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ABSTRACT

As recently as only the last few decades the study of nation branding has gained pervasive public attention. Within this short time its practice has quickly spread throughout the world amongst superpowers and the less developed alike. Nation branding is frequently brought up in conjunction with the phrase Joseph Nye[1] coined as 'Soft Power'. This Post-Cold war 'Soft power' is less tangible than the kind of power that belonged to the Great Powers in immediate post WWII period. The increase of in-between states interdependence in economics, communications and human aspirations allowed the new breed of power to gain importance. With it playing an important role, the world has witnessed the ability of various countries' resources such as culture, ideology and institutions to encounter external resistances to their wishes. In the words of Nye, it is all about 'getting others to want what you want', where it, in turn, promotes the emergence of so-called 'Cool Capitalism' as one specific strategy to achieve positive economic prosperity.

While the majority of existing literatures concentrate on researches into Nation Branding within the context of international marketing, image and identity management, much fewer literatures have been pursuing a comparative historical institutional approach, as well as in explaining the outcomes that rooted out of unparallel economic development paths. With the above as motivation, this dissertation takes a look at Britain's campaign of 'Cool Britannia' in the 90s in comparison to the 'Cool Japan' cultural export campaign seen as a key government-private collaboration in gaining its status as 'cultural superpower'. The main similarity between these similarly- labelled campaigns is the use of nation branding strategies to draw the beneficial correlation of culture and economy. Both have the aim to make possible the economic achievement through the utilisation of the non-economic factors targeting the outside world. The focal point will be on the actors that were shaped by the socio-economic development norms governing the policymaking institutions. On the one hand, the UK was one of those countries that has revolutionised and moved to the extreme neo-liberalistic side after a prolonged period of Mercantilism. On the other hand, the Japanese state has maintained its 'Iron Triangle' state of affairs where bureaucrats maintained their decisive role in the nation's economy. These Japanese pre-war characteristics have survived and developed to be the very tools behind Japan's success as late industrialisers and in popular culture. For the above reasons, one could conclude that while there was a brake in British political-economic paradigm, Japan maintained its unbroken status-quo as a mercantilist throughout its post-war times. This dissertation argues that these aforementioned differentiating norms played a key role in influencing the 'Cool Capitalism' and 'Nation Branding' paradigm of the both UK and Japan as they have grown out of the industrial era towards the proliferation of a post-industrial economy that has started to be the global trend.

[1] Nye, J. (2004). *Soft power : the means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

ABSTRACT

Erst seit ein paar Jahrzehnten haben Studien über "Nation Branding" ein starkes Interesse in der Öffentlichkeit erlangt. Innerhalb kurzer Zeit, hat sich diese Methode über die ganze Welt verbreitet, sowohl unter den Supermächten als auch unter den weniger entwickelten Staaten. „Nation Branding" wird öfters mit dem, was Joseph Nye (1990) als „Soft Power" bezeichnet hat, in Verbindung gebracht. Diese Post-Kalter Krieg „Soft Power" ist weniger konkret als die Art der Macht welche den großen Mächten unmittelbar dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs zu eigen war. Die Zunahme von zwischenstaatlichen Verflechtungen in wirtschaftlicher, kommunikationstechnischer Art und die menschlichen Bestrebungen erlaubten dieser neuen Sorte von Macht an Bedeutung zu gewinnen. Damit spielt sie eine wichtige Rolle und die Welt konnte beobachten, wie einige Länder verschiede ihrer Ressourcen wie Kultur, Ideologie und Institutionen mobilisierten, um externe Hindernisse gegen ihre Wünsche zu überwinden. In den Worten von Nye, dreht sich alles darum „den Anderen dazu zu bekommen, das zu wollen, was du willst", wo es, wiederum, den Aufstieg des sogenannten „Cool Capitalism" begünstigt als eine spezifische Strategie um eine positive ökonomische Entwicklung zu erreichen.

Während die Mehrheit der bestehenden Literatur sich auf die Forschungen zu „Nation Branding" im Zusammenhang mit internationalem Marketing, Image und Identitätsmanagement konzentriert, gibt es viel weniger Literatur, die dem komparativen historisch institutionellen Zugang verfolgt, sowie auch wenige, die das Resultat erklären, dass nicht parallele ökonomische Entwicklungswegen entstehen ließen. Mit dem eben erklärten als Motivation, wirft diese Arbeit einen Blick auf die britische Kampagne des „Cool Britannia" in den 1990er Jahren im Vergleich zur „Cool Japan" Kulturexport Kampagne, welche als Schlüssel der staatlich – privaten Kooperation zur Erlangung des Status „kulturelle Supermacht" angesehen wird. Die größte Gemeinsamkeit dieser ähnlich gelabelten Kampagnen ist die Verwendung von Strategien des „Nation Branding" um die nutzbringende Wechselbeziehung von Kultur und Ökonomie zu nützen. Beide haben das Ziel, den ökonomischen Erfolg durch die Verwendung von nichtökonomischen Faktoren, die die Außenwelt anvisieren, möglich zu machen. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf den Akteuren, welche von den sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklungsnormen geformt wurden, die die Politik bestimmenden Institutionen kontrollieren. Einerseits, war Großbritannien eines jener Länder, welche revolutionär waren und auf eine extrem neoliberale Seite nach einer verlängerten Periode des Merkantilismus gewechselt sind. Andererseits, hat der japanische Staat seine „Iron Triangle" Entwicklungsmerkmale beibehalten, in der Staatsbeamte ihre entscheidende Rolle in der nationalen Ökonomie bewahrt haben. Diese japanische Vorkriegscharakteristik hat überlebt und hat sich zum wichtigsten Werkzeug entpuppt, welches hinter dem japanischen Erfolg sowohl als spät industrialisiertes Land als auch im Zeitalter der Popkultur steckt. Aus diesen oben genannten Gründen, kann gefolgert werden, dass während es einen Bruch in den britischen politisch-ökonomischen Paradigmen gab, Japan seinen ungebrochenen Status-quo als ein Merkantilist auch in der Nachkriegszeit

beibehalten hat. Diese Arbeit argumentiert, dass diese zuvor erwähnten differenzierenden Normen eine Schlüsselrolle in der Beeinflussung der Paradigmen des „Cool Capitalism“ und des „Nation Brandings“ zufällt als beide, sowohl das UK als auch Japan aus dem industriellen Zeitalter in Richtung der Proliferation der postindustriellen Ökonomie herausgewachsen sind, welche begonnen hat der globale Trend zu sein.

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Ultimately, I would like to thank my family for their love and support that were easily felt despite the long distance. Especially to my mum, who I feel obliged to do my best for.

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INTRODUCTION

It was not a long time ago when Joseph Nye introduced the term 'Soft Power'[2], a non-traditional way a country can influence another countries wants, or its public's values.[3] Quickly after, scholarship on economic development concerning various nations has mushroomed to emphasise the significance of the term and how to enhance it. This was, firstly, due to the fear of non-renewable resource shortages that are now becoming one of the hottest topics. Moreover, to many, globalisation is believed to have paved the convergent path of consumer needs and tastes across different markets.[4] Specifically, what this dissertation finds most essential about 'soft power' is how it signifies the breaking down of barriers between culture and economy. Before the Cold War, the buzzword one could not avoid coming across when debating about the economic success would be 'Industrial Revolution'. Nevertheless, the world entered the period of Post-Industrial Revolution where the wealth of nations is not only limited to those that have made it as industrial superpowers, but also to those whom we call 'cultural superpowers'. With this shift deemed magnificent, various governments have invested efforts in revisiting public policies. The fruition has resulted in the birth of cultural policies and cultural diplomacy, providing guidelines of how best to manipulate and optimise countries' new kind of post-industrial economy. Yet the outcome varies not because of short term policies, but rooted in the long term institutional foundations and different intervention approaches of those nations.

Within the post-industrial economy, governments' attempts to enhance their soft power often associated with what is known as 'Nation Branding' resulting in what Peter Van Ham called 'Brand State'.[5] Yet, complication and difficulties exist as these two concepts are frequently faced with criticisms. Among many questions raised is whether it is truly beneficial and safe to brand a nation as if it were a product. Additionally, another feature that often characterises this cultural-based economy is the emergence of the hybrid known as 'cool capitalism', the marriage between counterculture and the neo-liberal ideology of consumer sovereignty in recent decades. The most notorious criticism regarding this coupling up is its complexity largely due to its high degree of uncertainty when it comes to what 'cool' essentially means and its power to manipulate. With the rise of 'Cool Capitalism', the 'Cool Factor' has obtained its status quo as 'a universal phenomenon, and

[2] Nye, J. (2004). *Soft power : the means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

[3] This definition appeared in McGray, Douglas. (2004) "Foreign Policy -- Japan's Gross National Cool, By Douglas McGray." *302 Found*. Accessed 27 Mar. 2012. <http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ikalmar/illustex/japfpmcgray.htm>.

[4] Fan, Ying (2010): Branding the nation: towards a better understanding, in: PLACE BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, 6(2) May: 97-103; FAN, YING (2006): Branding the nation. What is being branded? JOURNAL OF VACATION MARKETING, 12(1), 5-14.

[5] Ham, P. Van (2001): The rise of the brand state: the post-modern politics of image and reputation, in: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 80(5) September-October: p. 2-6.

no longer a passing fad', that has a remarkable influence on all sorts of institutions ranging from media, education, the real estate market and eventually the economy on the macro-level.[6] Focusing on the top two most reputed 'cool' campaigns with identical titles, one could examine the governments' initiatives which have marked crucial points in the studies of global economic history where culture, economy and politics intertwine.

For the purpose of setting the scene regarding government's effort to brand nations, one could not deny that Blair's effort of the 90s attracted the strongest public attention in the history of British politics, when New Labour officially came into power in May 1997. Two months later, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) was formed to regulate the government's fondness for revitalising Britishness, and in promoting creative industries. Since then, the 'Cool Britannia' equals proximate relationships between the government and its beloved celebrity, or reputedly radical figures from the entertainment industry, such as those of popular music. Yet, the campaign's fate underwent a transition after some months when the government decided to cut social-security entitlement for those only bureaucratically-portrayed as unemployed. This point, according to McGuigan[7], soon marked the quick evaporation of citizen's support, optimism, hope and hype, where the very idea became an embarrassment for the government. However, the incidence of 'Not-So-Cool Britannia'[8] has left us with a plenty of food for thought regarding the multi-faceted utilisation of creative industries for the purpose of economic gains, through the analysis of factors that have made Britain lose its cool.

A decade after, Douglas McGray introduced the term 'Gross National Cool', an immeasurable socio-economic performance indicator serving political and economic ends. Through this opinion, the world was, once again, reminded of the weakened wall between culture and economy. Despite the fact that Japan pioneered a new kind of economic superpower as early as the 80s, 'Cool Japan' was the essential point of departure where the success became most visible by international standards. With this Koizumi government-initiated campaign, Josef Nye declared that the global political economy has indeed entered the Japanese Era. Whether the efforts to brand nations through selling of culture have worked out in reality, and in the long run, is unknown. However, attempts will be made to

[6] Pountain, Dick. (2000) Cool Rules: anatomy of an attitude. London: Reaktion.

[7]Jim McGuigan is professor of Cultural Analysis the department of social sciences at Loughborough University, United Kingdom. He is the author of several books and articles, including Cultural Populism (1992), rethinking Cultural Policy (2004), Caunce, Stephenin. Relocating Britishness. Manchester New York New York: Manchester University Press Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 2004.

[8]Kate Oakley is Professor of Cultural Policy at the University of Leeds and a Visiting Professor at the University of the Arts London. Her research interests include the politics of cultural policy, work in the cultural industries, and regional development. from 1998 until 2010, Kate was an Associate at Demos, a think-tank focused on power and politics. While at Demos, she worked on the rapidly growing phenomenon of festivals. Oakley, Kate and Charles Leadbeater (2000) The Independents, London, Demos; Oakley, Kate (2004) *'Not so Cool Britannia, The Role of Creative Industries in Economic Development',* IN: International Journal of Cultural Studies article.

consider what the raison d'être of 'Cool Britannia' and 'Cool Japan' campaigns were, as well as the impacts of economic, social and cultural institutions towards the campaigns. The set goal is to make a comparative analysis of the extent the UK and Japan have similarly and distinctively used the nation branding pursuit and their creative industries as a capitalist tool, through a look at the nature of the nations' institutional arrangements. Ultimately, the key variables will be identified.

Through the studies of the responsible policy-making institutions, established policies and practices, I argue that the varied degree of success between the short-lived 'Cool Britannia' and the more recent success of 'Cool Japan' lies in the difference in the uniquely-Japanese bureaucratic makeup and methods as key engines supporting the in-charged ministries. The approaches used to regulate 'Cool Japan' under the responsibility of the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) has benefited Japan as a cultural superpower in the same manner as it served as a backbone of Japan's emergence as an industrial superpower. With this in mind, I intend to emphasise the uniqueness of the Japanese post-war capitalistic developmental state that is still prevalent and continues to be the foundation of Japanese economic development after the Heisei recession. Put simply, the success of Japan's cultural exports was due to the post-war legacy of unique state interventionism, bureaucratic systems and a public-private business cooperation characterising a capitalistic development state that has passed on and become embedded. Ultimately, I hope that this research could more or less serve as a lesson to learn from and how to maximise nation branding's benefits. As Ying Fan[9] reminds us, many non-marketing factors also affect a nation's image where the role played by nation branding may turn out to be only a modest one as seen in the 'Cool Britannia' effort. By investigating into this topic, I hope to contribute to the concerns over 'Nation Branding'. As we are aware, many countries may have possessed strong cultural heritage but still remain the economically disadvantaged. Hence, Nation Branding may not necessarily be of a magic answer to all nations. It is therefore the intention of this dissertation to point out the distinctive institutional settings as variables. The lesson learnt from 'Cool Britannia' has allowed us to understand the subsequent 'Cool Japan'. And while many countries are keeping their eyes on the performance of 'Cool Japan', they can make a better understanding their own countries' suitability.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Chapter Two starts with related literatures on characterization of the two concerned states, following WWII well into the eve of their 'cool' campaign. This chapter will be crucial in looking at the campaigns and their governing actors not only at a certain point but also at the roots of the nations' historical background of their politics and economies. This is because the central hypothesis of this dissertation is based largely on the understanding of states' policy-making institutions. Following on, Chapter Three briefly introduces the correlation between nation

[9]Fan, Ying. (2010) *Branding the nation: towards a better understanding, in place branding and public diplomacy*, 6(2) May: 97-103.

branding and cool capitalism as the two have steadily emerged as crucial when countries' reliance on the hard power has declined. Chapter Four discusses in detail 'Cool Britannia' and the developments of British 'creative industries' at the heart of Blarism. For the sake of reasonable comparison, Chapter Five lays out the similar sets of facts, opinions and key characterisations of 'Cool Japan' initiated a decade later in the Eastern hemisphere. The function of Chapter Six is to proceed into the multidimensional analysis of 'Cool Britannia' and its Japanese counterparts. This will draw together political, economic and cultural deterministic approaches that have shaped the nature of the policymaking institutions that, in turn, resulted in the immaterial peculiarities and diverging opinions towards the two. Finally, Chapter Seven collectively recaps the findings in summary making possible the dedication of future implications, limitations and some prospects for further research.

CHAPTER II - Economic History: Characterisation of UK and Japan States Compared

2.1. Characterisation of the UK State

2.1.1. Mercantilism to Support the UK's Development and Military Conquests

In between the 16th and the 18th centuries, the main economic policy applied in England was Mercantilism. The period was characterised by wars and confrontations which needed strong funding resources. In other words, as Weiss and Hobson[10] have pointed out, the British state in that time behaved in a more Gerschenkronian manner than is often supposed: it made possible the prerequisites necessary for economic growth – cf. the nineteenth-century Tsarist state, where government intervention was often thought to be the unique feature of later industrialisation. Within this period, the UK saw a very rapid growth. According to the Mercantilist theory, the wealth of a country is function of the amount of silver and gold it possesses, which means for every international trade, there is a winner and a loser. The idea is to maximise the flow of silver and gold into the country by encouraging exports and discouraging imports (i.e., having a favourable balance of trade) as well as maintaining domestic employment.

The mercantile system mainly served the interests of merchants and producers such as the British East India Company, whose activities were protected or encouraged by the state. In such an economic environment, the state plays a major role by imposing tariffs, prohibitions and quotas on imports and providing incentives for exports. This supports the argument that one of the most prominent features of Britain before Margaret Thatcher came to power was mercantilism. This could be implied that monopolies and economic rents served as salient sources of economic growth.[11] This idea was strongly criticised by economists such as Adam Smith who refuted the idea that a country's wealth is measured by the size of its treasury. Instead, he argues that trade can benefit both parties. This was the introduction of the free trade theory which slowly replaced mercantilism throughout the 19th century in the UK. The Napoleonic Wars in Europe and the Revolutionary War in the United States marked the end of military confrontation in Europe and the mercantilist policies that supported it[12].

[10] Weiss L and Hobson J. (1995) *States and Economic Development: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

[11] Peer Vries is Professor for International Economic History, in particular global history, at the Institute for Economic and Social History of the University of Vienna; Peer H. Vries, *'Governing growth: a comparative analysis of the role of the state in the rise of the West'*, Journal of World History, 13 (*2002*), pp. 67–193.

[12] Laura Lahaye. *Mercantilism*. Available at: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Mercantilism.html (accessed on November 8th, 2011).

2.1.2. The UK, the First Country to Industrialise

In the 18th century, the traditional, pre-modern, agrarian society that dominated the UK changed drastically through the Industrial Revolution. The period drove a structural change in the country's economic organisation, with the resulting economic environment characterised by an industrial economy based on capitalist methods.

The Industrial Revolution came about around the same period as demographic and agricultural revolutions. The latter occurred throughout the 17th and the 18th centuries and was characterised by many innovations in the agricultural sector in the UK that made farmers more productive. They were continually experimenting with new types of grains and vegetables and adopting new methods of farming. In doing so, English farmers simultaneously learned a great deal about manure and other fertilisers, treating farming like a science. All this resulted in greater yields and lower food prices, allowing people to save money they could then spend on other commodities such as manufactured products. The structure of the society in the UK surely was important to enable this revolution. Unlike countries such as France, England had an effective central bank and well-developed credit market. The English government allowed the domestic economy to function with few restrictions and encouraged technological changes.[13]

Demographically, UK's population was nearly doubling over the course of the 18th century. This demographic evolution, partially the consequence of the agricultural revolution, created higher demand for all types of commodities as well as high labour availability that was essential in factories. To meet the increasing demand for manufactured products caused by an increasing population and purchasing power, many technologies and processes were invented and innovated which made English industries more productive and competitive. This would not be wrong to say that the 19th century was the peak of British affluence when the British Empire extended around one fourth of the globe. Due to dominant merchant navy protected by the royal navy, a globally linked mercantile system that supplied people, resources and capital were developed. The system generated vast profits for the empire and its key companies, such as the East India Company.[14] As an economic titan, the country's aspiration was to supply two-thirds of the world with cotton, spun, dyed and woven, resulting in the country claim to be the *"Workshop of the World"*[15].

[13] Steven Kreis, (2001). *The Origins of the Industrial Revolution in England*. Available at: http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture17a.html (accessed on November 7th, 2011).

[14] Economy Watch - Follow The Money." *UK Economy: UK Economic History*. <http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/united-kingdom/uk-economic-history.htm>(accessed on November 7th, 2011).

[15] Ibid.

2.1.3. The UK Benefiting From Free Trade Before Returning to Protectionism to Protect Its Domestic Economy

At the exit of the Industrial Revolution, the British industrial sector gave the country a strong comparative advantage. In large part because of its new free trade policies, England became the dominant economic power in Europe[16]. Protectionist policies in Europe were relatively mild in the second half of the 19th century, although France, Germany, and several other countries were compelled at times to impose customs duties as a means of sheltering their growing industrial sectors from British competition. By 1913, however, customs duties were low throughout the western world, and import quotas were hardly ever used. It was the damage and dislocation caused by World War I (WWI) that inspired a continual raising of customs barriers in Europe during the 1920s.[17] However, following WWI and particularly during the Great Depression, the UK's trading position in world markets was severely eroded. Hence, protectionist policies were set up to protect the country's economy.

2.1.4. The Welfare State

In the late 19th century and early 20th century, a group of British thinkers, known as the New Liberals, went against laissez-faire classical liberalism promoted by Adam Smith. Instead, they argued in favour of state intervention in social, economic, and cultural life. The New Liberals, which included intellectuals like T.H. Green, L.T. Hobhouse, and John A. Hobson, saw individual liberty as something achievable only under favourable social and economic circumstances. New Liberals believed that human welfare could be rearranged only through collective action coordinated by a strong, welfare-oriented, and interventionist state. Subsequently, the Liberal governments of Henry Campbell-Bannerman and H.H. Asquith and especially thanks to Chancellor of the Exchequer and later Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, established the foundations of the welfare state in the UK before WWI. A comprehensive welfare state was built in the UK after World War II mainly by the Labour Party, although it was largely designed by two Liberals, John Maynard Keynes, who laid the economic foundations, and William Beaveridge, the inventor of the welfare system[18].

Britain emerged from the 1939-1945 as war triumphant, but economically exhausted. It was one of the top three superpowers, although in reality a distant third behind the United States and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, its political system and the British state had been vindicated by success in war, and over the next few years Britain emerged as a model social democracy, combining planning and collectivism with civil liberties. In 1945, the election of Clement Atlee as the new Prime Minister brought the Labour Party to the head of the

[16] Laura Lahaye. Mercantilism. Available at: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Mercantilism.html, accessed on November 8th, 2011.

[17] Britannica Academic Edition. Protectionism. Available at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/479643/protectionism, accessed on November 8th, 2011.

[18] Ian Adams, (2001). Political Ideology Today (Politics Today). Manchester University Press.

country. This new government was largely responsible for what is called the 'post-war consensuses', influenced by new liberalist thoughts of William Beaveridge and John Maynard Keynes. In practice this led to the commitment of the Government to maintain full employment by Keynesian techniques of economic management through, for instance, cutting taxes and boosting state spending to increase the level of economic activity. The domestic politics were also characterized by a mixed economy, with a large role for state ownership of the utilities and intervention and planning in the economy, as well as a welfare state. The latter implied a secured provision of income and health to each family in difficulty.[19] These policies were pursued by both Labour and Conservative governments.

2.1.5. Economic decline after WWII

After WWII, the Britain lost a considerable amount of wealth; its economy was driven almost entirely for the needs of war, while the transition was faster for other countries. Its colonies were asking for independence. While practically all European countries underwent economic recovery, Britain did not and was often described as the 'sick man of Europe'. The targets for blame included: 1) failure to invest in new plant and machinery, 2) restrictive working practices, 3) outdated attitudes on the shop floor, amateurish management, 4) loss of markets, and 5) rise of competition.[20] This resulted in inflation and low growth. During the 1960s and 1970s, the main parties competed to reverse Britain's economic decline, but, none succeeded. It is often argued that there were two responses to this failure: "either following the new ideas of economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman which advocated monetarism, a greater scope for markets and limited government or going towards more state ownership and protection of industry following a withdrawal from the European Community".[21]

2.1.6. Margaret Thatcher, Thatcherism and its Legacy

"Her real triumph was to have transformed not just one party but two, so that when Labour did eventually return, the great bulk of Thatcherism was accepted as irreversible."[22]

[19] Dennis Kavanagh, (2011). Thatcherism and the End of the Post-War Consensus. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/thatcherism_01.shtml (accessed on November 8th, 2011).

[20] Ibid.

[21] Dennis Kavanagh, (2011). Thatcherism and the End of the Post-War Consensus. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/thatcherism_01.shtml (accessed on November 8th, 2011).

[22] Lord Howe of Aberavon, whose resignation speech triggered the iron Lady's downfall; "*Statement from the office of the Rt Hon Baroness Thatcher LG OM FRS*" (Press release). Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 21 March 2002. (Accessed: 9 November 2011.).

1979 marked the important event in which the Conservatives led by Margaret Thatcher won the elections. This 13 year period could be seen as a break in British history, which shaped the country's institutions in the periods following it. For some, Thatcher administration was considered a new era for economic revival. However, many see it as a decade of wasted years and missed opportunities. The purpose of this dissertation is not to debate this, but to argue that the Thatcher administration was one of the most influential periods since 1945. During this time her administration has produced political, economic and social legacies that impacted the institutions and policies of the Blair government in the late 90s, most notably privatisation.

The above sentence is supported by the work of Marcussen et al. who sees that, over a long period of time, a nation's identities that have become consensual in a given policy are likely to remain stable. This could be that actors involved finally became socialised into the new collective identity and slowly internalise its content.[23] Or else, the institutions, formal or informal, will most likely become resistant to change. To elaborate, 'over time, nation-state identities tend to become embedded in political institutions and political culture and the degree to which political elites are able to manipulate identity constructions narrows considerably'.[24] The statements could then be implied that despite Blair not belonging to the 'Conservatives', does not mean that the sets of institutions were not embedded and remained. By institutions, this dissertation refers to both formal organisations, procedures and rules, as well as routines and collective understandings about ways of doing things.[25] In order to understand how the 'critical juncture'[26] towards a neo-liberal approach could have narrowed down the number of dissimilar institutional settings, or to what extent the institutionalisation of ideas makes deforming an uneasy task, the following paragraphs are devoted to the narration of major points during 13 years of Thatcher government.

To begin, during the 'Winter of Discontent' in 1979, several strikes occurred in crucial public services against the Labour government's economic policies that seemed to show the country was ungovernable and that no government had an answer to inflation.[27] This event illustrated the overall negative feeling of the public towards the Labour party.[28] For this

[23] Marcussen, Martin et al. (2001) *Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation-State Identities*. The Social Construction of Europe. London: sage Publications, Incorporated p.101-120.

[24] Ibid.

[25] March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P.,(1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. *International Organizationsl,* 52(4): 943-969; March, James. Rediscovering institutions : the organizational basis of politics. New York: Free Press, 1989. and March and Olsen 1998.

[26] 'critical junctures' are the brake in the history that in spite of the embedded-ness of certain institutions, provide a window of opportunity for party elites to deconstruct, reconstruct, and manipulate given nation-state identities.

[27] Feigenbaum, Harvey. (1999) Shrinking the State : the political underpinnings of privatization. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. (p. 59).

[28] Ibid.

reason, the victory of the Conservatives was equated to promises to recover the nation's economy. The end of the 1979 general election was followed by a complete switch of the country's economic environment. Britain as led by Margaret Thatcher had been strictly governed by the new motivation that is the neo-liberalism in which the state's role should only minimally interfere with the economic wealth of the nation.

Soon after inheriting the role as Prime Minister, Thatcher regularly attended lunches at the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) whose founder is the disciple of Friedrich von Hayek, an Austrian neo-liberalist monetarist thinking and economist of that time whose ideas attacked strongly the idea of welfare state and collectivism, the dominant norms of nations for a long time.[29] The issuance of IEA's pamphlets was due to the intention to emphasise the importance of limited government intervention, lower taxes, as well as increased freedom for both business owners and consumers. Seeing 'Statism' as a precipitous national decline, the work of neo-liberal scholars in general and of Hayek in particular, formed a firm intellectual basis for many Tories, especially Margaret Thatcher. As such, she began the intellectual campaign against the old government's conduct of welfare state Keynesian economics that at that time were falling into disrepute.[30] Specifically, the label 'Privatisation', originally coined by Peter Drucker, was adopted by Margaret Thatcher, along with other Conservative politicians, media commentators, 'New Right' think tanks and academics, in which it replaced the pursuit 'denationalisation' intensified during the Churchill government. Although it was not the first large privatisation programme launched in the UK, it was widely agreed to be the most important in its history.[31]

Since monopolies were seen as a hindrance for economic growth, the threatening image of the state were utilised in producing ideological legitimacy 'to roll back the economic frontiers of the state'.[32] Throughout the 80s, trade unions operated in a tighter legal framework and saw their rights marginalised. Major utilities like gas, electricity telephony, British Airways and later British Rail were privatised. The Thatcher administration accorded priority to keeping inflation low rather than ensuring full employment. Because of this, development of self-employment and the rise of employment within the service sector gained its presence. Shifting from demand management to supply-side policies, the government insisted that it could no longer be a universal provider and that more should be

[29]Feigenbaum, Harvey. (1999) Shrinking the state : the political underpinnings of privatization. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press,.; For a current survey, see William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, *From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization* (N.Y. Stock Exchange Working Paper No. 98-05, 2000) , available in Social Science Research Network at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=158313>.

[30] Feigenbaum, (1999) Harvey. Shrinking the state : the political underpinnings of privatization. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 64.

[31] Yergin, Daniel. (1998) The commanding heights: the battle between government and the marketplace that is remaking the modern world. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, p. 114; Megginson, W.L. and J.M. Netter. (2001)"From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 39, 321-389.

[32]Michie, Jonathan. (1992). The Economic legacy, 1979-1992. London: Academic Press, pg. 317.

left to the market, the voluntarily sector, and self help.[33] Following the 1983 election, the sales of state utilities steadily rose; more than £29 billion was raised from the sale of nationalised industries, and another £18 billion from the sale of council houses.[34] According to data gained from the World bank, a series of increasingly share issue privatisations (SIPs) during the last half of the 1980s and early 1990s reduced the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the British economy from more than 10 percent of GDP 18 years earlier to essentially nothing by the time the Conservatives left office in 1997,.[35] All in all, Thatcher remained labelled with her statement once made to the reporter Douglas Keay almost 10 years after the Iron Lady's first victory, stating that:

> ''I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand *'I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!'* or "I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!',' I am homeless, the Government must house me!" and so they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then also to help look after our neighbours and life is a reciprocal business and people have got the entitlements too much in mind without the obligations."[36]

2.1.7. Critics of the Thatcher Administration in Regards to Socio-economic Conditions, the Emergence of Post-industrial Societies and of the 'Enterprise Culture'

Yet, the 'Thatcher Miracle' was faced with strong criticism, largely due to overall structural troubles and economic problems that Thatcher has passed on to her successors.[37] In the view of Fine and Poletti regarding the aspects of industrial policy, what Thatcherism did was a 'half-way' reform, worked not to reduce the economic intervention but to modify the institutional structure for intervention and transfer the power to drive industrial change to

[33] Dennis Kavanagh. (2011).Thatcherism and the End of the Post-War Consensus. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/thatcherism_01.shtml (accessed on November 8th, 2011); Hughes, A. (1992) "Big business, small business and the 'enterprise culture'." In Michie, J. (ed.): *The economic legacy 1979-1992.* London: Academic Press, pp.296-311.

[34] Marr, Andrew (2007). *A history of modern Britain*. London: Pan Books.

[35] Megginson, W.L. and J.M. Netter. (2001), "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 39 321-389.

[36] "Interview for Woman's Own ("no such thing as society") with journalist Douglas Keay". Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 23 September 1987. Accessed 10 April 2010.

[37] The Economic Legacy, 1979-1992 (1992). London: Academic Press.

different agencies. In the same vein, Thomson utters that "One of the most remarkable features of the "conservative turn" experienced in the UK since 1980 is the paradoxical emergence of extensive *re*regulation of the economic activity in a period supposedly typified by drastic *deregulation*. Under the rhetoric of regulatory reform and competitive advance, supported by a deep ideological commitment to the virtues of market-led solutions to economic problems, the Conservative governments since 1979 have presided over what can only be characterised as a renaissance of intervention.'[38]

Other criticisms include ignorance of the institutional systems coherence, as well as a lack of a consistent rationale for the direction of the industry.[39] This is believed to have led to fragmented state intervention in response to a variety of diverse interests. Even the privatisation programme established within the supposed *laissez-faire* principle was, on the one hand, to concentrate power in the hands of fewer people and, on the other, to weaken the potential mechanisms of political control over that power. Despite the existing unifying ideological legitimation, the programme only met particular political needs at precise moments in time.[40] Obviously, whether the privatisation programme managed to halt the UK's persistent economic decline was strongly questioned.[41] Critics see that the three consecutive Conservatives governments merely worked to irritate the nation's long-term problems rather than to cure them.[42]

A prime example is the steel industry, a perfect demonstration of how the legacy of Thatcherism was both politically and institutionally a burden for state. In 1966, the industry was in a financial mess. At that time, the state had operated in ways to ensure private sector gain through obtaining public finance. Later, Thatcherism made it harder for the state to intervene to establish or support the 'economies of scope'.[43] As a result the poor performance of British industry over the long-term was not tackled, nor the agencies that were responsible for it, such as poor policy, poor management and poor incentive structures.[44]All in all, the Thatcher administration was less a matter of policy implementation and more a restructuring exercise in economic and political power. This, in the opinion of Fine and Poletti, is as much of a political failure as of market failure. [45] To

[38]Thompson, Grahame. (1990)The Political Economy of the New Right. Boston: Twayne Publishers. p. 135.

[39] Fine. B. and C. Polletti as cited in J. Michie (ed.) (1992) The Economic legacy, 1979-1992. London: Academic Press,. (pg. 315-319).

[40] Ibid.

[41] William L. Megginson, Jeffry M. Netter, (2001. From) State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization.
[42] The Economic Legacy, 1979-1992. (1992) London: Academic Press,.

[43] Fine. B. and C. Polletti (1992) 'Industrial Prospects in the Light of Privatisation' in J. Michie (ed.).pg. 325.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid (pg. 316, pg 330).

quote their assessment of Thatcher's performance in sharpening UK's coordination problems, "At a microeconomic level, old issues such as the integration of scientific and technological communities, the shift from the traditional authoritarian managerial style to a consensus-building kind of organisation, or links among companies through a network of local institutions, have been eliminated from the political agenda."[46]

Looking at the big picture, Malcolm Sawyer writes that, during the 60s and the 70s, the Labour government's effort to tackle the economic decline was through a 'corporatist' or 'tripartite' approach.[47] Policies such as the National Plan of 1965-1966, the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation of 1966-1970 and the Industrial Strategy and Sector Working Parties Policies of 1975-1979 all contained, to some degree, a developmental state role with the involvement of enterprises, unions and government. Nevertheless, these policies were not favoured by the Thatcher government and hence reversed.[48] Under Thatcher, two constraints in implementing the aforementioned policies are the absence of an entrepreneurial outlook by the civil service and the distrust by business that there is a developmental role by the state concerning industrial matters.[49] People are encouraged to look for services, not from state, but from the market, most of the time, private ownership is seen as crucial for productive efficiency and the barriers to competition are perceived as the fault of the state, rather than by dominant firms.[50] As Feigenbaum[51] et al comments, "While the Conservatives may not have had a policy of systematic privatisation to begin with, the policy fulfilled many of their most cherished political objectives, not least that of fundamentally and irrevocably reshaping Britain…a key element in transformation of British society".

As competition for jobs increased, the already high rate of unemployment got persistently worse. More vulnerable groups experienced the most severe problems in adapting. [52]It was evident that, among others, the ethnic minorities such as the British Blacks and Asians were the most disadvantaged in any life aspects.[53] They were frequently put into target by some Conservatives politicians like Norman Tibbit, who wrote about illegal immigrants attracted

[46] Fine. B. and C. Polletti (1992) 'Industrial Prospects in the Light of Privatisation' in J. Michie (ed.).

[47] Sawyer, MC, (1992) The *Industrial Policy Legacy in the Economic Legacy of the 1980's*.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid (pg. 330)

[50] Ibid. (pg. 331)

[51] Feigenbaum, Harvey. Shrinking the state : the political underpinnings of privatization. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[52] Moore, Barry. (1992) 'Taking on the inner cities' in J. Michie (ed.) The Economic legacy, 1979-1992. London: Academic Press.

[53] Childs, D. (2006). *Britain since 1945 : a political history*. London New York: Routledge. p. 356.

by the prospects of easy living without work.[54] All in all, the preceding Thatcherite policies complicated the implementation of state's developmental role, as well as undermining institutions that were associated with former developmental-style policies such as the National Economic Development Office (NEDO). As John Eatwell writes, while the content of the successive Labour government's economic policy may have been shaped by multiple potential sources of influence, the most significant have been the changes in the material and organisational circumstances of the economy.[55]

2.1.8. Entrepreneur Culture, Small Business Promotion and Self-Employment

> *'The vitality of our economy, the vitality of the country as a whole, and the vitality of individual towns and cities depends not upon large establishments, but upon the untidy undergrowth of small constantly adaptive competing businesses…No private wealth from small business, no widespread national wealth; no national wealth, no welfare...There is a close link between economic, social, cultural and political liberties, and at the heart of that link is the small businessman and the self-employed.*[56]

The above quote illustrates the truth that, during the course of the 80s the emergence and developments of what is known as the 'Enterprise Culture' as reflected in the shift in structure of employment and industry was observed. With new ideological legitimation, the linkages between the enterprise cultures, small-scale private enterprise, self employment and the nation's welfare have grown into the unifying theme in many Thatcher-government supply-side policies. This, in turn, means individual needs were prioritised over individuals sectors, industries or companies. Apparently, the UK experienced substantial shifts in the distribution of economic activity. [57] In 1977 and 1987 total industrial and services sector employment was approximately 24 million, whilst service sector employment rose by 2.4 million, increasing the share in the economy from 58% to 67%.[58] However, according to Alan Hughes, it would be misleading to treat the above evolution of policy towards small business sector as a long-term, consistently articulated strategy.[59] Further, he sees that

[54] Tebbit, N. (1991). *Unfinished business*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. p. 129.

[55] John Eatwell, (1992) The Development of Labour Policy, 1979-1992 in in J. Michie (ed.). pg. 333.

[56] Joseph, Keith Sir, Centre for Policy Studies (5 April 1976).Stockton Lecture, *Monetarism Is Not Enough*, with forward by Margaret Thatcher. (Barry Rose Pub.);Margaret Thatcher Foundation (2006).

[57] Hughes, A. (1992) "Big Business, Small Business and the 'Enterprise Culture'." In Michie, J. (ed.): *The economic legacy 1979-1992.* London: Academic Press, pp.296-311 (p. 303).

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid. (pg. 298)

large employment gains in the service sector do not always imply that the policies to boost service industry activities would be appropriate.

2.1.9. Blair and Bringing the state back in after it shrinking?: Not A break from the Conservatives Rule but the Product of New and Old

Thirteen years of Thatcherite administration could be summed up as 'shrinking the state'. The idea of Neo-liberalism has their goals not only to roll back the state's frontiers but also to reorganise both government institutions and civil society, as well as provide a border in between them.[60] Despite the end of Thatcher era, her successor, John major was called a Thatcherite and Liberal Democrat by Labour's John Cunningham and 'a Thatcherite with a different face' by Paddy Ashdown.[61] According to Childs, Major has shown his great ability in shifting the party from the Right to the Centre.[62]

Successive general election defeats gradually convinced Labour to accept much of the new settlement. From outright repudiation of the policies at the 1983 general election, Labour steadily came to accept successive trenches of Thatcher's policies.[63] Such as the need to prioritise economic stability, low inflation and borrowing, and encourage private enterprise. This marked the second period of free market reforms.[64] Through time, Labour's persistence to privatisation has weakened.[65] Notable examples include the attempts to privatise National Air Traffic Control Services, the London Underground and the Post Office, despite the fact that the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, had previously declared the Party's firm opposition to the privatisation of those services.[66] Also, the decline of the working class and trade union's importance meant that Labour's traditional electoral base was being eroded. Gaining the support of an increasingly middle class electorate was crucial for electoral victory as Britain underwent demographic and economic change.

After 18 years in power, the Conservatives lost the elections in 1997 to Labour led by Tony Blair, the first 'New Labour' prime minister. The new name to the party was given by Blair to

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[60] Gamble, (1996) "Privatisation, Thatcherism and the British State." See also, Joel Wolfe, *Power and Privatisation: Choice and Competition in the Remaking of British Democracy* (London: Macmillan.

[61] Childs, D. (2006). *Britain since 1945 : a political history*. London New York: Routledge. (p. 356) .

[62] Ibid. (p. 365)

[63] Dennis Kavanagh, (2011). Thatcherism and the End of the Post-War Consensus. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/thatcherism_01.shtml (accessed on November 8th, 2011).

[64] "Economy Watch - Follow The Money." *UK Economy: UK Economic History*. <http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/united-kingdom/uk-economic-history.html>.(accessed on November 8th, 2011).

[65] Feigenbaum, Harvey. (1999) Shrinking the state : the political underpinnings of privatization. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press.

[66] Ibid.

distinguish it from the discredited policies associated with the old, weak and divided Labour. In regards to the legacy of Thatcherite administration, Blair uttered in April 1997 that the Party has no strict rejection to privatisations. As such, they could be considered on a case-by-case basis. It seemed like the Labour's connection with privatisation, though not through an ideological commitment, could be termed as "reluctant privatisation" due to the financial necessity.[67] During Thatcher's interview whilst congratulating Blair for being elected as Labour Party leader in 1994, she referred to him as "…probably the most formidable Labour leader since Hugh Gaitskell. I see a lot of socialism behind their front bench, but not in Mr Blair. I think he genuinely has moved."[68] As for British political jargon, Thatcherism remains a potent byword with her successor, including Blair defining policies in post-Thatcherite terms. [69] Then it would not be to far from the truth to say that Blair's effort in 'Cool Britannia' is equated to the effort of 'bringing state back in', yet inescapably in a post-Thatcherite manner. All in all, with the twist and turn in policymaking bodies, the shape and form of institutional settings under Blair was not the same set as those before the 'institutional revolution' taking place from 1979.[70]

2.2. Characterisation of the Japanese State: a Focus on POST WWII Institutional Settings

To understand Japanese policies, it is necessary to understand the structure of Japan's political economy and its compositional complex from which these policies emerged. Therefore, this sector finds it important to narrate about the pre-war origins of institutions. The theory in focus could not escape from being the 'capitalist developmental state', which has been perceived to be an outcome of neo-mercantilism and economic nationalism combined. As Chalmers Johnson commented, the very idea of the developmental state originated in the situational nationalism of the late industrialisers[71]. Prior to the era of high-speed growth, Japan went through a tortuous learning and adaptation process beginning in 1927 with the financial panic closely followed by the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the fascist attacks on capitalism during the 1930's, the war with China from 1937 to 1941, the Pacific War, the collapse of the economy in 1946, the Dodge Line of 1949, the post-Korean War recession of 1954, the trade liberalization of the early 1960's, the recession of 1965, the

[67] *The Observer,*"How Blair's blurring the Labour line on sell-offs," March 16, 1997; "Labour expands scope of sell-off scheme," *The Independent,* April 7, 1997.

[68] *LA Times*. "Tobacco Company Hires Margaret Thatcher as Consultant". Associated Press. 19 July 1992. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Thatcher Retrieved 16 September 2011.

[69] Wikimedia Foundation. "Margaret Thatcher." *Wikipedia*., 04 Feb. 2012. Web. 15 Feb. 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Thatcher>.

[70]"Economy Watch - Follow The Money." *UK Economy: UK Economic History*. <http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/united-kingdom/uk-economic-history.html>.((accessed on November 8th, 2011).

[71] Johnson, C. (1982). *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

capital liberalization of 1967-76, the health and safety crises of the early 1970's, and ending with the adaptation in the dawn of the 1973 oil shock.[72] In other words, it was not so much of a matter of choice, but a matter of national survival that grew out of the mentioned series of economic crises that plagued Japan throughout the Shōwa era, and constrained them to maintain what was essentially a wartime level of social and economic mobilisation.[73]

2.2.1. From Pre-war Imperialism

Looking into the style of the Japanese state today, we can see that the traces of the antedated elements remain. In its pre-WWII days, Japan was imperialistic. This began with the Sino-Japanese War, which ended in 1895 with the signing of Treaty of Shimonoseki and the occupation of Taiwan after China had been defeated. Its approach, as opposed to Western Imperialism, mostly functioned as an institutional device to ensure trade and capital flows.[74] In fact, the Meiji Era's governing norm was explicitly indicated as 'Fukoku Kyohei' literally meaning 'rich nation, strong army' and 'to build Japan as an industrial and commercial power'.[75] In 1887, Inoue Kaoru stressed the need for Japan to build a European-style empire in Asia if it wished to compete with the superpowers.[76] In other words, Japan would flourish at the expense of its neighbours. Regarding Japan's entry into the Indochina region during the late 1930s in particular, 'If the British were the whale and the French were the crocodile as King Rama V once asserted, then the Japanese, in the words of Thai historian and politician Luang Wichitwathakarn, were 'the tiger we have to try to make friends with'.[77]

As Lockwood[78] notes, the first law authorising trade associations were promulgated in 1884. In his opinion, it was established to encourage a cooperating system between small-scale producers using the slogan 'promotion production' with principles such as protection of industries, provisions of subsidies and the establishment of exemplary state-owned factories, that would eventually be transferred to private ownership. Both industrial policy

[72] Johnson, C. (1982). *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

[73] Johnson, C. (1982). *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (p. 323); *Woo-Cumings*, *Meredith*, *ed*. (1999). *The Developmental State*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

[74] . Kaoru Sugihara,(2004) *Japanese Imperialism in Global Resource History*, Working Papers of the Global Economic History Network (GEHN), LSE .

[75] Gordon, A. (2003). *A modern history of Japan : from Tokugawa times to the present*. New York: Oxford University Press.; Beasley, W. (1982). *The modern history of Japan*. Tokyo, Japan Rutland, Vt: Charles E. Tuttle Co.

[76] *Jansen*, Marius B. (*1992) China in* the Tokugawa world / Marius B. *Jansen* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

[77] Khamchoo., C. (1988) *Thai Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective* Bangkok, Innomedia Co.

[78] Lockwood, W. W. (1968). *Economic Development of Japan: growth and structural change 1868–1938.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

and administrative guidance practices in the post-war economic recovery effort were rooted in the controlled economy of the 30's. Concerning this, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) were seen as the reincarnation of the wartime Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) that was later transformed into the Ministry of Munitions (MM) in 1943 before it was mutated as MITI in 1949. In the same vein, a pre-war business conglomerate known as Zaibatsu remained with their old trademarks and regrouped into new 'financial' linkages or the oligopolistic organisation of each industry by conglomerates known as *Keiretsu*.[79] All in all, during the mentioned pre-war years, the managerial tools of the developmental state were first tested. Some persisted due to its validity while some were rejected. Thus, post war Japan did not take on the brand new path of modernisation instead building on their known pre-war strengths.

2.2.2. United States Role and Late Industrialisation: Restrictions and opportunities

After 1945, a strict sense of 'Japanese Imperialism' dissolved as Japan was limited to low politics and focused on economic development due to Post WWII American occupation (1945-1952).[80] Many literatures have pointed out that this specific era of American Occupation witnessed the most intense degree of Japanese government control over the economy ever known in modern Japan. The level was decidedly higher than the level that existed during the Pacific War. It has been widely stated that the security provided by the US allowed Japan to climb the international economic hierarchy all the faster. Translating the nation's military capacity to economic capacity might not be a conventional choice, but it is quite a rational one.

Many scholars fit this occupation period into 'free ride' theory and argue that it was beneficial to Japan's growth for three reasons: first, a lack of defence expenditures, second, ready access to its major export market and third, cheap technology transfers. The occupation accounted for the miraculous part of Japan's post war boom. Not only had the occupation from the US also contributed to late-industrialised Japan as a consequence of the Cold and Korean Wars, but Japan was also able to reestablish Southeast Asian relations through reparations and economic aid because of conflict between the USA and Russia. Furthermore, special war procurement during the Korean War helped drive an economic boom in Japan's key industries such as steels, automobiles and electronic machinery, thus allowing them to modernise and expand production.[81] However, the contra-free ride theory

[79]Arase, D. (1995). *Buying Power: the Political Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid* Boulder, Colo. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Pg. 23.

[80] Khamchoo., C. (1988) *Thai Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective* Bangkok, Innomedia Co.

[81] Arase, D. (1995). *Buying Power: the Political Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid* Boulder, Colo. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

argues that Japan did not yet have the answers or the solutions to any of the critical problems of the twentieth century reflecting 'Japanese Exceptionalism' as derived from the state being of the 'capitalist developmental type.[82]

2.2.3. Post War Institutional Framework in Policymaking Process of Japanese 'Developmental State' model: Economic Cooperation (Keizai Kyoryoku)

'The developmental state promotes the intersection of public and private goals, with the later often as important as the former.[83]'

Following the end of WWII, the state's adaptations were continuously practiced and strengthened in a way that was invariably derived from comparisons with external reference economies. However, it is worth noting that comparisons with other world events are always viewed by the Japanese elites with the Japanese eyes and in Japanese perspectives. In general, the uniqueness of Japanese institutions have been explained by first referring to the distinctive cultural and psychological orientations of the Japanese people. Secondly, by referring to the persistence of pre-war values and thirdly, by illustrating how post-war industrial policy is the product of lessons learned from the pre-war period.[84] Since overcoming the depression, war preparation, war fighting, post-war reconstruction and independence from U.S. aid, the structure was laid out to guarantee that the areas of entrepreneurship were those of state interest.

Because of the particularly close and cooperative relations between the nation's political, administrative and economic power centres, *Keizai Kyoryoku*, the catchiest description of the state has been named as 'Japan Inc.'. Under the umbrella of Japan inc., the role of the Prime Minister (PM) is shaped by the fact that in spite of the continued one-party rule, the PM is the leader of uneasy coalitions of warring factions. This coalition containing big business groups, bureaucrats and the conservative ruling party has long been accredited as the defining characteristic of Japanese institutional arrangements through which the government role in the economy is shared with private enterprise. Within the *Keizai Kyoryoku* exist the consensus and collectivism in between competitive ministries and private sectors in which both have perfect means to make the market work for the developmental goals since the system has been designed to strategically satisfy both state and private sectors.[85] Japanese policymaking institutions equipped with market-conforming methods of

[82] Johnson, C. (1982). *Miti and the Japanese Miracle*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (page 323); *Woo-Cumings*, *Meredith*, *ed*. (1999). *The Developmental State*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

[83] Potter, D. (1998). *Japan's Foreign Aid to Thailand and the Philippines,* New York: St. Martin's Press.

[84] Samuel Pao-San Ho (1984), "Colonialism and Development: Korea, Taiwan, and Kwantung" in Myers and Peattie (ed.), *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, Princeton University Press, USA, (pg 347).

[85] Johnson, Chalmers. (1982). *Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

state intervention are rigid and resistant to external forces. Compared to other democracies, the Japanese government exercised a much greater degree of both protection and intervention than any of its Western European counterparts in the post WWII period.

2.2.4. Bureaucracy

Samuel writes that as early as the Meiji era, the state saw a strong bureaucracy as the guiding institution of economic development, where the ultimate goal to achieve national independence and an economic autonomy era could be met.[86]Among other elements, the characterisation of Japanese bureaucracy remained stable. Post-war Japan was equipped with a small, inexpensive but elite bureaucracy with the best managerial talent. According to Okita, Japanese pre-war bureaucrats were also passed on to form the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which performed as a central actor contributing to economic stabilisation.[87] Within this old bureaucracy structure, the economic ministries emerged as their power was strengthened due to the shift in focus from the defence ministries.

Their role is decisive in binding Japanese industries together through the reciprocities and mutual influences they have with the private enterprises. The powerful status of the bureaucrats shapes the proceedings of state priorities through horizontal coordination eliminating strong and dynamic leadership at the top. Being horizontal, middle-level officials such as heads of divisions exercise strong influence and proceed with the budgetary process in such a way that appropriations precede authorisations. [88] Although the process is influenced by those with the bargaining power, such as the pressure groups and political claimants, the elite bureaucracy makes most of these decisions, draft virtually all the legislation, control the national budgets and most important of all, is the source of the grand policy innovations within the whole system.[89] For instance, the existing governmental organisation law allows national administrative bodies to freely establish authority, policy council, subsidiary agencies, local and oversea branches and other bodies in the course of carrying out their own respective matters. Indeed, Japan is a system of bureaucratic rule as

[86] Samuels, R. J. (1994). *'Rich Nation, Strong Army': National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[87] Saburo Okita was a Japanese economist and government official. He served various positions such as chief of research for the Economic Stabilization Board in 1947, chief of the economic cooperation unit for the Economic Planning Agency in 1953 and later director general of their planning bureau in 1957, and then in 1963 the director general of the EPA development bureau. His role under the economic plan of then prime minister Ikeda Hayato, which greatly helped Japan's post-war economy. From 1979, he was appointed as the minister of foreign affairs, and continued to be one of Japan's foremost academic spokesmen. See also, Pierre, J. and Park, S.-C. (1997), The Dynamics of Abstract and Manifest Institutional Change: MITI and the Japanese "Economic Miracle" Reconsidered. Governance, 10: 351–376.

[88] *Philip H. Trezise* (Brookings) and *Yukio Suzuki* (Japan Economic Journal)7. 12. "*Social and Cultural Factors in* Japanese Economic.

[89] Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed.), *The Developmental State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, 348 pp.; Johnson, C. (1995). *Japan, Who Governs?: the Rise of the Developmental State* . New York: Norton.

most of the important work of the government is done elsewhere and only ratified in the Diet. This bureaucratic leadership structure was more emphasised when the former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, whom himself was an ex bureaucrat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was in the office. Most of the primary information flowed from the bureaucrats to the LDP. Thus the *Keizai Kyoryoku* is guarded from the public oversight system. The fact that the Diet is being kept in the dark due to the LDP control prevents the Diet from being used to disrupt the decision-making processes. This also takes away the Diet's ability to establish a stationary framework and administrative procedure and hence being handicapped in its effort to realise democratic control of the bureaucracy. With no basic principles, set framework and procedure coming from the diet, bureaucracy is made an independent body in policymaking matters. For instance, deliberations will be held within LDP's Policy Affairs Research Committee (PARC), bringing in bureaucratic and private sector representatives whenever there is a major change on the agenda. Factually, the private sector is inferior to and dependent on bureaucratic connections, licenses and approvals to have its voices be heard in the system. This means that, while the bureaucrats are exposed to the business representatives trying to pull their strings, these business representatives must comply with administrative guidance as an organisational norm.

The cooperation could also be explained through the cultural deterministic aspect. The famous distribution system which, amongst others, is known as Amakudari. This practice allows retired bureaucrats normally aged between 50 and 55 to enter into the private enterprises and banking system as well as the numerous public corporations of senior management positions. This direction of elite mobility is in reverse to what exists in the United States. 'Amakudari' or descent from heaven", is an eternal notorious practice; a phrase well reflecting the public's traditional deference to authority, despite repeated instances of corruption.[90] It works as former bureaucrats seek favours for their employers, strengthening government-business relationship.[91] As a result, Japanese capitalism is made less than a pure market-driven system with no clear line separating acceptable corporatism and corruption.[92] Furthermore, *Erabu* culture and *Awase* culture emphasised by Kinhide[93] are other cultural factors explaining the present day Japanese system. In brief, *Erabu* means 'to choose', implying analytical, decisionary and discriminatory approaches whereas *Awase* means 'to combine' implying synthesising, dilatory and harmonising approaches reflecting vague and inconclusive thinking whilst allowing for flexibility and openness to the social environment and to be liked by others. While *Erabu* is the ideal-typical Western way of

[90] Japan times, (2007), 'Amakudari' too entrenched to curb?, May, 29 2007.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070529i1.html

[91] Colignon, Richard A., and Usui, Chikako, (2003) *Amakudari : the hidden fabric of Japan's economy /.* ILR Press, Ithaca, N.Y. ; London.

[92] Foreign Affairs, 2003.

[93] Rothacher, Albrecht (1982)Trade policies and economic diplomacy between the European Community and Japan, 1959-1980, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of International Relations.

conducting international negotiations, Japanese diplomacy employs '*Awase*' approach.[94] Lastly, in the view of Ohkawa and Rosovsky[95], the Japanese culture of lifetime employment provides the Japanese entrepreneur a labour force without incentives to oppose technological and organisational progress, even of the labour-saving type.

2.2.5. MITI: a pilot institution functioning as Backbone of Japanese overall wellbeing

Despite the characteristic of the state being mercantilist for a long time before industrialisation, some see the 'miracle' only first appearing in the year 1962, when the productivity was one-third of what it would be in 1975.[96] Among the ministries playing key roles, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) is central to Japanese economic and political history. Amongst others, Chalmers Johnson's research studies of MITI as the pilot agency leading Japan's rapid industrial growth is one of the most classic institutionalist studies emphasising that the Japanese miracle is not by choice but by necessity.[97] This ministry always attracted the most talented graduates in Japan. Moreover, the positions of high-level officials in the ministry have been the most prestigious from societal point of view.[98] MITI's bulk production of theories and models of industrial policies began at the start of the 1960s when growth accelerated tremendously. As such, the ministry has been the leading actor in catalysing strategies for industrial adjustment. In 1964, the Industrial Structure Council (*Sangyō Kōzō Shingikai*) was established, this made it possible for analytical work on industrial policy to take place on a sustained basis.

The MITI firmly associates with the country's free enterprise, private property rights as well as the market. The ministry is more of an economic bureaucracy, and certainly not the bureaucracy of economists.[99] However, it is worth noting that the ministry is not equivalent to the Department of Commerce, but rather the department of Defence when compared to the institutions in the United States. As Robert Ozaki sees it, these industrial policies coming out of MITI are a reflection of economic nationalism. This implies that the priority is given to the interests of the nation, but not necessarily involving protectionism, trade controls, or economic warfare.[100] Within the Japan Inc. approach, the Japanese government did not

[94] Rothacher, Albrecht (1982)Trade policies and economic diplomacy between the European Community and Japan, 1959-1980, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of International Relations.

[95] Ohkawa, K. and Rosovsky, H., (1973) Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century. (London: Oxford University Press.

[96] Johnson, C. (1982). *Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Wright, M. (1999), *Who Governs Japan*? *Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Policy-making Processes*. Political Studies, 47: 939–954.

[100] Ozaki, R. (1978). *The Japanese*. Rutland: Tuttle.

insert direct orders to enterprises. Instead, these enterprises conformed to the signal coming from the state and then reacted. Through this cooperation, private sectors were favoured with privileges such as easy access to capital, tax breaks, and approvals of their projects, some of which involved bringing in foreign technology and in launching joint ventures. Whilst big firms that have no strong ties with the government exist, for example Sony and Honda, they are generally exceptions..[101]

Within the MITI principle, pure market mechanisms could never produce the desired shifts, where the government was more often than not found to be the driving force behind the inspiration and movement of certain industries. MITI's high-growth system composed of the elements such as the state's selection of industries for nurturing, and perfection of measures to commercialise the products of those selected industries, and the development of a means to regulate the cutthroat competition. MITI bureaucrats had control over all foreign exchange and imports of technology. This gave them the power to choose industries for development; the ability to dispense preferential financing, tax breaks, and protection from foreign competition, giving them the power to lower the costs of the chosen industries, and the authority to order the creation of cartels and bank-based industrial conglomerates, handing them the power to supervise competition. [102] All in all, the MITI could be seen as a hero that has made Japan a superpower and a very wealthy country, despite no army to speak of, no puppet regimes to prop up and no proxy wars to mind.[103] With all of the above characterisation of the crucial characterisation of the Japanese policymaking bodies, one could definitely conclude that Japanese economic success was not due to ideology, but it was a method that was indisputably Japanese.

These abovementioned methods, though, are embedded within the society that was strengthened within the Yoshida doctrine that favours the use of economic tools to raise Japan's international standing. The export-or-die 'mentality that the state promoted made sense for a war-devastated and import dependent Japan, and convinced the population that production should be a national priority.[104] The difference in how Japanese state intervenes is dissimilar to having a strong thumb out but no fingers, like in some other countries that are lacking information, skills, and flexibility to match private sector decision makers in

[101] Katsuro S, "*Japanese Economic Success*: *Industrial Policy or Free Market*?" Cato Journal 4. (Fall 1984): 521-43.

[102] Johnson, C. (1982). *Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

[103] McGray, Douglas. "Foreign Policy -- Japan's Gross National Cool, By Douglas McGray." *302 Found*. Accessed. 27 Jan. 2012. <http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ikalmar/illustex/japfpmcgray.htm>. ; Nye, Joseph. (2004) Soft Power. New York: Public Affairs.

[104] Birol Argun at Saban H. Calis, (2003) "*Reluctant Giant*: *The rise of Japan and its role* in the *post – Cold War era*", Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, 8(p.2).

reacting to market signals.[105] In conclusion, public-private cooperation has given Japan the characteristic of being a societal or network state compositing of, firstly, state exercise flexibility to match private sectors decision makers in reacting to market signals. Secondly, various organisational structures that give the MITI numerous levers to intervene in the market place. And ultimately, the influential bureaucratic power emerging from LDP-bureaucratic-interest group alignments and policy.[106] Wrapping up, it has been explicit that British and Japanese states went on a non-linear direction in regards to the level of state intervention in the Post WWII period. That is, while the UK strategy has taken on the extreme neo-liberalistic path in the revolutionary period of Thatcher, the Japanese state continues to cooperate with the private sectors within the style of the capitalistic developmental path. To elaborate, Japanese state in the post-cold war period continues what it practiced during its war reparations and economic boom.

[105] Johnson, C. (1982). *Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

[106] Okimoto, D. (1989). Between MITI and the Market : Japanese industrial policy for high technology. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

CHAPTER III - Nation Branding and Cool Capitalism

"Whichever way you spell it, it's as well to remember that the word cool is not merely another way of saying 'good'. It comes with baggage - an alternative set of values, which are often profoundly in conflict with official values."[107]

3.1. Nation Branding: a Virtual Playground where Culture, Economics and Politics Tightly Entwined

In the words of Anholt[108], brands could be sub-categorised into private domain brands and public domain brands. However, the private domain is owned by private companies which in most cases are managed by boards. Unlike the private domain, one could not limit public domain brands as owned by one single sovereign body with ultimate authority, since they are part of the popular or traditional culture. As such, no one has the property rights over them, at least in the commercial sense.[109] Public domain brands may include countries, cities, and regions, races, demographic groups, and even individual people.[110] It might be worth clarifying here that nation branding is dissimilar to a nation brand. Every nation has a brand image with or without the pursuit of nation branding.[111] Given that nation branding is the management of a public domain that does not belong to anybody, nation branding has been put into question whether anyone should manipulate the nation's image at all. Consequently, existing related scholarships have inclined towards the argument that a nation is an awkward brand. Among many others, Wally Olins[112] utters that treating nations as a brand in the same vein that Kellogg's Cornflakes is a brand is a huge mistake. Part of the argument was that, while products of the private domain brand could be taking in and out of the market, a nation's distinctiveness and exclusivity of public domain is hard to protect given that there does not exist a natural monopoly on the precise qualities. In other words,

[107] Pountain, Dick. (2000) Cool Rules: anatomy of an attitude. London: Reaktion.

[108] Anholt, Simon (1998): "Nation-brands of the twenty-first century", *The Journal of Brand Management*, Vol. 5, No. 6, pp. 395-406.; Anholt, S. (2010): Definitions of place branding: working towards a resolution, in: Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 6(1) February: 1-10.; Anholt, S. (2009): Should place brands be simple?, in: Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 5(2) May: 91-96.

[109] Beckett, Julia (2000), "The 'Government Should Run Like a Business' Mantra", American Review of Public Administration, Vol30 No.2, June.

[110] Anholt, S. (1998): "Nation-brands of the twenty-first century", *The Journal of Brand Management*, Vol. 5, No. 6, pp. 395-406.

[111] Simonin, B. (2008) 'Nation Branding and Public Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities', *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 32(3): 19–34.

[112] Olins, W. (2002) ' Branding the nation — The historical context ' , *Journal of Brand Management* , Vol. 9 , No. 4 – 5 , pp. 241 – 248 .

nations do not have appropriate access to these choices of being discontinued, modified, withdrawn, and re-launched or altered by any forms of manipulation.

Limiting the public domain of a nation, nation branding concerns the application of branding and marketing communication techniques to reshape the international opinion of a country just like the advertising process. To borrow the words of Anneke Elwes, Planning Director for the advertising agency of BMP, "The Cultural Output of countries is like a large advertising campaign on behalf of that country. While it may have recently become increasingly commonplace to refer to nations as competitors in the international arena and to speak of them as brands, a look through history will allow one to realise that selecting certain cultural goods that represent a nation as a whole has always been the practice to enhance the economic impact of the cultural image that was being branded."[113] For instance, the traditional image of Austria that has attracted tourists has long been the classical music and architecture, which are the symbols of Habsburg Dynasty. In the same manner, when we think of Japan, industrial and electronics products and Mount Fuji spring to mind as it is these that have given the country its fame. In other words, the world has always experienced the fact that countries possess certain images that do not entirely represent the country, and the notion that fragments of images can be viewed as a brand impacting consumers' decisions have long existed. The nationalist strategy of disseminating culture for national interests is not new. However, it has been only in the past few decades that nations have turned to the explicit use of the techniques of branding as practised in the business world ever more intensively. Terms such as 'brand image' and 'brand identity', are increasingly used to describe the commonly held perceptions of nations amongst their various 'stakeholders'.[114] In the past, the nations as business-like mega-corporate metaphors supported by the governments may have been implicit and was only a metaphor, however, it has been mutated into a guide for policies.

Among the first supporter of the notion of nation branding is Peter Van Ham who notes that "Smart states are building their brands around reputations and attitudes in the same way smart companies do".[115] Marketing of nations has been done more intensively through non-economic and non-material national treasures. More and more, the rise of the brand state is the outcome of the collaborative relationship between state and cultural industries. This has, in turn, contributed to the growth of public scrutiny of the interaction between politicians and private sectors[116]. Equally interesting, regardless of how affluent the

[113] Quoted in Lloyd, J. 'Cool Britannia Warms Up', *New Statesman*, 13 March 1998, p. 10.

[114] *Dinnie*, *K*. (*2008*). *Japan's Nation Branding: Recent Evolution and Potential Future Paths* [PDF]. *Journal of Current Japanese Affairs*, *16* (3), 52-65.

[115] Ham, P. Van (2001): The rise of the brand state: the post-modern politics of image and reputation, in: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 80(5) September-October: 2-6.

[116] Ibid.

countries are, we see that both the rich and the less affluent are spending heavily on their national branding programme. World Tourism Organisation statistics from 1999 reveal the top spenders on branding to be Spain, followed by Mexico, Thailand, Brazil, Australia, Singapore, Puerto Rico, China, Korea, and France. Certainly, nation branding has been one of the core reasons of the reconsideration behind the changing role of the government in shaping arts and cultural policy within so-called post-industrial societies.

3.2. Varying definitions of nation brands

With the fact that the 'Brand State' phenomenon has achieved its global spread, academia found the deepening of the academic interest in the topic necessary. Consequently, under the editorship of Simon Anholt who has been accepted as the founder of the field, the journal of Place Branding was initiated in 2004. In 2008, the life and time of the brand state has been further studied through a more serious and academic attempt by Keith Dinnie, who has recently published his book *Nation Branding*: *Concepts, Issues, Practice.* Nation branding, in Dinnie's term, is defined as something that designates the brand of the country, state, nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences'[117]. The conflicting viewpoints and opinions persist as scholars try to define the term. Some view the process as merely another form of country-of-origin effect or place marketing in which countries must manage and control what they are branding if wishing to effectively compete with and become advantageous in relation to other countries.[118] However, there are people, who see nation branding as a consistent and all-embracing national brand strategy determining the most realistic, most competitive and most compelling strategic vision of the country, and ensuring that this vision is supported, reinforced and enriched by every act of communication between the country and the rest of the world.[119] Taken to extremes, as Ying Fan writes, nation branding could be claimed as a panacea equivalent to a Grand National economic development strategy, desperately needed especially by developing countries.[120]

Governments often got a considerate role in shaping countries' image and cultural exports through their policy-making process as the consequence of the close-knitted correlation between economy and culture. For instance, the brochure published by a firm of image consultants in Germany titled 'Debate: A Global Brand for Germany', argues that it is essential for political leaders to become brand managers of their parties as well as for their

[117] Dinnie, K. (2008). *Nation branding : concepts, issues, practice*. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. P.15.

[118] Kotler, P.; Gertner, D. (2002): Country as brand, product, and beyond: a place marketing and brand management perspective, in: Journal OF Brand Management, 9(4-5) April: 249-261.; Gilmore, F. (2002): A country: can it be repositioned? Spain: the success story of country branding, in: Journal Of Brand Management, 9(4-5) April: 281-293.

[119] Anholt, S. (1998): Nation-brands of the twenty-first century, in: Journal Of Brand Management, 5(6) July: 395-406.

[120] Fan, Ying (2010): Branding the nation: towards a better understanding, in: PLACE BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, 6(2) May: 97-103.

nations.[121] As a consequence, it has become continuously controversial that it is a highly politicised activity where culture has come to be regarded as extremely crucial, politically and economically contributing to how much governments could maximise national interests through the branding of national cultures. This is because while companies are managed clearly according to ownership and a top down approach, countries are governed according to public interest where transparency and participation are necessary. The study of John O' Shaughnessy and Nicholas Jackson O'Shaughnessy has pointed to some neglected issues that show the notion of the brand has some limits when applied to nations.[122]

Growing rapidly in its popularity and importance alongside nation branding is the buzzword, 'creativity'. 'Creativity', according Kunzmann, is a friendly virus that has affected the community planners and helps us to survive as a creative profession.[123] Alternative, it is sometimes called creative milieu or creative industries, or even creative city[124] or creative class[125]. Nation branding and the viral spread of 'creativity', has contributed for the proliferation of the economy naming 'Creative Economy'. Its importance lies in its 'ever widening range of economic activity and is concerned with producing and marketing goods and services that are infused in one way or another with broadly aesthetic or semiotic attributes'.[126] The rise of this industry marks the commencement of 'Post Industrial Society' and 'late capitalism'.

In the opinion of a former UK art minister, "Industries, many of them new that rely on creativity and imaginative intellectual property are becoming the most rapidly growing and important part of our national economy. They are where the jobs and the wealth of the future are going to be generated" [127] With this new type of capitalism, 'culturepreneurs', urban protagonists who mediate between and interpret the area of culture and of service provision, is one potential champion of the coming together of nation branding and the rise

[121] O ' Shaughnessy , J . and O ' Shaughnessy , N . J . (2000) ' Treating the nation as a brand: Some neglected issues ' , *Journal of Macromarketing* , Vol. 20 , No. 1 , pp. 56 – 64.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Kunzmann, K. (2005) *Culture, Creativity and Spatial Planning*, Abercrombie Lecture, 29 March 2004, Department of Civic Design, Liverpool, UK.

[124] Landry, C (2000). *The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators*, London, Earthscan.

[125] Florida. R. (2002). *The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It is Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life*, New York, Basic Books.

[126] Scott 1997, p. 323; see also Landry 2000; Scott 1999, 2000; Kneafsey 2001 as cited in Gibson, C., Murphy, P., & Freestone, R. (2002). Employment and Socio-spatial Relations in Australia's Cultural Economy. *Australian Geographer*, *33*(2), 173-189. Routledge.

[127] Christopher Robert Smith, Baron Smith of Finsbury is a British Labour Party politician. He was the first openly gay British MP and to acknowledge that he is HIV positive. In 1997 he was appointed to Blair Administration as the first Secretary of State for Ministry of Culture, Media and Sport.

of the creative economy.[128] With 'Cool Capitalism', the role played of the public is surely the art managers to support and push further the causes of the nation's creativity. This was done with the eventual desire to make the art industry the mainstream of a new industrial revolution.[129] Whereas the main objectives of countries focusing on the rise of creative industries is somewhat homogeneous, the definition of creative industries varies in many countries, with some very much diverging away from the concept of this type of industry, which initially appeared in Australia at the dawn of the 90s.

In the same way that creative industry was once on the fringes of the grand economy, 'Cool was once an attitude fostered by rebels and underdogs - slaves, prisoners, political dissidents. While it has existed as a vital component of youth subcultures since the 50s when the 'cool' attitudes were widely adopted by artists and intellectuals alike, it has only been surfacing in the 80s and 90s. From then, it has been adapted and utilised by the mass media and advertising industries as the way into young consumers' mentality and wallets. At present, Cool is everywhere, dissolving the categories of the left and right by decoupling economic and social assumptions that have been more or less fixed since the French Revolution'.[130] Indeed, the 'cool' phenomenon or what writer Micheal Bracewell named 'the gentrification of the avant-garde' is becoming a universal phenomenon and influencing all institutions greatly. It is where 'exceptionalism' becomes the 'new conformism'. The following statement illustrates the prevalence of 'Cool',

> The election of the New Labour Government in 1997 sparked off a battle between these newspaper columnists to either support or trash a precariously concocted notion of 'Cool Britannia', which was fought by incorporating the greatest number of puns on Cool into their headlines. One newspaper even voted Cool its 'Word of the Year'. Glossy magazines splashed the word across their covers to exploit its 'feel-good' effect, flaunting membership of the in-crowd for just £2.50. A few more thoughtful commentators fought a desperate rear guard action. A British television critic, Desmond Christy (The Guardian, 3 July 1997), complained ironically that 'you can't really get a job in the media any more if you don't use the word "cool" as your response to most questions and situations.2 A few examples: "What did you think of last night's X-Files?" Response: "Cool." "I voted New Labour." Response: "Cool." You soon get the hang of

[128] Lange, B. (2006). From *Cool Britannia to Generation Berlin*? *Geographies* of Culturepreneurs and their Creative Milieus in Berlin In: Eisenberg, C., Gerlach, R. et Handkle C. (eds.) Cultural Industries: The British Experience in International Perspective.

[129] Iwabuchi, K . (2002) Recentering globalization : popular culture and Japanese transnationalism. Durham: Duke University Press.

[130] Pountain, Dick. (2000) Cool rules : anatomy of an attitude. London: Reaktion.

> it and it saves you from ever being short of something to say.' The Independent on Sunday ran a fatuous feature entitled 'A Guide to what's really Cool which attacked opponents of 'Cool Britannia': 'Of course Cool is important', it babbled. 'Cool is the summation of all we aspire to. Cool is not an image, a way of looking, talking or doing. It is a way of being.[131]'

3.3. Gross National Cool

Cool capitalism has indicated the evolution of nation branding that markets the culture of the majorities to touching upon the culture of the marginalised groups. Before the spread of 'cool', the culture that was utilised as to yield economic impact was 'high culture', i.e. the example of Austria and Japan aforementioned. However, consumer culture is being redesigned, repackaged and re-launched as a new academic or political project. Simultaneously, governments undergo shifts in its cultural policy accordingly and in manipulating the nations' pop culture'. 'Cool' has impacted the well-being of countries giving rise to what is called 'Gross national Cool'. 'Gross national Cool' is a kind of 'Soft Power' which works as 'a reminder that commercial trends and products, and a country's knack for spawning them, can serve political and economic ends.'[132] In the effort to measure Japanese National Cool, the Marubeni Research Institute made use of measureable data such as trade data on records, tapes, other recorded media, books, newspaper, pictures, photographic plates, films, art pieces, along with data on invisible trade such as royalties, fees, and personal, cultural and recreational services and credits as a means to evaluate the nation's level of cool.

'Cool' has also been argued to have positively contributed to the increase of nation's 'soft power'. The term 'Soft power' was coined by J. Nye Jr. not too long ago in his book *Bound to Lead*[133]. In 1990 however, his closer attempt to conceptualise the term was published in 2004 in *Soft Power*[134]. According to Nye, the essence of this soft co-optive power which resides to a large extent in the promotion of a country's culture is just as important as hard command power. This is because, as he further explains, a state will encounter less resistance to its wishes if it could already make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others. However, one must not assume that the concept is a synonym for culture, economics or anything other than military power.[135]

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[131] Pountain, Dick. (2000) Cool rules : anatomy of an attitude. London: Reaktion.

[132] *Douglas, M* , "*Japan's Gross National Cool*", Foreign Policy, May/June 2002.

[133] Nye, J. (1990). *Bound to lead: the changing nature of American power*. New York: Basic Books.

[134] Nye, J. (2004). *Soft power : the means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

[135] Ibid. pp. 162-163.

Wrapping up, the newness of the recent breed of nation branding is obviously the entering of an era where states have shown explicit involvement in the neo-liberal circulation of media and popular culture by collaborating with media culture industries. [136] Obviously, developments of nation branding has desirable economic power as well as considerable political and strategic implications. Yet it is not without any risks. For a state to rely peacefully on its creative economy, specific national institutions should govern in the way that incentives are attractive to those who generate and implement creativity, innovations or products. For any state to promote its country's coolness and to produce policies to support it, they must bear in mind that cool is not the synonym for good. It comes with baggage, an alternative set of values which are often profoundly in conflict with official values[137]. As the majority of the literature suggests, the soft power of cool has proliferated economically the certain countries through the export of 'cool' products. Despite that, management of cool has not always been an easy task because branding countries as 'cool' requires a sustained degree of concerted action. This has influenced many who doubt whether it is an appropriate idea at all. Despite the fact that superpowers like the UK and Japan have stamped the brand 'cool' in front of their countries' names as some explicit policies, we must bear in mind that, without strong leadership, any campaign in nation branding, like a vehicle ' with no one at the wheel', is doomed to fail[138].

[136] Nye, J. (2004). *Soft power : the means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs., pp. 162-163.

[137] Pountain, Dick. (2000) Cool Rules: anatomy of an attitude. London: Reaktion.

[138] Centaur Communications (2003) 'Britain is Driving Forward With No One at the Wheel', Brand Strategy, 9 June: 10.

CHAPTER IV - COOL BRITANNIA: On Culture and Politics

4.1. 'Cool Britannia' as symbol of cool capitalism of the 90s: famous or notorious?

The strongest motivation of the UK in revitalising the value of popular culture by the state has been economic. This has meant that policymakers believe creative industries would provide more resilient and indigenous economic hope when putting local circumstances into consideration. This inclination resonated with the belief that the country's economic future lay with a move towards a growing knowledge-based economy.[139] Referring to Stryker McGuire's statement in his March 29, 2009 article on the hope and hype of late 90s Britain, he writes" We just don't do hope here, do we?" Yet, later in his article, he recalled that in fact, "we did do hope here, and it wasn't that long ago ".[140] McGuire is the American Journalist who was among one of the first journalists who spelled out optimism, hope and hype of British music, nightlife, art and fashion that was associated with the vibrant 'Cool Britannia' campaign drawing media attention worldwide in 1996. Very shortly a young and dynamic Tony Blair was about to topple the Tory party.[141] When John Major was eventually ousted by Tony Blair in May, 'Cool Britannia' was Blair's most observable effort to rebrand Britain. In fact, the election marked the battle between newspaper columnists who either support or trash a notion of 'Cool Britannia' by incorporating the greatest number of puns of Cool into their headlines. [142] The campaign has been vaulted by the Prime Minister as if it was something close to a Grand National economic development strategy.[143] Casually speaking, it was not much of an exaggeration reminiscing UK's blossoming time.

'Cool Britannia' made its first public appearance in the freezer case as a domestically-targeted Ben & Jerry's ice-cream flavour. It is a concoction of vanilla ice cream, strawberries, and chocolate-covered shortbread. It was launched by a woman dressed as Britannia riding around the Royal Albert Hall dragging an inflatable ice-cream tub in May 1996.[144] By November 1996, London was labelled by Time magazine as "the coolest city in the world". In February 1997, Vanity Fair puts its weight behind 'Cool Britannia' in a "Swinging London" issue. The phrase is an obvious pun on the title of Bonzo Dog Doo Dah Band's patriotic song and Britain's unofficial national anthem Rule Britannia— a military hymn whose refrain

[139] Kunzmann K. R., 2004, Culture, Creativity and Spatial Planning, Town Planning Review, vol. 75, n°4, p. 383-404.

[140]McGuire, Stryker. "This Time I've Come to Bury Cool Britannia." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 28 Mar. 2009. Web. 2 Jun. 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/29/cool-britannia-g20-blair-brown>.

[141] Ibid.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Fan, Ying (2010): Branding the nation: towards a better understanding, in: Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 6(2) May: 97-103.; Fan, Ying (2006): Branding the nation. What is being branded? Journal of vacation Marketing, 12(1), 5-14.

[144] Leonard, Mark et.al. (2002) Public Diplomacy. London: Foreign Policy Centre.; Leonard, Mark. "Markleonard.net: Journalism / Cool Britannia." *Markleonard.net*. Web. 7 July 2011. <http://markleonard.net/journalism/coolbritannia/>.

goes, "Rule, Britannia! Britannia, rule the waves/Britons never will be slaves", back in 1967.[145] However, New Britain needed a new song in the 90s and so Rule Britannia was giving way to 'Cool Britannia'.[146]

Blair's attempt was believed to serve the purpose of rebadging the old country. Its commencement was seen by Hewison as crucial to British self-identity as it entered the new millennium where 'No longer would Britain be the land of bad food and crooked teeth; London was now to be the epicentre of a cultural renaissance, its inhabitants no longer citizens of a fading imperial power, but the vital members of a country blazing into the new millennium high on the rush of newness.'[147]By bringing these different worlds such as literature, film, music and politics together, the Prime Minister has gained celebrity status.[148] The eve and the peak of 'Cool Britannia' largely symbolised Number 10 Downing Street as a highly trendy place hosting 'cultural icons' such as sports and music stars, as well as fashion designers. It is where politicians and pop stars attend the same receptions.[149] The Blair administration reminded Britain of 'Swinging London', when Wilson associated himself with The Beatles leading up to the 1964 general election. Yet this time, visitors could easily enter without showing identification or having to go through a metal detector. The residence was rather empty and subdued more like an entrance of an upscale bed-and-breakfast as oppose to the anteroom to the office of the country's leader.[150]

'Cool Britannia' became a useful mechanism by which New Labour could shed its reputation for being stuck with post-war socialist dogma. As such, the party was to be seen as a youthful and forward thinking alternative to beleaguered, fractious and increasingly weary-looking conservative Party. [151] Many famous Britpop bands of that time that were invited, 'bad boys' Oasis was one of those with the highest proximity with the government. This mutual public-private friendship was evident when the Oasis songwriter said the party is

[145] McGuire, Stryker. "This Time I've Come to Bury Cool Britannia." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 28 Mar. 2009. Web. 05 Apr. 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/29/cool-britannia-g20-blair-brown>.

[146]A. Michael Froomkin, *When We Say US, We Mean It!*, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 842(2004).; Warren Huge, "London Journal; Blair's 'Rebranded' Britain Is No Museum," *New York Times,* November 12, 1997.

[147] Robert Hewison, 'Rebirth of a Nation', *The Times*, 19 May 1996.

[148] McGuire, Stryker. "This Time I've Come to Bury Cool Britannia." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 28 Mar. 2009. Web. 05 Apr. 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/29/cool-britannia-g20-blair-brown>.

[149] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.; Pratt A. C., (in press), Urban regeneration: from the arts 'feel good' factor to the cultural economy. A case study of Hoxton. London, Urban Studies (mimeograph available from author: a.c.pratt@lse.ac.uk).

[150] Pink, Daniel H. "The Brand Called UK." *FastCompany.com*. 31 Jan. 1999. Web. 02 July 2011. <http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/22/branduk.html>.

[151] D'Monté, R. and Saunders, G. (2007). *Cool Britannia? : British political drama in the 1990s*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (Pg. 11); See also, (2009). *The Cambridge companion to Caryl Churchill*. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press.

"top" in July 1997, and cemented when the head of their record label, Adam McGee was appointed as a government advisor in March 1998. In this same year, the Spice Girls, a female British pop group formed in 1994 were pillared as one of the country's leading exports, through sales of their music, attendances at their 'Spice World' and all other ancillary merchandising associated with the band. As part of reassuring the cool image in conjunction with the public campaign, the group were encouraged by ministers to visit the British embassy during their overseas tours.[152]

Despite the above, formally speaking, it has been argued that it was Mark Leonard[153], British foreign policy thinker, political writer and author, who coined 'Cool Britannia' along with the specific definition of the creative industries when he publicised the famous pamphlet *Rebranding Britain* at the age of twenty-three. He was chosen by Blair to run a foreign policy think-tank the following year.[154] In his book, 'Britain?', he advanced the argument that the UK could rebuild itself by rebranding stating, "We have spent most of this century in relative decline, after ending the last century as the top nation in the world,…That left us with a heavy legacy. We had created a set of institutions that had served us well in the industrial economy. But those old ways of thinking were preventing us from moving into the future."[155] In May 1997, the campaign was quickly solidified when New Labour culture secretary Chris Smith said 'Cool Britannia' is here to stay.[156] Consequently, its professional publicity was accelerated in July 1997.

Therefore, 'Cool Britannia' employed as many political associations as it did artistic and cultural ones. Apart from the bright, shiny, smiling young man crossing the threshold at 10 Downing Street amid a throng of Labour faithful and party-issue flags, after 19 years of Conservative rule, Blair's entrance also meant a huge temperature shift as everyone felt the

[152] *BBC News*. BBC, 04 Jan. 1998. Accessed 05 Apr. 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/72375.stm>.

[153]Mark Leonard is a Director of the Foreign Policy Centre, a think-tank he helped found at the age of 24, under the patronage of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Mark has also worked as a researcher for Demos, where he ran the Europe programme, as well as writing the Britain ™ report which is credited with launching "Cool Britannia". At the Foreign Policy Centre, Leonard wrote the influential report Public Diplomacy and served for many years on the UK government's 'Public Diplomacy Strategy Board'. This was Mark Leonard's *BritainTM: Renewing Our Identity* which attracted quite a lot of interest. Leonard left Demos to lead a new think tank the Foreign Policy Centre – again tightly aligned to the Labour Party and which produced a paper by Wally Olins on branding, *Trading Identities* in 1999 and a series of reports on Public Diplomacy starting in 2000. Wally Olins himself has long been a strong advocate of nation branding and his agency has been behind successive projects in nation rebranding in other countries like Germany, Poland and Liechtenstein.

[154] As he reassured, the Brits in the 90s were not living in a cultural desert, but instead "are trying to celebrate - creativity, multiculturalism, openness to the world, and all deeply rooted in British history and culture. Without abandoning our history, we will renew our identity and try to achieve a better fit between Britain's past, present and future".

[155] Pink, Daniel H. "The Brand Called UK." *FastCompany.com*. 31 Jan. 1999, Accessed: 02 July 2011. <http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/22/branduk.html>.

[156] Markleonard.net: Journalism / Cool Britannia." *Markleonard.net*. Accessed 05 Sept. 2011. <http://markleonard.net/journalism/coolbritannia/>.

exuberance.[157] Blair did not just represent the end of Tory dominance, he represented a sky walker who would lead post-imperial, post-Thatcher Britain, into the uncharted 21st century.[158] More specifically, the New Labour government were full of positivity that rebranding British-made culture through the promotion of local cultural commodities like music, media, publishing, fashion, lifestyle, design, and software could make a considerate impact on the global market, and make London as the global capital of coolness.

4.2. Culture for Sales in London and the Rise of the 'Independents' Making Up the Creative Class in the Late 90s

Being very much concentrated within the capital, the life and time of 'Cool Britannia' also marked the period when London was a hotspot in art and design. It was at this time that some artists were more famous than their art, and some art dealers like Charles Saatchi and Jay Jopling were more famous than their artists. Saatchi was the leading patron with particular close relationship with Blair government whose celebrated 'Sensation' exhibition took place at the Royal Academy in 1997, the institution right at the very heart of British art establishment representing impression of British culture and politics during the 1990s. As a means of showing Blair's focus on art, the 'powerhouse', an exhibition displaying the best of Britain's creativity and innovation was opened by the PM.

It is also worth noting that while 'Cool Britannia' was strongly associated with pop celebrities in the beginning, it was later more about the rise of creative class with the so-called 'Independents'. They were the first generation that grew up with computers, understood how to reap the benefits of modern computing power and communications. In terms of values, they were the generation that were brought up by parents who were teenagers in the 1950s and 1960s, and they themselves became adolescents under Mrs Thatcher's reign. This perhaps explains sufficiently why they are anti-establishment, anti-traditionalist and highly individualistic: they prize freedom, autonomy and choice.[159] Consequently, these values affected them in such a way to encourage self-employment and entrepreneurship.

Creative industry has been analysed in great details by the economist Richard Caves. He has defined creative industries as industries which supply goods and services that we broadly associate with cultural, artistic, or simply entertainment value. They include book and magazine publishing, the visual arts (painting and sculpture), the performing arts (theatre, opera, concerts, and dance), sound recordings, cinema, TV, film, even fashion and toys and

[157]Higgins C., (2006), From Moscow with moolah: how Russians are fuelling the art boom. Experts warn of downturn after record-breaking week in London auction rooms, The Guardian, 24/06/2006 , quoted in Basar S., 2006, De la Cool Brittania au Londres continental, L'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui, n° 365, p. 100-107.

[158] McGuire, Stryker. "This Time I've Come to Bury Cool Britannia." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 28 Mar. 2009. Web. 05 Apr. 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/29/cool-britannia-g20-blair-brown>.

[159] Leadbeater, Charles and Kate Oakley. (1999). *The Independents: Britain's New Cultural Entrepreneurs*. London: Demos.

games.[160] The independents who are backed by the self-employed, freelancers, and micro-business are the force for this growth.[161] In the UK context, they came into the workforce in the late 1980s and 1990s when public subsidies to the arts were under pressure. Since many large commercial organisations were in the midst of downsizing, careers in such places became more risky and uncertain. Subsequently, self employment and entrepreneurship gained more attention.

Essentially, British popular music, radio and television have been much more opened to black cultural expression than the traditional cultural institutions. It has been evident that popular music and some of the social movements around it – Rock Against Racism, Band Aid – have been more successful in expressing social issues such as anti-racism, the problems of unemployment, Third World poverty, than traditional political parties. Music businesses that were largely based in London in the 90s were one of Britain's largest export industries. At government level, policymakers have begun to appreciate 'high art', 'low' art, popular art, and 'community' art as they all have something to offer London. Government appreciation could initially be seen in the establishment of Cultural Industries by Greater London Council in 1984.

The rise of the creative class added the newness to British society. To elaborate, the independents' work approaches are based on the blurred demarcation line between the consumption and production, as well as between work and non-work.[162] These people combined individualistic values and collaborative working. They have one foot in the old world and another in the new.[163] The development of the 'Independents' is marked by the coming together of arts and business with strong public sector support and government approval as is evident in documents such as the Green Paper.[164] Certainly, London was the continent's centre for the commercial audio-visual and the corporate communications area; and its design consultancies and advertising agencies that operate on a worldwide basis include some of the world's largest companies as their clientele.[165]

Within the capital alone, people working in the creative industries represent 15 percent of London's economy, accounting for 20 percent of the workforce, and a turnover of between £25bn and £29bn. Although London contains only 12 percent of the UK's population, the city hosted 40 percent of its arts infrastructure, 70 percent of its music recording studios, 90 percent of music business activity, 70 percent of film and television production, 46 percent

[160] Caves, Richard (2000), Creative Industries: Contracts Between Art and Commerce. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pg. 1.

[161] Ibid. Pg. 299

[162] Nicholas. C. Wilson, David Stokes, (2005) "Managing creativity and: The challenge for cultural entrepreneurs", Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol. 12 Iss: 3, pp.366 – 378.

[163] Caves, Richard (2000), *Creative Industries*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.: pg. 175, 306.

[164] Ibid. P.375.

[165] Landry, C. London as a creative city. in: Hartley, J. (Ed) *Creative industries*. London: Blackwell, 2005. p. 233-243.

of advertising, 85 percent of fashion designers and 27 percent of architectural practices. A marked 81 percent increase in self-employment was also witnessed. Between 1997 to 2002, UK's creative industries grew at the rate of 6 percent annually in, against an average 3 percent growth for the overall economy. It generated revenues of around £112.5 billion and employed some 1.3 million people. It involved exports valued at £11.4 billion, or 4.2 per cent of all goods and services exported in 2001 and the industry accounted for 8 per cent Gross Added Value in 2002[166].

4.3. The YBAs: UK's Celebrities of the Creative Economy

The time of 'Cool Britannia' also coincided with the Thatcher's Big Bang phenomenon. It impacted in the way that the new breed of Master's graduates replaced the less inventive and less aggressive pinstriped stockbrokers and bankers of the former generation. These graduates were perhaps the single greatest driver behind the prosperity and laissez-faire gumption that cascaded across the country.[167] They were known as the Young British Artists (YBas). This flexible, creative, qualified and experienced workforce can be represented by those who graduated in 1988 from the Royal College of Art and Goldsmiths College, and taught by artists such as Michael Craig-Martin, encouraging them to take their career in hand at an early stage. Amongst others, artist Damien Hirst organised Freeze – an exhibition which presented the works of sixteen future YBas in which the exhibition was often put forward as the outcome of Michael Craig-Martin's teachings. The exhibited work was said to have been reproduced by an entire generation. Other renowned figures included Tracy Amin, Sam Taylor-Wood, Brothers Jake, Dinos Chapman, Chris Offili, Rachel Whiteread, Gary Hume, and Sarah Lucas. As has been extensively documented, they became a springboard, turning art into a cultural industry, and a cluster of SMEs that specialised in NICTs – the result of a subtle fusion between art and new technologies.[168] Due to their entrepreneurship and initiatives, they represented the transition from the anti-commercial artist to the "culturepreuneur", characterised as knowledgeable and polyvalent creative workers capable of wearing many different hats, whose formative years were Thatcherite but who came into their own during the Blair era.[169] Due to their emergence, *BritArt* was said to have made a sensational entrance into Britain's lethargic art world as well as a considerable impacts across Britain and beyond.[170] The UK in the 90s was on the threshold

[166] CITF (Creative Industries Task Force) (2001) URL: http://www.culture.gov.uk/ creative/mapping.html.

[167] World Wide Words: Cool Britannia." *World Wide Words*. Web. 02 July 2011. <http://www.worldwidewords.org/turnsofphrase/tp-coo1.htm>.

[168] Pratt A. C., (in press), Urban regeneration: from the arts 'feel good' factor to the cultural economy. A case study of Hoxton. London, Urban Studies (mimeograph available from author: a.c.pratt@lse.ac.uk); See also: *Rising East* Online. Charles *Ambrosino*. Creative London. London and the Creative City paradigm. Issue No. 7, September 2007. Accessed: http://www.uel.ac.uk/risingeast/archive07/academic/ambrosino.htm.

[169] Rising East Online. Charles Ambrosino. Creative London. London and the Creative City paradigm. Issue No. 7, September 2007. Accessed: http://www.uel.ac.uk/risingeast/archive07/academic/ambrosino.htm.

[170] Ibid.

of either a decadent fin de siècle or the breakthrough that characterized Vienna in 1900, when artists, playwrights, poet and composers launched twentieth century modernism."[171]

4.4. Continuity and Differences of British state's Cultural Agenda

Certainly, 'Cool Britannia' owed to some extent its development to the past government initiatives. This is most explicit when Jennie Lee of Prime Minister Harold Wilson's government was appointed as the first Arts Minister from 1964 to 1970. Back then, she played an important role in the establishment of the Open University, one of the greatest acts Wilson passed on according to himself. In Lee's views, "Political control is a shortcut to boring, stagnant art: there must be freedom to experiment, to make mistakes, to fail, to shock – or there can be no new beginnings. It is hard for any government to accept this."[172] Her outlook inherited liberal-elitist traditions of cultural ideas. Under her supervision, the regional offices would gain greater autonomy for in 1965 the Arts Council established a network of arts organisations across the country as regular client organisations.[173] Through the establishment of the Arts Council, 'Housing the Arts' fund and a Policy for the Arts white paper marked with Wilson's modernising homilies were also established. The Arts Council was granted a new charter of incorporation in 1967 which resulted in an expansion of its work in the regions, as well as the establishment of the new arts institutions at London's South Bank Centre. Its objectives were: 1) to develop and improve the knowledge, understanding and practice of arts, 2) to increase the accessibility of arts to the public and 3) to advise and co-operate with government departments, local authorities and other bodies on any matters concerned, whether directly or indirectly, with the foregoing objectives. Between 1966 and 1967, total arts spending increased steadily by 45%, accounting for the biggest increase in state subsidy ever.[174] The increase was evident especially in the record business that doubled in size in the 1960s making Britain a global player. This was thought, in large part, to be due to the government's belief that arts were a cure for social problems. As a result, Labour became the advocate of traditional elite culture, liberal and inclusive in purpose, and thus a barrier to mass culture.[175]

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[171] Rebecca D'Monte & Graham Saunders, eds. (2008) *Cool Britannia? British Political Drama in the 1990s*, London: Palgrave. ; See also: Sierz, A. (2001). *In-yer-face theatre : British drama today*. London: Faber and Faber.

[172]History of Arts Council." *Arts Council England*. Accessed. 01 June 2011. <http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/about-us/history-arts-council/1960s/>.

[173] Ibid.

[174] White, 287-288, 311; Hutchison, 171; National Archives PREM 13/721, Department of Education and Science, Report on the Arts, Sept. 1968, "A Going Concern", 1; *Sunday Times* 20 February 1967.

[175] Black, L. (2006). 'Not only a source of expenditure but a source of income': The Creative Industries and Cultural Politics in Britain from the 1960s to Cool Britannia. Published in: Christiane Eisenberg, Rita Gerlach and Christian Handke (eds.). (2006) *Cultural Industries: The British Experience in International Perspectiv,* P. 135.

Essentially, Lee wished to intervene the uniformity and joylessness of much of the social furniture we have inherited from the industrial revolution, in favour of "making Britain a gayer and more cultivated country".[176] Despite the above connection between the preceding governments and Blair's in terms of governmental support to arts, little attention has been paid to the fact that the foundation of 'Cool Britannia' campaign was hinted by the concept of 1960's where the government encouraged the country to be a leader of youth culture. Lee's effort focused on culture's consumers and audiences as oppose to producers and artists with the state as an enabler rather than deliverer. Today, Lee is seen as a "sanctified figure".[177] Fundamentally, Lee's activities could be understood as a progenitor of supposedly parallel New Labour traits. All in all, labour's relationship with popular culture was not always easy, there existed various common factors with later New Labour's penchant for the creative industries including post-industrial contexts for understanding British politics and culture, as well as the contribution to modernising cultural life and attitudes. [178]

When Thatcher came into the office, political events of the 80s considerably shaped the culture of the 90s. According to Rodney Fitch, the government banged the drum for design-led innovation like no other for 100 years. [179] Starting from the mid-80s onwards, England experienced a rapid change from an economy of production to a culture of brands. As such, companies no longer see their primary function as selling sneakers, personal computers and mugs of coffee; they now sell a 'lifestyle', a 'business solution', an 'experience'. [180] Rather than the relation of function of the products and consumers, a brand forged a products-consumers connection by representing ideals and values, giving a faceless commodity an aura of social value and culture importance. This fostered 'brand loyalty' on the part of consumers.[181] The *Arts* Council of Great Britain (ACGB) in the Thatcher era was felt to have shed its "welfare state mentality" and increased business investment tenfold from 1979-88,

[176] Black, L. (2006). 'Not only a source of expenditure but a source of income': The Creative Industries and Cultural Politics in Britain from the 1960s to Cool Britannia. Published in: Christiane Eisenberg, Rita Gerlach and Christian Handke (eds.). (2006) *Cultural Industries: The British Experience in International Perspective.*; See also: Black, L. (2006) ''Making Britain a gayer and more cultivated country': Wilson, Lee and the creative industries in the 1960s', *Contemporary British history.*, 20 (3). pp. 323-342.

[177] This is in the view of Geoff Mulgan, a major expert in cultural industries politics based at the Greater London Council's Cultural Industries Unit in the 1980s and in the 1990s, a Director of Demos, and an advisor to Blair.

[178] Black, L. (2006) ''Making Britain a gayer and more cultivated country': Wilson, Lee and the creative industries in the 1960s.' *Contemporary British history*, 20 (3). pp. 323-342.

[179] Rodney Fitch is the founder and Chairman of Fitch, the first design business to be fully quoted on the London Stock Exchange. Fitch's firm led the design industry in the 1980s before he resigned in 1994 in order to 'start again' with a smaller, more focused design firm specializing in branded retail and entertainment environments and communications for clients in Europe and Asia Pacific.

[180] Sierz, A. (2001). *In-yer-face theatre: British drama today*. London: Faber and Faber, pg. 40.

[181] Ibid.

to £30m. At the other extreme, the author Julian Gouigh states that artists like Oasis, Blur and the YBas came out of the dole culture of the Thatcher years when they did all their learning in poverty and then New Labour got into office and essentially took the credit for Thatcher's Cultural Revolution and benefited from the changes that were sweeping through the UK.[182] Because of this new generation, London's creativity was fed by both domestic citizens and international immigrants that pumped new skills, innovation, enthusiasm and plain hard work into a labour-hungry, creativity starved economy. This in turn created the space for the subcultures to flourish and added to the country's transition to a creative economy. As such, creative work supported by the Blair government was less British than the name the campaign suggested.[183]

4.5. Blair government: Institutions and Nation Branding in the Post Industrial Era

Though it would be somewhat absurd to label 'Cool Britannia' as Blair's invention given the above, it is to a large extent a groundbreaking campaign of British economic development history. Initially, Blair was the breath of political fresh air that comes along once in a great while and defines an era. One thing that was certain was that New Labour was more pluralist and less attached to specific cultural forms.[184] Thanks to the institutional changes around the arts from Jennie Lee's time and beyond, New Labour saw possibilities in fully embracing the consumer culture of American capitalism[185]. Like never before, the party saw England fully as a brand, as a commodity, to be marketed and managed. According to J. Harris, Blair's association with Britpop and art was more substantive than Wilson's 'pop' credentials.[186] According to Charles Landry, while London has been a creative centre for centuries, creative industry policies of the 90s represents the first attempt to treat the seemingly disparate sector as a coherent and powerful force.[187] Also, different sets of policy environments and institutions newly formulated within the New Labour government have created an entirely new environment.

To elaborate, the formal sources of the concept of the creative industries can be found in the Blair Labour Government's Creative Industry Task Force (CITF) initially released in

[182] McGuire, Stryker. "This Time I've Come to Bury Cool Britannia." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 28 Mar. 2009. Web. 2 Jun. 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/29/cool-britannia-g20-blair-brown>.

[183] Caves, Richard (2000), *Creative Industries*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press Pg. 387.

[184] Black, L. (2006) ''Making Britain a gayer and more cultivated country' : Wilson, Lee and the creative industries in the 1960s.', *Contemporary British history.*, 20 (3). pp. 323-342.

[185] Sierz, A. (2001). *In-yer-face theatre : British drama today*. London: Faber and Faber, pg. 40.

[186] J. Harris ch.12; Littler 208-209 as cited in Black, L. (2006). 'Not only a source of expenditure but a source of income': The Creative Industries and Cultural Politics in Britain from the 1960s to Cool Britannia. Published in: Christiane Eisenberg, Rita Gerlach and Christian Handke (eds.). (2006) *Cultural Industries: The British Experience in International Perspective* p. 139.

[187] Landry C., (2000), The Creative City. A Toolkit for Urban Innovators, London, Comedia – Earthscan Publications Ltd. Pg. 225-226.

November 1998 and revised in 2001.[188] It is the task force carried forward by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) established in 1997 also known as the 'Department of Fun'. The institution was restructured from the Department of Heritage to set about current activity in the creative industries, and identify policy measures that could promote their further development.[189] Within this department, the so-called knowledge-based economy was seen by the government as the capitalistic tool for wealth creation. The CITF was considered to be the first ever attempt to measure the economic contribution of these industries to the UK, and to identify the opportunities and threats they faced. It was charged with defining, mapping as well as measuring UK's creative industries. According to the government, they functioned as guidelines to track activity on a consistent basis and to develop policy accordingly in areas such as dedicated financial support, rethinking legal requirements, intellectual property law and the regulatory and incentives regime. In addition, a total of 8 regional development agency representatives for each region were responsible for drawing up a strategy that sets out the future of culture in their region. In the view of the government, there were no exceptions for any regions regardless of its industrial base, human capital stock, scale or history that were safe from the need for a 'creative hub' or 'cultural quarter'.[190]

The characteristics of the creative industry indicated in the Task Force were defined differently from the concept which emerged in Australia in 1990. Within the DCMS context, creative industries are defined as "those which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property".[191] Since the definition is different, it has been argued that the DCMS has moved 'creative' a long way from its common usage. The UK's Creative Industries Task Force identified thirteen sectors including advertising, architecture, the arts and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and radio. As such, the definition of culture has been very broad verging on the anthropological notion of culture as a way of life, including not only the arts but also parks and sports.[192] Within the scope of the DCMS, advertising is deemed creative whilst both science and marketing are not. However, craft-making, which is an archetypal small scale manufacturing industry, is characterised as a creative industry.[193] Also specific to the UK was

[188] CITF (Creative Industries Task Force) (2001) URL: http://www.culture.gov.uk/ creative/mapping.html

[189] Flew, Terry. 2002. "Beyond *Ad Hockery*: Defining Creative Industries." Paper presented at the Second International Conference on Cultural Policy Research, Wellington, New Zealand.

[190] Oakley, Kate. (2004). Not So Cool Britannia: The Role of the Creative Industries in Economic Development. International Journal of Cultural Studies 7 (1):67-77.

[191] DCMS, 2001, p. 4.

[192] Landry, C. London as a creative city. Em: HARTLEY, J. (Ed) (2005) Creative industries. London: Blackwell.

[193] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.

how another ministry acquired Information Technology (IT) matters, but sports were grouped together with culture and the arts.

The 'Panel 2000' committee was set up in April 1998 where its primary image was mostly about its strong connection with celebrities. Multiple names were chosen and announced by then the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary Robin Cook with the aim of giving Britain a 'cool image overseas'.[194] As Cook uttered, "it is important that we all project a positive image of modern Britain abroad". The collection consolidated in 1997 included those with expertise in many walks of life such as politicians, celebrities, business leaders of cutting edge industries, the media, design organisations as well as the government itself. [195] Their contribution was to advise the government on how best to promote an outstanding new image of Britain to the world and how Britons can successfully convey an accurate, constructive 'modern Britain' picture in time for the new Millennium, as the name 'Panel 2000' suggested. Described on the Greenwich2000 website as "a group of people whose creativity and energy show what modern Britain is about. Panel 2000 is also remarkable because of what it is setting out to do: it is tasked with improving the way Britain projects itself overseas."[196] The team was run by the icons listed below[197]:

- Peter Benjamin Mandelson, a key architect in the rebranding of the Labour Party as "New Labour" and its subsequent landslide victory in the 1997 general election.
- Martin Bell, independent Member of Parliament (MP) for Tatton from 1997 to 2001, and former BBC journalist
- Sir Colin Marshall, Baron Marshall of Knightsbridge, Chairman of British Airways
- Zeinab Badawi, Sudanese-British Broadcaster
- Judy Simpson, athlete and former TV "Gladiator"
- Waheed Ali, head of the TV production company Planet 24
- Stella McCartney, clothes designer, daughter of Paul McCartney of the Beatles

According to the Greenwich website, Panel 2000 is in charge of: 1) producing an overall strategy for projecting a positive, modern image of Britain abroad, 2) focusing on the key sending-out messages and the key targeted audiences, 3) pulling together all the strands of

[194] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.

[195] Greenwich, (2000): Millennium Info - Panel 2000 (towards a CoolBritannia)." *Millennium Dome: The O2 in Greenwich*. Web. 10 May 2011. <http://wwp.millennium-dome.com/info/panel2000.htm>.

[196] Ibid.

[197] Ibid.

public diplomacy from both the public sector (such as the Foreign Office and the British Council), and also from the private sector, in order to create a valuable partnership between business and the Government. Its responsibility is to make sure that the UK uses all the tools the country has at its disposal to promote the country 4) helping monitor and project Britain's strengths to enhance the attractiveness of its business and of its tourist potential. This involved establishing a baseline of perceptions in the key countries and measured progress against how people raise those perceptions, and lastly, 5) working with the Foreign Office as the country develop an open and modern image both at home and abroad.[198]

4.6. The Death of 'Cool Britannia'?

Despite the above fad filled with hope and optimism, it is also worth noting that in practical terms, 'Cool Britannia' also means finding access to low cost housing for artists, developing incubators and units for the creative industries, finding effective property development strategy for the arts, creating a talent development fund, establishing a cultural diversity partnership, initiating inter-generational arts projects and providing more opportunities for children to participate in the arts, as well as developing a coherent London-wide major events and festivals strategy.[199] As these issues arose, 'Cool Britannia' was quickly followed by the steady flow of criticisms starting as early as in the years 1998, from both sceptics and artists as a means to avoid co-optation of the campaign. The criticism worked to have created the assumption that the Blair era, once propped up with national spirit, hope and optimism, had either faded or remained unchanged and old. In agreement, Newsweek in June 1998 published an article stating that "for all the blather about 'Cool Britannia', much of the country remains old."[200]

Despite being moved to imagine that the campaign would brand British culture in order to make an impact on markets of a global scale, the government's approach was actually rejected by many of those actually working in the concerned industries.[201] As early as 1998, the Economist was commenting that "many people are already sick of the phrase."[202] Through Hemmingway's opinion, the campaign was thought to possibly do more harm than good given its dangerous and short-sighted features.[203] As he asserted, "There is a very

[198] Greenwich 2000: Millennium Info - Panel 2000 (towards a CoolBritannia)." *Millennium Dome: The O2 in Greenwich*. Web. 10 May 2011. <http://wwp.millennium-dome.com/info/panel2000.htm>.

[199] Landry, C. (2005) London as a creative city. in: HARTLEY, J. (Ed) *Creative industries*. London: Blackwell,.

[200] Markleonard.net: Journalism / Cool Britannia." *Markleonard.net*. Newsweek, accessed 07 Apr. 2011. <http://markleonard.net/journalism/coolbritannia>.

[201] McRobbie, A. (2000). *Feminism and youth culture*. New York: Routledge, Pg. 253.

[202] Cool Britannia." *The Economist*. The Economist Newspaper, 12 Mar. 1998. Accessed 07 Apr. 2011. <http://www.economist.com/node/370877>.

[203] *BBC News*. BBC, 02 Apr. 1998. Accessed 02 May 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/53273.stm>.

grave danger that by simply inviting a few, mostly naff, pop stars and comedians to drinkies at Number 10, the very people Blair is trying to impress will be turned off,"[204] Later on in this speech, "There was a lot of publicity after the election about youthful MPs. But having met a couple, they seem to have less in common with youth culture than my grandmother and - she has been dead for three years,… This is another reason why we don't want politicians in charge of Cool plc."[205] Later in March, the New Musical Express (NME), a popular music publication published weekly since 1952, accused the Labour spin-doctors of robbing British culture and repackaging it under "a cute brand name". Pulp lead singer, Jarvis Cocker even went further and stated that it would have been better if the Tories had won the election.[206] Two months later, Britpop stars collectively alarmed that the campaign will stifle creative talent. As one of the high-profile guests of the No.10, Noel Gallagher, stated, "If I could be arsed enough to vote now it would be for the Liberal Democrats." In the words put forward by Vogue magazine, 'the prodigious wealth of talent and all that is excellent in this country needs no fanfare. We know we are cool'.[207]

The UK's scope of creative industries was said also to have not represented manufacturing or technology. Apparently, there was a lack of industry involvement as well as willingness to pay for national branding campaigns that were prevalent among British business firms.[208] In one of Oakley's works aimed at addressing the shortcomings of governmental policies advocated for the growth of the creative industries, she argues that the term has been utilised very casually, neglecting regional variations within diverse cultural hubs, lacking sufficient comprehension of the industry's functioning and necessities. These problems had created paradoxes within businesses. The instances were Liverpool and Birmingham, where the respective industries operate very differently. The aspiration to use 'creative industries' as a single weapon with which to turn around economic depression risks creating polarised and unsustainable economic development.[209] As she put it, Creative industry developments, if they are to succeed, cannot be cut off from the cultural policies that nurtured them and the social policies that can help to sustain them. To many, the consequences of this 'new economy' rhetoric have been the idea that the 'old economy' did not matter; that the business cycle had been superseded; and that growing income inequality was the price to

[204] *BBC News*. BBC, 02 Apr. 1998. Accessed 02 May 2011. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/53273.stm>.

[205] Ibid.

[206] Leonard, Mark. "Markleonard.net: Journalism / Cool Britannia." *Markleonard.net*. Web. 7 July 2011. <http://markleonard.net/journalism/coolbritannia/>.

[207] Brampton 1998: p. 137.

[208] Kleppe, Ingeborg Astrid and Mossberg, Lena Larsson (2002): *Company versus Country*. *Branding – „Same, Same but Different*" (Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, October, P.9.

[209] Oakley, Kate. (2004). *Not So Cool Britannia: The Role of the Creative Industries in Economic Development*. International Journal of Cultural Studies 7:67-77.

be paid for increased flexibility.[210] While New Labour was very much interested in questions of image and creative industries, the campaign was criticised for its lack of systematic approaches.

To a lot of critics, many problems have stemmed from decades of underinvestment with the ideas that cities can negotiate a new accommodation within the global market where cultural producers sell into much larger markets but rely upon a distinctive and defensible local base.[211] The flexibility of the work conditions associated with this 'new economy' has led to the conventional styles of working to be branded as 'old'. Additionally, creative work involves changeable roles expected from workers which have not been explicitly defined. It has also been pointed out that the government sometimes appeared confused. The separation of the creative industry initiatives supported by the DCMS and the enterprise and innovation initiatives coming out of the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) was not explicit.[212]

Additionally, the fact that 'Cool Britannia' is composed of thirteen unparallel industries is quite ambitious. It runs the risk of being incoherent insisting that there is a connection when these thirteen sectors all have their origin in individual skill, creativity and talent.[213] Furthermore, it has been stated that these sectors have never been explored individually to shed light on how each functions differently. Stuck with a traditional organisational system which functions as very independent units, the country faced difficulties in integrating policies, taking up economics and tax, work, competition policy, education diversity, law and employment.[214] Subsequently, while the creative industries have been recognised as a source of untapped economic power and wealth, the implemented policies were said to be a hindrance for their progress and development.[215] It has also been stated that the overwhelming success that the statistics suggested, have been unrealistically leveled up to mask what casual insecure working conditions for many in the 'creative class' truly are.

Regarding cultural identity dimension, 'Cool Britannia' also was strongly associated with the darker side of 'cool' in the same way that the US hip-hop culture seethes with violence, from the gunning down of artists Tupac Shakur and Biggie Smalls to the indictment of Puff

[210] Oakley, Kate. (2004). *Not So Cool Britannia: The Role of the Creative Industries in Economic Development*. International Journal of Cultural Studies 7:67-77.

[211] Oakley, Kate and Charles Leadbeater (2000) The Independents, London, Demos, p. 14.

[212] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., Pg. 118.

[213] Cunningham S (2003) The Evolving Creative industries: from regional assumption to contemporary interpretations. Queensland University of Technology (QUT): www.creativeindustries.qut.edu.au/research/documents/The_ Evolving_Creative_Industries.pdf.

[214] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., Pg. 125.

[215] Oakley, Kate. (2004). Not So Cool Britannia: The Role of the Creative Industries in Economic Development. International Journal of Cultural Studies 7 (1):67-77.

Daddy for GBH and assault against his video producer. Specifically within the Blair era, 'Cool Britannia' is also tied to a group of young writers whose plays addressed violence and sexuality in an unflinching manner. Many of these plays were produced by the Royal Court and have emerged from the mid-90s.[216] There has also been the analogy between the drugs that became very much associated with the period.[217] For instance, Ravehill and Stafford-Clark's play titled 'shopping and fucking' created a theatre event that was pure 'Cool Britannia'.[218] All these characteristics were given the name of 'Cruel Britannia' which has been absorbed into the fabric of British theatrical culture, now a popular export for other theatre centres.[219] Although it is true that Blair had pledged that the campaign would combine both traditional and contemporary British culture, Fans argued that 'Cool Britannia' failed precisely because it abandoned traditional images in favour of hippy and trendy versions.[220] Concerning the subject of cultural identity, multiculturalism has also played a vital role in the life of 'Cool Britannia'.

Following Post-WWII, British society has witnessed a very striking inward-migration of people especially from the 'New Commonwealth'. This demographic change has created a fundamentally altered British society, and a wider acceptance of other cultures.[221] A famous example would be how Black people often have more influence on the dominant culture in Britain through pop music than any other channel. Such positive changes suggest new sets of identity and lifestyles resulting in a transition towards an ethically plural society.[222] London has been a melting pot composing of multiple identities. However, it has simultaneously posed such questions like who should be cherished, who is being left out, whether it should be forward-looking or nostalgic, and whether it should be locally, nationally, or internationally focused.[223]

The society has become ethically plural but yet racialised. Whilst some are welcoming the changes, issues of inequalities, the persistence of racism in daily life and in the major institutions have been prevalent. Taylor talks about the 'Seven Nations of Britain'. In the

[216] Urban, Ken. (2001) *An Ethics of Catastrophe: The Theater of Sarah Kane*. PAJ: Performing Arts Journal. 23.3 p. 36.

[217] Sierz, A. (2001). *In-yer-face theatre : British drama today*. London: Faber and Faber. P. 11.

[218] Urban, Ken. (2001) *An Ethics of Catastrophe: The Theater of Sarah Kane*. PAJ: Performing Arts Journal. 23.3 Pg. 47.

[219] Ibid. Pg. 52.

[220] Fan, Ying (2006): Branding the nation. What is being branded? Journal of Vacation Marketing, 12(1), p. 6.

[221] Beynon, H. and L. Kushnick (2003) '*Cool Britannia or Cruel Britannia*? *Racism and New Labour*', in L. Panitch and C. Leys (eds.), Socialist Register 2003.

[222] Ibid.

[223] Landry, C. (2005) London as a creative city. in: Hartley, J. (Ed) Creative industries. London: Blackwell,P. 239.

same vein, Laura McGinnis names the campaign as the *Waterworld* of nation branding.[224] To elaborate, it is hard to define national characteristics such as, what is 'Britishness' given the multiple cultures and the large ethnic population. To what extent the culturepreneurs of the Old Truman Brewery, artists of the White chapel art gallery or Asian shopkeepers produce a shared territorial identity that could be subject to a consensual planning policy is a question that definitely portrays how this branding campaign has faced challenges of fragmented image. [225] Like it or not, this vibrancy often causes the brand image of a nation to be nebulous and complex, and hence adding to the nation's 'cultural complexity', where after all the ethnic minorities are underrepresented.[226] In turn, creative industry growth poses some challenges in regards to social cohesion matters.[227]

In conclusion, the shift from 'Rule Britannia' to 'Cool Britannia' implies a shift in political paradigms. This is precisely the transition from the modern world of geopolitics and power, to the post-modern world of images and influences.[228] Despite a positive voice of Britons in regards to the campaign in the beginning, 'Cool Britannia' was seen as an ill-fated, short-lived campaign. According to a wide range of literatures, it best serves as a failed case for nations wanting to get involved in nation branding to learn from**.** Blair government's effort to rebrand Britain offered a demonstration in an institutional setting previously unparalleled. Amongst others, the failure was due to its inability to support small companies wanting to achieve rapid growth and development. The majority of the literatures have suggested that policies need to be more holistic and to define the nature of work making employment available to the masses.

[224] Was There a Cool Britannia Campaign?" *Public Diplomacy, Networks and Influence*. 6 May 2011. Web. 08 Aug. 2011. <http://pdnetworks.wordpress.com/2011/05/06/was-there-a-cool-britannia-campaign/>.

[225] J . and O ' Shaughnessy , N . J . (2000) ' Treating the nation as a brand: Some neglected issues ' , *Journal of Macromarketing* , Vol. 20 , No. 1 , p. 58 .

[226] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, Pg. 304.

[227] Ibid.

[228] *Peter van Ham*, "*The Rise of the Brand State*: The Postmodern Political Image and Reputation,". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct. *2001*).

CHAPTER V - COOL JAPAN

"A Cultural superpower needs a healthy economic base but not necessarily a healthy economy"[229]

5.1. Introduction: What is 'Cool Japan'?

Perhaps as part of globalisation process, the transportation of the 'Cool' campaign initiated in 1997 in the UK to the 2003 'Cool Japan' did not need any delegation such as Captain Perry for Japan to accept what could be simplified as western ideology of 'Cool Capitalism'. With or without Japan's fondness for all things western, the 'cool' prefix was shifted eastward. It was indeed not too long ago when Newsweek first portrayed the UK as the coolest nation. Roll the clock forward a few years and it became Japan's turn to be respected as the 'coolest nation on earth', the ''region's most visible arbiter of cool' and known to the west as the 'Empire of Cool.[230] Having reached the milestone of becoming the world's largest economy in the automotive and electronic industries, it is now withdrawing support for this sector where other sectors which previously emerged as lifestyle choices have turned economic fiat as a solution to the collapse of the bubble economy during 1991 recession.[231]

'Cool Japan' is a catchphrase referring to the economic and political influence of the nation's content industries. In a large part it involves utilising culture as tools for economic success and also as means to reinventing the country as superpower instead of collapsing beneath its political and economic misfortunes. This catchphrase, more specifically, is the cultivated image and new cultural policy focused on intangible intellectual property in the form of innovative and creative products designed to promote a specific sense of cultural identity. In addition, it is also referred to as a large scale national project incorporated in the Japanese Intellectual Property Strategy rigorously promoted by the state since 2002.[232] Somewhat similar to the UK government's collaboration with the nation's top celebrities, politicians and bureaucrats of the Koizumi government liked to create photo ops of themselves besides Japanese pop icons. Like in the UK, the 'Cool Japan' campaign is a state-run strategy to initiate new businesses in order to promote the export of cultural goods.

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[229] McGray, Douglas. "Foreign Policy -- Japan's Gross National Cool, By Douglas McGray." *302 Found*. Web. 27 Mar. 2012. <http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ikalmar/illustex/japfpmcgray.htm>.

[230] Kelts, R. (2006). *Japanamerica : how Japanese pop culture has invaded the U.S*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

[231] Allison, A. Spring, (2009). "The Cool Brand and Affective Activism of Japanese Youth." *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 (3). [PDF].

[232] Chitekizaisan Suishin Keikaku (Intellectual Property Strategic Program), 2004: 3 p.1.

Since the turn of the century, it has been argued that Japan has been perfecting the art of transmitting certain kinds of mass or popular culture—a technique that has contributed mightily to U.S. hegemony around the world.[233] Mairi Mackay writes that even though consumers from Asia, Europe and the United States might not be buying as many Japanese cars and TVs, they are influenced by Japanese culture since 'when global brands are looking for the hottest new fashions, eyes almost inevitably turn eastward.[234] Cultural commodities and exports have tripled in the past decade and exceeded the exports of industrial goods like steel and automobiles that had stood as leading industries for Japan post war's economy.[235] As Allison notes, the sales from the industry of cool culture products have brought much-needed capital to Japan both in real and symbolic terms during the time of "Heisei Recession" precipitated by the bursting of 1991 Bubble economy.[236]

Regarding the Japanese outward cultural spread, whilst others industries grew sluggish during Japan's recession-stricken economy, 'playful teen-centric products and services – fashion, telecommunication, entertainment, anime, manga, computer and video games, including all related merchandising, collectibles and toys – became the fastest growing components and among the most successful export industries.[237] This cool phenomenon has been labelled by The Marubeni Research Institute as the '"third wave of *japonisme*." The first wave took place around the latter period of the nineteenth century, when displays of *ukiyo-e* prints, kimono, and hand fans at events such as the Paris Exposition Universelle of 1867 fascinated Impressionist artists like Manet and van Gogh. The second wave lasted from the 1950s into the 1960s. [238] Within the realm of 'Cool Japan', a wide range of cultural goods positioned as 'Cool Japan' are products with global competitiveness. With governmental

[233] McGray, Douglas. (2004) "Foreign Policy -- Japan's Gross National Cool, By Douglas McGray." *302 Found*. Web. 27 Mar. 2012. <http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ikalmar/illustex/japfpmcgray.htm>. ; Nye, Joseph. Soft Power. New York: Public Affairs.

[234] Mackay, M. Can Japan Profit from Its National 'cool'?" *CNN*. 19 Nov. 2010. Web. 01 June 2011. <http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-19/world/japan.cool.money_1_japan-s-gdp-fashion-japanese-government?_s=PM:WORLD>.

[235] Allison, A. Spring, (2009). "The Cool Brand and Affective Activism of Japanese Youth." *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 (3).; Anne Allison. "Pocket Capitalism and Virtual Intimacy: Pokemon as Symptom of Postindustrial Youth Culture." In *Figuring the Future: Youth and Globalization*, edited by Jennifer Cole and Deborah Durham, (School of American Research, Summer, 2009). [PDF]; Anne Allison. "Japanese Mothers and Obentōs: The Lunch Box as Ideological State Apparatus." In *Permitted and Prohibited Desires: Mothers, Comics, and Censorship in Japan*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 81-104. [PDF].

[236] *Vaughan Yarwood takes a look at how Japan has gained in global cultural status despite a continued decline in its economic indicators.*

[237] Machiyama, Tomohiro. (2004). 'Mondo Tokyo: Otaku.' In Cruising the Anime City: An Otaku Guide to Neo Tokyo, eds. Patric Macias and Tomohiro Machiyama. Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press: 13–15.

[238] JETRO (*Japan External* Trade Organization) (*2005*a) '*Cool*' *Japan's Economy Warms Up*, *Economic Research Department* report, *March. < http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/market/pdf/2005_27_r.pdf>*

shift from the exporting of industrial goods to cultural goods, manga and anime, among others, have accounted for a large proportion the nation's important export shares and attracted a considerable overseas market. All these forms of cultural commodities have generated what is called, the 'Gross national Cool'.

Having always been renowned as major exporter of industrial goods, after the Meiji era the government has not been supportive of exporting culture.[239] With the industry of cool culture standing as a bright post-industrial hope, there is no doubt why the government found it appealing to put the cultural industry at the core of its policies as the country pursues its ambition of developing and maintaining its status as superpower. As such, the world witnesses the reverse in trends of Japanese policies towards promoting less tangible goods like anime as a top product for overseas markets. By the time the American reporter came up with the term 'Gross national Cool', the export of Japanese content industries had already exceeded what had been the leading industries in Japan' s post-war economy: namely automobiles and steel.[240]

5.2. 'Cool Japan' as part of the development of the aging society and turning crisis into opportunities?

What was derived as 'Cool Japan' is also arguably a product of Japan's domestic demographic and structural and traditional power structure changes. Japanese aging society and decreasing ratio of teens, compared to adults triggered the development of broadening lifestyle options and the evolution of more flexible career practices, which in turn has transformed the population's attitudes to leisure and expressions of cultural life. As a matter of fact, the young generation live with their parents longer, marry later, which increases their already considerable disposable income. Also, as the result of the spread of part-time work, more women are able to accumulate disposable income and additional leisure time has been created for other people who choose to reduce their level of employment.[241] Due to such social transitions, cultural products were adapted to attract the majority of the consuming population. Through a demographic research study on adult consumers carried out at the time a shrinking population of Japan's younger generation was revealed, Sanrio Company saw the need to come up with very careful business strategies for the spread of character-based products.[242]

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[239] Writing in The Japan Times at the height of Koizumi's championing of pop culture, Roger Pulvers compared the modern phenomenon with the export of Japanese culture during the Meiji Era (1868-1912).

[240] McGray, Douglas. (2002). 'Japan's Gross National Cool.' Foreign Policy (May/June).

[241] Yarwood, Vaughan. "Asia New Zealand Foundation." *'Cool Japan'* Web. 09 Apr. 2011. <http://www.asianz.org.nz/newsroom/regional-matters/cool-japan>.

[242] Knell, Simon. (2007). *Museums in the material world*. London New York: Routledge.

As contemporary Japan continues to develop and mutate, this has caused Japanese urban public space to be filled with image and consumption sites of popular culture that are also changed according to the society. As a result, Japanese culture today is becoming ever more dynamic and complex, with elements of a hedonistic and frivolous popular culture being incorporated into the more conservative spheres of work and family.[243] With Japanese youths becoming more secure in asserting their own values and traditions on the eve of the 20th century, Tokyo was said to be close to obtaining the status it sought at the turn of the 19th century when it simultaneously tried to engage with the West and to become a military and cultural power on its own terms.[244] This has resulted in Tokyo being a highly creative city where a lot of pop culture has recently emerged from mostly bottom-up. In the words of Featherstone[245], this 'cross-over' of popular culture forms above what were once strictly policed boundaries of the more orthodox culture producing unusual combinations and syncretism, undermining a simple categorisation of cultural spheres. This burst of cultural energy contributed to the proliferation of various types of pop culture and has pervasively influenced the young population all around the globe.[246] All in all, Japanese post-industrial society characterised by the shift from being exporter of industrial to cultural products has also become post-modern filled with post-modern pop.

In views of McGray, recession may have boosted Japan's "national cool" by getting rid of the once rigid social hierarchy and creating new opportunities for young entrepreneurs. In agreement' Mark Dytham, a Tokyo-based architect, has witnessed a new creativeness because there is less money and "Good art is appearing, young strong art. Young fashion is appearing"[247]. As a graphic designer Michael Frank adds, "A lot of interesting smaller magazines appeared in the last four or five years. A lot of small little businesses, people running their own shops, people running their own music labels, people running their own clubs. Bigger companies are starting to pick up on those little things and support them." In comparison to the period prior to the recession, Japanese people were not producing any noteworthy kind of international culture. However, it has been believed that when the Heisei recession hit Japan, the people got humble and so they become creative. [248]

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[243] Michal Daliot-Bul, "*Japan Brand Strategy: The Taming of 'Cool Japan' and the Challenges of Cultural Planning in a Postmodern Age*," Social Science Japan Journal 12(2).

[244] Dinnie, K. (2008), "*Japan's Nation Branding*: *Recent Evolution and Potential Future Paths*", Journal of Current Japanese Affairs, Vol 16 No 3,P. 8.

[245] Featherstone, M. (1995). *Undoing culture : globalization, postmoderism and identity*. London Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications. pg. 4.

[246] *Creative Japan*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Web. 15 May 2011. <http://www.creativejapan.net/>.

[247] Mark Dytham as cited in McGray, Douglas. "Foreign Policy -- Japan's Gross National Cool, By Douglas McGray." *302 Found*. Web. 27 Mar. 2012. <http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ikalmar/illustex/japfpmcgray.htm>.

[248] Haruki Marakami is one of the most renowned Japanese Writer and Novelist in the western world.

5.3. 'Cool Japan' and the Rise of Otaku

> *"Akihabara, a town known in the 1990's as being a place for the freaky and friendless, has managed a remarkable transformation under the Japanese government's 'Cool Japan' policy, becoming a place that everyone can enjoy."*[249]

Due to the above transition, various types of culture have become decisive selling points in which 'Cool Japan' has subsequently combined high culture, low culture as well as various existing subculture into one almost-coherent whole. As such, 'Cool Japan' can be 'provocative, audacious and explicitly countercultural. It can also be very violent and pornographic. Whether dripping sweetness or shockingly aggressive, 'Cool Japan' is a form of refusal interrupting the process of normalisation.[250] An excellent example is the rise and support of 'Otaku' by the government. Otaku, in the 80s, were described as social rejects, those who refused to conform or communicate with others. They had difficulty connecting consumption and play to productive roles at home, school, and work.[251] Nevertheless, this negative discourse faded at the turn of the 21st century when the economy formed the basis for the 'Otaku boom'. This is most detectable in Akihabara, where Otaku were recognised as ultra consumers and a creative force in the 'contents industries' making up the 'Cool Japan' phenomenon.[252] Nomura research Institutive has illustrated that approximately 1.72 million domestic otaku spend an annual $3.5 billion on their hobbies. Simultaneously, this no-longer-inferior- group were bluntly and unapologetically being tied to the Japanese brand, as mentioned in Japan Travel Bureau's book, *Cool Japan: OtakuJapan Guide* in 2008 on otaku tourism. Because of their ultra consuming behaviour, Akihabara could prosper amongst the recession, with the declining Japanese birthrate and aging societal characteristics also playing a decisive role in inspiring anime creators in targeting anime adult consumers.

5.4. Anime Passion From Those In Power

For some of the Japanese policy makers, the popularity of Japanese manga and anime abroad are vehicles for "soft power" which could help Japan in heightening its political

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[249] *International Community Centre/ Waseda University." 国際コミュニティセンター,* Accessed. 11 Apr. 2011. <http://www.waseda-icc.jp/eng/?p=2848>.

[250] Galbraith, Patrick W. "*Akihabara*: Conditioning a Public "*Otaku*" Image." *Mechademia* 5 (2010): 210-30. Published by University of Minnesota Press 'Otaku in Akihabara'.

[251] Galbraith, Patrick W. Mechademia, Volume 5, 2010, pp. 210-230 (Article) Published by University of Minnesota Press 'Otaku in Akihabara'; Galbraith, Patrick. *The Otaku Encyclopedia* is a good place to start reading about fan culture in Japan. http://www.amazon.com/Otaku-Encyclopedia-Insiders-Guide-Subculture/dp/4770031017.

[252] Galbraith, Patrick W. "Akihabara: Conditioning a Public "Otaku" Image." Mechademia 5 (2010): 210-30. Print. See Akihabara for more.

power derived from the attractiveness of a nation's culture and ideals. As put forwarded by Yarwood, 'This new twist on cultural diplomacy was the invention of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs'. [253] The initiative started when the Ministry decided that the three young women, Shizuka Fujioka, a stylish schoolgirl, vocalist Yu Kimura and Misako Aoki, a Lolita-esque fashion model, would be effective in cultivating goodwill toward Japan. As ways to prove their commitment to their 'pop culture, Japanese bureaucrats could simply yell "Ike, *Pikachu!* (Go, Pikachu!)", and throw the magic ball at your adversaries.[254] However, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was officially said to be one of the first to recognise the possibilities of 'Cool Japan'. In February 2002, he announced in his annually policy speech that the government of Japan would develop forthwith a national policy of intellectual property in the form of innovative and creative products such as content products. In the following month, the Strategic Council on Intellectual Property, led by the prime minister, related ministers and experts in the private sector was established. This was two months before McGray published his ''Japan's Gross National Cool' article in Foreign Policy which turned out to be extraordinarily influential in popularising the term 'Cool Japan' and linking it to the concept of soft power in the Japanese and international media and among policy makers in Japan[255]. In 2003, Koizumi talked proudly of the significance of anime and its role in promoting Japanese culture overseas during his inaugural address to the Diet. This has been viewed as the official point of departure from the top to market Japanese Popular culture worldwide.

The next Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, continued the trend by promising in his first policy speech to "formulate 'The Japanese Cultural Industry Strategy', which will enhance the competitiveness of areas that represent the good traits and uniqueness of Japan...and present them to the world".[256] Also crucial to this process has been Aso Taro, one of the top conservative bureaucrats who served as minister for foreign affairs from 2005 to 2007. He, himself, is a deeply devoted fan of manga and anime. Believing in building soft power through the utilisation of Japanese culture, Aso announced this would be pop culture including anime, music and fashion among others, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is

[253] Yarwood, Vaughan. "Asia New Zealand Foundation." *'Cool Japan'* Accessed 09 Apr. 2011. <http://www.asianz.org.nz/newsroom/regional-matters/cool-japan>.

[254] Pulvers, Roger. "Who out There Cares about 'Cool Japan'?" *The Japan Times Online: News on Japan, Business News, Opinion, Sports, Entertainment and More*. The Japan Times, 09 Apr. 2006. Accessed 02 June 2011. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/fl20060409rp.html>.

[255] Lam, Peng Er. (2007). 'Japan's Quest for ''Soft Power'': Attraction and Limitation.' East Asia: An International Quarterly 24(4): 349–363, p. 6.

[256] Yarwood, Vaughan. "Asia New Zealand Foundation." *'Cool Japan'* Accessed. 09 Apr. 2011. <http://www.asianz.org.nz/newsroom/regional-matters/cool-japan>.

going all out to market it.[257] While serving as a foreign affairs minister in May 2006, Taro paid a visit to the Digital Hollywood University situated in the Akihabara district. According to Galbraith, he was there for the purpose of unveiling a government campaign, strategically touting the global potency of Japanese pop culture as well as 'Otaku'. At Akihabara, Abe took the opportunity to thank the 'Otaku' whose 'subculture' has spread all over the world.[258] Aso who was running for Prime Minister thought his association with 'Otaku' and the district of Akihabara would boost up his public image.[259] The visit also included the establishment of an international prize in manga. Subsequently, Sugiyama sees cause for celebration, when the president of a Digital Hollywood technical university foresees Japan as a 'cultural empire'.[260] Taro was PM of Japan from 2008 to 2009.

5.5. MITI and institutions

> *"For, the economy shifts from industrial to immaterial production, so do the social relationships needed to reproduce it – from the more rooted, long-term ties of Japan Inc. to a more fluid, mobile and detached subjectivity in sync with the speeded-up, informational circuits of immaterial labour".*[261]

From the above, it is obvious that Prime ministerial support for the 'age of culture' had given cultural policy issue priority on the Japanese agenda. From the diplomatic point of view, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recognised Japanese popular culture as its most undeniable asset.[262] However, as a more economic-oriented institutional framework, when the government came up with the campaign, the term 'Cool Japan' was the short way of labelling "Japanese culture that the world find it cool and are used as drivers in expanding business worldwide and bringing in travellers from around the world", writes Oyanagi[263].

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[257] "A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy: A Call to Japan's Cultural Practitioners." *Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, 28 Apr. 2006. Accessed 03 June 2011. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0604-2.html>.

[258] Galbraith, Patrick W. (2010)"*Akihabara*: Conditioning a Public "*Otaku*" Image." *Mechademia* 5 210-30. University of Minnesota Press 'Otaku in Akihabara'.

[259] Ibid.

[260] Sugiyama, T (2006) *Cool Japan: Sekai ga kaitagaru Nihon*, Tokyo: Shōdensha.

[261] Allison, A. Spring, (2009). "The Cool Brand and Affective Activism of Japanese Youth." *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 (3). [PDF].

[262] Pulvers, Roger. "Who out There Cares about 'Cool Japan'?" *The Japan Times Online: News on Japan, Business News, Opinion, Sports, Entertainment and More*. The Japan Times, 09 Apr. 2006. Accessed 02 June 2011. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/fl20060409rp.html>.

[263] Oyanagi, Megumi. "Cool Japan Strategy: Japanese Culture Export in 10 Businesses." *Â» Cool Japan Strategy: Japanese Culture Export in 10 Businesses*. ThoseInMedia, 8 Jan. 2011. Accessed 19 July 2011. <http://moyanagijapan.thoseinmedia.com/2011/01/08/cool-japan-strategy-japanese-culture-export-in-10-businesses/>.

The entertainment industries, media industries, or cultural industries that Japan has been trying to manage and utilise in order to capitalise on its growth are called 'kontentsu sangyo' in Japanese. Directly in charge of ensuring the desired outcomes are the institutions that were responsible for the economic success of the 1980s. Having the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (MITI) as the main engine, Japan built the world's second-largest economy on electronics and automobiles as part of sorting out post war economic mess and building hard power through the productivity of industrial goods. Today, METI is responsible for perfecting the art of transmitting certain kind of mass culture, advocating the importance of cultural aspects of the economy, emphasising the importance of the development of the "sensitivity industry"[264]. Therefore, METI as backbone of Japanese 'promotional state' not only engages in the material economy but also in the symbolic economy.[265] Under the METI, one of the main expected outcomes is to drive exports from the small and medium enterprises and individuals from craft men to creators, to achieve exports of 13 trillion yen by the year 2020.[266]

According to data from 2001 income related to Japan's content industries as a percentage of GDP found by the METI was relatively low (2%), in comparison to the US (5%) and the world average (3%). As a result the government feels that nation's cultural properties have not been sufficiently exploited.[267] According to Condry, post-industrial Japanese economy with the shift of policy would take the advantages of Japan's high tech, information society infrastructure, an underemployed populace of well-educated, pop culture savvy youth, and the promise of getting more international capital, both cultural and economic, from hip cultural properties.[268] With the attempts to increase the percentage, a task force was formed to encourage the development of Japan as a 'nation founded on intellectual property'.[269] In 2004, the 'Japan Brand Development Assistance Program', through the Small

[264] *Japanese Popular Culture and Globalization*. Under contract with the Association for Asian Studies (as part of the series Key Issues in Asian Studies) for delivery in 2009, p. 38.

[265] Condry, I. (2007) "Yellow B-Boy, Black Culture, and Hip-Hop in Japan: Toward a Transnational Cultural Politics of Race", *positions*, vol. 15 no. 3.; Condry, Ian. "*Anime Creativity*: *Characters and Premises* in the. *Quest for Cool Japan. Theory, Culture & Society March/May 2009 26: 139-163.*

[266] Oyanagi, Megumi. "Cool Japan Strategy: Japanese Culture Export in 10 Businesses." *Â» Cool Japan Strategy: Japanese Culture Export in 10 Businesses*. ThoseInMedia, 8 Jan. 2011. Accessed 19 July 2011. <http://moyanagijapan.thoseinmedia.com/2011/01/08/cool-japan-strategy-japanese-culture-export-in-10-businesses/>.

[267] METI, 2005: 6.

[268] Condry, Ian. "*Anime Creativity*: *Characters and Premises* in the. *Quest for Cool Japan. Theory, Culture & Society March/May 2009 26: 139-163.*

[269] *Chiteki zaisan senryaku kaigi* [Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters, 2002.

and Medium Enterprise Agency of the METI were launched.[270] The work of Akutsu[271] provided a thorough study of the Japanese nations branding activities since its initiation from the Prime Minister Koizumi's policy speech in 2002, through to the activities of the Intellectual Property Strategic Program in 2006. From there, it could be concluded that Japan has made significant investments and efforts in recent years to brand itself and to project its attractive qualities to the outside world.[272] However, Kondo Seiichi, the first director general of Japan's Public Diplomacy Department explains that articulating linguistically the ideas has been hard. For it was only in July 2005 that the first documents clearly identifying Japanese popular culture as a gateway to Japanese culture was formulated by the Council for the Promotion of Cultural Diplomacy.[273]

The Creative Industries Promotion Office which is also known as Cool Japan office was established under METI in June 2010 with 15 strong staff. The plan is to upgrade the office to a department headed by a "Creative Industry Councilor" in 2011. For the year 2011, 1.4 billion yen was allocated for the 'Cool Japan' strategy. More specific targets have been set to drive export in fashion and household goods to China and in selling anime and consumer electronics to Brazil who adopted the Japanese format in digital terrestrial broadcasting.[274] However, with the Japanese-style public-private cooperation, the main players in this Post-Cold War Japanese Cool Culture Industries are still the private enterprises: individuals of designers and creators, and small and mid-sized companies. The private sector producing 'cool' products were promoted and supported given that many of them have difficulty in starting business abroad themselves due to insufficient capital and know-how. Concerning the assumed positive effects of the government initiative, METI would like to discover such business owners and help find international customers and overseas business owners for Japanese companies that make cool products. METI also believes that it would contribute to creating jobs for the young generation.[275] METI has calculated that 62 percent of the approx. 55.3 trillion yen that the multimedia industries are expected to generate in 2015 will include sales of software, motion pictures, artistic images and sound, video games, and

[270] Oyanagi, Megumi. "News and Opinion about Japan." *Cool Japan Strategy: Japanese Culture Export in 10 Businesses*. Nikkei, 8 Jan. 2011. Accessed 11 Apr. 2011. <http://moyanagijapan.thoseinmedia.com/2011/01/08/cool-japan-strategy-japanese-culture-export-in-10-businesses/>.

[271] Akutsu, Satoshi (2008), "The directions and the key elements of branding Japan", in: Dinnie, Keith (2008), *Nation Branding – Concepts, Issues, Practice*, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 211-219.

[272] *Dinnie*, *K*. (*2008*). *Japan's Nation Branding: Recent Evolution and Potential Future Paths* [PDF]. *Journal of Current Japanese Affairs*, *16* (3), 52-65.

[273] (ibid: 200)

[274] Oyanagi, Megumi. "Cool Japan Strategy: Japanese Culture Export in 10 Businesses." *Â» Cool Japan Strategy: Japanese Culture Export in 10 Businesses*. ThoseInMedia, 8 Jan. 2011, accessed 19 July 2011. <http://moyanagijapan.thoseinmedia.com/2011/01/08/cool-japan-strategy-japanese-culture-export-in-10-businesses/>.

[275] Ibid.

broadcasting.[276] Later by 2020, the aim is to increase profits by $85 billion (¥6.9 trillion) – to $698 billion (¥56.6 trillion). Revenues in 2007 amounted to $613 billion (¥49.7 trillion), according to Cool Japan.[277] Based on these figures, METI's "Multimedia white paper" predicted that the cultural industries will soon become the largest segment of Japan's economy.

5.6. Sales of Japanese Cultural Icons: Relationship between Cultural Production and Capitalist Production

"Japan is extraordinary skilled at creating characters to sell things."[278] Limiting to viewing METI's 'Cool Japan' as a mighty capitalist tool for generating sales by the government, METI emphasises encouraging a spirit of innovation and entrepreneurialism.[279] As Eric Cazdyn puts it, "… if there has ever been a moment to push aesthetics and political economy into the same idea – to put back on the table the relation between forms of cultural production and forms of capitalist production – it is now".[280] The fact that the 'Cool Japan' campaign has been focusing on ideas of creativity rather than on economic success itself is because the people in charge see gaining conspicuous visibility as more important than actual commoditisation within the logic of popular culture economics. Once the artists or companies have achieved high visibility and desire from customers, the possibility of making that character can ramify in many directions and over a long period of time, sometimes taking hold years after the original production. [281]

Looking through the economic lens, a Wharton marketing professor Jehoshua Eliasberg[282], sees that the industry is deeply entangled with marketing tie-ins ranging from video games and toys to watches, stickers, tableware and much more. Compared to the US, Japanese anime production houses and marketers are much more coordinated. The process involves the producers first making the film then showing it to distributors and marketers for possible licensing deals.. Derived from the 2005 Data provided by the DCAJ and METI, the

[276] MITI, 1993:210.

[277] Can Japan Profit from Its National 'cool'?" *CNN*. 19 Nov. 2010. Web. 11 Apr. 2011. <http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-19/world/japan.cool.money_1_japan-s-gdp-fashion-japanese-government?_s=PM:WORLD>.

[278] Kelts, R. (2006). *Japanamerica : how Japanese pop culture has invaded the U.S*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 55.

[279] Ikuta et al. (2007) as cited in *Dinnie*, *K*. (*2008*). *Japan's Nation Branding: Recent Evolution and Potential Future Paths* [PDF]. *Journal of Current Japanese Affairs*, *16* (3), 52-65.

[280] Eric Cazdyn as cited in Tsutsui, W. (2010). *Japanese popular culture and globalization*. Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies. p. 70.

[281] Condry, Ian. "*Anime Creativity*: *Characters and Premises* in the. *Quest for Cool Japan. Theory, Culture & Society March/May 2009 26: 139-163.*

[282] Knowledge@Wharton Marketing Research." *Anime: Japan's 'Gross National Cool'* Accessed 11 Aug. 2011. <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1613>.

market for licensed merchandise is based on fictional characters and dramatic premises that can be parlayed across diverse media ten times that of anime itself. [283] For Sanrio, the company receives 3 percent in royalties every time a company sells a product bearing a Sanrio character, and one-third of its profits comes from licensing fees.[284]

For the past decade or so, overseas consumption of Japanese industrial goods has declined, however, Japanese culture and lifestyle has attracted considerable international attention. The fact that that 60 percent of all cartoon TV shows broadcast worldwide in 2006 were made in Japan demonstrates how successful this industry is.[285] Amongst others, the majority of fans of Japanese pop-cultural products have always been the Japanese East Asian buyer. As early as around 1992, Japan's five major *manga* publishing companies have signed contracts for an estimated 10,000 titles covering 250,000 volumes with its East Asian counterparts. This process has generated approximately 4 billion yen in license sales and some80 billion yen in sales of original *manga* in East Asia.[286] With regards to the West, France and Italy were the first to have become fans and active buyers of Japanese animation.[287] Among the more embraced characters, Hello Kitty and Pokémon have been very closely associated with the hype of 'Cool Japan'.

Pokémon is believed to be a significant trait of post-industrial capitalism.[288] For many, Pokémon was the global kids' trend of the 1990s. Originally started out small as Game Boy game targeting at domestic consumers in 1996, its TV films have been broadcasted in 65 countries, and feature films have been shown in 45 countries around the world.[289] Three years later, *The First Movie* generated box-office revenues of approximately 17 billion yen in North America and Europe. That time was the largest overseas take of any Japanese *anime* feature films. Soon after, it quickly developed into a media-mix empire–of trading cards, television cartoons, movie series, video games and tie-in merchandise. When the new

[283]Condry, Ian. "*Anime Creativity*: *Characters and Premises* in the. *Quest for Cool Japan. Theory, Culture & Society March/May 2009 26:* p. 155.

[284] Sanrio spends ¥1.5 billion annually on documenting and protecting its copyrights (Yamazaki, 1999). and one-third of its profits comes from licensing fees (Ono, 1998). In: McVeigh, Brian (2000) 'How Hello Kitty Commodifies the Cute, Cool and Camp: "Consumutopia" versus "Control" in Japan', *Journal of Material Culture* 5(2): 225–45.

[285] Pulvers, Roger. "Who out There Cares about 'Cool Japan'?" *The Japan Times Online: News on Japan, Business News, Opinion, Sports, Entertainment and More*. The Japan Times, 09 Apr. 2006. Accessed. 02 June 2011. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/fl20060409rp.html>.

[286] *Dejitaru kontentsu hakusho 2003*[Digital Content White Paper 2003.

[287] Tsutsui, W. (2010). *Japanese popular culture and globalization*. Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies., p.54.

[288] Pokémon is an iconic example of Gross National's Cool; Yoda, T. (2006) *Japan after Japan : social and cultural life from the recessionary 1990s to the present*. Durham: Duke University Press.

[289] Japan External Trade Organization. *"Cool" Japan's Economy Warms Up*, May 2005 http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/stats/survey/pdf/2005/20050509_cool_japan.pdf.

millennium arrived, Pokémon games were being sold in 70 countries, the cartoon was being broadcasted in 51 countries, the movies were playing in 33 countries and the trading cards had been translated into 11 languages.[290] The economic ripple effect derived from the video game characters was worth 1 trillion yen in the Japanese market and 2 trillion yen in overseas markets. The US market was responsible for half of this gain whilst only a quarter came from European countries as a whole. According to Kelt, the phenomenon "can serve as a Rosetta stone for the Japanese anime industry: a critical translation device that unlocked for Americans and Europeans an entirely new language of entertainment.[291]" All the success of Pokémon, despite the recession, was deemed a sign of Japan's new *bunka pawa* (cultural power), in which it, in the words of an official of the Foreign Ministry speaking at a conference on J-cool held in Tokyo "plays in the terrain of coolness, where its currency is built on the effect of 'feeling good'".[292]

Equally striking is the amount of profit Sanrio could make from Japan's most visible pop icon cartoon cat Hello Kitty. Similar to the case of Pokémon, Kitty has been thought of as a symbol of capitalism where she generates annual profits of 1 billion dollars in the years 1999.[293] She came to life at the nexus between the drive for capital accumulation of a corporation, a daily aesthetic of cuteness and campiness[294], and the consumerist desires of individuals.[295] Agreeing to the above statement, McCracken views Kitty-Chan also as an icon for everyday, an idol for the masses, an image for modernity (i.e. capitalism, consumerism, state projects and programs), a symbol that allows meaning displacement or 'a kind of epistemological immunity for ideas'[296]

In order to boost sales domestically, Hello Kitty is not supposed to be Japanese by nationality. As such, Sanrio announced her surname as 'White' for the first time in 2001. This strategy was drawn from the fact that, during the time when Kitty was born, it was very unusual for the Japanese to go abroad and thus, people yearned for products with English

[290] Hatakeyama, K. and M. Kubo (2000) *Pokemon sutori* (Pokémon Story). Tokyo: Nikkei BP.

[291] Kelts, R. (2006). *Japanamerica : how Japanese pop culture has invaded the U.S*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.p.90.

[292] Allison, A. Spring, 2009. "The Cool Brand and Affective Activism of Japanese Youth." *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 (3). [PDF].P. 93.

[293] Sanrio's operations are international. For instance, in the US there are about150 'Sanrio Gift Gates' (company owned and operated) and 'Sanrio Surprises'.

[294] An artificiality of manner or appearance, appreciated for its humour or triteness.

[295] McVeigh, Brian (2000) 'How Hello Kitty Commodifies the Cute, Cool and Camp: "Consumutopia" versus "Control" in Japan', *Journal of Material Culture* 5(2): P. 226.

[296] McCracken, 1988: 109.

associations[297]. There was an idea that if Kitty-chan spoke English, she would be very fashionable. Her name is written in Roman letters – to add a foreign, exotic flavour – or in the angular syllabary of Japanese *(katakana)* rather than the cursive syllabary *(hiragana).* One clever strategy used to boost the sales was through intensifying the sentiments of desire or "to spin a fantasy world around a product that consumers can enter.[298]" As such, Kitty has her own world in which:

> "Her birthday is 1 November 1974 and she lives in London. She has the 'weight of three apples' and is characterized as *akarui* (cheerful, lively) and *yôki* (bright), two key themes found in Japanese pop culture, advertising, everyday aesthetics, and idealized as an essential component of 'human relations' *(ningen kankei)*. Not surprisingly, Hello Kitty likes 'small cute things, candy, stars, goldfish, etc.', and is described as 'A very energetic little girl, Kitty loves to play outdoors, in the park or forest. But you can also find her happily practicing on the piano or baking a cake, too!' She is a third grader who likes travelling, reading, eating, and making cookies, and has adventures at school. Hello Kitty has a family: papa (described as hardworking, dependable, absent-minded, with a sense of humour); mama (who is very kind and loving, takes care of her house, and is famous for her apple pie); grandpa (who is smart, paints, and likes to tell stories); and grandma (who likes to embroider in her rocking chair). Hello Kitty also has a twin sister, Mimi, who wears a yellow ribbon over her right ear to distinguish her from her sister."[299]

5.7. Influence of 'Cool Japan' as Soft Power?: A case of United States

Originally the Europeans were more accepting than the US because the US citizens were dominated by their own cheerful comics and animation, such as Walt Disney and Warner Brothers Cartoons. Secondly, they had a fixed perception that cartoons were for children but Japanese anime does not give this impression. A great comic artist Tezuka Osamu once even acknowledged the influence of early Walt Disney and Max Fleisher animation in his work.[300] Although the influence of Japanese culture might not create as much of a stir as a hit such as *Godzilla* in the 1950s kicked up, the scope and scale and the acceptance of the

[297] McGray, Douglas. "Foreign Policy -- Japan's Gross National Cool, By Douglas McGray." *302 Found*. Web. 27 Mar. 2012. <http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ikalmar/illustex/japfpmcgray.htm>.

[298] McVeigh, Brian (2000) 'How Hello Kitty Commodifies the Cute, Cool and Camp: "Consumutopia" versus "Control" in Japan', *Journal of Material Culture* 5(2):p. 235.

[299] Ibid. p. 236.

[300] Wong, Wendy Siuyi. Globalizing Manga: From Japan to Hong Kong and beyond. Mechademia: A Journal for Anime, Manga and the Fan Arts, Issue 1. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

boom of Japanese subculture of Otaku have been groundbreaking in the new millennium. To elaborate, following Murakami Takashi's "Superflat", a kind of young Japanese art inspired by the two-dimensional look of commercial cartoons, toured in the United States in 2001 and 2002, the future seems much brighter in numerical terms for Japanese anime and manga in the United States. The United States alone consumed $500 million worth of anime in 2003. In the words of the American cartoonist Charles Danziger, co-author of Mimei Sakamoto who has written 'Harvey and Estuko's Manga Guide to Japan', manga has played a very crucial role in helping Japan replace the previous dull salary man imagery that prevailed during the 1980s in the United States with its 'cool' status.[301] It is without doubt that the Hollywood's Matrix was inspired by Japanese comic books and *anime.* In terms of Japan's strategy in tying in character merchandising with animation contents, one of many excellent proofs is how toy maker Bandai has generated sales worth 28.5 billion yen in the United States. Apart from 'Pokemania' Japanese 'soft power', a huge craze as labeled by American press in 1998, Japanese game consoles Nintendo Wii could be sold in total of 6.5 million in the United States alone 10 years later.

[301] Dinnie, K. (2008). Japan's Nation Branding: Recent Evolution and Potential Future Paths [PDF]. Journal of Current Japanese Affairs, 16 (3), p. 11.

CHAPTER VI - The 'Cool' brand: A Multidimensional Analysis of 'Cool Britannia' and 'Cool Japan'

"Brands are an institutional embodiment of the logic of a new form of informational capital– much like the factory embodied the logic of industrial capital"[302]

6. 1. Nation Branding and the Shift of the Counterculture from the Fringes to the Mainstream

In the case of 'Cool Britannia' and 'Cool Japan', it has been apparent that there had existed a steady rise in the government's nation branding efforts following the decline of their industrial sectors. As Peter van Ham observes, traditional diplomacy of yesteryear is disappearing. Like never before, politicians train themselves in brand asset management. Their tasks range from finding a brand niche for their state, engaging in competitive marketing, assuring customer satisfaction, and most of all, creating brand loyalty. Interestingly, brand states will compete not only among themselves but also with super-brands such as the EU, CNN, Microsoft, and the Roman Catholic Church, to name just a few[303]. Given the circumstances, the two countries share their common hope that the culture-based industries could generate local sustainable jobs independent to the fluctuation of the global economy. As such, both states were well aware that an attractive national image and desirable commercial products and trends had political, economic, and social benefits. Having said the above, the policy implementations with the same name could be recalled as twin campaigns.

To elaborate, since 'Cool Britannia' came about, consumer behaviour around the world has promptly mutated resulting in what is called 'late consumer capitalism' in general and 'Cool' Capitalism in particular, as previously explained in detail in Chapter 3. Cool, which is ephemeral by definition as always to be replaced by something newer and more exciting, has become the central ideology of the late consumer capitalism. [304] We must also not forget that the Post-Cold War period also marked the time when many superpowers entered the 'Post Industrial Economy' where 'Soft Power' as part of Cultural Diplomacy came into being. Consequently, the rise of this type of capitalism both in the UK, the west, and Japan, in the East, works to confirm the emergence of the 'Soft Power' the world over.

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[302] Arvidsson, K (2006): vii as cited in Condry, Ian. "*Anime Creativity*: *Characters and Premises* in the. *Quest for Cool Japan. Theory, Culture & Society March/May 2009 26: 139-163.*

[303] Ham, P. Van (2001): The rise of the brand state: the post-modern politics of image and reputation, in: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 80(5) September-October: 2-6.

[304] Frank, Thomas. The conquest of cool: business culture, counterculture, and the rise of hip consumerism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. (24).

In both states, the techniques involving soft power enhancement were the utilisation of once-a-counterculture attitude that originally expressed resistance to subjugation and humiliation. It has been expropriated by the mass media and the advertising industry since the '80s and'90s, and used as the means into the hearts and wallets of young consumers, and the spill-over effect on the countries' political powers[305]. Essentially, with the synergism of nation branding and the enhancement of subcultures as targeted products, the commodification of pop culture has overturned the promotion of traditional mainstream culture. This, therefore, has made the Post-Cold War era unique from any efforts concerning nation-branding when they were more or less about promoting the conservative mainstreams of national identity. With the 'cool' factor taking an important role both at the heart of the private and public mind, any countries wishing to gain from branding their nations cannot simply rely on traditional working approaches associated with art worlds. In order to succeed, they will have to find unparallel ways of 'working' within the new cultural economy that most likely will include the alteration of the institutional settings previously paved. However, the marriage of counterculture, corporate business and politics has not shown to be smooth pervasively.[306] Hence, this dissertation saw the need to reconsider the extent to which the overall image of a nation can be manipulated when the boundaries between "creative arts" and "cultural industries", freedom and comfort, public and private, state-owned and commercial, citizen and consumer, the political and the personal have become considerably blurred.[307]Additionally, it has led many to doubt whether nation branding after all is an appropriate governmental policy. This is because, the depth of these subcultures in each society has their political, economic and social multi-aspects that are always more complicated than simply their 'cool' surfaces.

Looking into the two campaigns with very similar titles, one could easily point out a number of similarities. Among many other points, it is explicit how political leaders of the UK and Japan alike have almost too explicitly played the role of brand managers initiating the top-down approach invention into the countries' economic well-being. Additionally, the efforts in both countries have been utilised as capitalist tool while trying to reach out and embrace the subcultures of those being looked down upon like the working class of UK and the Otaku of Japan, for instance.

However, a closer look has allowed this dissertation to take on the institutional approach as I believe institutions and institutional changes have most intensively played key roles in the differences in their political and economic approaches, performances and outcomes. This is especially true when, most of the time, those popular cultures that have been promoted and sold are, in fact, universal goods that contained ambiguous or no elements of what are

[305] Pountain, Dick. (2000) Cool Rules: anatomy of an attitude. London: Reaktion. P.12.

[306] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.P. 377.

[307] Ibid., Pg. 18.

genuinely specific to the respective nations. This fact works to diminish the strength of statement that nation branding's success relys solely on what each country has to offer. Moreover, subcultures as a key contribution to cool capitalism requires dynamic intervening steps. However, this does not come by itself and could not be achieved easily. Having states intervening into the economic mechanism, the cases have proved that appropriate, careful, and continuous institutional support is the utmost crucial variable to direct the popular and subcultures related industries. As such, this dissertation argues that both formal and informal institutional arrangements persisted in Britain and Japan. These institutions in turn have had affected how the responsible institutions implemented the campaign, including how much they can manipulate the direction of process and growth. Due to the abovementioned, this dissertation also argues that the politico-economic characterisations of the states narrated in chapter 2 have contributed to the overall health of the countries' governmental campaign.

6.2. Decisive Institutional Points in The Case of 'Cool Britannia'

6.2.1. Blair Administration: the effort to bring 'state' back into Britain's economic life in Post-Thatcherism era amidst the Existence of Political and Institutional Heritage

> "…It was a heady time, and even Thatcherism could be seen in an appealing light: as detested as it was by so many, Thatcherism had worked a kind of alchemy on British society, effecting a multitude of changes, from the economy to the arts, some of which were not intended by the Iron Lady herself."[308]

With the history of the economic development deemed important, its connexion in terms of culture promotion as means of economic proliferation in the period after WWII was indisputable. The importance of this is that, whilst each period bears with them originality, observing from long term perspectives in regards to what has disappeared and what has evolved through time is important in analysing the topic. As mentioned, it has been coming out from a great number of literatures concerning 'Cool Britannia' that the campaign was nothing original to New Labour when the party came into power in May 1997. During Wilson's leadership of the country there was a high rate of employment and relatively high degree of economic prosperity, government money was allocated more to education than to defence for the first time in British history, as part of a number of substantial changes in a number of social areas. [309] At that time, the UK also experienced the enhancement and utilisation of certain subcultures of the marginalised groups that perhaps had been looked

[308] McGuire, Stryker. "This Time I've Come to Bury Cool Britannia." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 28 Mar. 2009. Web. 2 Jun. 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/29/cool-britannia-g20-blair-brown>.

[309] Wikipedia. Harold Wilson." Wikimedia Foundation, 04 Sept. 2011. Web. 12 Jan. 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_Wilson>.

down upon. Later, the element of Thatcherism making up the crucial characteristics of British economic development path could also be captured within the context of British creative industries. That is, the process of individualisation could summarily be defined as the convergence of the forcefulness of neo-liberal economics emphasised by the Thatcher government from 1979 onwards. The evidence could be traced through a much expanded workforce comprising of freelance, casual and project-linked persons.

However, the party under Tony Blair's stewardship was impressively quick to grasp the golden opportunity of 'Cool Britannia'. When Blair gained his victory over the Tory party, one of the main principles of the Labour party as narrated in Chapter 2 to a large extent was to bring the state back in, though not as intensively as when the UK was once governed by the state welfare system. This reversed the administration and policies practiced for over 12 years under the Iron lady. In the period of Thatcher government, while some key institutional arrangements established during Labour persisted, many were altered and changed dramatically. One thing was for sure, the UK which once had developed as a developmental state has dissolved during the Thatcher reign. One instance was the dismantling of the administration of the city of London which in turn connected with the destruction of the entire British bureaucratic setup. It has also been evident that there was also a more fiercely neo-liberal model in place with the blessings of government for overseeing the further de-regulation and commercialisation of the cultural and creative sector.[310] Another easily visible factor in terms of institutional arrangement was the abolishment of Greater London Council, largely because it was a difficult and powerful political competitor for the government. As Landry puts it, the impact of this in cultural policy terms was that no strategic overview of London took place in the post-Thatcherism administration.[311]

Reversing what had been paved by the Iron lady, the Blair government believed that the willingness to work in the creative industries requires the right policies from the state in order to maximise the industries' growth potential. Despite the fact that Blair did not desire to revitalise the welfare state system, the basis of the institutional setting established and remaining from Thatcherism had an inseparable impact on Blair's 'workfare' policy. The 'Workfare' state was largely about the state becoming more active once again, however not so much a deliverer but more of an enabler. Regarding 'Cool Britannia' as the explicit symbol of Blair's opposing norm, we could see that Blair was blending cultural studies into the mixture of neoliberal ideology of consumer sovereignty that was intensively carried forward during Thatcher era in his own state-intervening approach.

[310]Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.,pp.376-377; See also DCMS, 1998 and 2001.

[311] Landry, C. London as a creative city in: HARTLEY, J. (2005). *Creative industries*. London: Blackwell.

6.2.2. Criticisms: Why faced with criticisms?

Unfortunately, the 'Cool Britannia' under the responsibility of the DCMS has worked for the Blair Administration to be labeled as a PR gang attempting to carelessly manage the post-industrial Britain's soft power. The campaign has quickly become the target of satire and an example of problems national rebranding practices can encounter. Initially, in order to boost the creative industry's standing and put it on the political agenda, the definition of the 'Creative Industries' was independently coined by the ministry. As clearly stated in the Creative Industries Task Force, the definition excluded most of the business creativity and almost all scientific creativity.[312] With the UK government's style of grouping, the result was that the distinction between what are in fact, very different industries was blurred. Subsequently, the point that has never been well understood was that 13 industries work in different ways and hence require different sorts of interventions.[313] The same line of argument has revealed that while the UK has made many strides in measuring the size and structure of the creative industries themselves, the relationship between the sectors and the other claims made for it are largely under-researched and hence not well understood.[314] As Landry puts it, the government intervention, due to the above, has not been possible to establish the universally appropriated policies for all 13 wide ranging sectors.[315]

Additionally, it seems like the UK has been taking the creative industry for granted in the state's rush to develop regional creative economies and has forgotten that there existed the dire need in the same way that industrial economy required the understanding of regional difference. In agreement, Kate Oakley argues that much of the UK's rhetoric around knowledge-based economic development covers an immense number of unanswered as well as unasked questions[316]. Even the later Minister of the DCMS, Purnell, has admitted that some of the success lay in the poor administration where the government gave the impression that the state was more interested in parties than in policy. The effort was not sufficient and the result was that people thought the creative industries were all about a London elite, rather than about jobs and manufacturing in every region of the country.[317]

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[312] Landry, C. London as a creative city in: HARTLEY, J. (2005). *Creative industries*. London: Blackwell,Pg. 125

[313] Oakley, Kate. (2004). Not So Cool Britannia: The Role of the Creative Industries in Economic Development. International Journal of Cultural Studies 7., p.1.

[314] Ibid. p. 6

[315] Landry, C. London as a creative city in HARTLEY, J. (2005) *Creative industries*. London: Blackwell, , P. 238.

[316] Oakley, Kate (2004) *'Not so Cool Britannia, The Role of Creative Industries in Economic Development',* in: International Journal of Cultural Studies article.

[317] Billings, Scott. "DCMS Revives Cool Britannia but 'without the Parties'" *Graphics, Digital, Interior, Print, Retail, Design News & Jobs*. 25 June 2005. Web. 13 Apr. 2011. <http://www.designweek.co.uk/news/dcms-revives-cool-britannia-but-without-the-parties/1121527.article>.

6.2.3. Short-term enthusiasms and long-term erosions

In any case, this dissertation has, by no means, an intention to conclude that any criticism of 'Cool Britannia' is solely due to the responsible government's failure in policy implementation. Instead, I argue that the kind of obstacles and inertia to increase state intervention and reach the optimal conditions for a successful campaign was rooted in the persistent formal and informal institutional arrangements that were intensively mutated away from the former Labour administration during the Thatcher administration. While Thatcherism does not solely have negative effects on the rise of the egalitarianism and cultural industries, Blair's effort to boost the country's image and revenues via pop cultures and creative industries have been stiff from the non-linear institutional foundations. Regarding the abrupt change in policy direction, what could be learned from this British experience is that the weight of expectation now being placed upon these sectors to 'deliver' in terms that are not well understood economically and even less so in their social and cultural functions. Particularly, as the rhetoric and expectations grew upon the rising industries, the evidence based on which the other industries seem to shrink and we are currently stumbling, fairly blindly, in the belief that the creative industries have a well-understood role in economic development, regeneration and social inclusion.[318] This unfortunately is not the case.

What is worse was that there were many vested interests amidst the development of creative industries. Property contract was becoming lopsided as the larger, richer and more powerful tilted the balance too far their way. This also means that voices of artists who wanted more freedom were scarcely heard. [319] The study of Leadbeater and Oakley have revealed that there had been a large 'missing middle' in public policy at the national and also, critically, at the regional and local level. As such, policy-makers knew little about the new generations of entrepreneurs, especially about how they work, where they come from, what makes them tick, their distinctive needs—nor how to interact with them. [320] Traditional public arts institutions knew relatively little about commercial and cultural entrepreneurs. On top of that, policy-making within the local and national government is often split between culture and economic development departments that have different agendas. Policy-makers in economic development agencies lack the knowledge, time and tools to help develop a cluster of hundreds of independent micro businesses. [321] Without the well-supported policies and strategic authority, some inner areas of London had,

[318] Oakley, Kate (2004) *'Not so Cool Britannia, The Role of Creative Industries in Economic Development',* IN: International Journal of Cultural Studies article.

[319] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub P. 124.

[320] LEADBEATER, Charles and Kate OAKLEY, *The Independents: Britain's New Cultural Entrepreneurs* (1999) Demos. pg. 12; See also Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, Pg. 300.

[321] Ibid.

overtime, become gentrified which in turn pushed out low value occupants such as artists or local shops who cannot afford the new higher rents.[322]
As such, it had been concluded that the rise of the cultural entrepreneurs has exposed a serious shortfall in British public policy of that time.

6.2.4. Multiculturalism

> "If the loss of empire was once a drag on the spirit of the British people, the immigration that resulted in part from that loss had by the mid-1990s become a major driving force behind the richly multicultural London blossoming before our eyes."[323]

In the late 90s, many extraordinary events coincided: the election of a new government, millenarian anxiety, reminders of the loss of empire in the handover of Hong Kong, the anniversary of Indian independence and the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. These had already catapulted British identity to centre stage[324]. Moreover, the continuous in-migration had considerably transformed British cultural identity away from the traditional discourse of 'British'. As such, London's cosmopolitan richness from Jews to Indians to the new knowledge workers and asylum seekers has helped develop and sustain the city's role as a creative world city.[325] It had been clear that the dynamism and vitality of British cultures have been fuelled by Diaspora experience to the extent that one should indisputably accept that the cultural contributions of Black and Asian people to British society had been indivisible from British culture.[326] As a result, Britain has been given the name 'Seven Nations', where the brand image of the nation tends to be nebulous and complex. All in all, enhancing British identity in the context of 'Cool Britannia' could also mean the constellation of different through the revitalisation of British culture.

Due to the multiple identities associated with 'Cool Britannia', nation branding in the UK context had been exposed to a high risk in causing a conflicting image of a nation.[327] In essence, there existed the debate over what was 'Britishness' given the multiple cultures. The collection of multiracial and multicultural cultures provoked complex questions about

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[322] Landry, C. London as a creative city. Em: HARTLEY, J. (2005) Creative industries. London: Blackwell.

[323] McGuire, Stryker. "This Time I've Come to Bury Cool Britannia." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 28 Mar. 2009. Accessed 2 Jun. 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/29/cool-britannia-g20-blair-brown>.

[324] Leonard, Mark et.al. Public Diplomacy. London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002.; Leonard, Mark. "Markleonard.net: Journalism / Cool Britannia." *Markleonard.net*. Accessed 7 July 2011. <http://markleonard.net/journalism/coolbritannia/>.

[325] Landry, C. (2001) 'London as a Creative City', Paper Presented at *Cultures of World Cities*, Central Policy Unit, Hong Kong, July 31, 2001. www.info.gov.hk/cpu/english/culcities.htm.

[326] R Cohen, 'Perversions of Inheritance: studies in the making of multi-racist Britain'. In Cohen, P and Bains, H. (1988) *Multi-Racist Britain,* Macmillan, London.

[327] Jarvis, Robert. (1989). The logic of images in international relations. New York: Columbia University Press.

what a British identity means at the turn of the twenty-first century.[328] In relation to the state, critics both at home and abroad identified Blair's ideological commitment to multiculturalism as largely responsible for the mixed feeling in its approach to the war. By this, the leader's assumption that the communities with separate identities can live together peacefully, united by merely by the weakest of national identities was considered to be the governing doctrine. Officially, it took the form of policies promoting the politics of diversity rather than reinforcing a shared understanding of nationality that had traditionally sought to assimilate minorities within a dominant British identity."[329] Consequently, the creative work flagged up by the state is often less British than is assumed.[330] This is because what was once perceived as British popular culture as a whole has also been shaped by both English and ethnic minorities alike. That is, nation branding in the 'Cool Britannia' context can mean promotion of British music exports through Indian Rappers. By keeping in mind the existence of multiculturalism of 'Britishness', one can gain meaningful insights into the pursuit of Britain's nation branding and 'Cool Britannia'. Unfortunately, the 'Cool Britannia' as an ethically plural and racialised exclusion rooting out from the long-established multicultural social institutions caused the fragmented image effect and an inconsistent national image.

Like earlier mentioned, in order for the creative industries development to succeed, it would not be disconnected from the cultural policies that nurtured them and the social policies that can help to sustain them.[331] In other words, this means that it is dependent on the formal and informal institutions where those cultural and social policies come from. Consequently, I believe that the unparallel institutional foundations from one doctrine to another in British political and economic history, has worked to dictate the development path of how nation branding as well as cultures are perceived. Given the circumstances, there existed a high chance that whichever party followed the Thatcher administration would not be successful in the effort to step into economic life due to pressure from the economy and public institutions following the intense privatisation process and Thatcher's enterprise culture. It surely would have been a great challenge for any party.

6.3. Decisive Institutional Points in the Case of 'Cool Japan'

In Japan, it is widely argued that the key to Japan's economic ascendance was not ideology, it was a method that drove the most dynamic economy of the era, and it was indisputably

[328] D'Monté, R. and Saunders, G. (2008). *Cool Britannia? : British political drama in the 1990s*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.p.55.

[329] Jones, David Martin and Smith, L. R. (2006) *The Commentariat and discourse failure*: *language and atrocity in Cool Britannia*. International Affairs, 82(6).

[330] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub P. 387.

[331] Oakley, Kate (2004) *'Not so Cool Britannia, The Role of Creative Industries in Economic Development',* IN: International Journal of Cultural Studies article.

native of the Japanese.[332] In the Post-Cold war era when the term 'soft power' was brought into much of the discussions, the theory of developmental state seems to gain less intention compared to its reputation as the almighty tool behind Japanese post-WWII success. Still, a more in-depth analysis of Japan's policy-making institutions will allow one to understand that Japan's acquisition of its soft power has its root in the strong developmental state foundation as key enabler. In the same vein that Japan has been acknowledged as the donor of consequences in the way their economic aid was directed strategically to benefit Japan industrially, Murakami Marakami utters that "when we are rich in the 1980s, we weren't producing any kind of international culture. But when we got poor again humble. Then we become creative".[333]

At the centre of 'Cool Japan' is, according to Gayton, the proliferation of anime that is creating new interest in all things Japanese.[334]Despite that, the 'Cool Japan' campaign and the popularisation of J-cool around the world are not driven by the culture of the country of origin. Taking Japanese culture among American youth for example, interviews of the youngsters revealed that the majority of them never knew that the Americanised Power Rangers in the late 90s originally came from Japan.[335] Another reason why the measurement of cultural transfer could not be at the centre of the analysis is that, indifferent to the height of America's 'Pokemania' in the late 90s, the westward cultural transfer is nothing particularly unique to the campaign. The aforementioned statements reassure us that Japanese cultural goods popularity certainly carries an attractive power to international consumers. However, it is not Japanese culture itself that is signified. Instead, as Allison sees it, Japan operates more as signifier of a particular brand and a blend of fantasy-ware.[336] However, what is certainly new to this campaign is the intense degree of state intervention into how certain post-industrial, immaterial goods are being marketed worldwide, where a state's hands have been shifted from increasing the main revenues from the industrial goods. The new approach had contributed to Japan maintaining its status quo as a wealthy and powerful nation. Obviously, this indicates a government shift that is dictated by available resources and most suitable to the economic health of the nation.

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[332] McGray, Douglas. "Foreign Policy -- Japan's Gross National Cool, By Douglas McGray." *302 Found*. Web. 27 Mar. 2012. <http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ikalmar/illustex/japfpmcgray.htm>.

[333] McGray, Douglas. "Foreign Policy -- Japan's Gross National Cool, By Douglas McGray." *302 Found*. Web. 27 Jan. 2012. <http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ikalmar/illustex/japfpmcgray.htm>. ; Nye, Joseph. Soft Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

[334] Nelson Gayton specializes in entrepreneurship in media, technology, and entertainment. He assisted the chairman and CEO of Sony Pictures Entertainment in the development and marketing of feature films.

[335] Allison, A. (2006) "The Japan Fad in Global Youth Culture and Millennial Capitalism." in *Mechademia: Emerging Worlds of Anime and Manga*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

[336] Ibid.

In terms of the decisive responsible institution, MITI has been the key institution in the restructuring of Japanese national economy from Japan Inc towards the immateriality of affect known as the J-Cool.[337] Before, MITI led Japan through the most rapid evolution by rising from the ashes after WWII and churning out cheap copycat goods, then manufacturing automations in the 80s, to the rich and reliably peaceful economically of recent decades.[338] With regards to the promotion of the J-cool, MITI has dealt with it in the same manner it did with hard industrial goods where the Amakudari nature of Japanese bureaucrats worked to keep the business running. Because of MITI as the institution responsible for Japanese nation branding, the developmental state-like method has survived and has also been practiced continuously. As a persistent characterisation of the MITI approach, Michal Daliot-Bul states that, after all, what enters the Intellectual Property Strategy 'cultural basket', whoever wins the government-sponsored competitions, and those who are chosen to be exhibited become Japan's 'attractive and valuable information'.[339] Thanks to the iron Triangle, the cooperation between Japanese state, bureaucrats and the private sectors has helped with the establishment of the correct policies for the benefits of both the public and the private sectors.

While some reforms of the innovative system may be required for Japan to remain its economic superpower status via cultural goods with 'Cool Japan', the paradigm change is not. The elements of Developmental State kind of strategy worked as a rigid template in spite of the shift from building hard power to the state's effort to enhance the nation's soft power. Despite the not universally-appropriated social institutions such as Amakudari, the overall 'Iron Triangle' system has resulted in a complete mutual understanding and consent cooperation between state and private sectors. In the same manner that the Japanese public-private linkages have been allowing the nation to identify and exploit strategic opportunities for the country's management of industrial goods' exports, state's role is to enable the growth-promoting policies for cultural export. As such, the 'right' country-specific policies have been formulated and processed in the developmental state in ways that already have gained the consent of the concerned private sectors which are the key players in the development of creative industries.

With a network of shops across Japan and a listing on the Nikkei Stock Index, Mandarake Incorporated, the largest manga and anime shop in the world, has been positioning for

[337] Allison, A. Spring, (2009). "The Cool Brand and Affective Activism of Japanese Youth." *Theory, Culture & Society* 26 (3). [PDF]

[338] Tsutsui, W. (2010). *Japanese popular culture and globalization*. Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies,p. 39.

[339] Michal Daliot-Bul, (2009). "Japan Brand Strategy: The Taming of 'Cool Japan' and the Challenges of Cultural Planning in a Postmodern Age," Social Science Japan Journal 12 (2), pg. 227-245.

global expansion.[340] The fact that the Mandarake success is very much associated to the 'Cool Japan' Campaign has reassured that firm institutional support is still an almighty treasure of Japan. Since there has never been a break in the institutional arrangement for the country's economic wellbeing, both formal rules like the legislative structure as well as informal institutions such as bureaucratic mentalities have been of the same set as ones that contributed to the success of Japanese industrialisation following WWII. According to a former US Ambassador to the Netherlands, Cynthia P. Schneider asserted that even though this soft power resides to a large extent in the promotion of a country's culture, she has warned that "without institutional support, cultural diplomacy is not systematic, but capricious and sporadic, reflecting the interests of individual ambassadors".[341] However, this was prevented within the management of 'Cool Japan'.

Since the Developmental State model has provided the basic template for the 'Cool Japan' campaign to be processed, it then could be implied that the campaign success in gaining nation branding capabilities would largely depend on the extent to which the Japanese public and private sectors collaborate in order to achieve shared goals. Certainly, the study of the Japanese brand strategy allows an insight into the government laboratory in which the market driven imagery of 'Cool Japan' is being tamed and appropriated to suit national interests. To elaborate, selective appropriation, promotion and combination of cultural products altogether contribute to the construction of politically meaningful images of Japan for domestic and international audiences.[342] What helped was also the fact that Japan could easily be simplified an ethnically homogeneous nation despite the immense amount of in-migrants and visitors. As opposed to its 'Cool Britannia' counterpart, the lack of image fragmentation provided a more consistent, clear and more focused national image that was sent out to the international arena. As such, 'Cool Japan' has successfully found its harmony in the link between perception of contemporary Japanese-ness and century old Japanese ideals as a basis for nation-brand establishment. It could be concluded that analysis of brand strategy in Japan is crucial for the understanding of the country's present-day economic and political climate. On top of this, the re-examination of state's role as a cultural planning apparatus in an emerging global space of 'media convergence' is also significant.[343]

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[340] McGray, Douglas. "Foreign Policy -- Japan's Gross National Cool, By Douglas McGray." *302 Found*. Accessed 27 Mar. 2012. <http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~ikalmar/illustex/japfpmcgray.htm>.

[341] Schneider, Cynthia P. (2007), "Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy That Works", in: Melissen, Jan (2007), Introduction, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 160.

[342] Michal Daliot-Bul, (2009). "Japan Brand Strategy: The Taming of 'Cool Japan' and the Challenges of Cultural Planning in a Postmodern Age," Social Science Japan Journal 12 (2), pg. 227-245.

[343] Henry Jenkins, "Pop Cosmopolitanism: Mapping Cultural Flows in an Age of Media Convergence," in *Globalization: Culture and Education in the New Millennium,* ed. Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco and Desiree B. Qin-Hilliard, 114–40 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004).

Ultimately, this dissertation argues that the success of 'Cool Japan' is rooted in the characterisation of historical and national economic factors that are very deep-rooted, in which 'developmental state' model plays a decisive role within 'Cool Japan' campaign no less than its role for the Japanese post war Industrial revolution. Due to the existence of the 'developmental state' template, Japan has been particularly adept at such flexible manufacturing processes for a prolonged period of time and made available through the mutual consent and close cooperation between public and private sectors.[344] This, in turn, reflects connexion between Japan's part and presence as opposed to its British counterparts where there existed the depthless surface of the 'Cool Britannia' campaign. Due to all the above and despite being labelled as the offspring policy, it was largely agreed that the 'cool' label better applies to Japan in 2003 than to its British counterparts back in the late 90s.

[344] *Joseph* S. *Nye*, Jr. (Autumn, *1990*), *Soft Power. Foreign Policy*, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary, pp. 153-171.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION and FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Current practice and future horizons for nation branding

Creativity is not easily regulated. Moreover, one must not forget that 'cool' is not simply another way of saying 'good'. Instead, "it comes with baggage - an alternative set of values which are often profoundly in conflict with official values". For example it is not very smart for a political party to carelessly promote 'Cool Britannia' when it is also committed to a policy of reducing drug abuse.[345] More specifically, while the creative city template can be replicated, failure or success is to a large part dependent on long-standing development questions. These may include economic and social sustainability, gentrification, local displacement, exclusionary practices, and local identities. Naturally, a country cannot be managed like a business firm.[346] This is in large part due to the fact that top-down management and control concerning the nation branding needs to take into account a lot more of political and historical components. The fact that artists tend to come bottom-up, while the government is usually top-down has often created the problem of top-down, bottom-up split in the effort to consolidate creativity into business.[347] Given the nature that business wants profits, artists want success and the governments want a strong cultural sector and economy, meeting all the parties' desires will not be an altruistic process. These facts work to emphasise the importance of the nations' institutional settings. It is therefore clear that a measure of adroitness in policy formulation is required.[348] This means that planning with clear, informed objectives, respecting local needs rather than merely securing economic development, impact considerably efficiency and productivity within the postindustrial era.[349]

In the case of 'Cool Britannia', the key factor was neglected in deeper-seated creativity. Institutional inertia needs to be tackled, as do support mechanisms that tend to favour the

[345] Pountain, Dick. (2000) Cool Rules: anatomy of an attitude. London: Reaktion.P. 63; See also Jarvis, Robert. 1989. The logic of images in international relations. New York: Columbia University Press.

[346] [346] KLEPPE, Ingeborg Astrid – MOSSBERG, Lena Larsson (2002): *Company versus Country*. *Branding – „Same, Same but Different*" (Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, October; See also: Miller, Chris. "PolicyMic." *America: A Nation, Not a Business*. Accessed 13 Oct. 2011. <http://www.policymic.com/articles/1193/america-a-nation-not-a-business>.

[347] Billings, Scott. "DCMS Revives Cool Britannia but 'without the Parties'" *Graphics, Digital, Interior, Print, Retail, Design News & Jobs*. 25 June 2005. Accessed 13 Apr. 2011. <http://www.designweek.co.uk/news/dcms-revives-cool-britannia-but-without-the-parties/1121527.article>.

[348] Hartley, John. (2005). *Creative industries*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, p. 224.

[349] *Rising East* Online. Charles *Ambrosino*. Creative London. London and the Creative City paradigm. Issue No. 7, September 2007. Accessed: http://www.uel.ac.uk/risingeast/archive07/academic/ambrosino.htm.

tried and tested rather than the radical.[350] Any states could learn from the campaign that policy intervention needs to be balanced by knowledge of the particular cultural sector and the operative processes of the creative grassroots.[351] As many scholars have proclaimed, the state should not utilise the rise in creative industries as substitution of the decline of manufacturing. This, apparently, has been the case for both 'Cool Britannia' and 'Cool Japan'. Luckily, the framework of the Developmental State seems to have saved Japan from losing its 'cool' from its effort to nation brand the mixture of traditional - popular culture. Additionally, they should refrain from the formulation of short-term policies. Instead, in order to reduce the risks, far sighted plans with a judicious blend of wise investments for the future should be adopted.

While it is only in the past few decades that the public scrutiny of the close interaction between politicians and private sector has grown[352], it is worth noting that this characteristic has existed in Japan for much longer. This type of institutional support has provided Japan with the style of development that has been thought to be the third way between Soviet and US theories of the market.[353] In agreement with Ying Fan's statement that the function of nation branding is not to solve a country's problems but only serves as the final touch, to add icing on the cake. As such, if economic development in a country is like completing a gigantic jigsaw, nation branding is probably the last piece where basic firm foundation has been previously set.[354] A closer look at the study of Anholt, the so-called father of nation branding, will make one realise that his vision of branding is entirely without marketing but rather about reforming the actual country leading to change in policy. Ultimately, the main institutional and ideological differences between the two campaigns; the elements of Thatcherism in the multicultural UK and the elements of developmental state in the ethnically homogeneous Japan were decisive in the life of the campaigns after all.

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EDUCATION

2010-Present — **UNIVERSITY of VIENNA (Vienna)**
AUSTRIA — **Master of Arts - Global Studies**
European Commission's Erasmus Mundus Partial Scholarship
- Key subjects: development economics, institutional economics, economic history
- Dissertation: Culture for Sale: A Comparative Analysis on Cool Britannia and Cool Japan's Approaches of Nation Branding (Supervisor: Professor Wolfram Schaffar)

2009-2010 — **LONDON SCHOOL of ECONOMICS and POLITICAL SCIENCE (London)**
U.K. — **Master of Science - Global History**
- Key subjects: institutional economics, economic history, development and politics of East Asia and Asia Pacific Region
- Dissertation: Japan's Economic Aid and Thailand's Dualistic Economy: A Study Case of Eastern Seaboard Development Programme (Supervisor: Professor Patrick Wallis)

2005-2009 — **RITSUMEIKAN ASIA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY (Oita)**
JAPAN — **Bachelor of Social Science - Asia Pacific Studies**
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University 100% Tuition Fee Reduction Scholarship
- Japan Student Services Organization's *Honours Scholarship* (Apr 06 – Mar 07), (Apr 08 – Mar 09)
- Dissertation: Facebook and Its Social Impacts in the Age of Globalization (Supervisor: Professor Jeremy S. Eades)

2005 — **CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY (Bangkok)**
THAILAND — **Bachelor of Arts - Political Sciences** (first semester)

2003-2004 — **PINE RIVER HIGH SCHOOL (Michigan)**
U.S. — **Young Exchange Service Scholarship as cultural ambassador**

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES

2011 — **UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (UNIDO) (Vienna)**
6 months — **Asia Pacific Regional Programme Assistance (Intern)**
AUSTRIA
- Support industrial development officers in multiple, simultaneous projects
- Analyze quantitative and qualitative industrial performance data
- Carry out tasks covering concept development, project formulation and relationship with parties concerned
- Contribute to the biannual Round Table tasks especially in analysis of Green Growth as well as in human resource aspect

2008 — **HIJI TOWN HALL, Municipal Government (Oita)**
1 month — **Lifelong Learning Department (Intern)**
JAPAN
- Carry out tasks concerning tourism management, cultural sites preservations, facilities management

2008 — **THAI AIRWAYS International PLC (Tokyo)**
1 month
JAPAN
- Assist within administration, ticketing and tourism promotion departments

2007-2009 — **'OITA SPECIALITY CUISINE' WARAKU RESTAURANT**
26 months — **Management Assistant**
JAPAN
- Manage overall maintenance: supplies ordering, accounting, reservations, catering

IT KNOWLEDGE and LANGUAGES

Language — **Thai**: Mother tongue, **English**: Advanced (IELTS: 7.5), **Japanese**: Intermediate, **Spanish**: Beginner
IT — Microsoft Office Suite – Word, Power Point, Excel (Advanced)

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES and ASSOCIATIONS

LSE Charity Fundraising for Children's Shelter Chiang Mai; Prengo:APU student organization for supporting children in Thailand's rural area