jahjaga, an independent candidate, became President of Kosovo.

Until today, the LDK and PDK remain the main forces in the Kosovo Albanian political arena, but none of them has a monopoly on power and thus, they govern in coalition with each other or with smaller parties.

3.2. Adversaries in the Territorial Conflict

3.2.1. Main Adversary Serbia

3.2.1.1. Political and Ideological Setting

Like in all other former republics of Yugoslavia nationalist forces arose in Serbia during the mid 1980s. Yugoslavism did not correspond to the modern image of the state and the old system of self-government socialism was made responsible for the actual economic crisis. This laid the foundation for a Great Serbian ideology and boosted the nationalist trends within the Communist Party. Within the Serbian branch of the party, a power struggle had erupted immediately after Tito's death and was won by the nationalist wing candidate, Slobodan Milosevic, only in 1987. But the rise of a radical right wing force under Vojislav Seselj outside the party structures put even more nationalist pressure on Milosevic's party to transform from a socialist into a nationalist force. The first

post-communist elections in Serbia took place in December 1990 and earned Slobodan Milosevic the highest post in the republic as its new president. (cp. Hofbauer, 2001, pp. 82-84)

Against the background of the military confrontations within former Yugoslavia, the USA and the European Community increased the pressure on the Serbian political elite for which reason Milosevic and his Socialist Party (**SPS, Socijalistička Partija Srbije**) announced new elections. In December 1992, Milosevic was confirmed in his office as President of Serbia and the SPS won 101 of the 250 mandates for the Serbian parliament. Seselj's Radical Party (**SRS, Srpska Radikalna Stranka**) won 73 mandates and Vuk Draskovic's alliance, the Democratic Movement of Serbia (**DEPOS, Democratic Movement of Serbia**), which included his Serbian Renewal Movement (**SPO, Srpski Pokret Obnove**), some former members of the Democratic Party (**DS, Demokratska Stranka**) that now formed the Democratic Party of Serbia (**DSS, Demokratska Stranka Srbije**) under the leadership of Vojislav Kostunica, and some other political groups, gained 50 seats in the parliament. The three parties or movements, the SPS, the SRS and DEPOS, gained most mandates and its leaders were to dominate the Serbian government in alternating alliances for the coming years. In Serbia as well as in Montenegro, the collapse of communism did not mean the dissolution of the former political elite like in the other former republics. In contrast, the political structures remained and functioned to the benefit of members of the former leadership that now found its place in the new established parties.

The **SPS** as successor party of the Communist Party advocated the maintenance of Yugoslavia with equality among all peoples but did not accept secessions. Especially secessionist ambitions of Kosovo were refused because its territory was considered as the heartland of Serbia. In reality, the party followed a Greater Serbian ideology under the pretext of protecting discriminated Serbs within Yugoslavia. The **SRS** acted as the legal wing of the armed Cetniki who considered themselves as Serbian freedom fighters. The party programme was based on the demand for Serbian independence and the refusal of Yugoslavia. Greater Serbia should encompass all regions inhabited by Serbs like parts of Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Adriatic coast until Zadar and other regions of Croatia. The **SPO,** which was the strongest opposition party, demanded a new structure for Yugoslavia based on cantons with a Serbian king as ruling figure in order to avoid the

alleged discrimination of Serbs within the federation. This vision referred to a high degree on the desire for the restoration of the 1918 shape of Serbia. The **DS** was re-established in 1990 by a diverse group of Serbian intellectuals, among them Dragoljub Micunovic, Zoran Djindjic and Vojislav Kostunica. But after a series of poor election results, several members left the party and founded their own fraction. Zoran Djindjic became a driving force behind structural changes within the party and took over its leadership in 1994. Then, the party presented itself as being Western oriented and a viable partner for Europe. The DS adhered to Yugoslavia as model of integration and aimed at establishing a free market system. The **DSS** was founded in 1992 after its future leader Vojislav Kostunica and several other members of the DS, who supported the party's membership in the Democratic Movement of Serbia, decided to leave the DS and establish a new party which joined the DEPOS. (cp. Hofbauer, 2001, pp. 84-90)

The opposition to Milosevic and his Socialist Party organised itself in different alliances and had its greatest success in February 1997 when the SPS had to acknowledge the election victory of the opposition in the local elections of 1996 in several big cities in Serbia after three months of demonstrations against election fraud in Belgrade. Thus, Zoran Djindjic became the first non-Communist mayor of Belgrade. This was the time, when Milosevic's power within Serbia began to crumble. He stepped back from his office as President of Serbia and was elected by the Yugoslav Federal Parliament President of Yugoslavia. (cp. Hofbauer, 2001, p. 90)

After the Serbian defeat in the Kosovo war, Milosevic finally lost his social basis. Although he was elected President of Yugoslavia until 2002, Milosevic believed that he could seize the anti-NATO sentiments in Serbia and the expected election boycott by the Kosovo Albanians and the Montenegrins in order to be re-elected in new elections that were held on 24 September 2000. But the USA as well as the EU invested huge amounts in supporting the opposition and putting pressure on the Serbian public which resulted in an election victory for Vojislav Kostunica who was the candidate of the electoral coalition against the Milosevic regime, called **Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS, Demokratska Opozicija Srbije)**. The DOS temporarily consisted of 18 parties and smaller groups including the DS, the DSS and the SPO. When Milosevic did not acknowledge his defeat and called for a run-off vote, huge demonstrations against him were arranged to enforce the election result. On 5 October 2000, the so-called "bulldozer

revolution" took place which stands for the violent riots in Belgrade that occurred that day. The state-owned TV station was occupied by protestors and the parliament building was set on fire. As a result, Milosevic had to recognise Kostunica as new President of Yugoslavia.

At the Serbian parliamentary elections in December 2000, the election alliance DOS gained two thirds of the votes and formed a government led by Zoran Djindjic that remained in office even after Djindjic's assassination in March 2003 until December that year. The SPS under its leader Milosevic as well as Seselj's Radical Party suffered great losses while the Yugoslav left party and the SPO did not gain seats in the parliament at all. Only the party of the assassinated paramilitary leader "Arkan", called Serbian Unity Party, was surprisingly more successful than expected. (cp. Hofbauer, 2001, pp. 207-216) Zoran Djindjic adopted a pro-Western transformational course for which reason Milosevic who was accused by the ICTY of having committed war crimes was arrested in March 2001 and handed over to the court in The Hague in June that year. After initial successes, Djindjic had to face obstructionist attitudes by President Kostunica whose party DSS left the DOS alliance by mid 2002 as well as by criminal groups including Milosevic supporters and the war mafia. On 12 March 2003, Zoran Djindjic was murdered by members of a criminal network which plunged Serbia into crisis.

The nationalist and anti-Western SRS led by Vojislav Seselj who at that time was already in prison in The Hague won the early elections in December 2003 and went into opposition. The DSS as second strongest fraction built a coalition government led by Kostunica as Prime Minister with the DS, Miroljub Labus's **G17 Plus,** which developed out of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that promoted a reform course and the break with the nationalist past, and Vuk Draskovic's SPO-New Serbia (**NS, Nova Srbija**) alliance. Milosevic's SPS lagged far behind. In 2004, Boris Tadic won the presidential elections. During this period of governance, the rapprochement of Serbia to the European or Transatlantic structures fell behind and Serbia took also part in unsuccessful negotiations about Kosovo's status in which it held the view that Kosovo should receive more than autonomy but less than independence. (cp. Sundhaussen, 2007, pp. 451- 454)

In 2007, new National Assembly elections were held in Serbia. While the nationalist SRS became the largest faction in parliament, a coalition government led by Prime Minister Kostunica was formed by his party the DSS, the pro-European DS of President Tadic, the

NS and the G17 Plus. In January 2008, Tadic was confirmed in his office as President of Serbia but after the failure of the status negotiations and the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in February, early parliamentary elections had to be held in May that year. This happened because the nationalist Prime Minister Kostunica and President Tadic were unable to find a common position on Europe after many European states had recognised the independence of Kosovo. While the DSS as well as the DS stood both firmly against the independence of Kosovo like hundreds of thousands Serbs that staged peaceful demonstrations in Belgrade in the aftermath of the declaration, they differed on the question whether the reaction of the European states should have an impact on Serbia's quest for EU membership. Thus, Kostunica resigned and the subsequent election campaign was mainly dominated by a Kosovo and EU discourse. The EU finally offered a carrot by signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia which led to a close victory of the pro-Western bloc called "For a European Serbia", an electoral coalition comprising the DS, the G17 Plus, the SPO and some other parties. The pro-European government that is in office until today is led by the Democratic Party and consists of several parties including the SPS, the G17 Plus. Mirko Cvetkovic who is not a member of any of the parties but has close ties to the DS became Prime Minister. (cp. Brown/Dickson/Taylor/Townsend, 2009, pp. 3-7)

3.2.1.2. Resources

Although Serbia as a republic of the State of Yugoslavia had faced serious economic problems before the outbreak of the conflict, the violent disputes caused an even deeper recession due to the costs of war including the support for Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and the loss of the unified Yugoslav market. Furthermore, the FRY suffered from rigorous UN sanctions causing the country's international isolation. Since Serbia's main ally, Russia, was preoccupied with its own recovery after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Serbia was largely cut off from external support. Hence, the economic system during the Milosevic era was characterised by war economy, the black market, state-driven hyperinflation, client-patron relationships, an inefficient fiscal system and a lack of investment that lead to the impoverishment of huge parts of the Serbian population. (cp. Crnobrnja/Savic et al, 2006, pp. 11-13)

Despite these difficult circumstances with regard to resources, Serbia could recourse to a powerful means, namely huge parts of the Yugoslav security forces that stayed under its control. Although the main purpose of the Yugoslav army had been the maintenance of Yugoslav unity, it also split into national fractions against the background of the conflict at the Balkans. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina around 70,000 well trained forces with equipment including air planes, tanks and artillery became part of a future Serbian army and challenged the newly established and poorly equipped forces of the Croats respectively the Bosniaks. (cp. Hofbauer, 2001, pp. 33-35) Against the backdrop of growing violence in Kosovo, Serbia also increased the presence of its superior security forces in the region. Already at the end of 1997, Serbia deployed an increasing number of police forces including special police units which armament also comprised mortars and light wheeled tanks. Later, Special Forces were called into action that had been trained in counterinsurgency by the Ministry of Interior. Mechanised and artillerist military units supported the Serbian security operations in Kosovo. An estimated number of 50,000 official security personnel were deployed in Kosovo in spring 1999 supplemented by some thousand paramilitary forces like the Seselj gangs or the Arkan Tigers. (cp. Feichtinger, 2000, p. 96)

The moderate economic recovery from 1994 to 1999 was intercepted by the Kosovo war which caused another phase of the economic downturn. Although the initial phase of the NATO intervention aimed at destroying Serbian military and police logistic centres, the main military and political potentials were removed to a safe place before the attacks. Only office buildings, barracks and communication devices were damaged but that had no disruptive effect on the overall structure of the Yugoslav respectively the Serbian army. Thus, the NATO proceeded to destruct civil infrastructure like factories, energy companies or traffic connections. (cp. Hofbauer, 2001, p. 111) Only after the regime change in 2000, crucial economic reforms were initiated in Serbia that until today have aimed at the stabilisation and recovery of Serbia's economy. Until present, remittances and foreign aid are vital sources of income for Serbia.

3.2.2. Other Adversary Serbs in North Kosovo

The Serbs in Kosovo feared their subordination and therefore rejected the idea of belonging to an independent State of Kosovo until today. During the war, the Serbian

forces armed the Serbian population in Kosovo in order to delegate simple safeguarding functions to the local residents and to actively involve them into the fight. (cp. Feichtinger, 2000, p. 102) But although relations between the Serbs in North Kosovo, the biggest Serbian settlement area in Kosovo, and those in the enclaves in South and East of Kosovo existed, they never adopted a common strategy towards the Kosovo Albanians due to the isolation of the Serbian enclaves. (cp. Jurekovic, 2003, p. 101)

The Northern part of Kosovo (with North Mitrovica as its centre), on the other hand, is the main settlement area of those around 100,000 Serbs who stayed in Kosovo after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav security forces. In this border area to Serbia, they constitute the majority population and thus are the last Serbian bastion. This population is of special strategic importance when it comes to the question of the status of Kosovo because it has demanded its reintegration into the Republic of Serbia and as transitional solution the establishment of a Serbian entity within Kosovo and therefore has to be regarded as individual conflict actor. (cp. Jurekovic, 2003, p. 74 & p. 100)

3.3. External Environment

3.3.1. Regional External Actors with Relevance to the Conflict

3.3.1.1. Albania

After years of complete isolation of Albania under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, the communist regime was overthrown in 1990. The new reform communist government was the first and only country to recognise the Republic of Kosovo as sovereign and independent state in October 1991. When Sali Berisha, a North Albanian politician with kinship ties in Kosovo, became president in March 1992, his Democratic Party of Albania announced the unification of the Albanian nation as its objective. While these Greater Albanian ambitions were welcomed among Kosovo Albanians and among Albanian groups in Diaspora, the citizens of Albania were sceptical. Although there had been a strong sense of national solidarity with the Kosovo Albanians, the relationship between the Albanians in Kosovo and in Albania increasingly worsened after the immigration of huge numbers of young Kosovo Albanians who wanted to escape their levy to the JNA. Several of these young men soon became influential businessman who made profit from the bad economic situation in Albania and took over the control of the trade in illegal goods. Thus, the Albanian population, which was used to a high level of public security

and order during communism, associated the increased criminality with the arrival of the Kosovo Albanians. Soon the Kosovo Albanians were perceived as arrogant and moral depravity. Therefore, there was not much interest and concern for the political developments in Kosovo. Sali Berisha recognised this change in the mood of the Albanians and adjusted his policy from a nationalist Greater Albanian attitude towards the moderation of his nationalist rhetoric and the commitment to the existing borders of the country. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, pp. 78-80)

Although Kosovo had been an important factor in Albanian foreign policy, the country aligned increasingly with the European policy towards Yugoslavia due to the pressure exercised by the Western states and also in order to receive support for Albania's own necessary reform efforts. Therefore, Albania did not take a clear position concerning the status question of Kosovo. This had several reasons: the consideration of the position of the International Community, fear of hegemonic ambitions of Kosovo in case of the establishment of a second Albanian state and an internal economic crisis caused by the breakdown of a system of pyramid investment funds in late 1996 and early 1997, in which hundreds of thousands of Albanians had invested their life savings.

Although the Albanian government was able to constructively influence the Kosovo Albanian delegation at the peace talks in Rambouillet in 1999 in terms of their willingness to compromise, the Albanian political parties were split over the question of Kosovo. While the government dominated by the Socialist Party backed Hashim Thaci and the UCK, the opposition party under Sali Berisha supported Ibrahim Rugova and his LDK. The only question in which the Albanian parties agreed was that an international intervention in Kosovo was needed and therefore opened Albanian airports, maritime routes and streets for logistical supplies of the NATO troops. In return, Albania hoped for help in dealing with the refugee problem, border security and the reconstruction of infrastructure. Another important factor was Albania's desire for a membership in the NATO and for becoming an important partner of the USA in South East Europe. Albania also offered support to the UCK in terms of providing space for training camps and strongholds. Only after the fighting in the border region to Kosovo had intensified, the UCK received active support from the Albanian army. The war-related events in Yugoslavia led to the abandonment of the former political passivity of Albania towards Kosovo and initiated more involvement in consultations and negotiations with Belgrade.

But due to Albania's economic, military and political instability, the country did not become an important factor in the solution of the conflict. (cp. Schubert, 2000, pp. 213-216)

Summing up, Albania's main aims were the securing of life quality in terms of economic and social stability after its internal problems and the minimisation of negative effects of the Kosovo war on the country like refugee problems. The country was also interested in positioning itself as the lead nation within the Albanian inhabited territories and aimed at increasing its international relevance. (cp. Jurekovic, 2003, pp. 87-88)

3.3.1.2. Macedonia

Macedonia's importance in the Kosovo conflict is self-explaining when taking into consideration its huge Albanian minority. During the Kosovo crisis, the main concern of Macedonia was the maintenance of its independence and sovereignty, the avoidance of negative effects on its stability and the prevention of the establishment of an Albanian Republic within Yugoslavia or a Greater Albanian state that would have threatened Macedonia's territorial integrity. Thus, a civil war-like confrontation between the majority and the minority population broke out in 2001, which was partially guided by Kosovo Albanians, among them members of the Kosovo Albanian UCK. The conflict could only be alleviated by granting more minority rights to the Albanians in Macedonia. (cp. Jurekovic, 2003, pp. 89-90)

3.3.2. Global External Actors with Relevance to the Conflict

3.3.2.1. Worldwide Kosovo Albanian Diaspora

The Albanian population looks back on a long tradition of emigration which led to the establishment of Albanian communities in Greece, South Italy, in Balkan countries like Bulgaria and Romania or in other parts of the Mediterranean like Egypt. Starting from 1900, an Albanian community had even developed in the United States and later became influential enough to act as a lobby group in American foreign policy in the 1990s.

But the Albanians of Kosovo belonged to the most conservative part of the Albanian population of South East Europe and therefore were almost unaffected from these

developments. Only the late 1960s were characterised by the new phenomenon of mass labour migration of Yugoslav citizens to Western countries. This phenomenon included Kosovo Albanians who left Kosovo primarily due to the economic hardship or under the pressure of Serbian authorities that aimed at balancing the Albanian population growth. Thus, the 1970s were characterised by a chain migration of Kosovo Albanians to Germany, Scandinavia, Switzerland or the United States.

Their remittances to Kosovo played an important role in economic development and assured the Kosovo Albanians economic superiority over those demographic groups that were employed in the maraud Yugoslav public economy. Especially South Slavs were in privileged positions in Kosovo and therefore only few went abroad while the Kosovo Albanians immigrated in huge numbers and earned in foreign currencies. The Serbian population of Kosovo was dependent upon the subventions of the state while the Kosovo Albanians developed their own business activities. Thus, the Serbian policy of excluding the Kosovo Albanians from public economy and forcing their immigration unintendedly produced their economic advantage. With the help of the foreign money, Kosovo Albanians were able to buy real property that was extremely expensive due to the scarcity of land in Kosovo. The high prices prompted many Serbian inhabitants of Kosovo to sell their property in Kosovo and buy a new one in the heartland of Serbia where prices were lower.

The labour migration of the Kosovo Albanians did not only have economic effects but also provided the basis for political activities. Due to the insufficient integration of the guest workers in their host countries, an infrastructure of associations established that served as platform for communication. In Diaspora, relationships between members of different layers of the Albanian society as well as between people from different regions of origin established which would not have been possible within Kosovo due to the bad infrastructure. A homogenous and idealised pan-Albanian identity developed in the communities abroad and influenced the identity of the population in Yugoslavia which had crucial effects on the inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo or Macedonia. (cp. Schmitt, 2008, pp. 284-286)

Kosovo's relatively huge international Diaspora increased during the 1990s, when large numbers of Kosovo Albanians left the region due to political repressions.

Especially the Diaspora communities in the USA and Western Europe exerted enormous influence on the conflict in their home countries and offered the basis needed to catch the attention of the Western public. The communities were open for mobilisation efforts of the national movement and provided funding. By collecting a special tax among the Kosovo Albanians in Diaspora, the Kosovo Albanian government-in-exile in Bonn financed the parallel education and health systems in Kosovo. Remittances constituted a huge proportion of the family income and until today they are vital for Kosovo's economy. The Kosovo Albanian Diaspora also acted as information channel for the relatives at home, printed newspapers and was an active lobby for Kosovo abroad. (cp. O'Connell, 2008, p. 1)

Due to the fact that almost each Kosovo Albanian extended family had relatives abroad, and mainly in Western Europe like in Switzerland or Germany, the community imported Western lifestyle and values through the Diaspora. Thus, religion was less important and no form of Islamic extremism appeared during the time of conflict.

However, there are also evident signs that parts of the Diaspora helped to gather money needed for the Kosovo Albanian resistance through its involvement in various forms of organised crime.

On the political level, the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora was active in the establishment of political structures, in propaganda for the Kosovo Albanian liberation aspirations as well as in exercising influence on the situation on the ground. (cp. Blankenbichler, 2003, pp. 33-36)

3.3.2.2. Worldwide Serbian Diaspora

The worldwide Serbian Diaspora did not play a role in the conflict comparable to that of the active Kosovo Albanian Diaspora. Its only visible actions were demonstrations against the NATO bombing campaign in the countries of residence as well as efforts to improve the international image of Serbia.

A study about the political mobilisation of the high-skilled Serbs in German Diaspora showed that their mobilisation potential was high notwithstanding their insignificant number. The political activities of the Diaspora reached their peak during the conflict in

Kosovo and included not only the above-mentioned protests against the international intervention but also actions against Milosevic or the organisation of aid programmes for Serbia. But with the end of the war and the stabilisation of the domestic political situation in Serbia, the political mobilisation lost its intensity. (cp. Baraulina/Bommes/El-Cherkeh/Daume, 2007, p. 20)

3.3.2.3. The World Stage and the Role of the International Community

A rather important collective actor in any conflict, is the so-called "world stage" or international public opinion. One must not forget the vital role of auditors and interested parties that are indispensable for reaching foreign political support. International public opinion can be reached through international mass media or through representation or lobbying in international forums.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia was very complex and started at a time when the international security architecture had to pass a transitional phase after the end of the Cold War. Different perceptions and interests collided and thus produced institutional rivalries between and within organisations such as the EU, the NATO, the OSCE, the UNO or the Western European Union whose roles had to be redefined at that time.

The recognition of the sovereignty of the former Yugoslav republics by the majority of the so-called Western States marked a new attitude towards the right of self-determination but also strengthened the international fears that it could act encouraging on separatist attitudes elsewhere. Therefore, there were stronger prejudices against the secessionist ambitions of Kosovo due to the fact that it never had the status of a republic within Yugoslavia. This perception mainly based on the legal advice of the EU's Badinter Commission that determined the republic status as precondition for the recognition of the independence of a state. Thus, the EU as well as the USA promoted Kosovo's autonomy within Yugoslavia as solution to the conflict which was a big disappointment for the Kosovo Albanians. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 158-163)

The first international mission in Yugoslavia was deployed by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (later renamed into OSCE) already from September 1992 until June 1993 and was tasked with the collection of information about

human rights violations in the biggest settlement areas of minorities which were Kosovo, Sandsak and Vojvodina. (cp. Report 5, 1999, p. 325)

But Kosovo had not been a priority of the International Community until 1998 because it had obviously been perceived as less important in urgency and status than the other conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Especially against the background of the violent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo was deliberately sidelined and thus excluded from the Dayton negotiations. This resulted in the indirect legitimation of Milosevic's role in Kosovo and clearly signalled that Kosovo was off the current international agenda which had three escalating effects on the conflict: First, it gave the FRY the opportunity to act freely in Kosovo. Second, it weakened the non-violent movement in Kosovo. Third, it strengthened those Kosovo Albanian forces which promoted violent resistance.

To make things worse, the EU formally recognised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with Kosovo as part of it after the signing of the Dayton Agreement. The USA also recognised the FRY but insisted on the maintenance of sanctions against it due to the situation in Kosovo. So the only significant actors that engaged in Kosovo from 1993 to 1997 were NGOs which focused on the protection of human rights. (cp. Report 1, 2000, pp. 55-60)

The heavy fights between the UCK and the Serbian security forces in Kosovo finally led to foreign intervention, initially in the form of a double strategy of threat and negotiations. The International Community reactivated the Contact Group, which had been established during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to coordinate the policy of the USA, the European countries and the Russian Federation. The initial step of the International Community was sanctions against Belgrade. The USA pushed Belgrade into negotiations which resulted in the signing of the Holbrook-Milosevic-Agreement that had excluded the Kosovo Albanian side and therefore did not bring a durable solution to the problems on the ground. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, p. 166)

The second OSCE Mission in Kosovo was installed in October 1998 based on the Milosevic-Holbrook-Agreement and served as a verification mission. The mission, on the one hand, reported on movements of the armed forces or convoyed police units and, on the other, helped to temporarily calm down the military dispute through its apparent presence.

The EU demanded direct negotiations between the conflict parties but after the failure of the talks in Rambouillet and against the background of the deteriorating humanitarian situation it became clear that an international intervention with a robust mandate was needed to enforce a truce. Therefore, the members of the OSCE mission left Kosovo in March 1999 shortly before the start of the NATO intervention. (cp. Report 5, 1999, pp. 327-228)

Although China and Russia signalled in the UN Security Council that they would not support any military interference in the conflict, the NATO bombing started on 24 March 1999 and US President Clinton outlined the following goals of the intervention in a TV speech: the demonstration of seriousness in responding to aggression, the deterrence of Serbian escalating attacks in Kosovo and the damage of Yugoslav military capacities in order to prevent wars in future. The European leaders consented to these goals but stressed the need to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. (cp. Report 1, 2000, p. 85)

After the NATO ceased its air campaign against Serbia, the international military presence in Kosovo, KFOR, was deployed. On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 in order to set out the basic guidelines for the International Community's response to the post-war situation in Kosovo. (cp. Report 1, 2000, p. 99) Bernard Kouchner, the founder and long-term president of Medecins sans Frontieres, became the Special Representative and Head of the UNMIK that has been based on four pillars: First, humanitarian aid under the authority of the UNHCR (that was replaced in 2001 by the new pillar policing and justice under UNO control), second, civil administration subordinated to the UNO, third, democratisation and institution building under the authority of the OSCE and fourth, reconstruction and economic development under the oversight of the EU. (cp. Petritsch/Pichler, 2004, p. 290) According to the resolution, the KFOR under NATO command was responsible for deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining a ceasefire, ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Yugoslav and Serbian forces, demilitarising armed Kosovo Albanian groups, establishing a secure environment and thus coordinating with and providing support to the international civil presence. (cp. UN Resolution 1244, 1999, p. 3)

While the International Community established an international administration in Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic's fall from power was forced. Before the presidential elections in Yugoslavia in 2000, the USA as well as the EU were involved in the setup

and financing of the opposition, increased economic, military and political pressure and stationed war ships at the Montenegrin coast. NATO manoeuvres were conducted there in the forefront of the elections which was meant to be a direct threatening gesture to all Serbs testifying that if Milosevic got re-elected, the NATO would return to Serbia. In addition, Western States had a net of intelligence agents within Yugoslavia and conducted targeted killings of persons closely connected to Milosevic. Vojislav Kostunica, the candidate supported by the Western States, won the elections. Although Kostunica as a nationalist stood in diametric contradiction to the ideological interests of the Western Community, he did not have any economic perceptions and thus did not hinder the states to make huge profits on the Serbian market. (cp. Hofbauer, 2001, pp. 207-211) Critics emphasised that the international intervention in Kosovo primarily aimed at protecting the economic interests of important actors of the International Community. The attacks on Yugoslavia were allegedly based on geopolitical, geostrategic and military interests of the NATO, on the one side, and on economic considerations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), on the other. The opening and liberalisation of the Yugoslav market was already a subject of the Rambouillet agreement in order to make state property available to multi-national enterprises. The programmes for structural adjustment of the IMF and the World Bank demanded the promotion of exports, the shortage of social funding and the opening of the countries for foreign luxury goods and consumer products for the middle class. In Kosovo, the Commerzbank and the Raiffeisenbank later took over the main part of the bank sector and thus, now control all financial activities in the region. Western enterprises have profited from the natural resources of Serbia and Kosovo as well as from the forced privatisation of former state property. Thus, critics assume that the international crisis intervention mainly served the interests of the NATO members and its enterprises all over the world. The installation of UN administrations after interventions accordingly followed war logics that focused on the privatisation of profits and the socialisation of consequential costs. (cp. Gritsch, 2011, pp. 32-36)

The main goals of the Western Community after its intervention and the fall of the Serbian regime were de-escalation, economic development and the establishment of democratic structures with the prospect of a future integration of the Balkan region into the EU, the return of refugees and the autonomy of Kosovo while retaining borders of

existing states in the region. The Western Community regarded Kosovo's aspirations for self-determination as threat to its regional integration goals. But after international mediation efforts directed on finding a solution to the status question of Kosovo did not reach a breakthrough, Kosovo authorities unilaterally declared independence. This step was taken in close coordination with the EU, the USA and other states and was finally supported by many Western States but lacked general international recognition especially due to the refusal of the UN Security Council members China and Russia. (cp. Jurekovic, 2003, pp. 93-95; cp. Sejdiu, 25/07/12) Until today, 99 member states of the 193 members of the UNO have recognised Kosovo's independence but the conflict parties and their allies still conduct lobby work within the framework of certain other organisations.

Only in 2011, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, an inter-governmental organisation with 57 Islamic member states, adopted a resolution calling on its member states to consider recognising Kosovo. (cp. Homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Kosovo, 05/07/2011)

Most member states of the Non-Aligned Movement on the other hand have not recognised Kosovo until today. The organisation was founded on the initiative of Egypt, India and Yugoslavia in 1961 in Belgrade and consists of 118 countries that do not consider themselves formally part of any major power bloc. Today, Serbia has an observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement and uses the framework of the organisation to lobby against the recognition of independence of Kosovo. Most of the member countries therefore refused to recognise Kosovo but some are under pressure from European countries or the USA to do so like recently Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Saint Lucia. (cp. Barlovac, 05/09/2011)

3.3.2.4. USA

According to critics, the US-support for the independence of Kosovo is based on its wish for a loyal client state at the Balkans. The alleged motives include the wish for permanent presence at the US military camp Bondsteel, control over future pipeline routes as well as an additional European missile defence site. Parts of these assumptions prove to be realistic since the US military's European Command has openly declared interest in new operating locations in the region. But on the other hand, Kosovo's strategic value must

not be overestimated. Although the Kosovo Albanian leadership is supposedly loyal to the USA, Kosovo is among the smallest and poorest countries in Europe and its geographic position does not pose an indispensable asset for the USA which is already present in Bulgaria and Romania. One of the probably most important goals of the USA is long-term regional stability and democratic integration which allows the USA to reduce and redirect its troop commitments in the region.

Supporting Kosovo's independence is also regarded as an opportunity to preserve the credibility of the USA and to influence the process on the ground. This was the case when the USA were involved in the coordination of the timing of Kosovo's declaration of independence and positively influenced Kosovo's attitude towards the Ahtisaari proposal for continued international supervision, decentralisation and the protection of minority rights. Moreover, supporting the predominantly Muslim population of Kosovo serves USA's global strategic interests by showing that its War on Terror is not directed against Islam. And advancing good governance also reduces the risk of rising extremist ideology.

Thus, the USA chose the NATO as its main instrument to intervene in the process on the ground because it retained overall responsibility for security in the country, and its mandate extends indefinitely until it will be ended by a vote of the Security Council. (cp. Rhodes, 2008, pp. 125-128)

3.3.2.5. The EU and its Member States

Since the beginning of the conflict at the Balkans, the maintenance of stability in the region is regarded as an important benchmark for the assessment of the conflict management of the EU because the EU's engagement at the Balkans was the core element of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. (cp. Jurekovic, 2003, pp. 94-95) The original mandate of the EU was also the UN resolution 1244 which tasked the EU with contributions to the process of economic development and stabilisation in the region. But even with enormous amounts of financial aid the EU was not able to make substantial contributions to the improvement of the economic situation of Kosovo mainly due to a mistaken choice of priorities. The EU neglected support in the agricultural sector that would have led to a reduction of Kosovo's dependence on food imports. Also major EU projects like the running of the largest electric power station in Kosovo or the expansion

of the airport in Prishtina cannot be evaluated as success because they run inefficiently and millions of Euros were peculated. The privatisation process, which started in 2003/04 and primarily served the economic interests of the EU countries, did not have a positive influence on the local economy.

In 2006, the EU started its preparations for a new mission in Kosovo that further enabled EU member states to exercise influence on the proceedings on the ground by installing an EU Special Representative with far-reaching competencies, establishing the EULEX mission that is responsible for the area of rule of law in Kosovo and by intensifying its activities within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process. Although the EU provided Kosovo with a long-term European perspective, there is still disagreement within the EU on how to continue this process because Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain remain opposed to Kosovo's independence. (cp. Dzihic/Kramer, 2009, pp. 14-19) The reasons for the refusal to recognise Kosovo by the above-mentioned states were mainly based on internal considerations respectively cultural loyalties. Spain has its own problems with the extreme nationalist terror organisation, called ETA, while Slovakia and Romania regularly face nationalist claims from its Hungarian minorities as well as Hungarian nationalist parties. The two Orthodox EU member states, Cyprus and Greece, act out of solidarity with the Orthodox Church in Serbia and therefore refuse to grant Kosovo its recognition as a national state. (cp. MacShane, 2011, pp. 117-120)

3.3.2.6. Russian Federation

Russia defines itself as Great Power and Peacekeeping Power in Europe and therefore tried to become a relevant actor in the conflict at the Balkans. Due to Russia's own unsolved territorial conflicts within the federation, like the conflict in Chechnya, Russia supported the maintenance of the territorial order in the Balkan region and because of its historical alliance and cultural commonalities with Serbia it has refused the secession of Kosovo. Thus, Russia has tried to avoid any precedence for a successful secession. Although a Russian contingent was represented among the KFOR troops until 2003, Russia's main asset to exercise influence on the Kosovo issue has been its seat as permanent member in the UN Security Council which provides the country with the option to use its veto against the recognition of Kosovo's independence. Moreover, South

East Europe has been an important region for Russian economic activity and is therefore essential in boosting its economic position. (cp. Jurekovic, 2003, pp. 93-95)

A Russian textbook on geopolitics for universities published in 2007 referred to the Balkans as one of the most significant geopolitical and strategic priorities of Russia. Therefore, the support for Serbia has been very important and has assured Russia's presence at the Balkans. Serbia has also acted as a counterbalance to the rising influence of Turkey in the region as well as at the Black Sea and in Bulgaria. (cp. Malek, 2008, p. 136)

Thus, Russia exercised strong pressure in June 2007 to avoid the endorsement of a new resolution which should have replaced resolution 1244. Subsequent mediation efforts between Serbia and Kosovo by the Troika composed of the European Union, the Russian Federation and the USA were unsuccessful and therefore the last attempt by the Contact Group, including Russia, to find an agreement. Thus, all further steps in late 2007 and early 2008 were taken without the consent of Russia. But the lack of a new resolution on Kosovo and the opposition of the Russian and Serbian delegation to back the Ahtisaari plan at the level of the UN made clear that UNMIK would continue to play a role even after the entry into force of Kosovo's constitution on 15 June 2008. (cp. Marmsoler, 2008, pp. 106-111)

The Kosovo Albanian independence was harshly condemned by Russia and so it blocked Kosovo's admission to the UN. Serbia and Russia insist that any decision about this matter must be approved by the UN Security Council, and Russia has even demanded to declare the nullification of Kosovo's independence. (cp. Malek, 2008, p. 139) As the former Balkans Minister of Great Britain, Denis MacShane concluded, it became clear *"that Russia was not prepared to help bring peace to the Balkans but would prefer to maintain the non-status of Kosovo in order to show its continuing authority at the United Nations"* (MacShane, 2011, p. 114) Despite the International Court of Justice advisory opinion about Kosovo's independence delivered in 2011, Russia and Serbia continue to deny Kosovo the status of a nation-state. (cp. MacShane, 2011, p. 117)

3.3.2.7. China

The Kosovo question has direct implications on the constitutional structure of the Chinese state because its organisation is based on the same federation model as former Yugoslavia. Thus, Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence threatens to pose a precedent for China's 56 recognised national minorities that live in over half of the territory of the People's Republic of China. Moreover, there exist various special administrative regions like Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Tibet. On the one hand, China feels unease regarding the recognition of Kosovo by the majority of the Western states that therewith gave priority to the rights of a minority to exercise autonomy over the national sovereignty of Serbia. On the other hand, Kosovo's declaration of independence revives memories of the promises to respect the right of self-determination of minorities made by the Chinese communists in 1949 in order to seize power. However, China refuses Kosovo's recognition and thus uses its position as veto power in the UN Security Council to prevent Kosovo's admission as a member state. (cp. Bezlova, 19/02/2008)

3.3.3. Influence of the External Actors on the Conflict

The neighbour country of Kosovo, **Albania**, was preoccupied with its political transformation and economic problems and therefore reacted reluctant to the conflict. Despite the ethnic kinship, Albania mainly served as retreat and training area of Kosovo Albanian paramilitary forces and as safe haven for refugees. **Macedonia** occupied the role of a passive external actor because it did not actively interfere into the conflict, but its huge Albanian population also demanded unification with other Albanian inhabited territories within Yugoslavia and thus, it was affected by spill over effects.

While the **worldwide Serbian Diaspora** did not play a decisive role in the conflict, the **Kosovo Albanian Diaspora** provided substantial support to the national movements and served as their most important bankroller, information channel, source of recruitment and lobby.

The **International Community** became actively involved into the dispute only after the outbreak of the violent conflict. Several Western states engaged in providing equipment

and training for Kosovo Albanian forces, while mercenary soldiers from various other countries even actively participated in the fights in Kosovo.

The support of the **Western Community of States** had crucial influence on the conflict and comprised sanctions against Belgrade, mediation efforts between the conflict parties, a military intervention, the set up of an international administration in Kosovo and finally the recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence by the majority of its states.

The **Organisation of the Islamic Conference** called on its member states to consider recognising Kosovo, while most of the **Non-Aligned states** refuse the recognition of the State of Kosovo until today.

Russia has been an important opponent of the Kosovo Albanian independence as well and together with **China** blocked Kosovo's admission to the UNO, for which reason the status question is still unsolved.

Summing up, the external environment did not direct the Kosovo Albanian struggle, but substantial support from the side of powerful members of the International Community played a decisive role in the conflict.

4. Strategic Concepts

4.1. Strategic Resources Transformed Into Instruments of Power

4.1.1. Tangible

At the beginning of the conflict, the Kosovo Albanians did not command enough tangible resources to provoke a military confrontation with Serbia. Although the mobilisation capacity of their national movement was high, the Kosovo Albanians were not able to draw on any other resources than on means of peaceful (semi-)resistance. Due to the economic and military inferiority of the Kosovo Albanians vis-à-vis Serbia, the transformation of their resources into means of power assumed the shape of Kosovo Albanian parallel state structures and cultural institutions.

Also at a later stage, when the violent option gained popularity, the Kosovo Albanians lacked sufficient fighters, financial resources and military equipment to conduct a

conventional war against Serbian forces, for which reason they drew back on guerrilla warfare.

4.1.2. Intangible

The Kosovo Albanian national movements profited from the strong ideological commitment of the majority of their ethnic group to the common goal, self-determination and independence from Serbia.

In the early stages, there was a strong engagement in identity building and the introduction of new connecting values to the Kosovo Albanian society. During the phase of non-violent resistance, the new Kosovo Albanian image of being European and committed to values like self-discipline and patience served the national unity of the ethnic group in its struggle and created a positive image on the international stage. Thus, the Kosovo Albanians could draw back on moral and participatory resources in order to conduct semi-resistance that on the other hand earned them international backing.

After the Kosovo Albanians realised their lack of progress towards self-determination through non-violence, there was a high motivation of the Kosovo Albanians to engage in active fighting that was fuelled by Serbian repression, on the one side, and by successful political propaganda, on the other.

4.2. Strategic Ways

This chapter will deal with the strategic ways of the Kosovo Albanians segmented into options for action according to their intensity of violence. Hence, the non-cooperative way comprises forms of resistance while the cooperative way focuses on negotiations and the willingness to compromise.

4.2.1. Non-Cooperative Way

4.2.1.1. Non-Violent Resistance

At the beginning of the conflict, the Kosovo Albanians pursued the method of passive non-violent resistance to strengthen the internal unity, gain international support and avoid war with Serbia.

4.2.1.2. Violent Resistance

The violent approach included two options for action:

- **Readiness to use violence against property and persons**
  While the LDK was neither able nor willing to adopt a more active form of resistance, the UCK introduced guerrilla tactics against Serbian security institutions and thus accepted the killing of Serbian security forces.

- **Deliberate use of violence against persons**
  Although the UCK already called for peoples' war in 1993 and had conducted sporadic attacks on Serbian policemen, its actions increased since 1996 and were deliberately directed against Serbian "colonists" which also comprised targeted offences against civilians. The UCK allegedly conducted such deliberate violent actions against Serbs on the territory of Kosovo in order to escalate the situation and force the International Community to intervene, but refrained from terrorist attacks on Serbian territory or outside the conflict area. Thus, there have never been any attempts to apply international terrorism as means of struggle.
  The LDK, on the other hand, completely refused any kind of violent attacks. Since the LDK was aware that especially terrorist attacks were perceived as inacceptable by the International Community, it made sure that no subversive operations from inside the Kosovo Albanian society took place. Therefore, they were in permanent contact with the Kosovo Albanian people and conducted information campaigns. (cp. Bukoshi, 25/07/2012)

4.2.2. Cooperative Ways

4.2.2.1. Negotiations

Only when international pressure on the leadership of the Kosovo Albanian national movements increased, the representatives accepted to take part in negotiations at the Rambouillet conference. The representatives initially refused an agreement with Serbia and later only showed superficial readiness to find a compromise. Thereby, the Kosovo Albanian delegation fully relied on Serbia's refusal of the agreement because it was aware that if Serbia showed readiness to compromise, it would have obtained huge concessions in Rambouillet. (cp. Bukoshi, 25/07/2012) Despite this threat, the Kosovo Albanian side did not insist on a radical position and reacted flexibly enough to show signs of readiness to compromise when it seemed to best serve its interests. Thus, the Kosovo Albanians seized their window of opportunity.

5. Evaluation of the Kosovo Albanian Strategy With Respect to the Individual Strategic Elements

5.1. Conflict Conditions

As we have seen in the historical chapter of this work, the initial situation of the Kosovo Albanians was characterised by the international neglection of their national aspirations and thus, their affiliation to Serbia respectively Yugoslavia. Hence, the Kosovo Albanian struggle for self-determination continuously developed but only institutionalised late in the form of national movements as a consequence of the downturn of the Yugoslav federal state and the Serbian incorporation of Kosovo. Thus, the chance of the Kosovo Albanians to have a say in their national fate before that time was missed.

5.2. Formulation and Pursuance of Interests, Goals and Objectives

A big achievement of the Kosovo Albanian national movements was their contribution to the realisation of the national **interests** through substantial efforts in the assurance of security. Besides their promotion of the suspension of the blood feud to avoid internal struggles, the LDK managed to prevent the outbreak of violent clashes with the Serbian security forces for many years and at times of violent conflict the UCK established

military forces to provide physical security to the Kosovo Albanians. Regarding the Kosovo Albanian identity, most notable contributions were made by the LDK. A new Kosovo Albanian identity was established first as a side effect of the common peaceful approach and later as a means to improve the Kosovo Albanian image on the international stage. Also the interest of prosperity was pursued by the LDK in the form of the set up of parallel social institutions as well as a shadow economy.

Notwithstanding, the national movements drew the conclusion that the realisation of the Kosovo Albanian national interests had to be fulfilled through reaching the **goal** of self-determination, which was a plausible demand. But as Clark concludes regarding the final status, *"As an ultimate goal, the negative 'End Belgrade's rule of Kosovo' was clearly more acceptable internationally than an independence that most people interpreted as 'Albanian rule of Kosovo'. 'Self-determination' – without fixing on a precise from (independence, confederation or 'autonomy plus') – offered a more open process towards change, more easily concretised in various areas of life and carrying with it the onus to build confidence with other ethnic groups in Kosovo."* (Clark, 2000, p. 205) Since the Kosovo Albanian parties made sure that their demands were realistic and acceptable on the international stage, it was easy to gain international support for them. The Kosovo Albanian movements rightly assessed that it would be necessary to make Kosovo Albanian aspirations complementary to US-interests and thus conducted intensive lobbying in the USA since the European states initially showed less reaction to the Kosovo case. (cp. Bukoshi, 25/07/2012)

But major mistakes were made in the pursuance of the Kosovo Albanian **objectives**. Although they changed over time, an over-emphasis on Kosovo's final status led to the negligence of the steps towards self-determination which brought about the ossification of the LDK. The absence of interim and transitional objectives of the non-violent approach led to the exhaustion and subsequent demobilisation of the Kosovo Albanian society, which created a favourable opportunity for the violent approach of the UCK which was expected to deliver results more quickly. (cp. Clark, 2000, p. 204) Another point of criticism is the Kosovo Albanian insistence on the indivisibility of Kosovo and the resulting claim on North Kosovo. Several observers perceive the intransigence regarding an eventual partition of Kosovo as a major mistake in the recent strategy due to its obstruction of the country's stability and development. Notwithstanding, it can be

assumed that the majority of the Kosovo Albanian population would perceive the partition of the country as unacceptable loss since North Kosovo is not only of economic interest to the state, but also part of the national identity. Furthermore the partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines could pose a danger to the political stability of the whole region through the creation of a precedent. (cp. Kiqmari, 03/07/2012)

However, the Kosovo Albanian aspirations in the conflict can be assessed as reasonable, achievable and legitimate and thus, their realisation has been widely obtained.

5.3. Strategic Environment

5.3.1. Internal Environment

Since a particular Kosovo Albanian national identity emerged only against the background of Serbian repression within the framework of the Yugoslav federation, there was a lack of organisation and political representation of the Albanian population in Kosovo during the time when the territory was disputed between the Great Powers and their allies.

Thus, the institutionalisation of a Kosovo Albanian struggle for self-determination took place at a very late point in time, namely in the 1980s. The LDK, as first Kosovo Albanian national movement, enjoyed strong support from all layers of the society and highly contributed to its internal solidarity and unity. Notwithstanding, the LDK lost internal hold since it turned into a centralised bureaucracy over time and failed to deliver results. Hence, the UCK emerged as rival movement with a more active approach. Despite initial structural problems, the UCK had become a strong military force by 1998/99. Hence, the LDK's non-violent approach and the UCK's violent approach can be considered as a from of shared labour in the conflict. Despite their struggle for power within the Kosovo Albanian political sphere, both pursued common goals and objectives. The LDK and the UCK managed to appear rather coherent to the external environment and to conduct effective internal cooperation due to the absence of spoilers in their own ranks. The two national movements were never directed from outside actors, but conducted their independent struggle for their self-declared goal.

5.3.2. Adversaries

The Kosovo Albanians were aware that their adversaries, the State of Serbia and the Serbian minority in Kosovo, were an overly powerful block uncompromisingly opposing their self-determination. Serbia had a strong legal case to object to an eventual independence of Kosovo, but had a lack of international support due to its role in the wars in Croatia and in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Thus, the LDK rightly assessed that a military confrontation had to be avoided to gain time for an internal consolidation and that international support in the struggle against Serbia was indispensable. Only when the Kosovo Albanians realised that the International Community did not reward non-violence, the UCK deliberately provoked an international intervention. Thus, the Kosovo Albanian national movements rightly assessed the strategic situation of their adversary and therefore applied the right approaches in the conflict.

5.3.3. External Environment

With regard to the external environment, the Kosovo Albanians profited from the fact that there had not existed any vital external interests that contradicted the Kosovo Albanian goal or even a destructive form of inner-Albanian rivalries. Thus, the Albanian population in the neighbouring countries, the State of Albania as well as the worldwide Albanian Diaspora acted in favour of the Kosovo Albanian side. Hence, the Kosovo Albanians were not instrumentalised from outside but, in contrast, could draw back on Albanian solidarity.

But major omissions were made in dealing with the International Community because the Kosovo Albanian non-violent movement should have engaged more with the new international attitude that focused on preventive strategies of conflict intervention, which would have required detailed suggestions to channel this international interest. (cp. Clark, 2000, p. 209) Furthermore, the Kosovo Albanians regarded the countries of the West as important allies due to their power, but at the same time failed to look for broader support among Yugoslavia's former allies in the Non-Aligned Movemement. In addition, the Kosovo Albanians failed to take into consideration the importance of weakening the aggressor's international support. Naturally, this would not have reversed historical alliances, but it could have eased the strong opposition of some actors and increased their

willingness to act as broker in the conflict. However, it was a major success of the Kosovo Albanians to gain the support of the most powerful actors of the International Community and to reach their active diplomatic and military intervention into the conflict.

5.4. Strategic Concepts

The following chapter will deal with the evaluation of the Kosovo Albanian concepts, which amount to the ways that were chosen based on the available resources transformed into instruments of power. For the reason of clearness, the below used structure for the applied concepts will be borrowed from that of the strategic ways of the national movements but will already include the considerations made by the LDK and the UCK with regard to their resources.

5.4.1. Non-Cooperative Concepts

5.4.1.1. Non-Violent Concept

The Kosovo Albanian non-violent civil resistance to occupation was an adequate approach in relation to the resources of the national movement in the initial phase of the conflict, but did not succeed in bringing about the end of Serbian rule over Kosovo or an international intervention into the conflict.

Notwithstanding, with regard to its successes, two key negotiators at the conference of Rambouillet, Venton Surroi and Fehmi Agani, assessed that the non-violent approach was necessary because it prevented the premature outbreak of war by offering an alternative, maintained the integrity of the Kosovo Albanian community, countered Serbian pressure on Albanians to leave Kosovo and assured international support. Fehmi Agani further pointed out that the LDK achieved the political defeat of Serbia and prepared the ground for the violent approach of the UCK by making Serbia a strange presence in Kosovo and reducing it to police, army and force. Politically, Serbia had no support in any layer of the Albanian society and thus was isolated in Kosovo. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 186-189) Summarising the LDK's successes in terms of concepts, it has to be mentioned that the movement made a big contribution to the set-up of a democratic political system in Kosovo, built up a good information network, made the Kosovo case

internationally known through diplomatic initiatives and won the media fight against Serbia. (cp. Sejdiu, 25/07/2012)

Notwithstanding, the non-violent approach did not apply constant pressure on the Serbian regime, for which reason it failed to make the maintenance of control over Kosovo politically and economically costly for Serbia. (cp. Stephan, 2006, p. 71) Clark further argues regarding Serbia's ideology and the readiness of its regime to go to extremes without regards of consequences, *"Evidently Serbian attitudes to Kosovo, Miloševic's own 'borderline personality' and the nature of the regime were all factors militating against the success of civil resistance in Kosovo."* (Clark, 2000, p. 190) Also the Kosovo Albanian attempt to unilaterally declare independence in 1991 did not prove successful, since it was not recognised by the International Community and brought no reversal in the conflict. When it became clear to Serbia that the programme of re-Serbisation of Kosovo was unrealistic, the simmering conflict suited the regime because it used the tensions to justify the large Serbian police presence as well as to divert general interest from problems elsewhere. Although the Kosovo Albanians seized that time to strengthen their position by educating international opinion, domestically there would have been a need for more action and the LDK seemed incapable of initiative. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 186-189) Some scholars admit that especially the LDK's abandonment of any opportunities of cooperation with the Serbian opposition to the Milosevic regime or other groups in Yugoslavia might have been a strategic mistake. Within Serbia, several groups, including the Serbian pro-democracy groups, intellectuals, Orthodox religious leaders as well as parents of Serbian soldiers were dissatisfied with the regime but this discontent was not seized by the Kosovo Albanian leadership and thereby it ignored that Serbia was one of the key players in this conflict. Thus, there has never been any attempt to combine the pressure of non-violent resistance with negotiations with the Serbian opposition. (cp. Stephan, 2006, p. 75) Bujar Bukoshi, the former Prime Minister of Kosovo in Exile and acting deputy Prime Minister, on the other hand, categorically excluded any option for cooperation with the Serbian opposition, since there was a common perception among the Kosovo Albanian leaders that not any real peace camp had existed in Serbia due to the racist political climate in the country. And thus, any attempt to cooperate with Serbian groups would have been an illusion and therefore considered as a waste of time. (cp. Bukoshi, 25/07/2012) Notwithstanding, the LDK could have pursued a stronger peace policy by conducting more confidence building. (cp. Clark, 2000, pp. 203-204) Political

observers admit that before the public appearance of the UCK, there had been good chances that a more active non-violent strategy with stronger constructive programme could have had a much stronger international impact. Despite the refusal of active non-violence by the LDK leadership, this approach was nevertheless pursued by students, but their efforts were too little and too late. Despite the potential of the active non-violent approach to disrupt the status quo, to increase the cost of Serbian control over Kosovo and to gain support of groups within Serbia, it did not have enough time to develop. (cp. Stephan, 2006, pp. 73-75; Clark, 2000, pp. 186-189) After the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the Kosovo Albanians drew the conclusion that non-violence did not pay off while violence created new generally recognised realities and led to external intervention. (cp. Reuter, 2000 I, p. 171)

Only the non-cooperative approach of re-declaring independence in 2008 proved to be an adequate non-violent means to realise de facto statehood.

5.4.1.2. Violent Concept

Since the Kosovo Albanians conducted a realistic assessment of Serbia's military inferiority, they only turned to a violent approach when non-violence reached an impasse. An important success of the UCK was the "creation" of a humanitarian catastrophe that induced the International Community to intervene in favour of the Kosovo Albanian side. Although the UCK committed mistakes triggered by sophomoric behaviour, one can even say that the UCK's violent approach was the actuator for the international military intervention after the failure of negotiations when Serbia refused the agreement because *"[...] NATO would not have intervened without the Serbian atrocities of 1998 and January 1999 and these would not have occurred without the UÇK."* (Clark, 2000, p. 188) With regard to the international intervention that followed the failure of the negotiations there exist different notions. One is the conviction that the UCK would have won the military struggle against Serbia even without the military intervention because of the bad standing of the Milosevic regime in March 1999, but appreciated it because it was perceived to be a facilitating and accelerating factor for ending of the conflict. (cp. Kiqmari, 03/07/2012) Another belief, represented by the political circle close to the LDK, is that the NATO intervention was indispensable for the Kosovo Albanians to reach self-determination because without international engagement they would have failed. (cp.

Bukoshi, 25/07/2012) Most probably the absence of an international intervention would have caused a longer struggle and the possible outcome of the conflict is still disputed.

Nonetheless, a major mistake in the UCK's military operations was its attempt to act as regular army in a conventional war against Serbia after its liberation of several regions in Kosovo and thus, made itself an easy target for the Serbian forces, which led to defeats and a loss of reputation of the UCK.

5.4.2. Cooperative Concept

Despite the initial uncompromising position of the Kosovo Albanian national movements in terms of the goal of independence, the application of a cooperative approach in order to take part in negotiations with the adversary was an essential factor of success. The formation of an all-Kosovo Albanian delegation to the conference of Rambouillet can be evaluated as important achievement and especially its pro-Western attitude and its close cooperation with the USA, the EU and other supportive states were decisive for its success. (cp. Sejdiu, 25/07/2012)

Taking into consideration the different concepts applied by the Kosovo Albanian national movements, it can be said that they effectively utilised the available resources and made mostly beneficial choices of non-cooperative and cooperative ways that were considered legitimate by most actors of their strategic environment.

6. Synopsis of the Strategy and Illustration of Chances Missed and Opportunities Taken

Due to the Kosovo Albanian perception of the conflict as a Hard Zero-Sum-Situation, non-cooperative approaches towards Serbia dominated the Kosovo Albanian strategy during the conflict, but they were finally flexible enough to react when a decisive window of opportunity was left open.

In the course of the territorial dispute about Kosovo, the Kosovo Albanians missed their **first chance** to self-determination when the Great Powers rearranged the political map at the Balkans after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire due to an absence of a political representation.
Thus, a coordinated Kosovo Albanian struggle only developed late. Although the LDK seized the opportunity to initiate Kosovo Albanian resistance after the abolishment of Kosovo's autonomy, it did not produce concrete results. Thereby, the Kosovo Albanians missed the **second chance** to self-determination, because the LDK was not able to engage the International Community in conflict prevention and mediation about their status. Thus, Kosovo did not become part of the peace-building efforts within the framework of the Dayton Agreement.

The UCK, on the other hand, successfully seized the opportunity to produce a humanitarian situation that necessitated international involvement into the conflict.

In the course of the international diplomatic intervention, the UCK as well as the LDK realised the need to adopt a cooperative approach at least on the surface in order to **seize a unique opportunity** to realise their goal. Thus, an all-Kosovo Albanian delegation showed its willingness to compromise in peace negotiations, which finally resulted in a situation that afforded an international military intervention in the conflict to their benefit.

III.II. PALESTINE



Map 5: Historic Palestine (Planet Ware: http://www.planetware.com/map/israel-palestine-6th-1st-bc-and-roman-provincess-1st-7th-c-a-d-map-isr-isr7.htm)

1. Historical Development of the Territorial Conflict

The strategically important geographic position of Palestine at the interface of Orient and Occident is among the root causes for its violent history. The region is of crucial importance for the three monotheistic world religions and especially for the Jewish Israeli and the Muslim and Christian Arabic peoples that consider Palestine as their homeland.

Palestine was a march-through area and therefore a place of cultural get-together. Its borders have never been naturally determined but set by human beings, in most cases by strong neighbours but not by the local inhabitants. Politically, Palestine – as a whole or as a divided territory – has been a province within a bigger empire most of the time and thus only seldom had the status of an independent political unit.

The perspective of today's conflict parties is determined by biblical-historical associations, for which reason the disputed territory is perceived as “Holy Land”. As we will see in the following chapters, the Jewish claims on Palestine which they call “Eretz Israel” are based on biblical narratives that affirm the continuous presence of the Jewish people on that territory and their deep ties to that land. The Jewish Israeli people in conformity with the promise argue that it is their God-given right to possess the territory from “Nile to Euphrates”. The Arabic counterparts also claim their rootage in Palestine and refer to the Canaanites as their supposed ancestors who allegedly lived on the territory even before the Israelites. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 11-13)

1.1. Emerging States and National Awareness in the Middle East

1.1.1. Antecedents Relevant for Arab (Palestinian) and Jewish Israeli National Identity-Building

Since the Early Bronze Age, several tribes used to settle on the territory of Palestine. In the 3rd millennium BC, Canaanites immigrated and established independent city-states. In the early 2nd millennium BC, the Canaanites were followed by the Hebrews who are also referred to as Israelites.[20] At that time, parts of the Palestinian territory were under Egyptian control which was challenged by Babylon as well as by the Hittites. In the 14th century BC, the Jebusites occupied the territory of Judaea and chose Jerusalem with its fortress called Zion as their capital city. In 1270 BC, the Egyptians and the Hittites made peace and according to the Tanakh and the Bible, the Israelites under their leader Moses returned from their Egyptian exile after around 400 years. Around 1200 BC, the maritime Philistines[21], coming from the Aegean region, invaded the land and, together with the Canaanites, threatened the Israelites.

Against this background, the twelve Israelite tribes affiliated under their kings Saul, David and Salomon. In 997 BC, King David conquered the primal Canaanite Jerusalem and extolled it to the political and religious centre of the empire. Under the rule of his son Salomon, the First Temple was constructed. During that period, the cultures of the

[20] Several historians assume that the Hebrews did not immigrate as mentioned in the Bible but emerged out of the local Canaanite population.

[21] The name “Palestine“relates to the Greek “Palaistine” and the Latin form “Palaestina” which derive from the name of the “Philistine people”.

Canaanites, the Israelites, the Philistines and other groups began to blend and nomads from the Arabic Peninsula introduced Arabic elements to the multicultural state. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 23-28) But the Israelite Kingdom proved to be a fragile entity because it collapsed after the death of Salomon and split into the Northern Empire Israel with Samaria as its capital city and the Southern Empire Judah with Jerusalem as its capital. Ten of the twelve tribes used to live in the Empire of Israel. Between 732 and 721 BC, it was conquered by Assyria and its population was resettled by force. The Empire of Judah submitted itself to the Assyrian rule and later was conquered by Babylon. Jerusalem together with the First Temple was destroyed and its population was deported to Babylonia. Babylon assigned the occupied territories, which were still inhabited by Israelites, to the Province of Syria as well. The Persian Empire defeated Babylon and got the rule over Palestine. Under their domination, the Israelites were allowed to return from Babylonian imprisonment and to rebuild their religious monument, then called Second Temple.

The Greek colonisation and the forced Hellenisation that aimed at spreading the Greek culture over foreign peoples led to a Jewish uprising in the area in 167/66 BC. It was mainly encouraged by the motive of the endangered temple. This uprising led to wide political independence and to the extension of the Israelite lordship which today serves as a basis for the Israeli territorial claims.

After the Roman conquest of Palestine, there were two major Jewish uprisings. The revolt of the Zealotry from 66 to 70 AD failed and Jerusalem as well as the Second Temple were destroyed again. Only the Western part of the enclosing wall was left which today is called the Wailing Wall. After the revolt from 132 to 135, Jews were no longer allowed to enter Jerusalem. While the Jewish people amounted to only one fourth of the population of Palestine, the Arab quota was on the rise. The Jewish resettlement did not start before the year 422. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 22-26; Rotter/Schirin, 2001, pp. 357-358)

In 614, the Persian King seized Jerusalem and in 629, the Byzantine rule was restored and the Jews were dispelled again from the territory. After the conquest of Jerusalem by Caliph Omar between 636 and 638, the Muslims maintained the administrative structure of Palestine as a part of the Syrian province. Only in the period of the conquest of the crusaders between 1099 and 1291, independent political units emerged in Palestine that included the Lebanese coastal area. The so-called “Holy Land” politically turned into the

Christian Latin Kingdom Jerusalem and was recaptured by the Muslims under Saladin in 1187. From 1229 to 1244, it came under Christian control again, but finally was ruled by the Muslim Ayyubid dynasty and the Mamluks from the 13th until the 16th century. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 26-28; Rotter/Schirin, 2001, pp. 358-359) Under the Ottoman rule, which lasted around 400 years, from 1516 to 1917, the territory of Palestine was reorganised into different political units several times. Also its name, "Palestine", disappeared in official communication as the administrative units, the provinces and sub-provinces were renamed according to their capital. The Ottomans regarded "Palestine" as the denomination of a region without clearly defined borders while it is said that for the Arab population, Palestine was a common term to refer to a certain territory. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 26-28)

1.1.2. The Emergence of Arab (Palestinian) and Jewish Israeli National Awareness under Ottoman Rule and outside the Territory

1.1.2.1. The Emergence of Zionism

Around 1860, the first Jewish re-settling outside Jerusalem took place and in 1882, the first wave of Jewish immigration, known as Aliya, started as a consequence of pogroms and discriminations in the Russian Empire. This Aliya lasted until 1903 and was followed by several other immigration waves that have taken place until today.

In 1896, Theodor Herzl published his book "The Jewish State" which laid the foundations of Zionism. One year later, the first Zionist congress took place in Basel and resulted in the establishment of the **Zionist movement** with the aim to create a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine. At that time also the Arab national movement gained strength and thus, the Arabs claimed more rights from the administration of the Ottoman Empire. (cp. Rotter/Schirin, 2001, pp. 358-361)

But the outbreak of World War I changed the interest situation in the Middle East. Especially for the United Kingdom crucial interests were at stake. When the Ottoman army threatened the uninterrupted maritime route to India by occupying the Suez Canal, the British Empire took Arab support into consideration. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 64-65) In an exchange of letters between July 1915 and March 1916 the British High Commissioner for Egypt, Henry Mac-Mahon, made commitments to Sharif Hussein Bin

Ali of Mecca, the highest Arab dignitary and member of the Hashemite dynasty, in favour of the establishment of an independent Arab Empire under the Sharif's leadership after the end of World War I. This Arab kingdom should have comprised all Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire including Palestine. In return, the Arabs were asked to engage in a revolt against Ottoman rule.

But already in May 1916, the British negotiator, Mark Sykes, and his French counterpart, Georges Picot, with the assent of Russia, bargained a secret agreement defining the spheres of influence of the United Kingdom and France after the expected downfall of the Ottoman Empire. But the so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement ignored the commitments made by Mac-Mahon. (cp. Rotter/Schirin, 2001, pp. 362-363)

The Arab revolt under the command of Sharif Hussein's son, Emir Faisal, that was organised by the British Lieutenant Colonel, Thomas Edward Lawrence (also known as Lawrence of Arabia), started in June that year. The forces comprised mainly Bedouins and did not achieve decisive victories but conducted several guerrilla attacks on Ottoman infrastructure. While these Arab irregular troops were fighting for their national cause, the Arab Palestinian elite did not respond to the appeal of the Sharif to fight the Ottoman rule. Palestinian high dignitaries were employed by the Ottoman Porte as officials considered that an honour. Arab newspapers in Beirut and Damascus even criticised the lack of Palestinian nationalism and called for a Palestinian national movement with the aim to prevent further Jewish land purchase. But the Palestinian elite acted contrarily because Palestinian big landowner made huge profits by selling land to the Jews and were not willing to engage in an uprising against the Ottomans. The Jews on the other hand were ready to set up a Jewish regiment within the British army in order to support its fight for the liberation of the Holy Land. Thus, it was the British regular troops with Jewish participation that caused several decisive defeats to the Ottomans in the context of World War I, which increasingly weakened the Ottoman rule in the Middle East. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 67 & pp. 75-76; cp. Rotter/Schirin, 2001, pp. 362-363)

In November 1917, the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, affirmed to one of the leading figures of the Zionist movement, Baron Rothschild, in a letter that became known as Balfour Declaration, *"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it is being clearly understood*

that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine…" (Balfour, 1917 cited in Vogler, 2008, p. 49)

In December 1917, the British army under the leadership of Fields Marshal Allenby conquered Jerusalem and Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Executive, entered the city together with Allenby and the victorious British troops. In contrast to the Palestinian Arabs, who did not play a significant military or political role in World War I, the Jews took advantage of the situation and the World Zionist Organisation dispatched a Jewish regiment to Palestine in good time prior to the final victory of the allied forces over the Ottomans. With the ceasefire between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente on 30 October 1918, the United Kingdom and France finally ensured their influence spheres in the Middle East. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 75)

1.1.2.2. The Emergence of Modern Arab and Palestinian Nationalism

After the war, **Arab nationalism** became the only real option for the Arab population and arose out of political calculations. The proclamation of an independent Arab government in Damascus by Emir Faisal awoke hopes and especially for the Palestinians who took over many of the important administrative and governmental posts. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 189-190)

The corner stone for a particular **Palestinian national movement** was not laid by Arab Palestinians themselves but by Zionists. On 2 November 1918, Jewish demonstrators celebrated the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration in Jerusalem and only as a reaction to that provocative event the Palestinian Association of Muslims and Christians was established. This association can be seen as the germ cell of Palestinian nationalism but at that time, it had a stronger pan-Arab orientation.

In order to calm down the situation, the occupation force made a pacifying gesture and conceded self-determination to the people of Syria and Iraq in the Anglo-French declaration. The leaders of the Association of Muslims and Christians considered Palestine as part of a Greater Syrian Empire and thus, the association acted more as an anti-Zionist protest movement than as a national movement for an independent Palestine. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 76-78) But with regard to an all-Arab nationalism it soon became obvious that the Arab unity would fail due to diverging interests and the fact that

the priorities were given to the respective own countries and local environments. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 189-190)

In 1919, a peace conference with the participation of 28 countries took place in Versailles in order to determine the conditions for peace and clarify international politics after World War I. One of the results was the decision to establish the League of Nations that was tasked with the maintenance of world peace. Besides other obligation, the League of Nations was responsible for further deciding over the countries of the Middle East.

Although Emir Faisal had been head of the Arab delegation to the conference and thus should have represented the common Arab interests, he met the leader of the Zionist Movement, Chaim Weizmann, in Paris and in London to negotiate a secret agreement that defined Palestine as territory separated from the Arab State. According to these arrangements, Palestine would have become a Zionist enclave within an Arab State that would be ruled by Emir Faisal's family. This later proved to be crucial for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration.

The Palestinian Arabs had trusted Emir Faisal but wanted to declare their will themselves for which reason the Association of Muslims and Christians convoked the first Palestinian National Congress in Jerusalem in February 1919. Although the political undertone was clearly pan-Arab and pro-Syrian, there were two different orientations represented by two influential family clans of Jerusalem. While the Nashashibi clan advocated a pan-Syrian course with a pro-French attitude, the Husseini clan, which held the post of the Mayor of Jerusalem, wanted to keep its political and economic supremacy and therefore claimed a semi-autonomous Palestinian state under British protectorate. By representing this position, the clan responded to British diplomatic interventions against pan-Syrian and pro-French attitudes. Since the United Kingdom as well as France aimed at achieving the mandate over the future protectorate Palestine, both manipulated Palestinian national feelings in their interest. But the Palestinian National Congress achieved a compromise and sent a resolution to Emir Faisal in Paris in which it claimed an independent government for Palestine that should be associated with Syria. At that time, there was no reason for a strong articulated nationalism or a massive protest movement in Palestine.

When the political situation on the ground changed in 1920 due to the French and Britain ambitions to install their mandatory power in the Middle East, young forces mobilised an anti-Zionist protest movement that claimed an Arab Syrian Palestine under King Faisal. Countrywide demonstrations against the Balfour Declaration took place and Jewish settlements were attacked. The British military government reacted by dismissing the Mayor of Jerusalem, Al-Husseini, and instead appointed a family member of the Nashashibi clan. This led to the personal and political polarisation of the Palestinian national movement and was a main reason for its future structural weakness. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 78-84)

On 8 March 1920, the Syrian National Congress, which also included Palestinian delegates, proclaimed Emir Faisal king of an independent Syrian Arab state. But already at the mandate conference in San Remo, that took place in April that year and aimed at determining the League of Nations mandates for the administration of the former Ottoman territories in the Middle East, France had been declared protecting power over Syria and the United Kingdom over Palestine. The mandate system was equitable to colonial power but under the pretext of a certain responsibility of "experienced" states to assist the conquered territories on their way to independence by putting them under trusteeship.

Thus, there was little reason for Palestinian nationalist notables to continue their support for Faisal. He had always been looking anxiously for help even at the expense of the Palestinian cause and was obviously not able to defend his kingdom against European colonialism. In long negotiations between France and the United Kingdom, the former finally obtained the right to oust Faisal from Syria. In July 1920, French troops entered Syria and soon defeated the small makeshift army of Faisal's supporters and the king had to leave his country but was compensated by the United Kingdom with the throne of Iraq while his brother, Abdullah, was installed in Transjordan. The quick end of the Arab Kingdom of Syria also marked the end of the hopes of a Great Syrian Arab state. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 82-83; cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 192-196)

After recognising that the claims made in the resolution of the First Palestinian National Congress in 1919 were an illusion, the Palestinians were coerced to adopt a new policy at their Second Palestinian National Congress in December 1920. This policy focused on the defence of Palestine against the Zionists who were perceived as opponents instead of

the British authorities. The highest dignitary of the Husseini clan was elected chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Arab Congress.

The Nashashibi clan changed its attitude from the futile Hashemite, pan-Syrian and pro-French option to presenting itself to the British mandatory power as moderate opposition. The clan signalled that it was ready to collaborate with the British High Commissioner as well as with the Zionist Executive and was willing to compromise.

The Palestinian national movement was carried by these influential families who primarily aimed at preserving and increasing their sources of power. Even regional, social and religious differences were exploited by making skilful opposition policy. Main focus points were class antagonisms between the big landowning effendis in the city and the landless fellahin on the countryside as well as the latent conflict between Muslims and Christians. These inner-Palestinian differences were fuelled and utilised from outside, not only from the British side, but also from the Zionist Executive that even established an Arab office aiming at mobilising additional opposition forces.

In May 1921, there erupted new clashes between the Jewish and Arab inhabitants of Palestine and the Palestinian National Congress decided to send a delegation to London in order to negotiate Palestinian self-determination and the end of Balfour policy, but failed to gain concessions. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 86-94)

1.2. Palestine's Disputed Territory and the Palestinian Struggle for the Liberation of All of Palestine

1.2.1. Palestine as Separate Political Unit under British Mandate Established in the Aftermath of World War I and the Discord about its Partition

1.2.1.1. The Provisions of the British Mandate with Reference to the Jewish and Palestinian Claims on Palestine

The contract over the British mandate was signed in July 1922 and the concrete borders of the mandate territories were determined by France and the United Kingdom in 1923 and became effective in September that year. In the mandate contract[22], the United Kingdom took over contradictory tasks. In the preamble of the contract, reference was made to the

[22] See The Palestine Mandate: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp, retrieved 26 March 2012 at 01:00 pm

Balfour Declaration and reasons for the re-establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine were re-affirmed but the goal of the establishment of a Jewish state or the right of the Jewish people on Palestine were not mentioned. The contract also did not include any reference to Hashemite governance or the Palestinian right of self-determination. But according to article 2 of the contract, the mandatory power was responsible for placing the country under conditions that enable the establishment of a Jewish national home and at the same time for safeguarding the rights of all inhabitants of Palestine which was interpreted by the around 65,000 Jews as well as by the 600,000 Palestinians to their own favour. (cp. Vogler, 2008, p. 49)

1.2.1.2. Palestinian Resistance against Jewish Territorial Claims and the British Administration

Besides the failure to achieve concessions from the British mandatory power, the Palestinian national movement was also incapable of organising the Palestinian society in a way that could overcome its internal divisions. The Palestinian national movement had to make recourse to the mosques as their important instrument of power because they were inaccessible to British influence in order to mobilise followers.

This tactic laid the cornerstone for the rise of Mohammad Hadsh Amin Al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Supreme Muslim Council, the highest body in charge of Muslim affairs in Palestine that was established by the British High Commissioner Herbert Samuel in 1921. The Grand Mufti was among the leaders of the anti-Zionist protest movement in 1920 and then used his new position to make the Temple Mount the centre of power of the Palestinian national movement. In his post, he was able to decide over substantial financial means and to assign other influential posts. During the years of political repose, the Grand Mufti planned the war against the Zionist immigrants and their British patrons.

Opponents of the Grand Mufti within the Palestinian national movement composed a moderate opposition, with the Nashashibi clan as its driving force which was strongly manipulated by the Zionist side. In 1923, the Zionist Executive even encouraged the establishment of a Palestinian Arab National Party organised by the Nashashibi clan. The party promoted the collaboration with the British authorities and offered only moderate criticism against the Balfour Declaration. Its main opponent was the Association of

Muslims and Christians and its leading institution, the Arab Executive Committee, as well as the Supreme Muslim Council of the Grand Mufti.

The communal elections of 1927 brought another defeat for the Husseini fraction although the Grand Mufti was ready to collaborate with the Jewish side in order to deselect the Nashashibi clan from the position of the Mayor of Jerusalem. The political fiasco of that year presented a political reversal for the Grand Mufti with a change in the means to reach his aims.

With the approval of the Nashashibi party, the Palestinian National Congress reconvened for the first time after five years in June 1928. The resolution that was adopted by the congress lacked the usual protest against the mandate and the Balfour Declaration and abandoned unrealistic claims in order to take some pragmatic steps for the national future of Palestine. The newly elected Arab Executive Committee, which provided equal representation of both wings of the Arab national movement with Mussa Kasim Al-Husseini and Raghib Al-Nashashibi in the leading positions, showed a significant sign of cooperation towards British policy. But on the British side, fatal delays occurred and the newly elected British Labour Party pursued a more pro-Zionist policy. But despite the new Palestinian unity on the surface, the Zionist community had much greater achievements in terms of solidarity and extracted itself from the colonial state in important spheres of life. The Zionist leadership pursued its goal of constructing the infrastructure needed for a Jewish state in Palestine and by 1929 the Jewish Agency functioned as centralised governing institution of the local Jewish community.

Thus, in 1929, Palestinians pursued violent uprisings against Jews that took place all over Palestine, and the command for massacres had come from the Grand Mufti. He exploited highly symbolic sanctuaries in Jerusalem as means to mobilise violence and therewith brought up the pan-Islamic fight against Zionism with the Palestinian national movement as militant avant-garde of the Islamic World. The violent conflict between the Palestinians, the British police and the Hagana, a Jewish paramilitary organisation, caused several deaths and injured. But for the Grand Mufti, the incident had been a propagandistic success because the uprising embraced all social classes. Amin Al-Husseini infused the Palestinian national movement with religious fanaticism and thereby gave it a pan-Islamic and pan-Arab dimension. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 91-101; Pappe, 2010, pp. 87-89)

A British commission that investigated the reasons for the violent uprising identified the excessive Jewish immigration and land acquisition as trigger. Taking this conclusion into consideration, the British government accomplished a radical change in its policy and was aware of the social implications of the Jewish land purchase on different Arab classes, first of all on farmers. The new White Book on British policy in Palestine of 1930 therefore contained a restriction on Jewish immigration corresponding to the capacity of areas already owned by the Jewish National Fund as well as a guideline for the establishment of a legislative council for Palestine.

Palestinian nationalists reacted in different ways. While the Grand Mufti led an aggressive campaign against the White Book, the Arab Executive Committee supported its substance. Against this background, the Zionist Executive mobilised the world Jewry and organised protests in Palestine, the United Kingdom and the USA. Due to the Great Depression, the United Kingdom was highly dependent on monetary aid from the USA and therefore also politically tied. As a result, the British government assured the Zionist Executive to revise the White Book of 1930.

That time was the beginning of a period in which political changes in Europe directly influenced the conditions in Palestine with regard to population and soil. The anti-Semitism in several European countries caused huge immigration waves of Jews to Palestine for which reason quantitative as well as qualitative demands in soil rose. Thus, in the 1930s, Jews not only acquired land from large landowners but also from peasants what left a lot of landless fellahin unemployed. A report drafted in 1932 revealed that even members of the Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council had sold land to Jewish immigrants.

In 1933, landless tenants reacted critically against this method and now presented a populist platform for radical politicians. The newly founded Istiklal party acted as spearhead of the new radical opposition and embraced pan-Arab, pan-Islamic and anti-Imperialist attitudes. The Arab elite also reacted with radicalisation and thus, the Arab Executive Committee organised anti-British demonstrations. This wave of radicalisation undermined the political fundaments of the moderate opposition that until then neutralised the radicalism of the Grand Mufti. Amin Al-Husseini founded the Palestinian Arab Party that represented an ideology to which the Istiklal party as well as all other radical forces accepted a subordinate role.

The most important paramilitary subgroup of the new party, named Djihad Al-Mukaddass (Holy war in the Holy Land), trained its Mujaheddin (Holy Fighters) in order to fight the British mandatory power. Its most important protagonist was Sheikh Is ed-Din Al-Kassam who combined the fanatic religious rigorism of the Saudi Arabian Wahabites with the anti-Imperialist ideology of the Istiklal party to a social-revolutionary doctrine. Hence, the Palestinian national movement obtained its first ideological basis. Although the concept of the Mujaheddin served the Palestinian struggle for self-determination, it was motivated by religion instead of nationalism. In 1935, Al-Kassam invoked the Arab rebellion to fight the British army by using guerrilla tactics. The mountainous area of Samaria served as base for the Mujaheddin, who were ready to die as martyrs in the Djihad against the British imperialism. When Al-Kassam was assassinated by the British forces, he became the heroic idol of the subsequent anti-British uprising from 1936 until 1939.

At the beginning of the Palestinian uprising, militant Arabs only attacked Jewish targets like fields, shops or fabrics and killed dozens of Jews by arson attacks. But later in 1936, a transition from anti-Jewish terrorism to an armed fight against the British mandatory power took place. Fighters of the Djihad Al-Mukaddass attacked infrastructure as well as British institutions. The armed violence spread all over Palestine, and political forces of the Palestinian national movement formed a militant action front. It followed the credo "general strike until the national victory".

After a big anti-Jewish massacre took place in Jaffa, the Husseini and Nashashibi clan established the High Arab Committee with Amin Al-Husseini as President which should supersede the politically overran Arab Executive Committee. Whit this step, the Grand Mufti was on the top of the Palestinian national movement and dominated Palestinian policy until the partition of Palestine in 1948.

The militant spirit of the Mujaheddin was able to mobilise political potential, but did not lead to a revolutionary front. The Arab revolt lacked a conclusive ideology and a strong organisation in order to bridge the social differences between the effendis and the fellahin and thus failed to motivate the idealistic fighters and the selfish clans to fight a common popular war.

Inner-Arab discord as well as military and economic coercions led to the temporary collapse of the uprising. The leaders of the High Arab Committee were forced to ask their Arab brother states to conceal their failure by asking the Palestinians to calm down the revolt.

Among the Palestinians enthusiasm for the anti-Jewish policy of the German Nazi arose and the paramilitary forces of the Grand Mufti received money, weapons and munitions for the anti-British revolt from the Fascistic regime in Italy. The menacing forward push of Italy to the northern and southern flanks of the strategically important Suez Canal made the British government realise that it needed Arab support for the defence of the territory. Therefore it assured the governments of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia that the United Kingdom would look upon their independence efforts with favour. But this pro-Arab concept did not leave room for the isolated treatment of the Palestinian case. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 102-116)

1.2.1.3. The Partition Plan for Palestine of 1937 and the Subsequent Arab Opposition

The Palestine Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Earl Peel stated in its report of 1937 that the reason for the revolt in Palestine had been the Arab wish for national independence and the fear of the establishment of a national Jewish homestead according to the Balfour Declaration and the mandate contract that had been completely rejected by the Arabs.

Since the Arab and Jewish interests were not combinable, the Peel Report suggested the partition of Palestine. The proposal designated about 20 per cent of Palestine to the Jews which was considerably more than the territory that was in Jewish possession at that time. Around 70 per cent were granted to the Arabs and should be merged with Transjordan to an independent state. A third corridor should comprise sensible areas like Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nazareth and Tiberias that were designated to remain under British auspice.

While the Zionist Executive agreed to the proposal, the High Arab Committee of the Grand Mufti was shocked and thus refused to accept the Partition Plan and called for the establishment of an Arab state in all of Palestine. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 325-330)

When the committee asked the Arab brother states for help, a coherent proceeding failed because of the discordance among their interests. Palestinians were in an irrational situation of helplessness and hatred. For the radical forces of the Palestinian national movement, the only reasonable answer was armed resistance. This was the trigger for the restart of the revolt. The British administration reacted by declaring the High Arab Committee illegal and deporting radical activists. The Grand Mufti went into exile to Lebanon and members of the High Arab Committee set up the Central Committee for the Holy War in Syria to support the uprising in Palestine with money and arms. In October 1937, militant group leaders reassumed guerrilla war against the British mandatory institutions all over Palestine. After a period of rest at the beginning of 1938, the revolt blazed again against the background of the new concept of total popular war. The fighters controlled all villages in the mountainous area, used them as their bases and mobilised its inhabitants. By destroying infrastructure facilities, the insurgents paralysed the military clout of the conventionally combating British army.

But the new British anti-terror policy made collaboration of the rural population with the insurgents almost impossible because of its rigorous penalties. In turn, the rebels punished the local population for non-cooperation which increasingly destructed the strategic power basis and the ideological credibility of the fighters.

Although the Palestinian revolt also aimed at Jewish targets, the Jewish defence organisation Hagana adhered to its defensive character, excluding offensive violence at that time. More radical elements of Hagana split off and formed Hagana B. Members of Hagana B established Irgun Zwai Leumi (IZL), also-called Etzel, which specialised on terrorist attacks in Arab cities. Although the Jewish paramilitary groups mainly took actions against Arabs at that time, they also conducted operations against the British rule.

But the killing stroke of the Arab revolt did not come from the British or Jewish side, but was caused by inner-Palestinian disputes. In summer 1938, counterrevolutionary forces, led by the Nashashibi clan together with furious fellahin, started fighting the radical insurgents under the leadership of the Husseini clan. Even within the revolutionary movement, inner contests countermined the efforts of the rebels. None of the individual leaders of the paramilitary groups was willing to submit to external authority and thus they fought each other. These circumstances led to the final collapse of the uprising in autumn 1939. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 119-124)

1.2.1.4. Effects of World War II on the Territorial Conflict

Against the background of the Arab revolt and the upcoming World War II, a new British White Paper was published in 1939 that tightened the limitation of Jewish immigration and relativised the promises made in the Balfour Declaration, but left the core issue, the independence of Palestine, open. But the British gesture towards the Palestinians and the Arab countries, which aimed at assuring their support in the event of war, came too late and was not taken seriously due to the constant violation of promises since 1916.

The Jewish community on the other hand appeared fortified after the revolt and at that time Zionist militarism emerged. The objective threat as well as genuine fears justified the consolidation of an army and the adoption of more extreme positions towards the Palestinians and the British authorities. The Zionist leadership made the best of the war and exploited it to give the youth vital military experience and notwithstanding the Jewish wish to end the mandate and instead establish a Jewish state, the Jewish Agency decided to cooperate with the United Kingdom to fight the fascist regime in Germany. Since the beginning of World War II, Hagana as well as Irgun Zwei Leumi had ceased attacks against British institutions, even though they still pursued a pro-Arab course. Only the newly established extremist group Lechi continued its fight against British imperialism. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 107-108 & pp. 117-118)

Palestinian Arabs did not capitalise on the favourable political situation, but in contrary continued inner-Palestinian acts of revenge and the Grand Mufti was still driven by anti-British hatred. Therefore Amin Al-Husseini cooperated with Nazi Germany which posed a strategic risk to British interests. Especially in the summer of 1942, British interests were endangered by the advancement of the military forces of the Axis powers Germany and Italy. But already in autumn the same year, the military danger was averted due to their defeat. The elimination of an acute military threat in the Middle East as well as the ongoing genocide in Germany and the complicity of the Grand Mufti with the fascist regimes slowly changed the British policy back towards a pro-Jewish attitude. In 1944, the British Labour Party demanded the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine as well as the exodus of the Arab majority. But despite this new political orientation, Jewish paramilitary forces resumed their fight against the British rule. Lechi and Etzel launched terrorist attacks against infrastructure and persons while Hagana only concentrated on material damage.

Due to the divisiveness of the Palestinian national movement, there was no space for the development of a new national consciousness or political institutions that were able to deal with the forthcoming challenges. Therefore the fate of the Palestinian people was in the hands of their Arab neighbour states that established the Arab League in March 1945 as their umbrella organisation. The Arab League was centred on its only common interest, namely the political guardianship of Palestine. In November 1945, the Arab League enforced the restructuring of the High Arab Committee. The new structures of the committee left space for all former parties, but the Grand Mufti again acquired the leading position. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 131-143)

1.2.2. The Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947 and the Territorial Split into the Israeli and Palestinian State

In May 1946, the British mandate over Transjordan expired and after the news about the increase in terrorist attacks in Palestine had become public in the United Kingdom, the British people also demanded to relinquish the mandate over Palestine. In April 1947, the British government asked the Secretary General of the United Nations to convene a General Assembly meeting about Palestine. On 29 November 1947, 33 states, among them the newly arisen superpowers, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (also referred to as USSR or Soviet Union) and the USA, voted in favour of the partition of Palestine, 13 against the proposal and 10, including the United Kingdom, abstained from voting. The British government declared to end its mandate on 14 May and to leave Palestine by 16 May 1948. The decision could be taken so fast because the parties concerned, the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs, were excluded from the brief decision-making process.

Even when the time had come to react to the Partition Plan, the Palestinian national movement was not able to take the adequate steps. The Grand Mufti's untrained troops lacked military command and had no popular basis for a military fight against the proposal. Therefore the Arab League overlooked the Grand Mufti, who was the figurehead of the Palestinian national movement, and decided to react with military resistance to the partition of the land. Instead of granting Amin Al-Husseini the formation of a Palestinian government in exile, the Arab states agreed to decide on the destiny of the Palestinians at a later time according to their own territorial interests. The Arab League established a political and a military committee as well as a pan-Arab army of volunteers,

the Arab Liberation Army, with the responsibility of coordinating the Arab resistance against an impending Jewish state. The Grand Mufti criticised the structure of the military committee and required to lead his own war. As a compromise, the Arab Liberation Army was responsible for the defence of the northern areas of Palestine, Galilee and Samaria, while the irregular troops of the Grand Mufti were responsible for the southern coastal areas and Judaea. But due to deficient collaboration and counteracts from the side of the Grand Mufti, the cooperation of the Arab forces proved unfruitful.

On 30 November 1947, the Palestinian Arabs organised violent protests that were followed by a wave of terrorism against Jews. By using guerrilla tactics, the irregular Arab troops tried to cut the Jewish settlement areas into pieces and undermine the defensibility of a potential Jewish state. The first appearance of the Arab Liberation Army in the so-called "war in the streets" took place in January 1948. The civil war escalated in February and March that year and pushed the Jewish side in a defensive position. The Jewish underground organisations reacted with terrorist violence against the Arab attacks. Massacres against Arab Palestinians spread fear among the civilians and led to a first wave of about 75,000 refugees which can be classified as psychological warfare. The new military doctrine of the Jews comprised defence as well as the conquest, occupation and devastation of Arab villages in regions that, according to the UN Partition Plan, were not granted to the future Jewish state. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 143-148)

The attitude of the Arab military groups and the High Arab Committee of the Grand Mufti towards the forced migration respectively the evacuation of the Palestinian inhabitants changed regularly. On the one hand, the High Arab Committee, the Arab Liberation Army and the Jordanian army issued commands to evacuate the territory while, almost at the same time, they led a campaign against the escape and blocked escape routes and threatened the refugees on the other hand. After the dreadful massacre of Dir Jassin close to Jerusalem on 9 April 1948, committed by Irgun and Lechi, in which 254 Palestinian civilians lost their lives, there was no way to stop the mass exodus of the Palestinian Arab population. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 166-171)

After the death of the military leaders of the Grand Mufti's irregular Arab troops and an inglorious massacre against Jewish civilians, the military role of the unguided Palestinian troops ended. When the British High Commissioner left the mandated territory on 14 May 1948, David Ben Gurion, the President of the Executive of the Jewish Agency,

proclaimed the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel in Tel Aviv. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 148-151)



Map 6: UN Partition Plan, 1947 (Report 2, 2008, p. 8)

1.2.3. Palestine in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and its Consequences

1.2.3.1. The War and its Territorial and Demographic Consequences

On 15 May 1948, parts of the regular armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq attacked the newly established state with the aim to destroy the Zionist entity and dispatch its Jewish inhabitants. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 151) But the overall constellation was more favourable to the Israeli side. The Jewish population had emerged more united than ever from the Arab revolt and World War II. Its Jewish defence group Hagana had gained military experience during that time and had been able to mobilise a lot of volunteers who then became part of the Israeli army called Tzahal. In July, the Israeli army had 65,000 soldiers at its command and already 96,000 at the end of the year.

The five Arab states only sent parts of their military forces, all together 25,000 soldiers who were poorly trained, insufficiently armed, uncoordinated, and lacked a functioning supply system. Only Jordan possessed a powerful army, but it did not stick to the arranged battle plan. Instead the Jordanian army started to conquer all territories the UNO assigned to the Arabs, but did not seize any Jewish territories. Syria and Egypt perceived this proceeding as a bigger threat to their interests than the actual enemy, the Jewish state. Thus every effort to coordinate a common military action failed due to inner-Arab rivalry.

During the first phase of the war, until the first ceasefire agreement of 11 June, the Israeli army was able to hold back the Arab advance. That time was crucial for the construction of the metaphor of the battle between David and Goliath. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 368-370) In the period of rest after the ceasefire agreement, which was forced by the UN, the refugee problem took centre stage. At the beginning of the war, Israel had no clear attitude towards the handling of the Arab population in Palestine, but during the fights the Israelis became convinced that they could seize the opportunity to gain an ethnically pure Jewish state free of Arab population. The expulsion of Arabs from the territory of the new State of Israel became a silent consensus among the Israeli Jews. Only the socialist party Mapam argued in favour of peaceful coexistence. A newly established Transfer Committee organised the displacement of the Arab Palestinians and the Judaisation of their territory according to the following plan: First, Arab villages should get largely ruined during the combat actions, second, agricultural activity should be abandoned even in periods of ceasefire and third, Jews should colonise deserted the villages and cities. Therefore UN-mediator Duke Folke Bernadotte travelled to Tel Aviv on 17 June and demanded the return of 300,000 refugees and the reserve of their property rights. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 172-174)

During the second phase of the war from 8 to 18 July, Israel captured big parts of Arab populated agricultural land. This led to the displacement of another 100,000 refugees. A new ceasefire lasted until 15 October and gained Israel time to establish its civil infrastructure. Immigration restrictions were abolished and the number of new arrivals increased enormously, which reduced the Israeli pressure to be ready to compromise. While the Israeli side improved its starting situation for new combat actions, the Arab side was further disunited. In order to prevent the Jordanian king from occupying all territories intended for the Arabs, the Arab League decided on 6 September to deploy an

all-Palestine government in Egyptian occupied Gaza. But this new government was doomed to failure. Meanwhile Israel was further pressurised by international claims, with the USA ahead, for more flexibility towards the refugee problem and an exchange of land. Western Galilee should have been returned in exchange of the Negev, which would have meant the restitution of the conquered territories. These claims also outlined the core of the mediation efforts of Duke Folke Bernadotte who therefore was murdered by a member of Lechi on 18 September.

Israel broke the ceasefire on 15 October 1948 and the subsequent third phase of the war led to the escape of another 100,000 to 150,000 Arab people. The Israelis realised that they were able to shift the borders of the Jewish state, that had been set by the UN, through military force. When another ceasefire entered into force on 31 October, Israel already occupied 77 per cent of the former mandate territory of Palestine and the Israeli population census of November 1948 revealed 782,000 Jews and 69,000 Arabs on the territory. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 371-374) At its third regular session in December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 194 (III). It offered ways to resolve the Palestinian problem according to Duke Bernadottes' suggestions. The Assembly declared that refugees should be allowed to return to their homes, compensation should be paid for the property of those not willing to return and Jerusalem should be demilitarised and internationalised with protection of, and free access to the holy places. Despite US-American pressure on Israel to comply with the UN-resolution and to cooperate with the newly established Palestine Conciliation Commission, Israel only consented to the return of 100,000 refugees. (cp. Report 2, 2008, p. 11) In January 1949, the Israeli army even pushed forward to the Sinai Peninsula but had to withdraw due to international pressure. The ceasefire of 7 January finally put an end to the first military conflict between the Arab states and Israel. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 373-374)

David Ben Gurion with his Labour Party Mapai won the first Knesset elections in January 1949. Gurion became Prime Minister, while Chaim Weizmann, who had become President already after the proclamation of the State of Israel, was confirmed in his office. Irgun disintegrated after disputes with Hagana, which meanwhile had fully transformed into the Israeli Defence Forces, and former Lechi activists established a party that entered the parliament. (cp. Krämer, 2002, pp. 374-375) David Ben Gurion, the principled and pragmatic leader of the State of Israel, decided not to endorse the return of the refugees as

demanded by the UN-resolution, because it was perceived as a threat to Israel's security although Israel signed armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria between February and July 1949 under United Nations auspices. (cp. Report 2, 2008, p. 10)

When the Palestine Conciliation Commission ended its work on 12 September 1949, the UN organisations counted more than 700,000 Palestinian refugees (38 per cent in the West Bank, 26 per cent in the Gaza Strip, 24 per cent in the refugee camps of the Arab neighbour states and only 1 per cent in Egypt). (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 180) These figures indicate that the consequences of the war for the Palestinian people were disastrous and led to their dispersion throughout the region and thus to further external domination. In the West Bank, the Jordanian King Abdullah installed Raghib Al-Nashashibi as military governor while Gaza was governed by an Egypt military administration and Jerusalem was divided between Jordan and Israel. The Arab population of Palestine perceived the war of 1948/49 and its consequences as catastrophe, the so-called Nakba. But the war also brought along a legitimacy crisis for the ruling elites of the neighbouring countries which at a future date resulted in political upheavals like the military coups in Syria, Egypt and Iraq and the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan. For the Yishuv, the body of Jewish residents in Palestine before the establishment of the State of Israel, the events enabled the realisation of the Zionist ideology. (cp. Krämer, 2002, p. 376)

1.2.3.2. The Question of the Representation of the Palestinians

The new post-1948 era manifested itself in the struggle over the representation of the Palestinians. King Abdullah of Jordan, whose army retained the largest part of Palestine that had not been incorporated into the State of Israel, was interested in furthering his dynastic interests and therefore annexed the territory in 1950. The Jordanian parliament ratified the unification of the East and West Bank, now called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The annexation was widely regarded as illegal and only formally recognised by the United Kingdom, but behind the scenes the United States also favoured the extension of Jordanian sovereignty. Abdullah laid claim to represent the Palestinians who then outnumbered the original Jordanian population two to one. His only challengers, the Grand Mufti with his shadow Arab Higher Committee and the Arab League-supported

All Palestine Government in Gaza, had been forced to withdraw to Cairo during the last phases of the war and therefore lost their political influence.

From this time onward, most Palestinian political activity would take place outside Palestine because the occupying powers, Israel, Jordan and Egypt, perceived Palestinian organisations as subversive and a threat to their interests. But among the dispersed Palestinians in exile or in Middle Eastern refugee camps, a new generation of political activists took the stage. This new generation was rooted in a major change in the social basis of political power because the leaders drawn from the notable class, who had dominated Palestinian politics until the 1948 war, had been swept away or had lost their social status. Therefore, only few members of the major families of Palestine have played a political role after 1948. The new generation was characterised by a new social strata, different educational backgrounds and an innovative worldview with different solutions to the Palestinian problem. The new activists operated under the conditions of extreme dispersion and fragmentation and were divided between Israel, the West and East Bank, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Egypt and the refugee camps of Lebanon and Syria. But the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) after the war proved to be a connective factor because besides its functions of health care and social services, it had enabled the Palestinians to benefit from a Western educational system. After the loss of material wealth of the upper classes, social divisions among Palestinians of the time before 1948 were bridged by the sense that all Palestinians seemed to face the same fate. The Palestinians in this new Diaspora were tasked with the revival of the Palestinian identity and the Palestinian national movement on a totally new basis. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 135-138; Kimmerling/Migdal, 2003, p. 223)

Due to the active repression of a national Palestinian identity, King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian activist in 1951 in Jerusalem, but his successor, King Hussein, did not substantially change the Jordanian policy towards the Palestinians. At that time, an important new challenge to the Jordanian efforts of assimilation of the Palestinians and claims on their representation arose. In 1952, King Farouq of Egypt was overthrown in the Egyptian Revolution led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the main protagonist of the pan-Arab putschists. His pan-Arab ideology was strictly anti-imperialistic and therefore abandoned the motive force of Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood, a religious

party with about two million supporters at that time, had to go into the political underground. No Arabs had more to gain from Arab unity than the Palestinians because of its emphasis on political and social liberation from Western imperialism. The ideology of pan-Arabism transformed the Palestinian problem from a particular to a general concern and enabled a broad mobilisation against Zionism. (Kimmerling/Migdal, 2003, pp. 221- 227)

The awakening from political amnesia started where political desperation and social grievances reached its highest level, namely in the refugee camps. Out of this weak position, the Palestinian resistance activists had no choice but to use terrorism as their weapon. They started operating from those places that were closest to the Zionist enemy, namely the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon. Small commandos invaded the Israeli border areas and committed attacks against infrastructure, isolated settlements or defenceless civilians. This technique was akin to the terrorist methods during the Arab revolt in the 1930s. Until 1954, the majority of the guerrilla commandos came from the Jordanian border, but in 1955 the direction of impact changed and they entered from the Gaza Strip. Attacks on Israel from Syrian and Lebanese territory were comparatively few. The Israeli army reacted with a strategy of tough retaliation to this first wave of Palestinian terrorism. Initially the Israeli army only attacked villages and refugee camps that offered shelter to the guerrilla fighters, but later it expanded its war to military facilities of the front states Egypt and Jordan. Particularly the Israeli Special Forces Unit under the command of Ariel Sharon conducted purges in Palestinian settlements. The Israeli anti-terror strategy put pressure on the Arab states. When the Israeli Air Force started bombing refugee camps in February 1955, Palestinians protested against the passivity of the Egyptian army. The protests led to an extensive intervention by the Egyptian Intelligence Service that aimed at bringing the Palestinian guerrilla groups under control. These repressions from the Egyptian side were answered by further Palestinian protests conducted by Palestinian students in Cairo who demanded the downfall of Nasser. In the 1950s, the future elite of the new Palestinian national movement studied at the universities of Egypt and Lebanon and started to establish new political networks. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem no longer served as role model, but the militant preacher Al-Kassam, who died in the revolts in 1935, became one of the new idols of that generation. Among those students in Cairo was Yasser Arafat, who initially had close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. But when they lost influence

in the country, his group of academics opened itself to new Arab ideologies like the anti-imperialistic pan-Arabism of Nasser or the socialist course of the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath party. The main aims of Arafat, who was leader of the Palestinian Students Association from 1952 until 1956, and his followers were the seizure of a leading role of the Palestinians in the liberation of their land and the independence of a new Palestinian national movement from neighbouring countries. Thus, the new approach led to a confrontation with Nasser's claim to the sole representation of pan-Arabism. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 183-186)

1.2.4. The Suez War of 1956 and its Consequences

1.2.4.1. The War and its Territorial Consequences

The second war between Israel and its Arab neighbours, the so-called Suez War, did not focus directly on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Israel led this war because it aimed at territorial expansion, and to adopt a new order in the Middle East in coordination with the United Kingdom and France, but also against the background of increased tensions with Egypt.

The Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had presented himself to the Arab masses as the leader of pan-Arabism and starting from 1955, he encouraged Palestinian guerrilla fighters to attack Israel from the Gaza Strip. The same year, Egypt blocked Israel's access to the Red Sea, the Straits of Tiran. In 1956, Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal, which had been possessed by a joint stock company with British and French majority share. The United Kingdom and France reacted with a military intervention aiming at revoking Egypt's step. Israel took advantage of the situation and occupied the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip and enforced the reopening of the Straits of Tiran. The Soviet Union and the USA activated the United Nations, asserted a ceasefire and forced Israel, the United Kingdom and France to withdraw. In December 1956, Israel drew back its forces from the Sinai Peninsula in return for a warrant for free shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1957, Israel also withdrew from the Gaza Strip and UN troops were stationed in the area. (cp. Johannsen, 2006, pp. 24-25)

1.2.4.2. The Effects of the War on Israeli and Palestinian Political and Military Capacities

The obvious result of the war was the enormous deepening of the involvement of the army in Israeli life, and according to Ilan Pappe this led to the completion of the militarisation of Israeli society.

On the Palestinian side, the incidents opened the way for a revolution in approach, tactics and structure because new political movements had emerged in the refugee camps. But the structure of the groups of Palestinian fighters suffered a major setback when Israel occupied the Gaza Strip during the war for which reason the political activity of the Palestinians calmed down in the aftermath the Suez crisis. (cp. Pappe, 2010, p. 163)

1.2.5. Palestine in the Arab Cold War between 1958 and 1964 and the Institutionalisation of the Palestinian Resistance

1.2.5.1. The Political Constellation during the Arab Cold War

The Arab Cold War was the struggle for hegemony in the Middle East between 1958 and 1964 and derived its name from the ongoing confrontation between the world's two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, which was called Cold War since it never led to a direct military conflict between the antagonists. The Cold War in the Middle East took the form of a two-fold confrontation: on the one hand, Nasser and his allies were pitted against traditional pro-Western monarchies in the Arab countries and on the other hand, Nasser confronted other radical leaders in the region. One of these leaders faced by Nasser was Abd Al-Karim Qasim who overthrew the Hashemite Dynasty in Iraq in 1958. The ultimate manifestation of radicalism in the Arab world was the official commitment to liberate Palestine, which was especially propagandised by this Iraqi regime. By the end of 1958, Qasim employed a pro-Palestinian rhetoric that raised claim to establish a Palestinian entity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with the assistance of a new Palestinian army. Nasser was not able to respond in adequate manner due to his preoccupation with his interests in Syria since Egypt and Syria had united to the United Arab Republic in 1958. Therefore the military units of the Palestinians were considered not as means to fight Israel, but as part of a network that should help to sustain the fragile union.

At the beginning of the 1960s, political changes in the Arab world led to a new focus on the Palestinian question. The United Arab Republic collapsed already in 1961 due to the takeover of officers of the Ba'ath Party in Syria. In 1963, the next takeover of a group of officers affiliated with the Ba'ath Party who had closer relations with Egypt and the Soviet Union occurred in Syria, and Abd Al-Karim Qasim of Iraq was also overthrown in a coup. So Nasser, on the one hand, and the new regimes in Syria and Iraq, on the other, drew back on the Palestinian armed struggle as pawn for their own political interests. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 163-165)

1.2.5.2. The Emergence of Palestinian Resistance Movements and the Establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)

Within these new geo-political conditions, a new political group called Al-Fatah or Palestinian National Liberation Movement had emerged. Al-Fatah under the leadership of Yasser Arafat aimed at the destruction of Israel through armed fight that should be a catalyst for the pan-Arab nation which was a contradiction to Nasser's approach and to that of the Ba'ath parties. Al-Fatah was later joined in this struggle by another guerrilla organisation called Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The Palestinians living within the borders of the State of Israel felt detached from pan-Arabism and remained far less radicalised than those outside. Due to the absence of refugee camps within the state's territory, there was a clear difference between the Palestinians living on either side of the demarcation line. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 163-164)

When the Arab intelligence services informed their governments about the growing anger of the Palestinians in the refugee camps about their inactivity, the Arab League decided to head the uncoordinated Palestinian political forces in controlled pathways. At the first summit of the Arab League in January 1964, the radical Arab leaders decided to acknowledge a Palestinian existence. Because they felt more comfortable with the old Palestinian nationalist notables that with the new generation of fighters, they instructed Ahmad Al-Shiqairi, a member of the Arab Higher Committee, to convene a national congress for Palestinian dignitaries in Jerusalem in order to adopt an organisational frame for the Palestinian political activities. At this congress on 2 June 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established and a Palestinian National Charta was drafted. The PLO Charta was adopted at the second summit of the Arab League in

September that year. It determined the legitimate right of the Palestinians to their homeland, and at the same time the PLO assured that it would not exert any sovereignty over the territories occupied by Egypt and Jordan. The PLO's responsibility in the fight for liberation was limited to organisational, political and financial matters. In order to ward off the demand for the armament of the Palestinian people, the Arab League established the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Egypt, Iraq and Syria kept the Palestinian brigades stationed on their territory under their national command while Jordan and Lebanon even denied the stationing of PLA units on their land. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 188-191) Instead of winning the trust of the refugees, the PLO and the PLA became career posts for the urban middle class.

Although Nasser focused on the Palestinian cause because he was working hard on uniting the Arab world and preparing it for a future confrontation with Israel, he excluded the Palestinians from power and decision-making. In response, none of the Palestinian fighter organisations joined the PLO and instead created an informal association called Al-Muqawwama which means resistance. This alliance was modelled on the Viet Cong and the Front de Libération of Algeria and acquired weapons and skills from revolutionary movements in the Third World. Al-Fatah held the central role, but the PFLP became an increasingly important factor. The PLO aimed at making the Arab countries adjacent to Israel a launching pad for guerrilla attacks against the Zionist state. The militant circle of Al-Fatah decided to start the armed fight on 1 January 1965 and attacked Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Lebanon. As guerrilla activity intensified, Israeli retaliation ramped up to the same extent. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 166-167)

Also the Arab states reacted with repressive measures against the combative Palestinians. They were denunciated as pro-Western agents employed to offer Israel a reason to attack the Arab states. In March 1965, a wave of arrests of members of Al-Fatah took place in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. Nasser obviously did not accept that Palestinian revolutionaries tried to reverse his pan-Arab credo "unity for the liberation of Palestine" into "the liberation of Palestine for unity". At the same time, Al-Fatah hoped for a new military confrontation between the Arab states and Israel in order to bring about the liberation of Palestine. Hence, Palestinian terrorism and Israeli retaliation were part of Al-Fatah's concept to drag the Arab countries into war. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 192) In

1966, Israel carried out a large-scale operation against Palestinian guerrilla fighters in the West Bank. This further worsened Israel's relations with Jordan. These growing tensions pushed the Jordanian regime into a military alliance with Egypt and Syria.

Al-Muqawwama's inability to succeed in the liberation of Palestine partly accounted for its failure to stay united. There were great internal dissensions between the PFLP, which had clear revolutionary goals like the abolishment of traditional Arab regimes and the establishment of a Marxist Palestinian state, and Al-Fatah, which was only vague about the character of the future Palestinian state. But both had one common objective which was to wait for a suitable moment to take over the PLO. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 167-168)

1.2.6. Palestine Occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967 and its Consequences

1.2.6.1. The War and its Territorial Consequences

The time before the outbreak of the war was characterised by an enormous arms race on the Israeli as well as on the Arab side which included the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Israel invested in nuclear capability while the Arab states spent their resources on the build-up of modern armies. However, both sides prioritised the investment in military capacities over social and economic needs of the citizens. This situation in addition to the tensions in the region created a vacuum, which was filled by Jewish fundamentalism, on the one side, and political Islam, on the other. Charismatic leaders who offered radical interpretations of their respective religions became central figures on the political stage at that time. And their rhetoric was converted into military action starting from April 1967 when a confrontation between Syria and Israel about water broke out.

The Egyptian leader, Nasser, decided to intervene in support of Syria while Soviet advisors to the Syrian leadership heated up the situation and pushed Egypt, Jordan and Syria into a military alliance. This gave Israeli nationalists, who regarded the West Bank as part of ancient Israel, the opportunity to pursue the realisation of their dream of a Greater Israel. Since the 1950s, the Israeli army had been working on plans which foresaw a quick occupation of the West Bank. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 184-185)

On 14 May 1967, Egypt mobilised its troops and closed the Straits of Tiran for Israeli shipping eight days later. UN troops left the Gaza Strip on request of Egypt, and Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian and Syrian troops were deployed at the Israeli borders. In a surprise attack on 5 June, Israel destroyed major parts of the Egyptian as well as the Syrian Air Force and within six days seized the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The result was a substantial increase in Israeli controlled territories and the solidification of its image as invincible military power. As a consequence, the Arab world was in a state of shock and completely paralysed. Although the UN Security Council affirmed the inadmissibility of the military acquisition of territory, Israel did not give up the seized areas. (cp. Johannsen, 2006, p. 26)

Map 7: Occupied Territories since 1967 (Report 2, 2008, p. 17)

The UN Security Council Resolution 242 adopted on 22 November 1967 laid down the principles for a peaceful settlement of the conflict which included the withdrawal of

Israeli forces from all territories occupied in the recent conflict, the termination of all claims of belligerency and the acknowledgement of the sovereignty and political independence of every state in the area. (cp. Report 2, 2008, p. 16)

1.2.6.2. The Palestinian Struggle for the Liberation of Palestine from Israel and for the Removal of Arab Dominance Culminating in the "Black September"

In its efforts, the UN Security Council had ignored the Palestinian National Liberation Movement which had ideological and operational consequences for the movement. Testimonies of solidarity and Arab unity by their neighbour states lost significance for the Palestinians and the hope of a military victory over Israel in conventional warfare got lost.

Al-Fatah as well as the other organisations were even more convinced that armed struggle on their own initiative was the only solution to their dilemma. Palestinian guerrilla groups propagated the revolutionary peoples' war against Israel and herewith achieved support in the refugee camps as well as in the capital cities of Arab states, but mainly in Damascus and Baghdad where the Ba'ath Party seized power. After the fatal military defeat of the conventional Arab armies in the war of 1967, the strategy of the guerrilla fighters to pinhole Israel was a welcomed new asset for the weakened Arab states. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 195-196)

The natural focus of the guerrilla fighters became the liberation of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip by applying the strategy of popular guerrilla war from within the occupied areas. The Al-Muqawwama was inspired by Maoist practice and ideologies and therefore tried to find a rural base for the revolt and for attacks on Israel and to set up a net of secret cells. But soon the Maoist model proved inadequate because the Palestinian population did not provide an active base for the struggle. So the guerrilla groups decided to use territories of neighbouring states as launching pad for guerrilla attacks on Israel which were answered by Israeli acts of reprisal.

But in March 1968, Palestinian guerrilla fighters under the command of Yasser Arafat together with Jordanian soldiers succeeded to defeat an Israeli contingent near the Palestinian settlement Karameh in the Jordan Valley. After the glorious Battle of Karameh, thousands of young people joined the Palestinian guerrilla fighters. The Battle

of Karameh became a symbol and Palestinians now perceived themselves as spearhead of the Arab nation. One year after the war, the Palestinian guerrilla groups were strong enough to seize power within the PLO. In July 1968, Al-Fatah assumed leadership within the PLO, changed its organisational structure and brought an end to the external control of the Egyptian President and the Secretariat of the League of Arab States. The reformulation of the Palestinian National Charta, initially declared under Nasser's influence in 1964, reflected the change in the group's ideology. It now stressed the need for liberation through a people's war and focused on PLO's independence from pan-Arab domination. In February 1969, the takeover of power by the guerrilla groups was accomplished. They now elected Yasser Arafat, the leader of Al-Fatah, chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO.

At that time, an internal struggle for power within the PLO erupted and led to an ideological disagreement between Yasser Arafat and his former associates, George Habash and Naif Hawatmeh. Both cooperated in the leftist organisation Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), but Hawatmeh later established his own party called Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). Both parties launched attacks from Jordan and Lebanon and started to commit terrorist campaigns outside Israel. The PFLP was the first organisation to hijack airplanes while Al-Fatah fought a guerrilla war at the border between the West Bank and Jordan only pursuing national, not world revolutionary aims.

In the first two years of revolution, the PLO fully made use of the inexperience of King Hussein of Jordan, and due to its demographic situation, Jordan became almost a Palestinian state. Al-Fatah equipped the refugee camps with infrastructure in order to use them as bases for the struggle against Israel and at the same time took care of education and welfare in order to gain popular support. King Hussein increasingly got worried about a possible takeover of Jordan by the PLO and, after a failed assassination attempt on him conducted by the PDFLP, tried to disarm the members of the organisation in the refugee camps in September 1970 which ended in a bloodbath, also known as "Black September".

Syria reacted by invading northern Jordan in order to demonstrate its solidarity with the Palestinians. The Egyptian President Nasser stopped the bloodshed by obtaining a ceasefire and fashioning an agreement that transferred the PLO to Lebanon. The PLO

managed to keep its high profile through its social and professional unions that filled the lack of a state apparatus and represented people's national interests. But the incidents in Jordan weakened the ties between the PLO and the Palestinian population living in the Occupied Territories, in the refugee camps and in Israel. Therefore the dispersed Palestinians were not able to find a common ground at that time. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 191-194)

In September 1970, the PLO had to recognise that its strategy of people's war did not correspond to the pragmatic interests of the Arab States and could easily be counteracted by Israel and the superpowers. In July 1971, last revolutionary fighters had to leave the territory of Jordan and escape to Lebanon or Syria. Due to its long border with Israel, its high quota of Palestinian population that facilitated supply and recruitment and its conservative regime, Jordan had offered perfect geographic as well as political conditions for the guerrilla war. The expulsion of the fighters from Jordan approved the PFLP's perception that people without land should make use of a worldwide strategy of international terrorism. Also Al-Fatah became more and more influenced by the revolutionary dynamics that derived from the PFLP and the PDFLP and parts of Al-Fatah now also promoted anti-imperialistic and world revolutionary aims. Therefore Al-Fatah established, on the one hand, a regular, heavily armed army and, on the other, a secret terrorist organisation, later known as "Black September", targeting Israel as well as Jordan. The group gained worldwide awareness through its terrorist attack during the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. But in summer 1973, the leadership of Al-Fatah obviously ended the operations of "Black September", because it was not able to control the multifaceted terrorist activities of all its cells any more. Abu Nidal and Wadi Haddad were among the dissidents who were responsible for attacks even after the termination of international terrorism by Al-Fatah and the PFLP. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 217-224)

1.2.7. Palestine in the Yom-Kippur War and its Consequences

1.2.7.1. The War and its Territorial Consequences

The fourth war in the Middle East, also-called October War or Yom-Kippur War, broke out on 6 October 1973 and was initiated by the new Egyptian President, Anwar Al-Sadat, in order to lend weight to his demand for negotiations about the restitution of the Sinai Peninsula. The Syrian President, Hafis Al-Assad, also speculated on the retrieval of the

Golan Heights and therefore took part in the surprise attack against Israel. While Egypt occupied the Eastern littoral of the Suez Canal, Syria executed an operation in the Golan Mountains. The Soviet Union supported Syria and Egypt with deliveries of arms while the USA organised air transports to Israel and delivered satellite imagery about the Egyptian offensive. Only after initial military victories of the Arab armies, the Israeli army was able to reverse the situation on the ground and made further territorial gaining beyond the borders of 1967. (cp. Johannsen, 2006, p. 29)

On 22 October 1973, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338 demanding a ceasefire and negotiations among all involved parties in order to find a just and lasting solution for peace in the Middle East. (cp. Report 2, 2008, p. 18) When the Soviet Union threatened a military intervention in favour of Syria and Egypt, the USA coerced a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel that later was joined by Syria. On 26 October 1973, all combat actions ended. In 1974, Israel deployed its troops from all territories it had seized during the war back to its borders of 1967, and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was stationed to establish a controlled buffer zone at the Golan Heights. (cp. Johannsen, 2006, p. 29)

1.2.7.2. The New Political Context as a Result of the War Enabling a Peace Process

The most important factor at that time was the change in the political constellation after the war in 1973. In Israel, the war was perceived as traumatic event due to the shock of the near defeat and thus shattered the myth of Israeli invincibility and the illusion of unity of purpose within the Israeli society. The general sense of grief because of the high number of deaths had negative effects on the prestige of the government and significantly weakened the political elite in Israel.

For the Arab neighbour states, Egypt and Syria, the ending of the war posed a new chance for a constructive peace process in the Middle East. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 206-207)

1.3. Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinian Struggle for the Liberation of the Occupied Territories

1.3.1. The Palestinian Struggle for Recognition to Act on their Own Responsibility and the Resistance against Israeli Occupation

1.3.1.1. The PLO's Adjustment to the Middle East Peace Process and its Recognition as Sole Representative of the Palestinians

Egypt and Syria, which were seen as the most important Arab front states, both entered bilateral negotiations with Israel within the framework of the Geneva Conference and were ready to find a path towards peace through the UNO and the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR. Iraq and Libya, on the other hand, opposed negotiations with Israel and were ready to support dissidents of PLO groups in their fight against world Imperialism by terroristic means in order to oppose the ongoing peace process.

The PLO had to react to the new circumstances in order not to be politically offside and therefore had to abandon counterproductive strategies. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 227-228) At that time, also other factors forced Al-Fatah, the PFLP and smaller groups like the PFLP-General Command or (PFLP-GC) or the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) to refrain from further worldwide operations. Among them was the Israeli anti-terrorism strategy that applied massive counteractions and also the fact that Communist regimes started rejecting worldwide terroristic actions because they were perceived as contradiction to the character of people's war and therefore had not led to the desired mobilisation of the masses. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 226-227)

In spring 1974, the Central Committee of Al-Fatah discussed measures for the establishment of a Palestinian authority in the Occupied Territories for the first time which implied the acceptance of the division of Palestine at least as a temporary solution. The new political program of the PLO rejected the peace process, but was ready to adopt all means beside armed struggle to liberate Palestine, which could also include political and diplomatic actions. It also endorsed the de facto partition of Palestine as a tactical intermediate stage towards the final goal which was the establishment of a democratic Arab state and the concurrent destruction of the Zionist state. The program also foresaw the overthrow of King Hussein of Jordan in favour of the installation a pro-PLO government. Jordan and the territories which Israel would have to hand back to the Palestinians were envisaged as future operational basis to fight the Jewish state. But the

sense of reality of the PLO members did not correspond to the political changes in the Middle East at that time.

A real turning point in the peace process was reached when the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, decided to enter the diplomatic stage at the Arab League summit in Rabat and at the UN General Assembly in New York in autumn 1974 where he symbolically appeared with a holster and an olive branch. These efforts led to the realisation of the PLO's main intention, which was its recognition as sole representative of the Palestinian people first by an Arab League declaration and shortly afterwards also by two UN-resolutions. The resolutions were adopted on 22 November 1974 by the UN General Assembly and confirmed the acknowledgement of the PLO as representative of the Palestinians and granted it observer status in all UN-bodies.

Despite this diplomatic success, pragmatic political realities were still not in favour of the PLO because Israel continued to refuse the organisation as negotiating partner. From now on, Israel also declined multilateral negotiations in Geneva that directly and indirectly had brought the PLO to the scene. Talks with Jordan about an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank were blocked under the pretext of the PLO-declaration of the Arab League in Rabat, and for strategic reasons Israel was not interested in negotiations with Syria about its disengagement on Golan anyways. Israel was only willing to further negotiate the disengagement with Egyptian troops which was linked to crucial commitments of the USA. Among them was the assurance that the USA would not negotiate with the PLO as long as it did not recognise Israel's right to exist. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 242-249)

1.3.1.2. The Palestinian State within the State of Lebanon

While the leadership of the PLO was still excluded from any peace talks, its fighters tried to establish their own "guerrilla republic" in Lebanon by applying the concept of revolutionary peoples' war. Thus, they were increasingly involved in violent clashes with Lebanese security forces. The PLO fighters allied with allegedly underprivileged Muslims to mobilise them against the Christian Maronite dominated government of Lebanon. The PLO denunciated its adversaries as elements of Imperialism and Zionism that supposedly had undermined the Palestinian revolution and the anti-Imperialist movement of Arab masses. The PLO-provoked peoples' war escalated in 1975 and led to

the division of the unstable balance of the different confessions in the country and finally to civil war. The dissolution of the Lebanese army into religious fractions led to an Islamic revolutionary leftist alliance between Shiite, Sunni and Druze militias supported by PLO fighters, on one side, and to a Christian Maronite alliance composed of members of the former state army, on the other. In this precarious situation, the Maronite leadership called on the Syrian regime for help. Due to this shift in the balance of power which was a contradiction to Syrian interests in 1976, the country complied with the Christian call for help and deployed troops on Lebanese territory. With Syrian help the Maronites were able to push back the leftist front and to conquer Palestinian refugee camps.

In early summer 1976, the PLO witnessed the so-called "Black June" which brought bloody internal fights. Pro-PLO forces included Al-Fatah, the PFLP, the PDFLP as well as Iraqi and Egyptian controlled forces, while the PLO group Al-Saiqa, the PFLP-General Command and some PLA brigades fought on the side of Syria. But Israeli threats against Syria prevented bigger Syrian interventions into the power struggle. Although the PLO suffered great losses in Black June, it was able to increase its overall military power in Lebanon. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 298-303)

1.3.1.3. The Palestinian Territories as Agenda Item at the Camp David Peace Negotiations under Exclusion of Palestinian Representatives

In 1977, the Egyptian President, Al-Sadat, surprisingly travelled to Jerusalem to meet the Israeli Prime Minister. This action was strongly opposed by the other Arab states and thus, the leader of Libya, Muammar Al-Gaddafi, initiated a front of rejection against the ostensible pan-Arab betrayal committed by Egypt that had been joined by the majority of the Arab regimes.

After the consultations between the Egyptian President Al-Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Begin, the latter presented the peace plan of his nationalist party Likud, which, for the first time in history, had won the majority in Israeli elections. In accordance with the party's right-wing Zionist ideological background that had aimed at the recovery of "Eretz Israel" from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, he suggested a status of autonomy for the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, but claimed sovereignty over the territories of "Eretz Israel" and the right for Israelis to settle there. This plan did not involve a particular political self-determination for the Palestinians.

Although Al-Sadat tried to find a compromise for the question of the Palestinians in his negotiations with Israel, his efforts were unsuccessful. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 254-258)

Meanwhile Israel had launched heavy retaliatory strikes for PLO after attacks on its territory that had been committed from Southern Lebanon. Israel occupied the area but under the pressure of the USA and the UN, Israel had to withdraw its forces in June 1978 and the peace-keeping force United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was installed. The forces acted as a buffer between southern Lebanon and Israel. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 303-304)

Only under the mediation of US President Jimmy Carter between Israel and Egypt, negotiations led to the Camp David Agreement of September 1978, the so-called "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and finally to a peace agreement between both states on 26 March 1979. Egypt step by step regained the Sinai Peninsula and Israeli settlements were evacuated until 1982. Although Egypt had been isolated from the Arab world, the conflict between Israel and the Arab states lost much of its potential of regional escalation. (cp. Johannsen, 2006, pp. 29-30)

In the Camp David Agreement the parties stipulated that representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in the negotiations on the solution of the Palestinian cause and that the result of these negotiations had to respect their legitimate rights. Palestinian self-determination should be realised according to a three-phase plan within an interim period of five years. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 261) Despite these concessions, the Israeli Prime Minister Begin focused on the avoidance of peace negotiations with PLO involvement that could have led to the establishment of a Palestinian state. At the same time, he worked on the Judaisation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through Jewish settlement that fulfilled the function of carving up the territory in order to undermine the viability of a potential Palestinian state. On 25 May 1979, negotiations on the full autonomy of the Palestinian people started between Egypt and Israel while Jordan as well as Palestinian representatives were not present. But when Al-Sadat came to know that the Knesset was about to adopt a law that would declare the whole city of Jerusalem Israeli capital, he terminated the negotiations on 15 May 1980. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 276-278)

1.3.1.4. The PLO's Expulsion from Lebanon during the War in 1982 and its Consequences

Israeli nationalists continued to acquire land through expropriation of Palestinians and thus, the tense situation escalated. After terrorist attacks of Al-Fatah and the newly established group Islamic Jihadon civil targets in Israel, Jewish terrorists committed retaliation operations on Palestinian mayors. In reaction, Palestinians of the Occupied Territories revolted against the occupation in spring 1982. The Israeli Likud thus decided to increase the pressure through threats of deportation and economical sanctions in order to force the Palestinians to migrate or to submit to Israeli rule. This strategy aimed at bringing Israel closer to its overall goal, namely the colonisation and annexation of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli government concluded that the fortitude of the Palestinians could be undermined best through the elimination of its leadership in the PLO headquarters in Beirut. Due to the fact that the PLO had established a state within a state in the south of Lebanon, the Israeli Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon, planned the invasion of Lebanon called "Operation Peace for Galilee". (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 282-289)

Starting from 3 June 1982, Lebanon was charged by 60,000 Israeli soldiers who blockaded Beirut for two months with the aim to completely eliminate the PLO's leadership. After weeks of continuous bombardment, the USA mediated a ceasefire and the PLO's dignified withdrawal from Lebanon, which was realised until 1 September that year. The fighters celebrated their heroic exodus but the organisation had to transfer its headquarters from the immediate neighbourhood of Palestine to the remote city Tunis. (cp. Johannsen, 2006, pp. 30-31) The PLO members still believed in the myth of their revolution and were not aware of the political realities that had left them without a territorial base for the continuation of their fight against Israel.

The PLO left behind about 5,000 Palestinian refugees whose faith was now in the hand of the new Lebanese leadership. Israel's master plan envisaged the installation of the pro-Israeli new President Bachir Gemayel who was expected to contain the Palestinian refugees and prevent the return of the PLO. But already on 14 September 1982, he was murdered by unknown terrorists. After his death, Israeli forces occupied Western Beirut in order to avoid the potential outbreak of chaos in the city. So the Israeli government at the suggestion of Defence Minister Sharon decided to let Christian Maronite Phalangist

militia enter the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila in order to conduct a cleansing of terrorists and thereby committed a massacre among the civil inhabitants. 382 corpses were found and 991 inhabitants of the camps were missed. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 294-297)

During the war, a new adversary to Israel's presence in Lebanon called Hezbollah had emerged. The group was a radical political Islamist Shiite movement supported by the Iranian regime. Its aim was the withdrawal of the Israeli forces for which reason Hezbollah members attacked northern parts of Israel and committed suicide attacks against the Israeli army. Therefore, Israel established a so-called security zone in southern Lebanon before its final withdrawal from Lebanon. Due to the fact that the war in Lebanon was the first one without backing from the Israeli population, Ariel Sharon had to step back from his post as Defence Minister. (cp. Johannsen, 2006, pp. 30-31)

While the PLO was leaving Lebanon, President Al-Assad of Syria and President Al-Gaddafi of Libya organised a conspiracy against the PLO. In November 1982, President Al-Assad allowed Yasser Arafat's archenemy Abu Nidal to transfer the headquarters of his terrorist group from Iraq to Syria although his group had committed attacks against Syrian aims until then. Under the influence of the Syrian regime another oppositional group within Al-Fatah was formed around the leaders Abu Saleh and Abu Mussa. In May 1983, President Al-Assad tried to seal the fall of Yasser Arafat during an audience in Damascus. The Syrian intelligence service initiated a staged uprising of members of Al-Fatah against its own leadership that was invoked by Abu Saleh and Abu Mussa. The mutineers constituted a new political group called "Al-Fatah Revolution", but were not successful in widening their rebellion. Due to his charisma and his symbolic value, Yasser Arafat was able to keep control within Al-Fatah and the PLO. Even the leaders of other fractions within the PLO like Habash, Hawatmeh and Jibril, who had moved to Damascus after their expulsion from Beirut, stayed loyal to him. But the external initiated rebellion led to a stronger polarisation within the movement. In June 1983, Yasser Arafat was expelled from Damascus by Syrian police forces and escaped to northern Beirut where pro-Syrian PLO-forces attacked the last Al-Fatah positions. Yasser Arafat had to leave Lebanon in November 1983 after having experienced the enormous power of self-destruction within the Palestinian movement. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 306-309)

1.3.1.5. The Palestinian Territories Designated to the "Jordanian Option"

Yasser Arafat still counted on America to exercise pressure on Israel, but the USA found itself in a dilemma. While Israel rejected an independent Palestinian state and the attendance of the PLO at any negotiations, the organisation insisted on Palestinian sovereignty and on its right to actively participate in the peace process. The PLO continuously refused to recognise Israel and a radical minority even insisted on the realisation of the Palestinian National Charta of 1968 that aimed at the destruction of the State of Israel by terroristic means.

The only realistic alternative left at that time was the so-called "Jordanian Option" which meant the resolution of the Palestinian question based on a territorial compromise over the West Bank with Jordan. Thus, Israel would not have been obliged to deal directly with the PLO or to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state. King Hussein could have functioned as negotiation leader of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation backed by the USA to find an agreement with Israel. Although this option was overshadowed by the 70-year-old rivalry between the nationalistic Palestinians and the Hashemite Dynasty in Jordan, King Hussein and Yasser Arafat had enough sense for pragmatism to capture this chance.

But King Hussein's and Yasser Arafat's efforts were undermined by the ambivalence within the PLO itself and especially by PLO dissidents like those around Abu Nidal who attacked Jordanian aims as well as PLO members with desire for peace.

In July 1984, the Israeli Labour Party was victorious in the elections and as a coalition partner of Likud it was able to resume its policy "Land for Peace" and its support for the Jordanian Option. So King Hussein organised a further meeting with Yasser Arafat in February 1985 to discuss a common peace initiative. On 29 May 1985, King Hussein travelled to Washington and informed US President Reagan that PLO was ready to recognise Israel and the UN-resolutions. But when the USA repeatedly urged non-violence from the side of the PLO, Al-Fatah forces committed several attacks that led to the termination of all diplomatic efforts. At that time, the Israeli peace camp lost public trust while the Likud party gained support. In September 1985, Israel conducted a violent retaliation campaign against the PLO in their headquarters in Tunis, but Yasser Arafat survived.

In 1986, Yitzchak Shamir became the next Likud Prime Minister of Israel and enforced a radical policy of settlement and annexation of the Occupied Territories, which could neither be influenced politically nor military by PLO activists in Tunisian or Syrian exile. The population that suffered from this occupation was abandoned to its faith and in this desperate situation took the initiative. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 316-328; Schlaim, 2010, p. 143)

1.3.2. The Palestinian Struggle for Self-Empowerment and a Two-state solution

1.3.2.1. The Palestinian Self-Empowerment in the Occupied Territories during the First Intifada

At the beginning of the year 1987, after twenty years of occupation, the people living in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip were convinced that no outside external factors would bring an end to Israel's unyielding and inflexible praxis. Israel conducted a "creeping annexation", as Ilan Pappe pointed out, meaning that Israeli governments permanently interfered in all aspects of life of the occupied population and also created an economic relationship of neo-colonialist dependence. Hence, the most affected direct victims of Israel's occupation were, on the one hand, Palestinian producers who had never gained from their investments and, on the other, refugees in the camps of the Occupied Territories who suffered from extremely poor living conditions. At the same time, Jews were settled in several parts of the Occupied Territories, because they were perceived as vital for Israel's existence.

The PLO's political strategy at that time was centred on the built-up of a safety net for Yasser Arafat and appeared resigned towards the occupation and the problem of refugees. So the only dynamic political space was local politics in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the guidance of young national leaders. This leadership consisted of middle-class urbanites and professionals who were only loosely affiliated to the various PLO fractions. In December 1987, Palestinians in Gaza's refugee camps started their first attempt to end Israeli occupation by initiating an uprising later called Intifada ("shaking off"). The First Intifada had all makings of an anti-colonist movement and thus included measures like demonstrations and civil disobedience. The responsibility of keeping the uprising alive over a longer period of time was lying in the hands of the farmers of rural Palestine. But the Israeli army reacted brutally to Intifada measures by bombarding the

villages with tear-gas, executing mass-arrests without trials and by applying torture during interrogations. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 230-234)

Especially at the beginning of the First Intifada, members of the group Islamic Jihad were also active. They refused to wait for the mental and political mobilisation of the Muslims before fighting their Zionist enemy, but preferred to accelerate the process of political consciousness-raising through the commitment of terrorist attacks. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 335)

The PLO was in a difficult position when it came to their reaction to the outbreak of the Intifada because its various fractions did not agree on how to best exploit the situation. It took about two weeks until its leadership realised the complex circumstances and the consequent perspectives. Yasser Arafat instructed Al-Fatah's youth organisation to take over the lead of the uprising in order to influence the proceedings. Shortly afterwards the PLO succeeded and took over the guidance in the uprising. Four PLO groups, Al-Fatah, the Communist Party, the DFLP (before called PDFLP) and the PFLP, formed the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), also-called Al-Qiyada Al-Muwhhada. Islamic Jihad was no mass organisation and had no exile leadership in Tunis and therefore was excluded from the leading committee. The UNLU circulated its directions through leaflets and graffiti so that the Intifada took place at two levels: locally, there were spontaneous youth protests and nationally, the UNLU directed countrywide protests, general strikes or memorial days. In its leaflets, the PLO promoted martyrdom and combined Islamic emotionalism with militant slogans of the various PLO groups. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 337-338)

Despite drastic operations of retaliation by the Israeli army, the motivation for the continuation of the Intifada was drawn from flyers issued by the National Unified Command of the Occupied Territories, which served as kind of Intifada newspaper that also specified further targets and goals of the uprising. In the course of the Intifada, the Palestinians within Israel became active and declared their solidarity with the uprising by organising strikes and demonstrations, which were later even supported by segments of the Jewish left. These were the first actions coordinated between the Palestinians within Israel and those in the occupied areas. In 1988, the first commemoration of the Day of the Land was celebrated as an act of solidarity on both sides of the demarcation line. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 234-235)

In January 1988, the UNLU decided to escalate the Intifada into total people's war, but did not call for violent action. In contrary, it had forbidden the use of firearms and promoted street fighting by non-violent measures of the "generation of occupation" mentioned above. A campaign of civil disobeying against the military government as well as the economic boycott of Israel was promoted. This non-violent strategy aimed at embracing all segments of the Palestinian society and casting off the administrative, economic and social structures of occupation. Self-help and Palestinian initiative should provide the basis for the establishment of alternative structures that made the Intifada a process of inner liberation and aspiration for independence. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 339-340) Popular committees in which Palestinian women, workers, doctors, farmers and students had organised themselves according to their political affiliation already before the Intifada together with the UNLU were engaged in building new structures as a basis for statehood that transformed the Intifada from a spontaneous uprising to an organised resistance movement. Also important external factors changed in the context of the First Intifada. On 31 July 1988, King Hussein of Jordan formally renounced all demands of sovereignty over the West Bank that was annexed in 1950 due to public pressure exercised by activists within Jordan. Therewith the involvement of Jordan by international law was omitted (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 345; Heacock, 2001, pp. 16-17)

1.3.2.2. The Inner-Palestinian Divergence over a Two-state solution

Suddenly, the PLO was obliged to take administrative, financial and political responsibility to push forward the Palestinian struggle for independence. Yasser Arafat mobilised the PLO members for a policy change that comprised the following aspects:

- the acceptance of a two-state solution based on the division of Palestine by the UNO according to resolution 181 of 1947 that would provide legitimacy for the national aspirations of the Palestinians by international law
- the recognition of the UN-resolutions 242 and 338 that demanded the return of the territories occupied in 1967 as well as
- the recognition of the existence of the State of Israel.

These steps would have meant the total abandonment of the PLO's radical and revolutionary positions enshrined in the organisation's Charta. Therefore intensive

negotiations with members of the DFLP and the PFLP were necessary in order to assure Arafat a broad consent within the PLO. (cp. Husseini, 2001, p. 197)

But in the course of 1988, another group of activists, called Islamic Resistance Movement, Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyya (Hamas), had appeared on the scene. The organisation was neither subordinate to directives of the PLO or the UNLU nor was it affiliated to Jihad Al-Islami. Its "Holy Fighters" were members of the Muslim Brotherhood and formed Al-Mujahidin Al-Islami, the armed wing of an Islamic cultural and social organisation led by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. Due to divergent views on strategy and tactic, Hamas became a rival organisation to Jihad Al-Islami. While Islamic Jihad tried to mobilise the Palestinian people for the Holy War through terrorist attacks, Hamas first aspired after an Islamic cultural revolution that should be followed by the Holy War. In a time when PLO was attempted to take part in peace negotiations, Hamas declared all Palestine including the territory of Israel as holy and inalienable property of Islam. Hamas aimed at establishing itself as mass organisation and therefore tried to attract attention through spectacular confrontations with Israel. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 347-349)

Also the Damascus based PLO groups, Al-Fatah Revolution, the DFLP, the General Command and the PFLP, still promoted the violent struggle against Israel and thus had the potential to counteract all efforts of the PLO leadership in Tunis. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 374)

1.3.2.3. The Declaration of an Independent Palestinian State and First Diplomatic Steps towards Direct Negotiations with Israel

Despite these obstacles, Yasser Arafat declared the Palestinian State on 15 November 1988 at the PLO summit in Algiers. At this summit, the Declaration of Independence based on the UN-resolution 181 was adopted. The PLO also renounced threats of violence and terrorism, but reaffirmed its right to resistance within the Occupied Territories. Although Palestine was recognised by more than hundred states until 1991, the USA still refused to do so. Yasser Arafat, who planned to ask for a seat at the UNO at its Plenary Meeting in New York, was denied an American visa for which reason the world forum decided to hold its session once in Geneva. At this meeting, Arafat held a

speech in which he proclaimed the Palestinian readiness to make peace with Israel. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 367-370) The decision taken by Yasser Arafat and the Executive Committee of the PLO was a historic step towards peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis and included some significant commitments like the recognition of Israel's right to exist on 78 per cent of the territory of historic Palestine. (cp. Husseini, 2001, p. 197)

Hence, US President Reagan initiated the start of a dialogue with the PLO as first step towards direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO. These incidents were indicative of a change in the US-American policy towards the Middle East. The main problem in the establishment of the new diplomatic relations between the USA and the PLO was the fact that Yasser Arafat was not able to guarantee the promised renunciation of force. When the Damascus based PLO fractions sent guerrilla troops from Lebanon to attack their Zionist enemy, Israel exploited the incidence to propagandise against the dialogue between the USA and the PLO. But against the background of the new policy of détente of the superpowers in the Middle East, the dialogue continued because the geo-political change was expected to influence the behaviour of their allies in the region.

Also within the political landscape of Israel, new approaches arose. As long as the Labour Party and the Likud were not able to find a compromise, Palestinians should have been offered a confidence-building interim autonomy. After the omission of the Jordanian Option, Israel also took into consideration to negotiate directly with Palestinians from the Occupied Territories explicitly excluding Palestinians in exile, Palestinians from East-Jerusalem as well as PLO members. In April 1989, the President of the USA invited the leading figures of Egypt, Jordan and Israel and utilised the dialogue with the PLO as auxiliary construction to mediate between the different positions. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 372-382)

1.3.2.4. The Weakening of the PLO's Diplomatic Standing due to Militant Violence and its Alignment Behaviour in the Second Gulf War

Meanwhile, the revolutionary reality in the Occupied Territories showed that it was impossible to separate politics from militant violence and fanatic strike forces replaced regular forms of security institutions like the police or criminal courts. The militant groups committed violent attacks against Israeli soldiers as well as against suspected collaborators and criminals. In April and May 1989, mutual operations against

inner-Palestinian enemies escalated when more Palestinians were killed by Palestinians than by Israeli soldiers. These incidents eroded the solidarity within the Palestinian society and left room for analogies with the revolt from 1936 to 1939. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 345-347) An initial alliance in the fight between Hamas and the PLO did not last very long and Hamas gained more and more influence through the mosques and its social movement in the Gaza Strip. At the end of 1989, Hamas and the PLO were equal in combat and organisational power. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 351)

Israel was coerced to reconsider its strategy to oppress the uprising of the Palestinians because the well equipped Israeli army was not prepared for urban guerrillas armed with stones. Due to the fact that Israel possessed a people's army neither the government nor the military leadership was capable of telling soldiers to contravene to moral and ethical principles. The army was therefore not able to achieve a military victory and to defeat the Palestinians' will to resist. So the use of violence was officially limited to the dissolution of illegal demonstrations and to cases of fierce obstructions against arrests. But in reality Israeli forces reacted very brutally against Intifada actions, what caused Israel's loss of image all over the world. The Israeli Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin tried to lower the level of violence of the Intifada through mass arrests and the detention of its leaders, but the people's uprising did not need a leadership.

Within Israel, the Intifada was associated with the notorious Palestinian terrorism over time and therefore caused a political shift to the right. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 354-364) This political right shift was in close connection to the Israeli society's wish for more military security, which was exploited by politicians who were not ready to give up any territory of what they perceived as Eretz Israel. But all initiatives to end the First Intifada through political expedient failed and caused a further loss of image for Israel.

Despite high US engagement, the transition of the PLO from a revolutionary and terroristic movement towards a moderate political organisation did not bring about a breakthrough towards a peace process. When Israel was under enormous pressure to reconsider its standpoint in spring 1990, a terrorist attack against Israel committed by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) provided Israel with the chance to show the world public that the PLO did not stick to its promise to abandon violence. The leader of the PLF, Mohammed Abdel Abbas alias Abu Abbas, was close to Yasser Arafat and was holding a seat in the PLO Executive Committee. This incident did not leave any other

choice to the USA than to cancel its dialogue with the PLO. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 388-390)

The beginning of the Second Gulf War on 2 August 1990, when Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, further worsened the strategic situation of the Palestinians. A high proportion of Palestinian refugees lived and worked in Kuwait, and the oil-rich Gulf States had always been a sponsor of Palestinians including the PLO. After the invasion, around 300,000 Palestinians escaped from Kuwait and Yasser Arafat immediately took up diplomatic action. Instead of being neutral or supportive of the moderate states, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, the PLO together with Libya backed Iraq although the majority of the members of the Arab League had condemned the Iraqi invasion. The Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, even called for the overthrow of the regime in Saudi Arabia that had provided the highest financial support to the PLO and Yasser Arafat declared that the armed military units of the PLO would fight beside the Iraqi soldiers.

Saddam Hussein demanded an end to the occupation of all Arab territories within one overall solution. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from Golan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the retreat of Syrian forces from Lebanon and the Iraqi pull-out from Kuwait should occur at the same time. Saddam Hussein tried to make a connection between the conflicts in order to gain time and because the liberation of Jerusalem had always been a propagandistic aim. Although this proposal was rejected by the USA as well as by most Arab countries, the Palestinians hoped that Saddam Hussein would help them to bring an end to their occupation.

After the expiry of the UN-resolution ultimatum for Iraq to comply with the UN demands, the country was attacked by US, British and French forces on 17 January 1991. On the same day, the PLO Executive Committee condemned the international intervention and called for resistance against the aggression of Americans, Europeans and Zionists. Yasser Arafat declared that a second front would be opened in Lebanon where PLO militias should fight the Zionist enemy. The PLO measures did not show much effect, but Israel became target of Iraqi middle range missiles. After a successful ground offensive by the allied forces in February 1991, the war ended with a ceasefire between Kuwait and Iraq and both antagonists declared themselves winner. The fast action taken by the UN was a result of the policy of détente of the two superpowers that were now under enormous pressure to find a solution to the Middle East conflict. Moreover, the

Soviet Union was forced to show its engagement in front of its former radical Arab clients in order to keep its face and the USA had to prove that the defence of Human Rights in Kuwait was as important as in Palestine.

The Second Gulf War had important implications for the strategic environment in the Middle East because a volte-face of Syria had taken place. In this war, Syria had fought together with Egypt and Saudi Arabia alongside the superpower USA and the former colonial powers United Kingdom and France. Also the Soviet Union, the former army supplier of Syria, wished to see an alleviation of tensions in the region and increasingly improved its relationship with Israel. De facto, the anti-Iraqi alliance had comprised some of the main actors in the Middle East, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria as well as Israel, which suddenly had shared common goals. Hence, the Gulf War had shifted the geopolitical power balance. Besides the Iraqi regime, the big loser among the Arab actors was the PLO that lost all its political prestige it had gained before through guerrilla fighting and skilful manoeuvring. Due to his support for Saddam Hussein and his positioning against the other Arab regimes that had supported the PLO from the beginning, Yasser Arafat became politically isolated. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 392-403)

And due to the regularly arising violence of the still ongoing Intifada, Israel was in a position to legitimately use drastic measures against the rebels in the Occupied Territories as last resort. Israel cut off electricity and water of the villages and prevented Palestinians from olive picking during the peak season. Starting from 1991, the potential of violence of the First Intifada declined. (cp. Pappe, 2010, p. 235) But two substantial characteristics of the First Intifada introduced new aspects to the conflict, namely the new active role of the refugees and the fact that intellectuals were the driving force behind the uprising. (cp. Heacock, 2001, p. 18)

1.3.2.5. The Palestinian Participation at the Multilateral Peace Conference in Madrid

The USA initiated a new initiative for peace in the Middle East starting from March 1991. All four part-conflicts, Israel's tense relationship with Jordan, Lebanon and Syria as well as the Palestinian cause, should be solved in parallel negotiations. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 403-409) As John Bunzl noted, these US efforts to stage a peace conference were intended to be remuneration for the Arab participation in the Second Gulf war against

Saddam Hussein. (cp. Bunzl, 2001, p. 45) Thus, the Madrid Peace Conference, hosted by the Spanish government and co-sponsored by the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, started on 30 October 1991and lasted for three days.

The innovation in this conference was the fact that the Palestinians were represented equally to the Israelis. The mere presence of a Palestinian delegation marked an important reversal of Israel's refusal to negotiate with Palestinians at all. Israel's veto against Palestinian representatives who belonged to the PLO or were living in East-Jerusalem brought a young, talented and effective negotiation team, including Haydar Abd Al-Shafi, Ghassan Al-Khatib and Saeb Erakat, to the fore. The team was part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the conference and had an advisory council with Faisal Al-Husseini in the position of the coordinator and Hanan Ashrawi as spokeswoman. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 156-159; Heacock, 2001, p. 19)

Haydar Abd Al-Shafi held the Palestinian opening speech at the conference which clearly aimed at countering harmful stereotypes about Palestinians in world public and humanising the Palestinian cause. It also intended to convince the Israeli public that Palestinians were committed to a peaceful solution and co-existence countering the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's belief that all Arabs still refused to accept Israel's right to exist. The historic transformation within the Palestinian camp was not only reflected by the moderate speech of its delegation, but also by the composition of the negotiation team itself. Half of the Palestinian representatives to the Madrid Peace Conference were academics and intellectuals who did not present themselves as alternative leadership to the PLO. Although all their steps were taken in coordination with the PLO leadership, they proved to be better qualified to present their case to world public than the discredited PLO leadership in Tunis.

After the plenary session of the peace conference, several separate bilateral meetings between Israel and the respective Arab delegations took place. The Syrian representatives were most uncompromising while the Palestinians were eager to push forward the talks in order to reach a freeze on Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Due to these different attitudes, the common Arab front collapsed. Palestinians refused to accept that the peace process should once more be held hostage by inter-Arab political antagonism.

An important factor for Palestinian success was the newly emerged political alliance with the USA that was the driving force behind the peace process. The Palestinian position was a lot closer to the US-American than to the Israeli position and so the pressure was on the latter. In contrast to Israel, the Palestinians explicitly accepted the condition that the talks should be based on UN-resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of "land for peace". This new alliance marked the most far-reaching historical change in Middle East policies. At the same time, the Arab support in the war against Iraq and the advancing collapse of the USSR that was officially dissolved in December that year challenged the special relationship between the USA and Israel based on Israel's role as protector of US interests in the Middle East against communism and pan-Arab nationalism. Although the official position of the USA towards the conflict had remained unchanged since 1967 and included the support of the principle of "land for peace" and the refusal of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem as well as Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, President Bush now did more than only repeating this position. This new engagement led to an open confrontation between President Bush and Prime Minister Shamir in which the latter not even received support from the Israeli public. Shamir repeatedly called for direct negotiations between his delegation and the Arab representatives, but he continuously erected obstacles to those talks. As Avi Shlaim noted, one could get the impression that Shamir's real goal was the break-up of the peace process while ensuring that the Arab delegations took the blame. But after the Madrid Peace Conference, Israel's politicians were no longer able to claim that there were no peace partners among their Arab counterparts. The conference also showed that the Palestinians had learned their lessons from mistakes of their leaders and from successes of their opponents. Most important, they realised the importance of good public relations, of not formulating maximalist goals, of applying a gradualist approach as well as of having a powerful sponsor. In Madrid, the Palestinians presented themselves as moderate what found response in the world public opinion and was the most encouraging result of their performance. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 159-167)

1.3.2.6. The Bilateral Oslo Peace Process

Stagnation in the official talks in the aftermath of the Madrid Peace Conference prompted Israel as well as the PLO to seek a back channel for communicating. So the Norwegian

Foreign Minister, Johan Joergen Holst, and the social scientist, Terje Roed-Larsen, acted as hosts and facilitators of secret talks in Oslo that started in late January 1993. The talks were encouraged by the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, Yossi Beilin, who belonged to the extreme dovish wing of the Labour Party, and with the knowledge of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. The key players in the secret talks were two Israeli academics, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik, and the PLO treasurer, Ahmad Qurei. 14 sessions took place over an eight-month period in parallel to the official bilateral negotiations in Washington and proceeded without the knowledge of the official delegations. The unofficial talks were centred on a conceptual framework for an accord between Israel and the Palestinians. At a certain point, the secret negotiators started to let their respective leaders in on the issue and informed the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, respectively the leader of the PLO Executive Committee, Yasser Arafat. So they managed to install an indirect line of communication between the government in Jerusalem and the PLO headquarters in Tunis.

After the failure of the tenth round of the official talks, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, invented the idea of dealing on Gaza first. Yasser Arafat proposed the counter offer to deal on Gaza and Jericho first which served as a symbol of the Palestinian claim on the West Bank. Israeli officials were convinced that progress towards a solution to the conflict with the Palestinians would also lower the price for the settlement of the Israeli-Syrian dispute. So Rabin stated publicly that the cooperation with the PLO will be unavoidable, but he insisted on changes in the Palestinian National Charta. The willingness to hold direct talks with the PLO marked a diplomatic revolution.

This step paved the way for the so-called Oslo Accords signed on 13 September 1993 in the White House sealed with a historic handshake between Rabin and Arafat. As its name implies, the accords were based on the outcome of the secret negotiations in Norway and consisted of two parts, namely, on the one side, the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO in the form of letters written by Rabin and Arafat. In his letter, Yasser Arafat confirmed the PLO's commitment to recognise Israel's right to exist as well as the UN-resolutions 242 and 338, renounced the use of violence and terrorism and declared the PLO's willingness to change parts of the Palestinian National Charta that contradicted these commitments. Rabin, on the other hand, only confirmed that the Israeli government would recognise the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people and that it was

willing to commence negotiations within the peace process. On the other side, the Oslo Accords contained the Declaration of Principles for Palestinian self-government in Gaza and Jericho.

What was really historic about the signing of the Oslo Accords was the reconciliation of the main actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict that before had denied the other's right of self-determination on the disputed territory of Palestine. So both agreed on the partition of Palestine based on a territorial compromise and therewith abandoned the ideological dispute over the rightful ownership of historic Palestine regarded as patrimony and vital part of national identity for both conflict parties. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 188-193)

1.4. Palestine's Stride towards Statehood

1.4.1. Palestinian Self-Government and the Establishment of the Palestinian National Authority and its State Structures

The main understandings of the Declaration of Principles for the Palestinian self-government in Gaza and Jericho, based on the agreement worked out in Oslo, included the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, the establishment of a Palestinian Authority with competencies in education and culture, health, social matters, direct taxes and tourism as well as the election of a Palestinian Council and the enlargement of the territory on which this elected council had responsibility over civilian matters and security of the Palestinian inhabitants. Border security, external relations, public order in Jewish settlements as well as the unimpeded transit on the roads remained under the responsibility of the State of Israel.

The clarification of difficult issues like Jerusalem, settlements, the refugee problem, security, borders, external relations and other questions of mutual concern was postponed to the planned "final status settlement". (cp. Watzal, 2001 I, p. 30)

Summing up, the Oslo Accords reflected the unequal power balance between the State of Israel and the Palestinians, but also implied a tactical innovation, namely the gradual procedure. Due to their weak position, the Palestinians were forced to accept the ambivalent deal with Israel. (cp. Bunzl, 2001, p. 45) But both contractual partners were exposed to strong opposition by their respective national hardliners. Yasser Arafat as well as Yitzhak Rabin was accused of betrayal. While the Israeli hardliners argued that the

gradual approach to establish a Palestinian state violated their right for a Greater Israel, the PLO itself was split. Radical nationalists like George Habash's PFLP and Hawatmeh's DFLP accused Arafat of abandoning the PLO principles in order to grab power. Yasser Arafat even had to face opposition of Palestinian mainstream figures who criticised the weaknesses of the accords. The militant resistant groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad that were not part of the PLO, completely refused any arrangement with Israel and within the League of Arab States the PLO's diplomatic solo steps consternated especially Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. But Rabin as well as Arafat managed to get the necessary majority support within their camps in favour of their deal. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 195-197)

After the completion of the Oslo Agreement, further negotiations led to the signing of additional documents related to the Oslo Accords. The first two were the *Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on 29 April 1994* and the *Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area of 4 May 1994*. (cp. Watzal, 2001 I, p. 30) Finally, eight months after the signing of the Oslo accords, the redeployment of Israeli forces cleared the way for the return of the PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian administration, the so-called Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as an interim institution for a five-year period, during which final status negotiations between Israel and the PNA were planned to take place. The Israeli Civil Administration handed over its responsibilities for Gaza and Jericho to the PNA and Palestinian police forces took up their work. On 1 July 1994, Yasser Arafat triumphantly returned to Gaza and from the beginning gave full priority to the build-up of state institutions. These efforts were overshadowed by a series of suicide attacks committed by Islamist militants who opposed these developments. Israel reacted with a policy of interdiction that from this time on became a regular element of life for the Palestinians as well as with the expansion of Israeli settlements. The Palestinian National Authority, on the other side, was powerless to intervene against Israel's policy because it lacked European and US support. (cp. Baumgarten, 2001, pp. 58-59) Despite these counterproductive measures, further documents within the framework of the peace process were signed. On *25 July 1994, the Washington Declaration* was signed by the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein of Jordan and on *29 August 1994, the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO* was concluded. Especially the *Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip also known as Oslo II signed on 28*

September 1995 by Yasser Arafat, Bill Clinton, Hosni Mubarak and King Hussein, in which the territory of the West Bank became divided into three zones, caused huge changes on the ground:

- Zone A includes major Palestinian cities and comprises about 3.5 per cent of the territory. In this zone, the Palestinians are allowed to manage their civil matters as well as security executed by the Palestinian Police.
- Zone B contains 420 small cities and villages in which the Palestinians are allowed to control civil administration and police matters that only affect Palestinians while the overall responsibility and the competencies in security matters are dedicated to Israel.
- Zone C includes about 73 per cent of the West Bank and the status quo on this territory is not designated to change. In reality, this provision has caused a change for the worse for the Palestinians because Zone C is divided by Jewish settlements and therefore allows the Israeli authorities to seal off the various autonomous Palestinian areas within the zone.

Although the Israeli military administration redeployed from the population centres, its regulations remained in force and from this time on had to be executed by the Palestinian National Authority. Also in the economic field, a strong dependence from the Israeli authorities remained and Israel kept the de facto control over all spheres of life of the Palestinians. (cp. Watzal, 2001 I, pp. 30-31)

Within Israel, Rabin was accused of causing national humiliation and following the dictates of Yasser Arafat who was still perceived as terrorist. On 4 November 1995, Rabin was assassinated in Tel Aviv by a Jewish nationalist radical who aimed at obstructing the peace process. Due to an electoral defeat in May 1996, Shimon Peres, who had succeeded Rabin after his death, was not able to continue his efforts. Binyamin Netanyahu and his party Likud, which had opposed the principle “land for peace” and the deal with PLO from the beginning, came into power. The policy guidelines of his government clearly refused the establishment of a Palestinian state, the Palestinian right of return as well as the dismantling of Jewish settlements on the Occupied Territories. The Likud also asserted Israeli sovereignty over the whole city of Jerusalem and opposed a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Golan Heights. But pressure from the US government coerced the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to concede territory to the

Palestinians following the signing of the *Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron on 15 January 1997* and the *Wye River Memorandum of 23 October 1998*. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 202-204)

The main part of the Wye River Memorandum consisted of security matters that actually posed a risk to democracy and human rights. The resolved measures were based on the formula of reciprocity and aimed at preventing criminal, terrorist or other violent attacks on the respective other side and included the systematic combat of terrorism. Palestinian authorities thus were forced to arrest and convict persons accused of having committed violent acts. The further withdrawal of Israeli forces was linked to the compliance with security and reciprocity and therewith posed an instrument for Israel respectively the USA to evaluate the measures taken by the PNA as insufficient.

Under US pressure the PLO was coerced to abrogate its Charta on 14 December 1998, when US President Clinton visited the Palestinian territories for the first time. The 50 years of struggle for independence were discredited as terrorism. While Bill Clinton's visit did not imply the expected recognition by international law, Yasser Arafat was coerced to perform humiliating gestures. The memorandum was a success for Israel and the USA that therewith managed to equal the Arab-Israeli conflict with the War against Terrorism.

Also the *Sharm Al-Sheikh Memorandum of 4 September 1999 or Wye II*, further disillusioned the Palestinians who hoped for easier negotiations after the landslide victory of the Labour Party under the leadership of Ehud Barak. (cp. Watzal, 2001 I, pp. 33-35) But Avi Shlaim assessed the situation as follows: *"Barak's style was arrogant and authoritarian, and he approached diplomacy as the extension of war by other means."* (Shlaim, 2010, p. 204) The memorandum that according to Ludwig Watzal was known as *"Implementation agreement of the implementation agreement of the implementation agreement of the interim agreement"* (Watzal, 2001 I, p. 36) did not bring huge progress. Both parties affirmed their willingness to start negotiations on a framework agreement for a final status settlement in which the UN-resolutions 242 and 338 should be realised. Both parties committed themselves not to change the status quo on the ground which was queered by Israel through settlement building and the construction of separate infrastructure to connect the settlers to Israeli territory. Watzal analysed that, at that time, Palestinian politicians acted apolitically and in a naïve way. (cp. Watzal, 2001 I, p. 36)

1.4.2. The Stagnation of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process and its Consequences

1.4.2.1. Set-Backs in the Peace Process

On 8 November 1999, the official talks about the final status agreement between PLO and Israel started in Ramallah, but the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, had already declared before that the building of settlements would not be stopped and that the UN-resolution 242 would not be applicable. His delegation received the instructions to negotiate a framework agreement in which all critical issues that could not be resolved during the talks should be recorded. The agreement was meant to stop the conflict between the two parties taking into considerations Israel's so-called "five red lines":

- No return to the borders of 1967;
- No division of Jerusalem which should stay united under Israeli sovereignty;
- No total evacuation of settlements which instead should be annexed by Israel;
- No stationing of foreign armies on the Western side of the river Jordan;
- No return of Palestinian refugees to Israel.

These political guidelines met approval within the Israeli political class even among the moderate leftist wing. Therefore, the negotiations ended without an agreement and US President Clinton invited Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, and the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, to a summit at Camp David in July 2000 where Ehud Barak still focused on the same "five red lines".

Yasser Arafat, on the other hand, was commissioned by the Executive Committee of PLO to enforce the following demands:

- The complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Occupied Territories in accordance with UN-resolutions 242 and 338;
- East-Jerusalem as capital of a future Palestinian state;
- The removal of all Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories;
- The right to return for the Palestinian refugees or an adequate compensation based on the UN-resolution 194.

All fractions of the Palestinian community were represented at Camp David except of Hamas and the PFLP that refused their participation, but the Camp David accord was planned to be evaluated through a referendum.

But Ehud Barak arrived in Camp David without sufficient backing in Israel. His government was shaken by a crisis and fell apart and Barak lost two confidence votes at the parliament. Yet, the Israeli Prime Minister was convinced that he would be successful and otherwise he could blame Arafat for not having accepted his readiness of compromise. In world public's perception Barak's participation at the summit would earn him credits as an important statesman who was ready to make huge sacrifices in order to reach peace.

In view of these facts, the Camp David Summit was condemned to failure. Yasser Arafat rejected a proposal made by Ehud Barak and realised that Israel was able to veto against all demands made by the Palestinians and therefore refused to be blackmailed. As expected, the USA and Israel blamed the Palestinian side for the failure of the summit.

The agreements from Oslo to Camp David made the Palestinian problem a bilateral power struggle between Israel and the Palestinians in which Palestinians were condemned to lose. (cp. Watzal, 2001 I, pp. 37-40)

1.4.2.2. The Second Intifada as a Consequence of the Stagnation of the Peace Process

After reaching a dead end in the actual negotiation rounds, Ariel Sharon, the Likud candidate for the post of the Prime Minister, provoked the outbreak of the Second Intifada by visiting the Muslim holy site Haram Al-Sharif, also-called Temple Mount by the Israelis, on 28 September 2000 accompanied by about one thousand security forces. The already frustrated Palestinians could not accept this further Israeli attempt to humiliate Yasser Arafat and his government in front of the world public and started an uprising, also known as Al-Aqsa-Intifada. It can be seen as the result of the long period in which agreements were signed that did not bring about the emancipation of the Palestinians, but resulted in their total submission under Israeli rule. (cp. Watzal, 2001 I, p. 39)

The Second Intifada not only comprised violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians or Palestinian suicide attacks within Israel, but also a war of propaganda. Ehud Barak publicly accused the Palestinian National Authority of using violence as means to promote its political aims. But in reality, Arafat was keen on bringing the violence under control in order to make use of the last months of Bill Clinton's term as US President and Barak's term as Israeli Prime Minister to conclude the process of Oslo. Arafat needed

progress to build on it in negotiations with a new Israeli government under the auspices of the succeeding US government.

Despite the ongoing uprising, the Israeli as well as the Palestinian side was ready to pursue the negotiations. Mid-December 2000, US President Clinton in accordance with the future US President, George W. Bush, activated the talks hoping to reach an agreement within the last days of his term. The negotiations started on 18 December 2000, but ended inconclusively for which reason President Clinton presented his proposals in Washington on 23 December 2000. President Clinton's suggestions touched the disputed issues of land distribution, Jerusalem and refugees. The proposals were accepted by Israel with reservations while the Palestinians asked for further clarifications before giving their consent. Against the background of the violent incidents in Israel and the Occupied Territories that caused huge human losses and the fact that US President Clinton was to be replaced and the Israeli Prime Minister had to face imminent elections, all parties were under enormous time pressure.

On 21 January 2001, talks took place in Taba and Eilat that only led to a final communiqué that underlined that significant progress had been made and both opponents expressed their hope that negotiations would presume after the elections in Israel.

For the Palestinians, Ehud Barak's proposal in Camp David as well as Bill Clinton's suggestions for a settlement of the conflict that was in line with the Israeli terms of reference posed unacceptable offers because they implied the abandonment of unalienable Palestinian demands. Due to the fact that no written documents or conventions arose from the negotiation rounds, Yasser Arafat had to return back home empty-handed.

On 6 February 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected new Israeli Prime Minister, which heralded the start of a change in policy that finally brought an end to the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. While Barak's campaign convinced the Israeli public that he had offered the Palestinians a state, but they refused due to their wish to destroy Israel, the new Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, came up with his radical policy guidelines.

They included the following:

- No negotiations with the Palestinian as long as violent clashes erupt;
- Negotiations should aim at a ceasefire agreement rather than a solution to the conflict;
- No recognition of results of former negotiation rounds;
- No division of Occupied Territories due to the fact that they were part of Eretz Israel;
- If a future Palestinian state were to be established, it would have to be on the territories of zone A and B which was about 40 per cent of the West Bank.

These Israeli preconditions made a fair settlement of the conflict impossible, but were fully backed by the new US President, Bush, who was not willing to presume Clinton's active policy in the Middle East.

Against this background, the Intifada as well as the counter-measures by Israel continued and even intensified. Israeli security forces aimed at the directed suppression of the Palestinian revolt that included mass arrests and targeted killings of political leaders and militants. Potential negotiation partners were systematically liquidated and Yasser Arafat was placed under house arrest. Israel conducted a policy of collective punishment towards the Palestinians through interdiction. The aggressive "shoot-to-kill" approach of the Israeli security forces provoked the militarisation of the Palestinian society that quickly changed its approach from a consensus on passive resistance and civil disobedience to the use of violent means and firearms. (cp. Baumgarten, 2002, pp. 208-225)

Despite harsh measures taken by Ariel Sharon to suppress violence, the Islamic militants of Hamas and Jihad Islami were not reluctant to commit suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. This course of action found broad acceptance within the Palestinian society. This prompted even the Al-Fatah associated Al-Aqsa Brigades to follow their examples. The living situation thereby changed for both adversaries: While Israeli public life was paralysed by the fear of new attacks and the economy had to face recession, long curfews and isolation of villages in the Occupied Territories disrupted Palestinian economic activities completely and unemployment rose extremely.

The Palestinians perceived terrorism as legitimate reaction to sustained occupation and as a means to bring violence into the heart of Israel in order to reveal the costs of occupation and make clear that there would be no peace before the end of the occupation. But Palestinian terrorist acts proved to be self-defeating and strengthened the Israeli conviction that Palestinians did not accept Israel's right to exist and aimed at its liquidation. So the Israeli government blamed the Palestinian National Authority and Yasser Arafat personally for terrorism. (cp. Böhme/Kriener/Sterzing, 2009, pp. 86-88)

In April 2001, an international commission issued a document known as the Mitchell Report that although it did not meet Yasser Arafat's demand for the stationing of an international force in the West Bank, supported many of Arafat's positions. The report called for a freeze on settlements, the resumption of negotiations and its analysis of the violence did not blame Arafat for the incidents. But the Palestinians missed this opportunity to gain more political support on the international level.

Also the attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001 would not only have offered a threat, but also opportunities for the Palestinians. US policy now focused on the war against terrorism originating from the Middle East, and therefore was looking for Arab allies in fighting the radicals. This would have posed an opportunity for Yasser Arafat to trade Palestinian support to regain American sponsorship and produce pressure on Israel. Instead of seizing the chance, he responded with a public campaign condemning the attacks on New York and Washington and took measures against pro-Bin Laden manifestations. But Arafat missed the chance to prove that the Palestinians were allies in the fight against terrorism. Thus, they were rather seen as part of the problem. So the Bush administration did not change its hostile attitude towards Yasser Arafat who was not considered to be a reliable partner for peace and demanded political reform that should include his resignation.

In defiance of the political opportunities offered by the Mitchell Report and the September 11 terrorist attacks, Yasser Arafat did not make serious attempts to bring an end to the violent fighting. Israeli civilians were even attacked the day that Ariel Sharon and George W. Bush met which further underlined the position of the Israeli Prime Minister. In contrast to Yasser Arafat, his opponent, Ariel Sharon, acted more sensitively and did not order his forces to seize control over the West Bank from the beginning in order to avoid international pressure on Israel. Only when the terrorist attacks escalated

and Yasser Arafat lost Western as well as Arab support, the Israeli Prime Minister ordered the army to evade the territories of the Palestinian National Authority in order to damage its facilities, destroy weapons factories and kill or arrest people accused of being involved in terrorist activities. Israeli forces put a siege on Arafat's compound in Ramallah in March 2002. Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian people had to realise the high costs of the continuation of their fight, which had a demoralising effect on the Palestinian society. But even though the majority of Palestinians favoured an end of the war, they still incorporated a powerful attitude of militancy and support for Arafat, which was perceived as patriotic imperative.

On 25 June 2002, the US President publicly declared that as long as Arafat was the Palestinian leader, peace would not be achievable. US officials considered Arafat to encourage terrorism instead of opposing it and therefore blamed him of refusing to bring violence under control by using either his moral authority over his people or his political power over the Palestinian organisations. (cp. Colp Rubin/Rubin, 2003, pp. 262-266)

In autumn 2002, the Israeli government coalition fell apart due to a dispute over the question of settlements. This conflict led to premature new elections that were won by the Likud party of Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, and earned his party additional seats in the Knesset. Israel's new coalition was made of four parties within the rightist nationalist and ultra-Orthodox wing following a rather intransigent political course. Stagnation was fostered by the crisis in Iraq that had become a focus within US policy. The forced overthrow of Saddam Hussein was supported by Israel where the change in power had raised hopes among members of all fractions. While the right wing parties hoped for a moderation of Arab regimes and a decrease in demands towards Israel, the left wing fraction expected the USA to put more pressure on the Israeli government to freeze settlement activities and to return to the negotiation table.

After the war in Iraq the Bush administration seemed to be willing to take a more active role in the conflict and took part in the Quartet on the Middle East composed of the EU, Russia, the UN and the USA. The quartet worked on proposals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and finally presented them in April 2003 in form of the so-called Road Map for Peace. The Road Map intended the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in 2005 after the gradual implementation of its proposal. While the Palestinian side accepted the Road Map, the Israeli government only gave its approval against the

background of international pressure and in exchange for an affirmation by the US administration that all of its fourteen reservations would be taken into consideration what posed a clear challenge to the whole Road Map.

Lessons learned from the Oslo Process were that external pressure was needed to push forward the peace negotiations for which reason the quartet should be permanently involved in the issue. In order to avoid mutual blockings based on the accusation of non-compliance to commitments by the respective other side, the Road Map was grounded on the principle of parallelism. It seemed that the Quartet on the Middle East had understood that the failure of the Oslo Process had not been caused by the eruption of the Second Intifada but by the despair of the Palestinians following the unsuccessful negotiations. The Palestinians felt betrayed by Oslo because their living conditions worsened while Israeli settlement activities accelerated and the vision of an independent Palestine seemed unrealisable.

But again all efforts of the Road Map focused on Israeli security demands and its precondition to work on normalisation only after the end of terrorist attacks. The chances for a settlement of the conflict were extremely limited at that time since two of the coalition parties within the Israeli government openly refused the two-state solution. Within the Palestinian political sphere, reforms within the Palestinian National Authority occupied centre stage. A Palestinian constitution was designed and the position of a Palestinian Prime Minister was generated against the resistance of Yasser Arafat who feared losing power. In May that year, Mahmoud Abbas alias Abu Mazen, who enjoyed the trust of the International Community, was nominated Prime Minister, but resigned already in September 2003 because he was neither able to assert himself against Yasser Arafat in the dispute over the command over security forces nor against Israel which refused normalisation. Although his successor, Ahmad Qureia alias Abu Ala, was a confident of Yasser Arafat, internal disputes over power and influence as well as accusation of corruption within the apparatus paralysed the Palestinian National Authority that was no longer able to exercise self-government. Thereby, Hamas, which meanwhile had positioned itself as social, political and terroristic movement, gained increasing support especially in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli security forces were not able to suppress its activities although it had already eliminated major parts of its leadership and had destroyed its infrastructure.

In October 2003, the construction of a separation barrier (generally known as “wall”) by Israel on Palestinian territory was subject to a UN-resolution adopted by the General Assembly. The resolution considered the erection of the barrier on Palestinian land, which was envisioned to reach over 700 km length upon its completion, as contradiction to international law and demanded an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The Israeli government justified the construction of the separation barrier as a necessary step to protect its citizens from terrorism, but in reality the wall served as basis of future borders. At some points the barrier went deep into the Palestinian territory of the West Bank in order to connect Jewish settlements to Israeli territory and prepare its annexation. In addition, Israel planned to establish a security zone at the Eastern side of the West Bank in the Jordan valley, which was envisioned to remain under Israeli control. Therewith the Palestinian territories would be transformed into separated enclaves that in the future would not be able to become a viable state. Although also the International Court of Justice in The Hague declared the separation barrier illegal by international law, the decision did not have any consequences on the ground. (cp. Böhme/Kriener/Sterzing, 2009, pp. 86-97)

In December that year, a substantial proposal to end the conflict, the Geneva Accord, was presented and received strong international backing. This newly introduced initiative put enough pressure on Ariel Sharon to force him to take new steps to come out of his political defensive position. In January 2004, Sharon therefore presented a plan for a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip including the evacuation of 7,000 settlers and their settlements. With this plan, Sharon aimed at avoiding further peace initiatives from third parties and tried to connect the withdrawal from Gaza with the backup for Jewish settlements in the West Bank. So US President Bush gave him a written confirmation in April that year that a future peace settlement would not include the return to the borders of 1967 or the Palestinian right to return, but instead would take the changed demographic facts on the ground into consideration. The Arab side perceived this confirmation as “second Balfour Declaration” which also had negative effect on the perception of the US-American role as fair mediator in the conflict.

Although there was hope among the peace supporters that Sharon’s revolutionary approach to dismantle settlements would trigger a new dynamic, he seized the situation to

continue the building of the separation wall as well as settlements and to liquidate more Hamas officials unrecognised.

After the death of Yasser Arafat on 11 November 2004, Mahmoud Abbas took over the leadership of the PLO and was nominated President and won the elections on 9 January 2005. Therewith, the only democratically elected Arab leader was the President of the stateless Palestinians what proved that a second democracy in the Middle East was on its way. But all hopes for a Palestinian new start were belied because the new President was not able to reach the same level of political legitimation and self-assertion as Yasser Arafat. Therefore, he could not meet the expectations of his followers to ensure normalisation. Extensive restrictions for the Palestinian police forces and justice institutions by Israeli authorities made it impossible to control the activities of the armed wings of different political fractions and private militias.

Although Mahmoud Abbas managed to integrate Hamas into the process of communal elections in 2005, he was not able to stop the internal struggle for power within Al-Fatah in the aftermath of Yasser Arafat's death. Political as well as ideological differences within the party came to the fore and security forces and the Al-Aqsa Brigades that were affiliated to Al-Fatah took on a life of their own. Mahmoud Abbas had nothing to set against the shelling of Qassam rockets fired on Israel from the Gaza Strip for which reason the Israeli government did not react to all his offers for negotiations. Not even the final withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip in summer 2005 did unfold political dynamics towards peace. This offered Hamas and the other armed groups in the Gaza Strip the opportunity to present the Israeli withdrawal as their own victory instead of portraying it as positive outcome of Al-Fatah's negotiation efforts. (cp. Böhme/Kriener/Sterzing, 2009, pp. 99-105)

At a summit in Sharm Al-Sheikh in February 2005 hosted by the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and joined by the Jordanian King Hussein, Abbas and Sharon exchanged formal ceasefire commitments in which they agreed to stop all violent acts against each other. This ceasefire can be seen as the de facto end to the Al-Aqsa Intifada. (cp. Journal of Palestine Studies, 2009, p. 142)

After its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel pursued a policy of economical devastation by closing border crossings for weeks and only assuring a minimum standard

of humanitarian aid. Israel was still in control of Gaza's supply in energy, goods and food as well as of its access via land, sea or air. In September 2005, the Israeli air force conducted air strikes against cities in the Gaza Strip as a reaction to enduring shelling of Qassam rockets. Thereby Israel transformed occupation into siege.

The withdrawal also had huge consequences within the political arena in Israel. Ariel Sharon left the Likud party and formed his new Kadima but suffered a stroke and lapsed into a coma in January 2006. (cp. Böhme/Kriener/Sterzing, 2009, pp. 106-107)

1.4.2.3. The Inner-Palestinian Conflict between the Political Main Actors, the PLO and Hamas, and the War in Gaza

Also in January that year, parliamentary elections within the Palestinian territories should finalise the integration of Hamas into the pre-state structures of Palestine. But against all expectations, Hamas won the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). This was the result of protest votes against Al-Fatah's policy. This election result destroyed all hopes for an internal stabilisation and a restart of the peace process. On 30 January 2006, the Quartet on the Middle East decided to boycott the new government and linked the resumption of contacts and financial aid to the recognition of Israel's right to exist, the confession to non-violence and the recognition of all former agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. The Palestinians reacted with anger to these preconditions because the outcome of the election was the result of a democratic process. The international policy of isolation against Hamas government led to an economic deterioration for all Palestinians and further to an armed struggle between militias of Al-Fatah and Hamas as well as an internal power struggle between the Al-Fatah affiliated President, Abbas, and Hamas affiliated government led by Prime Minister, Ismael Haniyeh, which almost led to civil war.

Although the new Israeli party Kadima had lost its leading figure, Arial Sharon, it won the parliamentary elections on 28 March 2006 and Ehud Olmert became new Prime Minister in a government coalition with the Labour Party and some smaller groups. The program of the new government envisaged the withdrawal from huge parts of the West Bank, the acknowledgement of the pathway of the separation barrier as future border of Israel and the annexation of Jewish settlements on the western side of the wall. For security reasons, the Jordan valley was envisaged to remain under Israeli control, which

would have left fifty per cent of the West Bank for the establishment of a Palestinian state.

But on 25 June 2006, military contestations between the militant Islamist groups and the Israeli security forces escalated when Hamas attacked Israeli soldiers and kidnapped one of them. On 12 July, the Hezbollah, which was operating from Lebanon, conducted a similar operation at the northern border of Israel and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers. Israel replied by heavy air strikes against Lebanon aiming at the destruction of the Hezbollah. The new war in Lebanon cost the lives of over a thousand people and made around one hundred thousand refugees. But Israel did not succeed in weakening and isolating the Hezbollah. Instead it won the support and solidarity of the Lebanese society that was as a whole negatively affected by Israeli attacks. In the course of the war, Israel lost international backing and was coerced to agree to a UN-ceasefire-resolution. The main parts of the ceasefire agreement foresaw the stationing of the Lebanese army at the border to Israel and herewith the displacement of Hezbollah from the south of Lebanon. Also the UNIFIL was equipped with a new robust mandate to oversee the ceasefire. Among the Israeli society, the Lebanon War of summer 2006 brought along an enormous loss of confidence in its leading politicians while Hezbollah celebrated its victory.

Within the Palestinian political arena, only an intervention by the royal house of Saudi Arabia into the internal Palestinian dispute could avoid further escalation and reach an agreement on the formation of a government of national unity between President Abbas and Prime Minister Ismael Haniyeh on 13 March 2007. But main questions like the supervision of the security forces were left unresolved and thus, security forces affiliated to Al-Fatah refused to accept orders from Hamas affiliated Minister of Interior. Furthermore, Hamas'ss expectations that the international boycott would be abolished after the formation of the government of unity were deceived.

Therefore, violent clashes between militias of Al-Fatah and Hamas resurged. In June 2007, Hamas pre-empted an Al-Fatah coup and seized total control over the Gaza Strip. After the takeover, President Abbas dismissed the government under Prime Minster Haniyeh and appointed Salam Fayyad as successor who enjoyed wide international acceptance. Israel and the Western countries resumed payments for the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank, but Palestinians were left divided not only geographically but also politically. The enduring boycott over the Gaza Strip led to a

humanitarian catastrophe and was expected to undermine public support for Hamas. But it proved to be unrealistic to expect that a political force like Hamas would disappear completely and therefore the new (so far rather unsuccessful) approach aimed at its reintegration into the political process. (cp. Böhme/Kriener/Sterzing, 2009, pp. 106-118)

But the Israeli Prime Minister tried to take advantage of the situation and began lobbying the USA to consider the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as separate entities to enable Israel to persecute Hamas. US President Bush agreed to support President Abbas and his government in the West Bank and the resumption of peace talks which became known as the joint Israeli-US American approach "West Bank First". On 24 June 2007, the Egyptian President Mubarak, the Jordanian King Abdullah and Ehud Olmert met Mahmoud Abbas at a summit in Sharm Al-Sheikh to demonstrate their support for the Palestinian regime in the West Bank. Shortly afterwards, Israel continued its attacks on the Gaza Strip aiming at assassinations of members of Hamas and Jihad Islami. Due to the deterioration of the humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip as a consequence of the isolation, Hamas leader Haniyeh was even ready to offer the handover of control of Gaza's crossing to the Presidential Guard of Abbas or any international force, but the Palestinian President as well as Israel refused.

US President Bush gave a major policy speech in July that year referring to the "West Bank First" approach in which he assured substantial aid to the Palestinian National Authority. He also-called for an international peace conference to negotiate the revival of final status talks. In order to ensure a successful outcome, the PNA was urged to stop all Palestinian violent acts against Israel and to take actions against terrorists and their infrastructure. Israel on the other hand was demanded to transfer the value-added taxes owed to the PNA and to freeze new settlement building. Ehud Olmert made the proposal for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement in principle about the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank as interim solution before a final settlement. At that time, Israel still continued its military operations in the Gaza Strip. In August 2007, armed forces of Al-Fatah began to re-enter the territory with Israeli help in order to contribute to the destabilisation of Hamas regime by organising strikes and boycotts. Mahmoud Abbas also rejected Hamas'ss appeal for reconciliation talks and amended the Palestinian election law, which from now on should make it more difficult for Hamas to win the presidency or the majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council.

Further Presidential decrees effectively enabled the firing of civil servants affiliated with Hamas. Al-Fatah's challenging of Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip led to the resumption of inner-Palestinian clashes.

In the meantime, Israel had informed the US-administration that it was not ready to discuss final status issues at the planned peace summit in Annapolis or any other topics that posed a threat to Israeli security. Although Abbas protested against these preconditions, the US administration told the two parties to work out these differences themselves. This in fact led nowhere. While the US administration declared that the Annapolis conference would take place as scheduled, it downplayed expectations for its outcome.

In the preparation phase of the draft for a joint Israeli-Palestinian statement, Olmert assured his cabinet that no steps towards the establishment of a Palestinian state would be made unless the Palestinians had fulfilled their obligations agreed to in the Road Map. Also the USA agreed to use the Road Map as the basis of the summit and called on the PNA to work harder to fight terrorism and on Israel to halt its expansion of settlements.

The Annapolis Summit took place in November 2007, but did not even include efforts to reach an agreement on parameters for final status negotiations. Instead the conflict parties worked on a statement underlining the parties' intentions to implement the Road Map as first step towards the resumption of final status negotiations. But under US pressure, Israel had to reduce its military action against the Gaza Strip as confidence-building measure during the summit. On the other hand, the Knesset also authorised Israel to retain value-added taxes owed to the PNA as compensation for Israelis harmed by Palestinian terrorism, and the Mayor of Jerusalem announced new construction projects aiming at the Judaisation of East Jerusalem.

Also the first round of post-Annapolis talks between Israel and the Palestinian government did not bear fruit and was heavily influenced by the situation on the ground. While the PNA accused Israel of undermining its credibility through the continuation of attacks against the Gaza Strip, Israel demanded that the PNA should take more effective steps against terrorism. Already one month after the Annapolis Summit, Israel declared that it would not be bound by the scheduled date for a final status agreement envisioned

for the end of 2008 because progress would depend on the ability of the PNA to ensure Israel's security.

Although the Egyptian President, Mubarak, tried to mediate a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel, Ehud Olmert refused all offers until Hamas would meet the three Israeli preconditions: the recognition of Israel's right to exist, the renunciation of violence and the approval to adhere to the existing agreements.

On 17 January 2008, Israel declared economic warfare on the Gaza Strip and closed its borders aiming at deposing Hamas government and stopping rocket fire on Israel. The UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, John Duggard, appraised theses measures as collective punishment and war crimes, while the PNA reaction was rather moderate and aimed at exploiting the situations to its own advantage. It stated that the only way to overcome this crisis was by unseating Hamas.

When the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) launched Operation Hot Winter targeting Gaza's allegedly terrorist infrastructure, Mahmoud Abbas came under heavy pressure to react to the situation on the ground and therefore suspended peace talks with Israel that in turn accused him of violating the Annapolis agreement. But the US administration could persuade Abbas to return to the negotiation table. At the same time, he agreed to the Yemeni offer to mediate between Al-Fatah and Hamas. Although an inner-Palestinian agreement could be reached, the US and Israel put pressure on Abbas to declare that no progress on national unity could be made until Hamas would hand over the control over the Gaza Strip to the PNA. After Abbas's reversal, the IDF escalated its attacks against the Gaza Strip. Under further US pressure, Abbas and Olmert resumed their negotiations on 7 April 2008, but already the next day, Israel increased its military operations and also intra-Palestinian violence spiked.

At that time, a new Presidential campaign in the USA was under way and Ehud Olmert faced corruption charges and therefore announced that he would not run in the upcoming Israeli elections and would step down as party head of Kadima. In September 2008, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni won party elections and became caretaker Prime Minister in charge of the formation of a new government. She declared not to be able to form a new coalition. This made clear that there would be no push forward in the peace process until new Israeli and US-American administrations would assume their offices.

Although bound to a ceasefire with Israel, members of the Jihad Islami launched heavy attacks on Israel in retaliation for the assassination of one of its senior commanders. (cp. Journal of Palestine Studies, 2009, pp. 155-168) This incident gave Israel the pretence for its long planned military campaign against the Gaza Strip, Operation Cast Lead, from 27 December 2008 until 18 January 2009.

The three weeks of war caused 1,430 human casualties among the Gazans and wounded another 5,300. The reaction in the West Bank included an only one-day strike and a series of demonstrations, but the security cooperation between the PNA and Israel continued. Also the peace talks were just formally suspended and not completely abandoned. Neither Hamas nor Al-Fatah was able to take advantage from the events. While Hamas was only able to assure its self-preservation, Al-Fatah blamed Hamas to be the trigger for the Israeli attacks. Due to its deep divisiveness, the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank was not even able to organise popular protest movements which brought the level of trust in the PNA institutions to an all-time low. Palestinians felt that their government was insensitive to the suffering of its own people and it seemed that the ideological tensions within the PNA between national liberation and pre-state bureaucracy were resolved in favour of a quasi-state administration. Thus, in contrast to Hamas, which still fought against Israel, Al-Fatah cooperated with the enemy. Operation Cast Lead revealed these fundamental differences in the Palestinian political sphere but at the same time increased the public demands for national reconciliation. (cp. Blecher, 2009, pp. 64-71)

After the Knesset elections in Israel on 10 February 2009, Avigdor Lieberman's hard-line rightist party Yisrael Baitainu emerged as one of the big election winners and now had a heavy bearing on the political arena in Israel. All in all, the elections of 2009 showed a new trend of colonialist goals and the exclusion of the national Palestinian minority inside Israel. Even the Labour Party joined the coalition with Yisrael Baitainu and the rightist Likud led by Benjamin Netanyahu who became new Prime Minister. These happening were a clear indicator for a further complication of the almost non-existent peace process during this term. (cp. Yiftachel, 2009, pp. 72-75)

1.4.3. The Deadlock of the Peace Process and the Unilateral Palestinian Request for Recognition of Statehood at the UNO

The newly elected President of the USA, Barack Obama, affirmed his commitment to find a peaceful solution for the Middle East Conflict and thus pushed Israel and the Palestinians to start another round of peace negotiations that finally started on 2 September 2010. These direct negotiations were overshadowed by acts of violence from the side of the Palestinian militant camp and Israeli retaliation as well as by Israeli plans to expand the settlements in the West Bank what finally led to the breakup of the negotiations.

Independently, the Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, presented a plan in August 2009 that envisaged the preparation of the Palestinian political and economical field for the independence of the State of Palestine. In September 2011, President Mahmoud Abbas held a speech at the UN Security Council requesting recognition for his state and the UN membership despite Hamas'ss refusal of that step. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 61-62)

In November 2012, Israel conducted a military operation against Gaza as retaliation to Hamas'ss rocket firing on Israeli cities which unintendedly strengthened inner-Palestinian solidarity and thus, resulted in the improvement of relations between Hamas and Al-Fatah. Therefore, a new round of reconciliation talks was opened under the mediation of the Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi.

Due to a lack of progress to the Palestinian UN bid, the Palestinians decided to request the status as observer state at the UN General Assembly on 29 November 2012 which de facto implies the recognition of Palestine as occupied state. This time, the effort was not only supported by the PLO parties but also by Hamas. The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved the upgrade of the Palestinian National Authority's observer status to "non-member state" from "entity" with 138 votes in favour, nine against (Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Panama, Palau, USA) and 41 abstentions. (cp. Charbanneau, 29/11/2012)

Alghouth the Israeli legislative elections of 22 January 2013 strenghtened the position of the centre-left parties vis-à-vis the centre-right and right-wing forces and recent opinion polls showed that the Israeli society is predominantly ready to make peace with the

Palestinians based on a two-state solution, the new coalition government made of Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu, Yesh Atid, the Jewish Home and Hatnuah grants key ministries to pro-settler and right-wing parties, for which reason the chances for a two-state solution still seem very limited.

2. Issues and Interests at Stake

2.1. Strategic National Interests, Goals and Objectives of the Main Adversaries in the Conflict

2.1.1. Israeli Aspirations

The **Israeli national interests** include aspects of security, identity and prosperity. Due to Israel's unique history of expulsion and especially against the background of the Holocaust, Israel regards itself as haven for the Jewish nation and the territory as means of Jewish survival. Israel faces enduring existential threat that is based on a deep sense of Jewish victimhood and vulnerability. Therefore, control over the Palestinians is an imperative in an ongoing state of emergency, and ***security*** is the central means of legitimation of the state. (cp. Report 3, 2010, pp. 41-42) Due to the fact, that Israelis have immigrated to the Jewish state and do not have a "mother country" to return to, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is perceived by much of the population as ***Hard Zero-Sum Situation*** in which the readiness to compromise on this national interest is low and the probability of escalation is high. (cp. Sayigh, 1986, p. 106)

Besides the shared notion of victimhood, there arose a common sacralisation of the "Holy Land" when the Jews lived in Diaspora. The Jewish imperative of maintaining Israel's nature as Jewish state has strong implications on the Israeli fear of being absorbed by its Arab neighbours or even the Arabs already living inside Israel or in the Occupied Territories. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 183) Israel as an occupation force is in a demographic dilemma because of the rapid growth of the Palestinian population. If the Palestinians obtain the majority, this will create a situation in which a minority population rules over a majority and thus, is not compatible with democracy or the Jewish character of the State of Israel. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 67) These factors reveal the strong ***identity*** aspects of the conflict for which reason it also includes characteristics of a ***Grey-Zone Situation***.

The fact that Israel obtains one third of its needed water from the West Bank and therefore wants to keep the control over the water reserves makes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also an issue of ***prosperity*** in which a distributive problem exists. (cp. Baumgarten, 2002, p. 121) Such a ***Soft Zero-Sum Situation*** offers possibilities for a settlement if an agreement with mutual advantage can be reached.

Thus, the Jewish/Israeli **goal** has been the establishment and maintenance of a Jewish state. Thereby, the majority of the Israelis have aspired after the enlargement of the state territory and the continuation of control over the Palestinian Territories that are considered a part of Eretz Israel. Within the Zionist Movement there had been a broad consensus that *"There could be no viable Jewish state in all or part of Palestine unless there was a mass displacement of Arab inhabitants, who opposed its emergence and would constitute an active or potential fifth column in its midst."* (Morris, 03/10/2002) Until today, political debates about the so-called "transfer" of the remaining Arabs take place.

Political Objectives agreed upon by the majority of the Israelis until today can be summarised as follows: In an exchange of letters, David Ben Gurion, one of the founding fathers of Israel, explained to the French statesman General Charles De Gaulle that the main aspiration of the Jewish people for 2,000 years was the return to their homeland. According to Ben Gurion, the Jews all over the world identified their existence completely with ***Eretz Israel*** and thus had to renew their independence and nationhood. (cp. Ben Gurion, 1973, p. 641) After the establishment of the Israeli state, most Israelis and Zionists hoped for the disappearance of the Palestinians[23] and their absorption into the surrounding Arab societies. A majority of the Palestinians had already been successfully expelled from the state's territory anyway and so the armistice lines of 1949 served as de facto borders. Even at the end of the 1960s, when the Palestinians for the first time accepted that Israelis had equal political rights in Palestine, most Israelis were not ready to recognise the rights of the Palestinians. They neither accepted the idea of a single democratic state in Palestine for Jews and Arabs nor approved the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that it had occupied in 1967. At the time when the Palestinians declared independence in 1988,

[23] There existed the well-known formula for the justification of the colonisation "a land without a people for a people without a land", which referred to the belief that the people living in Palestine were no people with separate history or culture and therefore were not entitled to national self-determination. (cp. Krämer, 2002, p. 197)

Israel did not accept that the Palestinians were a people with rights to self-determination and independent statehood. This only changed with the beginning of the peace process in 1991 when the Israeli government was obliged to start direct negotiations with the Palestinians about a ***two-state solution***. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 190-195)

Israel has always aimed at achieving a maximum of security and therefore wants to keep control over certain territories it considers critical and at the same time insists on the termination of terroristic acts against Israeli security personnel and civilians. It further aims at the ***annexation of constantly increasing Jewish settlements*** in the West Bank and keeping the unified city of Jerusalem under its sovereignty while Israel refuses the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. (cp. Magenheimer, 2003, p. 85)

Another important Israeli aim is the decline of occupation costs and the termination of its regional economic isolation based on a ***contractually guaranteed self-administration of the Palestinian territories under Israeli sovereignty.*** (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 42)

Israel's acceptance of a two-state solution would require the realisation of the following principles outlined by the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to the Israeli Cabinet in August 2010 before entering a new round of direct talks with the Palestinians: *"First of all, the recognition of Israel as the national state of the Jewish people, the end of the conflict and of claims on Israel, that will stem from recognizing it as the national state of the Jewish people, and the establishment of tangible security measures on the ground so as to ensure that there will not be a repeat in Judea and Samaria of what happened in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip after Israel withdrew from these areas. Of course, there are many other issues but I note these three principles as the basic components of Israel's approach."* (Netanyahu, 29/08/2010) According to the Senior Palestinian Negotiator, Dr. Nabil Shaath, the "security measures" mentioned by the Israeli Prime Minister envisage to keep not only 26 per cent of the Eastern West Bank (in the Jordan valley) as buffer to Jordan under military control but also a 10 kilometre strip at the Western border of the West Bank due to the "slimness" of Israel. Several roads that connect these Israeli controlled zones would further cut the Palestinian territory into pieces. Dr. Shaath also mentioned that Israel aims at keeping the siege of the Gaza Strip and further conducting border control. Thereby, the sovereignty and viability of a prospective Palestinian state would be undermined. (cp. Shaath, 29/11/2010) This suggests that Israel aims at putting the majority of the former mandatory territory under its sovereignty.

2.1.2. Palestinian Aspirations

Palestinian national interests derived from deep existential fears that had been cemented since the beginning of the 20th century when the Palestinians underwent traumatic experiences. Those realistic and justified fears of being dispersed or eliminated as a people are based on experiences of the denial of their very existence and their legitimacy as national entity, repressions and domination by foreign powers, expulsion and military occupation. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 183) Thus, the Palestinians regard the dispute as conflict over their ***security*** and thus as ***Hard Zero-Sum-Situation***.

The shared mass trauma of the destruction of Arab Palestine in 1948 and the consequent claim on victimhood also posed a basis for the Palestinian national identity for which reason the Middle East Conflict is also an issue of the group's ***identity*** and therewith a ***Grey-Zone Situation***. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 182-184)

At the same time, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state was considered a necessary precondition for ***prosperity*** and only chance for the refugees to materialise their right of return and economic well-being. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 42) For this reason, the conflict is partially considered to be a ***Soft Zero-Sum Situation***, in which considerable distributive problems have to be solved in order to reach a final settlement.

Therefore, the generally accepted Palestinian **goal** has been ***self-determination*** as a people.
This implied an important fact: Since the national interests of survival and identity have been at stake, there has been little room for compromise especially when taking into consideration that both national interests have long presumed the physical elimination of the enemy. This attitude becomes evident in the Palestinian opposition to Zionism and to Israel's very existence. Thus, there have been calls for *"a transfer of the Jews out of Palestine, or 'throwing the Jews into the sea', as the phrase goes."* (Morris, 03/10/2002)

But the Palestinian political **objectives** have changed over time and have varied between the different political factions. In the time after the establishment of the State of Israel the objectives of all political parties were centred around ***the liberation of all of Palestine*** which meant the restoration of Arab Palestine although it had never been a sovereign state before and had been deprived of its social basis after the escape of over half of the Palestinians. The Palestinian National Charta claimed that Israel had to be destroyed and

that the future ***Palestinian state*** should replace Israel encompassing the entire territory of the former British mandated land. Israel's existence as a state and the presence of Israeli people was not accepted.

The first reversal of the Palestinian standpoint occurred at the end of the 1960s following the war of June 1967 and was initiated by the DFLP and backed by the leaders of Al-Fatah. The new proposal called for a ***single, secular, democratic state in Palestine*** with equal rights for its citizens of all faiths. This was the first time that Palestinians recognised equal political rights of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in Palestine. But this approach did not recognise the Jews as a people with collective national rights and thus presented a continued rejection of the State of Israel itself. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 42)

As a reaction to the Black September of 1970, King Hussein of Jordan presented a new plan in 1972 that envisioned a *Palestinian-Jordanian Federation*. This federation should have consisted of two regions: Palestine in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and Jordan. The so-called "Jordanian option" was refused by the Israeli government from the beginning, for which reason the PLO and its various fractions were effectively not coerced to take up a concrete attitude towards the plan. (cp. Baumgarten, 2002, p. 79)

Since 1972/73 the main intention of the PLO had been becoming a central actor in peace conferences that aimed at finding a solution for the Middle East Conflict and being recognised as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. By the mid-1970s, it became clear that the ***two-state solution*** was unavoidable because no major global player would accept a conflict settlement that neglects the existence of Israel within the 1967 borders. Although the majority of the Palestinians came to terms with this reality, there was still a front of rejection that refused the establishment of a Palestinian state on only 22 per cent of the former mandatory territory comprised of the PFLP, the PFLP-GC and the ALF. But these parties were not able to influence Arafat's political programme and by the end of the 1970s, the PFLP slowly came to terms with the two-state solution. At that time, it was perceived as temporarily solution. The two-state solution was formally adopted in 1988 in the framework of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence that proclaimed the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel based on the UN-resolution 181 of 1947. This step was the first official recognition of the existence of Israel although the Israelis refused to recognise the Palestinian right to

self-determination. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 189-195) The establishment of an ***independent Palestinian state on the basis of the pre-1967 borders*** as main political objective was also advocated in the context of the peace process between the PLO and Israel that started in 1991. The end of the Israeli occupation and the right of self-determination were considered as first steps towards the establishment of a sovereign state what was believed to be accompanied by economic recovery. A peace settlement with Israel has also been regarded as chance to find a solution for the refugee problem and end the economic discrimination. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 42)

Within the front of parties that reject the peace process with Israel, the solution that envisages the establishment of a secular democratic Palestinian state alongside Israel has been seriously challenged by the Islamist parties Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Although these parties have also aimed at the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, their perceptions of the shape and type of the future state have differed from those of the majority of the PLO fractions. Especially Hamas became a very popular force in the Palestinian struggle for statehood and gained support less through its ideological position that demands the elimination of Israel and the *establishment of an Islamic state* than through its critique on the Oslo process. But since Hamas has decided to become a political force, it indicated that it does no longer reject a *two-state solution* under certain preconditions with abandoning violent struggle against Israel. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 98-101) According to the PLO Chief Negotiator with Israel, Saeb Erekat, today more than 75 % per cent of the Palestinians want a two-state solution to the conflict and accept territorial swaps in order to reach an agreement. (cp. Erekat, 25/04/2012)

2.2. Conflict Issues

2.2.1. Territory and Borders

From the beginning of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the territory of ancient Palestine and the shape of the State of Israel respectively the state of Palestine have been contested. Today, there is a general agreement on a two-state solution but the notions on how the territory should be shared are totally incompatible. The Palestinians want to establish their state on the basis of the pre-1967 borders that they consider as significant concession because this corresponds to only 22 per cent of the former British

mandated territory. The Israelis, on the other hand, aim at the annexation of 69 Jewish settlements including their surroundings what corresponds to about 10 per cent of the West Bank. The settlements would then be pulled together as settlement blocks where around 85 per cent of the settlers reside and an additional Israeli controlled security zone would be established in the Jordan valley. Together, these territorial losses would cut the Palestinian territory into three parts and would prevent unhindered goods traffic and freedom of movement as well as an efficient imposition of law and order. In order to create facts on the ground, Israel started the construction of a so-called "security barrier" around the West Bank in 2002 that obviously has been serving the demarcation of future Israeli borders. The concept of ethnic separation has also been employed on the Gaza Strip where settlements were dismantled in 2005. This step was based only on Israeli strategic interests that centred on getting rid of about 37 per cent of Palestinians who had lived under Israeli occupation. Therewith Israel solved a pressing demographic problem. But Israel is still in control of the coastal waters and the airspace of Gaza. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 63-67)

2.2.2. Statehood or Autonomy

Even without a state, the Palestinians have developed a fully established national identity. State structures followed when the Palestinian National Authority was established, but important functions of a sovereign state are still missing such as defence, foreign policy and foreign economic relations or full control over strategic resources like water and land. The government has not been able to enforce its legitimate monopoly on the use of force and thus the Israeli military destroyed several Palestinian security facilities under the pretext of combating terrorism and upheavals. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 59-63)

2.2.3. Resources and Economy

Due to the fact that water is, in the true sense of the word, a vital but rare resource in the Jordan valley, which is fed by the Jordan River that rises in the Golan Heights and the groundwater of the West Bank, it has been the most contested resource among the conflict parties in the Middle East and has affected Jordan, Lebanon and Syria as well. The Israeli agriculture has demanded a high water consumption than that of its

neighbouring countries which is less an economic than an ideological imperative that is based on the device "to make the desert bloom". Also its constantly rising population, the industrial and agricultural expansion and growing life standards have increased the overall demand in water. Today, Israel assures half of its water supply through the control over the occupied Golan Heights and the West Bank where settlements cement that control. Israel thus uses 80 per cent of the groundwater and restricts the Palestinian consumption through discriminatory allocation quota and high prices. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 67-72)

The Palestinians expected economic recovery as an immediate consequence of independent statehood but the violent struggle for a state has only hindered economic growth. So the peace process with Israel and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority were linked with high expectations of development. These expectations were soon belied and led to further impoverishment and broad frustration. The miserable situation of the Palestinian economy is caused by the high dependence on financial aid as well as its dependence on the Israeli economy under asymmetric conditions. The occupation caused a deformation of the economic structure, the isolation of the Palestinian economy and a high dependence on labour migration. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 87-93)

2.2.4. Israeli Settlements on the Occupied Territory and the Return of Palestinian Refugees

A net of 121 Jewish settlements and another 100 settlement outposts have been built in the West Bank since 1967. The Israeli settlement policy is the civilian counterpart to the military colonisation and envisions the transmission of Israeli law on the occupied land. Although the settlements are considered illegal by International Law, Israel regards the Occupied Territories as land that had been unappropriated (only administered by Jordan respectively Egypt) when it was occupied. The Israeli considerations regarding the settlements comprise, on the one hand, the expansion of its territory as well as the protection of its future borders and, on the other, the avoidance of the establishment of a viable Palestinian state and the consequential emigration of the Palestinians. Surveys show that about three quarters of the settlers would be ready to move to the Israeli

heartland in return of a generous compensation but the fanatic religious settlers regard this territory as indispensable element of Israel. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 72-76)

According to UN data, around 726,000 Palestinians left the territory on which Israel was established during the military disputes in 1948/49. After their escape, more than 400 Palestinian villages were destroyed and replaced by Israeli residential quarters. Due to the high birth rate, today there are around eleven million Palestinians worldwide. Most of them live in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the neighbour states, while a minority settled in the Golf states, the USA and Europe. Their poor integration into most Arab societies results from the fact that the Arab regimes made political use of the refugee question and thus were not interested in the permanent absorption of the Palestinians. Furthermore the refugees have served as a reservoir for the recruitment of Palestinian national movements. The acceptance of the Palestinian right of return would turn Israel into a bi-national state what is refused by the majority of the Israelis. Thus, a solution to the problem would demand the recognition of the right of return from the side of Israel as well as a commitment to take a certain quota of Palestinians who want to return and accept to live in Israel. Every other host country would also be required to determine a quota for the Palestinian immigration and Palestine itself would be open to any Palestinian and there should be inducements for those who decide to settle in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 82-87)

2.2.5. National and Religious Monuments in Jerusalem and the Identificatory Meaning of the Territory

All three monotheistic religions regard Jerusalem as Holy City and thus it is extremely disputed even beyond the main conflict parties. While the Palestinians have laid a claim to East Jerusalem as the capital of their future state, Israel has been adamant that the whole city shall stay under its sovereignty and be the capital of Israel. Thus, all Israeli parties have agreed to pursue a policy of confiscation, discrimination and isolation vis-à-vis the Palestinians in East Jerusalem in order to bolster the Israeli claims. A dismantling of the settlements there is politically unthinkable. The religiously meaningful old town of Jerusalem accommodates holy sites of the Christians, the Jews and the Muslims and thus there exists a compromise proposal to put the historic centre under a special international regime, but this has been refused by Israel until today. (cp.

Johannsen, 2011, pp. 77-82) For the Jewish-Israeli as well as the Arab-Palestinian population, the territory of today's State of Israel and the Palestinian Territories are of enormous religious and cultural identificatory interest. Therefore, the conflict is not a conflict about power but about identity. (cp. Al-Ayed, 13/01/2010)

3. Strategic Environment

3.1. Internal Environment: National Movements in Palestine

The Palestinian political field has been characterised by a large variety of parties and movements whereby the considerable political actors convened under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) or were subgroups of the Muslim Brotherhood among which only Hamas gained central importance.

3.1.1. Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)

3.1.1.1. Context of Establishment

The physical dispersal of the Palestinian people had diverse effects on the future Palestinian political scene. On the one hand, it dissolved former loyalties and family ties and, on the other hand, it confronted the Palestinians with the respective power and belief systems they found in their new places of residence. These factors probably laid the basis for the political fractioning and the slow reactivation of an independent Palestinian nationalism. While Zionism was the catalyst for this nationalism, the existence of Israel became the actuator of a radical policy change in the Arab World. The old leadership lost credibility due to its failure and coup d´états were legitimised by the readiness to fight against the new enemy Israel that was identified as a symbol of imperialism and colonialism. Instead of proving the before claimed solidarity, each of the new Arab regimes prioritised the consolidation of its own power.

However, within the region, the conviction arose that only a radical change in the conditions within the Arab countries and collaboration could bring success and thus manifested in the Arab Nationalist Movement under the leadership of George Habash in 1958. Against the background of previous political successes, the movement approved Nasser's claim to leadership in the Arab world and at the same time refused communism.

Only political stagnation of the pan-Arab concept after 1958 forced the movement to adopt a new ideological approach, namely the concept of mobilisation of the masses. This new stream led by Nayef Hawatmeh emphasised economic and social tenors more than pure political nationalism and became even more popular after the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in 1961. This led to the adoption of more Marxist-Leninist approaches by the movement but without giving up its ties to Nasserism. Only after the defeat of the Arab states in 1967, Nasserism was abandoned and the diverse local branches of the Arab Nationalist Movement became independent political groups headed by a new, mostly well educated generation of leaders. Among its organisational and ideological successor groups were the DFLP, the PFLP, the PFLP-GC and the PLF.

Pan-Arabism did not prove to be a solution to the Middle East conflict because its political dynamics did not correspond to the socio-economic conditions in the Arab countries and because the elites in the Arab countries were not ready to give up their claims to power. The war of 1967 forced Arab leaders, who were no longer able to exercise custodianship on the Palestinians, to modify their political standpoints. So the new common attitude did no longer focus on the solution of the Palestinian question through Arab unity but that the liberation of Palestine would lead to Arab unity. Thus, Palestinian nationalism and self-determined armed struggle were considered the solution to the problem what was embodied by Al-Fatah. (cp. Lüders, 1982, pp. 40-47)

Although the Palestine Liberation Organization was already founded in 1964 at the Arab summit in Cairo at the instigation of Nasser, who aimed at controlling Palestinian activities in the Middle East, it only managed to become an umbrella organisation for the different Palestinian political groups as a consequence of Al-Fatah's takeover in 1969. Thus, the PLO became a reservoir of different political streams within the Palestinian society and an independent dynamic actor vis-à-vis the Arab regimes in the Middle East. (cp. Lüders, 1982, pp. 58-60)

3.1.1.2. Strategic Objectives, Aims and Ideological Orientation

Before Al-Fatah assumed the leadership, the PLO was only one organisation among many others that pursued the objective of liberating Palestine without defining a clear strategy. Furthermore, the PLO was financed by the Arab League and promised not to

interfere in internal matters of the Arab countries. According to its National Charta of 1964, it did not demand Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank that was annexed by Jordan or the Gaza Strip that was administered by Egypt. Its Palestine Liberation Army was comprised of Palestinians and soldiers from the Egyptian, the Iraqi and the Syrian army in order to avoid unauthorised actions. Therefore, the PLO confined itself to inflammatory propaganda against Jews. This goal reflects the dependence of the PLO on Nasser and the Arab League.

Only when Al-Fatah and other political groups recognised that the PLO was an institution that offered the possibility to represent Palestinian concerns on an official basis, it adopted the aim of transforming the PLO into a sheer Palestinian advocacy group. Thus, Al-Fatah and some smaller resistance groups took part in the Meeting of the Palestinian National Council of the PLO in 1968 in which the Palestinian National Charta was changed in order to enshrine the armed battle as means to liberate Palestine which at the same time implied the goal of the destruction of Israel. (cp. Lüders, 1982, pp. 58-61)

Thus, the PLO served as umbrella organisation for various groups with different ideological orientation. At that time, the fractions within the Palestinian political sphere followed three main tendencies:

- The *Pan-Arabists* still advocated the liberation of Palestine through the common efforts of all Arab countries and did not consider Palestine to be an independent nation but part of the Arab nation. This view also included Pan-Islamic ideas and was represented by groups that were dependent on Syria or Iraq.

- The *Palestinian nationalists* demanded to liberate Palestine under their own power and thus rejected the Pan-Arabic ideology although the sovereign Palestinian struggle was seen as part of an overall Arab aspiration. Therefore the Arab countries were expected to offer help and support for the Palestinian cause. This ideology was mainly represented by Al-Fatah.

- *Radicals* considered the fight against Israel as part of the global confrontation of the Third World against imperialism and capitalism that allowed them to expand their action space even beyond the Middle East. Thus, supporters of this idea

> advocated that the liberation of Palestine would only be possible when the prevalent conditions in the reactionary Arab countries were reversed. Groups like the PFLP that represented this ideology were often directly dependent upon states they already considered to be progressive like Jordan or Lebanon.

But in general, all these ideologies did not serve as basic concept for the Palestinian paramilitary groups but rather posed an expression of the self-interest in the self-perception of the Palestinian refugee existence. Ideology thus served as means of mobilisation, explanation and legitimation of the violent policies promoted by the various movements. (cp. Schiller, 1982, pp. 284-286)

In September 1969, the Palestinian National Council announced the goal of the establishment of a democratic secular state on the whole territory of Palestine in which inhabitants regardless of their religion should have the same rights as political aim of the PLO while the recognition of Israel had not been an issue at all.

The Palestinian concept of peoples' liberation war on the basis of guerrilla tactics undermined the position of the leading Arab elites by demanding the support of the Arab masses and revolutionary activity. Further, guerrilla attacks on Israel from the territory of Arab neighbouring states provoked Israeli retaliation. Thus, the Arab countries prioritised the restoration of the territorial status quo before the war of June 1967 over revolutionary aims. Therefore, some fractions of the PLO like the PFLP or the DFLP started to demand the elimination of subversive leaders and regimes like the King of Jordan in order to transform the country into a revolutionary basis for the peoples' war against Israel which led to the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan. Palestinian political groups also aimed at the internationalisation of the conflict by committing violent attacks that attracted international attention to the Palestinian demands.

But after the war in 1973, which strengthened the internal position of the regimes in Egypt and Syria, the PLO was obliged to abandon its social revolutionary aims. In return, the Arab countries recognised the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Thus, the countries assisted the PLO in becoming an acceptable actor on the level of international diplomacy. Since that time, the aim of a revolutionary change in the Middle East has only been kept alive as an ideology and serves the PLO leadership as basis of legitimation and integration.

In June 1973, the PLO adopted its Ten Point Programme in which it had stated its readiness to establish an independent Palestinian state on each liberated part of Palestine and herewith signalled its willingness to content with a state on only parts of the territory of former Palestine. Officially, the PLO argued that this objective was only the first step towards the establishment of the democratic secular state what could be considered as concession to the hardliners within the PLO. The PLO experienced its international breakthrough despite the establishment of a front of non-compliance within the PLO itself consisting of the ALF, the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, the PPSP, and after its establishment in 1977, the PLF. Yasser Arafat even advocated the legitimate Palestinian rights at the UN General Assembly.

However, after the involvement of the PLO in the Lebanese civil war, which started in 1975, and the completion of the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel, the PLO announced its readiness to take part in any conference or international forum that was concerned with the conflict in the Middle East which was a clear sign of willingness to negotiate. In 1978, the PLO announced its readiness to recognise Israel in return of the establishment of a Palestinian state on the Occupied Territories and thus endorsed the so-called two-state solution. But the front of resistance within the PLO undermined this concept by pursuing armed struggle against Israel as well as against Al-Fatah in Lebanon. (cp. Lüders, 1982, pp. 60-69) Despite these obstacles, the new standpoint of the PLO leadership had been a major evolution of the Palestinian position in the conflict but did not lead to any change in Israeli or US American attitudes towards the basic issues at stake nor did it initiate peace talks. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 195)

The Islamic revolution of Iran in 1978/79 was another event that revealed the flexibility and exchangeability of the political ideologies within the Palestinian political sphere. There arose new interest in Islamic traditionalist streams which led to the renunciation from left revolutionary or anti-imperialist ideas respectively Marxist or Maoist theories used before in the PLO propaganda. With the new-found religious elements even lower layers of the population could be mobilised for the struggle against the Western state Israel. But the internal structures of the PLO groups were dominated more by networks of loyalty than by ideological principles. (cp. Schiller, 1982, pp. 286-288) In sum, the main aims of the PLO during between 1974 and 1982 when it was displaced from Lebanon were the preservation of its political status, the resolution of the conflict through the

weakening of Israeli political will and the defence of its headquarters in Beirut. (cp. Sayigh, 1986, p. 101)

During the First Intifada, the aim of the new local leadership in the Occupied Territories, the UNLU, was mainly to break the dependency on Israel as a first step towards the establishment of a state.

When King Hussein of Jordan refused all claims on the West Bank in 1988, Yasser Arafat proclaimed the Palestinian independence and negotiated with the Marxist PLO groups, the DFLP and the PFLP, ways for a political transformation into a moderate force that would deny all radical and revolutionary positions. The failure of the Intifada to cast off the occupation and achieve independence led to the redefinition of aims that now focused on the re-establishment of the Palestinian political agenda on the international level and the strengthening of the Palestinian identity. The Intifada enabled residents of the Occupied Territories to exercise more influence on the PLO's political position and pushed it towards the acceptance of Israel and the two-state solution, the abandonment of armed struggle in the course of the Intifada and the participation in US-sponsored peace talks with Israel in spite of the formal exclusion of the PLO. On the ideological level, the First Intifada even strengthened the future role of Islam in Palestinian politics that had developed to an accurate alternative to European-style nationalism. Especially in the Gaza Strip, Islamic organisations challenged the worldview of the more secular PLO and the Unified Leadership. (cp. Kimmerling/Migdal, 2003, pp. 296-308)

Since the break of the unity government of the PLO and Hamas and the consequent takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 2007, the PLO has been under pressure to reconcile with Hamas because the majority of the Palestinians does not support a three-state solution with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip being established as individual states alongside Israel and still demands an independent Palestinian state based on the pre-1967 borders. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 105)

3.1.1.3. Internal Structure and Mobilisation Capacity

Since the PLO has had the function of an umbrella organisation, there are various PLO member parties for which reason this chapter will examine their structure, orientation and capacity to mobilise followers more closely.

Al-Fatah: After leaving Cairo, Yasser Arafat, later called Abu Ammar, together with his fellow students, among them Salah Chalaf alias Amu Ijad, Chalil Al-Wazir alias Abu Dschihad, Mohammed Jussuf en-Nadshar alias Abu Jussef and Faruq Qaddumi alias Abu Al-Lutf, founded Al-Fatah in Kuwait on 10 October 1959. The name Al-Fatah means opening or victory and is a reverse acronym of its full name Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Watani Al-Filastin that can be translated as Palestinian National Liberation Movement. In its early days, Al-Fatah was a secret organisation that was threatened by the intelligence services of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The organisation was built around the following main pillars:

- The Palestinian resistance movement had to act independently from the influence of its Arab host countries because the movement and not the Arab League were considered to be in charge of liberating Palestine. On the other hand, Al-Fatah would not interfere in inner matters of its host countries to make sure not to menace the unity of the Arab faction against its enemy.
- Palestinian resistance should not suffer from internal disunity that reduced its combat power. Therefore it presented itself as a national non-party movement for all ideological streams. Ideological disputes shall not to paralyze political pragmatism and revolutionary dynamics.

Al-Fatah's leaders drew back on idols that fought in revolutionary movements of the Third World like in Vietnam or Algeria because those movements in contrast to many others did not wait for the emergence of a mass movement, but initially started their guerrilla fight. This liberating power of revolutionary violence should politicise and mobilise the people in Palestine as well.

The main goal of Al-Fatah was the destruction of the Zionist State of Israel with armed fight as the tactical and strategic instrument for its realisation. Tactical, militant actions should make the world public aware of the Palestinian faith while on the strategic level, guerrilla fight aimed at inspiring the masses and mobilising people in the refugee camps as well as in the cities of Al-Fatah's host countries for a revolutionary peoples' war. Al-Fatah considered the liberation of its homeland as the central aim of the pan-Arab nation and itself as the catalyst of union. Therewith the movement stood in fundamental contradiction to Nasser and the Ba'ath parties in the Arab countries that postulated the

reverse chronological order: first the pan-Arab union, then the liberation of Palestine with cumulative force. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 186-188)

Al-Fatah constructed a national infrastructure that enabled it to carry out armed struggle as well as to sustain independent Palestinian politics. The organisation managed to widen its circle of supporters by issuing a journal called "Filastinuna" ("Our Palestine") and retaining its military capabilities by allying with Syria. The main characteristics of Al-Fatah were its young members, mainly students and workers, what made it significantly different to the composition and orientation of former traditional Palestinian parties. Here the absence of an articulated ideology within Al-Fatah was an important feature. There was only the consensus that Palestine had to be liberated and Israel destroyed as well as that there was no room for Jews in the Middle East who had arrived on the territory after World War I. Therefore, the program could not be properly defined as being left or right on the political spectrum or associated with any post-colonial ideologies. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 163-164)

During its first phase of existence, Al-Fatah only had a few hundred activists and supporters within the Palestinian middle class and thus focused on mobilising followers in Kuwait as well as in the refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. After the successful independence war of Algeria that was based on guerrilla tactics, Al-Fatah received support for its purposes from the Algerian state. Al-Fatah opened an office in Algiers and received deliveries of arms. Also the regimes in Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia decided to offer support to Al-Fatah in order to narrow Nasser's influence on the conflict. Under the pressure of competition with other guerrilla groups, Al-Fatah's military wing, Al-Assifah, commenced the armed fight against Israel in 1965 in order to increase its popularity. Al-Fatah had its final breakthrough after the successful Battle of Karameh in 1968, which was followed by an enormous increase in party members and volunteers to fight against Israel. In 1969, Al-Fatah was powerful enough to take over the control over the PLO. The organisation constructed huge arms depots in Jordan and in Lebanon and established social infrastructure like hospitals or schools in the refugee camps.

From that time on, Al-Fatah's activities and operations have been led by the Central Committee consisting of four historic leaders and six other activists who are in direct control of Al-Assifah. The Committee has been controlled by the 40 members of the

Revolutionary Council. They are elected by the General Congress during which 200 to 300 activists of Al-Fatah meet every 3 years. (cp. Lüders, 1982, pp. 52-57)

After Al-Fatah was expelled from Jordan as direct consequence of the civil war, members of the military wing of Al-Fatah formed the group Black September in order to commit acts of retaliation against the Jordanian government and attacks on Israeli associated aims abroad until its dissolution 1974. Al-Fatah, which was influenced by the revolutionary dynamics of other PLO groups, adopted a more world revolutionary course and Iraq and Libya started to play a more important role in financial, ideological and personnel matters of the movement.

At that time the regular military strength of Al-Fatah was about 7,000 to 9,000 fighters but the level and quality of their military training differed among the various formations. The fact that Al-Fatah did not exist as a party but as a revolutionary movement made it difficult to create a stable organisational structure. The headquarters of the organisation had to be moved to different countries over time and fissions within the movement were unavoidable.

Sabri Khalil Al-Banna, the former leader of Al-Fatah in Iraq, founded his breakaway faction, the *Abu Nidal Organisation*, in 1974 with the support of the Iraqi regime. After the debacle in the civil war in Lebanon the group became widely known as Black June and served as reservoir for radicals of Al-Fatah, the PFLP and former members of Black September. The group committed terrorist attacks including acts of retaliation against PLO institutions and diplomatic facilities of Arab states. (cp. Schiller, 1982, pp. 300-302)

In 1983, another splinter group of Al-Fatah was established by Said Al-Muragha, alias Abu Musa. His group called *Fatah al-Intifada* has remained committed to armed struggle to reach the liberation of Palestine and thus has never joined the PLO but has stayed under Syrian control. (cp. Terrorist Organization Profile)

Although Al-Fatah had reconsidered its position towards Israel, it exhibited only limited commitment to the peace process. In 1995, Yasser Arafat and the leadership of Al-Fatah set up the unofficial militia Tanzim in order to pose a counterweight the increasing influence of the armed wings of Palestinian Islamist groups. (cp. Cordesman, 2005, p. 37) Only in 2000 at the beginning of the Second Intifada, there evolved a new militant network of autonomous West Bank militias called Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade that is

affiliated to Al-Fatah. It committed attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers in the Occupied Territories and later also on civilians inside Israel. Although the network is affiliated to Al-Fatah it seems unlikely that it operates on the order of the Al-Fatah leadership. In October 2005, the Palestinian Prime Minister, Ahmed Qureia, presented a proposal that envisions the incorporation of members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade into the official Palestinian security forces. (cp. Fletcher, 02/04/2008)

In 2009, Al-Fatah published its political programme, The Political Platform, in which it affirms its objectives: the liberation of the homeland, the ending of settler occupation and the attaining of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. It also explained that although its revolutionary struggle was launched by armed struggle, it was never confined to this method and thus stressed the meaning of peaceful resistance in Al-Fatah's struggle for a Palestinian state. (cp. The Political Platform, 2009, pp. 12-13)

The PFLP and its splinter groups: The Arab nationalist Al-Qawmiyyun Al-Arab, another Palestinian organisation, founded in 1951 in Beirut, profited from the upheavals in the region. This leftist refugee movement led by George Habash expanded into a significant force after 1956 by supporting Nasser's policies. It retained close ties with the Syrian regime after the disruption of the United Arab Republic. Therefore the group was coached by the Syrian military intelligence and pursued the goal of revolutionising the whole Arab world rather than liberating only Palestine. In the mid 1960s, members of the group formed a proper guerrilla organisation named *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)* with focus on the armed struggle against Israel. (cp. Pappe, 2010, p. 164)

But already in 1967, a first split within the PFLP occurred and resulted in the establishment of the militant Palestinian *Popular Struggle Front (PPSF)* that never reached considerable influence within the Palestinian political sphere.

At the end of 1968, Ahmed Jibril left the PFLP due to internal ideological disputes between George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh. Thus, Jibril established the *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC)* which was dependent on Syria but had an enormous military strength in relation to its small number of members. When the PFLP-GC later joined the front of rejection against the peace

negotiations with Israel, it left the PLO and since that time did not resume its membership.

In 1969, the internal rivalries within the PFLP led to another split because Habash, who had become increasingly influenced by Marxism-Leninism, and his followers took violent measures against Hawatmeh and his supporters who were followers of Trotskyite socialism. While Habash focused more on the pan-Arab dimension of the Palestinian struggle, Hawatmeh established the *Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)* that stressed the need for a social reorientation. Like the PFLP, the new DFLP was backed and financed by the Syrian regime. Although both parties focus on peoples' war against Zionism, imperialism and reactionary Arab regimes based on Marxist-Leninist ideologies, the main difference between the groups is that the DFLP has been convinced, that the Palestinian question could also be solved politically. This had been totally rejected by the PFLP that has committed itself to its radical maximalist demands. Thus, the concept of a democratic secular state in Palestine for Jews and Arabs was introduced into the political programme of the PLO on the initiative of the DFLP. While the PFLP aimed at drawing international attention on Palestine through operations abroad, the DFLP never became internationally active although it also committed attacks on Israel. The combat strength of the PFLP never exceeded 2,000 to 3,000 fighters but it had advantage over the weaker DFLP.

In 1973, the DFLP even demanded the establishment of a national authority on all freed territories what came close to the concept of establishing a Palestinian state in only the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The DFLP had close ties to socialist states because its party programme corresponded mainly to that of other communist parties while the PFLP's relations to the Soviet Union were rather tense until the end of the 1970s. But due to their radical and consequent ideologies the PFLP as well as the DFLP were judged critically by the leaders of the Arab states and thus never reached the level of influence Al-Fatah could exercise in inter-Arab relations.

In 1977, Mohammed Abdel Abbas alias Abu Abbas and Talaat Yacoup left the PFLP-GC and founded the *Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)* because in contrary to Jibril they were sceptical about the Syrian intervention into the Lebanese civil war and in general paid more attention to political and ideological tenors than Jibril. (cp. Lüders, 1982, pp. 48-51)

In 1978, a minor breakaway faction of the PFLP, called *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Special Command (PFLP-SC)*, was established but never joined the PLO.

The *Palestinian Democratic Union*, also known as *FIDA*, was established as a splinter faction of the DFLP in 1990 and headed by Yasser Abed Rabbo who was replaced in 2002 by Saleh Raafat. The party has advocated pluralism and democracy within the Palestinian political arena and has supported a two-state solution with Israel and thus also the Oslo Accords. (cp. Homepage of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center: Palestine Democratic Union (FIDA), 10/07/2012)

The PLO leftist factions suffered an enormous set-back after the collapse of the Soviet Union since it deprived them of their superpower backer and their ideology. Thus, the PFLP and the DFLP which were in an extremely weak power political position best secured their organisational survival by remaining part of the PLO that assured their funding. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, p. 99)

Since the above-mentioned parties adapted their goals and tactics to the political developments over time, today they pursue new strategies. The most important factions are still actively involved in the politics of the PLO respectively in the PNA institutions and modified their strategies accordingly. The *PFLP* advocates a peaceful way and its leadership regards it as necessary to understand that the USA will never be ready to agree to the minimum national ambitions of the Palestinians. Therefore, it requests a new form of negotiations with Israel which should be realised as international conference at the UN Security Council in which all relevant forces including Hamas shall be involved. (cp. Shehade, 21/09/2010) Also the *DFLP*, which had been the first Palestinian party that called for a negotiated settlement to the conflict, still advocates negotiations with Israel on the basis of the UN-resolutions but identifies the negligence of the resolutions as well as the unilateral US sponsorship for Israel as main obstacles for that way. Thus, it demands the recognition of the validity of commitments made earlier in the peace process as well as a concentration in the negotiations on the sovereignty of a future Palestinian state instead of only focussing on its viability. (cp. Abu Laila, 21/09/2010) The PLF calls for a coordinated strategy of negotiations and public resistance without weapons like demonstrations. Furthermore, an international isolation and pressurisation of Israel should take place to reach the implementation of the UN-resolutions. (cp. Abu Youssef, 19/09/2010) The *PPSF* is a minor socialist faction of the PLO with only limited influence

on the politics of the PLO while the PFLP namely the *PFLP-GC* still refuses peace negotiations with Israel and therefore is not a member of the PLO and regarded as terrorist organisation by many Western countries.

The Palestinian People's Party (PPP): The PPP was established in 1982 as Palestinian Communist Party and since then has been a non-militant faction of the PLO. Today, it is a social democratic party and advocates of a negotiated settlement with Israel. But its leadership refuses further negotiations without a stop of Israeli settlements and without any commitments from the Israeli side. Thus, negotiations should take place under the umbrella of the UNO because in bilateral negotiations Israel is in a position to veto any decision point. Furthermore, the PPP supports the Palestinian request for UN membership and full recognition of the Palestine on the borders of 1967. On the other hand, alternative solutions should be taken into consideration like a one-state solution because according to the party leadership the Palestinian cause is about self-determination no matter in which frame. (cp. As-Salhi, 19/09/2010)

Baathist Groups: Also in 1968, a new party called *Al-Saiqa* emerged out of an organisation that was initiated by the socialist Syrian Baath Party as its branch in Palestine. Within a short period of time, the group was in possession of huge military capacities and a great number of activists. But due to its dependence on Syria it lost credibility after the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976.

One year after the founding of Al-Saiqa, the Iraqi branch of the socialist Baath Party established a Palestinian branch called *Arab Liberation Front (ALF)* which never reached the strength and influence of its Syrian-led counterpart. (cp. Lüders, 1982, pp. 50-51) Another rather insignificant Iraqi Baathist group that became a member of the PLO is the *Palestinian Arab Front (PAF)* that was established as a splinter group of the ALF only in 1993.

The military mobilisation capacity of today's considerable PLO factions is almost impossible to elicit. Hence, the following figure shows an overview of the estimated military and paramilitary strength of the central PLO factions:

- *"Palestinian National Liberation Army (PNLA)/Al-Fatah - 5,000-8,000 active and semi-active reserves that make up main pro-Arafat force, based in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen under the tight control of the host government.*

- *Fatah Tanzim - Claims to have tens of thousands of members, aged 20-35, most of them residents of Palestinian autonomous territories, and recruited in Universities, established in 1995 and led by Chairman Yasser Arafat.*

- *Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (al Aqsa) – unknown strength, emerged in 2000, has disputed links to Arafat's Fatah, based in Israel, West Bank and Gaza, and may have members in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.*

- *Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Abu Abbas Faction - 300-400 men led by Abu Abbas, based in Iraq.*

- *Arab Liberation Front (ALF) - 300-400 men based in Lebanon and Iraq.*

- *Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) - 400-600 men led by Naif Hawatmeh, which claims eight battalions, and is based in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere.*

- *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) - 800 men led by George Habash, based in Syria, Lebanon, West Bank, and Gaza.*

- *Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PSF) - 600-700 men led by Samir Ghawsha and Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, based in Syria."* (Cordesman, 2005, p. 166)[24]

The institutional setup of the PLO is based on a manifold structure comprising the following **bodies of the PLO:**

- **Palestine National Council (PNC):** The Palestine National Council was established in 1964 as the PLO's legislative-body-in-exile in which all Palestinian groups are represented but the exact number of its members is fluctuating. Until 1978 the PNC meetings took place once a year but later the intervals extended. In its function as de facto parliament of the Palestinians, the PNC adopted and later amended the Palestinian National Charta.

- **Executive Committee (EC):** The Executive Committee is the central executive authority of the PLO and after the proclamation of the Palestinian state in 1988 it became widely known as the Palestinian government-in-exile. The 18 members of the Executive Committee are elected by the PNC and hold different responsibilities similar to those of ministers in a government. The last elections took place in 1996 but some members had to be replaced in the meeting of the PNC in 2009. The Executive Committee elects the PLO Chairman who then becomes head of the PLO executive.

- **Palestine Central Council (PCC):** The Palestine Central Council was installed in 1973 and serves as steering board of the PLO when the PNC by which it is elected is in recess. The meetings of the 91 members of the PCC (including the members of the EC) take place every 6 months.

- **Palestine Liberation Army (PLA):** The Palestine Liberation Army was installed in 1964 and has served as the official military wing of the PLO. After the signing

[24] The table inserted above shows numbers mentioned in reports of the U.S. Department of State adapted by Antony H. Cordesman and originally referred to the state of play in 2000. Upon the request of the author of the recent study, a PLO representative and political-military insider, who wishes to remain anonymous, has appraised that the numbers might be accurate for the year 2000 as well as for recent times due to their imprecision and high range of variation in the numbers. Thus, the recent work considers the figure as reference values for the further academic work.

of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, the PLA units were incorporated into the national guard of the Palestinian Authority. [25]

- **Force 17:** The Force 17 was established as a consequence of the Black September in Jordan in 1970 when violent internal disputes threatened to split the PLO. The elite unit was tasked with the protection of the leadership of Al-Fatah but later expanded its field of action to operations inside Israel, liquidations of Arafat's opponents and the commitment of attacks that served the political aims of Al-Fatah.

- **Palestine National Fund (PNF):** The Palestine National Fund is financed by three- to six-per cent taxes on incomes of Palestinians as well as through donations of Arab countries and has its headquarters in Amman. The fund is the Palestinian treasury and also serves social purposes like help to wounded or support for the families of killed resistance fighters. (cp. Eichenseder, 2000, pp. 250-254)

Although the **Unified Leadership** is not a body of the PLO, it became an important institution with close ties to the PLO. The Unified Leadership emerged during the first six months of the First Intifada in 1987 when residents of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank instigated active resistance from within the Occupied Territories. In order to avoid open rifts with these young leaders, the PLO incorporated the Unified Leadership and some observers argue that it became the local political and activist arm of the PLO. (cp. Kimmerling/Migdal, 2003, pp. 304-305)

In the absence of a fully institutionalised system of legitimate representation, Yasser Arafat as chairman of the PLO used benefits, material inducements and jobs in the above-mentioned bodies to secure the loyalty of subordinates and to co-opt opponents. Although the set-up of new political institutions in 1994 within the framework of the **Palestinian National Authority (PNA)** enhanced the level of institutionalisation within

[25] PLA units stationed in Syria remained active under their host country's control and did not become part of the PNA forces. Until today, Palestinian refugees in Syria do their military service in the Syrian PLA.

the Palestinian political arena, it did not end neopatrimonialism as basis of Arafat's rule. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, p. 98) Originally, the PNA was meant to serve as interim government of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the leadership of the PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. During the phase of the establishment of the PNA, the PLO underwent a complex transformation process. It converted from a revolutionary movement towards a state-establishing administrative body. For that reason the PLO had to transform from a loose coalition of independent guerrilla groups into a government tasked with imposing discipline and stemming Palestinian terrorism directed towards Israeli civilians. The PNA's difficult responsibility was the initiation of a state-building process under the most unfavourable circumstances. Members of the PNA were tasked with the construction of the foundations of a future state and of the structures of a new society. Thus, its main functions were the maintenance of stability, the promotion of economic development and the establishment of social institutions. Some of this administrative work had been executed by the Israeli civil administration before and was simply taken over by the PNA. But all these tasks had to be fulfilled under enormous time pressure during a period of extreme turbulent events and against the background of not having full power over the own territory or control over Palestinian borders while Israel was supervising security. Many officials lacked training, experience and reliability and due to few natural resources and little help from the side of the Arab states, the PNA was dependent on donors. But the most complicated task of the PNA has remained reaching a peace agreement with Israel. (cp. Rubin, 1999, pp. 1-7) Its bodies comprise the following institutions:

- **The President:** The President of the PNA is directly elected by the Palestinian people and also holds the position of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In January 1996, Yasser Arafat, the charismatic leader of the PLO, was elected first Palestinian President and thus became the head of the PNA. Double-hatted as president and chairman of the PLO, Arafat possessed all power within the Palestinian political scene and completely refused to delegate it. Thus, all newly created democratic institutions remained subordinate to the head of the executive. However, Arafat did not impose his will by tyrannical means but based his leadership style on balancing and manoeuvring between the different political fractions. Summing up, it can be said that the PLO under Yasser Arafat had

neither introduced a dictatorship nor real democracy. (cp. Rubin, 1999, pp. 4-5) Today this function is held by President Mahmoud Abbas.

- **The Cabinet:** The Cabinet, also first invested in 1996, is headed by the Palestinian Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President. All ministers of the cabinet proposed by the Prime Minister as well as he himself must be approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council upon entering into office. Since the break of the national unity government of the PLO and Hamas in 2007, Salam Fayyad, leader of the party Third Way, occupies the office of the Palestinian Prime Minister and thus is head of 17 ministers and one Cabinet Secretary. (cp. Homepage of the Palestine Cabinet, 2011)

- **Palestine Legislative Council (PLC):** On 20 January 1996, the first election for the Palestine Legislative Council, the Palestinian unicameral parliament, took place and the first session of the 88 elected members was held in March that year. The function of the PLC is to balance the power of the executive branch and to create a legal framework for the regulation of the PNA behaviour. But Yasser Arafat was also part of the legislative branch as the 89th member of the PLC and claimed to be its head as well. Within the PLC there were no well-organised fractions with parliamentary discipline for voting but members of Al-Fatah posed a distinct majority within the PLC. (cp. Rubin, 1999, pp. 27-28) In 2005, the PLC passed a new electoral law that increased the number of parliamentary seats from 88 to 132 before holding parliamentary elections in 2006. Hamas, which is not a member party of the PLO, initially took part in these elections and gained the majority of the 132 seats. Al-Fatah emerged as the second strongest party while all other PLO groups did not gain a relevant number of seats. The election results reflected the power struggle between Hamas and Al-Fatah that led to the break of the national unity government in 2007 which was composed of both parties. (cp. Beck, 2006, pp. 2-3) Since that time the PLC has been unable to fulfil its duties because of the internal conflict of Hamas and Al-Fatah and the indefinite postponement of elections. An agreement between the PLO and Hamas reached in 2011 envisions the formation of an interim government of independent technocrats and new legislative and presidential elections in Palestine by May 2012. (cp. Der Standard, 07/08/2011)

3.1.1.4. Infrastructure and Resources

According to Rachel Ehrenfeld, the PLO has had nine principal sources of income comprising official contributions from Arab states, the Palestinian Liberation Tax Fund that has collected 3,5 to 5 per cent taxes on the income of Palestinians worldwide, donations from wealthy Palestinians and international organisations like the UNO and the EU, support from charitable organisations, income from legitimate and illegitimate investments, so-called protection charges paid by companies and states in order to prevent them from becoming targets of terrorism, illegal trafficking in arms, fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, drug trafficking and other criminal activities. (cp. Ehrenfeld, 2003, pp. 72-73)

In the 1960s and 1970s, the PLO was highly dependent on donations from Arab countries that wanted to continue their confrontation with Israel through the organisation. The various PLO fractions needed financial sources in order to recruit members who were paid by the parties equally to local workers for their membership and loyalty. Thus, Yasser Arafat soon recognised that a strong financial base was indispensable for the flourishing of his organisation. Therefore, the Palestine Martyrs Works Society, known as SAMED, was established in Beirut after the PLO expulsion from Jordan to give the PLO a pathway for its business development. The SAMED stood under direct control of Al-Fatah and became the economic arm of the military forces. The institution was originally designed to offer the children of martyrs of the Palestinian revolution a possibility to work and as a nucleus for the economic structure of a future Palestinian state. But in reality it took advantage of the large workforce in the refugee camps to enable the PLO to be self-funding and independent from outside donations. It established social and industrial infrastructure based on the initial help of sympathetic governments like those of East Germany, the Soviet Union or Romania. Hence, it quickly expanded to cover a wide area of industrial production. The PLO also realised the key to Lebanese economy was the control of its ports through which most raw materials were imported. Thus, the PLO fractions took over the control over the ports and collected bribes and taxes. Furthermore, they established more and more profitable enterprises and businesses or controlled local firms secretly or through the installation of Palestinians in management positions. The PLO's control over the Lebanese economy enabled the organisation to exercise considerable political authority.

During the PLO's residence in Lebanon, further income sources were bank robberies in Beirut that was the financial centre of the Middle East at that time. Although all financial institutions in Beirut's Street of Banks, except of the Arab Bank, had been robbed, the most lucrative operation was the robbery of the Beirut branch of the British Bank of the Middle East by members of the PLO, the Lebanese Phalange forces and some Italian safe-breakers in 1976. This operation contributed significantly to the growing wealth and status of the PLO. Some PLO parties like the PFLP gained financial resources not only from investment and criminal acts in Lebanon but also from ransom paid for the release of hijacked international planes. Until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, only the SAMED owned thirty five factories in Lebanon and several businesses abroad and had a turnover of $ 45 million per year. Although much of its infrastructure had been destroyed by the Israeli invasion, it could be relocated to Algeria, Tunisia and Syria. (cp. Adams, 1986, pp. 85-99)

Especially the international legitimation of the PLO as representative of the Palestinians enabled the PLO to obtain further financial backing from countries such as the Soviet Union and its satellites in Europe, from Latin American and African states as well as from members of the Arab League. This money enabled the PLO to conduct an international propaganda campaign to increase its popularity and influence.

In 1983, the PLO adopted the decision to exploit the drug trade for funding under the chairmanship of Yasser Arafat at a secret emergency session of the Finance Committee in Algiers. According to a Reader's Digest article published that year and cited by Rachel Ehrenfeld, the PLO purchased around 40 per cent of its light infantry weapons with money gained from heroin, hashish or morphine base produced by laboratories under Syrian and PLO control. A CIA report of 1990 estimated the PLO wealth accumulated through drug trafficking, arms smuggling and money laundering or counterfeiting accounted to between $ 8 and $ 14 billion. In 1993/94, the British National Criminal Intelligence Services estimated the annual income of the PLO to $ 1.5 to $ 2 billion. The organisation made investments in farms, industrial plants, clothing and weapon factories, real estate, media companies, duty free shops and even airlines.

The establishment of the PNA enabled the PLO to obtain financial aid not only from Arab countries but also from the international donor community, especially the UNO, the USA and the EU. From the Oslo Accords until 2003, the estimated amount of international aid

to the PNA was around $ 5.5 billion. Furthermore, the PNA was in possession of various monopoly positions within the Palestinian economy such as the control over basic goods like cement, petro, wood, wheat or cigarettes. There is evidence that some part of the money was misused by the PLO in order to finance terrorism or support the families of so-called martyrs. Moreover, the PNA faced regularly charges of corruption and theft of medicine and food supplies donated by the UNRWA or Arab countries. (cp. Ehrenfeld, 2003, pp. 72-90) From mid-2007 until the end of the first quarter of 2012, the PNA was dependent on more than $ 3 billion in direct foreign donor assistance to its budget and it will continue to rely on economic donor aid. (cp. CIA World Fact Book, last updated 11/04/2012)

Regarding the acquisition of weaponry the Palestinian factions faced an enormous challenge in the initial phase of the Palestinian armed struggle. In the aftermath of the war in 1956, Al-Fatah was able to collect and store several outdated or rusted arms, but it needed further military equipment and thus tried to find ways for further arms purchase in order to conduct guerrilla warfare. (cp. Frangi, 1982, p. 134) Especially the defeat of the Arab armies in the war of 1967 underlined the necessity to intensify the Palestinian armed struggle for which reason Palestinian commandos collected arms and ammunition from the battlefields and stored them in Jordan. Al-Fatah representatives sought support from Arab countries, which led to the set-up of training camps in Damascus and Algiers. And the success in the Battle of Karameh strengthened the Palestinian fighting morale and enlarged the mobilisation. (cp. Frangi, 1982, pp. 149-153) But soon, there arose various Palestinian paramilitary groups operating under separate command. Their disunity as well as their dispersal from Jordan in 1970 deprived the Palestinians of much of their infrastructure that had to be rebuilt in Lebanon. But most of the Palestinian cadres lost their newly gained strength in the fighting with Israel in Lebanon in 1982 and most financial sources dried up after the Gulf War. Furthermore, the Syrian and the Lebanese army disarmed most PLO factions in Lebanon in 1991 and confiscated heavy arms such as tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery. After 1991, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq had been maintaining tight control over the weapons and operations of the Palestinian movements on their territory because they had no interest in granting them real military competence. (cp. Cordesman, 2005, p. 35)

Although the Palestinian armed forces were weak and poorly equipped when the peace process began, the Oslo II peace accords of 1995 strengthened their role in Gaza. The Accords foresaw a total number of 30,000 Palestinian security forces. 18,000 forces should be stationed in Gaza and allowed to be armed with rifles, pistols, 7,000 light personal weapons, 120 machine guns and 45 wheeled armoured vehicles. The 12,000 forces envisioned for the deployment in the West Bank should be allowed to possess 4,000 rifles, 4,000 pistols, 120 machine guns and 15 light unarmed riot vehicles. But in reality the PNA established a larger number of forces and more weaponry than permitted by the agreement with Israel. Weapons from Iraq were smuggled to the West Bank via Jordan and were distributed among individuals as well as various Palestinian militias and the groups even received anti-tank weapons and armoured personnel carriers. Tons of modern weapons produced in China or Russia were shipped to Gaza. The PNA obtained unauthorised artillery rockets, anti-tank rocket launchers, anti-tank guided missiles and possible even portable surface-to-air missiles. (cp. Cordesman, 2005, pp. 37-39)

3.1.1.5. Employable Concepts

Due to the defeat of the Arab states by Israel in the initial phase of the military conflict, the newly established Palestinian national movements were convinced that only a revolutionary strategy could reverse the balance of power and that armed struggle was the only means to reach the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The Algerian war of independence that relied on guerrilla tactics against the oppressor served as role model. With their attacks on strategic Israeli aims they did not only focus on harming Israel and increasing the organisation's popularity but also on provoking another war between Israel and the Arab states. However, the Palestinian reliance on a military victory of the Arab states in another military confrontation was deceived after the glorious victory of Israel in 1967, in which it occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (cp. Baumgarten, 2002, pp. 34-41)

The Syrian Baath Party as well as Al-Fatah assessed that the Israeli occupation could provide better conditions for their revolutionary peoples' war than they faced before. The guerrilla strategy was expected to fail within Israel due to the low proportion of Arab population, but the fighters counted on the will of resistance of the Arab masses in the Occupied Territories that would enable them to move "like a fish in the sea", as Mao

Tsedong described the practices of classical guerrillas. Thus, Al-Fatah's leadership revised its policy of secrecy towards the Arab states and achieved to get their approval for the escalation of the guerrilla war as well as material support. In their guerrilla war, the fighters targeted only seldom infrastructure of the Israeli army, but mainly attacked civilian aims. They deposed explosive charges at bus stations, streets and markets, but they never managed to initiate the planned transition from pure terrorist attacks to military operations. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 200-201) The Maoist model proved to be inadequate for the Palestinian population because it was not ready to present an active base for the struggle and the Israeli anti-guerrilla strategy strengthened this adverse attitude.

So the movements adopted the new plan of using territories of neighbouring states as launching pad for guerrilla attacks on Israel. Hence, first actions started already in 1967. But the systematic attacks on Israeli military infrastructure were answered by Israeli retaliation operations. The only rather successful military operation was the direct confrontation between the Israeli army and Al-Fatah fighters in the Battle of Karameh. Shortly after the takeover of the PLO by the Palestinian groups, an internal struggle for power erupted around the question of methods to liberate Palestine as well as the underlying ideologies. Thus, the PFLP applied action to overthrow Arab regimes which were considered as reactionary while Al-Fatah was still seeking their support. The PFLP as well as Hawatmeh's later established PDFLP decided to launch attacks from Jordan and Lebanon and started to commit terrorist campaigns outside Israel. The PFLP was the first organisation that hijacked airplanes while Al-Fatah preferred to fight a guerrilla war at the border between the West Bank and Jordan and pursued national, not world revolutionary aims. (cp. Pappe, 2010, pp. 191-192) Over time also Al-Fatah became more and more influenced by the revolutionary dynamics that derived from the PFLP and the PDFLP. It suffered a fundamental break of its political consciousness and partially changed its path from a policy of non-interference into the internal affairs of Arab states to an active fight against Jordanian forces. The expulsion of the fighters from Jordan approved the PFLP's ideology that people without land could only reach their political goals through a worldwide strategy of international terrorism in cooperation with other liberation movements in the Third World as well as with anti-imperialist groups in capitalist countries. At that time, parts of Al-Fatah also promoted anti-imperialistic and world revolutionary aims for which reason the organisation was threatened to split into

fractions. Only a minority was ready to stick to the traditional attitude of non-interference while leaders like Abu Jihad and Abu Ijad demanded a policy of violence against Israel and retaliation against King Hussein of Jordan. Therefore, Yasser Arafat took the following decision: Abu Jihad, the leader of the military branch of Al-Fatah, should go to Lebanon with his fighters in order to establish a regular, heavily armed army. Abu Ijad, the leader of the intelligence service of Al-Fatah, should lead a secret terrorist organisation targeting Israel as well as Jordan. This group later became known as "Black September" under the leadership of Mohammed Daud Auda alias Abu Daud. The group gained worldwide awareness through its terrorist attack on the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. The new world revolutionary course of Al-Fatah was confirmed at the 10th PLO congress in Cairo in April 1973 and the PLO initiated a pan-Arab revolutionary meeting in Damascus in November that year. Already in summer 1973, the leadership of Al-Fatah obviously ended the operations of "Black September" because it was not able to control the multifaceted terrorist activities of all its cells any more. Abu Nidal and Wadi Haddad were among the dissidents, who were responsible for attacks even after the termination of international terrorism by Al-Fatah and the PFLP. This kind of spoiler violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s had been part of an internal struggle over influence within the PLO (cp. Schreiber, 1992, pp. 217-224)

Before the outbreak of Egypt's planned war against Israel in 1973, the PLO was forced to reconsider its political agenda: in case of an Egyptian success, the logical consequence would have been peace talks in which the PLO would have needed to participate in order to counter its political marginalisation. Therefore, it had to publicly stand back from terrorist attacks that would be counterproductive for the new political objectives. (cp. Baumgarten, 2002, pp. 77-80) This shift towards diplomacy was largely motivated by the competition of the PLO leaders with Jordan over the legitimate representation of the Palestinians. The stake in this battle over representation was the survival of the PLO itself and thus, the PLO leaders had to prove that they held the key to a peaceful settlement and not Jordan or other Arab countries. While the Fatah leadership sought entry into the peace process in order to avoid its marginalisation in Arab and international politics, hardline factions of the PLO committed acts of spoiler violence against the diplomatic strategy to avoid their own marginalisation in Palestinian politics. Military attacks enabled them to compete for power outside the realm of formal PLO institutions that were dominated by Fatah and earned them popular support. Therefore, Al-Fatah was forced to also commit

occasional attacks to appease the hardline opinion within the PLO. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, pp. 87-92) *"The paradoxical outcome was that Fatah leaders pursued diplomacy to increase the PLO's regional and international clut, but it could not rely solely on diplomacy, because this risked weakening the national consensus on which the PLO was based. […] Thus, even when there were compelling strategic incentives to embrace the peace process, pressures stemming from internal Palestinian politics kept armed struggle alive."* (Pearlman, 2009, pp. 94-95)

Especially after the PLO's exclusion from the Camp David negotiations between Israel and Egypt, which did not bring any positive outcome for the Palestinians, there followed a period of violent confrontation with Israel in the Occupied Territories as well as in Lebanon. Only after the PLO's defeat in Lebanon in 1982, it became clear that the resistance had to be taken from Diaspora into the Occupied Territories. Thus, all PLO groups put a focus on mobilising and organising resistance in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which developed its own dynamics and resulted in the First Intifada in 1987. (cp. Baumgarten, 2002, p. 114)

Summing up, the violent measures used by the Palestinians in the First Intifada comprised two principal forms: terroristic acts committed by fractions of the PLO and the Islamic Jihad, on one side, and spontaneous demonstrations with forms of violence below armed terrorism, on the other. The latter measures were created by the young "generation of occupation" and included stone-throwing, the use of Molotov Cocktails, the burning of car tires, temporary liberations of villages from Israeli presence and the construction of barriers around them (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 328) Peaceful resistance during the Intifada was centred on civil disobedience, political and media struggle, demonstrations, sit-ins, negotiations with the occupation authority and the extensive use of national symbols. When the Israeli administration closed educational institutions as retaliation to these measures, the Palestinians even managed to establish their own parallel institutions like an alternative educational system. (cp. Johannsen, 2006, pp. 32-35; The Political Platform, 2009, p. 13) Hence, the Unified Leadership focussed on the shunning of the Israeli civil administration, the boycott of Israeli products, the refusal to pay or collect taxes, the avoidance to work in Israel or in settlements, the closing of shops for a certain time each day and the establishment of alternative Palestinian institutions. (cp. Kimmerling/Migdal, 2003, p. 299)

During these dynamic times, Yasser Arafat tried to get into motion the diplomatic process and proclaimed the establishment of the Palestinian state in a speech at the UN General Assembly in Geneva in 1988. But the subsequent peace dialogue as well as the Intifada reached an impasse.

Although most Palestinians now built their hopes on Saddam Hussein's plan to solve the Middle East Conflict all at once and approved the Iraqi attacks on Israel, Yasser Arafat refused to fulfil the Iraqi leader's demand to commit terrorist acts against Western aims worldwide.

But since the beginning of the peace process with Israel in 1991, the Palestinians had been able to conduct a political struggle against Israel for their right based on the principle "land for peace". (cp. Baumgarten, 2002, pp. 156-164) From this time on, the PLO's desire for peace was closely linked to its aim to strengthen its exclusive leadership of the Palestinians. However, negotiations between the PLO and Israel did not lead towards a final agreement until 2000, when they were interrupted by the Second Intifada. At that time, all Palestinian militias attempted to end the occupation through massive violence and terrorist attacks. Suicide bombings in Israeli shopping centres, buses and close to military installations became a popular means to fight against Israeli occupation. Furthermore, the Palestinian national movements conducted guerrilla operations against Israeli security forces in the Occupied Territories and indiscriminate killings of Jews, which was a severe threat to Israeli security and living standards. (cp. Pappe, 2006, pp. 275-278) The Second Intifada ended with a truce between the PNA and Israel since that time the PLO has been concentrating its efforts mainly on diplomatic efforts, non-violent popular struggle, the regaining of national unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and international activism. (cp. Shaath, 29/11/2010) The most comprehensive non-violent effort took place in 2005 when a coalition of political parties, unions and organisations representing Palestinian refugees, Palestinians under occupation and Palestinian citizens of Israel issued the so-called "Palestinian Civil Society Call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions". But the cooperation and coordination between the signatories of this initiative and the PNA respectively other actors engaged in non-violent resistance have been limited. The PNA set up the National Dignity Fund to increase the availability of Palestinian products at the markets of the West Bank. Besides these efforts, weekly protests against the separation wall take place in the West Bank and recently,

1,600 prisoners conducted a coordinated hunger strike against the Israeli practice of administrative detention which allows Israeli forces to arrest Palestinians for up to six months without charge or trial. In times of Arab uprisings in the region, the international attention provides good conditions for civil resistance. (cp. Gallagher, 2012)

According to Saeb Erekat, diplomatic measures such as the Palestinian request for membership in the UNO serve the international protection of the 1967 borders, which Israel has been disregarding so far, as well as the enhancement of the Palestinian position towards Israel in future negotiations. (cp. Erekat, 21/03/2012)

At present, the dominant movement within the PLO, Al-Fatah, states in its political bulletin "The Political Platform" of 2009, *"[...] the selection of struggle methods, in time and space depends on the capabilities of our people and our Movement. It also relies on local and external developments, on the calculation of power equations, the necessity of safeguarding the Movement and the people`s ability to carry on the revolution, and sustain steadfastness and the presence of real opportunities for peace. In Fatah´s principles; ends do not justify all means."* (The Political Platform, 2009, p. 13)

3.1.1.6. Assessment of the National Movement's Representative Function

Due to the fact that the PLO did not stick to a certain dogmatic ideology and functioned as an umbrella organisation for various political parties, the PLO definitely represented the Palestinian majority opinion, which over time was acknowledged by the Arab League as well as by the United Nations. In the early stages of the Palestinian dominance over the PLO, there was a broad consensus among all parties that the liberation of Palestine and the destruction of Israel was the overall objective that should be reached through Palestinian armed struggle. Only when the PLO declared its readiness to establish a state on each liberated part of Palestine, the new goal was not backed by all fractions an more and thus, was no longer a majority position. The most obvious set-back for the PLO was its defeat in the elections of 2006, which revealed that the movement was no loger the dominant political force in the Palestinian political sphere.

3.1.2. Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyya (HAMAS)

3.1.2.1. Context of Establishment

By founding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, Hasan al-Banna and his compatriots paved the way for many Islamist groups that became inspired by the Brotherhood's ideology, and laid the structural basis for future radical splinter groups like Hamas. In an era that was characterised by huge frustration with Western and especially British influence in Egypt, the movement pursued the objective of returning to a time of global Islamist order, called the Caliphate. The British mandate territory Palestine was among the first regions that became influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's visions which found its expression in the establishment of branches in the West Bank already between 1946 and 1948 and shortly afterwards in the Gaza Strip. The occupation of the West Bank by Jordan and of the Gaza Strip by Egypt caused a split of the organisation into two separate groups. At that time, Islamist ideology was perceived as a threat to the popularity of secular oriented pan-Arabism and also to the legitimacy of various traditional Arab monarchies that therefore refused Islamism. The Muslim Brotherhood was banned in Egypt and temporarily experienced strong repressions. The organisation also received less popular support than the secular forces. When Israel conquered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, the Palestinians favoured revolutionary Palestinian nationalism over Islamism.

However, the occupation provided unexpected advantageous conditions for the Muslim Brotherhood. Israel's control over both Palestinian territories enabled the two branches of the Muslim Brotherhood to unite and establish relations with the Islamist forces inside Israel. Another important factor was that the Israeli administration identified the increasingly popular Muslim Brotherhood which strictly refrained from armed struggle as primary competition to the terrorist group Al-Fatah. Thus Israel sought to undermine Al-Fatah by enabling the Brotherhood to operate with relatively little oversight. In 1973, the Brotherhood member Ahmed Yassin even received an Israeli license to establish an Islamic Centre in the Gaza Strip. It served as the movement's political and cultural heart and the centre of a huge network of health and food services, youth activities and other charities that won the organisation the loyalty of the poor Palestinian population living in refugee camps. This laid the basis for a strong political movement based on a network which by the mid-1980s comprised mosques, fundraising centres, diverse social services

and educational institutions that later served as recruiting reservoir. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 13-22)

Ideologically, the Muslim Brotherhood capitalised on the wars of 1967 and 1973 to raise Islamic consciousness among the Palestinians and in the whole region. Arab military defeats were interpreted as a consequence of a lack of religious faith and the failure to stick to divine laws while victories were attributed to the faith of the fighters. Another important aspect that contributed to the rise of the Islamic movement was the increasing influence of oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states in the Arab political arena. Due to the strong Islamic orientation of these countries, Islamic movements all over the Arab world benefited from their new wealth and power. Another boost for Islamic movements all over the Middle East was the Islamic revolution that took place in Iran in 1979 because it offered a precedence and role model for the establishment of an Islamic state. The Islamic revival aimed at ending of the subjugation of Islamic societies. Thus, it promoted the confrontation of Westernisation and aspired after the restoration traditional Islamic values. The Israeli occupation, which was perceived as threat to Palestinian Arab and Islamic Identity, had been a source of motivation for the Palestinians to join Islamic movements.

Failures of and discord among the PLO parties increasingly turned the attention of the Palestinian people to the Islamic alternative. In contrast to the PLO, the Muslim Brotherhood did not suffer from Israeli repression and thus was able to build a stable organisational structure. Furthermore, the Brotherhood was not forced to put its political abilities and anti-corruption attitudes to the test. The financial resources needed to increase the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood had been gained through donations from abroad or inside the Occupied Territories as well as through membership dues. Also other Islamist groups worldwide have provided the Brotherhood with political, moral, financial and material assistance. Important sources of mobilisation of followers were the mosques, the schools and publications of the organisation that included a strong political message. Gaza's socially conservative society that had lived under poor economic conditions traditionally provided a huge pool of potential followers. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, pp.11-21)

Ideological disputes between the young and the old guard of the Muslim Brotherhood arose because the old generation represented the traditional non-violent approach of the

Muslim Brotherhood that envisioned a long and protracted battle of wills as way to retake Palestine, while the young Islamists focused on the conquest of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state before the spiritual transformation of the Muslims could take place. This ideological confrontation led to the establishment of a splinter group of the Brotherhood, the Harakat al-Islamic Jihad fi Filastin (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PIJ), in 1979 by Sheikh Abd Al-Aziz Awda and Fathi Shiqaqi. Both Islamists wanted to take advantage of the Islamic revolution in Iran and called for an immediate confrontation with Israel as part of its commitment to transform the existing world order into a new one that would be dominated by Islam. The Islamic Jihad rejected the existence of Israel and aimed at its destruction through Jihad. Before the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987, the Islamic Jihad had carried out a wave of extreme violent guerrilla attacks. Although IDF operations systematically decimated the PIJ fighters, the violent actions of the movement encouraged Palestinians to confront Israel in the name of Islam and inspired more elements within the Muslim Brotherhood to call for a more active approach.

These conditions led to the establishment of another splinter organisation of the Brotherhood, the Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyya (HAMAS), by Ahmed Yassin in 1987 in Gaza. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 21-22) The Arabic word Hamas means zeal and at the same time is an acronym for Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Resistance Movement). Hamas became a political and military arm (or so-called "resistance wing") of the Muslim Brotherhood and an umbrella organisation for all Muslim brothers that sought a guerrilla war. (cp. Muslih, 1999, pp. 2-3) Furthermore, the organisation soon turned into the main competitor of the PLO since it was perceived as the Muslim Brotherhood's parallel institution to the PLO's Unified National Leadership. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, p. 68)

3.1.2.2. Strategic Objectives and Ideological Orientation

The Muslim Brotherhood's ideological bias towards Palestine had been based on its consideration that all Palestine is Muslim land. According to this view, Israel had no right to exist and any political settlement to the conflict corresponded to treason because no one had the right to concede any part of the Holy Land. The establishment of a Palestinian state on only parts of the territory was perceived as acknowledgment of the legitimacy of

the conquest of Muslim land. The Brotherhood regarded any other position too concessionary.

The objective of the Muslim Brotherhood was the establishment of an Islamic state, society and regime in one of Israel's neighbouring countries in order to use it as a base for the Islamic movement in Palestine and as a prerequisite to realise the overall goal embodied in the victory of the Islamic call. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, pp. 23-26) Thereby the Brotherhood refrained from armed struggle because it had been preoccupied with the preparation of a Muslim generation with the ability to fight the enemy and in order to avoid offering Israel a pretext to attack the Brotherhood's infrastructure. A gradual change in this attitude towards a more militant role took place even before the First Intifada when members of the Brotherhood clashed with Israeli troops and the organisation started to resort to more national themes as well as Palestinian symbols. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, p. 37) The Intifada marked the beginning of a new phase in the development of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Occupied Territories characterised by active resistance against Israel. Thus, the establishment of Hamas was a response of the Brotherhood to the eruption of the Intifada that took place in the context of broad disillusionment with the Palestinian secular movements.

Palestinians turned to Hamas because it combined Palestinian nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Fundamentalist groups exerted activism that was based on patriotism and moral purity respectively social action and the promise of divine grace. The establishment of Hamas was also a manifestation of the Brotherhood's ideological dilemma. Until this time the Muslim Brotherhood had argued that it was still in a state of Islamic upbringing and therefore it needed a new institutional framework to justify the ideological shift. However, due to the high popularity of Hamas and its ability to challenge secular forces, the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine gradually submerged in the new organisation.

The Hamas charter of 1988 derived most principles from the ideological attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, pp. 59-80) The movement even declared itself as branch of the Brotherhood but paid more attention to the objective of liberating Palestine through Jihad than to the main objective of the Muslim Brotherhood, namely the transformation of the Muslim society. According to Amandeep Sandhu's analysis of the Hamas charter, it justified political violence within an Islamic framework through

authorisation based on historical memory of injustice and defeat, dehumanisation of the enemy and shame that derived from experiences of subjugation. (cp. Sandhu, 2003, pp. 4-10) The movement's perception of the struggle against Israel enshrined in its charter was totalistic and supposed as conflict of survival that could not be ended unless its cause, the Zionist settlement in Palestine, the confiscation of its land and the displacement of the Palestinians, was removed. (cp. Pedahzur /Weinberg, 2003, p. 75) The motto of Hamas is the following, *"Allah is its Goal. The Messenger is its Leader. The Qur'an is its Constitution. Jihad is its methodology, and Death for the sake of Allah is its most coveted desire."* (Sandhu, 2003, pp. 1)

During the first years of its existence, Hamas'ss worldview was dominated by the perception of a civilisation struggle that had to be fought against hegemonic policies advanced by US-led imperialism and Zionism. These dominant forces were perceived as harmful to the interests of the Islamic nation and thus the Palestinian question was viewed as a conflict between Islam and its enemies. But Hamas was also aware that its main strategic aim at that time had been its own survival for which reason it avoided any kind of confrontation with the hostile Western powers. (cp. Muslih, 1999, pp. 17-21)

Despite its refusal of political settlements with Israel, some Hamas leaders adopted a more realistic approach in the course of the Intifada and advocated more moderate ideas. Thus, the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin declared the Brotherhood's willingness to negotiate with Israel under certain conditions. But Yassin had rejected the notion that a Palestinian and an Israeli state could live in peace besides each other and thus had demanded the establishment of one Islamic dominated state in which Jews, Christians and Muslims could live together. Further, Yassin had indicated that the utilisation of violence did not aim at the destruction of human beings but at the removal of oppression and corruption. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, pp. 75-79)

The period of the Madrid and Washington talks from 1991 until 1993 was characterised by a self-search process within Hamas and a search for alternatives. A secret document that circulated among Hamas leadership members in July 1992 summarised the following objectives and aims of the movement in this phase:

- *"a. Preserving the movement's popular base so that it can strongly support the continuation of the Jihad in the next campaigns. This means that [if we were]*

politically isolated and absent [from the political arena], we would be deprived of the masses and lose much of the popular support that until now we have not been able to organize [ta'tir].

- *b. Adhering to Jihad as the way to liberate Palestine from the [Israeli] occupation, which will remain during the implementation of the interim self-rule.*
- *c. Resisting normalization and further negligence and surrender of the Palestinians' rights. This might be the most important factor in determining our choice... [sic]. It must be bound to our goals and interests in every historical phase... [sic]."* (Mishal/Sela, 2000, p. 126)

After the beginning of the Oslo Peace Process, several trends gained importance within the ideological spectrum of Hamas, which might have been an indication for Hamas's ability to adjust to the new situation:

- One trend was the preservation of the principle to accept only the total liberation of Palestine as settlement to the conflict. This goal should be reached through Jihad and not through negotiations with Israel that had been completely rejected.

- Centralist figures within Hamas tended to accept the idea of stages. This approach envisioned the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as immediate solution, which should function only as transitional stage. This transitional stage should be reached through direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Hamas would be ready to accept a peaceful settlement under the condition of a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Occupied Territories but ruled out the recognition of Israel.

- Another trend proposed a truce with Israel that according to Islamic jurists was acceptable as temporary arrangement. But this proposal did not call for war with Israel after the expiry of the truce but rather for a plebiscite to let the Palestinians decide their faith.

- Some members of Hamas had even represented the trend towards participation in the newly established structures of the PNA as expression of their desire to find new access to political power. (cp. Muslih, 1999, pp. 29-33)

In the aftermath of the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 a subsequent radicalisation of the internal political discourse in Israel as well as in the Palestinian Territories took place. Correlating with this trend, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad carried out a series of terror attacks inside Israel. The adversaries of the Oslo Peace Process adhered to the establishment of a bi-national Palestinian state and their refusal of a Palestinian state in only the Occupied Territories. Hamas had not only national religious motives to attack Israel but also aimed at increasing its support among the Palestinians through the criticising of the Oslo Peace Process. Violence was used as a means to undermine the PLO's diplomatic efforts. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 98-100)

In the time prior to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, Hamas paid much attention to its organisational continuity in terms of preserving its base of support and its power position. Thus, its focus shifted from foreign to domestic issues like to the performance of the PNA, corruption in the Palestinian institutions, the economic situation in the Occupied Territories or the status of democracy and human rights. The fact that the peace process had reached an impasse served Hamas'ss interests and finally led to the outbreak of the Second Intifada. (cp. Muslih, 1999, pp. 41-44) In this context, Hamas committed many bomb attacks and therewith gained even more support among the critics of the negotiations with Israel.

Only in 2004, it became obvious that Hamas was looking for a new role in politics and thus decided to participate in the communal elections that year and also in the parliamentary elections in 2006. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 100)

Israel, the United States and the European Union refused to recognise Hamas'ss electoral victory and imposed sanctions against the Hamas-led government although Hamas began to moderate its political programme after its election. Hamas still refused to recognise the Jewish state but it increasingly abstained from its ideological rejectionism and the call for an Islamic state on the whole territory of the former mandatory Palestine. Instead it adopted the more pragmatic approach based on a two-state solution that envisioned the establishment of a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967 resting upon a long-term truce with Israel. But Israel refused to cooperate with a government that included Hamas members and instead encouraged Al-Fatah to overthrow Hamas and regain power. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 309-311) Thus, the national unity government collapsed in June 2007 and Hamas took over the Gaza Strip. When Hamas was boycotted by the International

Community and Israel caused a humanitarian crisis by declaring a blockade over the Gaza Strip, the pragmatic forces within Hamas lost ground. All efforts to transform Hamas into an accountable political party were annihilated and the hardliners within the movement, who advocated armed struggle and aimed at sabotaging any compromise between the PLO and Israel, gained strength. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 104-105)

When Khaled Meshal, the leader of Hamas took a stand on a number of critical issues in an interview with the Jordanian newspaper Al-Sabeel in July 2010, he explained that Hamas did not fight against Jews as a religious community but against Israeli occupation. Thus, he concluded, *"[...] we refuse to recognise the legitimacy of Israel because we refuse to recognise the legitimacy of occupation and theft of land."* (Meshal, 04/09/2010)

3.1.2.3. Internal Structure and Mobilisation Capacity

After its establishment, Hamas was able to resort to the organisational spadework of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood leader in the Gaza Strip Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and the Brotherhood members Abd Al-Aziz Al-Rantisi, Ibrahim Al-Yazuri, Sheikh Salah Shihada, Issa Al-Nashshar, Muhammad Shama and Abd Al-Fattah Dukhan comprised the first leadership of Hamas that had established wings and committees in the information, military, political and security sphere. Sheikh Jamil Hamami who had acted as a contact person between the Brotherhood in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip formed a parallel leadership body for Hamas in the West Bank. Hamas was virtually led by a consultative council comprised of members inside and outside the Occupied Territories. Due to the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine organisationally belongs to the society in Jordan, the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has played an instrumental role in the leadership of Hamas although the policy of the two organisations is not identical. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, pp. 64-65)

Hamas served as an umbrella organisation for Brotherhood members that sought a guerrilla war against Israel and thus, became operational in the context of the First Intifada. Hamas's leaflets and grassroots protests contributed an enormous share to the mobilisation of violence and earned the organisation a larger clientele. It is estimated that Hamas controlled about 40 per cent of the mosques in Gaza by 1988 and increasingly gained popular support through its social services. The organisation did not join the

UNLU during the First Intifada but had its own decision-making apparatus that included several independent wings that operated in compliance with the larger movement. The political wing was responsible for the interaction with the Palestinian people while the communications wing issued leaflets and information about Hamas. The internal security wing took actions against suspected collaborators and Palestinians who refused to take part in Hamas's protests. The Intifada wing of the organisation served as reservoir for Hamas'ss fighters, while the youth wing coordinated resistance in terms of demonstrations and rock-throwing. Although much of the activity at that time took place at the grassroots level, the leadership of Hamas exercised oversight over the operations. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 24-25) The operational arm of the security section known as Majmuat Juhad wa-Dawa was not only active in the elimination of collaborators but also attacked Israeli targets and became part of the broader network Al-Majahadoun.

Against the background of increasing IDF operations against Hamas, including efforts to arrest or neutralise fighters as well as the leadership, the organisation had to be flexible in order to adapt itself to the new threats. Thus, the military apparatus of Hamas underwent several changes and in 1991, Hamas established its new military wing called Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades and conducted first attacks against Israeli civilians in settlements in the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Hamas'ss network of social institutions continued to pay dividends by earning the organisation even more popular support. International support helped Hamas to increase its power and the organisation even announced its ties to the Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon at that time. The new foreign political activity demanded the creation of a political bureau of Hamas and so many of Hamas'ss structures paralleled those of the PLO.

After Hamas had adopted the new tactic of suicide bombing by 1994, Israel carried out operations against Hamas infrastructure and its leadership. Even security forces of the PNA engaged in arresting Hamas members but the popular support for the Islamist groups in the Occupied Territories was undaunted high. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 33-45/Cordesman, 2005, p. 193)

An important characteristic of Hamas is that the organisation is geographically scattered and its highest decision-making bodies based in Gaza as well as in Syria and more leaders in the West Bank, Israeli prisons and locations throughout the Arab world. Thus, there is internal rivalry over differing power interests with regard to possible options of actions to

end the conflict. The Gaza government, which remains internationally isolated, bears responsibility for the administration of the over one million inhabitants of Gaza and thus fears that the weight of its concerns might be given insufficient attention. The external leadership, headed by Khaled Meshal, is likely to be interested in diplomatic action of Hamas, while the military wing is more sceptical to find a role in an eventual diplomatic process. (cp. Brown, 17/01/2012) In the year 2000, this military wing of Hamas comprised an estimated number of 300 men based in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip who were engaged in regular operations. This number is equal to the military strength of the Islamic Jihad, but Hamas enjoyed stronger popularity due to its huge social network. (cp. Cordesman, 2005, p. 166) Hamas decided to convert its popularity into political power by taking part in the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council and formed a Hamas-led national unity government after its victory in 2006. But the national unity government collapsed soon and Hamas took over the sole power in the Gaza Strip. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 309-310) According to Israeli assessment, Palestinian forces counted 15,000 fighters by 2008/09 including around 8,000 members of the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, 6,000 members of the Executive Support Forces, which is a civil police controlled by Hamas, and more than 1,200 special police. (cp. Journal of Palestine Studies, 2009, p. 192)

3.1.2.4. Infrastructure and Resources

After its establishment, Hamas profited from the Muslim Brotherhood's well-developed network that ensured its financial survival. The Brotherhood's financial sources included support from the mother organisation in Egypt and individual members of the Brotherhood elsewhere, financial contributions from Arab regimes like those of Jordan, Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States as well as donations and alms money which were used to enhance the organisation's infrastructure and popular support. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, pp. 8-15) When Hamas posed a growing challenge to Al-Fatah's power and gave a proof of its eagerness to resist Israeli occupation during the First Intifada, it gained financial assistance from donors in the oil-rich Gulf countries, who sought to enhance Islamist influence in the Middle East. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, p. 27) In 1989, Hamas and the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed on an alliance in the war to liberate Palestine which led to a long standing patron-client relationship that infused Hamas with ideology on the one hand and financial support on the other. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency Iran

provided more than $ 100 million between 1988 and 1994. Hamas also established strong ties with the Syrian regime that allowed the organisation to conduct training and operations in Lebanon and provided logistical support and safe-havens. At the same time Hamas profited from its increasingly stronger relations with governments of Sunni Arab states like Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan or Tunisia that had granted financial aid to Hamas. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 32-33/Cordesman, 2005, pp. 206-207) Other Hamas funds included donations collected in the Occupied Territories, financial assistance from Islamic movements abroad, informal donations from Muslims in other Muslim/Arab countries, Europe or the United States, contributions by governments like those of the Gulf States especially after Hamas had condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and revenues from investments. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, pp.87-88) A Congressional Research Service Report for the US-Congress about illicit drug trafficking revealed that Hamas as well as the Hezbollah *"[…] have also reportedly raised funding for their terrorist activities through linkages formed with DTOs (Drug Trafficking Organizations, author's note) in South America, particularly those operating in the tri-border area (TBA) of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina."* (Report 8, 2010, p. 6) Although Hamas had public funds at its disposal after its electoral victory, it was denied the access to foreign-aid provided by the International Community. Thus, the organisation still relies on the above-mentioned sources of income to govern the Gaza Strip and finance all branches of the movement. (cp. Backgrounder Council on Foreign Relations, 27/08/2009)

Regarding its weaponry, Hamas was only able to smuggle small amounts of goods and weapons from Egypt into the Gaza Strip through underground tunnels and thus did not possess a huge arsenal of weapons during the time of the Oslo period. But by 2003, the Israeli administration became aware of increasing weapon deliveries through tunnel smuggling due to the indulgence of the Egyptian military border guards and the Iranian funding of the tunnels, that often had a length of over 100-yards, cost up to $ 200,000 and lied more than 60 feet beneath the earth's surface. Although Israeli military operations aimed at the destruction of the tunnel network, they could not prevent the smuggling of weapons including armour-piercing weapons, automatic rifles, antitank missiles, mines or rocket-propelled grenades. Most of the weaponry came from Egypt, Libya and Sudan. In order to hide the smuggled arms, Hamas even stockpiled them under kindergarten playgrounds. The Islamists also imported raw materials needed to build homemade

Qassam rockets or explosives for suicide bombings. The unilateral disengagement of the Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip allowed Hamas to manufacture thousands of explosives and self-made weapons more easily and at the same time facilitated the tunnelling activities. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 85-89) After Hamas'ss takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the organisation at pace converted its social infrastructure into a military one and established strategic defensive military positions to punish Israel in case of invasions. Hamas'ss takeover of security buildings of the PNA in the Gaza Strip provided the movement with a huge arsenal of US-supplied weapons including thousands of assault rifles, ammunition, large-calibre machine guns and even rocket-propelled grenades with warheads able to penetrate armour and antiaircraft weapons. The newly acquired weaponry as well as the increased Iranian guidance supported Hamas'ss restructuring of its fighting force. Fighters were trained with the help of Iran and Syria and Hamas established a complex bunker system with rocket lunching and surveillance positions along the fence between the Gaza Strip and Israel. Israeli military tactics were studied and Hamas set up ambushes for the IDF in case of operations within the Gaza Strip. Hamas even drew back on psychological operations and issued threats to harm the kidnapped soldier Corporal Gilad Shalid if Israel would launch an invasion. Hamas engineers also reached a technological breakthrough by increasing the outreach as well as the storage capability of homemade Qassam rockets, which drastically enlarged the number of Israelis threatened by Hamas weapons. By 2008, Hamas's military strength reportedly comprised 20,000 armed operatives, large-scale training operations, improved explosives and rockets as well as an improved command and control system. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 174-178) Hamas's capacities increased due to the new favourable situation created through the political changes in the regional environment since the Arab Spring. Thus, Hamas receives backing and material support from countries such as Egypt, Libya, Qatar or Iran. Especially the new rocketry like the Fajr-5 that was smuggled to Gaza from Iran and can reach Tel Aviv or Jerusalem put 50 percent of Israel's population under Hamas's guns and thus improve Hamas's military situation. (cp. Krauthammer, 2012)

3.1.2.5. Employable Concepts

Since the Muslim Brotherhood rejected armed struggle as means to liberate Palestine and aimed at avoiding a military confrontation with Israel, Hamas offered a forum for Islamist

participation in the violent resistance against Israel. Hamas's participation in the First Intifada was marked by regularity, extensiveness and the diversity of applied means ranging from regular Intifada activities like stone-throwing or strikes to the use of violent tactics against Israelis and alleged collaborators. In the course of the Intifada, Hamas's standpoint became increasingly militant in content and tactics especially with regard to armed attacks against Israeli targets and opposition to the peace process. Israeli suppression led to a radicalisation of the movement and as peaceful Intifada activities declined, Hamas enhanced its violent operations that were justified through the religious reference to Jihad. According to senior Hamas leaders, Hamas would have preferred a peaceful way and its resort to violence was only aimed at the removal of oppression and not at the destruction of human beings. Notwithstanding, peaceful solutions and compromise with Israel were excluded in the movement's charter. (cp. Abu-Amr, 1994, pp. 67-81)

Although there emerged different trends within Hamas as a result of the start of the Oslo period, the organisation decided to pursue a terrorist tactic based on political calculation that aimed at undermining the credibility of the PLO respectively the PNA as partner in a peace process. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 100-101) Hamas was forced to antagonise the PLO that was trying to make profit out of its international diplomacy and its propaganda campaign, which the Islamists had been lacking. Thus, Hamas drew back on deep-rooted Islamic symbols and beliefs as well as the revival of armed struggle to delegitimise the diplomatic efforts of its rival. Jihad was generally considered to be the only legitimate way to regain Palestine in its entirety. (cp. Mishal/Sela, 2000, pp. 49-50) Hamas had always condemned the PLO respectively the PNA for its willingness to recognise Israel and *"[...] regarded any possibility of a political settlement based on compromise as a violation of Palestine's status as an Islamic endowment (waqf) as well as the Islamic precept of holy war against the Zionist invasion."* (cp. Mishal/Sela, 2000, p. 53) Hamas's critique on the negotiations with Israel was backed by all its members and earned it even more popularity among the Palestinians.

Even Hamas's decision to conduct attacks against Israeli civilians and to apply the tactic of suicide bombings against Israeli targets starting from 1994 was supported by the majority of its followers. Especially after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, Hamas changed its tactics from attacks on the Israeli army to assaults on civilians. From 2003 on,

Hamas started to cause human casualties through rocket attacks on Israeli cities. This spoiler violence secured Hamas a place in the new political arena and its scale was clearly determined by the level of popular support for the actions. They partly served as tactic to protect its interests vis-à-vis the PLO against the background of a lack of clear rules on how opposition groups could improve their bargaining position with Arafat. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, pp. 100-102)

When Hamas decided to look for a new role in politics and took part in elections as a political force, its victories revealed the coherent support for these measures. But also pragmatists within Hamas were strengthened at that time and indicated that they did no longer exclude negotiations about a two state solution but also admitted that they would not abstain from violence against the occupation. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 101) But after having been denied outside recognition of its access to power, Hamas turned to the weapon of the weak, namely terrorism. Members of Hamas as well as of the Islamic Jihad infrequently launched Qassam rocket attacks on Israeli settlements. Despite Hamas's readiness to sign a six-month ceasefire with Israel in June 2008 tensions were high and finally led to war in December 2008 that ended with a unilateral ceasefire and Israel's declaration of victory. But in reality the war meant a moral defeat for Israel while Hamas, which was still in power, held the moral high ground. At the same time it weakened Al-Fatah and underlined Hamas's role as the only leader of the Palestinian resistance. Another consequence of the events was the radicalisation of the mainstream Muslim opinion. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 311-316) Thus, Hamas's ways have ranged from roadside murders, suicide bombings, rocket firing on Israeli cities to mass demonstrations and graffiti to convey their message. (cp. Cordesman, 2005, p. 191)

In an interview in September 2010, Hamas leader, Khaled Meshal explained the ways of his movement. According to Meshal, resistance is the means to achieve the strategic objective of the restoration of Palestinians' rights and the ending of occupation, but it is not an end or the objective. He also described Hamas as an all-embracing national liberation movement and not just a military group. The resistance is only directed against the enemy and not against supporters of Israel. (cp. Meshal, 04/09/2010) Muhammad I Totah, an elected Hamas member of the PLC, specified that resistance against the occupier should be practiced by all means but he abandoned military operations outside Palestine. (cp. Totah, 22/09/2010) Regarding negotiations with Israel, Khaled Meshal

stated, *"The negotiator cannot succeed without basing his position on the multiplicity of options, meaning that, inasmuch as you are ready for negotiation, you are also ready and able to go to war. If negotiation reaches a deadlock, you must be prepared to go to war, attrition or resistance; otherwise negotiations will be useless." But resistance shall only serve as a means to reach the strategic objective, which is "the liberation and restoration of our rights and ending the Zionist occupation of our land and our holy sites."* (Meshal, 04/09/2010) According to the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas'ss leadership was ready to confine itself to peaceful resistance against Israel as part of a reconciliation agreement that should lead to the establishment of a national unity government of the Hamas and the PLO. Although Hamas leader Khaled Meshal did not openly accept to recognise the State of Israel he accepted the establishment of a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967, which in practical terms amounts to the acceptance of the existence of Israel and thus means an important sing of willingness to compromise. (cp. Abbas, 28/11/2011) As Nathan Brown notes that although Hamas has rejected to recognise Israel, *"[…] the relevant question is whether it would accept as binding a Palestinian decision to recognize Israel, not whether it would change its own ideology."* (Brown, 17/01/2012) Moreover, Hamas has been an official partner in negotiations for a truce with Israel during the military confrontation in November 2012. Leila Shahid, the Ambassador of Palestine to the EU, further indicated that Hamas, at the instigation of Khaled Meshal, has supported the diplomatic step of a Palestinian request for recognition at the UNO and even considered a shift towards non-violent resistance. (cp. Shahid, 23/11/2012; Kotsev, 04/12/2012)

As Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela concluded about the patterns of adjustment and political pragmatism of the Hamas, *"Adjustment had become the main feature of Hamas'ss political conduct. Its strategies of controlled violence, negotiated coexistence, and calculated participation all reflected Hamas'ss effort to avoid making a decision about these conflicting commitments to an all-Islamic vision and a Palestinian nation, on the one hand, and to communal interests, on the other. Whereas an all-Islamic vision would mean a strategy of confrontation with Israel, the PLO and the PA, local communal considerations would encourage Hamas to adjust to the changing circumstances and acquiesce in the political reality."* (Mishal/Sela, 2000, p. 147)

3.1.2.6. Assessment of the National Movement's Representative Function

Hamas not only profited from the reputation and well-established infrastructure of the Muslim Brotherhood but also gained support through its resort to Islam and violent struggle for its uncompromising objective, the liberation of Palestine. Hamas further obtained popular support by stressing its commitment to morality and family values. Thus, within only some month, the movement became an important factor in the Palestinian arena and developed into the main competitor of the PLO. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 31-32)

At the beginning of the 1990s, Hamas was in possession of an impressive network of social service institutions that bought the support of the Palestinian people regardless of their attitude towards Hamas's Islamist agenda. But a significant portion of the Palestinians supported Hamas's violent proceeding and its efforts to block peace. The PLO and some observers estimated that Hamas's popularity stood between 30 and 45 per cent at that time. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, p. 37-38)

But soon Hamas realised that its violent acts caused an enormous backlash within the Palestinian community during a time when people set their hopes on the peace process. Due to the growing Palestinian desire for peace and the deterioration of the living conditions caused by Israeli economic retaliation, the public support for Hamas dropped significantly in the mid 1990s and the organisation was forced to change its conduct. (cp. Cordesman, 2005, p. 194) At that time, around 70 percent of the Palestinians refused the Islamist attacks. Under Israeli and US pressure, Yasser Arafat carried out a campaign against the Islamist opposition and popular opinion gave the PNA a mandate to implement the crackdown with 59 percent of the Palestinians supporting the PNA's measure. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, p. 201) But with the onset of the public disillusionment with the peace process, Hamas regained support. As oppositional movement to the peace process, Hamas could not be blamed for the disappointing negotiation results and was not suspected of corruption and betrayal, which increased the trust of the Palestinians in the movement. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 99) Especially during the Second Intifada Palestinians in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip backed the radical forces, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, more than ever before. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 58-60)

Thus, there were two main considerations behind Hamas's decision to transform the movement into an official party and to take part in elections. On the one hand, it was the

structural weakening of Hamas through the Israeli elimination of many members of Hamas leadership that forced the movement to rethink its proceeding. On the other hand, Hamas recognised the potential of converting its popularity into political power and thus gained the absolute majority in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 100-101) Although the Islamist movement Hamas functioned exclusively as a Muslim representation and therefore excluded the Christian minority population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip it had enjoyed increasing popularity among the Palestinians since the war in Gaza in 2008. But polls in mid-2011 indicated that elections in the Gaza Strip would have brought great losses for Hamas with only about 28 per cent of the votes because Hamas had failed to improve the living conditions in the Gaza Strip. (cp. Vick, 24/10/2011, pp. 37-38) Only the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the presidential elections in Egypt in June 2012 and the Israeli military aggression on Gaza at the end of the year enhanced Hamas's domestic political position.

3.1.3. Power Structure within the Internal Environment

Despite similarities in the Charta of the PLO and Hamas with regard to national goals and strategies for the realisation, their approaches are of different nature. The PLO defined its stance in national, civil and legal terms, while Hamas drew back on religious principles. However, *"despite its rivalry with the national-secular factions, its militant attitudes, and its opposition to the PLO's policies, Hamas stated its willingness to subordinate itself fully to the PLO if that body were to adopt Islam as its way of life [...]. Yet even without the fulfilment of this condition, Hamas affirmed the kinship and national bonds linking member of the two rival movements, emphasizing their shared goal and common enemy."* (Mishal/Sela, 2000, p. 45)

Since Hamas challenged the power position of the PLO, the two movements have been rivals. In July 1990, Yasser Arafat called for a meeting between the two groups in which he invited Hamas to officially join the PLO but despite a mutual agreement to work together in the fight against Israel, tensions between the movements continued. The rifts between the PLO and Hamas even deepened against the background of the Oslo process. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, pp. 37-38) The Oslo process offered Yasser Arafat an opportunity to contain Hamas since it pushed the Islamist opposition to the margins of the completely transformed Palestinian political landscape. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, p. 98) As Jeroen

Gunning put it, *"Oslo provided a golden opportunity to salvage [Arafat's] dreams of statehood, stay in power, and keep Hamas and other contenders (including Fatah's local cadres) out.... Each subsequent attack on the peace process, by Hamas or other contenders, must therefore be seen as, at least in part, an attack on this elite arrangement."* (Jeroen Gunning, 2004, p. 243[26] cited in Pearlman, 2009, p. 101) During the Second Intifada, the rivalry between Hamas and the majority part of the PLO, Al-Fatah, even developed towards civil war. Hamas seized the instability in the Palestinian Territories to weaken the Palestinian old guard and even attempted to displace it. Yasser Arafat, in return, ordered the arrest of Islamists and therewith appeared to be aiming at the neutralisation of political rivals. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, p. 60) Thus, within few years, the political rivalry between the PLO respectively Al-Fatah and Hamas developed a confrontational military component. Several attempts of reconciliation talks failed due to the diverging standpoints towards the use of violence. (cp. Schanzer, 2008, p. 66-71) The changes in the power structure within the Palestinian political field became obvious when Hamas won the parliamentary elections of 2006. The establishment of a national unity government of the PLO-Hamas was overshadowed by fights between the rival parties for which reason the coalition broke already in March 2007. Subsequently, the Palestinian Territories were politically split when Hamas took over the power in the Gaza Strip and the PLO kept control of the West Bank. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 103) Hamas even managed to come out of the Gaza war of 2009 as the leader of the Palestinian resistance which further weakened the political position of Al-Fatah. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 312-316) Currently, reconciliation talks between the PLO and Hamas take place aiming at brokering an agreement on holding new elections because as the International Crisis Group notes, *"Without a Hamas-Fatah power-sharing agreement and as long as the Islamists feel marginalized, unable to govern and in an existential struggle for survival, there can be no sustainable diplomacy."* (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. ii[27] cited in Pearlman, 2009, p. 109)

Only recently, the PLO was able to negotiate an agreement with Hamas that in principle approved to comply with the PLO decisions and commitments which comprised the two-state solution, non-violence and the recognition of Israel's right to exist.

[26] See Gunning, Jeroen (March 2004): Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation. International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2

[27] International Crisis Group (28/02/2007): After Mecca: Engaging Hamas. Middle East Report No. 62, Brussels

3.2. Adversaries in the Territorial Conflict

3.2.1. Main Adversary Israel

3.2.1.1. Political and Ideological Setting

Even before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Zionism aimed at an exclusively Jewish presence in Palestine and the state should function as a haven for the Jewish nation. According to the historian Ilan Pappe, changed conditions on the ground after the end of the British mandate provided an ideal context *"[...] for implementing the ideological vision of an ethnically cleansed Palestine".* (Pappe, 2006, p. 6) As Benny Morris notes *"the idea of transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution [...] and driving it was an iron logic: There could be no viable Jewish state in all or part of Palestine unless there was a mass displacement of Arab inhabitants, who opposed its emergence and would constitute an active or potential fifth column in its midst."* (Morris, 03/10/2002) As the social scientist Avishai Ehrlich concludes: *"[...] Zionism's approach was characterized by unilateralism: pursuance of Zionist goals regardless, or rather in contravention of, the interests of its Arab neighbours. The only limits Israel considered were the limits of its military capabilities and the amount of backing it could muster from strong allies."* (Ehrlich, 2004, p. 216)

Before the declaration of independence of the State of Israel there existed well-established Jewish organisations on the Mandatory territory like the provisional parliament that included centrist as well as more radical parties. The 37 members of this provisional parliament signed the Declaration of Independence of Israel in 1948. (cp. Diskin, 2005, p. 49) *"The first important mission to be undertaken by the new state was the removal, as best it could, of those who definitely did not regard themselves as Jews. [...] Of the approximately 900,000 Palestinians who should have remained in Israel and the additional territories it had seized in its military victory, some 730,000 fled or were expelled – more than the total number of Jews in the country at that time (630,000)."* (Sand, 2010, p. 281)

After the establishment of the State of Israel and the end of the subsequent war, the first Knesset elections in Israel took place in 1949 and David Ben-Gurion became the first Prime Minister of Israel. The elections marked the transition from the Yishuv to a state and also had implications for the political parties that were already active in the

mandatory period because new parties appeared on the scene and have played a leading role in Israeli politics until today.

Since this time, the political scene of Israel has been dominated by three main political camps composed of the following parties that governed in various different coalitions:

- Leftist Camp Parties:

Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael (Mapai)
Mifleget ha-Poalim ha-Meuhedet (Mapam) ideologically to the left of Mapai
the Communist Party which later was called **Ha-Miflagah ha-Kommunistit ha-Yisraelit (Maki)** to the left of Mapam

- Right Wing Parties:

the **General Zionists** representing the social and economic right
the **Herut Movement** established by IZL and representing the nationalist right
the more moderate right wing **Progressive Party**

- Religious Parties:

the religious camp made up of two Zionist and two ultra-Orthodox parties

Only after the Six-Day War of 1967 changes occurred within the Israeli party map. **HaAvoda**, the left-wing Labour Party, was founded in 1968 as successor party of Mapai and some smaller parties. (cp. Diskin, 2005, pp. 48-53) The military victory enabled Israel to annex and colonise the newly acquired territories and the Israeli political fractions split into "doves" supporting the principle of returning captured "land for peace" and the establishment of a Palestinian state and "hawks" completely opposing this idea. In general, the Israeli peace camp that seeks a territorial compromise with the Palestinians is closely associated with the political left. (cp. Ehrlich, 2004, p. 216)

Following his retirement from the army in 1973, Ariel Sharon's entrance in to politics lead to the creation of the conservative Likud party that succeeded the Herut party and several other right wing movements. At that time also **Shinui**, a new centrist-rightist party on social and economic matters with dovish attitude towards defence and foreign affairs, appeared on the scene. (cp. Diskin, 2005, pp. 54-55) The experience of the indecisive war of 1973 actuated Israel to start a peace process with the first Arab state,

Egypt. When the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin of the Likud party, made peace with Egypt the consequence was the erosion of the Arab war alliance as well as a deep rift among the Israeli doves and hawks. But Begin considered the West Bank to be the core of the Jewish ancestral homeland and returning land to Egypt as part of the peace deal gained him time to massively expand Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Only the discord among the Arab states and the collapse of the Soviet Union respectively the end of the Cold War that required Israel to absorb massive immigration of ex-Soviet Jews and made the country more dependent on external funding enabled the USA and the European states to force Begins successor, Yitzhak Shamir, also a Likud member who came into office in 1983, to make concessions. (cp. Ehrlich, 2004, pp. 216-217) Meanwhile, a new party, the **Sephardim Shomrei Torah (Shas)** representing the ultra-Orthodox Sephardic community, had been established and gained in strength. Due to its flexibility with regard to the policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the party joined several government coalitions. (cp. Diskin, 2005, p. 56) In 1991, Israel was ready to take part in the Madrid Conference. When Yitzhak Rabin of haAvoda became Prime Minister in 1992, he adopted the policy of giving land of the State of Israel in return for peace and broke with Israel's unilateralism to take up a dialogue, the Oslo Process. This approach led to a collision with the Israeli Right and as Ehrlich argues, this break from Jewish consensual politics led to Rabin's assassination in 1995. After the death of Rabin, Shimon Peres of haAwoda transitorily took over his office and was replaced by Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party in 1996 who desperately tried to reverse Rabin's political course. But when the USA forced him to implement stages of the Oslo Agreement, he lost the majority in the Knesset and was succeeded by Ehud Barak of haAwoda in 1999. Although Barak unilaterally withdrew the Israeli troops from Lebanon, he did not follow Rabin's approach. He returned to consensus politics and went into coalition with the religious block. The same year, Avigdor Lieberman founded his ultra nationalist party **Yisrael Beitenu** that has represented primarily immigrants from Russia and East Europe. Settlement activities increased during Barak's time in office and due to the fact that he had no majority for the continuation of the Oslo Process, he confronted the Palestinians with an all-or-nothing approach offering them to accept a disarmed, divided, unviable and Israel-dependent mini-state. Barak did not have political or public support for his peace plan inside Israel for which reason the government and media blamed the Palestinians' refusal to give up the right of return for the failure of the peace process. There has always

been broad consensus within Israel that the right of return of the Palestinians would change the demographic conditions within Israel threatening the "Jewishness" of the state. Therefore it is rejected by the majority of Israelis. The violence that accompanied the Second Intifada furthermore strengthened the Israeli view that the Palestinians had never really accepted the existence of the State of Israel.

Barak was succeeded by Ariel Sharon who became Prime Minister with a huge Likud majority in 2001 and refused to go back to negotiations with the Palestinians while paying only lip service to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Instead Sharon focused on military measures against the Palestinian uprising and took advantage of the changed American Foreign Policy after 9/11 and made a link between the Intifada and the Global War on Terrorism. (cp. Ehrlich, 2004, pp. 217-222) Sharon's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and the evacuation of more than 7,500 settlers from this territory was internationally portrayed as concessions but in reality earned Israel strategic promises from the US-administration. US-President Bush agreed that future peace talks would not include a right of return of Palestinians to areas inside Israel and that the negotiations would take into consideration the demographic realities on the ground implying that the 1967 borders would no longer serve as baseline for future state borders. Sharon also needed time to complete the building of a fence in the West Bank, to consolidate settlements that would divide the West Bank into three separate units and to eliminate any Palestinian leadership regarded as peace partner. (cp. Ehrlich, 2004, pp. 231-233) The Israeli settlement policy is regarded as the civilian counterpart of the military colonisation and serves different interests. From the Labour Party point of view, settlements in the Jordan Valley, around Jerusalem and along the Green Line have a strategic value with regard to border protection and incorporation of further land. The Likud party, on the other hand, aims at diminishing the chances for the establishment of a viable, coherent Palestinian state by partitioning the Palestinian land and by restricting free movement. With this concept, the Likud pursues the goal of making more Palestinians leave the West Bank and controlling those who decide to stay. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 73-76) Formally, the settlement movement is not connected to a certain Israeli party but parts of Likud, other right wing parties as well as religious parties or the secular party Yisrael Beitenu act as its political lobby. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 95) As a consequence of the right wing's refusal of the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Ariel Sharon left the Likud party and founded Kadima, a liberal party that is

politically located between the Likud and haAvoda. After he lapsed into a coma, Ehud Olmert, also member of the newly established party **Kadima**, took over Sharon's office until 2009. (cp. Böhme/Kriener/Sterzing, 2009, p. 107) During that time, Israel continued its political strategy of divide and rule between the rival Palestinian factions. While Israel supported Hamas in order to weaken Al-Fatah in the 1980s, it now reversed its tactic and encouraged the corrupt Al-Fatah leadership to overthrow Hamas after its electoral victory in 2006. This proceeding resulted in Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip and enabled Israeli leaders to prepare a war in the lead-up to the general elections of 2009. Internally, all political competitors were seeking an opportunity to demonstrate their abilities while Israel portrayed itself to the outside as victim of Palestinian aggression. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 310-311) The parliamentary elections of 2009 brought an electoral success for Kadima closely followed by the Likud that took over the lead of the government coalition consisting of the Likud, Yisrael Beitenu, haAvoda and the Shas party with Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister. Thus, the focus of this term lied on the traditionally dominant issues of security policy. (cp. Homepage of the Knesset, 10/02/2009) According to Jair Stein, a professed supporter of the political right wing in Israel and descendant of Lechi leader Avraham Stein, the Israeli right wing parties, in contrary to the peace camp, do not want to solve the conflict with the Palestinians and instead try to maintain the present situation. The main reason is that fundamentalist Muslims are expected to not agree to peace with Israel and a potential Palestinian state is might become a terrorist entity. Therefore, the right wing aims at the continuation of a political status quo in the conflict. (cp. Stein, 24/09/2010) The last legislative elections for the 19th Knesset, which took place on 22 January 2013, resulted in a victory for the election alliance between the centre-right Likud and the right-wing Yisrael Beitenu with 31 seats followed by the newly founded centrist party **Yesh Atid** under the leadership of Yair Lapid with 19 seats and HaAvoda with 15 seats. But a study of the election results of all eligible 34 parties reveals that right-wing parties were deprived of the predicted landslide victory while centre-left parties were empowered. Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Likud-Yisrael Beitenu alliance are reliant on political support from the side of the centre-left parties since the ultra-Orthodox parties partly withdrew their support due to the newly introduced military conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews since 2012. This new constellation does not look promising with regard to a settlement of the conflict, but on the other hand, it is a known fact that the right, especially if backed by a strong centre, would be in the best position to sell a peace deal to the Israeli public, which

predominantly supports the two-state solution. In December 2012, two separate polls, commissioned by the US-based S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, showed that two-thirds of all Israelis are ready to accept a peace deal involving a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital. (cp. Lis/Lior, 24/01/2013; Kotsev, 24/01/2013)

3.2.1.2. Resources

Although the newly established State of Israel faced the difficult challenge to establish and consolidate its economic sector during times of conflict and against the background of rare natural resources, it soon experienced rapid growth. Israel profited from foreign investment, international Jewish donations and financial compensation from Germany as well as from its human capital that increased through immigration.

With regard to Israel's military resources it is worth mentioning, that since the Israel Defence Forces officially emerged out of the pre-state Haganah during Israel's so-called "War of Independence" from 1947 to 49, the IDF became one of the world's leading armed forces. It fought successful battles against coalitions of Arab neighbour states, came up with innovative concepts like the conscription of women and even developed new weapons systems. Thus, the IDF remains the guarantor of Israel's existence and a crucial factor in the balance of power in the region. (cp. Van Creveld, 2002, p. xxi) Israel's armament with weapons of mass destruction has started in the times of the cold war. The country has been able to produce atomic bombs since the 1960s and today is in possession of estimated 100 to 200 nuclear weapons. (cp. Magenheimer, 2003, p. 63) With financial aid of the USA, which today amounts to around $ 3 billion per year, Israel became the strongest military force in the Middle East. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 129) Israel receives most US-military assistance in the form of grants for weapons purchases and is the only country that is allowed to use a substantial portion of this aid to develop also its own domestic military industry. (cp. Berrigan, 2009, pp. 6-7) Thus, the arms industry soon became Israel's most profitable branch and today Israel is among the world leaders in high-tech. As Frida Berrigan noted, *"The bulk of Israel's current arsenal is composed of equipment supplied by the United States. For example, Israel has 226 U.S.-supplied F-16 fighter and attack jets, more than 700 M-60 tanks, 6,000 armored personnel carriers, and scores of transport planes, attack helicopters and utility and*

training aircraft, not to mention innumerable bombs and tactical missiles of all kinds. The IDF also has a wide array of munitions at its disposal, including cluster bombs and incendiary devices like white phosphorous." (Berrigan, 2009, p. 9)

3.2.2. Further Opponents Arab States

Although Israel is the main adversary of the Palestinian national movements, it has to be mentioned that there have been several other opponents of Palestinian statehood that sought to pursue their own territorial interests in the region such as Syria, Jordan or Egypt, which will be subject to a more detailed analysis in the following chapter.

3.3. External Environment

3.3.1. Regional External Actors with Relevance to the Conflict

3.3.1.1. Collectivity of Regional Arab States

Besides the two main adversaries in the territorial fight, the Israelis and the Palestinians, also the Arab states exercised substantial influence on the future of Palestine and offered refuge as well as financial assistance to the Palestinians. Besides their own territorial and power interests in the region, some of the reasons for the interference of the Arab countries are common cultural characteristics like language, religion and the holy places of the Islam in Jerusalem, a common history under the Ottoman rule and during the time of European colonisation and a huge Palestinian Diaspora in the Middle East. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 107-108) The conflict further embodied values fundamental to Arab-Islamic identity such as solidarity, Arab unity, collective dignity, and anti-imperialism. Thus, Arab leaders openly showed their differences when each claimed to be the primary defender of Arab interests and anti-Zionism became a central means to prove this pan-Arab commitment. At the same time, Arab leaders appeared to have overcome their differences when they supported the hard-line policies of their counterparts. (cp. Lebovic, 2004, p. 170) The new order after the war of 1948 was characterised by an Arab struggle over who would represent the Palestinians. Most Palestinian political activity had to take place outside Palestine due to Israel's oppressive measures against Palestinians on its territory, Jordan's perception of any Palestinian organisation as subversive and threat to the unity of the kingdom and Egypt's refusal of

Palestinian activity in the Gaza Strip because it could have jeopardised Egypt's armistic agreement with Israel. Since that time, the Palestinians have been divided between Israel, the West and East Bank of Jordan, the Gaza Strip and refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Egypt. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 135-137)

Between 1958 and 1964, there raged a vicious struggle for hegemony among the Arab states also known as "Arab Cold War" that was marked by a two-fold confrontation. On the one side, Nasser and his allies were pitted against traditional pro-Western Arab monarchies and, on the other side, Nasser confronted other radical leaders like his Iraqi rival Abd Al-Karim Qasim. Due to Nasser's commitment to pan-Arabism, he affiliated Egypt and Syria in 1958 to the United Arab Republic and therewith created a new geopolitical situation. But the United Arab Republic collapsed already after three years due to the takeover of Syrian officers who were closely allied to the Baath Party. This enabled Nasser to focus more on the Palestinian question that was even more the case after Abd Al-Karim Qasim of Iraq was overthrown in 1963. At the same time a new takeover of Baath forces with closer ties to Egypt and the Soviet Union occurred in Syria. Nasser as well as the new regimes in Syria and Iraq were using Palestinian armed struggle for their political interests.

But also the remaining Palestinian nationalist notables utilised the Arab Cold War to create a space for Palestinian activity within the Arab League. The radical regimes that now dominated the regional association could easily be persuaded to embrace a Palestinian organisation. Despite their antagonism, the radical regimes and the traditional monarchy of Saudi Arabia, they had one common political ambition which was the embarrassment of the Hashemite regime because Jordan was regarded as British outpost. And the Palestinian question offered a good pretext to test Jordan's pan-Arab patriotism. Therefore, the initiators of the newly established PLO chose Jerusalem as place for the organisation's inauguration in May 1964. After the ceremony, the PLO established representative bodies throughout the Arab world. But the Palestinian guerrilla groups refused to join the organisation and instead focused on their fight against Israel, which created tensions along the Israeli-Jordanian border that pushed King Hussein of Jordan into a military alliance with Syria and Egypt. But in fact it was Syria that suffered most from the struggle with Israel. In the early 1960s, there started a war of attrition along the Israeli-Syrian border prompted by Israel's construction of a national aquifer. (cp. Pappe,

2010, pp. 163-167) These tensions led to the Six-Day War of 1967 between Israel and the Arab states, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, in which the former occupied the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. As a consequence, the Arab regimes did not focus on revolutionary goals that were pursued by the guerrilla movements at that time but on the restoration of the territorial status quo before the war. This interest was based on the fact that regional borders represented the political power of the ruling class and thus state borders and sovereignty became important elements for the separate Arab entities. This new territorial ideology was in sharp contrast to the Palestinian guerrilla strategy because Palestinian attacks on Israel from the territory of Arab states provoked Israeli retaliation and coerced the respective host country to abandon its sovereignty. Thus, Syria and Egypt denied granting the Palestinians operation bases for which reason they tried to transform Jordan into a revolutionary base for people's war and later were forced to move to Lebanon. (cp. Lüders, 1982, pp. 62-63)

The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was the last war of an Arab alliance against Israel and an unsuccessful Syrian and Egyptian attempt to regain the territory lost in the war of 1967. But initial military victories of Egypt and Syria eased the humiliation caused to the Arab states in the previous war and probably created the prerequisites needed for the entry of Arab states into peace negotiations with Israel based on their individual interests as we will see below. James H. Lebovic from the Department of Political Sciences of the George Washington University concludes: *"The Palestinian cause may have remained critical to Arab identity and the regional political agenda, but the conflict with Israel could no longer induce strong and persisting conformity in the alignment of regional states."* (Lebovic, 2004, p. 171) Only Saddam Hussein tried to make a connection between the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait during the Second Gulf War and the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and demanded that the withdrawal should be part of an overall solution to the conflicts in the area. (cp. Schreiber, 1992, p. 394) The latest common Arab effort to end the conflict was the so-called Arab Peace Initiative proposed at the Arab League Summit of 2002 in Beirut which has not been supported by any Israeli government since the time of its proposal. (cp. Report 3, 2010, p. 94)

In the ensuing paragraphs, the role of the most affected and influential single regional actors in the conflict will be examined more closely.

3.3.1.2. Jordan

Especially Jordan played a crucial role in the conflict since it laid territorial claims on Palestinian land and Palestinians posed a huge proportion of the state's inhabitants. King Abdullah of Jordan, whose army retained the largest part of Palestine that was not incorporated into the territory of Israel in the war of 1948, acted according to his dynastic and nation-state interests. He demanded the unification of the two banks of the Jordan River into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan which was ratified by his parliament in 1950. King Abdulla not only annexed the territory, but he also laid claim to represent the Palestinian people. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 135) The West Bank was under Jordanian control until the war of June 1967 when it was occupied by Israel. In 1988, Jordan finally abandoned its territorial claims in favour of a sovereign Palestinian state. Only in 1991, there was a first attempt to find bilateral solutions for the regional conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria within the framework of the Madrid Conference. After the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO in 1993, Jordan was encouraged to follow the Egyptian example and concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Despite small border adjustments, the contract adopted the demarcation of the time of the British mandate and included several security issues as well as cultural and economic matters such as the distribution of water between the two countries. While there was broad support for this step within Israel, the Jordanian Islamists and Arab nationalists refused the bilateral agreement and there was also no popular support from the Jordanian citizens. The Palestinian side raised serious objections against the arrangement regarding Jerusalem that underlined the Jordanian role in the administration of the Holy Sites. This understanding on the one hand affirmed the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem as given fact and, on the other hand, collided with the Palestinian claim on East Jerusalem as capital of their future state. Therefore, a cooperation agreement between Jordan and the Palestinians was signed in 1995 stipulating that Jordan would take the responsibility for the Holy Sites in Jerusalem until the Palestinians could exercise sovereign rights over the territory. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 110-113)

3.3.1.3. Egypt

Egypt is the most populous Arab country with enormous political influence for which reason it has traditionally played a leading role in the conflict between the Arabic states

and Israel. Due to Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula in 1967, also Egyptian territorial interests became involved. After the unsuccessful attempt to regain its territory in the war of 1973, Egypt on the instigation of its then President Anwar Al-Sadat became more closely associated with the USA in order to regain the Sinai Peninsula. This step led to Egypt's isolation within the Arab World and at the same time made Egypt a reliable partner for the USA. In 1978 Egypt was the first Arab country that entered direct negotiations with Israel about peace in the Middle East in Camp David. One direct consequence of the Camp David Agreement was the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979 which effectively resulted in a so-called "cold peace" that did not go beyond diplomatic relations between the two countries because the Egyptian population did not supported the conclusion of peace. The unsolved Palestinian question has had a bad impact on the inter-state relations until today.

Only in the 1990s, a re-evaluation of the Egyptian single-handed peace accord with Israel took place and at the Madrid Conference in 1991 efforts were made to further solve the Middle East Conflict on a bilateral basis between Israel and the other involved Arab countries. This new attitude lifted Egypt's isolation and strengthened its leading role in the Arab World. Due to Egypt's close ties to Saudi Arabia where around three million Egyptian workers are employed and its good relations to the USA, Egypt is an important political player. Egypt therefore is the host country of important Arab summits as well as of international Middle East conferences that aim at keeping alive the peace process. Egypt also plays a crucial role as mediator in inner-Palestinian disputes as well as between Israel and Hamas when it comes to negotiations of truces.

Although the future of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is uncertain after the democratic revolution of 2011 when then President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, any future government might not risk serious border conflicts with Israel or the spread of the Gaza conflict to its state's territory due to Egypt's financial dependency from tourism, dues for the Suez Canal as well as Western aid. But the political changes in Egypt also pose a certain threat to Israel. Due to the unpopularity of Israel among the Egyptians, any future government will be a less convenient partner than the autocratic regime of President Mubarak. Egypt also decided to end its secret complicity in maintaining the Gaza blockade and will no longer back the Israeli blocking of the peace process. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 108-111)

3.3.1.4. Syria

Another country with direct territorial interests in the dispute with Israel is Syria. Syria is concerned not only because the perception that Palestine should once have become part of a Greater Syrian Empire but also because today's Syrian Arab Republic has vital interest in regaining the Golan Heights, which were occupied in 1967. Syrian inhabitants were dispersed and Israeli settlers took possession of the mountains that were annexed in 1981. According to international law, the Golan Heights are occupied territory for which reason Syria refers to resolution 242 of the UN Security Council and requests the return as precondition for the end of the formal state of war. Until today, the countries have only concluded an armistice. For a long time, Syria regarded the dispute about the Golan Heights as part of an Israeli-Arab conflict that should have been solved in one comprehensive agreement. Syria was convinced that Israel would be in a more powerful position vis-à-vis single Arab states for which reason Syria had refused to negotiate with Israel on a bilateral level.

But at the time of the Madrid Conference in 1991 Syria felt that the time was strategically right to enter negotiations. First, Syria wanted to take advantage of the sympathy it earned from the USA through its support against Iraq in the Second Gulf War and second, the formula for the conference was "land for peace". Although Israel as well as Syria is interested in peace, both countries have different preconditions. While Syria claims the full return of the Golan Heights according to the status quo before 4 June 1967, Israel has different perceptions of a territorial compromise and insists on the "international borders" of the former mandatory land that were arranged between France and United Kingdom in 1923 and would grant a much bigger proportion of land to Israel. Israel further demands strict security measures, diplomatic relations and a comprehensive peace with open borders for cultural, touristic and economical exchange. Israel regards the Golan Heights as buffer zone that shields Israel from various forms of attacks and allows Israel to explore huge parts of Syria and South Lebanon. Syria, on the other side, argues that due to the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights Damascus is within the range of fire of conventional Israeli weapons. Another factor, which may be even more important, is the question of water. Israel obtains around 10 per cent of its water from sources that would be under Syrian control after the full return of the Golan Heights. Syria has insisted on an "honourable" peace mainly because after the death of the powerful leader Basil Al-Assad and the takeover of his son Bashar Al-Assad in 2000, the regime was not in a position to

ignore the tradition-conscious military elite and the domestic resistance against an unpopular peace agreement. Therefore, Bashar Al-Assad avoided taking precarious foreign political decisions but showed readiness to negotiate with Israel on several occasions but the Israeli preconditions blocked all efforts. Currently, the Syrian regime is confronted with a popular uprising and the violent fight for its maintenance of power is isolating the country with regard to international politics. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 120-125)

3.3.1.5. Lebanon

Although there is no substantial territorial dispute between Israel and Lebanon, the country has also been deeply affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the 1948 war 100,000 Palestinian refugees came to Lebanon whose population only amounted to 2.7 million at that time. Due to the precarious balance between Christians, Shiite Muslims and Sunni Muslims the Palestinians were not integrated into the Lebanese society and therefore stayed in refugee camps that unintended served as basis for the Palestinian resistance movement against Israel.

In 1975, a civil war between the religious groups erupted in Lebanon under participation of Palestinian groups and with regular military interference of the adversaries Syria and Israel. PLO forces seized the opportunity to attack Israel from Lebanese territory which led to two major Israeli military interventions. The first took place in 1978 and was followed by the installation of the UNIFIL to confirm the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The second intervention of 1982 aimed at the expulsion of the Palestinian leadership from Beirut. But the Israeli military operation was opposed by Syrian troops and also gave rise to the establishment of a Shiite resistance force called Hezbollah that was supported by Iran and Syria and seriously challenged Israeli troops in Lebanon. Thus, Israel withdrew its forces in 1985 but until now has considered a strip in the South of Lebanon as “security zone”. Although the PLO had to leave Beirut in 1982 and the Lebanese army was able to eliminate the last PLO bases in the South of Lebanon with the help of Syrian troops in 1991, Hezbollah has continued its struggle against Israel, which provoked retaliation operations that caused damage to Israel’s image on the international stage. Also within Israel the war became increasingly unpopular so Israel deployed all its troops from Lebanese territories without a bilateral agreement in 2000. This step put

Syria under international pressure to withdraw its forces as well. But only after the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Al-Hariri, who demanded the end of Syrian predominance in his country in 2005 under alleged connivance of the Syrian regime, Syria had no choice but to withdraw its forces. But even after this de facto restoration of Lebanese sovereignty the country stayed unstable and deeply divided between family and clan membership respectively confessional and religious affiliations that determine the loyalty of the citizens.

Politically, Hezbollah asserted itself and has been taking part in parliamentary elections since 1992 and has been part of changing governments since 2005. The armed branch of Hezbollah has comprised several hundred active fighters and several thousand men in support. It was again involved in a military confrontation with Israel in 2006, which was followed by truce that was supervised by the UNIFIL. The international troops are further responsible to prevent illegal arms deliveries to Lebanon. A demonstration of Hezbollah's power in 2008 led to serious clashes with the security forces of the pro-Western government, which caused damage to Hezbollah's image. In 2009, Hezbollah presented a doctrine of deterrence in order to dispel the people's concerns about a new war with Israel. Israel, on the other hand, is worried about Hezbollah's armament with rockets with a range of fire of over 200 kilometres as well as about the nuclear programme of Hezbollah's ally, Iran. Due to its domestic strength as social force and its actual role as ruling party its disarmament and the integration of its forces into the national army would only be possible with Hezbollah's consent and therefore the chances for this transition are minimal as long as there is no lasting solution to the Middle East conflict. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 113-120; Cordesman, 2005, p. 167) Hezbollah has offered continued support and guidance to the Palestinian fighters of Hamas as well as the PLO and is suspected of providing significant material assistance through arms smuggling and military training. Furthermore, there is evidence that Hezbollah has provided Palestinians with military intelligence and financial assets. (cp. Cordesman, 2005, pp. 224-226)

3.3.1.6. Iran

Besides the above-mentioned directly involved Arab states, Iran is worth mentioning as single actor due to its continuing role in undermining the Middle East Peace Process and

its support for Palestinian armed struggle. Israel's military strength threatens Iran's regional dominance and a successful completion of the conflict could further empower Israel and at the same time isolate Iran. Thus, Iran provided financial assistance to all factions that continued their violent fight against Israel including the front of rejection of the peace process which included Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and the PFLP-GC. During the Second Intifada, Iran seems to have even financed militant operations of the Al-Fatah affiliated Tanzim inside the Palestinian Territories. Additionally, Iran supported the activities of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Besides providing financial assistance, material support and military training to the militant groups, Iran provided financial and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians engaged in Jihad against Israel. (cp. Cordesman, 2005, pp. 233-235)

3.3.2. Global External Actors with Relevance to the Conflict

3.3.2.1. Worldwide Palestinian Diaspora

The Palestinian Diaspora is recent, forced and directly personal and thus connected with memories of loss of life and properties. Most Palestinians fled to the neighbouring countries, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, but a significant number also went to other Arab countries, to Europe or to the Americas. Their exile has been experienced as humiliating and ultimate despite the international recognition of the right of return because in fact most Palestinians have no choice to return to their native land. The deep desire to return to the homeland caused an idealised and complex relationship between the people living in Diaspora and the Palestinian territory. Ironically, the dispersal and fragmentation have served as uniting factor within the modern Palestinian national Identity. Therefore, the lost homeland has become the focal point of the identity of the deterritorialised Palestinian community. The Palestinian national narrative perceives the Diaspora as problematic situation and defines individuals living outside the homeland negatively. Therefore, permanent residents of the Palestinian Territories impute returnees of having preferred the comfort and safety of the Diaspora to the common suffering under Israeli occupation. Despite this negative perception, the Palestinians are well aware of the fact that the Palestinian people are overwhelmingly Diasporic and their important role in offering political and other assistance. (cp. Rabinowitz, 2002, pp. 768-77; Lindholm Schulz, 2003, p. 2) For instance, the Palestinian Diaspora in the USA established the

American Task Force on Palestine in 2003 that functions as a pro-Palestinian lobby group in Washington. It *"[...] is dedicated to advocating that it is in the American national interest to promote an end to the conflict in the Middle East through a negotiated agreement that provides for two states - Israel and Palestine - living side by side in peace and security."* (Homepage of the American Task Force on Palestine) On the other hand, the Arab governments' treatment of an estimated 4.6 million of stateless Palestinians as refugees served as a means of applying pressure to Israel and thus, they have been a political plaything. (cp. Miller/Samuels, 22/10/2009)

3.3.2.2. Worldwide Jewish Diaspora

The Jewish Diaspora is characterised by the impersonal, constructed and mythologized memory of dispossession. Due to the strong relation of Jews to their homeland, early Zionism aimed at overcoming the status of Diaspora. Although most Jews living in Diaspora have been well acculturated and can chose to immigrate to their home country since the establishment of the State of Israel, the meaning of territory is central to the nation. (cp. Rabinovitz, 2002, pp. 768-770) Thus, Jews worldwide are strongly engaged in the political and financial support of Israel. Shlomo Sand noted, *"As the Yiddish culture lost its vitality, Israel increased in importance for many American Jews, and the number of Zionists increased. If, during the Second World War, American Jewry behaved rather apathetically toward the mass slaughter in Europe, it responded with sympathy and support for Israel, especially following Israel's victory in the 1967 war. In Europe, with the rise of the European Union and the weakening of the nation-states within it, the Jewish institutions in London and Paris also experienced a transnational ethnicization, and the State of Israel learned to derive maximum political benefit from this worldwide network of Jewish power."* (Sand, 2009, p. 310) Thus, Israel profited from the considerable influence of Jewish lobbies worldwide among which those in the USA are by far the most powerful. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt described the so-called "Israel lobby" in their famous identically named book as *"[...] loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. [...] It is simply a powerful interest group, made up of both Jews and gentiles, whose acknowledged purpose is to press Israel's case within the United States*

and influence American foreign policy in ways that its members believe will benefit the Jewish state." (Mearsheimer/Walt, 2007, p. 5)

Despite the fact that the globalisation led to an increased pro-Zionist ethnicization among the established Jewish communities worldwide, the assimilation of Jews progressed. As a consequence, the democratic power base of the Jewish establishment is eroding and despite the strong solidarity with Israel among Jews aged over sixty, the support for Israel among Jewish families under thirty-five is declining. This fact implies that the inflow of power from Israel's transnational Diaspora may not be stable over time. Although Israel does no longer need demographic increase through immigration, it is highly dependent on retaining the loyalty of overseas Jewish organisations and communities because they are close to centres of power and communication in the Western world. (cp. Sand, 2009, pp. 309-311)

3.3.2.3. The World Stage and the Role of the International Community

As in any conflict, the international public opinion plays a central role in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute because it determines the level of support from outside actors. Thus, Israel as well as the Palestinians has to take into consideration that their behaviour directly influences their international public image and the willingness of other actors to back up the respective party in the conflict. On the other hand, certain tactics used in the struggle would not have functioned without international notice like the concept of using international terrorism to gain attention for political demands.

Since the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there has been a high degree of international involvement. When the conflict arose, the European mandate powers gained centre stages and were replaced during the Cold War by the two Great Powers. During that time, there was an understanding between the USA and the Soviet Union about international conflict management. Although the USA supported Israel and the Soviet Union forged an alliance with the Arab states, the two Great Powers agreed on the rejection of any solution that would favour one party over the other. As Riad Al-Malki noted, the main reason was the need for a continual conflict in order to ensure the perpetuation of the Cold War itself without allowing it to get out of control. Thus, the International Community was not able to overstep this bi-polar order. (cp. Al-Malki,

2007) Not even the **Non-Aligned Movement** was able to pose a counterweight to the existing world order. But after the PLO had reached recognition as sole representative of the Palestinians at least from the Arab League it aimed at further strengthening its international role. Thus, the PLO seized the opportunity to make the delegations to the 4th Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries from 19 to 21 March 1974 in Algiers aware of the Palestinian problem. Every delegation was accompanied by a Palestinian escort who was able to inform the delegates as well as journalists about the Palestinian cause in their respective mother tongue. Hence, the conference was dominated by the Palestinian question. Yasser Arafat even managed to increase the influence of the PLO within the Non-Aligned Movement by accommodating differences between Muammar Al-Gaddafi and Fidel Castro. The participation of the PLO in the conference led to a huge success which was the adoption of a declaration in which the members of the movement confirmed the recognition of the PLO as representative of the Palestinians. (cp. Frangi, 1982, pp. 195-196) But the Non-Aligned Movement completely lost its prestige and importance due to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the majority of the former Soviet states tied up their security and economic interests to the USA and Israel. (cp. Al-Malki, 2007) Only with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the new uni-polarity with the USA as only Great Power developed. Consequently, the USA enforced its will worldwide and other countries tried to win the goodwill of the USA at the expense of former allies and principled positions. Al-Malki calls the partiality of the USA to Israel an "indisputable fact" as revealed by the stances of the US-administration regarding the Middle East Conflict. And according to him, other states became aware of the heavy price they were liable to pay for not complying with this reality or for condemning Israel in international forums. (cp. Al-Malki, 2007) Especially the **United Nations Organisation** has played a steady role in the Middle East conflict. UN-Resolutions like the UN Partition Plan or the establishment of organisations such as the UNRWA had significant impact on the process on the ground. But the UNO has always been restricted in its scope of action due to the mutual blocking through the veto power in the Security Council. Although the UNO has offered a forum to advocate demands and gain international support, for instance when the Security Council confirmed the right of the Palestinians to establish their own state, it was not involved in the initiation of the peace process. Nevertheless, the UNO has fulfilled crucial tasks like the support of refugees, the supervision of truces, the denunciation of Human Rights abuses. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 138-144) Regarding the international arena, Al-Malki

concludes, *"The voting pattern of the U.S. in the Security Council where Israel is concerned has imposed itself on the rest of the international community. The big blocs forming the international community have become very complaisant in dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They have become increasingly reticent vis-à-vis American and Israeli intractability, adopting instead more lenient and less confrontational stances. […] All this data leads to one conclusion: that the members of the international community do not possess the power — even if they had the will — to impose a stand that contravenes the U.S., especially regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Once these countries realized their total powerlessness to influence developments on the ground as far as the conflict is concerned, they resorted to new and disparate middle positions. This means, in practice, the withdrawal of the majority of the international community in the face of the clear and unwavering American position pertaining to the conflict or other regional conflicts, giving the U.S. free rein to define not only its own position, but, through it, that of the international community regarding any issue without exception. And while the American position regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is clear in its absolute bias towards Israel, it means any new move must first come from the U.S. or with its agreement; otherwise any other attempt would be futile and doomed to fail, in spite of its importance to the Palestinian side."* (Al-Malki, 2007) Thus, when Israel refused to recognise Hamas's election victory and de-legitimised it as terrorist organisation, the United States and Europe joined Israel in imposing sanctions against the Hamas government. By trying to bring the government down by withholding tax revenues and international aid a situation was created in which the International Community imposed sanctions against the occupied instead of the occupier. (cp. Shlaim, 2010, pp. 309-310)

Although the majority of the member states of the UNO – until today the number amounts to 126 countries – has recognised the State of Palestine, it is not yet a full member of the organisation. Hence, the Palestinian Authority submitted its application for membership in the world forum in September 2011, but it has not yet been decided upon. In September 2012 it therefore asked for its upgrade to a non-member state, which was granted by the majority in the General Assembly.

But the main supporting block of the Palestinians, the Muslim countries, that cooperate under the umbrella of the **Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)**, which is the second largest international body after the UN and designed to advocate Muslim interests,

have lacked the mechanisms for the implementation of their resolutions. This is mainly attributed to the multiplicity of interests among the countries, the disparity in their positions and the formation of alliances. Religion is no longer the moving principle behind these countries but primarily economic, security and political interests. Thus, the OIC has used its influence within the UN on several occasions to push initiatives in the interests of the Muslim countries, like greater access to Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem or even in favour of the Palestinians in particular but the organisation has never developed into a major factor in the conflict. (cp. Johnson, 29/06/2010; Al-Malki, 2007) Also the member states of the **League of Arab States** have never acted homogeneously with regard to the Middle East Conflict. The organisation was highly engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in Palestinian politics in its initial phase and even set up the PLO in order to assure its influence on the conflict. Later it was the Arab League that first recognised the PLO under the leadership of Yasser Arafat as sole representative of the Palestinians and announced the recognition of the State of Palestine immediately after its declaration. But today, the Arab League has not much left to offer to the Middle East Conflict other than the Arab Peace Initiative it adopted at its Beirut Summit of 2002. In this initiative, the Arab states reached the limit of what can be offered from their side under the current circumstances without getting concessions from Israel. (cp. Al-Malki, 2007; Report 3, 2010, pp. 93-94) Thus, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, presented the initiative, *"[...] calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land-for-peace principle, and for Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel."* (Arab Peace Initiative, 2002)

3.3.2.4. USA

In 1948, the USA as well as the Soviet Union supported the establishment of the State of Israel. Only the Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt in 1955 brought the USA to the arena that engaged itself in the establishment of anti-Soviet alliances. (cp. Bunzl, 2008, pp. 119) Especially against the background of Israel's military successes against its Arab neighbours, the country became an increasingly important strategic partner for the USA

because it proved that it was able to contain the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Thus, the USA assisted Israel in becoming the strongest military force in the region and provides continuous financial support. At least since the 1970s, the USA have been the most important external actor in the Middle East Conflict. But its partnership with Israel equals a guarantee for the existence of the State of Israel and as mentioned above, the USA have used its veto power in the UNO in favour of Israel. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 127-129) Since 1983, a "strategic cooperation" has existed between the USA and Israel which led to the establishment of common working groups in the military, security and economic field that enables Israel to exercise influence on US-decisions about external aid. (cp. Watzal, 2001 II, p. 102) Thus, the economic assistance, the military aid and the weapons transfers from the USA to Israel have increased in recent years. The USA and Israel even conduct joint military research, production and training. (cp. Berrigan, 2009, pp. 6-7)

US-American foreign policy is highly influenced by interest groups, media and domestic political factors. Due to the fact that elections take place every two years, the political representatives in the Senate and Congress are under permanent pressure to compete for support. Thus, the financial power of the Jewish community in the USA plays a central role in the extremely costly election campaigns for the Senate and the Congress as well as for the office of the President and interest groups like the above-mentioned Israel lobby can exert much political influence. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, p. 126/Watzal, 2001 II, p. 101/Kramer, 1999, p. 82) Summing up, the US-American foreign political interests in the Middle East Conflict are based on economic considerations like the vital meaning of the oil reserves for the Western industrial states and huge arms deals with the Gulf countries, on the fight against international terrorism which originates in the region and on the so-called "special relationship" with Israel within which the USA guarantee the security of the State of Israel in case of an existential threat. This special relationship is partly referable to the strong emotional connection between the people of the USA and the Jewish people. This relationship is grounded first, on the feeling of guilt for not preventing the Holocaust from the side of the USA as well as on the perception that the two people are congenial because they are both societies of pioneers with cultural roots in Europe. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 126-127) Furthermore, it has to be mentioned that Christian extremists in the USA, comprising about 80 million people, exercise domestic

political pressure in favour of Israel because the territory is perceived as Holy Land that shall stay under Jewish control (cp. Primor, 25/05/2011)

Today, the central role of the USA is not only accepted by Israel but also by the Palestinians because they know that only the USA will be in a position to put enough pressure on Israel to agree to a solution to the conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the USA has acted as mediator between the conflict parties. Despite this role as broker, Israel's security is a top priority in US-American foreign policy and even gained in importance after 9/11 when Israel managed to make a connection between its fight against militant Palestinian groups and the "Global War on Terror". (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 129-130) Ludwig Watzal concluded that, *"Although the USA always point out that all controversial questions have to be solved between the Israelis and the Palestinians without external influence, it is pulling the strings from behind the scene."* (Watzal, 2001 II, p. 105) But *"[...] the United States never unequivocally and in practice supported the self-determination and independent, viable state of the Palestinians, and often acted to undermine this and other universal principles of international law and legitimacy. Without these principles, needless to say, a just and lasting resolution of this problem is impossible."* (Khalidi, 2006, pp. XXXI-XXXII)

3.3.2.5. The EU and its Member States

Especially the former mandate powers France and Great Britain played a crucial role in the Middle East conflict because it was perceived as important scope of political influence. Especially Great Britain had favoured outcomes that were politically convenient domestically (like considerable electoral and financial advantages to be obtained from supporting Zionism) over solutions compatible with the situation on the ground or with the principles of international law and self-determination. Like the succeeding Great Power USA, it aimed at dominating this crucial territory, keeping it in friendly hands, and preventing others from controlling it. Furthermore, there existed sympathy for Zionism among many politicians based on a particularly Protestant immersion in the Bible which was often combined with a wish to make amends for the persecution of the Jews in different parts of Europe or the desire to have the victims of persecution find haven somewhere other than in the United Kingdom or the USA. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. XVIII/p. XXXII)

Over time, the Middle East Conflict has become a strategic priority of the European Union as a whole due to various reasons. Among them is, on the one hand, European history, especially colonialism and the Holocaust and the interest in a stable neighbourhood and a low number of asylum seekers on account of the war, on the other. During the 1970s, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict developed into a security problem for Europe due to Palestinian international terrorism. The permanent tensions in the region led to its high degree of militarisation and the economic problems of many countries in the region led to undesirable migration waves to Europe. Furthermore, the member states of the EU import more than one quarter of their oil from the Middle East and North Africa. Although there is a significant interest of the EU to be involved in conflict resolution, the USA has avoided letting European states become a rival in their role as mediator. Furthermore, Israel did not wish any political involvement of European actors.

Due to a lack of options to exercise influence, the EU first concentrated on the adoption of declarations like the important Venice Declaration of 1980 in which the Palestinian right to self-determination was recognised. Additionally, the EU started to deploy economic instruments that broadened its scope of action. European states perceived their involvement in the conflict as chance to get rid of their colonial image and some even assumed the role as "advocate of the Palestinians". But in particular Germany has played a special role due to its high commitment towards Israel in the form of political support and reparations payments. The mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO in 1993 offered new options for an involvement of the EU in the conflict and thus, the EU tried to speak with one voice regarding its foreign and security political engagement in the Middle East. Only as a member of the Middle East Quartet that was established in 2002, the EU assumed the role of a mediator although in consultation with the Quartet partners and especially the USA. But the main role of the EU is that of a donor. Between 1994 and 2009, its financial support for the PNA, Palestinian NGOs, humanitarian aid for refugees and peace projects amounted to around € 8.4 billion. Therewith, the EU aims at improving the framework for the peace process like by assisting in the set-up of Palestinian state institutions or infrastructure. (cp. Johannsen, 2011, pp. 132-138) The strong financial involvement of the EU into the peace process, which amounts to an average of € 179 million per year, is based on three main considerations. First, the EU thinks that the establishment of a viable Palestinian state is in line with the Israeli interests. Second, it assumes that an increase in the life quality of the Palestinians will lay

the cornerstone for a successful peace process and third, bilateral Israeli-Palestinian projects are expected to improve the relations and therewith promote peace. (cp. Asseburg, 2001, pp. 113-114)

The role of the EU can be summarised as follows, *"[...] Europe projects itself as soft power and aspires to assume the role of a mediator especially in view of the increasing criticism that the US lost its credibility during the era of the Bush administration and can no longer act as an honest broker in the conflict. [...] European policies on Palestine, however, have suffered from a lack of political coherence and strategic focus. European strategic culture is based more on diplomacy and international conventions than the use of hard power and open confrontation. Part of the reason why European efforts have failed in Palestine is due to divergences between Europe and the US regarding the use of (hard) power".* (Kalin, 2009, p. 179)

3.3.2.6. Russian Federation

In the era of the Cold War, the Soviet Union tried to exploit the Middle East Conflict to increase its influence in the region and thus, there was evidence that it started efforts to establish ties to the various factions of the PLO at the beginning of the 1970s. Although it did not yet recognise it officially, a first indirect delivery in arms was arranged via Syria and Egypt. Only after the war of 1973, the Soviet Union openly showed its support for the Palestinian national demands based on a two-state solution. Against the increasing US-American influence in the disengagement negotiations in the aftermath of the war, the Soviet Union intensified its support for the Palestinians. Hence, it offered assistance in military training that even included two-year-courses in guerrilla warfare as well as in classical military techniques. Against the background of the Egyptian efforts to make peace with Israel and the strong common interests of the oil-rich Gulf countries and the USA, the Soviet Union identified the PLO as an important actor to exercise further influence on the ground. (cp. Schiller, 1982, pp. 432-437) But following the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia let the USA take the lead in Middle East diplomacy and meanwhile, good Israeli-Russian relations developed on the economical, cultural and military level. Israel welcomed that Russian Jews were allowed to immigrate to Israel and thus hoped for rapidly developing bilateral cultural and consequent political relations between the two countries. But due to internal political changes within Russia,

the country took a more critical stance towards Israel and a more sympathetic one towards the Arabs states. Especially since Vladimir Putin's term in office as Russian President, one of the main aims besides the restoration of Russian international prestige and economic development was the containment of Muslim and in particular Middle Eastern aid to Chechen rebellion. The Russian pro-Palestinian attitude was expected to further that ambition while the country also maintained a strong bilateral cooperation with Israel in terms of trade, tourism or culture although it was overshadowed by diplomatic conflicts. On several occasions, Russia supported Israel critical UN-resolutions like those condemning the Israeli security barrier or the Israeli military incursion into Gaza. Although Russia has been part of the Middle East Quartet since its establishment in 2002, it undermined the consensus of the Quartet by inviting delegates of Hamas as legitimate political representatives of the Palestinians after their election victory in 2006. This diplomatic support for Hamas as well as Russia's backing and assistance to Israel's main enemies Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, which aimed at the enhancement of the Russian position in the Middle East, caused deterioration in the Israeli-Russian relations. Despite this alienation, there has still existed a bilateral cooperation in arms sales to third countries and also the trade between the two countries has expanded in the following years to around $ 2.5 billion annually. This mirrors Russia's great interests in the expansion of economic ties with Israel, especially in the high-tech sector in which neither the Arab states nor Iran can be a helpful partner. Hence, Russia regards the high proportion of Russian-speaking Israelis as possible factor of influence inside Israel.

Russia clearly seized the conflict to regain a more central role in Middle East diplomacy and therefore even offered to host an international conference in Moscow, which would be a great step towards the realisation of its aim. (cp. Freedman, 2010)

3.3.2.7. China

Although China played a peripheral role in Middle East politics during the Cold War, it has had a historic function in supporting Third World revolutionary movements and anti-colonial struggles in the region and thus, it has advocated the Palestinian national cause, recognised Palestinian territorial claims and supported its struggle for self-determination. China not only recognised the PLO as political representative of the Palestinians but has also perceived Hamas as legitimate representative since its election

victory in 2006. As a UN Security Council member, China has levelled criticism of Israeli actions like the continued occupation of Palestinian land, the Gaza war or the construction of the separation barrier. Thus, it is perceived by many Arab and Muslim states to have the potential to challenge the USA and therewith contain the Israeli influence in the region. But Chinese behaviour suggests that its policy regarding Palestine is based on pragmatic grounds that are in line with the international consensus on the conflict led by the USA. Furthermore, China has steadily improved its relations with Israel, especially in the economic field because the trade volume between the countries represents the sixth largest in the world. The diplomatic differences as well as Chinas close ties to Iran and Syria did not challenge this strong economic cooperation. In particular China's quest for advanced technology in the military field and Israel's aggressive export efforts in this sector link the two countries.

To sum up, China's Middle East Strategy is based on questions like energy security due to the fact that China is the third largest importer of oil as well as on economical considerations like the opening up of consumer markets and investment opportunities. Furthermore, China is keen on enhancing its diplomatic influence on the international stage. (cp. Zambelis, 2009)

3.3.3. Influence of the External Actors on the Conflict

As in any conflict, it has been indispensable for the Palestinian national movements to take into account the interests of the external actors. Especially with regard to the immediate neighbours of Palestine because not only Israel had an interest in expanding its land but also other **Arab countries** had territorial interests in Palestine. Thus, there had been strong influence on the Palestinian struggle for self-determination from the side of the Arab countries, especially in its initial phases. In particular, the neighbour states, Jordan, Egypt and Syria, interfered heavily in the conflict. On the one hand, they were involved through active warfare against Israel and, on the other, they provided political, financial and military support to the various Palestinian paramilitary groups according to their own interests. Also other member states of the Arab League interfered in the conflict by making allies with certain Palestinian groups or even pitting them against each other. As Yezid Sayigh stated, there was a strong relationship with Arab host societies since the Palestinian leadership and main institutions were based in exile. However, *"[...] the need*

to establish secure sanctuaries brought the Palestinian guerrillas into conflict with the Arab governments concerned and invited punitive Israeli reprisals that increased the burden on civilian populations and national economies. [...] Their intervention in domestic politics inevitably exacerbated latent tensions in the host society and fuelled civil strife." (Sayigh, 1997, p. 675) The complex relationship to Jordan was mainly based on the question of the representation of the Palestinians. The loss of the sanctuary of the Palestinian fighters in Jordan after 1970 increased the importance of Lebanon and subsequently made them more dependent on Syria that exercised substantial influence in its neighbour country. Syria perceived itself as entitled to Arab leadership and thus exerted a special role in the Palestinian question. Iraq as well as Saudi Arabia has also played a prominent role but Egypt was of much greater importance due to its military and diplomatic support for Palestine and its controversial decision to make peace with Israel. (cp. Sayigh, 1997, pp. 675-676) According to Michael Lüders, a historical analysis shows that the Arab states pursued a pro-Palestinian respectively pro-PLO policy as long as it could be used as leverage to enhance their own interests. (cp. Lüders, 1982, p. 62)

The same principle applies to the policy of **Iran** that became an ally of the anti-Israeli Islamic forces in the conflict due to its internal ideological orientation after the Islamic revolution.

Although the huge **worldwide Palestinian Diaspora** plays a crucial role for the political and economic spheres in the Palestinian Territories, the main financial resources for the Palestinian struggle derived from other countries rather than the own people living abroad. The Palestinian Diaspora has always served as a lobby for Palestinian interests and as a reservoir for well-educated leaders. Same applies to the **Jewish/Israeli Diaspora** which not only plays a crucial role in gathering political support for Israel but also in funding the State of Israel.

The political contexts in which the national struggle was conducted *"[...] were the interrelated local, regional and international environments that provided settings for Palestinians' search for self-determination. With Israel physically in control of Palestine after 1967, the regional and international environment became the main stages upon which the struggle developed. As each of these contextual environments became less opposed to purely Palestinian nationalism, opportunities for the Palestinian National Movement increased."* (Tschirgi, 2001, p. 203) Thus, the **International Community** has

played an active role in the conflict since its beginning. Especially the UNO with its Partition Plan and its active institutions on the ground have provided a framework for the handling of the conflict. *"Aware of the tremendous power imbalance, and having enjoyed significant success on the international arena, the Palestinians have consistently requested greater involvement by the international community. This has included frequent appeals to the United Nations, Europe, the Arab world and the United States."* (Report 9, 2002, p. 13) According to Faisal Mekdad, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Syria, the double standards applied by the USA and Europe as well as their support for the Israeli occupation created a situation that made it impossible for the Palestinians to reach statehood. (cp. Mekdad, 01/09/2010) Especially as long as there is external support for the ethnic self-definition of the so-called "Jewish state", which denies the presence of Christians and Muslims inside Israel, it will be impossible to sustainably resolve the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. (cp. Muhasien, 18/09/2010)

Although several international organisations like the **Non-Aligned Movement** and the **Organisation of the Islamic Conference** have pretended to be strong supporters of the Palestinian national struggle, they never exercised substantial influence on the conflict. Particularly the permanent **UN Security Council member states** have showed greater involvement in the conflict and made use of their veto power but primarily the interests of the USA in the region have dominated the process on the ground until today. Thus, Riad Al-Malki concludes *"[...] that the members of the international community do not posses the power – even if they had the will – to impose a stand that contravenes the U.S., especially regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict."* (Al-Malki, 2007)

Hence, it has to be noticed that that the Palestinian struggle for self-determination has long been directed from outside and until today is dependent upon external support in financial, military, ideological and diplomatic terms.

4. Strategic Concepts

4.1. Strategic Resources Transformed Into Instruments of Power

4.1.1. Tangible

In the initial phase of the conflict, the Palestinian paramilitary groups lacked the tangible resources necessary for effective attacks on Israel for which reason several smaller guerrilla operations were committed. Only the acquisition of increasing amounts of old weapons and the mobilisation that broadened after the famous Battle of Karameh enabled the paramilitary groups to conduct actions on a larger scale. Especially after the takeover of the PLO by the Palestinian groups, the Palestinian national movements had more access to financial, military and political resources.

Hamas, on the other hand, was able to draw back on better infrastructure in the time following its establishment due to the spadework of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the organisation was able to enter the political stage immediately after its set-up during the First Intifada and soon became a strong political and military force.

Although Israeli military acts of retaliation have caused huge set-backs for the infrastructure of the PLO as well as Hamas, both national movements have been in a position to overcome them without being under existential threat.

4.1.2. Intangible

Both Palestinian national movements benefited from the deep ideological commitment of their people since self-determination was a commonly shared goal.

The PLO is well-known for its strong role in Palestinian identity building and its leader, Yasser Arafat, became a national symbol. Thus, its potential for mobilisation and the motivation of the fighters to free their land from occupation was rather high. This notion shaped Palestinian martyrdom, which means the readiness to die for the national cause.

Hamas, on the other hand, drew back not only on nationalist mobilisation but also on religious values. This deep religious commitment has partly been transformed into a sense of self-abandonment that even produced Holy Fighters ready to commit suicide attacks. Hamas successfully transformed its prestige into political power.

As we have seen in previous chapters, the Palestinians could draw back on strong international solidarity but have lacked decisive international diplomatic backing for their demands.

4.2. Strategic Ways

The following chapter examines the strategic ways used by the Palestinian national movements classified according to their level of violence.

4.2.1. Non-Cooperative Way

In order to maintain the classification of the non-cooperative approach into three different levels ranging from the least until the most violent action the following paragraphs will not be based on a chronological order.

4.2.1.1. Non-Violent Resistance

First absolutely non-violent approaches were adopted at the beginning of the 1970s when demonstrations, strikes and boycotts against the Israeli occupation inside the Palestinian Territories took place and the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories started to build their own infrastructure in order to disconnect themselves from the occupation force. This newly established network of organisations including trade unions, committees and student associations took a central place in the activities applied during the First Intifada.

Only in the aftermath of the Second Intifada, new non-violent initiatives gained centre stage. Academic institutions, trade unions and religious organisations were engaged in targeted boycotts and sanctions against Israel.

4.2.1.2. Violent Resistance

The violent approach of the Palestinian national movements comprised the following two kinds:

- **Readiness to use violence against property and persons**

  At the beginning of the Palestinian national struggle, attacks against Israeli infrastructure were committed, but soon terrorist attacks against civilians gained centre stage. Although these guerrilla operations took the loss of human lives, it was not their main purpose. Important reasons for the adoption of armed battle as PLO's means to liberate Palestine were the hope for a renaissance of the Palestinian identity after the traumatic events of 1948, the overcoming of the fragmentation of Palestinian resistance into various organisations and the strengthening of the morale of the Arab masses. Another crucial consideration was the provocation of another military confrontation between the Arab states and Israel that was expected to achieve the liberation of Palestine. (cp. Baumgarten, 2002, pp. 38-41)

  During the 1970s, various PLO fractions even drew back on international terrorism that included the hijacking of airplanes as well as large-scale operations like the kidnapping of the Olympic athletes in Munich 1972. In each such operation, the loss of human lives and the destruction of property were accepted.

- **Deliberate use of violence against persons**

  Although the destruction of the State of Israel was the overall goal of the Palestinian national movements and there existed the well-known slogan that the Jews should be dropped into the sea, the deliberate use of violence against persons took place only rarely until the 1990s. But the concept of suicide bombing became a frequently used tactical measure applied by different Palestinian groups starting from 1994 and definitely aimed at threatening the lives of people and especially civilians. Particularly during the Second Intifada, suicide bombings in Israeli shopping centres, buses and in the surrounding of military installations were conducted. Since 2003, Hamas has even used rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip on Israeli cities to cause human casualties.

4.2.2. Cooperative Way

4.2.2.1. Negotiations

In the aftermath of the war of 1973, the PLO had to react to the new political context in order to avoid its political marginalisation. The political rethinking of the PLO and its readiness to adapt its political agenda to the realpolitik implied a more cooperative approach for which reason the PLO entered the diplomatic stage. Especially Al-Fatah was forced to accommodate the anti-Israeli sentiments in the Palestinian refugee camps and thus, maintained its radical rhetoric but showed its readiness to compromise on the quiet. (cp. Lüders, 1982, p. 72) The PLO finally decided to enter a peace dialogue with Israel and accepted its existence as well as a two-state solution. This readiness to compromise largely stemmed from the hope of the PLO leadership to maximise gains vis-à-vis its internal rivals more than vis-à-vis Israel and there was huge antagonism against the peace process from the side of Hamas. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, p. 98) Hamas officially has refused any cooperative approach towards Israel although it seems increasingly ready to accept a long-term truce with Israel, which subliminally implies the acceptance of the two-state solution.

5. Evaluation of the Palestinian Strategy With Respect to the Individual Strategic Elements

5.1. Conflict Conditions

Due to the absence of a Palestinian political representation in the diplomatic struggle over the distribution of the former Ottoman territories as well as in the decision making process when the International Community decided upon the fate of Palestine in the 1940s, the Palestinians missed their first chances to self-determination. The Palestinians also did not play a role in the conventional wars of the Arab states against the newly established State of Israel and therefore, their self-responsible struggle for their interests only started in a very late phase of the territorial dispute.

5.2. Formulation and Pursuance of Interests, Goals and Objectives

The Palestinian national movements have been actively pursuing the national **interests** of security, identity and prosperity. The PLO has made enormous contributions to the security respectively survival of the Palestinians as an ethnic group living largely in Diaspora through its promotion of armed struggle and national symbols that created a common base of Palestinian identity. Furthermore, the PLO has been engaged in the defence of refugee camps and in the construction of economic infrastructure as well as in the build-up of the PNA to improve the level of security and prosperity of the Palestinian people. Also Hamas has played an important role in Palestinian identity building with a strong focus on religion and has been in possession of security forces as well as economic institutions. Notwithstanding, the realisation of those central national interests is perceived to be possible only within the framework of self-determination.

The **goal** of self-determination has been commonly agreed upon from the beginning of the Palestinian struggle but the **objectives**, expressed in different forms of self-determination, have changed over time and have not been coherent and accepted by all Palestinians. The amendment of the PLO's initial unrealistic objective of 1964, the elimination of Israel, towards the wish to establish a secular democratic state for Muslims, Christians and Jews, replacing Israel, which appeared to satisfy most Palestinians, made it easier for outsiders to be pro-Palestinian without being accused of being anti-Zionist. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 154-156 & p. 169) Notwithstainding, the negotiated two-state solution and a gradual abandonment of armed struggle were a pragmatic adjustment to the circumstances and also marked a certain maturity of Palestinian political discourse. This step facilitated the winning of international support and recognition. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 169) Thus, there occurred *"[...] a gradual shift from 'total' objectives to far more limited 'phasal' ones, from the 'ideal' to the 'realistic'."* (Sayigh, 1986, p. 98) As Rashid Khalidi notes, *"In spite of this major evolution in the PLO position, the Palestinian cause in the late 1970s and 1980s appeared to be marking time or even going backwards. This was partly because of the incoherence of the Palestinian position and the internal contradictions in Palestinian strategy (still ostensibly wedded to the continuation of armed struggle while moving toward a negotiated, political solution)."* (Khalidi, 2006, p. 156) Within the inner-Palestinian discourse there had arosen problems with the general understanding of the political standpoint of the PLO. As long as the PLO had fought to defend its physical

existence and its initial political gains, its followers were aware of these well-defined aims and could be easily mobilised. But after 1974, a crucial problem in the Palestinian conduct was that the ultimate objective, which would have been required for any successful political or military action, was played down in favour of transitional objectives. These newly adopted "phasal" or transitional objectives caused disarray among the Palestinians, who no longer knew whether the total liberation still was an objective and if so by which means it should have been reached. This confusion over the overall objective had a strong impact on the operational level and indiscriminate military action undermined the Palestinian interests. Thus, the military actions taken between 1974 and 1982 did not relate to the political aspirations of the PLO such as gaining international political recognition and support. Hence, the separate components of the PLO's strategy did not add up to an integral whole nor had complementary effects. To the contrary, the PLO's adversaries manipulated the interdependence of the various arenas of Palestinian activity in their own interests. By conducting military operations the political message was weakened and the Palestinian population was demoralised. (cp. Sayigh, 1986, pp. 103-108)

Since the beginning of the peace process in the 1990s, there has been strong inner-Palestinian discord about the negotiated two-state solution. Notwithstanding, on the practical level, Hamas has not shown any ambition to implement its stated overall objective of establishing a global Islamic Umma. Instead the movement's leadership has also pursued a more realistic approach in order to avoid its marginalisation due to the dogmatic adherence to maximalist goals. (cp. Muslih, 1999, p. 44; cp. Mishal/Sela, 2000, p. 148)

5.3. Strategic Environment

5.3.1. Internal Environment

With regard to the internal environment of the Palestinian national movements, it has to be mentioned that the Palestinians have faced internal obstacles since the beginning of the territorial conflict. Thus, Rashid Khalidi hypothesises that the causes for the Palestinian defeats in 1948 did not lie in the events of that fateful year but are also partly connected to the structural problems in Palestinian society and leadership that prevented the

Palestinians from better dealing with these dilemmas. One of the core problems in the initial period of the conflict was the failure to create Palestinian national structures that might have enabled the Palestinians to conduct a more coherent struggle for their goals even before the revolt from 1936 to 1939 or to reach better outcomes in the negotiations of 1939 in London. Thus, the Palestinian society fell apart in the years between 1947 and 1949, which created a difficult basis for the establishment of the future national movements. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. XL- XLI) Furthermore, despite the PLO's role as forum for all relevant Palestinian political forces, there were considerable internal rivalries. Additionally, the reliance on the Arab states for material support constrained the independence of the Palestinian national movements and together with the nationalist emphasis of Palestinian politics had huge influence on the social content of the struggle. Although the leftist parties of the PLO may have employed Marxist-Leninist terminology, in reality there was little social or economic focus in their programmes. The same applied to the mainstream PLO leadership, because the emergence of a statist option, which was financed by Arab oil wealth, encouraged more profitable politics than the social transformative project. Furthermore, the dispersal of the Palestinians and the sense of lost identity encouraged an obsession with rhetoric and symbols and at the same time discouraged functional or instrumental organisation. (cp. Sayigh, 1997, pp. 679-680) As Rashid Khalidi notes, *"[…] as early as the 1970s in Lebanon, the PLO had become bureaucratized, and in this process became more and more of a quasi-state and less and less of a national liberation movement."* (Khalidi, 2006, p. 177) As a consequence of the balance of power within the PLO leadership and due to the variety of political tendencies within the organisation, there occurred serious internal and public deliberations about the movement's strategy from the 1950s until the mid-1980s. Also the PLO failed to impose internal discipline to pursue a unified course. But in contrast to this contention over strategy, Yasser Arafat increasingly took decisions himself starting from the mid-1980s until his death in 2004. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 148) *"'Arafat's preference for the personal over the organizational, his notorious tendency to create duplicate lines of authority (and often duplicate structures, notably within the security services), his systematic undermining of administrative routine, and his general preference for controlled chaos over order, can be faulted in part, but in part only, for the Palestinians' failure to move much further than they had during the Mandate period toward a stable, unified quasi-state structure. Against this background must be set the undeniable fact that Fateh was remarkably successful in dominating Palestinian politics from soon after its*

establishment in the late 1950s until 'Arafat's death, a period of great fluidity and difficulty for an independent Palestinian political movement. Moreover, there is little question that the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, by the Palestinian themselves, by the Arab states, and by most of the world, was a considerable achievement, for which 'Arafat deserved much of the credit." (Khalidi, 2006, pp. 143-144) But a central problem with regard to the leadership of the PLO has been its steady decline in competence and effectiveness since its expulsion from Beirut. Many of the most dynamic individuals who had dominated Palestinian politics for decades were assassinated by the mid-1990. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 163) The qualities of the leadership members of the PLO had eroded by the time it gave up useless exile politics and shifted the centre of gravity from the Arab neighbour countries back to the Occupied Territories to set up the PNA after long years of forced exile. Against the background of their long experience in clandestine military activities, they had a lack of training and experience in the routine tasks of governance and administration. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 176 & p. 169) Since the leaders of the PLO had never lived in a system where the rule of law prevailed, they were not prepared to lead the needed transformation. Furthermore, there was an inability to understand the limits of violence, which produced a strategic incoherence resulting from the trying to be all things to all people. While the PLO had accepted a two-state solution and had renounced violence by 1988, it did not draw the logical conclusion to re-educate the Palestinians away from armed struggle towards unarmed mass popular struggle. This procedure raised questions about the good faith of the Palestinians. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 178-179) Furthermore, the Palestinian leadership had not respected the principle that all Palestinians, whatever their place of residence, was one people and that the amelioration of those under occupation was only part of the resolution of the Palestinian problem. Thus, in Madrid the PLO accepted to deal on the issue of refugees only after reaching interim agreements for the Occupied Territories which created the impression that it abandoned especially those who had enabled the PLO to rise to prominence, namely the residents of refugee camps in the neighbouring countries, like those in Lebanon, who had already been abandoned by the PLO without protection when it was forced to leave the country, as well as the Diaspora. This approach led to the further delegitimation of its leadership and increased the credibility of Hamas that never had formal responsibilities for the Palestinians and therefore was able to pay lip service to the refugee rights. Furthermore, the PLO committed the failure to accept a series of flawed accords with the Israelis starting from

the Oslo Agreement 1993. As Rashid Khalidi analysed, many of these strategic errors grew out of collective decision-making by the entire leadership of the PLO respectively the PNA. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 146 & pp. 180-181; Trakher, 30/08/2010) According to critics, the increasing trust of the PNA in good governance as means of resistance was the starting point of the transformation of the government into a bureaucratic entity that got progressively isolated from its political roots. The Palestinian strategy of steadfastness had degenerated into paralysis over the years. (cp. Blecher, 2009, p. 69) However, until the emergence of Hamas as serious challenger to its legitimacy, the PLO had been the central force in Palestinian politics. This process started in the late 1990s and resulted from the political fallout of the Oslo period from 1991 to 2000 and the subsequent Second Inifada. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 166) But during the 2006 PLC elections, the PNA was accused of corruption, featherbedding and nepotism and additionally it can be said that the dominating force, Al-Fatah, never managed to bring unity and discipline to the fractioned Palestinian political scene. Al-Fatah's near-monopoly over decision-making did not translate into a unified national movement and was undermined by the inability of the PLO respectively the PNA to incorporate Hamas and smaller Islamist groups like the Islamic Jihad. The movement lost much of its credibility due to the failure to negotiate more effectively with Israel, to provide security and to conduct proper governance and effective leadership for the struggle of the Palestinians to recover their national rights. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 152)

The Muslim Brotherhood and its splinter group, Hamas, on the other hand, skilfully seized Israeli acts of aggression and the discord among the PLO parties to offer the Palestinians an Islamic alternative. Despite its dependence on external material and ideological support from Egypt, Syria and Iran, Hamas has been an internally united movement with clear hierarchical structures and internal cooperation between its different wings. It successfully drew back on existing infrastructure and managed to position itself as relevant actor in the conflict. Hamas managed to translate its popular support into political power by becoming a democratically elected party. At the same time, Hamas has kept its military arm and has conducted operations based on political calculations to undermine the PLO's efforts. A big advantage of Hamas in comparison to the PLO is that even if military operations, which are not coordinated by the movement's leadership, are conducted, they are not of subversive character since Hamas has never refrained from violence. Since the political rivalry between the PLO and Hamas almost

led to civil war, there occurred a political split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and there is no effective cooperation with regard to a coherent Palestinian approach until today. Although the elections of 2006 would have provided a good opportunity to establish a legitimate system of representation that could have granted Hamas its organisation survival and enabled it to become a peaceful opposition, it was missed. Therefore, Hamas did not have any incentive to stop undermining the PLO's efforts. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, pp. 105-107)

5.3.2. Adversaries

The Palestinian proceeding with regard to its main adversary in the territorial conflict, Israel, was mostly marked by unrealistic appraisement and negation. Instead of initiating a bi-national compromise with the Zionist movement already in the 1920s or 1930s or accepting the Partition Plan of 1947, the Palestinians ignored the Jewish presence on their territory and instead demanded the establishment of an independent state on all of the territory of the former Palestinian mandate. After the establishment of the State of Israel, the Palestinians believed in a military victory of Arab states over Israel, which should have led to the elimination of the new state. Although Israel emerged strengthened from the wars and managed to expand its territory, the Palestinians believed according to the infamous saying that all Jews could be "dropped into the sea" and that they would regain their territory through armed struggle despite Israel's superiority. Even when the Palestinians realised that the elimination of the State of Israel was an unrealistic demand due to its strength and international standing, there was a lack of coordination with the Israeli peace camp to end the conflict. But when the Palestinians entered bilateral negotiations with Israel, there was a disastrous imbalance in power and external support between the two parties, which the PLO was not able to tilt. Hamas has anyway refused to recognise the existence of Israel and has not been ready to negotiate on a compromise agreement. Thus, the Palestinians failed to conduct a realistic assessment of their main adversary and to adapt their approach to it.

As already mentioned, the Palestinians were also confronted with territorial interests of Arab neighbouring countries that were countered adequately. As a result, all Arab countries that previously had laid claim on Palestine, had to renounce their claims and recognised the Palestinian right to self-determination.

5.3.3. External Environment

The Palestinians have had to face a very complex external environment for their struggle. Thus, they could have opposed the British mandatory power more systematically and earlier than in their revolt in 1936 to 1939. The Palestinians failed to seize the levers of power of the mandatory state or to establish alternative state structures. In the years after 1948, there was not only a disastrous lack of cohesion and organisation in the Palestinian polity but also a high degree of tutelage exercised by Arab states which initially did not welcome the Palestinian efforts to reorganise their national existence. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. XL- XLI & p. 173)

The Palestinians have been the weakest of all the parties involved in the struggle over the fate of Palestine including the British Empire, which was the greatest power of its day until World War II and actively opposed a Palestinian statehood and independence, as well as other states like the USA, the Soviet Union or France which supported Zionism and the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. These states did not even prevent the abortion of the Palestinian state in 1947/48. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. XI) With regard to the Palestinian adaption towards its external environment and especially the role of the British Empire and the USA, Kahlidi notes, *"For reasons of self-interest, strategy, ideology, and domestic politics, both powers consistently privileged the interests of the country's Jewish population over those of its Arab residents [...] And facing both was a weak and ineffective Palestinian leadership that seemed to grasp only dimly, if at all, the strategic challenge facing their people, the actual balance of forces in the field, the exact nature of the relationship between the great power of the day and its local Zionist allies, the way political functioned in London and Washington, and how best to use the meagre resources at their disposal to overcome these long odds."* (Khalidi, 2006, pp. XVIII-XIX) But it has to be mentioned, that the PLO's readiness to use violence and even international terrorism as means of struggle earned it even more the antagonism of the Western powers and other international players.

With regard to the Arab states, one must take into consideration the "shark-filled waters" in the Arab world in which the Palestinian national movements have been operating. Thus, the PLO had to balance one powerful state off against another and had to be aware of all Arab attempts to penetrate the Palestinian political arena. Furthermore, there was an absence of reliable external sources of support and a lack of nearby secure operation

bases. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 174) Hence, it was not easy for the PLO to gain recognition as independent representative of the Palestinians against the opposition from Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Libya or Saudi Arabia which at different stages opposed the organisation, limited its independence and scope of action or tried to subordinate it to its own objectives. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 167-168) While Palestinians managed to get along with the inhospitable environment they faced, Palestinian political structures suffered from Arab domination efforts and setbacks after multiple mistakes were committed in Jordan and Lebanon that led to the expulsion of the PLO. Although the PLO struggled to resist Arab pressure, its dependence on Arab states for diplomatic support, bases and money required the movement to undertake delicate balancing acts. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 145) Especially the polarisation of Arab regional politics in the 1980s, the paralysis of the USSR, the decline of the Non-Aligned Movement deprived the PLO of vital diplomatic assistance. (cp. Sayigh, 1997, p. 690) Thus, *"[…] Arafat's instinctive grasp of the direction of change in the Soviet Union and the international system led him to make the gamely concessions in 1988 and 1991 that assured the PLO of a continued place in regional politics and a role in the Arab-Israeli peace process."* (Sayigh, 1997, p. 691) Since Hamas is considered a terrorist organisation despite its electoral victory in 2006 by some of the main actors in the conflict such as Israel, the USA or the European Union, it has not acted as a generally accepted representative of the Palestinians nor has it played any official role in the peace process. But due to its close connection to the Muslim Brotherhood, it has earned strong material and ideological support from the Arab and some Muslim states, most notable Iran. Today, the PLO is diplomatically struggling for the support of the International Community and the international delegitimation of the Israeli occupation, while Hamas basically relies on its existing alliances.

5.4. Strategic Concepts

The following chapter will provide an evaluation of the Palestinian concepts and thus describes the ways that were applied by the national movements in due consideration of their resources. The structure of this chapter is based on that of the strategic ways of the national movements and thus also classified according to the level of violence of the different approaches.

5.4.1. Non-Cooperative Concepts

5.4.1.1. Non-Violent Concept

With regard to the non-violent concept, a major omission was that *"[d]uring the times of active armed struggle the PLO failed to pay enough attention to the inner workings of the Israeli society and politics and to consider the implications of its own strategy. Thus, it disregarded non-military forms of struggle waged in the occupied territories and feared competition from local leaders for which reason it tried to subordinate them to its strategy."* (Sayigh, 1997, p. 676) The reticence of the Palestinians vis-à-vis the abandonment of violence may have derived from the fact that the commitment to non-violence came in the humiliating form of a formal renunciation of terrorism by Yasser Arafat in 1988 which unintendedly put random violence against innocent civilians and resistance against military occupation on one level and thus cast doubt about previous approaches of the Palestinians. And also within the political parties there was a lack of clarity about the limits of violence and in consequence a strategic incoherence in the Palestinian position. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 178-179) The most important collective effort to resist Israel by non-violent means was the First Intifada that forced the PLO to change its strategy or risk irrelevance. Thus, it entailed the unilateral declaration of independence that despite huge international backing did not enhance Palestinian autonomy. During the collective uprising even the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which had earlier called for armed struggle and were not part of the UNLU, agreed with the PLO leadership to generally ban the use of firearms for strategic reasons. The use of weapons would have minimised popular participation and provide the Israeli forces with a pretence to commit retaliatory violence. Despite several achievements, the Intifada failed to realise the intended elimination of Israeli occupation because it did not adequately target the Israeli government's main source of power, namely Israeli and US-American public opinion. Thus, it did not cause enough political and economical costs to Israel. Furthermore, the Palestinians did not unify around a common strategy and occasional acts of terrorism undermined its legitimacy. (cp. Stephan, 2006, pp. 65-67) Especially by 1990, when the Intifada had begun to lose momentum and moderate Palestinian leaders were arrested or deported, more militant individuals filled the political vacuum and the factions increasingly turned to violence. The mixture of violent and non-violent approaches decreased popular participation and caused Palestinians to lose the moral high ground, but enabled Israel to justify its occupation military presence. (cp. Stephan, 2006,

pp. 69-70) Additionally, Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War severely damaged the image of the Intifada and cut the funding from Arab countries. But the most negative consequence of the Gulf War for Palestinians, according to activist Ghassan Andoni, was that *"it encouraged Palestinian leaders to abandon the local struggle and to look to the outside for solutions to the conflict, hoping that an increasingly active United States would dictate a solution."* (Stephan, 2006, p. 69) Issa Kassissieh, the Director General of the Negotiations Affairs Department of the PLO, concluded that an Intifada without being backed by peace negotiations or negotiations without popular support would never lead to the desired effect. (cp. Kassissieh, 21/09/2010)

The successes of the Intifada were that it posed a serious challenge to Israel's control, and its non-violent measures put an end to the political stalemate and legitimised Palestinian self-determination goals. Its power lied in the will of an entire population living under occupation and therewith altered the political calculation inside Israel by making the principle "land for peace" and negotiations with the Palestinians a majority view. Furthermore, one of its unintended results was that Jordan renounced all claims to the West Bank and recognised the PLO as Palestinian representative. (cp. Stephan, 2006, pp. 65-70) The recognition of the Palestinian declaration of independence by 127 UN member states was a sign for the PLO's successful efforts to gather international support.

Despite the Intifada, another noteworthy contribution of the PLO as well as Hamas in terms of non-cooperative non-violent measures was the set-up of an unofficial political and social infrastructure over the years of struggle that created social cohesion and assured public care. Furthermore, the PLO successfully established state structures in the form of the PNA, which increased the Palestinian level of autonomy and democracy and should have functioned as first step towards statehood.

Another important success of the PLO was its media and diplomatic struggle against Israel, which raised international awareness and support for the Palestinian cause.

5.4.1.2. Violent Concept

After the Palestinians realised that they had erroneously relied on an Arab military victory over Israel, their self-initiative violent concept was also characterised by major obstacles and mistakes. It had to be adapted to the lack of resources of the Palestinian guerrilla

fighters in the initial phase. These included shortcomings in sufficient equipment, military knowledge, operational bases as well as members. Therefore, the only applicable way was unprofessional small-scale operations against Israeli aims. Even after Al-Fatah's takeover of the PLO, armed actions of the organisation in the period between 1967 and 1973 were rather characterised by stubborn persistence than by effective and efficient military operations. But the mere fact that there existed an independent Palestinian military struggle contributed to the regaining of a national identity of the Palestinians, reasserted their existence internationally and mobilised followers. (cp. Sayigh, 1986, p. 99) *"[...] the guerrilla groups composing the PLO consistently described the armed struggle as the principal, even exclusive, means of liberation of Palestine throughout their evolution. Yet their military effort never exceeded a certain level in terms of scale and impact, and certainly failed to approach the models offered by the frequently cited Chinese and Vietnamese experiences of guerrilla war and people's war. Whatever the individual sacrifices of the Palestinian rank-and-file or the strength of their convictions, the movement as a whole lacked the single-minded determination to take the practice of armed struggle to the elevated position it occupied in formal doctrine and to develop its organization in a manner commensurate with the task."* (Sayigh, 1997, p. 664) However, the lack of new formulations of military doctrine brought to the surface the strategic dilemma that the elimination of Israel and liberation of Palestine were unachievable. But armed struggle had not outlived its purpose because the leadership of Al-Fatah used violence to gain breathing space and affirm its internal control in the wake of the expulsion from Jordan. For the ensuing two years the PLO conducted international terrorism in order to disguise its predicament from outside enemies and regain the strategic initiative. (cp. Sayigh, 1997, pp. 683-684) Terrorist attacks committed by Palestinians were based on three considerations. First, they were meant as an act of retaliation against Israel and Jordan and second, they should have raised international awareness for the plight of the Palestinians and third, they should have mobilised international support. But in reality they missed their aim because although they had raised international awareness the support stayed out since terrorism undermined international sympathy for the Palestinians. (cp. Baumgarten, 2002, p. 72) But the war of October 1973 meant a turning point in the evolution of the Palestinian armed struggle. It showed the limits of Arab military power and political will but also revealed the potential of a negotiation strategy backed by the use of force. Thus, the function of armed struggle changed from a means to strengthen identity and legitimacy towards becoming one of

several instruments of policy serving the broader Palestinian diplomatic approach. (cp. Sayigh, 1997, p. 684) Despite these changes in the overall political objectives, there was an absence of clear articulation and general understanding of the PLO's ambitions. Palestinians were not aware of adequate ways. Hence, there was uncertainty whether the new conduct would be protracted warfare or struggle in stages with alternating violent and peaceful means. Thus, the military operation conducted between 1974 and 1982 did not relate to the political and diplomatic aims of the PLO and had spoiling effects. Especially terrorism undermined the political and moral message of the PLO to Israel and the Western countries. At the same time, the PLO mistakenly assessed that scaled-down political objectives would require lesser military performance standards because it should convey political messages instead of causing real damage. The operations actually aimed at providing the Palestinians with a better position at the negotiation table and more political weight in the inter-Arab power balance, but the actions lacked professionalism, technical competence and reasonable moral justification. Therewith, the political message was weakened and the Palestinians were demoralised. Furthermore, Palestinian guerrilla tactics could hardly raise the direct material costs of maintaining the occupation due to the high external subsidies Israel receives for its economy and defence sector. (cp. Sayigh, 1986, pp. 103-106) *"The dilemma facing the PLO at the beginning of the 1980s was acute: its limited armed struggle was insufficient to compel Israeli withdrawal and impose establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, but it remained unwilling to accept the offer made in the Camp David accords for a transitional period of Palestinian autonomy to be followed by negotiation of a permanent settlement with Israel."* (Sayigh, 1997, p. 686)

Besides the PLO, two Islamic Movements, the Islamic Jihad and especially Hamas, have also played a major role in the resistance to Israel. Those movements have pioneered the tactic of suicide attacks on Israeli civilians, which proved to be morally indefensible as well as disastrously counterproductive strategically. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. XXIV) However, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad have shown that they can effectively sustain an asymmetric war by these unconventional tactics although their military capabilities have been weak compared to those of their adversary. Furthermore, one must not forget that the Islamic movements have profited from foreign support from various Islamic countries and can internationally mobilise fighters for their cause. (cp. Cordesman, 2005, p. 187) Hamas, like several other Islamic movements, also proved to be flexible in adopting

mixed elements of the reformist-educational, communal-welfare, political and combatant-political approaches under different social and political conditions. Hamas'ss need to ensure its survival and its growth has made continued access to power and resources necessary while living in coexistence with its rival, the PLO. Hamas also has to focus on minimising the damage to its political standing when collaborating with the PNA. Besides its reformist religious character, Hamas was also a combatant-political movement committed to the liberation of Palestine through Jihad and although its leaders refused to replace their dogmatic doctrine of armed struggle by social and political action, there was still a readiness to adapt to changing political circumstances in order to assure Hamas'ss survival in the framework of a Palestinian self-governing authority. Thus, armed struggle did not serve as a strategic but as a tactical aim that was subordinated to the movement's needs at the respective times. (cp. Mishal/Sela, 2000, pp. 113-120) Furthermore, Bassam As-Salhi, Party Leader of the non-militant PPP, critically assessed that today military resistance was used to change the balance of power within the Palestinian political arena instead of serving the struggle against Israel. Thus, the intention behind military actions is more to gain power within the PNA than to end occupation, which is a useless approach. (cp. As-Salhi, 19/09/2010)

Yezid Sayigh suggests that the success in the military performance of the PLO was not measured in conventional terms but served other primary functions. *"Above all, the armed struggle provided the central theme and practice around which Palestinian nation-building took place, and laid the basis for state-building by driving elite formation and militarization and allowing political legitimation."* (Sayigh, 1997, p. 665) Furthermore, armed struggle created a common political arena and provided channels for mass participation in national politics. The guerrilla groups were also political parties and became the leadership and central decision-making body of the Palestinians. But the fact that the Palestinian leadership based its legitimacy on its armed struggle enabled the movement to lay a basis for populist politics as well as authoritarian control. (cp. Sayigh, 1997, pp. 669-670) However, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the displacement of the PLO from Beirut in 1982 marked the end of Palestinian armed struggle as main dynamic factor of state-building. But the PLO lacked other instruments of constructing its state-in-the-making. (cp. Sayigh, 1997, pp. 686-687)

5.4.2. Cooperative Concept

Despite the Palestinian refusal of all mediation proposals in the forefront of the conflict and its uncompromising position until then, the PLO finally decided to adopt a cooperative approach and to seek negotiations with Israel in the 1990s. Among the major mistakes in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians was Arafat's divide-and-rule policy that led him to authorise multiple negotiation tracks and continuously alter the composition of the negotiating teams whose members were in fierce competition. Additionally, the teams only received vague guidance regarding the aims they should achieve. Furthermore, the content of the peace treaty framework was based on the rationale to agree immediately on easy matters while important controversial issues were postponed to later stages believing that during the ongoing peace process, good faith for the resolution of difficult questions would be built on both sides. (cp. Report 3, 2010, p. 53) Thus, the Oslo Process was characterised by a partial interim approach that served Israeli interests by preventing it from making hard decisions on ending the occupation and settlement activities. Instead, the period of negotiations were seized to reinforce both. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, p. 162) According to Hanna Issa, Deputy Minister of Christian Religious Affairs of Palestine, the biggest mistake of the PLO at that time was to enter negotiations with Israel to the exclusion of parties that would have supported Palestine like the EU or Russia. Therefore the process was "propaganda negotiations" and the only possible outcome was a "minimum peace". (cp. Issa, 20/09/2010) In the Oslo Process, the Palestinian leadership accepted boundaries for the negotiations but the solution should have been comprehensive for which reason preconditions should have been respected. (cp. Baker, 20/09/2010) Due to the lack of positive results of the Oslo Process, Hamas appraised the Oslo Accord as biggest mistake made by the PLO. (cp. Totah, 22/09/2010) A crucial mistake in this negotiation approach was that the PLO focused on the establishment of a state but it had done little to prepare for independent statehood. The PLO leadership was inhibited from obtaining sovereignty, statehood or even jurisdiction and control over the Occupied Territories because of Israel's overwhelming power and the fact that its own weak negotiation position led to the inclusion of several restrictions in the Oslo Accords. (cp. Khalidi, 2006, pp. 158-159) John Bunzl summarised the ambivalence of the agreements between Israel and the Palestinians by listing the few Palestinian achievements and compared it with the numerous deteriorations. Among them he stated the lack of fair negotiations, the extensive Israeli control over water and streets for settlers, lasting Israeli military

presence and economic dependence, the undemocratic character of the Palestinian National Authority, the murder of Yitzhak Rabin and the Israeli reactions on that incidence, the increase in settlement activity in the Occupied Territories as well as in East-Jerusalem, the unwillingness of Israel to recognise Palestinian detainees as prisoners of war as well as the build-up of barriers and curfews that made especially Gaza a big prison. (cp. Bunzl, 2001, p. 46) If Yasser Arafat had accepted a deal under Israel's conditions in Camp David it would have meant the end of his political career as well as the total sell-out of Palestinian interests. Watzal argues that the Palestinian willingness to compromise bordered on self-abandonment that he assigns to Yasser Arafat's strong wish to become the first Palestinian President. But in Camp David, Watzal annotates, Arafat became aware of this national responsibility. (cp. Watzal, 2001 I, pp. 38-40) But one central reason for the lack of progress in the Middle East Peace Process is that until today, the maintenance of the status quo is not a huge financial burden for Israel but in contrary offers the Israeli economy chances to profit from the conflict. (cp. Report 3, 2010, p. 99) Furthermore, as Mahmoud Abbas noted, there would have been a need for more cooperation with the Israeli right wing in order to reach a solid agreement. (cp. Abbas, 28/11/2011) With regard to current non-violent efforts, also greater coordination between Palestinian civil society and the PNA would be needed but the latter is too invested in the peace process to fully support a large-scale effort including boycotts, divestment and sanctions against Israel. Furthermore, the open backing of such actions would result in the loss of financial and diplomatic support during a time of tenuous stability. (cp. Gallagher, 2012)

In the evaluation of the successes of the negotiation approach of the PLO one has to bear in mind that the willingness to compromise of the Palestinians earned them a lot of international diplomatic support that can be crucial in international arenas. Furthermore, John Bunzl analysed the successes in the peace process which include the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994, the return from exile of PLO cadres, the build-up of Palestinian police forces, control over zone A and codetermination in zone B and internationally recognised elections in 1996. (cp. Bunzl, 2001, p. 46)

6. Synopsis of the Strategy and Illustration of Chances Missed and Opportunities Taken

The Palestinian conviction that the conflict about Palestinian self-determination is a matter of ethnic survival has led to its perception as a Hard Zero-Sum-Situation. Therefore, non-cooperative approaches towards the Jewish presence on the territory respectively the State of Israel have dominated the strategy of the Palestinian national movements.

Hence, the Palestinians missed the possibility to constructively intervene into the international allocation of mandatory Palestine and refused the Partition Plan of the Peel Commission. In 1947, the Palestinians also rejected the UN Partition Plan and thus missed the **first chance** of the creation of a Palestinian beside a Jewish state. Instead of supporting preventive diplomatic proposals, they pursued the fight against the Jewish presence in the area and subsequently against the State of Israel. The charismatic Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, promoted resistance by all means ranging from passive resistance to large-scale violent attacks that deliberately harmed the life of human beings. Thus, Al-Fatah and the other armed groups seized Palestinian armed struggle as a basis for the formation of a new Palestinian identity that enabled high political mobilisation as well as the containment of political outside direction. However, there has always been high dependence on outside actors who tried to exercise influence on the Palestinian conduct by offering financial, military and ideological support. Rashid Khalidi concludes the following with regard to Palestinian self-responsibility in the struggle *"[…] Palestinian society and politics were most definitely divided and faction-ridden, in ways that gave hostile forces many cleavages to exploit. But the Palestinians had many assets, were far from helpless, and often faced a range of choices, some of which were better, or at least less bad than others. In this way, I propose to put the Palestinians at the center of a critical phase of their own story."* (Khalidi, 2006, p. XXX)

Observers argue that especially the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank would have provided the framework for the **second chance** of the Palestinians to self-determination, but the Palestinians missed to put pressure on Jordan to grant them an independent state before 1967. The peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel in 1979, which included Palestinian self-determination that could have led to independence, can be evaluated as

third missed chance because it was rejected by the Palestinians due to their non-involvement.

Despite disunity within the Palestinian political sphere about the recognition of Israel, the PLO changed from a completely non-cooperative attitude towards a more pragmatic approach. Therewith, the PLO reacted to the threat of political marginalisation after it had realised that its central objective, the destruction or replacement of the State of Israel, was unobtainable. Hamas, on the other hand, still rejects a two-state solution. By taking part in the Oslo Process, the PLO **seized the opportunity** to obtain a certain degree of self-determination through the establishment of the PNA, but although the process aimed at the creation of a Palestinian state, its establishment failed.

Hence, the **fourth missed chance** to statehood was the Camp David Summit in 2000 in which Yasser Arafat rejected Ehud Barak's proposal because Israel vetoed all Palestinian demands. Thereby, Arafat avoided a total sell-out of Palestinian interests, but, on the other hand missed the opportunity to make an agreement with the Israeli government before the rise of more hawkish forces inside Israel. Although the Mitchell Report of 2001 supported many of the Palestinian positions, the Palestinians failed to gain more international political support from the report's findings.

Since that time, there has been a deadlock in the negotiations with Israel and the Palestinians realised that an international re-thinking regarding the application of double standards is needed to reactivate a more fruitful peace process. Thus, a conflict resolution is still out of sight and would demand new impulses.

IV. COMPARISON OF THE STRATEGIES APPLIED IN KOSOVO AND PALESTINE

1. Correspondent Conflict Phases

As illustrated in the timelines below, the two conflicts started at the same time but for the sake of a comparison it is not possible to focus solely on chronology. Thus, it is necessary to extract relevant timespans with comparable characteristics.



Image 2: Timeline 1



Image 3: Timeline 2

2. Similarities and Differences in the Strategic Scopes

The following chapter will elaborate the similarities and differences of the strategies applied in both cases. It will follow in its structure the various elements as presented in the descriptive chapters of this work and will identify where the elements are similar, and where they differ.

For a useful comparison it needs a balanced mix of similarities and differences. If there would be no or not enough similarities, a comparison would be fruitless (“apples and kangaroos”). Only if there are enough similarities for a comparison to be reasonable, it would make sense to focus on the differences in strategies as possible reasons for the differences in results.

2.1. Conflict Conditions

Kosovo as well as Palestine suffered from delayed statehood since they were denied self-determination after the territorial rearrangements in the wake of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Kosovo became an entity within the Serbian state and thus part of federal Yugoslavia while Palestine was determined mandatory land.

The Kosovo Albanians developed their struggle for self-determination already within the framework of the Yugoslav state against the background of increasing suppressions of their national inspirations by Serbia and the downturn of the federation. The Palestinians, on the other hand, have long been excluded from the dispute about the territory and did not participate in the war of 1948 and the following wars between Arab states and the newly established Israeli state.

The Kosovo Albanians only acquired their right to statehood rather late. Serbia denied their internal self-determination (autonomy) and thus created justification for their own struggle for external self-determination (secession). This triggered their struggle for statehood. On the other hand, the Palestinian right to statehood has been generally acknowledged already since 1947, but only the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 initiated a autochthonous Palestinian struggle for statehood.

To sum it up, both territorial conflicts have common origins and foreign dominance prevented the establishment of a Kosovo Albanian and a Palestinian state for a long time.

Topics	**Kosovo**		**Palestine**	
	Action/Cause	**Effect**	**Action/Cause**	**Effect**
Conflict origins	Territorial rearrangement after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire	▪ Kosovo as part of Serbia within Yugoslavia ▪ Denial of Kosovo-Albanian statehood	Territorial rearrangement after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire	▪ Palestine as mandated land ▪ Denial of Palestinian statehood

Territorial claims & dispute	Serbian denial of autonomy for Kosovo in the course of the downturn of the Yugoslav multi-ethnic federal state	Emerging idea of Kosovo Albanian secession and struggle for independence	Arab and Israeli territorial claims on mandated Palestine	Conventional war between Israel & Arab states without Palestinian participation
Occupation & the question of ownership	Serbian rule over Kosovo	Escalation and institutionalisation of the Kosovo Albanian struggle for statehood	Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip	Inception of a self-responsible organised Palestinian struggle for statehood

Table 1: Comparison of Conflict Conditions

Similarities

A major similarity can be seen in the common origins of the territorial disputes as a result of the territorial rearrangements after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as well as in the drawn-out duration of foreign dominance, which prevented the establishment of statehood for decades.

Differences

The most striking difference has to be seen in the ownership within the struggle for the territory.

- The Kosovo Albanians developed their struggle for self-determination on their own without an external driver.
- The Palestinians had long been excluded from the dispute about the territory. When the Arab states went to war against the newly established Israeli state, the war took place without a distinct Palestinian participation.

Another difference of a more gradual character has to be seen that

- resistance in Kosovo took a “quantum leap” when the autonomy was abolished, while
- autochthonous resistance in Palestine began only after Israel had occupied Palestinian territory in 1967.

2.2. Issues and Interests at Stake

Due to Serbian as well as Israeli attempts to change the demographic situation in the respective conflict areas through dispersal as well as immigration, the Kosovo Albanians and the Palestinians considered the struggle over their homeland not only as a highly symbolic value but also as a fight for the prosperity and, most important, security for respectively survival of their ethnic group. This resulted in the common perception of the conflicts as Hard Zero-Sum-Situations that entail strong non-cooperative approaches which hardens all fronts in a conflict.

The Kosovo Albanians as well as the Palestinians pursued the goal of self-determination. During the initial phase of the conflict about Kosovo, when Serbia even revoked Kosovo’s autonomy, there was no outside support for Kosovo Albanian statehood. The Palestinian right to statehood, on the other hand, had been approved by the majority of the International Community since the UN Partition Plan and had even been officially accepted by Israel.

The Kosovo Albanians and Palestinians differed in the level of realism within the pursuance of their objectives in the respective conflicts. The former adopted realistic and internationally acceptable objectives from the beginning of their struggle that presupposed the acceptance of the right to exist of the State of Serbia as well as of Serbian inhabitants in Kosovo. This gained them international sympathy and support. The Palestinians, on the other hand, pursued unrealistic and internationally inacceptable initial objectives like the elimination of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine and the destruction of the State of Israel, which is an internationally rejected demand. Thus, they refused the Partition Plan that would have assured them more territory than they could gain in negotiations today and blindly relied on an alleged pan-Arab fight for Palestinian interests. Although the PLO adopted more adequate objectives over time, until today

there is no official consensus within the Palestinian society to accept a two-state solution and to abandon the claims on all of the territory of the former mandated Palestine.

In summary it can be said that the Kosovo Albanians aimed at the possible, while the Palestinians have demanded the impossible and thus did not succeed in its realisation.

Topics	**Kosovo**		**Palestine**	
	Action/Cause	**Effect**	**Action/Cause**	**Effect**
Category of conflict	Perception of the territorial conflict as matter of security, identity & prosperity	Hard Zero-Sum-Situation with strong non-cooperative tendency	Perception of the territorial conflict as matter of security, identity & prosperity	Hard Zero-Sum-Situation with strong non-cooperative tendency
Main goal	self-determination	▪ Serbia's refusal of autonomy or statehood ▪ International Community's initial refusal of the right to statehood	self-determination (until 1974 in historic Palestine, afterwards in the Palestinian Territories)	▪ International Community's approval of the right to statehood based on the UN Partition Plan ▪ Israel's acceptance of Palestinian statehood within determined territorial borders

Objectives	Realistic objectives based on the limited demand for Kosovo's statehood without questioning Serbia's existence	▪ Gaining international sympathy and support ▪ International acceptability of the objectives	Unrealistic objectives based on the excessive demand for statehood in historic Palestine thereby denying Israel's right to exist	▪ International rejection of Palestinian demands ▪ International inacceptability of the objectives ▪ Adaption of the demands
			More realistic objectives based on the limited demand of statehood in the Palestinian Territories without questioning Israel's right to exist	▪ Increase in international support for Palestinian demands ▪ International acceptability of the new objectives

Table 2: Comparison of Issues and Interests at Stake

Similarities

In both cases, self-determination (in the sense of independence) was a declared goal and the conflict was perceived as a matter of prosperity, identity and security respectively survival. Therefore, they are also similar in being Hard Zero-Sum-Situations with strong non-cooperative tendencies.

Differences

Differences can be seen in the attitudes of the adversaries:

- Serbia denied the right not only of statehood but even of autonomy for Kosovo during the Milosevic rule;
- Israel, on the other hand, in principle accepted a Palestinian statehood, however, with disputed existing borders.

Finally, the two cases differ significantly in the respective objectives:

- Kosovo aimed at independence from Serbia without, however, further questioning the right of Serbia's existence;
- The Palestinian side first completely denied Israel's right to exist and even now this right has not yet been commonly accepted within the Palestinian society.

Correspondingly, the limited demands of Kosovo for statehood proved achievable and were finally accepted, while the excessive (and thus unrealistic) Palestinian demands were unachievable and internationally rejected.

2.3. Strategic Environment

2.3.1. Internal Environment

Since there was a lack of Kosovo Albanian national structures as well as Palestinian national structures at the time of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent international allocation of the territories, both peoples missed the opportunity to have a say in their national fate. Thus, Albania was granted statehood but without Kosovo, which was awarded to Serbia, while the Palestinian territory became a mandated land and later subject to the international Partition Plan.

Both peoples only established national movements based on resistance against suppression.

In their initial phase, both, the LDK as well as the PLO emerged as highly participatory movements with charismatic leaders ahead and enjoyed broad support within their own societies.

Crucial differentiations between these movements can be made with regard to the question of internal unity. In the case of Kosovo, there had been internal unity within the LDK and thus an absence of internal subversive behaviour. This enabled the movement to act in a well coordinated manner and to present itself united to the outside giving an image of a reliable partner. The PLO, on the other side, suffered from internal disunity and power rivalries since its establishment. Therefore, it was characterised by a lack of coordination among its different member groups, subversive behaviour against each other and a disunited appearance to the outside, which caused an image of unreliability to external actors.

Both, the LDK and PLO, developed into centralised bureaucracies over time and lost support due to their elevatedness and their lack of success in realising goals. This facilitated the emergence of alternative forces, namely the UCK respectively Hamas. They managed to establish themselves as rival national movements by offering alternatives to the followers.

In its initial phase, the UCK was characterised by deficits in the internal coordination due to the lack of hierarchy and the existence of clan loyalties. It only slowly increased its popularity among the Kosovo Albanians and gradually developed into a challenging movement to the LDK. Hamas, on the other hand, could make recourse to the organisational and social infrastructure of the Muslim Brotherhood, which enabled it to conduct good internal coordination and quickly earned it the support of the Palestinian population. Thus, Hamas rapidly became a central political player in the conflict.

Since the LDK promoted non-violence and the UCK demanded armed struggle, there emerged differences between the movements, but at the same time they pursued a division of labour, thus being competitors but also partners. Hamas, on the other hand, developed into a bitter rival to the PLO. As they pursued similar approaches, there was no space for a division of labour.

While the LDK and the UCK were ready to find a mutual consent for the sake of their common goal of self-determination and at the end adopted a common cooperative platform to participate in peace negotiations, the PLO and Hamas have lacked any consent for the sake of their struggle. Besides pursuing different objectives in terms of the realisation of self-determination, the movements have not been able to adopt a common

cooperative attitude. As a result Hamas acts as a spoiler to the peace process between the PLO and Israel.

Another important difference appears in the role of external actors. Kosovo Albanian movements were never directed or dominated from external actors but acted autonomously. In contrast, both Palestinian movements were influenced and thus dominated from outside. The rivalries between the supporting Arab states also led to rivalling influence on the PLO thereby undermining unity.

Summing up, the central factor with regard to the internal strategic environment is the Kosovo Albanian national willingness and capability to put aside their internal differences and power rivalries in order to conduct a common independent struggle for self-determination, whereas the Palestinian national movements were in parts unwilling to cooperate internally and often unable to cooperate due to the projection of rivalries of the Arab states into the PLO via their proxies within the movement.

Topics	**Kosovo**		**Palestine**	
	Action/Cause	**Effect**	**Action/Cause**	**Effect**
Late establishment of national structures	Lack of distinct Kosovo Albanian national structures at times of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire	Missed opportunity to intervene into the international allocation of territories at the Balkans	Lack of Palestinian national structures at times of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire	Missed opportunity to intervene into the international allocation of Palestine

Emerging of political structures	Long-lasting suppression	Emerging as resistance movements	Long-lasting suppression	Emerging as resistance/liberation movemements
Mobilisation & representation capacity of initial national movements	LDK as highly participatory movement with Ibrahim Rugova as charismatic leader	Initially unrestrained support within the Kosovo Albanian population	PLO as Palestinian political umbrella organisation with Yasser Arafat as charismatic leader	Initially unrestrained support within the Palestinian population
Internal consistency of the initial national movements	Internal unity within the LDK	▪ Internal coordination and discipline ▪ No subversive behaviour from inside the LDK ▪ United appearance to the outside causing the impression of reliability	Internal disunity & power rivalries within the PLO	▪ Lack of internal coordination & discipline ▪ Subversive, contradicting behaviour from inside the PLO & Palestinian society ▪ Disunited appearance to the outside causing an impression of unreliability

Decline in popularity of the initial national movements	Development of the LDK into a centralised bureaucracy	▪ Loss of internal hold ▪ Continuous erosion of leadership qualities	Development of the PLO into a centralised authoritarian led bureaucracy	▪ Loss of internal hold ▪ Continuous erosion of leadership qualities
Emergence of rival national movements	Establishment of the UCK	Positioning as rival national movement of the LDK	Establishment of Hamas	Positioning as rival national movement of the PLO
Internal consistency of rival national movements	Low consistency of the UCK due to a lack of hierarchy and the existence of clan loyalties	▪ Lack of internal coordination ▪ Restrained support from the Kosovo Albanian population	Recourse of Hamas on social infrastructure of the Muslim Brotherhood	▪ Good internal coordination & collaboration ▪ High level of support from the Palestinian population, especially in the Gaza Strip
Internal power struggle	Difference in the approach (LDK non-violent, UCK armed struggle)	Division of labour, complementary <u>consequently:</u> ▪ Low reflexion of the power	Similarity in the approach	mutually exclusive, competition <u>consequently:</u> ▪ Strong reflexion of the power

		struggle to the outside world ▪ Preservation of a coherent Kosovo Albanian image		struggle to the outside world ▪ Projection of a disunited Palestinian image
Cooperation between the national movements	Putting rivalry between the LDK and the UCK behind their common goal	▪ Acceptance of a cooperative approach ▪ Joint participation in peace negotiations ▪ Absence of spoilers from inside the Kosovo Albanian society	No putting of rivalries between the PLO and Hamas/other Islamist movements behind their common goal	▪ Different approaches to the conflict obstructing a common (cooperative) attitude ▪ Separate participation of the PLO in peace negotiations despite Hamas's refusal ▪ Hamas and other movements as internal Palestinian spoiler

Self-responsibility of the national movements in the struggle for self-determination	No interference on Kosovo Albanian national movements from outside	Self-responsibility & independent and coherent acting	Direction of various Palestinian national movements by different actors from outside according to external and often contradictory interests	Low level of self-responsibility and independent acting; proxies of rivalling Arab states prevent unity

Table 3: Comparison of the Internal Environment

Similarities

Both cases show a high degree of similarity in the original situation, with no functioning structures of their own to intervene into the international allocation of territories after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

They also show similarities in the development of highly participatory resistance movements (LDK and PLO) under rather charismatic leaderships.

Finally, in both cases the original leading resistance movements were challenged by rival movements (UCK and Hamas).

Differences

The major difference has to be seen, however, in the degree of unity and disunity within the respective movements.

- In Kosovo, there had been a high degree of cohesion within both movements. Initial lacks of coordination within the UCK could be successfully overcome.

Also, even when the LDK later was challenged by the UCK, the two organisations found a way to overcome their differences and joined forces in their common struggle against the common adversary. Thus, there were no "spoilers" for Kosovo's strategy.

- In contrast, the situation in Palestine has been characterised by a high degree of disunity and factionalism. Even when the PLO was under the charismatic leadership of Arafat and appeared as a coherent movement, there was consistent in-fighting both within the PLO but also with dissident factions outside the PLO. The emerging of Hamas as a rival to the PLO led to civil war among Palestinians rather than finding a common ground. Hence, while Hamas would have offered a relatively coherent structure due to its basis within the Muslim Brotherhood, its emerging just contributed another factor of disunity among Palestinian movements. When the PLO decided to participate in peace negotiations, Hamas refused and thereby prevented a coherent strategy for negotiations.

Finally, a major difference can be seen that the movements in Kosovo were autonomous and not directed from the outside. In contrast, several fractions within the PLO could be seen as "proxies" of various Arab states who "projected" their rivalries into the PLO and thus further undermined unity. Therefore, united acting of the Palestinian authorities became close to impossible.

2.3.2. Adversaries

The Kosovo Albanian struggle for self-determination was directed against the State of Serbia and the Serbian minority in Kosovo that both pursued common interests and, due to the absence of further adversaries, presented a coherent opponent block to Kosovo Albanian demands. The Palestinians, in contrast, had to deal with several adversaries, of which all were in a stronger power position. Besides Israel as the main adversary, also several Arab countries laid claims on Palestinian territory. Notwithstanding, they were not merely opponents in the conflict but also supported the Palestinians when it seemed to serve their interests and thus, played an ambivalent role for decades. Therefore, the Palestinians faced a very complex and unfavourable situation for their struggle.

Serbia as well as the mainstream in Israel aimed at the domination of their adversaries' territory to assure the survival of their ethnic group that was perceived to be at stake. Furthermore, the Serbs and Israeli Zionists aimed at the establishment of Greater Serbia respectively Eretz Israel based on the sacralisation of the land. Thus, Serbia and Israel considered their respective conflict as a matter of security and identity. Despite these similarities in the security and identity interests at stake, there is a crucial difference with regard to the economic situation. Israel, in contrast to Serbia, also saw prosperity at stake due to the crucial question of its water supply from the West Bank, while Kosovo as least developed region within Yugoslavia was rather an economic burden for Serbia. Hence, Serbia as well as Israel perceived the struggle for land mainly as Hard Zero-Sum Situation, which implies a strong non-cooperative attitude from their sides.

Notwithstanding, Serbia as well as the Zionists colonised the claimed territory in order to reinforce their demands. The Serbian colonisation of Kosovo failed due to remigration of Serbs who did not perceive Kosovo as their homeland. The Zionist colonisation of mandated Palestine, in contrast, was successful due to the absence of alternative settlement options for dispersed Jews from all over the world and due to the Jewish perception of Palestine as their homeland. Despite the allocation of the territory based on the UN Partition Plan, the Zionists successfully colonised the West Bank with Israeli settlements but failed to permanently colonise the Gaza Strip where the Israeli settlements had to be evacuated for political reasons.

Serbia had a strong legal case to object to Kosovo's unilateral independence because at times of the outbreak of the conflict, Kosovo was a recognised province within the Republic of Serbia. Israel, on the other hand, had a weak legal argument to object Palestine's unilateral independence because Israel's as well as Palestine's right to statehood was internationally sanctioned by the adoption of the UN Partition Plan. Furthermore, the Occupied Territories as well as the illegally annexed territory (the city Jerusalem) have never been internationally recognised as a part of Israel. (cp. Grossman, 2011)

Serbia competed for international support by portraying itself as defender of the Western civilisation against Islamist extremism although both Kosovo Albanian national movements had developed a secular ethnic-based identity. Israel initially presented itself to the Western world as its outpost in the Middle East and in the course of the conflict also

tried to create an image as defender of Western values first against the PLO which was portrayed as Soviet proxy, and then against Hamas portrayed as Islamists. Despite its efforts, Serbia enjoyed only weak international support, while Israel has been backed by the most influential world players. A crucial difference might be that the Israeli lobby in Washington as well as in Europe is much stronger than the Serbian lobby. It can be argued that Israel has served the foreign policy interests of the USA and influential European states in the Middle East while Serbia was of less geo-strategic importance for the West but rather for Russia. Russia, in turn, has been a far less powerful ally than the USA, as only remaining super power, together with important European states. With regard to the world public opinion, one has to take into consideration that Milosevic's international standing was weakened by the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Serbian ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians was more recent and televised than Israel's expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948. (cp. Grossman, 2011)

To sum up, the Palestinians faced a much more complex constellation of forces opposing their self-determination than the Kosovo Albanians. Furthermore, the Palestinian main adversary, Israel, was backed by far more powerful forces than the Kosovo Albanian opponent, Serbia.

Topics	**Kosovo**		**Palestine**	
	Action/Cause	**Effect**	**Action/Cause**	**Effect**
Actors considered as adversaries	Serbia together with the Serbian minority in Kosovo as only adversary in the conflict	Kosovo Albanian struggle directed against consistent Serbian interests	Israel as main adversary in the conflict beside several Arab states with territorial claims	Palestinian struggle against different adversaries with distinct self-interests

Main adversaries' aspirations	Serbian aspiration to incorporate Kosovo as part of Greater Serbia as a matter of security & identity	Hard Zero-Sum-Situation with strong non-cooperative tendency	Zionist aspiration to establish a state in all of "Eretz Israel" including the Palestinian Territories as a matter of security, identity & prosperity	Hard Zero-Sum-Situation with strong non-cooperative tendency
Substantiation of demands through colonisation	Serbian colonisation of Kosovo	Failed colonisation due to remigration of Serbs who did not perceive Kosovo as their homeland	Zionist colonisation of mandated Palestine	Successful Zionist colonisation of mandated Palestine due to a lack of alternative settlement options & perception as Jewish homeland

			Israeli colonisation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip	▪ Successful colonisation of the West Bank through the construction of illegal permanent settlements ▪ Failed permanent colonisation of the Gaza Strip due to its lesser value for Israeli identity and prosperity
Legality of main adversaries' territorial claims	International recognition of Kosovo's initial status as part of Serbia	Serbia's strong legal case to object to Kosovo's unilateral independence	International recognition of the UN Partition Plan & condemnation of illegal settlement in the Occupied Territories and annexion of Jerusalem	Israel's weak legal argument to object Palestine's unilateral independence

International standing of the adversary	Serbian self-portrayal as defender of the Western civilisation to gain international support	Lack of standby from the most powerful actors of the IC due to Serbia's limited geo-strategic importance, historical alliance with Russia, insufficient lobbying in the West & damaged international image	Israeli self-portrayal as Western outpost & defender of the Western democracy & civilisation to gain international support	Standby from the most powerful actors of the IC due to Israel's geo-strategic importance, successful lobbying & tolerable international image

Table 4: Comparison of Adversaries

Similarities

Serbia as well as Israel aimed at the incorporation of the disputed territories. Both assessed the conflict as matter of security respectively survival and thus, they are similar in their perception of the territorial disputes as Hard Zero-Sum-Situations in which strong non-cooperative approaches dominated.

Another similarity can be seen that both sacralised the claimed territory as part of their historic land and conducted colonisation to underpin their demands.

Finally, they also show similarities in their self-portrayal as defenders of the Western civilisation against threats of Western values (first in the case of Israel against communism, later in both cases against Islamist extremism) as means to gain international support.

Differences

A major difference has to be seen in the actors considered as adversaries to statehood:

- Serbia and the Serbian minority in Kosovo pursued consistent interests and therefore were considered by the Kosovo Albanians as one opposing block that had to be fought against.
- In the Middle East, in contrast, the constellation of forces opposing Palestinian statehood was much more complex. The Palestinians had to direct their struggle not only against their main adversary, Israel, but also against several Arab states that pursued distinct self-interests in the conflict but at the same time partially provided indispensable support for the Palestinian struggle.

With regard to the main adversaries in the conflict, it is a noteworthy difference that Israel has pressing economic interests of prosperity in the West Bank while Kosovo was an economic burden for Serbia.

One of the decisive differences between Serbia and Israel was their achievement in terms of colonisation:

- Serbian colonisation of Kosovo failed because of remigration of Serbs who did not consider Kosovo as their homeland.
- Zionists, in contrast, considered Palestine their homeland and safe haven from persecution and thus successfully colonised mandated Palestine. Today, the ongoing Israeli settlement building in the West Bank is still considered as return of Jews to their homeland.

A remarkable difference between the main adversaries is that Serbia had a much stronger legal case to object to Kosovo's independence than Israel to refuse the statehood of the Palestinian Territories.

Finally, a major difference can be seen with regard to Serbia's and Israel's international standing:

- Serbia suffered from a lack of pivotal international support due to its limited geo-strategic importance, historical alliance with Russia, insufficient lobbying in the West & damaged international image.

- Israel, in contrast, enjoys the support of the most powerful actors of the International Community based on its geo-strategic importance, successful lobbying and tolerable international image.

2.3.3. External Environment

The International Community neither granted Kosovo nor Palestine the right to affiliate to existing nation states or to create their own ones based on the fact that they have constituted the majority population on the territory in the aftermath of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, their emerging national aspirations were suppressed under foreign rule.

One of the central differences between the cases is that there is no involvement of external interests that contradict the Kosovo Albanian self-determination, for which reason there were no external actors seriously undermining this goal. In contrast, there have been various interests involved in the Middle East conflict of which several have contradicted Palestinian self-determination such as Arab territorial claims or interests of the Zionists respectively the the strong pro-Jewish sentiments in the West that strongly influence the position of the Western states.

Another crucial factor was the structure of the external supporters. The supporters of the Kosovo Albanians were coherent, while in the case of Palestine the supporters were incoherent following their own interests against each other. Thus, the Kosovo Albanians were not confronted with inner-Albanian rivalries but enjoyed support and solidarity from the side of the Albanian state as well as of Albanian minority groups in other neighbouring countries and in Diaspora. Although the Macedonian crisis of 2001 was based on the Albanian request for more autonomy within the state, there was no direct relation to the Kosovo Albanian struggle for statehood. The Palestinians, in contrast, suffered from external instrumentalisation from the side of many Arab countries and their struggle served as projection screen for inner-Arab disputes. Hence, when Arab countries intervened into the conflict, Palestinian interests were their least concern and when the Palestinian struggle spread to the territory of neighbouring countries, Arab regimes proceeded against the Palestinians.

The Kosovo conflict became virulent as a regional dispute between the State of Serbia and the Kosovo Albanian people and was initially perceived by the International Community as internal matter of Yugoslavia. Therefore, there was a low level of external interference. The conflict about Palestine, on the other hand, had a strong international component from the beginning due to the fact that it had been mandatory land and that the UN proposed a Partition Plan and thus, there was a high level of external interference.

When the Kosovo Albanians started their autonomous struggle for self-determination, their declaration of independence in 1990 was not recognised by any foreign power. In contrast, the International Community had officially agreed on the Palestinian right to statehood already in 1947 and thus, 127 states later recognised Palestine's declaration of independence in 1988 since Palestine also profited from the solidarity of many Third World countries.

The Kosovo Albanians as well as the Palestinians enjoyed external support for their struggle from their allies respectively from beneficiaries of the conflict in terms of material and financial resources.

However, the former increasingly gained the political backing of the most powerful international players for their claims, while the latter obtained insufficient support from influential actors within the International Community. Thus, international support facilitated the Kosovo Albanian struggle against Serbia while the Palestinian struggle against Israel stagnated due to missing political patronage.

When the conflict in Kosovo escalated, the International Community urged the conflict parties to conduct peace negotiations under international mediation. When the peace talks failed, the International Community was willing to take alternative actions to overcome the deadlock. In the case of Palestine, in contrast, the International Community was initially not ready to accept the Palestinians as party in peace negotiations when they showed sings of willingness to cooperate due to the PLO's image as terrorist group. Thus, the Palestinians first had to struggle for their recognition as party in peace negotiations. When the talks under international mediation reached a dead end, the International Community only put pressure on the parties to reactivate the frozen peace process due to a lack of international willingness to take other actions.

Thus, the USA and its European allies intervened into the Kosovo conflict to stop the violent conflict and to overthrow Milosevic and installed an enduring civil and NATO security presence. This intervention not only reduced the length of the violent conflict but also enhanced the Kosovo Albanian position vis-à-vis Serbia because the foreign protectorate backed Kosovo Albanian self-determination. In the Palestinian case, in contrast, there was a lack of such an international intervention or installation of a military presence on the ground and the USA, as the world's only Great Power, only took a mediation role. Therefore, the conflict continued and the Palestinian position vis-à-vis Israel as occupying power that tries to prevent Palestinian self-determination continually deteriorated.

When Kosovo re-declared independence in 2008 it was only recognised by 83 UN member states, but among them were the most influential states of the International Community. Thus, it still lacks encompassing international recognition as de jure state, while it exerts de facto sovereignty over its territories. Although Palestine was recognised in 1988 by 44 more states than Kosovo in 2008 and received the support of 138 states for its status upgrade to a non-member state at the UNO, the most influential actors of the International Community did not back Palestinian statehood. Hence, Palestine enjoys de jure statehood but lack de facto sovereignty over the Palestinian Territories.

To sum up, the Palestinians faced much more obstacles with regard to the external actors involved in the conflict than the Kosovo Albanians, since many pursued interests that were in contradiction to Palestinian self-determination. The Kosovo Albanians were able to conduct their self-dependent struggle, while there was strong domination of the Palestinian struggle from outside. Especially the support of the USA and the most powerful European states seems decisive in a conflict since their material assistance, including military interventions and diplomatic backing and initiatives, enables the national movements to proceed against virtually superior adversaries at eye level. The existing imbalance between Kosovo and Palestine in the support of the world's most powerful states obviously accounted more with regard to de facto statehood than a broad international approval.

Topics	Kosovo		Palestine	
	Action/Cause	**Effect**	**Action/Cause**	**Effect**
External prevention of self-determination	IC's refusal to create a Greater Albanian state including Kosovo after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire	Suppression of Kosovo Albanian national aspirations under Serbian rule	IC's refusal to create a Greater Syrian state including Palestine after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire	Suppression of Palestinian national aspirations under mandatory rule
External interests with regard to self-determination	Weak involvement of external interests that contradict Kosovo Albanian self-determination	No subversive external interference	Involvement of external interests that contradict Palestinian self-determination	Subversive external interference
Role of ethnically related states	No inner-Albanian rivalries & differences	No external instrumentalisation of Kosovo Albanians but Albanian solidarity	Inner-Arab rivalries and differences	Palestinians as projection screen of inner-Arab discrepancies

Level of internationalisation of the conflict	Initial international perception of the status of Kosovo as internal matter of Yugoslavia	▪ Regional conflict inicially without external interference ▪ Kosovo Albanian self-initiative in the struggle for self-determination	International conflict based on mandates and a UN Partition Plan for the distribution of the territory	▪ International conflict with significant external interference ▪ External dominance in the dispute with initial lack of Palestinian self-initiative in the territorial dispute
International perception	Perception as internal matter	International refusal to recognise Kosovo's declaration of independence in 1990	Perception as international conflict	Official international consensus about the Palestinian right to statehood and recognition of Palestine's declaration of independence in 1988 by 127 states
Role of external supporters/allies	▪ External support from allies ▪ No selfish interests	Unconditional material, financial and political support for resistance	▪ External support from allies & beneficiarie	Material, financial and political support often to respective

			s of the struggle ▪ in parts selfish interests	proxies
Role of major powers	Increasing support (diplomatic, material, military) from major powers (USA etc.)	Strong diplomatic/negotiation position	Limited (diplomatic and humanitarian) support from major powers (USA etc.)	Weak diplomatic/negotiation position
International diplomatic conflict intervention	IC's pressure on Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians to participate in peace negotiations under international mediation	▪ Acceptance of the failure of negotiations ▪ Willingness to take alternative action/intervention	Initial refusal of the IC to accept the PLO as party at peace negotiations	Palestinian diplomatic struggle to be recognised as party in peace negotiations
			Eventual IC's mediation role in peace negotiations with Israel	▪ Notice of the failure of negotiations ▪ Diplomatic pressure to reactivate the frozen peace process

				▪ No willingness to take alternative action/intervention
International military intervention	International military intervention; International civil and military presence in Kosovo	▪ Shortening the armed conflict ▪ Installation of an international protectorate backing self-determination ▪ Strenghtening of the Kosovo Albanian position vis-à-vis Serbia	No international military intervention; No international military presence in Palestine	▪ Continuation of armed conflict ▪ Continuation of foreign occupation that tries to prevent self-determination ▪ Continuous weakening of the Palestinian position vis-à-vis Israel
International stance towards the outcome of the struggle	Acceptance of Kosovo's re-declaration of independence by the most influential members of the IC	▪ Lack of encompassing internationally recognised de jure statehood ▪ De facto sovereignty over Kosovo	Acceptance of Palestine's status as non-member state at the UN by the majority of the IC excluding the world's most influential states	▪ De jure statehood of Palestine ▪ Lack of de facto sovereignty over the Palestinian Territories

Table 5: Comparison of the External Environment

Similarities

The critical similarity with regard to external actors is that the self-determination of the Kosovo Albanians as well as of the Palestinians was prevented from the International Community after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and led to the suppression of their national aspirations under foreign rule for decades.

The cases also show similarities in the external backing of allies that facilitated the struggle by material and financial support.

Finally, in both cases the International Community took a mediation role in peace negotiations between the opponents in the territorial conflicts.

Differences

Among the central differences are the external interests involved in the conflicts:

- There were no significant external interests contradicting Kosovo Albanian self-determination and thus, their struggle was not undermined by destructive external interference.
- In contrast, Palestinian self-determination was opposed by Zionists respectively pro-Jewish sentiments in the West as well as by Arab states.

Another crucial differenc is the inner-ethnic relations:

- Due to an absence of inner-Albanian rivalries, the Kosovo Albanians could draw back on ethnic solidarity.
- The Palestinians, in contrast, were faced with Arab states that laid territorial claims on their territory and served as projection screen of inner-Arab rivalries.

An important difference between the cases is the role of external supporters respectively allies:

- In the case of Kosovo, the allies acted non-selfish and provided unconditional support;

- while the Palestinian supporters pursued selfish interests in the conflict and thus provided assistance only to their proxies.

A decisive difference between the conflicts can also be seen in the level of internationalisation and international support:

- The International Community initially perceived the Kosovo conflict as internal matter of Yugoslavia for which reason external actors did not interfere into the dispute or recognise Kosovo's declaration of independence in 1990. However, the most influential actors of the International Community successively increased their support for the Kosovo Albanians in their struggle against Serbia.
- The conflict about Palestine, in contrast, has been highly internationalised since the adoption of the UN Partition Plan. It actually implied the International Community's approval of the Palestinian right to statehood. The majority of states only recognised the State of Palestine in 1988, but it still lacked sufficient diplomatic backing from powerful players in their dispute with Israel.

Another important difference is the distinct international conflict intervention:

- In Kosovo, the International Community urged the conflict parties to participate in a peace conference about the status of Kosovo. When negotiations failed, it was ready to conduct a military intervention and install a protectorate in Kosovo, which enhanced the Kosovo Albanian position vis-à-vis Serbia.
- In Palestine, the International Community initially refused peace talks with direct Palestinian participation. It only accepted them later but when the direct negotiations between the PLO and Israel reached a deadlock, the International Community refused to intervene on an alternative basis and only put pressure on the conflict parties to resume talks.

Finally, a crucial difference is the stance of the International Community towards the outcome of the struggles:

- Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 was recognised by less than half of the UN member states, but among them were the most powerful players. Although Kosovo still lacks encompassing international de jure recognition, it exerts de facto sovereignty over its territory.

- Palestine's status as state at the UNO was approved by a broad majority in 2012, but it still lacks the backing of the most influential actors of the International Community. Hence, despite de jure recognition, Palestine is still unable to exert de facto sovereignty over the Palestinian Territories.

2.4. Strategic Concepts

2.4.1. Non-Cooperative Non-Violent Concept

Passive non-violent civil resistance served the same purpose in Kosovo and in Palestine although it was initiated out of different considerations. In Kosovo, this approach prevented the premature outbreak of war, while for the Palestinians it was a reaction to unsuccessful violent concepts. In both cases, passive non-violent civil resistance was induced from the side of the civil society like the protest march of the Trepca miners or the First Intifada of the Palestinians under occupation and functioned as a countermeasure to the adversaries' attempts to suppress and displace those living under its rule. Furthermore, it enhanced the self-empowerment, unity and integrity of the respective groups and earned them international support and, in the Palestinian case, sympathy even within the Israeli society.

Another important non-violent measure was the establishment of social and political parallel institutions in Kosovo and Palestine. In Kosovo, this measure led to the isolation of the Serbian administration, while it enhanced democratisation, created social cohesion and assured the preservation of cultural autonomy. In Palestine, unofficial parallel institutions enhanced social unity and offered infrastructure for the national movements before the establishment of the PNA. After the realisation of the Oslo Agreement, the establishment of an official Palestinian administration served the increase in autonomy as a first step towards statehood and led to the democratisation of the political system.

Especially the Kosovo Albanian and Palestinian media and diplomatic struggle against their adversaries earned them international attention and sympathy.

Kosovo as well as Palestine declared their independence in the course of the conflicts, but while the former was not recognised by any foreign power, the latter was recognised by

the majority of states. Notwithstanding, in both cases this step did not enhance the respective territory's status.

In both conflicts, there was no cooperation with the opposition of the hostile regime. The Kosovo Albanians were not able to establish alliances against Milosevic inside Serbia due to the unwillingness of the political opposition to cooperate and the absence of a Serbian peace camp, while the Palestinians missed the chance to build an alliance with the Israeli peace camp against the Israeli opponents of a two-state solution because they underestimated its role.

Furthermore, in both cases the weakening of the adversary's international support had been neglected, which could have softened the opposing attitude of Serbia's respectively Israel's allies. Hence, opportunities to engage the allies of the adversaries as brokers and to deprive the adversary of their support were missed.

The Kosovo Albanians as well as the Palestinians failed to combine their non-violent approach with constant pressure on the opponent regime. The build-up of this pressure would have afforded much stronger external political engagement. Thus, they did not manage to make the adversaries' control over their territories politically and economically costly enough to enforce its end. (cp. Stephan, 2006, p. 71) In contrast, the conflicts were seized by the respective main adversaries to justify their military presence and tightened control over the disputed territories. In the case of Palestine, Israeli military action often functioned as retaliation for violence committed by spoilers.

The lack of results of the non-violent approach of the national movements in Kosovo and in Palestine led to the conclusion that only violence would produce the desired outcome and thus, both conflicts escalated towards violence.

After the calm down of violence, the Kosovo Albanians as well as the Palestinians made recourse to diplomatic measures that were refused by their adversaries as non-cooperative "unilateral" steps. Thus, the former re-declared independence, which did not lead to an encompassing international recognition of Kosovo but to its de facto sovereignty. The latter successfully filed an application to be recognised by the UNO as non-member state but still lacks de facto sovereignty.

To sum up, in both conflicts the non-violent concepts made important contributions to the inner constitution of the societies and earned them international sympathy needed to advance towards the realisation of their goals. However, due to similar omissions, the non-violent concepts of the Kosovo Albanians and the Palestinians were not able to produce the desired outcomes, for which reason they were complemented by violent means. Although both made recourse to diplomatic means after the violent period, it earned the Kosovo Albanians de facto sovereignty, while the Palestinians still lack control over their territory.

Topics	**Kosovo**		**Palestine**	
	Action/Cause	**Effect**	**Action/Cause**	**Effect**
Purpose of non-violence	Acts of passive non-violent civil resistance	▪ Countermeasure to Serbian attempts of displacement & social pressure ▪ Prevention of the premature outbreak of war with Serbia ▪ Self-empowerment of the Kosovo Albanians ▪ Creation of internal unity & maintenance of Kosovo Albanian integrity	Acts of passive non-violent civil resistance (Intifada)	▪ Countermeasure to Israeli attempts of displacement and social pressure ▪ Reversal of the Israeli public opinion towards the principle “land for peace” ▪ Self-empowerment of Palestinians living under occupation ▪ Creation of internal unity

		▪ Earning of international sympathy and support		& improvement of the Palestinian image ▪ Earning of international sympathy, renewed awareness & support
Parallel structures	Establishment of unofficial political and social parallel structures	▪ Isolation of Serbian administration in Kosovo ▪ Infrastructural setup for national movements ▪ Creation of social cohesion & preservation of cultural autonomy ▪ Democratisation of the Kosovo Albanian political sphere	Establishment of unofficial political and social parallel structures	▪ Negation of Israel's administration in the Occupied Territories ▪ Infrastructural setup for the national movements ▪ Creation of social cohesion & preservation of cultural autonomy

			Establishment of political and social structures of the PNA	▪ Democratisation of the Palestinian political system ▪ Increased level of autonomy as first step towards statehood
Public struggle	Media and diplomatic struggle against Serbia	Increase in international attention and support	Media and diplomatic struggle against Israel	Increase in international attention and support
Declarations of independence	Unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 1990	No enhancement of autonomy due to absence of international recognition	Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Palestine in 1988	No enhancement of autonomy despite international recognition
Relations to the internal oppositions of the hostile regimes	No chance to cooperate with the Serbian opposition and absence of a Serbian peace camp	Impossibility to build alliances against the Serbian regime	Lack of cooperation with the Israeli peace camp	Missed opportunity to build alliances against the Israeli opponents of a two-state solution

Weakening of the adversaries' support	Lack of attention to the weakening of Serbia's international support	Missed opportunity to soften the opposing attitude of Serbia's allies and to engage them as brokers in the conflict	Initial lack of attention to the weakening of Israel's international support	Strengthening of international support for Israel and weakening of the Palestinian positions
			Current lobbying attempts to weaken the Israeli international stance	More international understanding of the Palestinian position & engagement in peace building
Failures of non-violence	Lack of support of non-violence due to a lack of chance to put pressure on the Serbian regime	▪ Failure to make the Serbian control over Kosovo politically & economically costly enough ▪ Serbian seizure of resistance to justify Serbian forces in Kosovo & to divert general interest from internal problems	Lack of combination of non-violence with constant pressure on the Israeli regime	▪ Failure to make the Israeli control over Palestine politically & economically costly enough ▪ Israeli seizure of the conflict to justify Israeli occupation & to commit acts of retaliation

Implications of non-violence	Lack of results of the non-violent approach	Conclusion that only violent measures will create generally recognised realities and lead to international intervention	Lack of results of the non-violent approach	Disappointment that led to the fading of the Intifada and the resurgence of violent measures
Recourse to diplomacy after the violent escalation	Re-declaration of independence	▪ Recognition by less than the majority of the IC ▪ De facto sovereignty	Bid for a non-member status at the UNO	▪ Recognition of statehood by the majority of the IC ▪ Non-member state status at the UNO ▪ lack of de facto sovereignty

Table 6: Comparison of Non-Cooperative Non-Violent Approaches

Similarities

Central similarities between the cases lie in the genuine characteristics of the non-violent approach itself. Non-violence was induced from the civil society and served as a countermeasure to suppression and displacement. In both conflicts, it made important contributions to the unity and self-empowerment of the society and improved their image. The media and diplomatic struggle against the respective adversaries gained the Kosovo Albanians and the Palestinians international support. Parallel institutions enhanced democratisation, institutionalisation and cultural autonomy.

Other similarities of the non-violent approach in the two conflicts are of more case-related character:

- Kosovo as well as Palestine unilaterally declared independence as a means of their non-violent struggle.
- Neither the Kosovo Albanian nor the Palestinian approach produced enough political and economic costs for the opponent regimes to enforce their resignation but instead served as pretext for the adversaries' tightened control. In both conflicts, there was no cooperation with the opposition of the hostile regimes and the weakening of the adversaries' international support was neglected. Thus, the non-violent approach of the Kosovo Albanians and the Palestinians failed to reach the desired outcome and therefore were complemented by violent means.
- After the calm down of violence and the stagnation of the cooperative approach, the Kosovo Albanians and the Palestinian authorities drew back on non-cooperative diplomatic measures to assert their statehood.

Differences

A difference can be seen in the reason for the adoption of a non-violent approach in the two conflicts. The Kosovo Albanian non-violent concept prevented the premature outbreak of war, while the Palestinians applied it as an alternative to previous unsuccessful violent approaches.

One central difference between the non-violent measures was that the most popular features, Kosovo's and Palestine's declarations of independence, respectively the Palestinian UN bid, revealed that the former had a much weaker quantitative backing among the International Community than the latter but a decisively better qualitative one in terms of the power of its supporters. This difference has serious implications on the de facto sovereignty over the claimed territories.

2.4.2. Non-Cooperative Violent Concept

With regard to the adequacy of the application of violence, it can be said that the Kosovo Albanians were aware of Serbia's military inferiority and its political courses of action

from the beginning of their violent approach. Thus, they applied adequate violent means in addition to the ongoing non-violent approach to resist Serbian pressure. Therefore, the UCK decided to conduct acts of guerrilla warfare according to its own strength in addition to the LDK's ongoing non-violent resistance. The Palestinians only made a realistic assessment of Israel's overwhelming military strength and political power after having recognised that their reliance on the anticipated victory of the conventional Arab armies was a critical mistake. Thus, the Palestinians took self-initiative based on guerrilla warfare only when they were already under Israeli occupation.

The guerrilla attacks of the UCK as well as of the PLO produced international awareness for the conflict. For the latter, they also served as a means to strengthen internal solidarity and identity. However, despite the UCK's official declaration that its guerrilla tactic against the adversary on the disputed territory had been designed in the style of that of the PLO, there was a decisive difference. The UCK limited its attacks against Serbian property and persons to the territory of Kosovo, while the Palestinians committed attacks not only in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but also in the territory of the State of Israel and abroad, which they considered as part of Palestine. Thus, the UCK's violent approach led to an escalation of the conflict and a humanitarian crisis inside Kosovo that afforded international engagement. The PLO, on the other hand, became internationally isolated due to its terroristic acts against Israel and other states.

The Kosovo Albanians clearly profited from their deliberate decision to refrain from terrorist attacks outside the conflict area and thus, received strong international backing. The Palestinians, in contrast, committed regional and international terrorism, which led to international rejection. Furthermore, Palestinian terrorism increased the international solidarity with Israel and consolidated the position of the Israeli hardliners.

To sum up, the Kosovo Albanians conducted a correct evaluation of the strength of their adversary and thus applied adequate concepts in line with the criteria of international acceptability which earned them international backing. The Palestinians, on the other hand, initially mistakenly relied on Israel's perceived inferiority in conventional wars and later drew back on internationally despised measures, which deprived them of international support while inducing solidarity with Israel.

Topics	Kosovo		Palestine	
	Action/Cause	**Effect**	**Action/Cause**	**Effect**
Adequacy of the violent approach	Realistic assessment of the military inferiority of Serbia	Adequate use of violence in the form of guerrilla warfare in combination with ongoing non-violent resistance	Initial unrealistic assessment of Israel's military strength	Erroneous reliance on a military victory by conventional armies of alleged allies
			More realistic assessment of Israel's military inferiority in the course of the conflict	Self-initiative in the form of guerrilla warfare without combining it with non-violent resistance
Area of application of guerrilla attacks	Guerrilla attacks against Serbian property & persons on the territory of Kosovo	Escalation of the conflict & creation of a humanitarian catastrophe leading to international intervention	Guerrilla attacks against Israeli property & persons on the whole disputed territory (including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip & Israel)	▪ International attention ▪ Strengthening of internal solidarity & identity ▪ International isolation of the Palestinians due to attacks

				on the State of Israel ▪ Lack of international diplomatic support
	No use of terrorism outside the conflict area	International sympathy and support	Regional and international terrorism	▪ International rejection ▪ International solidarity with Israel ▪ Consolidation of the position of the Israeli hardliners

Table 7: Comparison of Non-Cooperative Violent Approaches

Similarities

The only considerable similarity in the violent approaches of the Kosovo Albanians and the Palestinians can be seen in the typical function of guerrilla activities, namely in the attraction of international awareness for both conflicts.

Differences

An important difference between the cases is that the Kosovo Albanians applied violent actions, in addition to the continuing non-violent measures, that corresponded to their military inferiority and were adequate to counter Serbian pressure. The Palestinian initial misjudgement of Israel, in contrast, resulted in their delayed self-initiative in the form of guerrilla warfare, which primarily relied on violent measures.

The major difference has to be seen in the area of application of guerrilla attacks:

- The Kosovo Albanian guerrilla attacks were limited to Serbian property and persons in Kosovo and aimed at the escalation of the conflict. The Kosovo Albanians did not expand their operations to the territory of the State of Serbia and refrained from international terrorism, which earned them international sympathy and support up to a military intervention.
- In contrast, the Palestinians not only committed attacks in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but also on the territory of the State of Israel as well as on an international basis, which was internationally considered as terrorism and thus, rejected. Regional and international terrorism strengthened the solidarity with Israel and the position of its political hardliners.

2.4.3. Cooperative Concept

The Kosovo Albanians as well as the Palestinians missed their first chance to negotiated self-determination due to the absence of a representation of their interests in the International Community's allocation of the former Ottoman territories. In the forefront of the outbreak of the violent conflicts, both again missed the chance for an internationally brokered settlement, but for different reasons. The Kosovo Albanians were not able to draw enough attention to their case for an international effort in conflict prevention, while the Palestinians refused any international mediation proposal.

Although in both conflicts there came a time for direct peace negotiations between the opponents, the central difference was in the inclination of all parts of the society to cooperate with the adversary. The Kosovo Albanians united around their common goal and showed unified readiness to negotiate with Serbia, which strengthened their international support. The Palestinians, in contrast, never found unity regarding a basical willingness to negotiate with Israel, for which reason their international support and the PLO's bargaining position were seriously weakened.

The Kosovo Albanians demonstrated willingness to compromise and the Serbian refusal of the proposed agreement led to a strong international alignment with the former and triggered the NATO intervention. The contentions between the Palestinian national movements and spoiler violence against a peace process, on the other hand, created the

impression of lacking credibility when the PLO declared its willingness to accept a two-state solution.

Summing up, the main difference between the cooperative concepts of the Kosovo Albanians and the Palestinians was that the former showed unified willingness to negotiate and compromise with their adversary, while the latter did not have a credible position in peace negotations.

Topics	**Kosovo**		**Palestine**	
	Action/Cause	**Effect**	**Action/Cause**	**Effect**
International mediation in the forefront of the conflict	Non-existence of an Albanian representation of interests in the international allocation of former Ottoman territories	Missed opportunity to present territorial interests	Non-existence of a representation of interests in the international allocation of former Ottoman territories	Missed opportunity to present territorial interests
	Lack of possibilities to reach international conflict prevention before the outbreak of the Yugoslav secession wars	Missed opportunity to engage the IC in conflict prevention	Refusal of international mediation proposals	Missed opportunity to find an internationally negotiated solution in the forefront of the violent conflict

Willingness to negotiations	Readiness to negotiate with Serbia	Strengthening of international diplomatic support	In parts lack of readiness to negotiate with Israel	Weakening of international diplomatic support & undermining their bargaining position
Readiness to compromise	Readiness to compromise	▪ International alignment with the Kosovo Albanians ▪ Inducement of an international military intervention after Serbia's refusal	No unified readiness to compromise	▪ International doubt about the Palestinian willingness to compromise ▪ Lack of international political or military engagement

Table 8: Comparison of Cooperative Approaches

Similarities

A similarity can be seen in the fact that the Kosovo Albanians as well as the Palestinians missed the chance to find a negotiated and internationally brokered settlement before the outbreak of the actual conflicts and only participated in direct peace negotiations with their adversaries after a long period of non-cooperation including violent confrontations.

Differences

A significant difference between the cases is the willingness to negotiate and readiness to compromise:

- The Kosovo Albanians were perceived as reliable partner in peace talks due to their united willingness to negotiate and readiness to compromise.
- The Palestinian credibility and bargaining position were constrained because of the lack of internal unified willingness to adopt a cooperative approach.

3. Comparison of the Overall Strategies and Outcomes

In both cases, the strategies show sufficient similarities to allow for a comparison. It is, however, the significant differences within the various elements of their strategies, which suggest the conclusion that these differences in strategy might also explain the differences in the results until now, namely why Kosovo has achieved independence and statehood, and Palestine has not yet.

The most prominent differences in the strategies of the national movements are the following:

Topic	Kosovo	Palestine
Aspirations	Realistic claims	Unrealistic claims
Internal Environment	Independent acting	External domination
	Internal unity	Factionalism & internal spoiling
	Credible united bargaining position	Unreliable disunited bargaining position
Adversary	One main adversary with weak international standing	Powerful and internationally backed main adversary & further opponents of self-determination with own territorial interests
	Failed colonisation	Successful colonisation
External Environment	Inner-ethnic solidarity	Inner-ethnic rivalries
	Powerful external supporters	Lack of powerful external supporters
	International military intervention	Lack of international military intervention
Concepts	Local guerrilla warfare	Regional & international terrorism

The analysis of the two cases suggests the assumption that the Kosovo Albanian national movements were able to seize decisive opportunities to advance towards self-determination due to their strategic flexibility and only missed few chances on their way towards statehood. The Palestinians, on the other hand, lived up to their infamous

reputation that they “never missed a chance to miss a chance” for the establishment of a sovereign state not only due to external obstacles but also because they stood in their own way.

So, while the Kosovo Albanian strategy led to de facto statehood and Serbia is becoming increasingly realistic with regard to the definite loss of Kosovo, the Palestinians are still under Israeli occupation. This different outcome of the strategies is remarkable because the Palestinian right to independent statehood has actually been collectively recognised by the International Community since the beginning of the conflict. Notwithstanding, the International Community accepted the incorporation of Palestine by other Arab states and Israel for decades and despite the confirmation of Palestine’s de jure statehood in the form of its recent upgrade to a non-member “state” of the UNO, it still lacks full sovereignty over its territory for which reason it is not a de facto state such as Kosovo.

V. CONCLUSIONS

From an academic point of view, many sub-research questions could be answered in the course of this work. They will be the basis for conclusions through a verification or falsification of the hypotheses and give an answer to the main research question.

As mentioned in the introduction of this work, only a detailed elaboration on both conflict cases could reveal the meaningfulness of the comparison of Kosovo and Palestine, which was necessary to take a stand on the question whether the former can be a role model for the latter. By examining the similarities and differences between the cases, we can derive some relevant conclusions:

- **Aspirations** of the national movements must be realistic and internationally accepted. Maximalist objectives that presuppose the elimination of the adversary not only lack broad international backing but even cause solidarity with the adversary or an intervention in favour of the opponent. Some goals, like the establishment of a democratic state, demand the appropriate means, which therefore must also be based on democracy. Other goals can themselves be a recipe for war if they are pursued uncompromisingly. (cp. Clark, 2000, p. 203)

- National movements within one society must overcome their **internal** ideological differences and power rivalries through a higher level of institutionalisation inside the political sphere in order to enable all parties to occupy a place in the struggle for a common goal. The domestic power balance influences foreign policy and shapes the assessment of the costs and benefits of war or peace. The internal consent for the sake of the higher goal is a precondition for success and enables the actors to maintain a united image on the diplomatic stage where peace can be reached.

- With regard to the **adversaries**, national movements have to be aware of the strength and the nature of the opposing forces, which can vary from only one adversary to one opposing block consisting of more adversaries with the same interests or even to a complex constellation of forces whose interests contradict a

people's self-determination. The latter situation seriously complicates the struggle of the national movements.

- Strong domination and dependence from **external actors** seriously narrows the scope of action of the national movements. Furthermore, the strategic procedure of national movements is seriously complicated if their struggle serves as projection screen for power struggles within their own ethnic group instead of being an inducement for solidarity of entities with the same ethnic majority population. The probably most important factor with regard to external involvement is the diplomatic and military support of the most powerful states of the International Community, with the USA ahead. In order to acquire this support, lobbying and image-building on the international level are indispensable. Only strong international backing enables the national movements to compete against the hostile state at eye level.

- With regard to the national movements' choice of applicable **concepts** in a territorial dispute, the cases showed that a successful strategy must draw back on a combination of non-cooperative and cooperative approaches. This presupposes flexibility and the ability to adapt concepts to the developments in the conflict.

- While a **non-cooperative non-violent** approach can make important contributions to the inner unity of a society and the gathering of international sympathy, it might not be able to attract enough international engagement for an intervention into the conflict. Thus, it needs to put enough pressure on the adversary's regime to make the control over the territory politically, economically, and militarily unaffordable. A unilateral declaration of independence can be a powerful political means but needs the backing of powerful international players to change things on the ground.

- **Violent** means, on the other hand, escalate the situation on the ground. Due to the military inferiority of the national movements, they draw back on guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks, but should take care that their measures are still in

line with the important criteria of international acceptability. International terrorism permanently harms the movements' image and deprives them of the necessary external support.

- A **cooperative approach** can avoid a conflict through conflict prevention or serve as last resort of national movements to avoid their marginalisation and neglection in international conflict mediation efforts. This concept necessitates the unified willingness to compromise of all political actors within the society at least on the surface. This is hard to reach, because historic compromises inevitably cause disunity and internal strife since different factions in the nation may not consent to the terms of the agreement. (cp. Ehrlich, 2004, p. 219) Otherwise, the delegation will not be accepted as serious partner in peace negotiations and there will occur spoiler violence from inside the society. Such measures aim at undermining the peace process as well as at avoiding the perpetrators' loss of influence in domestic politics. (cp. Pearlman, 2009, p. 106)

When comparing these findings with the hypotheses, which served as main arguments in the public debate about the comparability of Kosovo and Palestine, one can see that there is a strong congruence with the assumption of the hypotheses that the active support of powerful external actors and internal unity within the national movements are decisive factors in a conflict. Thus, the hypotheses can be verified but have to be complemented by decisive additional factors. With regard to the external support, the hypotheses failed to consider that it strongly depends on the nature of the claims and the violent struggle of the national movements. Furthermore, they missed two important factors, namely the role of the national movements' united readiness to negotiate and compromise at the right time and the strong impact of the constellation of forces opposing the statehood of a people.

One of the scientific sub-goals of the study concerning methodology was to contribute to the debate whether a comparison of two apparently different cases can be of relevance also for the political realities. Only the close analysis of the various factors of strategy and their cause-effect relations, and refraining from too simplistic approaches - as for example chronology - revealed that there exist enough similarities to draw meaningful comparisons from their differences. Thus, the question whether it made sense to compare two cases that appear as "kangaroos and apples" at first sight, can be affirmed positively.

This does not mean that the main research question - whether it might be advisable to apply the "Kosovo strategy" also in the case of Palestine, too – could as such be answered positively by necessity. There is no simple recipe for independence, as every conflict has its own complex history and thus, the strategic situation of the national movements would require different strategic proceedings. Therefore, simplistic analogies must be avoided, and Shlomo Avineri is right in arguing that a comparison of the conflicts reveals the limits of analogy and the sometimes propagandistic use made of it. Rather, each conflict has to be addressed and settled on its own merits. (cp. Avineri, 2008).

It would thus be a mistake to focus on just one or the other element, as for example Kosovo´s unilateral declaration of independence, and present this as "strategy" and role model for other cases. However, taking a comprehensive view on the strategies with all their elements, it might reveal some insights worth considering. As we could see, differences within the strategies in key issues as for example between realistic vs. unrealistic claims, the degree of internal unity, the restraint in violence, or gaining support from major powers, etc. could be identified as significant factors in explaining also the difference in their results, namely achieving - or missing - independence and statehood. Rather than drawing simple analogies, it might be thus the "lessons learnt" from the differences in crucial elements found by comparing the strategies that could also prove practical political relevance of the findings of this study for future cases.

VI. SUMMARY

1. English Summary

The title of the current dissertation "The Way to Statehood. Can the Kosovo Approach be a Role Model for Palestine?" simultaneously corresponds to the central research question. The work on this issue was inspired by a public discussion about the analogies of the case and about the possible applicability of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo to the conflict in Palestine. Thus, it seems necessary to conduct a detailed comparison of the strategies of the national movements during their struggle for statehood.

The prevalent theories on strategy define strategy vaguely as success-oriented constructs or calculations that take into account various strategic elements in order to obtain a more favourable outcome of a certain problem case than might exist without deliberate strategic proceeding. Thus, the following strategic elements were analysed as a basis for the comparison of the strategies of the national movements: their aspirations (in the sense of interests and goals), their strategic environment (internal settings, adversary/adversaries, external context) and their concepts (resources & courses of action).

The comparison of these strategic elements in both conflicts reveals significant differences in the strategic situation of the national movements, which are decisive for the different outcomes of the conflicts. Hence, the Kosovo Albanian strategy resulted in de facto statehood despite the lack of collective international recognition of their unilateral declaration of independence. The Palestinians, on the other hand, live under Israeli occupation until today despite their de jure recognition by the International Community and thus, do not exert de facto sovereignty over their territory.

The study proved that it is useful to conduct a comparison of the two cases, because it reveals important lessons about strategies in territorial conflicts and the factors that influence their success or failure. Notwithstanding, the main research question whether Kosovo can serve as role model for Palestine cannot be answered positively. The reasons for the different outcomes of the two cases are manifold and thus, there is no cure-all such as a unilateral declaration of independence to solve disputes over territories.

2. German Summary

Der Titel der vorliegenden Dissertation “The Way to Statehood. Can the Kosovo Approach be a Role Model for Palestine?” beinhaltet gleichzeitig die zentrale Forschungsfrage. Die Bearbeitung des Themas ist durch eine öffentliche Diskussion über die Analogien der Fälle sowie über eine mögliche Anwendbarkeit der einseitigen Unabhängigkeitserklärung des Kosovo auf den Konflikt in Palästina inspiriert. Aus der Forschungsfrage abgeleitet, ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit eines detaillierten Vergleichs der Strategien der Nationalbewegungen auf ihrem Weg zu Staatlichkeit.

Die vorherrschenden Strategietheorien definieren Strategie vage als erfolgsorientierte Konstrukte oder Kalkulationen, die verschiedene strategische Elemente einbeziehen, um ein vorteilhafteres Ergebnis für einen bestimmten Problemfall zu erzielen, als es ohne strategischem Vorgehen eintreten würde. Für den Strategievergleich der Nationalbewegungen werden daher folgende strategische Elemente analysiert: ihre Ansprüche (im Sinne von Interessen & Zielen), ihre strategische Umwelt (internes Umfeld, der/die Gegner, externes Umfeld) und ihre Konzepte (Ressourcen & Handlungsoptionen).

Der Vergleich dieser strategischen Elemente in den beiden Konflikten enthüllt bedeutende Unterschiede in der strategischen Situation der Nationalbewegungen, welche für die unterschiedlichen Ergebnisse der Konflikte ausschlaggebend sind. Deshalb führte die Strategie der Kosovo-Albaner, trotz des Mangels an kollektiver internationaler Anerkennung ihrer unilateralen Unabhängigkeitserklärung, zu de facto Staatlichkeit. Die Palästinenser hingegen leben trotz ihrer de jure Anerkennung durch die Internationale Gemeinschaft unter israelischer Besatzung und haben daher keine de facto Souveränität über ihr Land.

Die Dissertation zeigt auf, dass es sinnvoll ist, einen Vergleich der beiden Fälle durchzuführen, da wichtige Schlussfolgerungen über Strategien in territorialen Konflikten und erfolgsbestimmende Faktoren gezogen werden können. Dennoch kann die zentrale Forschungsfrage, ob das Kosovo als Vorbild für Palästina dienen kann, nicht positiv beantwortet werden. Die Gründe für die unterschiedlichen Ergebnisse der beiden Fälle sind vielfältig und deshalb gibt es kein Allheilmittel, wie eine unilaterale Unabhängigkeitserklärung, um territoriale Konflikte zu lösen.

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VIII. LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAK	Aleanca per Ardhmerine e Kosoves
AKR	Aleanca Kosova e Re
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
AL-FATAH	Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Watani Al-Filastin (Akronym)
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DEPOS	Democratic Movement of Serbia
DOS	Demokratska Opozicija Srbije
DS	Demokratska stranka
DSS	Demokratska Stranka Srbije
EC	Executive Committee
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Hamas	Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyya
IC	International Community
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

ICO	International Civilian Office
ICR	International Civilian Representative
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISG	International Steering Group
JNA	Jugoslavenska narodna armija
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
LBD	Levizja e Bashkuar Demokratike
LDK	Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves
LKCK	Levizja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves
LPK	Levizja Popullore e Kosoves
LPRK	Levizja Popullore per Republiken e Kosoves
Maki	Ha-Miflagah ha-Kommunistit ha-Yisraelit
Mapai	Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael
Mapam	Mifleget ha-Poalim ha-Meuhedet
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations
NS	Nova Srbija
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Conference

OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAF	Palestinian Arab Front
PBD	Partia e Bashkimit Demokratik
PCC	Palestine Central Council
(P)DFLP	(Popular) Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PDK	Partia Demokratike e Kosoves
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – Genral Command
PFLP-SC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Special Command
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PNC	Palestine National Council
PNF	Palestine National Fund
PPP	Palestinian People’s Party
PPSF	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front
SAS	Special Air Service
Shas	Sephardim Shomrei Torah

SPO	Srpski Pokret Obnove
SPS	Socijalistička Partija Srbije
SRS	Srpska Radikalna Stranka
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UCK	Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves
UDM	United Democratic Movement
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNLU	Unified National Leadership of Uprising
UNMIK	Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VV	Vetevendosje!
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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