



universität
wien

MASTERARBEIT

Titel der Masterarbeit

„Climate-Proofing Refugee Aid:

The UNHCR's Approach to Climate Change Induced Displacement and Climate Justice“

Verfasserin

Leonie Tuitjer

angestrebter akademischer Grad

Master (MA)

Wien, 2013

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt:

A 067 805

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt:

Individuelles Masterstudium:
Global Studies – a European Perspective

Betreuerin / Betreuer:

MMag. Dr. Ilker Atac



universität
wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit /Title of the master thesis

Climate-Proofing Refugee Aid: The UNHCR's Approach to Climate Change Induced Displacement and Climate Justice

Verfasser /Author
Leonie Tuitjer

angestrebter akademischer Grad / acadamic degree aspired
Master (MA)

Wien, 2013

Studienkennzahl :

A 067 805

Studienrichtung:

Individuelles Masterstudium:
Global Studies – a European Perspective

Betreuer/Supervisor:

MMag. Dr. Ilker Atac

Climate-Proofing Refugee Aid: The UNHCR's Approach to Climate Change Induced Displacement and Climate Justice

Abstract

English

Climate change has the potential to trigger mass displacement, likely affecting the people of the Global South disproportionately. In academia and popular literature the term “climate refugee” has been coined, having been both embraced and rejected by different academics, NGOs, the media and politicians. The diverse academic debate around the issue is somewhat unified when it comes to the normative understanding of the topic. Much of the scholarly work on the topic embraced notions of “climate justice”. The topic has left academic circles and we can witness a struggle for the “right response” by policy makers, too. In this paper the policy approach to “climate refugees” of the UNHCR, the world’s largest refugee agency will be analysed. Informed by a neo-Gramscian view on international relations the ideological dimension of the policy process will be examined. Through a discourse analysis and expert interview the subsequent steps which form a *hegemonic project* within policy formations are traced. The paper investigates the agency’s position and promotion of the topic within the international community and which role “climate justice” notions play within their approach. The paper comes to the conclusion that the agency was slow in developing its strategies. However, after establishing a policy paper the UNHCR decisively promoted its position within various UN bodies and was instrumental in informing important international outcomes. Climate Justice, however is of little importance to the agency.

Deutsch

Klimawandel kann zu “displacement” Szenarien führen und es ist davon auszugehen, dass die Bevölkerung des „globalen Südens“ überproportional davon betroffen sein wird. In akademischen und populärwissenschaftlichen Debatten wurde der Begriff „Klimaflüchtling“ geprägt, welcher von WissenschaftlerInnen, PolitikerInnen und NGOs gleichermaßen benutzt wie auch abgelehnt wird. Die kontroverse akademische Debatte um „Klimaflüchtlinge“ ist doch in einem Moment vereint, da fast alle Autoren zu dem Thema auf normative Politiken abzielen die als „Klimagerechtigkeit“ begriffen werden können. Auch in politischen Zirkeln hat das Thema Beachtung gefunden. In dieser Arbeit soll die Strategie der UNHCR zu dem Thema untersucht werden. Von einem neo-Gramscianen Blickwinkel auf Internationale Beziehungen werden die ideologischen Aspekte des Policy-Prozesses untersucht. Mit Hilfe einer Diskursanalyse und Experten Interview werden die aufeinander aufbauenden Schritte die zu einem *hegemonialen Projekt* führen untersucht. Die Arbeit untersucht im weiteren wie die UNHCR das Thema und ihren Policy Ansatz in der internationalen Gemeinschaft verbreitet und welche Rolle hier „Klimagerechtigkeit“ spielt. Die Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass nach zögerlichen Anfängen, die UNHCR sehr entschlossen das Thema in internationalen Foren vorantreibt. „Klimagerechtigkeit“ ist dabei allerdings nicht der entscheidende Faktor.

Table of Contents

1) Introduction	3
2) Literature Review	8
2.1) “Climate Refugees” and Environmental Factors	9
2.2) “Climate Refugees” and Security Concerns	12
2.3) “Climate Refugees” and International Law	18
2.4) “Climate Refugees” and Modes of Representation	25
2.5) Summary and Working definition	30
3) Theory and Methodology	33
3.1) Hegemony in International Relations	33
3.2) Historicist Perspectives and Discourse Analysis	40
3.3) Elite Interviews	46
4) Case Study: UNHCR and Climate Change Induced Displacement	48
4.1) Context and Preconditions	48
4.2) Discursive Communication: Environmental Factors in Refugee Aid	52
4.3) Establishing an Official Discourse: The Policy Paper	59
4.4) Ideological Domination: UNFCCC outcomes	73
4.5) Inter-Discursive Struggle: ExCom Results	77
4.6) The Way Ahead: Bellagio Expert Meeting and Nansen Conference	79
5) Conclusion	87
6) Bibliography	97
Annex	108
Transcript Interview 1, 13 th September 2012, Expert A	108
Transcript Interview 2, 20 th September 2012, Expert A:	116

List of Abbreviations

AWG-LCA	- Ad Hoc Working Group for Long Term Cooperation Under the Convention
CICERO	- Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo
COP	- Conference of Parties
DFDR	- Development- forced displacement and resettlement
ExCom	- Executive Committee
FAO	- Food and Agricultural Organisations
G8	- Group of Eight
IASC	- Inter Agency Standing Committee
IDP	- Internally Displaced Person
ILC	- International Law Commission
IOM	- International Organisation for Migration
NGO	- Non- Governmental Organisation
OCHA	- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	- United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	- United Nations Environmental Programme
UNFCCC	- United Nations Framework for Climate Change Conventions
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Refugee Convention	- 1951 “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”
RPG	- Refugee Policy Group

1) Introduction

*Indeed, of all the global mega-trends that I have mentioned
[Population growth. Urbanization.
Water scarcity. Food and energy insecurity.],
climate change is the one that has the greatest multiplier
effect in terms of human security and human mobility.*

*Antonio Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Speech at Nansen Conference, Oslo 5-7 June, 2011
(UNHCR, 2011 (d); 2)*

The reality of climate change¹ has entered global politics. From a marginalized topic, which was treated in a purely technical way, it became priority on the international agenda and was mainstreamed into various areas of international cooperation. The 2007 G8 Summit in Germany was dedicated to climate change and the *United Nations Conferences of Parties (COP)* meetings in 2009 and 2010 receive widespread media attention.

Moreover, climate change also has had an effect on global civil society: various new NGOs and activist networks have been founded to promote environmentally friendly legislations world wide. New coalitions between environmental and social activist groups have been formed. Within these coalitions the notion of “climate justice” has become prominent. “Climate Justice” movements emerged all over the planet. Although they differ somewhat in their perception on justice and how to achieve it,

¹ Climate change is define as following by the IPCC: “Climate change in IPCC usage refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This usage differs from that in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where climate change refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods” (IPCC, 2007; 30).

most activist groups share a similar set of beliefs, which Geoff Evans summarizes as the following:

- that the historical responsibility for the problem rests with corporations and governments in the Global North;
- that inequitable and disproportionate harmful consequences of climate change fall on Indigenous communities and poor and vulnerable communities mostly living in the Global South;
- that this constitutes an ecological debt (specifically a climate debt) owed by corporations and governments of the Global North to the people of the Global South; and
- that market solutions will not solve the problem” (Evans, 2010; 203).

In the Kyoto Protocol an attempt was made to incorporate the idea of “justice” into the mechanisms as one can read on the UNFCCC webpage:

“Recognizing that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (UNFCCC, “Kyoto Protocol”, online).

Obviously, the last issue raised by several climate justice groups, that “market solutions will not solve the problem” of climate change is not reflected in the Kyoto Protocol, as the market based mechanisms of emission trading, joint implementation projects and clean development projects are the central part of the protocol.

While the Kyoto Protocol focuses on emission trade and green house gas reductions, the scientific community has also acknowledged the link between climate change and humanitarian hardships. Recently, the connection between climate change and displacement has received a lot of attention. Rising sea-levels due to global warming, increased desertification processes in large areas in Africa and Latin America, higher velocities and intensities of tropical storms and high tides, as well as changes in rain patterns, will force millions of people out of their habitat (Jouzel, 2010; 8-9). Already in 1990, the IPCC predicted that the greatest impact of climate change will be human displacement (Brown, 2008; 9). Subsequently the media, alongside the academic community and various NGOs have coined the term “climate refugee”² to draw attention to the plight of those at the risk of displacement. “Climate refugees” pose

² The term “climate refugee” is highly contested, as will be explored in the literature review of this paper. However, for the lack of an agreed terminology, I will use the term “climate refugee” throughout the first parts of this paper (Introduction and Literature Review) when feasible (e.g. when summarizing authors who use the term). Later I will follow less contested wordings such as “environmental related internal/ external displacement”. However, for the sake of shortness I decided to use “climate refugee” within the titles of my literature review subchapters.

various questions to the international community: The majority of those who will face displacement are located in the so-called “Global South”, while the majority of those contributing to climate change live in the “Global North”. Here the link between human movements caused by climate change and the idea of “climate justice” surfaces prominently. However, the “climate refugee” debate is also often linked to notions of security, as Gregory White explains in his 2011 book called “Climate Change and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming World”. He analysed EU and US policy strategies that deal with the topic (White, 2011; 5-7). This demonstrates: we are witnessing a struggle over meaning and responses within the international arena (both in academic as well as in policy maker circles) regarding climate change induces displacement.

Hence, this thesis will concentrate on how the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) –the largest global humanitarian agency to assist refugees and displaced persons- is handling the challenging predictions of an increase in climate change displaced people. The UNHCR has developed a well-established norm-setting power (e.g. the very definition of the “refugee” category of international law is based on the UNHCR definition) as well as huge moral credibility within the international community throughout its more than 60 years of existence. The UNHCR is thus a relevant actor within the international community to address climate change induced displacement. The paper will therefore focus on agency more than on structure. Informed by a neo-Gramscian perspective the case study will analyse the UNHCR’s approach as a *hegemonic project*. Thus, the case study aims at tracing the ideological dimensions of the development of the policy approach of the agency, its consolidation and promotion. Furthermore, central part of this analysis will be an investigation into notions of climate justice within the agency’s approach.

The thesis starts with a literature review summarizing the evolving discourse from “environmental” to “climate refugees”. The focus is mainly on the academic debate, since it seems important to give an extensive overview of possible “framings” of the issue. Whenever appropriate, positions of non-academic actors like NGOs or policy institutes are mentioned as well to give a holistic overview. There is no agreed upon definition of the respective terminology or typology, yet. Hence, the aim of the review is to give an overview of the most prolific positions on this topic and to conclude with a convincing “working definition” for the subsequent case study.

The review is divided into four clusters, based on the line of argumentation used by the authors. Group one (“Climate Refugees and Environmental Factors”) tries to categorize the different environmental factors which trigger potential refugee movements (Tolba/El-Kholy, Bates, Neuteleers). Group two (“Climate Refugees and International Security”) pays attention to the connection between mass displacement and security concerns. The authors (Myers, Homer-Dixon, Tickell, Kibreab, Suhrke, Lonegran, Döös, Reuvney, Dupont, Pearman) are divided into a *Maximalist* and *Minimalist* approach and try to estimate the number of people potentially threatened to become displaced. Minimalist and maximalist authors are by far the most cited and prominent ones within the literature. Moreover, they seem to have the biggest impact on policy development, as earlier mentioned in connection to Gregory White’s work. The third cluster of academics (“Climate Refugees and International Law”) is more concerned with the legal implications of the term. They ask who is entitled to receive protection under international law and propose to either renegotiate existing conventions (Conisbee, Simms) or install new protection mechanisms (Boas, Biermann, King, Docherty, Giannin). While some of them firmly reject the notion of “climate refugee” (McAdam) other advocate for the term in order to highlight the vulnerability of the people displaced by climate change. The last group of authors presented (“Climate Refugees and Modes of Representation”) seems less established in the academic debate. These authors are concerned with the fate of the people who inhabit low lying island states in the Pacific, who are virtually threatened with extinction due to sea-level rise. They look at the power of representation and alternative narratives to climate change processes (Millar, Farbotko, Lazrus, McNamara, Gibson, Corlett).

These groups will be linked back to the UNHCR’s approach in the case study of this paper. Little systematic research has been done on the (evolving) UNHCR position towards “climate refugees”³ so far. Hence, the case study attempts to address this lack of research and tries to contribute to the debate.

³ In 2007 McNamara published an article employing discourse analysis in order to investigate positions of UN employees regarding “climate refugees”. However, this paper does not deal specifically with the UNHCR position and furthermore does not analyse policy papers or conference outcomes, but focuses on individual’s perspective on the issue. Moreover, in early 2012 Walter Kälin published a paper about protection gaps within the debate in which he reflected on the role of the UNHCR in this matter. Walter Kälin is closely connected to the UN, as he worked for it as special representative for IDP rights. Also Koko Warner from the United Nations University prepared a paper in 2011 for an UNHCR expert meeting on how climate change induces displacement policies of the

Employing a neo-Gramscian perspective, the literature review leads to a cluster of questions subsequently addressed within the case study. Neo-Gramscian notions within International Relations entail a focus on how *hegemony* is achieved within the international system. *Hegemony* is not meant in a militaristic sense, but rather looks at how consent is established by means of censorship and teaching within the international community. Peter Ives's book on "Language & Hegemony in Gramsci" has been instrumental for this paper. The linguistically enriched perception allows for the concept to be applied to the work of the UNHCR on the topic of climate change induced displacement. Furthermore, several essays by the scholar Hajer inform the methodology section which relies on a critical discourse analysis, making transparent various steps which characterize a *hegemonic project*. The three steps (*discursive communication-discourse-ideological domination/legitimization*) which form the ideological aspect of a hegemonic project will be traced throughout the case study in respective sub-chapters.

Questions emerging from this perspective are thus:

When and why did the UNHCR turn to questions of climate change and displacement scenarios? Which positions of the academic discourse found entrance into the "discursive communication" and "discourse" of the UNHCR? How is *hegemony* sought for; How does the UNHCR promote its' position? Which role does the notion of "climate justice" play?

The materials used to investigate these questions are various forms of texts released by the UNHCR and expert interviews conducted with a senior representative of the organisation. Extremely helpful for the research was the *unhcr.org* web page and the *refworld.org* database. Moreover, through an internship at the UNHCR I gained some relevant insight into the agency's practical work and was able to schedule the interviews with the senior employee.

The case study follows a chronological line from the mid 1990s to the year 2011. It sets out with a short subchapter on the context in which the UNHCR works and sets up new policies. Afterwards the *discursive communication* of the agency in the late 1990s

UNHCR need to be linked to the UNFCCC framework. However, none of these papers has a focus on the position of the UNHCR towards the topic or employs a neo-Gramscian angle.

and early 2000s will be traced as the initial step of the policy process. This was a period in which the UNHCR paid little attention to the topic. In 1996 there was a symposium conducted together with IOM on environmental displacement. Climate change issues were addressed at this symposium. However, the meeting did not trigger much further engagement of the agency with the topic. Furthermore, some external scholars published an article on environmental and climate change induced displacement on the UNHCR webpage, that gives some insight into how the agency saw the issue.

2008 marked the crucial year for UNHCR's engagement with the topic. A policy paper was published that year and from then on the agency became active working on the connection between climate change and displacement. Until today the policy paper forms the backbone of the UNHCR's approach and determines the discourse of the agency. The analysis of this paper is thus central part of the case study.

From the COP 15 meeting of 2009 onwards, the UNHCR started to promote their position to other international bodies with considerable success. In the third subchapter of the case study this process will be analysed. Here inter-agency submissions to the UNFCCC as well as internal struggles within the governing body of the agency will be discussed. This subchapter is crucial to understand how *hegemony* is achieved through framing the issue and promoting a specific understanding of the complex challenge of climate change related human movement within the international community.

In the last part, very recent events will be examined. After the agency put forward their position in form of the aforementioned policy paper, it was able to seek support and consent from other international bodies; the UNHCR continually enriches its position by incorporating ever more knowledge on the emerging phenomenon. In 2011, an expert meeting was held in Bellagio Italy and the Nansen Conference in Oslo, which triggered the Nansen Initiative.

2) Literature Review

In the following literature review a short overview of the current debates about "climate refugees" will be given. The debate about the link between environmental factors and

migration is not entirely new; however, in recent years the literature grew rapidly. Despite the increased academic attention little consensus exists among scholars. There is no coherent, agreed upon definition of what a “climate refugee” might be. Moreover, one can find not only the term “climate refugee”, but also “environmental refugee”, “environmentally displaced person”, “environmental migrant”, “ecomigrant”, “climate change induced displacement” or alike in the literature (Dun/Gemenne, 2008; 10). All of these terms refer to people driven to leave their usual habitat by environmental forces.

However, all of them imply slightly different cause-and-effect relations, call for different political attention and policies and advocacy for different groups of people. A shift from the notion of “environmental refugees” to “climate refugees” can be noted in the debate and possibly be explained by increasing political attention towards climate change. The notion of “environmental refugees” usually entails “climate refugees” and is thus more of an umbrella term (Boas/ Biermann, 2010; 62). In the following review important texts about “environmental refugees” will also be considered, since they incorporate debates and arguments about “climate refugees”.

The text discussed will systematically be scanned for a) a definition of the term, b) their position towards the term “refugee” c) proposed (political) actions to be taken and their interwoven notion of justice. The last part is particularly relevant to the following case study, since most authors call for the international community (and in particular for the UNHCR) to take action. Finally, the review will conclude with some critical reflections on the discussed contributions and with a working definition of the term “climate refugee”, which is necessary for the subsequent case study.

2.1) “Climate Refugees” and Environmental Factors

Interestingly, it was the former executive director of the UNEP, Tolba, who popularized the term “environmental refugee” and triggered both media as well as civil society⁴. In the UNEP World Environment Report of 1992, the most pressing issues listed are: air pollution, ozone depletion and climate change. In the section about climate

⁴ E.g.: The environmental NGO *Friends of the Earth Australia* published a “Citizens Guide to Climate Refugees” in 2004. In 2007 the German *Greenpeace* group published a booklet entitled “Climate Refugees – The denied Catastrophe”. Moreover, as shown in subchapter four of the review, international media eagerly picked up the terminology.

change it is pointed out that climate change has a strong impact on global society and bears the potential to lead to sea level rise and desertification “resulting in millions of environmental refugees” (Tolba/El-Kholy, 1992; 72). Still, an often cited definition of the term “environmental refugee” is that of UNEP researcher Essam El-Hinnawi from the year 1985:

“Environmental refugees are defined as those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of marked environmental disruption (natural and/ or triggered by people) that jeopardize their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life. By “environmental disruption” in this definition is meant any physical, chemical and/ or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life” (El-Hinnawi cited in Neuteleers, 2002, 230).

This definition has been criticised and re-defined by numerous authors, as it will be demonstrated below. Nevertheless, some key elements of this definition have been adopted by later authors on this topic.

Diane Bates, for example, worked with El-Hinnawi’s definition and tried to establish a more refined classification of “environmental refugees”. She differentiates her classifications along two important paradigms. She firstly establishes the importance of human agency in the decision to migrate and advocates for understanding the environmental migration nexus as a continual spectrum of voluntary to involuntary migration (2002; 468). That means that environmental migration has to be perceived as a voluntary choice of individuals (usually also influenced by other factors such as economic ones), whereas, “environmental refugees” are people who are forced out of their habitat by environmental factors (Bates, 2002; 468). The major focus is on distinguishing groups of environmental refugees according to different environmental factors (disasters, expropriation, deterioration) (Bates, 2002; 470). For her, environmental factors that trigger refugee flows can be put in three categories:

The first category of refugees are those forced to leave due to natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes, as well as technological disasters such as radioactive accidents, which “produce short-term refugees from a geographically limited area” (Bates, 2002; 469). Both natural disasters and anthropogenic disasters are “temporally acute and unintentionally produce migration” (Bates, 2002; 471). Her second category is constituted by people permanently displaced due to the appropriation of their usual land of residence for activities that are incompatible with residence (Bates, 2002; 472). Here

she mentions people displaced by either large scale development measures (dam or road constructions) or warfare (e.g. “ecocide” which means the “intentional destruction of human environments in order to strategically relocate a target population during a period of war” (Bates, 2002; 472)). In the last category she mentions environmental deterioration as a phenomenon that leads to migration. Here she refers to slow changes of the environment that cause pressure for moving elsewhere, e.g. pollution, depletion and degradation of the atmosphere (Bates, 2002; 474)⁵. Diane Bates points out that people falling into this category “share an almost universal lack of recognition as refugees” (2002; 473). In this category she highlights the interconnectedness of environmental degradation and poverty, coming to the awareness that “the effects of deterioration filter through the local economy. The poor are normally most vulnerable...” (Bates, 2002; 473). Due to the complexity of migration decisions in situations of environmental deterioration, she proposes to call these people “environmental emigrant” instead of refugees. Bates also stresses that migration is only one possible strategy to cope with the changing environment (2002; 473).

Stijin Neuteleers commented on Bates’s classifications and focused on the subcategory of “deterioration refugees”. In this category she explicitly mentions “climate refugees” as pure victims of environmental deterioration. The argument is that the subcategory of “deterioration refugee” needs to be further divided into “pure” refugees and those who are forced to move because of various issues. Neuteleers explains that a great amount of “deterioration refugees” cannot be distinguished from regular economic migrants. She says:

“Economic migrants are people who choose to flee from poverty (caused by social, political and environmental factors), hoping to build a new life somewhere else, but the same applies to people migrating because of gradual environmental deterioration” (2002; 241).

However, the case lies differently with “pure” deterioration refugees, such as the inhabitants of low lying island states. The author argues that this group of people is “the ideal type of environmental refugees and of ‘climate refugees’” (Neuteleers, 2002; 242). In the case of sea-level rise the environmental factor can be clearly isolated from all other factors that could trigger migration: due to climate change and global warming the sea-level is rising and thus literally “drowns” small islands states. Furthermore, this type

⁵ Bates does not use the term “climate refugee”. However, the notion that ozone depletion, global warming and the polluting of the atmosphere with all its negative and adverse effects may trigger migration is explicitly mentioned within the text.

of refugees is distinct from others, because one can identify who is primarily responsible for the loss of the territory: namely industrial states who have (historically) contributed most to green house gas emission and thus (unintentionally) fostered global warming (Neuteleers, 2002; 242). Therefore, she concludes that it is a moral obligation for the polluting countries to assist these island states with money for the evacuation processes and a new place where the communities can resettle (Neuteleers, 2002; 243). She concludes with stressing that to remedy the situation one needs to hope for better environmental policies within developed countries and for “a more charitable attitude towards migrants in general” (Neuteleers, 2002; 246).

A more recent typology was put forward by Walter Kälin from the University of Bern. His classification is based on the assumption that both slow and sudden onset natural disasters linked to climate change can lead to (voluntary) migration as well as (involuntary) displacement within or across borders (Kälin, 2010; 84). Furthermore he takes into account that governments might require relocations of people in high-risk zones and also factors in displacement scenarios spurred by conflict related to climate change (e.g. through massive resource depletion). He highlights that in particular slow-onset phenomena are often rendered as causing migration rather than displacement (Kälin, 2010; 89). Sudden onset disasters make possible a more causal link between event and displacement and are likely to grow in the future (Kälin, 2010; 82).

2.2) “Climate Refugees” and Security Concerns

This cluster of scholars is divided into a *maximalist* and *minimalist* approach, as Neuteleers and Suhrke argue. While *maximalist* put forward alarmingly high numbers of potential “environmental refugees”; *minimalist* tend to question the link between environmental changes and displacement altogether.

Norman Myers is among the most prominent writers of the so-called *maximalist* approach. He started to work on the topic in the late 1980s and since then has published various articles linking climate change to migration flows and security concerns. In his 1993 article he defines “environmental refugees” as the following:

“They [environmental refugees] are people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their erstwhile homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, and other environmental problems. In their desperation, they feel

they have no alternative but to seek sanctuary elsewhere, however hazardous the attempt (Myers, 1993; 752).”

To this broad definition (which resembles that of former UNEP director Tolba) he adds, that people displaced by large development projects, such as the building of dams, need to be considered as “environmental refugees” as well (Myer, 2001; 609)⁶.

Myers is widely known for having tried to estimate the number of potential “environmental refugees”. Based on the assumption that little will be done to curb greenhouse gas emissions, he uses the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projections for sea-level rise for the year 2050 (Myers, 1993; 753). He correlates this with the expected population growth for 2050 in coastal areas and thus presents numbers of potential “environmental refugees” (Myers, 1993; 753). He comes to the conclusion that if population patterns continue as today there will be 15 million “environmental refugees” due to sea level rise in Bangladesh in the year 2050 alone (Myers, 1993; 754). All his further predictions are also centred on so-called developing countries, for the author believes it is they that have to bear the brunt of the adverse impacts of climate change (Myers, 1993; 753). Homer-Dixon, a scholar of security studies, shares the conviction that it is the developing countries that will suffer most from the effects of climate change (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 78). Myers concluded his 1993 article with the assumption that there will be 150 million environmental refugees from developing countries in the climate change affected world of 2050 (Myers, 1993; 757). Major causes for this large-scale displacement are sea-level rise, coastal erosion and flooding as major threats in low-lying countries and river deltas in Asia (Bangladesh, India, China, Vietnam) and Africa (e.g. Egypt) (Myers, 1993; 753-755). He points out that in these cases the population of the mega-cities such as Manila, Bombay or Bangkok will be particularly negatively affected (Myers, 1993; 756). This sentiment is shared by Tickell, who as early as 1989, warned in a lecture at the Royal Society in London that climate change will lead to major human displacement (Tickell, 1989; 3). The major causes for this displacement are population growth, resource scarcity and the depletion of the ozone layer leading to global warming (Tickell, 1989; 5).

⁶ The number of those people should not be underestimated, as Anthony Oliver-Smith points out. In his essay about development induced displacement and resettlement, he states that the World Bank has estimated that “publicly and privately funded development projects displace approximately 10 Million people a year” (Oliver-Smith, 2005; 189).

Bo R Döös equally tried to estimate the number of climate refugees. The two factors he is focusing on are desertification and subsequent famines and sea-level rise. While he concludes that famines will not necessarily lead to displacement; sea-level rise will lead to mass displacement in coastal areas and can be predicted with some accuracy, since those people virtually have no choice but to migrate (Döös, 1997; 59).

For Myers, Tickell and Homer-Dixon these large scale movements bear the potential for civil unrest and conflict. Hence, Myers future scenario is grave:

“Refugees would tend to crowd into settlement camps or shantytowns, which would become prime breeding grounds for crime, civil disorder, social upheaval, and violence of many sorts (Myers, 1993; 759)”.

Homer Dixon shares the idea that environmental factors heavily contribute to all sorts of conflicts such as “war, terrorism, or diplomatic and trade disputes” (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 77). Also in 2006, Dupont and Pearman published a paper on the connection between climate change and security issues. They believed that:

“there is no consensus about appropriate strategies for dealing with the consequences of climate change, primarily because there is no agreement about its seriousness for international security” (Dupont/Pearman, 2006; vii).

With respect to “climate refugees” they elaborate that mass emigration by “climate refugees” might very well spark international conflict and that unrest due to these movements is “plausible” (Dupont/ Pearman; 2006; 55). In their estimation “climate refugees” or migrants

“can impinge on the living space of others, widen existing ethnic and religious divides and add to environmental stress in a self-sustaining cycle of migration and instability” (Dupont/Pearman, 2006; 56).

In a similar vein Rafael Reuvney argues that “climate change-induced migration appears in many climate change-to-violence scenarios” (Reuvney, 2007; 656). He particularly mentions that the speed with which refugee flows related to environmental catastrophes appear might fuel conflicts and lessen the chance of “smooth integration” (Reuvney, 2007; 660) into the receiving communities. Most of these conflicts will occur in developing states, as these are also the regions where most environmental refugees will appear. Reuvney reasons that the Global South will see more refugees, because these states lack technology and money for adaptation measures and their population disproportionally depends on agriculture and the environment for their living (Reuvney, 2007; 661).

These last examples demonstrate that the connection between “climate refugees” and security issues is not solely a notion of the beginning of the debate, but still finds supporting voices⁷.

It is noteworthy that environmental degradation is seen as the root cause for refugee flows by many of the authors. Only in subsequent paragraphs do they mention that usually these flows are triggered not only by one factor but by multiple others (Myers, 2001;609/ Tickell, 1989;11/ Homer-Dixon, 1991; 97). Myers in particular mentions the fatal connection between poverty and environmental destruction (Myers, 2001; 610) which intensifies the pressure to leave ones land. There as Tickell is prone to highlight is the significance of population growth in connection to environmental degradation (Tickell, 1989; 5). Myers’s proposed remedy is found in preventions which include a consequent turn to sustainable development and anti-desertification actions, as well as a coherent response by the United Nations (Myers, 2001; 612). This response would entail the recognition of so-called “environmental refugees” by the international community and its refugee agency the UNHCR. Homer-Dixon further urges for more equal food distributions and looks into the capacities of the market to achieve that (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 99).

This *maximalist* approach was embraced by various NGOs, but heavily disputed by scholars of the so-called *minimalist* school (Neuteleers, 2011; 232). They doubt the estimated numbers, the assumed causality between environmental changes and mass exodus as well as the connection between migration and security concerns.

Gaim Kibreab from Uppsala University is one of the *minimalist* authors and argues that it is still primarily social factors that lead to migration movements. The author points out that (civil) war and social unrest in combination with poverty are the dominant forces that cause refugee flows in Africa. These social instabilities may lead to environmental destruction and the breakdown of “traditional resource management

⁷ Most recently, in 2011 an article was published by Sarah Johnstone and Jeffrey Mazo, exploring the links between climate change and the uprisings in the Arab world known as the “Arab Spring”. Although they do not see global warming as the primer cause for the uprisings; they do view the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as: “a textbook example of what analysts mean when they talk of complex causality and the role of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier” (Johnstone/Mazo, 2011; 11). They warn not to underestimate the impact of global warming on the global food production and see food shortages and a subsequent rise in prices as one of the sparks that triggered the revolutions in that region (Johnstone/ Mazo, 2011; 15). They conclude their essay with the warning: “And climate change may increase the probability that events such as those we are seeing in the Middle East and North Africa will happen elsewhere in the world”(Johnstone/Mazo, 2011; 15).

systems” (Kibreab, 1997; 22); it is not the other way round. In the subsequent paragraphs the author moreover pays attention to the potentially negative impacts of refugees on the eco-system of the host country, stressing that these negative influences on the environment caused by sudden mass migration have long been neglected by international relief agencies and scholars alike (Kibreab, 1997; 23). The author comes to the conclusion that the practice of keeping refugees in segregated settlements (as is often the case in African countries) negatively contributes to environmental depletion within the respective area; thus freedom of movement and settlement would be beneficial for the environment and the people (Kibreab, 1997; 33).

Similar to this approach is the line of argumentation of Astri Suhrke. In her 1993 article it is established that the connection between migration and climate change is not as straight forward as *maximalist* authors propose. In fact, migration is here presented merely as an adaptation measure to deal with changing environments (Suhrke, 1993; 5). Environmental factors play only a marginal role in people’s decision to move and those who move constitute a small number of people (Suhrke, 1993; 15). The author advocates for more thorough case studies before assuming a direct correlation between migration and environmental factors. She gives a couple of detailed accounts on how modernization processes, paired with Nation building and massive population growth have caused ecosystems to become unbalanced in Africa, India and Latin America (Suhrke, 1993; 16). The core of the argument can be summed up as follows: Due to the interconnectedness of the above mentioned phenomena environmental refugees cannot be differentiated from “economically motivated migrations” (Suhrke, 1993; 32).

This sentiment is shared by Steve Lonegran, who explains the complexity of migration. Lonegran admits that environmental factors might play a role in the decision of individuals to migrate. But he also firmly states that

“...drawing a linear, deterministic relationship between environmental degradation and migration (and security) is not only inappropriate, but impossible, despite the claims of some authors” (Lonegran, 1998; 6).

Both, Suhrke and Lonegran, reject estimations of potential refugees. For Lonegran the numbers put forward by authors like Myers are only vague estimations “presented ... either for shock value or for political reasons” (Lonegran, 1998; 6). Surke shares this belief. Only in situations where development projects are planned and communities need to be resettled could estimations be precise enough to be worth

doing (Suhrke, 1993; 33). In conclusion Suhrke remarks that root causes of environmental degradation need to be addressed and that structural tension rather results from rapid urbanisation processes (Suhrke, 1993; 35). The author sums up with respect to the link between environmental migrants and conflict, that the main outcome will be “exploitation rather than acute conflict. The main reason is that those who are most victimized by environmental change are also likely to be weak and numerical few” (Suhrke, 1993;35). The term “refugee” is avoided and replaced by “migrant” which has far less dramatic connotations by Suhrke, Lonegran and Kibreab alike.

The presented positions revolve around the central question of how many people might be affected by climate change related displacement and whether or not this will lead to conflict or not. All the authors mentioned come to somewhat different answers, as sketched above. They show little interest in the legal aspects of their proposed definitions and use the term “refugee” rather carelessly. This is best illustrated by a statement from Myers. In his 2001 essay he wrote that people:

“... with poverty and ‘life on the environmental limits’ as the main motivation forces, it matters little to the migrants whether they view themselves primarily as environmental or economic refugees” (Myers, 2001; 610).

This sentiment will be picked up and disputed in the following subchapter on the legal dimensions of the term.

In 2011 Gregory White published the previously mentioned book “Climate Change and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming World”. His book also acknowledges the rigid division between *minimalist* and *maximalist* scholars and aims to transcend it by carefully analysing how the securitization of “climate refugees” happened. He points out that for influential actors like the EU and the US National Intelligence Council climate change has long been perceived as a “threat multiplier” and crucial attentions is paid to the protection of borders against potential mass refugee movements linked to climate change (White, 2011; 7). This has to do with a gradual shift within the security paradigm in international and national politics. According to White one can trace securitization efforts regarding the environment since the end of the cold war: security is by now much more than a military; rather it encompasses various aspects of human being (food, shelter, economy) including the environment we live in (White, 2011; 62). He moreover mentions that in the North Atlantic countries climate change policies that centred around security issues received more electoral

support than costly mitigation policies (White, 2011; 58). In the same vein as the securitization of the environment and more specific of climate change entered policy practices, migration policies became linked to notions of threats and security (White, 2011; 65-66). Both within the NAFTA and the EU region borders became more rigidly enforced and migration progressively harder (White, 2011; 66-67). Climate change induced migration was thus readily translated into a threat by policy makers. White concludes this by pointing out that: “wearing security glasses can make one shortsighted” (White, 2011; 65). Jane McAdam (her work will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter) also highlights that the UN General Assembly and Security Council also focused on climate change induced displacement and frames the issue with a focus on security (McAdam, 2012; 222). In 2009 they even adopted a resolution entitled: “Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications”, which focuses also on displacement scenarios (McAdam, 2012; 222).

These last two authors thus show: the topic has made it onto national and international policy maker agendas, albeit from a rather limited perspective on security notions only.

2.3) “Climate Refugees” and International Law

In this subchapter the term “environmental or climate refugee” will be discussed from a legal perspective. Authors in this cluster raise several concerns when talking about “climate refugees”. The “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees” of the United Nations from the year 1951 puts forward a clear definition of the term “refugee”. A refugee is someone who:

“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return” (UNHCR, 1951; 14).

This definition is until today the cornerstone in international refugee protection. More than 140 states have ratified the conventions and a subsequent protocol dating back to 1967 (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 27). The most important elements of this definition are a) the reasons for being considered a refugee (e.g. political opinion or

religion) are based on group characteristics, b) the fact that the person is outside his/her nation state or (in case of statelessness) outside of the country of habitual residence, c) the person is unwilling or unable to return home because of the fear of persecution (Docherty/Giannini, 2009; 362).

The protocol was established and ratified right after the World War II. The convention also sets out specific rights of refugees, making the principle of *non-refoulement* the most important one. It means that refugees cannot be returned to their home country without their consent (UNHCR, 1951; 30). For the purpose of this work it is important to highlight, that environmental changes are not explicitly mentioned in the definition and thus represent no obvious reason for granting refugee status.

Nevertheless, there are several authors who argue that “climate refugees” need to be recognized and granted equal rights to “convention refugees”. Molly Conisbee and Andrew Simms published a pocket book entitled “Environmental Refugees –The Case for Recognition” for the *Think Tank New Economics Foundation* in 2003. For their purpose they define “environmental refugees” as those being displaced by large scale development projects (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 19) and “climate refugees” of low lying (islands) states who are displaced by a rising sea level (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 17). They focus on these two groups, because here a legal case can be constructed in support for granting the victims of such displacement official refugee status.

The authors start to highlight why the international community should assist those two categories of environmental refugees. They point out that in the case of large-scale development projects local (often indigenous) communities are actively displaced through resettlement schemes of their own government (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 19). Thus, the governments in question are “the direct cause of displacement –and a poor source of protection” (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 27). Furthermore, in the case of “climate refugees” a rising sea level has the potential to erase whole nation states; thus these states are incapable of protecting their own citizens (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 27). And finally, most of the countries affected are poor developing states who often do not have the financial means to adequately protect their people (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 28). Their last argument for international protection is a moral one:

“It’s the central contention of this pocketbook that the international community has a duty to help environmental refugees. ... This means an historic act of facing up to the real cost of our lifestyle” (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 25).

The authors then argue that there is a need to either supplement the Geneva Convention or to expand it (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 30). They root this proposal in the notion that the environment can intentionally be used to harm people (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 30). In the case of infrastructural measures which lead to displacement, this is obvious. However, for Conisbee and Simms it is also evident that the negative consequences of a fossil-fuel-intensive, Western lifestyle (namely global warming and a related sea-level rise) are commonly known. And that:

“To disregard that knowledge, or to fail to respond adequately, must be classed as intentional behaviour. Such intentional behaviour will result in environmental refugees. It’s thus perfectly fair to categorise it as environmental persecution.” (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 30).

“Environmental persecution”, as the author call it, should therefore become a legitimate reason for granting refugee status to people. Conisbee and Simms finish their pocket book with a proposal for a global UN Commission whose task it would be to either “update the Geneva convention” or write a “new convention” for the protection of those affected by environmental persecution and, furthermore, to establish a compensating mechanism for ecological debts (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 33/34).

In regards to the UNHCR and the refugee convention of 1951, Conisbee and Simms are very outspoken. For them the agency’s rejection to grant refugee status based on environmental factors risks making the convention and UNHCR look “out of date” and even “absurd” (Conisbee/ Simms, 2003; 33).

An even more encompassing proposal for international engagement, which also favours the term “climate refugee”, was presented by Boas and Biermann in the year 2010. They also argue for including internally displaced people into a new “climate refugee” convention. In their text they “provide a blueprint for a global governance architecture on the recognition, protection, and voluntary resettlement of climate refugees” (Boas/Biermann, 2010; 62). They start their proposal with a narrow definition of a “climate refugee” to make the term more usable in international law. They exclude various factors and strip down the notion of “climate refuge” to:

“the victims of a set of three direct, largely undisputed climate change impacts: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity” (Boas/Biermann, 2010; 64).

They continue to assume that the existing differentiation between environmental migrants or refugee is not useful and come to the conclusion that “adopting voluntariness as a defining criterion would be either analytically not useful or morally dubious” (Boas/Biermann, 2010; 65). Furthermore, the differentiation between long- and short-term relocation is seen as obsolete as much as the differentiation between internally displaced or internationally displaced matters little to victims of climate change (Boas/Biermann, 2010; 66). They advocate the use of the term “refugee” instead of “displaced person” because they believe the moral connotations and responsibilities associated with the term are appropriate for those forced to flee their home due to climate change (Boas/ Biermann, 2010; 67). Following their definition of a “climate refugee” they explain why they reject a “simple” expansion of the existing refugee conventions (Boas/ Biermann, 2010; 75). Instead they outline a possible new mechanism to protect “climate refugees” based on the following principles:

“Politically, it is essential to specify climate refugees because of the link of this type of migrants with the overall climate regime and its emerging debates on liability, compensation, equity, and common but differentiated responsibilities” (Boas/Biermann, 2010; 63)

Here their stand on the connection between the “climate justice” sentiments referred to in the introduction of this paper and the “climate refugees” concept is very pronounced. A new mechanism is needed to merge those two approaches and to secure both protection of refugee needs and justice in the times of global warming. They are among the only authors who acknowledge that in theory also people from the Western world would fall into the category of “climate refugees”. However, in their opinion it is still the population of the developing world that will be in the centre of attention in the debate, due to the lack of adaptation resources in developing countries (Boas/Biermann, 2010; 67).

Directly opposing this position, Tracy King published an article called “Environmental Displacement: Coordinating Efforts to Find Solutions” in the *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review*. She states:

“...most persons who migrate for environmental reasons are not refugees as currently defined in international law because they are not persecuted by the state based on certain enumerated grounds” (King, 2006; 551).

Her line of argumentation will be outlined below. King starts with acknowledging that there is a connection between environmental factors and migration,

but stresses that it is hard to differentiate between environmental factors and other ones such as economic motives (King, 2006; 546). King gives a list of reasons why the term “environmental refugee” should be avoided and why it bears no ground in international refugee law. First, she reminds the reader that “environmental refugees” are usually not persecuted by their home state. In most cases the state is not using the environment to intentionally hurt people belonging to one of the enumerated categories that would justify international protection (e.g. religion or nationality).⁸ In fact most of those affected by climate change can rely on their state for a certain level of support (King, 2006; 553). Here a stark contrast between her position and that of Conisbee and Smith is obvious. Second, she warns against re-negotiating the international refugee convention because this could lead to a delusion of the original principles. This argument is partly historically based (King, 2006; 551). The Refugee Convention was established in the aftermath of World War II. King states that this particular historical situation was necessary to negotiate conventions that are as favourable to refugees as the ones we have today. Opening the convention for renegotiation in the time of tightened asylum regimes and a generally more hostile environment for refugees could jeopardise the framework for protection for millions of people (King, 2006; 554). Third, most people who have to leave their home because of environmental factors are not actually leaving their country. Most of them merely migrate to another city or region within the same state. Thus, one of the defining criteria for being considered a refugee (being outside ones home nation or habitual country of residence) and being eligible for international protection, is not fulfilled (King, 2006; 551). Her fourth point is an economic one and refers to the international community. If “environmental refugees” were recognised as eligible to receive the same support as “convention” refugees, the financial burden for the international community (in particular for the UNHCR) would be enormous. Money would then have to be deferred from the protection of “convention” refugees in order to protect the new category of people (King, 2006; 554).

Thus, instead of re-negotiating the original convention, King advocates for not granting refugee status but to use the term “environmentally displaced”. She argues that

⁸ King, however, acknowledges the problem of ecocide and sees that as a legitimate reason for granting refugee status. She refers to the Iraqi government which “systematically destroyed marshes in southern Iraq in response to politically rebellion by the Marsh Arabs of the region” (King, 2006; 553) during the 1990s. Nevertheless, incidents like this are rather few and due to the obvious persecution based on group characteristics, the means of persecution (environmental pollution) becomes somehow redundant.

people driven from their habitual place of residence due to environmental factors resemble refugees because

“they are vulnerable and have limited time and few resources with which to migrate. As a result, environmentally displaced persons are in particular need of international assistance” (King, 2006; 555).

They are distinct from voluntary migrants because of a paramount “push” factor that forces them to migrate elsewhere (King, 2006; 555). She revisits her initial distinction of sudden- to slow onset environmental changes and comes to the following conclusions:

- 1) People who have to flee sudden-onset events such as floods or earthquakes are clearly to be characterized as environmentally displaced (King, 2006; 556).
- 2) It is more complicated with slow-onset events, because they make a proactive as well as a reactive reaction possible. Once environmental deterioration (like desertification or rise of sea level) start, a progress of the phenomenon can be assumed and the choice to move elsewhere is influenced by anticipated hardship, as well as by acute one (King, 2006; 556).

The author thus sums up that:

“In general slow onset problems create environmental migrants, and both slow and acute onset problems create environmentally displaced persons” (King, 2006; 556).

King also emphasises the responsibility of the Western societies because the unsustainable lifestyle in those countries is triggering environmental hardship in other places (King, 2006; 558). She moreover points to the potential security implications of large scale displacement and urges to take action to “maintain global security” (King, 2006; 558).

The way forward King suggests, is introducing an “International Coordinating Mechanism for Environmental Displacement (ICMED)” (2006; 559) to co-ordinate the work of the various UN agencies potentially fit to help remedy the situation such as the UNHCR, UNEP or the UNDP. The work of the ICMED would involve measures to prevent displacement (King, 2006; 561), prepare for possible catastrophes (e.g. by implementing and improving early warning systems as well as monitoring systems in vulnerable places) (King, 2006; 562), mitigate the effects of migration movements (e.g. with humanitarian assistance in the host country) (King, 2006; 562), rehabilitate places

negatively effected by environmental impacts (King, 2006; 563) and resettle people in cases where a return is impossible (King, 2006; 564). She finishes by stressing that only a multidisciplinary agency that combines humanitarian expertise with environmental science expertise can be successful in holistically addressing the complex phenomenon of environmental displacement (King, 2006; 565).

Apart from King, Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannin, both lecturers at the Harvard Law School worked out new mechanisms to help “climate change displaced people”. They agree that the contemporary international refugee convention is not sufficient to deal with the emerging category of environmentally displaced people (Docherty/ Giannin, 2009; 350). As they put it:

“In short, displacement due to climate change is a *de facto* problem currently lacking a *de jure* solution” (Docherty/Giannin, 2009; 357).

They state that while the UNHCR mandate is too narrow to deal with climate change refugees, the UNFCCC conventions only relate to inter-state activities and are not designed to deal with issues of human displacement and subsequent aid delivery (Docherty/ Giannin, 2009; 358). Thus, they propose for an entirely new framework to deal with “climate refugees”. Their proposal is designed to support those who cross international borders to flee climate change impact. Although the authors agree that internally displaced person deserve the same protection, their proposal is strictly meant to deal with the international dimension of such displacement as only here is international law applicable (Docherty/ Giannin, 2009; 360).

The authors then develop a detailed instrument to ensure this aid entails not only human rights protection and humanitarian aid but also addresses the shared responsibilities of the international community by establishing a global fund for research and adaptation measures (Docherty/Giannin, 2009; 373). The UNHCR should contribute to this new mechanism by expertise in status determination processes (Docherty/Giannin, 2009, 374), guidelines and legal advice for human rights protection (Docherty/Giannin, 2009; 376), as well as with (material) humanitarian aid (Docherty/Giannin, 2009; 379).

The most recent work on the topic of climate change induced displacement from an international law perspective is probably done by Jane Mc Adam who published an entire monography on the topic earlier this year. She rejects the notion of “climate

refugee” for much of the same reasons as mentioned before (McAdam, 2012; 43). Instead of designing fictitious new treaties she explores the role of complementary protection. This means: existing mechanisms need to be linked and optimized instead of creating new norms in a climate where there is no international support for them anyways. In particular human rights approaches (McAdam, 2012; 38) and disaster relief schemes (McAdam, 2012; 106) need to be better integrated and might prove beneficial within climate change related scenarios, too. Due to space/time limitations her arguments will not be put forward in detail here. It only needs mention that she examines the question of statelessness which possibly arises in some of the Pacific island states in great detail in her book and in an earlier essay on the topic. Her earlier reflections focus on when and how statehood actually ceases to exist under international law (McAdam, 2010; 117).

Although the presented positions differ widely in their definitions of a “climate refugee” and their proposals to remedy the situation, they are united on the notion that people affected by climate change need international support. All urge the United Nations to take action and agree on a moral obligation to focus on this emerging group of displaced people. In particular the authors King, Boas, Bierman, Docherty and Giannin develop detailed institutional settings to support environmentally displaced people. Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the UNHCR’s policies towards this category of people is missing. Since there is little or no evidence that the international community is willing or able to realize any of the proposed mechanisms to protect “climate refugees” (Millar, 2007; 86), existing practices of the UNHCR are worth a closer look.

2.4) “Climate Refugees” and Modes of Representation

In this last sub-chapter of the literature review, the focus is on the potential “victims” of climate change. In particular the authors Neuteleers, Myers, Boas and Biermann stress the vulnerability of inhabitants of low-lying island states and the dangers of sea-level rise. Therefore, this category of “pure climate refugee” as Neuteleers put it, will be more closely examined. Here texts concerned with the Pacific Ocean region will be presented which are united in their urge to pay closer attention to the narratives and images of so-called “climate refugees”, as portrayed in the media, political circles and academia. These papers present alternatives to the dominant narratives about the devastating effects of

climate change. Influenced by a constructivist understanding they seek to explore the positions and “identities” of the affected countries of the periphery.

Commonly, Pacific island states are rendered in terms of vulnerability, marginality and remoteness. These characteristics are further accentuated within the climate change discourse. Illona Millar summarizes the most precarious environmental conditions arising from climate change on the islands: the rising sea level threatens the fresh water reserves of the low-lying islands, thus salination already puts severe stresses on the population of the Atoll islands and their small-scale agriculture (Millar, 2007; 74). Global warming leads to so-called coral bleaching which has destructive effects for the local fishermen; furthermore, soil erosion and more frequent and severe tropical storms threaten the existence of the Pacific islands (Millar, 2007; 75). Even if the worst-case scenario of extinction is not likely to occur overnight, severe consequences of global warming are already felt today by the islanders, making them the “ideal” victim of climate change. This notion is further strengthened by the serious health impacts the changing climate will have on the islanders. The United Nations World Health Organisation has recently started to promote research and regional workshops on health issues related to climate change in the Pacific region (Ebi/ Lewis/ Corvalan, 2006; 1957). Drastic weather phenomena such as king tides, increase and hardship of the rainy season and cyclones can have various effects on human well-being and cause severe injuries, various stress-related disorders, increase in the spread of diseases as well as food insecurity and malnutrition (Ebi/ Lewis/ Corvalan, 2006; 1959). To these grave predictions, Stephen Tully from the College of Law, Sydney links a human rights dimension. The rising sea level is not only threatening people’s physical but also their cultural home, infringing on their right to a safe and healthy environment as much as on their right to cultural participation (Tully, 2007; 182). And even more drastically, the rising sea is making it impossible for states to secure the most fundamental human right; the right to life (Tully, 2007; 184). Representing the islanders as victims and their fate as a tragic incident is also common outside of academia and within the media. Different authors demonstrate how Pacific islanders are portrayed in the media and by NGOs (e.g. Friends of the Earth Australia) in the light of climate change. They come to the conclusion that: “NGOs appear to almost universally portray potential ‘climate refugees’ in the Pacific as passive victims” (McNamara/ Gibson, 2009; 479). The same apparently holds true for various analysed newspaper articles (e.g. from the *Time Magazine*, *Sydney Morning Herald*, *The Times of India* or *New Zealand Herald*), which are unified by an

apocalyptic vision of the future that pushes the islanders to relocate elsewhere as the only chance for survival (McNamara/ Gibson, 2009; 479).

From this narrative of “vulnerability” alternative ways of representation are sought for by authors like Carol Farbotko. The author warns that:

“Dominant, global narratives about climate change, such as climate refugee discourses, can entrench vulnerable communities in inequitable power relations, redirecting their fate from their hands” (Farbotko/Lazrus, 2012; 382).

Her paper from the year 2005 is entitled “Tuvalu and Climate Change: Constructions of Environmental displacement in the Sydney Morning Herald” and presents a critical discourse analysis of the construction of so-called “climate refugees” from Tuvalu in a major Australian newspaper. The author shows how Tuvaluans are dominantly presented as extremely vulnerable to effects of the “outer world” (in terms of their physical vulnerability to environmental effects or their heavily dependent economy) (Farbotko, 2005; 279). In the newspaper articles analysed it becomes obvious that Tuvaluans are mostly depicted as “tragic victims” of climate change. In one incident the paper only presented a desperate appeal by the island government to Australia for granting citizenship to those Tuvaluans forced to leave their land due to climate change. Other, much more self-assured actions by the island leaders are not reported (e.g. Tuvalu’s Prime Minister was considering to raise legal actions against the USA as prime polluter and thus prime threat to the existence of Tuvalu as a nation) (Farbotko, 2005; 282). This provokes an impression of passiveness and disempowerment of the citizens of Tuvalu, according to Farbotko. Relocation of the population is widely discussed in the newspaper articles: however, other alternatives to combat the adverse effects of climate change, such as curbing emissions and other costly but effective adaptation measures were not mentioned (Farbotko, 2005; 286). The author comes to the conclusion that while superficially seen as an awareness-raising measure of a mainstream newspaper, the articles in the *Sydney Morning Herald* also harbour some potentially precarious notions (Farbotko, 2005; 289). The articles portray Tuvaluans strictly from a perspective of victimhood, and thus “alternative discourses of adaptation for Tuvaluans are marginalized” (Farbotko, 2005; 289). The effects of such a discourse should not be underestimated, due to the common notion in Australia to have “a ‘special right to manage’ the affairs of their Pacific neighbours” (Farbotko, 2005; 282). In subsequent years Farbotko published two more articles on this topic. In 2010 she further investigated the perception of Pacific Islands in the current climate change discourse,

coming to the conclusion that only the fact that these places will be lost forever makes them relevant to the discourse (Farbotko, 2010; 48). In her view the disappearance of the islands becomes the ultimate truth about climate change and the long needed evidence to make politicians act (Farbotko, 2010; 48). She points out:

“Island people, long marginalised, are denied their own agency in the climate change crisis. They are fictionalised into victim populations fleeing inundation, desperate for dry land, even drowned” (Farbotko, 2010; 58).

Only under conditions of global warming do those islands make an appearance in the Western psyche, having to endure an “ecocolonial gaze” (Farbotko, 2010; 58). In 2012 she and Heather Lazrus further elaborated, that the islanders have always been moving from one island to the next; movement and “sailing the waves” have always been part of their history and identity (Farbotko/Lazrus 2012; 383). Instead of granting those people refugee status in countries like New Zealand or Australia, adaptation measures and training programs would be beneficial as they would allow some of the islanders to migrate as skilled workers to support their kin through remittances (Farbotko/Lazrus, 2012; 383).

Karen Elizabeth McNamara and Chris Gibson also deal with the representation of small Pacific island states in the time of climate change. They are concerned with the self-positioning of Pacific ambassadors to the United Nations in the “climate refugee” debate. In 2009 they published an article in the journal *Geoforum* called “We do not want to leave our land”; Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations resist the category of ‘climate refugees’. Their paper is informed by a poststructuralist notion of international relations:

“understanding the etymology and affect of discursive categories matters because they generate their own altered realities, setting the term of debates, changing political landscapes and shifting relationships between people, institutions ...” (McNamara/ Gibson, 2009; 476).

From this theoretical background they analyse what geopolitical implications for a common future the term “climate-refugee” and the portrayal of Pacific islanders as such has. Hence, the authors conducted interviews with Pacific Ambassadors at the United Nations headquarters (McNamara/ Gibson, 2009; 477). Interestingly these interviews reveal that the category “climate refugee” is not desired, and is even rejected by the ambassadors. For them leaving their homeland was an unacceptable reaction to climate change. The ambassadors lobbied for curbing green house gas emissions at the UN, rather than broadening existing refugee conventions (McNamara/ Gibson, 2009;

479). The interviewed ambassadors called for the international community to stick to the principle that sovereignty is paramount in international affairs and urged for it to pay greater attention to sustainable development (McNamara/ Gibson, 2009; 480). A common opinion among those interviewed was that the developed nations need to curb their emissions and pay greater attention to the right of self-determination of all nations. Just because the island states are remote and low in population and income, developed countries have no right to jeopardise the existence of the nations. Rather, developed countries have the (historical) responsibility to alter their consumption and emission patterns and to support smaller states with adaptation measures that could preserve their sovereignty (McNamara/ Gibson, 2009; 481). According to the authors, the rejection of the “climate refugee” category and their reassertion of the right to self-determination of their nations highlight the different geopolitical visions for the future (McNamara/ Gibson, 2009; 482). While the ambassadors advocate for taking climate change seriously and doing everything to prevent it, those advocating the new category of “climate refugee” risk that within developed nations:

“... the category of ‘climate refugees’ legitimises future visions of a climate change affected world in which mass population mobility and loss of homelands are considered unfortunate, but acceptable ‘solutions’ to the problems of the social impacts of climate change” (McNamara/ Gibson, 2009; 482).

Finally, the Australian scholar David Corlett is dealing with the notion of “climate refugees” from the Pacific islands. In his 2008 book “Stormy Weather: The Challenge of Climate Change and Displacement” he uses various interviews made with Tuvaluans on the topic to draw attention to their perception of the near future. However, the author did not only talk to politicians and leaders of the community. He also talked to regular citizens, fishermen and their wives as well as to religious leaders. Tuvalu’s population is mostly Christian-Protestant and the religion has a great impact on people’s everyday life, their vision of the future and also their perception of climate change (Corlett, 2008; 38). While many interviewees acknowledged the changes and negative impacts of the environment on their livelihood (Corlett, 2008; 29, 30, 34), there is also a considerable number of deeply religious protestants on the island who trust in God’s intentions to spare their land from flooding (Corlett, 2008; 38). In an interview summarized in the book the Reverend Tafue Lusame makes clear that many Tuvaluans are convinced that there was only one flood since the beginning of time and that it was in the time of Noah (Corlett, 2008; 39). Obviously, the population in Tuvalu is split in their ideas of the climate change. While politicians seek international help and justice,

the local population is torn between religious beliefs and adopting small-scale adaptation measures (Corlett, 2008; 40).

The importance of these last three texts lies in the understanding that “victims” of climate change do not necessarily see themselves as victims and that Western media and politics may foster a certain “acceptance” of the loss of the discussed islands and their cultures. The notion of “climate refugee” might be dangerous because it advocates for relocating people, instead of pressing for curbing green house gas emissions to stop the adverse effects of climate change. These texts most explicitly raise the question of (historical) responsibility.

2.5) Summary and Working definition

This review has shown how diverse the approaches are to the topic “environmental/climate refugees”. The issue of environmentally triggered migration is an interdisciplinary one. Thus, the diversity of opinions and research agendas expressed in this review is partly due to the various disciplinary approaches. It needs to be stressed that there is a certain progression within the debate. While in particular the authors of the second cluster (most of those texts being published in the late 1980s and 1990s) linked “environmental/climate refugees” to overarching security concerns to gain the attention the phenomenon deserves, later authors also analysed the problem through different lenses. In the more recent articles of the third cluster the focus is more on legal debates and the development of sound mechanisms to combat the challenge of climate change related displacement. Moreover, there is a progression noticeable in the conceptual division between “environmental”- and “climate refugee”. The increasing awareness that climate change is both anthropogenic in nature and highly adverse in its effects allows for the insight that developed countries need to assume greater responsibility. The portrayed solutions in the different clusters reflect that notion. The last subchapter is looking at the issue from a different angle, highlighting the idea of prevention and adaptation measures as well as more liberal migration schemes. They politicise the discourse about climate change by highlighting certain power structures within the debate and advocate for taking the right to self-determination as a nation more seriously. Furthermore, this review touched upon the fact that climate change induced displacement is mostly seen as a security issue for policy makers, as

demonstrated in the second subchapter. As this review has demonstrated, the central contention is not so much whether climate refugees exist (or will exist in the future) but what they signify. We need to think about “climate refugees” as a symbol for larger questions of responsibility, burden sharing and justice. Only then we can understand the normative undertow of many of the contributions discussed.

Interestingly, in all clusters authors can be found who turn in one way or another to the international community for solving the problem. Some of the authors even set out very specific proposals of how to deal with the connection between climate change and population movements (e.g. Biermann/Boas). But a systematic analysis of the actual position and policies of the UNHCR with respect to “climate refugees” is not given. The subsequent case study will thus try to fill this gap.

To achieve this, the literature review must conclude with a working definition of the subject matter. Within the following case study I will strictly look at how the UNHCR is dealing with climate change related population movements. It is not my goal to invent yet another term for people who have to leave their land because of climate change related phenomena. Rather I will appropriate existing definitions. I advocate for using the term “displaced person” in the following text, rather than using the term “refugee” for the following reasons:

The legal dispute is a convincing one. There is an established definition for what a “refugee” is and changing this definition might undermine the generous rights refugees (in theory) are granted under international law. The movement of people will come in various forms: Some might have the form of migration, while other movements will be clearly more similar to displacement or refugee-like situations. While the term “refugee” already has a very fixed definition, “displacement” refers to a certain amount of cohesion that can be inflicted by other people or the environment (Cohen, 2009; 58). Moreover, internal displacement will most likely occur as often (or even more often) than the crossing of borders with respect to climate change; thus a considerable number of people would not receive protection under current refugee law anyway. In addition to that, the rise of a new category of people in need of protection does not mean that traditional “Convention” refugees cease to exist. The latest developments in the Middle East, in particular in Syria show how urgently needed conventional refugee protection remains. Finally, and most importantly, the word “refugee” is rejected by at least some

of the people it tries to describe, as explained in the last subchapter and words and representations matter as they influence behaviour and political decisions.

In lack of an approved terminology I will hence refer to “climate change induced (internal or external) displacement”.

Moreover, it is necessary to define which environmental factors might trigger displacement. As the review has demonstrated various typologies of causes has been put forward. It is not my intention to develop yet another, rather I will draw on existing notions. This paper will exclusively look at climate-change related phenomena that might result in displacement. Thus the more general definitions used to define “environmental refugees” are not quiet satisfying. My own typology borrows from all of the above mentioned authors and is divided into the following subgroups:

- 1) Slow onset events: like desertification or sea-level rise; making shores, arid areas and low lying island states extremely vulnerable (Based on King, Myers, Conisbee/Simms, Nuteleers, Kälén)
- 2) Sudden onset: natural disasters like king tides or hurricanes whose velocity and frequency increases under climate change conditions (King, Bates, Kälén)
- 3) Violent conflicts triggered by scarcity of resources (Based on Myers, Trolladen, Homer-Dixon, Kälén)

This definition aims to incorporate many of the points put forward by the academic literature. Sea-level rise and desertification which seem to be the phenomena most frequently cited as triggering displacement are both covered within the definition. The typology proves useful as it focuses on climate change-related displacement and does not include other forms of environmental disruptions that can lead to displacement. Large scale development measures, such as infrastructure constructions, are thus not taken into account. For people displaced by these events other international bodies are responsible and have developed protection standards⁹. Nuclear or industrial accidents

⁹ Development- forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR): “refers to the involuntary displacement and resettlement of people and communities by large-scale infrastructure projects such as capital-intensive, high-technology, large-scale projects which convert farmlands, fishing grounds, forests, and homes into dam-created reservoirs, irrigation schemes, mining operations, plantations, colonization projects, highways, urban renewal, industrial complexes, and tourist resorts, all in the name of regional and national development, aimed at generating economic growth” (Ferris, 2011; 4). DFDR always applies to communities or groups instead of to individuals; The World Bank has

like Chernobyl which lead to displacement are furthermore not considered, as it is hard to directly relate them to climate change.

From this starting point the paper will continue with the theoretical scope, and methodological procedure, followed by the case study.

3) Theory and Methodology

In the following chapter I will elaborate on my theoretical outline and the methods employed. My research questions, as stated within the introduction are: - Which impact does the academic literature have on the UNHCR? Which positions can be found in their policy approach? -Which role does the notion of climate justice play within their policy approach?

To answer these questions, I chose a neo-Gramscian perspective on international relations within my paper. Discourses are not free from power or hierarchy. As Chapter 2.4. has demonstrated language is crucial for shaping our perspectives on a certain topic. This holds true for the media as much as for the political sphere. Employing a neo-Gramscian approach enables me to address the above stated questions from a critical point and makes it possible to investigate into power structures which make certain discourses *hegemonic* to others.

3.1) Hegemony in International Relations

Before we turn to the internal processes of the UNHCR, we need to understand the importance of the agency in a wider context; namely in the context of the contemporary mode of global governance and the hegemonic power structures within it.

‘Governance’ refers to the mode or method of government and regulation (Weiss, 2000; 795) and points to a highly interactive process. Governance means the collaboration of

established *Guidelines on Involuntary Resettlement* which aim at guaranteeing their rights (Ferris, 2011; 6).

different stakeholders within society, like civil society, government, local authorities, and the private sector and thus should not be confused with a singular body of “the government”. Hence, global governance is often understood as a consent-based, joint project to establish rules/norms of behaviour within international politics (Sørensen, 2010; 1). Originally the term was widely used in an economic context, describing the administrative structures of large companies. Political (global) governance refers to institutions, global organisations, international law and structures that guide and regulate (and sometimes even punish) the international behaviour of states (Barnett/Duvall, 2005, 2). Global institutions like the UNHCR thus can be said to “socialize” states into a particular behaviour and acceptance of norms. Or, as Karns and Mingst put it: “International organizations may serve as agents of social construction, as norm entrepreneurs, trying to change social understanding” (2004; 51). Since the end of the Cold War this concept has advanced to “one of the defining characteristics of the current international moment” (Barnett/Duvall, 2005; 1). In essence global governance is usually conceptualized as a means to make:

“states and people [...] cooperate on economic, environmental, security and political issues, settle their disputes in a nonviolent manner, and advance their common interests and values” (Barnett/Duvall, 2005; 1).

The United Nations and its various agencies are a crucial component of this governance system. The ideology behind this system is inherently liberal as it focuses on the cooperation between states for their mutual benefit (Barnett/Duvall, 2005; 5). In an ideal situation of “governance” all stakeholders would have the same possibilities to voice their policy proposals and engage in a democratic and open deliberation to seek best (as in just and rational) outcomes. Only then: “Governance is viewed as a truth-seeking process, and institutions should be designed to approximate such conditions” (Adler/Bernstein, 2005; 308). But, as Andrew Hurrell puts it, with this vision of global governance “we are left with a strikingly apolitical and far too cosy a view of institutions and of global governance” (Hurrell, 2005; 33).

“Global governance” is, despite its positivist notions, not a level playing field. Unequal power relations and different abilities within agenda setting processes, negotiations and policy outcomes are deeply embedded within contemporary global governance. Institutions must hence also be seen in a “political” dimension: That means they are not free from struggles for power and recognition. They produce authority and they make possible new forms of participation; while at the same time constricting participation based on certain norms and rules (Selznick, 2007; 5). In particular the

process of agenda-setting is an interesting incident where power is displayed in these institutions, because the ability to set the agenda equals the ability to establish ones own priorities as relevant to all stakeholders (Barnett/Duvall, 2005; 16).

Power relations within IR are not solely based to the military or economic capabilities of a particular state. They are also enforced by notions of ideological superiority and leadership in certain political terrains. Power thus needs to be conceptualised in a broad and inclusive way that allows it to occur in very different forms. When looking at organisations within global governance this becomes obvious. As the UNHCR is not a state, and has no military and no independent economic resources with which to impose policies; its “power” resembles what Duvall and Barnett called *productive power* and what can then be used to establish the neo-Gramscian notion of *hegemony*.

Productive power means the production of “meaning and signification” as well as it “defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shapes whose knowledge matters” (Barnett/Duvall, 2005; 3-4). Productive power for the authors essentially is:

“...the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope” (Barnett/Duvall, 2005; 20).

Organisations like the UNHCR possesses this *productive power* as they are often called upon by states for assistance in their respective areas of expertise. However, they are also platforms for negotiating and establishing norms and international rules and thus are particularly relevant for analysing the manufacturing of *productive power* and subsequent *hegemony*. The very definition of the legal term “refugee” and its subsequent recognition around the world by a majority of all sovereign states is probably the most striking example of how the UNHCR was able throughout its existence to establish *hegemony* in their field of expertise.

A more substantive elaboration of the admittedly diffuse, yet important capacity of global organisations within international relations is based on the Gramscian notion of *hegemony*. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian journalist and Marxist activist, who spent much of his adult life imprisoned under the Mussolini regime where he conducted the majority of his writing. Born in 1891, he was concerned in his elaborations with the role of the Italian working class during the rise of Fascism. The starting point for many of

his reflections was the question of why the working class was not engaging in the revolution against the Fascist regime even though this regime was not working for its interests. Gramsci's major achievement was probably the broadening of the economic focus of classical Marxism. He paid utmost attention to the role of culture, language and ideology within societies as he saw these elements as central to establish one's vision of social order within society (Francese, 2009; 1)¹⁰.

Peter Ives published a book on "Language & Hegemony in Gramsci", which relates Gramsci's work to linguistic approaches within the social sciences. This connection seems very fruitful for the purpose of this paper. Ives uses the metaphor of language, or to be more precise the phenomenon of grammar, to approach what Gramsci meant with *hegemony*.

During the first decades of the 20th century the Italian government sought to install a common "standard Italian" within the country to facilitate easier communication among the country's various provinces and dialectal regions (Ives, 2004; 84). Gramsci differentiates between two sets of grammar that make up language. "Spontaneous grammar" is what everyone is permanently and unconsciously using in everyday speech and which inherits a certain degree of free will and flexibility (Ives, 2004; 91). "Spontaneous grammar" finds its expression within dialects and socio-dialects used by different groups and classes and even entails the notion that "each person has a grammar of his own" (Ives, 2004; 91) based on the individual's experiences and personal history or life story. However, in order to make ourselves comprehensible we cannot express ourselves by spontaneous, individual grammar alone. Instead our sentences have to obey (to a certain degree) the logic of an accepted "normative grammar", which is best understood as a reciprocal process of established correctness (Ives, 2004; 93). This means that even "normative grammar" (the "fixed", accepted and standardised part of

¹⁰ It needs to be mentioned that Gramsci was mostly analysing the rise of Fascism in his home country Italy when he developed his concept of hegemony. Only later scholars of IR deemed his elaborations relevant for the international terrain and appropriated some of his concepts for explaining international politics. Obviously, this was not embraced by all scholars of the IR discipline. There are also authors (e.g. Adam Morton) who argue that the concept of *hegemony* bears only restricted explanatory value on an international level, as international politics lacks the clear hierarchical structures which were present in Fascist Italy during Gramsci's analysis. The international system works according to different processes, despite similar logics (Worth, 2010; 380). These more critical voices do not advocate not using Gramsci's analysis at all. But advertise for focusing on more traditional Marxist topics such as class struggle and modes of production, where they think that Gramsci can more directly be appropriated to the international level (Worth, 2010; 380). However, I deem it feasible to use the linguistically enriched concept of *hegemony* as summarized by Ives within my analysis.

language) is established through a social process and is not –as some linguists would argue- a given or even universal property of every language (Ives, 2004; 93). Going back to the historical example of establishing a standardised Italian language this means: The “spontaneous” grammar of a specific group (namely the socio-dialect of the bourgeoisie of the northern cities) advanced to the new “normative grammar”. This was achieved through mass media and educational institutions which advertised the new Italian language as the modern, superior and educated way of speaking and writing. “Censoring” and “teaching” were important tools to establish the status of the new language (Ives, 2004; 94). Instead of force or violence the “normative grammar” was installed through mechanisms of consent and *common sense*. A unified language appeared desirable for the majority of Italians. *Common sense* in a Gramscian notion is very similar to an understanding of ideology. This close and intimate relationship between *common sense* and ideology will be used throughout the methodological section, too and thus sometimes the terms will be used inter-changeably. Gramsci sees *common sense* as a heterogeneous thing that varies across regions and social classes (Liguori, 2009; 122). It forms a coherent world view (like ideologies do) and offers guidance and a normative framework to the masses. *Common sense* is moreover enriched with scientific findings and thus appears as “correct” to people (Liguori, 2009; 124). Therefore, ideology too combines the “popular” with “scientific” facts. Ideological dominant assumptions are viewed as correct or even “natural” as they leave no room for alternatives.

Thus, installing ones “normative grammar” as *common sense* is the crucial step in the quest for *hegemony* as common sense bridges the gap between scholarly and the popular opinions (Liguori, 2009; 124).

Gramsci reminds the readership that because “normative grammar” has to be understood as a process, it is shaped by historical conditions and powerful forces at the time. It comes into existence through the tensions and struggles within society that lead to privileging one “spontaneous grammar” over the other. These processes cannot be fully planned as they depend on various factors and actors (Liguori, 2009; 125). The historical establishment of “normative grammar” matters, because otherwise:

“power relations that operate through language, common sense philosophy, ideology and world-views are obscured by the purely synchronic approach to language” (Ives, 2004; 95).

As Ives sums it up, languages thus are “moral judgements with political effects” (2004; 95).

However critical Gramsci looks at the idea that “normative grammar” should be understood as a given, apolitical thing, he does not reject “normative grammar” altogether. Coming back to the example, the project of introducing a standardised language in Italy obviously had its advantages. For example, it massively simplified the communication among different regions. For the purpose of organising the working class, which Gramsci aspired to do being the Italian Marxist party leader, a unified language was essentially helpful. However- and here the notion of *hegemony* becomes prominent- he voiced criticism regarding the way the new language was designed and imposed. From all the various, vibrant dialects of the Italian language only one dialect became the new “normative grammar”, namely that of the well-off Florentine bourgeoisie (Ives, 2004; 99). One can thus argue that Gramsci hence saw the installation of this dialect as the new “standard” which all people had to respect as a *hegemonic project* of the ruling class. Through advertisement, mass media, and a nationalistic ideology the ruling class sought support for this project and established a consent that protected the new unified language. Gramsci’s vision of a more democratic “normative grammar” would involve aspects off all “spontaneous grammars” established through a wide process of deliberation (Ives, 2004; 100).

A *hegemonic project* in a nut shell thus entails the following: Those with power can install their vision of reality (e.g. their vision of a “normative grammar”) through productive power (persuasion, knowledge, teaching and censoring and other forms of coercion) which then becomes accepted by those governed because this vision of reality appears as *common sense*. *Hegemonic projects* basically work in cycles: New projects are based on old *common sense*.

How does this example of establishing a standardised Italian language then relate to IR theory in general and to the role of the UNHCR within the “climate refugee” debate in particular?

With respect to climate change induced displacement we can witness a struggle for *hegemony* by various actors. In other words: different actors try to establish their *hegemonic projects* and framings of the issue on a national or global scale. The literature review (in particular chapter 2.2) has shown that international bodies such as the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the European Union and the US National Intelligence Council all work on the topic and translate it into a security issue. The previous literature review has also demonstrated that there are more perceptions

and research on this topic available for policy makers: the discussion is in flux and various “spontaneous grammars” are competing with each other. The UNHCR is not the only, albeit a powerful, actor within this struggle for framing the issue. Their resourcefulness makes them a fit actor for establishing their discourse as *hegemonic* within the debate.

While in conventional IR theory the term *hegemony* is used in a narrow sense (referring to the direct control or power of one actor over another), *hegemony* in a Gramscian meaning within IR moves beyond the idea that cohesion is the only way of domination and that the nation state is the only powerful actor in politics (Worth, 2010; 375). Global elites and (in a more strictly Marxist understanding) classes as well as global civil society and global institutions can all influence politics through asserting some sort of *hegemony*:

“Simply put therefore, international hegemony is referred to as ‘a form of class rule based on consent rather than coercion and on accommodation of subordinate interests rather than on their repression’” (Worth, 2010; 378).

Global hegemony is not the product of a single state or a single class alone. And it would be inappropriate to characterize the UNHCR as a “class” within a classical Marxist understanding. However, the UNHCR is a powerful actor within a specific group of actors. The UNHCR is a leading institution within the humanitarian community. According to authors like Marchart it is necessary to unify actors not only around material interests but also by shared ideological values (Marchart, 2007; 180). The third and forth chapter of the following case study thus explores the UNHCR’s position within relations towards the wider UN community. Furthermore, *hegemony* needs to be understood as an ever changing and multifaceted construct manufactured by a variety of actors which has to be (re-)negotiated, altered, defended and updated permanently (Worth, 2010; 383). Or, as Scherrer puts it, a *hegemonic project* needs actors, a particular space and a certain historical moment or time frame (Scherrer, 2007; 82). Therefore, the case study aims to give very concrete examples and analysis on these three aspects. It will explore the particular time frame in which the UNHCR started working on the issue. Furthermore, it will highlight the “space” in which the *hegemonic project* is established (mostly conferences, inter agency meetings and high level UN meetings). It will also trace the changes within the UNHCR’s approach as the agency engages in negotiations with other actors. The successful installation of the UNHCR’s

framing of the topic within the UNFCCC meetings will serve as an example on how positions need to be constantly altered and updated to establish ones *hegemonic project*.

According to Worth, Jonathan Jones defines *hegemony* as such:

“[he] argues that hegemony is a process that exists at two levels – a ‘conscious’ level, whereby ideas are conceived and a ‘structural’ one that embeds and secures the unity of the contradictions that arise from the various practices that emerge from such ideas. In global politics therefore, there exists a multitude of both structural and conscious hegemonic configurations/projects and the overriding process of hegemony is to restore equilibrium at every level” (Worth, 2010; 383).

Candeias, explains that there is a need for actors to transcend the small, self-interest objectives they have into more political and broader issues in order to gain support from other actors (Candeias, 2007; 19). These compromises are not only found between different groups or actors but are usually necessary to unify the internal positions, too (Candeias, 2007; 20). Throughout the case study we will see how the UNHCR is struggling to unify the different interests and opinions of its regional offices, headquarter and governing body. One concrete way of tracing these struggle and compromises are conferences and meetings on which the UNHCR seeks to incorporate opinions from experts into their approach. Moreover, the expert interview conducted for the thesis shed light on these questions. Christoph Scherrer, a scholar advocating for more concrete and empirically inspired applications of Gramsci’s theories points out that “feedback” is a crucial instrument for actors to incorporate “other” perceptions within their *hegemonic projects* to achieve consent (Scherrer, 2007; 81). At the same time the agency is also a key sight where a meaning of the category “climate refugee” is negotiated. Against the backdrop of old *common sense* (which in this case the 1951 Refugee Convention would be), new “realities” (climate change) have to be managed. The Gramscian concept of *hegemony* and the example of competing forms of “grammar” helps us to understand the importance of the struggle over meaning.

3.2) Historicist Perspectives and Discourse Analysis

Neo-Gramscian scholars are in particular known for having developed a *historicist* method that aims to explore the connection between the ideological conditions and material forces leading to specific actions (Bieler/Morton, 2001; 17). This method

usually divides human history into specific epochs which are characterized by particular features and dominated by specific “hegemonic” beliefs and actors (Bieler/Morton, 2001; 17). For Gramsci, the past stands in a dialectic relationship with the present; past decisions and hegemonic beliefs become institutionalized and thus make up the “reality” of our present. Only by tracing the manufacturing of these hegemonic beliefs throughout history is one able to understand current struggles over hegemony (Bieler/Morton, 2001; 18). This paper is much too short to look at all historical processes and power configurations that form the base for the UNHCR’s approach to “climate refugees”. However, the first subchapter of the case study will try to identify certain processes that shaped earlier changes and triggered the agency’s responses towards new refugee situations. Thus, there will be some brief historical excursions within the text to highlight the importance of certain power constellations throughout the history of the agency.

The main methodology employed in this paper is a discourse analysis. Peter Ives explains that:

“‘Discourse’ is derived from the Latin *discursus* ‘running to and fro’. It can mean the process of reasoning, most narrowly from premise to consequence, but also a discussion or conversation” (Ives, 2004; 139).

Discourse analysis as a methodology is crucially interwoven with Gramsci’s concept of *hegemony* (Tischler, Wodak, Meyer, Vetter, 1998; 179). Discourse analysis thus looks at power within discourses and power over a specific discourse (Tischer/Wodak/Meyer/Vetter, 1998; 180). This power is –following Gramsci– discursive and embedded in the social relations between actors. Discourses are situated in a dialectical relationship towards society and culture. This means: Society and culture only come into existence through discourses; at the same time society and culture also constitute the parameters in which these discourses can take place (Tischer/Wodak/Meyer/Vetter, 1998; 180). A discourse is thus a two-way relationship that leads to the permanent transformation and re-formulation of both the discourse and the social settings in which it takes place. The goal of a discourse analysis is to interpret and (try to) explain the power relations and ideologies that shape the discourse.

Discourses thus have a “real” and tangible effect as they result in ways to establish a degree of control over human action (Ives, 2004; 139). Discourses are thus not “innocent”: they do establish a degree of “authority and regulation” (Ives, 2004; 141). Also they are an inherent part and paramount tool within every *hegemonic project*.

Thus, the point of paying attention to discourses is to highlight that political decision-making is not purely objective or apolitical but always influenced by deeper (often unconscious) perceptions of the world (Ives, 2004; 143).

Maarten Hajer is another scholar who drew on Gramsci's notion of hegemony within his work. This chapter heavily borrows from the author and uses his main points to illustrate how the political process can be described as a *hegemonic project*. While Hajer (1989, 34) pays great effort into differentiating between three different spheres which make up a hegemonic project ("Ideology", "Institutionalization" and "Strategy"), this master thesis is too short to analyse all the three dimensions and the processes at play which interact among them. Furthermore, this thesis also has to deal with resource restrictions of a different kind of nature: The UNHCR does not publish results of internal meetings, the agency does not make their budgeting transparent (one can only find information about money spent on regions; not on individual projects) and there was only one expert interview possible. Moreover, information about IASC meetings are even harder to obtain which would be necessary to also analyse the other aspects of the policy formation. Hence, the data collection for this thesis only allows for focusing on one of the three aspects.

Therefore, the focus will be on only the first pillar (Ideology) which constitutes the political process according to the author. Hajer explains the connection between "discursive communication – discourses – ideological domination/ legitimation" which is an important process that works in policy formations within global institutions to install a *hegemonic project* (Hajer, 1989; 38). The reason for this focus and selected approach is rooted not only in time but also in resource restrictions. While it is possible to investigate the formation of a hegemonic project on the communicative/ ideological side; it is much harder to extract information about the two other spheres. Without extensive research in the UN archives the "strategy" formation for example is hard to analyse.

Nevertheless, the focus on only one aspect of a *hegemonic project* still reveals some very potent structures within policy formations. In the following the different phases of that aspect will be explained and combined with the linguistically enriched concept of Peter Ives:

"Discursive communication" entails the central idea that language is more than just a medium or the neutral representation of an objective outer world. Language is

always part of our perception of the world and embedded in beliefs and values and also embedded in hierarchies and power (Hajer, 2008; 212). Hajer argues that communication (in everyday life as much as in international politics) is essentially ideological as it reflects and reproduces our perceptions of the world (1989; 38). The idea is that language is the preferred tool within politics to get one's own position heard and translated into policies. For this concrete analysis it means that the interpreted texts have to be considered in their wider context (Tischer/Wodak/Meyer/Vetter, 1998; 181). Moreover, the text forms analysed are necessarily of heterogenic nature (Tischer/Wodak/Meyer/Vetter, 1998; 182). Since discursive communication does not evolve within one singular text but entails expressions in an interrelated set of documents of various kind the material used within the following case study embraces different forms of publications. Scientific texts, policy documents, submissions to inter-agency committees, official press releases and interviews are considered in the case study as an attempt to give a holistic picture of the discussions on climate change induced displacement within the UNHCR. This part of the *hegemonic project* resembles what Ives termed with regard to Gramsci "spontaneous grammar".

"Discursive communication" is then concentrated to discourses that form the structure of discursive debates. It is the transition from one phase of a *hegemonic project* to the next which is particularly interesting. How does *discursive communication* become condensed to a *discourse*? Here again the work by Peter Ives can be applied. As explained earlier "teaching and censoring" are necessary to transform "spontaneous grammar" to "normative grammar". Within the policy process this is similar. A *discourse* is nothing less than an "interpretative framework" (Hajer, 1989; 38) which is manifested in words, categories, ideas and action (Hajer, 2008; 217). This becomes promoted (taught) to others. Language and actual rhetoric figures such as metaphors give insight into the deeper meanings of discourses and thus will be taken into consideration in the subsequent case study. Within a discourse analysis the aim is thus to identify the parameters of this framework. It is important to note that establishing a discourse is not free from conflict and struggle. In Hajer's words:

"To get people to think in your terms, to get them to interpret the world according to your view of reality, is an enormous source of power" (Hajer, 1989; 38).

Not all actors within a discourse have the same source of this "convincing-power". Thus *inter-discursive struggles* appear which represent "the fight of competing

discourses to get their interpretation of the state of affairs dominant” (Hajer, 1989; 41). This means that there are different groups with divergent interpretations of “reality” and future. This paper examines the UNHCR. However, as the case study will make obvious this one actor is by no means monolithic. The agency consists of various regional bureaux, the High Commissioner, the Executive Committee (which represents the nation state stakeholders) and various thematic and organisational divisions. We will see whether *inter-discursive struggles* can be traced within the UNHCR’s position towards climate change induced displacement.

“Ideological domination” is the implicit goal of each discourse formation. Especially, within new and evolving discourses the struggle over installing dominant views is strong. This became evident within the previous literature review of this paper. Competing discourses (or interpretative frameworks) were presented from scholars of different academic disciplines. However, also within the same discipline academics struggle for the “right” interpretation of reality as demonstrated in the “Climate Refugees and Security Concerns” subchapter. Within the field of politics these struggles bear even greater consequences as they heavily influence political action and outcomes. This is so because a dominant or (to use a Gramscian term) a hegemonic discourse gives a certain degree of legitimacy to a matter. In particular within politics this legitimacy is sought as a base for deriving policies from (Hajer, 1989; 39). A well established discourse thus serves as a legitimate base for actors to define their strategies and desired policy outcomes (Hajer, 1989; 39). Thus, the subsequent case study tries to identify the inter-discursive powers at play leading to the “ideological domination” of the UNHCR’s policy outcomes. Hajer (based on Giddens) gives three strategies by which dominant classes try to establish a discourse as dominant: either it is sought to establish the particularistic interest of a specific discourse as universal (Hajer, 1989; 42). Or dominant classes try to “obscure contradictions” (Hajer, 1989; 42). Finally, they strive to “naturalize” the discourse and by thus make it sound as if there were no alternatives (Hajer, 1989; 42). We will see whether the UNHCR uses any of these strategies.

The following graphic representation is based on the above mentioned work by Hajer and tries to combine it with the linguistically enriched perception of *hegemony* by Ives:




Abb.1 Ideological Aspect of Policy Formation. Based on Hajer (1989), Ives (2004), Scherrer (2007).

This graphic representation of establishing a *hegemonic project* is obviously very schematic and does not allow for an overlapping of phases which in reality might happen. The individual phases may not be as clear cut as they are depicted here. However, the general idea that a *hegemonic project* is a process established in succeeding steps employing discourses becomes apparent. By combining the theoretical insights of the three authors we can read the chart from bottom to top. In a first phase of the policy process we can witness *discursive communication*, or as Ives appropriated it from Gramsci: “spontaneous grammar”. Here various actor put forward their positions. However through mechanisms of teaching and censoring only some of these arguments make it to the next stage and become part of the *discourse* that sets the framework for the policy process. This process is marked by *inter-discursive struggles*. Establishing the discourse is thus not without conflicts. The third phase then marks the establishment of the discourse as dominant or the new “common sense”. This last phase is crucial element of the hegemonic project. On the right hand side we see that this process is embedded in a specific time/space and historical context. These elements are instrumental in shaping the policy process as they constitute the parameters or conditions under which policies are formulated at all. This means that even before the

institutional filtering mechanisms set in there are already configurations of place/context and also power which allow some ideas to pass by more easily than others. Some of these configurations will thus briefly be discussed in the beginning of the case study to contextualize the work of the UNHCR.

3.3) Elite Interviews

Elite interviews (or expert interviews) are a form of qualitative inquiry within the social sciences. “Elite” or “expert” is a vaguely defined term in this matter (Harvey, 2011; 432). Some authors define “elite” as people who are “highly skilled, professionally competent, and class-specific” (Harvey, 2011; 432). However, in theory an expert on youth culture could also be the skater boy from around the corner as he could give invaluable insight into the rites, rhetoric and tastes of a specific group within society. The “elite population” hence depends on the research question and not on the position of an individual within society (Goldstein, 2002; 670).

Thus, it feels necessary to explain what an “expert” is within the topic of my thesis.

I opted for engaging with a senior UNHCR employee working on the “climate refugee” *problématique* because the person has long years of experience in policy development and implementation within the agency. The person is regularly asked to represent the agency and has been instrumental in the work on the topic within the UNHCR. In fact, I was able to interview a person associated with the policy document that forms the core of this case study.

Elite interviews differ widely from other forms of interviews, as the roles of interviewee and interviewer are somewhat reversed: “Whereas in non-elite studies the researchers have the position of ‘expert’, in elite studies those who are being studied are “in the know” (Mikecz, 2012; 483). I tried to assume a role of the “informed outsider” (Mikecz, 2012; 485) in order to demonstrate my knowledge on the subject matter, gain trust of the interview partner and to establish the scientific parameters of the interview. I used these interviews as an opportunity to fill in the gaps of the literature I was working with. The UNHCR publishes many of its policy outcomes and approaches online and has a big public relations sector. However, for exploring the internal

“discursive communication” patterns and the subsequent discourse formation the insight of my interview partner was invaluable.

The main challenge with elite or expert interviews is usually that of gaining access to members of the elite in question (Goldstein, 2002; 670). Here my internship at the UNHCR was undeniably the door-opener for my research. Without having a personal connection, the interviews would probably have been much harder to realize. Both interviews were conducted via phone and on two subsequent weeks. Conducting interviews via phone obviously has some disadvantages. Mikecz points out that the establishment of trust is paramount for a successful and insightful interview and that trust and rapport are harder to create via the phone; since personal interaction is not as easy and cultural differences harder to observe (Mikecz, 2012; 487). Furthermore, telephone interviews are said to often result in shorter and less detailed answers (Mikecz, 2012; 487). However, since time and money did not permit for a face-to-face interview, I decided to follow Harvey’s Guidance who summarized various scholars of qualitative research who deemed telephone interviews as efficient as they enable participation of people of geographically distant areas (Harvey, 2011; 435). In particular when interviewing elites, Harvey mentions that they appreciate the flexibility of an interview via the phone, since their schedules seldom permit for extra appointment (Harvey, 2011; 436). In fact, the interviews I conducted with the expert (in the following case study referred to as “Expert A”) were divided into two 30 minutes sessions as the expert’s timetable did not permit for one longer session. Harvey concludes his reflections on telephone interviews by saying: “some data of elite respondents was better than no data” (Harvey, 2011; 435) and I decided to stick to this perception.

I recorded both interviews and the transcriptions can be found in the annex of this paper. Because of the very limited number of interviews, some prudence in basing conclusions on them seems necessary. The interviews primarily helped with gaining insight into the process and discourse of the UNHCR. They filled-in the gaps of the material released online by the organisation. The main insight and invaluable contribution of the interviews lies in the authentic description of the motives and attitudes of different stakeholder within the organisation. Following the example of Mikecz, I prepared a semi- structured interview with open questions that would allow the respondents the room to elaborate on their experiences and insights (Mikecz, 2012; 487). As requested by the interviewee I sent a guideline for the questions before

conducting the interview. The expert displayed great preparedness and willingness to answer my questions in both sessions.

4) Case Study: UNHCR and Climate Change Induced Displacement

4.1) Context and Preconditions

Astri Suhrke and Kathleen Newland portray the changing nature of the agency and its work. According to them, UNHCRs refugee aid from the 1950s to early 1970s was mainly targeting (small numbers of) people fleeing from Communist countries to Europe or the USA, which were quite welcomed in the receiving states due to the bloc constellation of international politics (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 285). Refugees from the East were seen as a political gain and served as a massive symbol within Western politics. Dissidents from the East were readily welcomed in the West and their flight portrayed as a “voting with their feet” (Loescher, 2001; 35). Refugees from the Global South (often displaced by separation or independence movements) mostly found shelter in their neighbouring states as they could count on various forms of solidarity in their region (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 285). In general the asylum regime of this age can be understood as a regime of “separation” and “control” (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 286), as the authors put it. Control was exercised by the countries of refugee origin (e.g. Soviet States had a strict border regime which made mass flights a rare occasion¹¹), as well as by the receiving states through the mechanism of resettlement which allowed Western states to set up quotas and to choose their refugee intake (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 286). “Separation”, the other characteristic of the asylum regime, was manifested in the regional restriction of the UNHCR mandate (there were special agencies to deal with refugees from Palestine or Korea; furthermore the mass displacements during the Indian partition were not recognized as a refugee crisis, since the ones displaced could either turn to the Pakistani or Indian state) (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 286). Analytical separation between the two categories “refugee” and “migrant” was also much easier, since the Western states had multiple legal entrance schemes to attract foreign workers

¹¹ They nevertheless happened when in 1956 and 1986 mass refugee movements occurred from the Czech Republic and Hungary to Western European states (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 286).

during their economic boom period (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 287). There was no need for people wanting to migrate to a Western country to mask themselves as refugees (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 287). Climate change makes clear what the end of the Cold War has foreshadowed: The world is much more interrelated and interdependent than the post World War II refugee convention foresaw. The “golden age” of refugee protection is over and the policy approach of separation and control might not be feasible any longer. Refugee mass movements happen more frequently; border control within the Global South is less effective; countries of the Global South are less willing (or able) to accept large numbers of new refugees; legal separations between migrant, displaced person and refugees become ever more blurring in a climate change effected world where famines, social unrest and poverty work hand in hand to push people for seeking better lives elsewhere. Furthermore, the political incentive to take in refugees is less obvious since now the “voting with the feet” logic is more feared than anticipated by Western nations. The liberal asylum policies of the past are gone and staggering numbers of climate change displaced people will not necessarily bring those days back. These negative configurations have to be kept in mind when evaluating the climate-change policy of the UNHCR.

As mentioned in the theory section of this paper, *hegemonic projects* always occur in specific historical settings and need to be contextualized. One more development that deserves mentioning here during the phase of *discursive communication* is a greater involvement of the UNHCR with Internally Displaced People (IDPs).

The academic Barnett elaborates that UN agencies in general and the UNHCR in particular have indeed seen severe changes and adapted to new realities since the end of the Cold War, based on a changed perception of sovereignty (Barnett, 2001; 245). While the original refugee convention clearly limited the agency’s activities by the paramount principle of non-interference, the UNHCR nowadays is increasingly concerned with both the refugee “producing” as well as the refugee “receiving” state (Barnett, 2001; 246)¹². With the end of the Cold War the very structure of people in need of refugee

¹² This policy trend actually already started in the 1970s. In particular the US-led Vietnam War and the oil price shocks had a major impact on it (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 288). The crises of the Western economies led to a tightening of immigration policies and a greater unwillingness to receive refugees. The Vietnam War led to a mass exodus of refugees (so-called “boat people”) which was willingly triggered by the Vietnam regime to “rid themselves of unwanted segments of their populations and cause trouble in the countries of asylum” (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 288). Then the same happened with Cuban refugees, the Western states initiated a “root cause” debate on refugee flows, which marked the turn to greater involvement within the refugee-causing states (Suhrke/Newland, 2001; 288).

status was altered. The collapse of the bi-polar system led to more and more civil-war-like situations and internal unrest. Thus, the number of internally displaced people increased steadily. Although these people were not directly part of the UNHCR mandate, states encouraged the UNHCR to take over responsibility for them. Barnett explains this through the Gulf and Yugoslavian Wars (Barnett, 2001; 267). Turkey's decline to protect fleeing Kurds and Europe's limited enthusiasm to help displaced people from the Balkan states were in stark contrast to their humanitarian obligations (Barnett, 2001; 267). Thus, these nations in particular encouraged the UNHCR to take over responsibility. And the UNHCR was installed as the lead agency within both crises.

In 2005 a report was released about the UNHCR's involvement with IDPs. The report was written by members of the UNHCR as well as external researchers and came to the unfortunate conclusion that the agency's engagement with IDPs situations can best be described as: "Uncertain, inconsistent and unpredictable" (Crisp/Kiragu/Tennant, 2007; 12). Empirical data within the report supported the impression that the UNHCR's case by case approach led to confusion amongst governments and other UN agencies and NGOs regarding leadership and responsibility (Crisp/Kiragu/ Tennant, 2007; 12). The so-called "cluster approach" was then initiated in order to facilitate a smother and more efficient response for IDPs in emergency situations. On the UNHCR homepage one can read that the agency since assumed the lead-role in the following clusters: "protection and shelter needs, and camp coordination and management" (UNHCR, Sister Organisations, accessed 16.8.2012)

It becomes obvious that IDPs are no longer seen as separated from the UNHCRs work. The involvement with IDPs is still somewhat restricted to conflict related IDPs (Crisp, Kiragu/ Tennant, 2007; 12). However, greater engagement with UN sister organisations like UNICEF and OHCHR in the areas of health, sanitation and water has been agreed upon in situations of natural disasters (Crisp, Kiragu/ Tennant, 2007; 12). The inter-agency efforts were backed by innovations within the UNHCR itself: a special senior officer for IDPs was appointed and a IDP support group was established (Crisp, Kiragu/ Tennant, 2007; 12). Again, these changes in the agency were partly initiated by the High Commissioner. When Antònio Guterres was appointed in 2005 he promised at an ExCom meeting that his agency would become more reliably involved with the topic (Crisp, Kiragu/ Tennant, 2007; 13).

The greater engagement and official urge to support internally displaced people marked an important step for broadening the original mandate. The UNHCR has both published a *Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons* (which aims at giving guidance to the personnel in the field) and has been heavily engaged in setting up international standards for the protection of IDPs namely the *Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons*¹³. Although the UNHCR is still primarily responsible for giving legal protection to refugees, IDPs play a much bigger role in its work¹⁴. In fact, the UNHCR is now also the lead agency in situations where IDP and refugee flows occur. Since there are more IDPs than legally recognized refugees, this trend seems to be legitimized.

After considering the political and institutional changes of the agency, also the budget situation of the UNHCR is of important. More than 95% of the UNHCRs budget comes from voluntary donations made by member states; with the US and the Nordic Countries and the Netherlands as the major contributors (Vayrynen, 2001;151). The United States give more than one third of the budget, which has provoked authors to doubt the agencies independence altogether; In particular because much of the donations come in the form of “tight earmarking” which permits spendings on specific projects/regions only (Roper/Barria, 2010; 620). This is crucial to bear in mind. Throughout this paper the UNHCR is portrayed as a rather independent and powerful actor. However, their financial dependency and the interests of member states which form and inform the governing body of the agency shed some doubt on the actual capability of the agency to pursue independent politics. Further reflections on this will be given in the conclusion of the paper.

As a final point to bear in mind is the hierarchal structure of the agency and the strong position of the High Commissioner. Historically, decisive leadership and superb diplomacy skills of the High Commissioners made advances of the agency’s position possible. Only by actively lobbying for independent funds was the first High Commissioner, Gerrit van Heuven Goedhart, able to assume a lead role in the 1953 West Berlin blockade, as well as in the 1956 Hungarian refugee crisis (Loescher, 2001;

¹³ These *Guiding Principles* are not binding international law; however received widespread attention and support from the international community. In the foreword it says: “These Principles, which are based upon existing international humanitarian law and human rights instruments, are to serve as an international standard to guide governments as well as international humanitarian and development agencies in providing assistance and protection to IDPs” (OCHA, 2004; 0)

36). Even more independent leadership was displayed by the actions taken by the second High Commissioner, Auguste Lindt, when Tunisia requested material assistance for Algerian refugees in 1957. Lindt understood that the UNHCR would have to broaden its focus and become more involved with refugee situations outside of Europe if it did not want to become redundant. Thus, the High Commissioner actively involved himself in a very delicate diplomatic endeavour whose results formed the base for later support in Africa and Asia and the 1967 protocol that to the convention which altered the geographic restrictions of the agency's mandate (Loescher, 2001; 39).

After these brief reflections about the changing perspective on refugees, the careful broadening of the UNHCR's approach to IDP's (and the creation of the legal category IDP including the mentioned soft law measures), the role of the donor states and the status of the High Commissioner, we will now turn to the phase of *discursive communication* within the "climate refugee" debate of the UNHCR.

4.2) Discursive Communication: Environmental Factors in Refugee Aid

In this first part of the case study the focus is on the first step to establish a *hegemonic project*:

When researching the UNHCR's approach to climate change induced displacement it is astonishing that the topic has been picked up by the organisation only recently. Similar to the development from "environmental" to "climate refugees" as sketched in the literature review; the first encounter of the UNHCR with the topic was also more focused on the link between environmental degradation in general than with climate change in particular. In the interview with Expert A this was confirmed:

"In fact the topic goes back to 1994 or 1995 where we first did a first joint sort of joint colloquium with IOM, where we first looked at environmental factors as a cause of displacement. It looked more at environmental degradation rather than climate change per se" (Interview 1, Expert A).

Online, one can find a detailed 155-page report from 1996 of a joint conference by IOM, UNHCR and RPG: "Environmentally-Induced Population Displacements and Environmental Impacts Resulting from Mass Migrations, 21-24 April, 1996 in Geneva" (UNHCR, 1996; online). Clearly, the focus was on environmental degradation and not on climate change as such. Furthermore, the report highlights the fact that the issue was

seen as a “twin challenge of preventing population movements triggered by environmental damage and mitigating the damage caused by mass displacements” (UNHCR, 1996; 5). While displacement caused by the environment is seen as problematic, so are the people displaced as they potentially contribute to further deterioration of land and natural resources. The concern of host governments over constant new mass influx movements is voiced here.

This reminds one of authors from the *minimalist* cluster who also stressed the importance to research the impacts of displaced populations on already fragile ecosystems. Today, the UNHCR has incorporated ecological measures within their camp management. On the agency’s webpage some of those are introduced to the public, such as solar cookers and lightning in various refugee camps in Africa (UNHCR, News Story, online). Environmental concerns thus entered the agenda of the UNHCR in the mid-nineties albeit with a slightly different focus.

The conference report states that the term “environmental refugee” is rejected and avoided within this report to prevent any confusion with the legal term “refugee” as highlighted in a note (UNHCR, 1996; 10). However, no further explanations of which other terminology should be used is given. Instead, the report mostly renders the problem as a migration-as-adaptation issue (UNHCR, 1996; 11). Displacement scenarios (which are distinguished from migration scenarios due to a certain amount of force) are also mentioned; here “acute onset” events are cited as the main source for this type of movement. However, also “slow onset” scenarios like desertification and sea-level rise are considered and linked to climate change, proving that some awareness of climate change already informed the debate. In the possible mitigation actions in this case the paper stresses the role and importance of industrialized nations. It says:

“Such assistance can come from international donors and relief organizations; in particular, there is a need for industrialized countries to target the most needy countries” (UNHCR, 1996; 18).

However, the report remains silent about why industrialized countries should feel compelled to support “the most needy” ones. While the academic literature summarized for this paper usually elaborates on arguments concerning why Western states should take greater interest in supporting developing countries with mitigation and adaptation measures, the conference seems to not engage on this topic further.

The paper makes clear that a severe gap is perceived in the responsibility of agencies for the problem, as no individual UN agency has a mandate for dealing with the specific needs of people displaced by environmental factors (UNHCR, 1996; 35). Hence, as next steps envisioned by the conference participants one point shall be addressed here, namely that of better coordination. The conference paper states:

“Within the framework of existing coordination responsibilities, mechanisms, and fora, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and notably its Task Force on Internally Displaced Persons, there is a need for active interchange of information and cooperation between refugee/migration-oriented agencies, the development community, and environmental organizations” (UNHCR, 1996; 21).

One platform for these enhanced cooperation efforts is the Inter Agency Standing Committee. Among IASC membership, the incorporation of development and humanitarian agencies appears to have been the most successful. However, environmental NGOs are not exclusively a part of the committee. The *InterAction Alliance* of US-based NGO does have environmental organisations as partners; however UN agencies such as UNEP are not part of the committee and neither are other environmental NGOs (IASC, “About the Inter-Agency-Standing-Committee”, online).

Advocacy is another important next step, according to the paper:

“Due to the acute needs and vulnerability of the environmentally displaced, awareness of their situation belongs on the international agenda and they should be targeted for special projects and assistance” (UNHCR, 1996; 22).

The report does not mention that a sustainable, long term mechanism to deal with the problem is needed. The “special projects and assistance” required are not further elaborated on. Nor are ways to finance and implement these projects discussed. The rest of the conference report addresses the negative impacts of displaced populations on their host environment. Hence, apparently, at that point in time the discussion within the UNHCR regarding the environment-human mobility nexus was more centred on how to prevent negative impacts of mass displacement on the environment. Furthermore, climate change was not seen as a major concern; rather the conference focused on environmental degradation in general.

This notion is also reflected in some external papers published on the UNHCR webpage. Beyond this early conference the UNHCR itself remained more or less silent on the topic for some years. However, in the *New Issues in Refugee Research* series several

papers were published in the early 2000s which dealt more exclusively with the environmental degradation/climate change - displacement nexus. On the unhcr.org webpage one can find a style sheet for publishing articles in the *New Issues in Refugee Research*, which contains the following information:

“Launched in 1999 and published by UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES), “New Issues in Refugee Research” is a web-based series of research papers focusing on refugee, humanitarian and migration issues. By the start of 2008, 150 papers had been published in the series” (UNHCR, Style Sheet, online).

The *New Issues in Refugee Research* is open to both external researchers, as well as staff, interns and other associates. Texts are reviewed by UNHCR employees who decide on the publication. Although the UNHCR says that the series does not reflect an official UNHCR perspective, it seems to be feasible to ask how independent the authors of the texts really are. It appears there must be a certain amount of affiliation with the agency, simply because there is no official peer review system and thus a certain bias of the editors of the magazine is possible. In terms of privilege and equal access to the discourse this should be kept in mind. In particular because the UNHCR is keen to point out that the series is designed to give an input to the debate and is designed to provide background for later policy options. In the case of climate change related displacement it makes sense to look at the process of information gathering and policy formulation because the topic is still new and the discourse evolving. Publications under the umbrella of the most important refugee organisation worldwide thus will have some influence. As demonstrated in the theory section of this paper power and knowledge are interwoven and hence it seems worthwhile to investigate whether these publications had an impact on later policy papers of the UNHCR.

The first article published in the *New Issues in Refugee Research* on the topic was entitled “Environmental Refugee –Myth or Reality” and was written by Richard Black from the Sussex University in Great Britain. The entire paper (beginning with its highly sceptical title) questions the existence of a linear connection between environmental factors and refugee movements. Black acknowledges that the two most cited causes for environmental migration are rising sea-levels and desertification processes. He in particular questions the latter and investigates the “myth of desertification”. Black cites authors who demonstrate that “desertification” in the Sahel zone is not necessarily a growing phenomenon, but rather prove that the deserts margins are in constant flux due to changing rain patterns (Black, 2001; 4). Thus, the image of the desert conquering

ever-expanding territories and thus pushing people (in particular small-scale farmers) into the city, can be seen as a “myth” (Black, 2001; 4). He then proceeds to argue (based on several case studies by co-academics) that it is also a myth to believe that desertification leads to mass exodus; Instead he points out that economic and political factors are paramount in causing people to leave their land (Black, 2001; 5). He characterizes people’s movement in the Sahel zone as

“migration as an essential part of the economic and social structure of the region, rather than a response to environmental decline” (Black, 2001; 6).

He also highlights that in Mali famines did not lead to migration, but hindered it since during times of scarcity the initial material means necessary for migrating were not available (Black, 2001; 7). In a similar vein he then turns to the phenomenon of sea-level rise and disregards this as a trigger for migration. Black states that usually flooding will lead to short-term displacements within a very small territory (Black, 2001; 8). In 2007, McNamara published an article investigating the discourse within the UN about so-called “climate refugees” and with respect to Black (who neatly falls into the *minimalist* approach as portrayed in the “Climate Refugees and Security Concerns” chapter) she says,

“such critiques have had the effect (whether intentional or not) of contesting and dismissing the phenomenon of environmental refugees altogether” (McNamara, 2007; 14).

The connection between environmental degradation and conflict is highly contested by Black. He cites a review in which:

“major conflicts that have caused large-scale forced migration during the 1990s [...] provides little evidence of the generation of environmental ‘hotspots’ that have developed into war” (Black, 2001; 8).

Black therefore seems to be privileging the view that environmental refugees are a “myth” in so far as a direct connection between environmental degradation and mass exodus cannot be drawn. He advocates for taking the contextual factors for conflict and subsequent migration into perspective and sees the environment as just one of many puzzle pieces whose significance should not be overestimated (Black, 2001; 10). He concludes his essay by asking why environmental refugees got on the agenda. Here he gives a series of possible answers. For him the

“answer lies in the agenda of policy-makers in the North, who wish to further restrict asylum laws and procedures: thus the term was ‘invented at least in part to depoliticise the causes of displacement, so enabling states to derogate their obligation to provide asylum’” (Black, 2001; 11).

The sentiment that talking about “climate refugees” or “environmental refugees” is not helpful within a global restrictive asylum trend is shared by some of the authors of the previous literature review. The fear for a delusion of the original convention is a common theme in some argumentations and thus might be well justified. However, denying the environment-displacement link as Black does might not be a very productive and helpful endeavour either. Also, the idea that “environmental refugees” depoliticise the meaning of refugees is interesting. Nuteleers who divided groups into “environmental refugees” (which can hardly be separated from economic migrants according to her) and “pure” “climate refugees” might echo this. While the environment as a cause for displacement might be too “depoliticised” and too shallow, climate change might serve as a new approach to actually bringing back politics into the environmental debate. Within the respective international forums (UNFCCC, COP), climate change is seen as a highly political issue calling for “shared but differentiated responsibilities”. Thus, “climate refugees” could potentially introduce this notion to the humanitarian world as well. However, Black avoids linking environmental changes to climate change and does not refer to any responsibilities. While –as shown in the literature review of this thesis- most authors address Western states as main polluters and drivers of environmental change, Black leaves out this question completely, which is in line with the 1996 conference which also avoided this topic. Thus, in a way his very essay might also be seen as a contribution to depoliticise the topic.

A year later, Stephan Castels from the Oxford University published a paper in the same series. His work “Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate” is equally critical of the notion that environmental changes trigger refugee flows. Castels sets out to reconsider Norman Myers’ work on “environmental refugees” (for information on Norman Myers’s work see chapter 2.2 of this paper). Castels and Black both view Myers’s assumption as speculative and based on dubious statistical procedures (Castels, 2002; 3). Castels in particular mentions that Myers keenly puts future scenarios out there, but fails to present any current numbers. Like Black, Castels is highly sceptical of the causal connection between environmental degradation and conflict resulting in displacement. He insists that factors like ethnicity or religion are much more likely to trigger conflicts (Castels, 2002; 7). When it comes to acknowledging “environmental refugees”, Castels points out that the Vietnam War saw a considerable number of people forced to leave their land due to environmental persecution (Castels,

2002; 9). However, he is keen to remind the reader that those people where refugees because of general persecution; the means of persecution (intentional destruction of their livelihoods) is more or less redundant after the refugee status was granted based on other grounds.

A crucial departure from Black's text is that Castels does not avoid addressing responsibilities. He sees that Western states disproportionately contributed to environmental degradation that might cause people to leave their homes (Castels, 2002; 11). For him the entire debate about "environmental refugee" is thus best captured by a discourse about the right to development. He fears that the talk of "environmental refugees" might be used to hamper development strategies in the non-Western world (Castels, 2002; 14).

What Castels seems to be doing is a rephrasing of the problem into a developmental discourse. Considering the pronounced fear of some developing states that "climate change" will yet serve as another way to impede them from catching-up of those states to a Western lifestyle, it could be seen as a Global South sensitive approach. But *de facto* we need to rethink development. Growth and development can only be realistic options for a shared future if we manage to re-interpret both and get them into compliance with sustainability and fairness. The text echoes more the newly developing countries' fear of the Kyoto Protocol than a human-rights aware refugee perspective.

Six years later, in 2008 Etienne Piquet published the essay "Climate Change and Forced Migration" in the UNHCR's *New Issues in Refugee Research*. As the authors before him he echoes the sentiment that it is dangerous to present estimated numbers of "climate refugees" as these (usually large) numbers might trigger hostilities in Western states towards granting refugee status (Piquet, 2008; 3). Central to his argumentation is that people displaced by natural events usually want to return and migrate only within very short distances (Piquet, 2008; 6). Granting them asylum in other states might not actually be beneficial or even desired by the people. Without much elaboration, Piquet also refers to the fact that Western states are primarily responsible for environmental displacement (Piquet, 2008; 8). Piquet's argument about the increasing hostility of Western states against refugees ties in with the arguments given by Astri Suhrke and Kathleen Newland in the previous subchapter.

If we consider the contributions and developments from the above sketched theoretical perspectives several things are striking. Although the debate about climate change and displacement was and is vivid and puts forward various positions, the three publications in the UNHCR series are all to be characterized as belonging to the *minimalist* approach, which is highly sceptical about the connection between climate change and displacement. The phase of *discursive communication* within the agency was thus not very inclusive. Rather a certain position dominated the discussion from the beginning and (since this position was so critical regarding the magnitude and velocity of the problem) might have hampered a more profound engagement with this looming policy issue. Also remarkable is that within the 150 publications of the series only three were concerned with the topic of environmental change and refugee flows. It needs also to be kept in mind that the early discussions revolve much more around “the environment” in general. Climate change is explicitly referred to only by the last contribution mentioned, of 2008. Within the academic literature this turn was anticipated several years earlier, as demonstrated in the literature review. In conclusion one could say that the engagement with the topic was rather reluctant. Or: climate change and displacement scenarios were not on the agenda of the UNHCR until 2008. It remains now an open question whether in 2008 the discussed contributions became dominant within the agency and inspired the policy paper.

4.3) Establishing an Official Discourse: The Policy Paper

In this section the second phase of the *hegemonic project* is investigated. The main focus will be on the analysis of the policy paper of the UNHCR which until today forms the core of their policy approach.

Framing a New Topic

During an interview with the senior employee of the UNHCR and author of the below discussed policy paper, the following statement was given:

“... [I] was struck at the fact that a lot of the literature around this issue actually specifically mentioned the UNHCR or speculated about a UNHCR role in this area and yet in looking around I was struck that the UNHCR had never really pronounced itself on the debate and on any of the points raised in the scholarly literature. So the first policy statement was really just an initial contribution to this debate” (Interview 1, Expert A).

When analysing the content of the policy paper after studying the publications within the *New Issues in Refugee Research*, one might expect the agency to have a cautious, maybe even sceptical approach to the topic within the paper. However, only few statements within the policy paper resemble the *minimalist* attitude of the articles in the research series. For example, displacement caused by climate change is portrayed as one of various measures to cope with a changing environment (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 10). This reminds one of the criticism voiced by authors like Black who doubt the displacement scenarios put forward by other authors. Furthermore, the paper advocates for extended and better research to be able to give more precise predictions of the magnitude of the potential displacement (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 10). This argument was frequently put forward by authors of the *minimalist* cluster who view the problem as overstated and not based on actual research. Overall, however, *minimalist* argumentations are at most marginal in the paper. The official UNHCR paper displays a much greater concern for the people affected by climate change and instead of advocating for caution embraces various other positions as it will be demonstrated below. Some of these positions actually seem to be a development of the 1996 conference outcomes discussed in the previous subchapter. It feels like the conference actually was more important to the formation of a policy approach than the publications in the research series.

So, only in 2008, did the UNHCR release the policy paper entitled “Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: a UNHCR Perspective”. In a footnote one can read that the paper “...will be updated as necessary, in line with relevant developments within the climate change debate” (UNHCR; 2009 (a); 1); such an update was released in 2009 and only the revised version from the 14th of August 2009 is discussed here as it is available online. In one of the interviews conducted for this paper the senior employee of the UNHCR explained that this updated version only altered minimal things.

After side-stepping the topic throughout the 1990's, it is interesting why the agency suddenly produced a policy in 2008. What had changed? In the interview with Expert A this issue was discussed and it was made clear that external factors as much as internal factors played a key role in bringing this topic on the agenda of the UNHCR. Namely four reasons were presented why 2008 was the break-through year for the UNHCR to engage with climate change induced displacement:

“...That was the year in which I think it was the fourth IPCC report [that came out] which really confirmed that we were facing a dynamic of global warming. And it was also a time when our High Commissioner began to speak about the link between climate change, the multiplication of natural disaster scenarios increases and movements of population. So and finally again it was the year in which the US seemed to ... let's say [was] accepting the reality of climate change which ... the Bush administration had been denying”

“... In addition we were also part of the Inter Agency Standing Committee... I mean we are... which is a coordination body basically bringing together UN and non-UN actors from the humanitarian world... to see how to better coordinate humanitarian response [in] particularly in IDP situations but not only. So at that point we were also participating in an IASC working group which was looking at the possible typologies of movement and terminology surrounding the climate change issue” (Interview 1, expert A).

The 2007 IPCC report had an impact on the entire international community. Climate change was finally accepted as the new reality. This report was instrumental, as it confirmed climate change as the top challenge ahead for the international community. Media attention was widespread and long standing climate sceptics had to face the fact climate change was now perceived as “reality”. It succeeded in becoming a hegemonic discourse through the legitimization of an accepted international scientific body. Hence, the turn towards climate change issues within the UNHCR was anticipated.

The change in the American administration is clearly an external factor that allowed for a greater and more proactive engagement of various UN bodies with climate change. The impact of the USA on the UNHCR should not be underestimated, as this is the agency’s biggest donor. So, if their position towards climate change alters, obviously this makes new strategies within the UNHCR possible, too.

The role of the High Commissioner is also seen as instrumental by the interviewed employee. This is not astonishing, as the High Commissioner traditionally has a big source of authority within the agency. Indeed, severe capacity restrictions and insufficient funds forced the agency since its establishment to seek for more autonomy. Conflicts with donor states were unavoidable and sometimes led to a stronger position of the agency afterwards. The role of the High Commissioners is thus crucial. With respect to climate change displaced persons the current High Commissioner seems to be rather sympathetic. The firm belief that climate change will cause displacement was in fact underlined by the High Commissioner’s attendance at the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen. In a press statement he was quoted as following:

“UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres predicted Wednesday in Copenhagen that climate change will become the biggest driver of population displacements, both inside and across national borders, within the not too distant future” (Fleming, 2009, online).

In 2009 the High Commissioner also addressed the topic of climate change triggered displacement at the General Assembly of the UN. In his *Note on International Protection* he said that climate change will most likely trigger mass displacement and will make new legal protection measures necessary. He also urged states to respect the practice of asylum for Convention refugees, and made clear that the Convention will have to be keenly safeguarded (UNHCR, 2009 (b); 2). Guterres’s attention towards the topic shows how the agency has accepted climate change induced displacement as a part of its agenda.

Furthermore the work in the IASC helped foster the topic in the agency and brought together the expertise of various humanitarian actors which undoubtedly made it easier for the UNHCR to form a policy approach relatively rapidly. The importance of the IASC was already mentioned in the 1996 conference. Apparently this instrument proofed its efficiency.

Besides the decisive role of the High Commissioner, the UNHCR today consists of various other bodies and regional bureaus, too. When asking Expert A how the regional offices treated the matter and whether the field missions were more pro-active on the matter even before 2008 (since they potentially were more directly affected by the phenomenon in their daily work) the answer was not affirmative.

In fact, as Expert A pointed out the awareness for the topic and the appreciation for getting engaged with it only came gradually. While in the time of the initial policy statement many field missions did not perceive climate change as a real threat to their work, this notion changed (Interview 1, Expert A). By now this attitude has altered drastically and in particular the Asian regional bureau of the agency became much more involved in meeting the challenge of climate change:

“... [the] Asian bureau is actively participating now in looking at national disaster response in the Asia- Pacific region. And the Philippines asked us to become directly involved in the flood response when Manila and other parts of the country were hit by flooding a couple of years ago. ... I would say the perception of the reality of climate change and also the realization that it would

have a very direct impact on operations has only now or is only now beginning to crystallize” (Interview 1, Expert A).

Typology of Displacement Scenarios

The policy paper begins by naming several possible future scenarios of displacement. For the UNHCR climate change factors that trigger displacement are:

- “hydro-meteorological disasters (flooding, hurricanes/typhoons/cyclones, mudslides, etc.);
- zones designated by governments as being too high-risk and dangerous for human habitation;
- environmental degradation and slow onset disaster (e.g. reduction of water availability, desertification, recurrent flooding, salination of coastal zones, etc.);
- the case of ‘sinking’ small island states; and,
- violent conflict triggered by a decrease in essential resources (e.g. water, land, food) owing to climate change” (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 4).

In particular the second point on the list is an interesting addition to the frequently cited displacement scenarios within the academic literature. This point was mostly neglected by the afore summarized authors. When inquiring how this typology was established in the interview with Expert A, it was mentioned that these scenarios were based on close cooperation with external researchers.

“... [At] the categorization question we actually work very closely with Walter Kälin from the University of Bern who was at the time the Secretary General Representative for the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and Walter, and one member of his staff, myself, IOM, and the Norwegian Refugee Council were participating at this Inter Agency Standing Committee Group which was looking in the issues of typology and terminology and so we basically as a group accepted to work on the categories that Walter Kälin had then kindly identified”(Expert A, Interview 1).

The great influence of a relatively small number of people is striking here. As demonstrated in the literature review, the struggle over defining what constitutes a “climate refugee” has by no means come to an end. Thus, the decisive turn towards the definition put forward by one expert is remarkable, as this typology became the background for all of the future work of the UNHCR with this topic. Furthermore; it also apparently became the background for the work of the IASC, which is the coordination mechanism for the larger humanitarian community. Establishing a shared definition here (or a “normative grammar”, to go back to the example used to illustrate

the Gramscian notion of hegemony) is essential for subsequent common action. But again one must be allowed to wonder how inclusive the establishment of the typology was.

While the paper covers both sudden-onset and slow-onset scenarios it was pointed out in the interview:

“... that is why the natural disaster type scenario sudden-onset event is much clearer and much let's say clearly in the row of the forced displacement because you have a triggering event which is clearly distinguished, visible ah there is no question whether it was the natural disaster that was the cause ... but at least in sudden onset natural disasters you got the smoking gun you got the ... you got the movement so, the whole issue of that ... causality is simply not raised at all“ (Expert A, Interview 1).

This sentiment is repeated in an issue of the *Forced Migration Review* of the Oxford university, where some scholars pointed out in 2008: “...current policy responses tend to focus on the impacts of sudden disasters rather than the consequences of longer-term environmental degradation” (Morton/Boncour/Laczko, 2008; 5). The focus on sudden-onset events demonstrates that the international community has the same problems as the academic community to deal with the blurring boundaries between migration and displacement when it comes to slow-onset scenarios. Due to the rather pragmatic nature of international bureaucracy within the UN, the turn to sudden-onset events seems logical.

Terminology of Displacement

After introducing displacement scenarios the paper continues with a reflection on possibly affected groups of people and an assessment of why they are of concern to the agency. The paper makes clear that under very specific circumstances people displaced by climate change events could be characterized as refugees. However, this list of people will probably be very short, as the grounds for refugee statues laid out by the original convention have to be met. This means: only people affected by climate change whose government wilfully and based on one of the convention grounds (race, ethnicity, religion...) withholds support for these people, can be granted refugee statues (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 7). Also in cases of general violence due to scarcity of resources linked to climate change the UNHCR would become active within their mandate (UNHCR, 2009 (a), 6). While these specific scenarios might appear, the majority of people affected by climate change will most likely suffer from other forms of hardship.

The paper hence stresses that internal displacement will likely rise due to climate change. At this point it seems necessary to reflect on the IDP situation for a moment, as most scholars stressed that IDP will be the largest groups of climate change victims and potentially receive least attention as they do not fall into the original mandate of the refugee agency. The UNHCR's increasing work in this area since the 1990s suggests otherwise. For climate change victims this might be seen as a particularly important trend. As demonstrated in the review, many authors agree that the majority of the climate change displaced persons will probably not leave their country, but become IDPs. The fact that the UNHCR is involved with the IDPs plight more readily might serve as a basis for the engagement with climate change related victims, in particular because the policy paper refers to the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement for protection (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 4). The UNHCR has gained more expertise and experience with the specific needs of IDPs and since 2009 has assumed the lead role in IDP camps management; furthermore, as one can read on the agency's webpage:

“Millions of other civilians who have been made homeless by natural disasters are also classified as IDPs. UNHCR is only involved with this group in exceptional circumstances, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the earthquake in 2005 and floods in 2010 in Pakistan and 2008's Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar” (UNHCR, On the run in their own land, online).

Despite the success in establishing the *Guidelines for Internal Displacement* and the wider attention and concern of the international community, implementation of the guidelines remains an issue of concern. However, (at least in theory) climate change related IDPs are able to rely on some sort of support and protection. Antonio Guterres highlighted in his report to the General Assembly in 2009 that the UNHCR will further improve their IDP approach and mainstream their concerns into the agency's policies. IDPs thus are confirmed as an integral part of persons of concern within the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2009 (b); 5).

Furthermore, statelessness¹⁵ (which is already a part of the core mandate), is mentioned as a growing problem in a climate change affected world within the policy paper. In particular the situation of low-lying island states is mentioned. Many unprecedented legal questions will arise if those states vanish, as the disappearance of a

¹⁵ Statelessness can arise due to various (often discriminating) reasons. While the world saw an increase of stateless people in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and after colonial independence of several African and Asian states; statelessness is also caused by discriminatory law against either ethnicities of countries or against women who in more than 30 countries of the world can not pass on citizenship to their children (UNHCR, Media Backgrounder, online)

state due to climatic changes is itself unprecedented. In a 2009 paper of the UNHCR, IOM and Norwegian Refugee Council some reflection was made on statelessness and climate change. The question for the international community will be: when exactly does a state (with all its administrative rights and functions) stop to exist? Is the temporary or permanent exile of the government and its population the determining factor for the end of statehood? (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 2) The policy paper highlights that the international community already has two instruments at hand which deal with statelessness. There is the 1954 “Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons” and the 1961 “Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness”. Thus, people who become stateless are clearly under the protection responsibility of the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2009; 5). Article 9 of the 1961 Convention forbids signatory states of the convention to deprive citizens of their nationality based on ethnical, race or religious reasons, while Article 10 which specifically addresses the “transfer of territory”. On the UNHCR webpage one can read that:

“The issue of transfer of territory is addressed in Article 10. It follows from this provision that treaties shall ensure that statelessness does not occur as a result of transfer of territory” (UNHCR, Statelessness Article, Online).

However established these two conventions are, they are far less recognized than the Refugee Convention as such. In 2011 (at the 60th anniversary of the “Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness”) only 71 states had signed the convention (UNHCR, 2011 (e); 45). The UNHCR policy paper concludes its reflections on statelessness with the note that statelessness has so far not arisen due to climate change and thus all attention needs to be drawn on preventing statelessness (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 5).

While IDPs and statelessness already are addressed by respective international norms another displacement type is less noticed. According to the UNHCR a severe protection gap arises for those externally displaced (across international borders). Those people are not recognized as “refugees” and so far there is no agreed-upon other definition and legal category which would offer them protection (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 2). In the case of external displacement, the legal status remains unclear and poses a severe challenge to the international community. Their status determination is central for the subsequent provision of support and protection. The policy paper highlights that it is hard to characterize them as “migrants” as their choice to move was in most cases not voluntary but a matter of survival. But they also do not qualify as refugees, since environmental degradation does not count as persecution in the majority of cases. Until

today there is no legally recognized category of “externally displaced persons”. However, as expert A pointed out:

“... for the time being there is no other terminology so at least as a placeholder just to mark a difference: what we are suggesting is let's use external displacement for environmental reasons” (Interview 1, Expert A).

Here a niche arises for the UNHCR to display its norm setting capacities. The fate of externally displaced persons remains unclear and the international community needs to look into this new “category” of people. In the later sub-chapters of this case study this will be explored.

One section of the policy paper exclusively deals with the problem of terminology and urges to pay respect to the legal definition of the term “refugee”. The current definition of a “refugee” under international law does not view environmental change as a reason to permit this status as it is reserved for people who suffer persecution due to a special group characteristic. During the expert interview for this paper it was said:

“... we really take issue with the quote/unquote refugee label for a number of reasons. First of all ... [it] is a commonly held assumption that most movements would in fact be internal in nature and as you know the term refugee ah is only used when people cross the border...” (Interview 1, Expert A)

“Secondly, the environmental refugee label has simply no foundation in international law. It may be a catchy term for journalists and for people who want to dramatize the plight of those affected and of course it is a catastrophic situation ... but we thought that if we as an agent introduce that typology [we] would endanger ... the refugee convention and simply add confusion to what we are talking about” (Interview 1, Expert A).

So, the awareness that cross-border movement will not take place in the majority of cases and the lack of environmental reasons for refugee status in the original convention, make the term undesirable for the UNHCR. Furthermore, and that clearly displays the self awareness as a powerful actor of the agency, the agency sees itself as an agent in the international community who could potentially add even greater confusion to the complex matter by using the popularised term “climate refugee”. The paramount focus on the legal matters surrounding the climate change- displacement nexus is in line with what the scholars Karns and Mingst describe as a tendency of the UNHCR to focus on legalistic matters (Karns/Mingst, 2004, 57).

The policy paper furthermore states:

“Some states and NGOs have suggested that the 1951 Refugee Convention should simply be amended and expressly extended to include people who have been displaced across borders as a result of long-term climate change or sudden natural disasters. UNHCR considers that any initiative to modify this definition would risk a renegotiation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which, would not be justified by actual needs. Moreover, in the current political environment, it could result in a lowering of protection standards for refugees and even undermine the international refugee protection regime altogether” (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 9).

This sentiment was repeated in the interview with the UNHCR employee

“... for example as I was writing the first draft in early 2008 I noticed that for example - if I recall correctly- it was the Maldives that was calling for some sort of new convention in this area” (Interview 1, Expert A).

The Maldives, being severely affected by rising sea-levels and at a similar risk of disappearance as some of the Pacific states, clearly has a national interest in enhancing international protection measures. An amended convention thus seems –from the island’s government perspective- a realistic demand. However; the UNHCR rejects this step:

“... [I came across a] draft text and even an unhappy formulation where someone just tried to amend Article One of the Refugee Convention and add a few words. -As if that was sufficient to bring all of those [affected by climate change] into the refugee sphere. We do not think that this is the correct approach” (Interview 1, Expert A).

This is very much in line with the legal debate as portrayed in the third subchapter of the literature review of this paper. The language used here by the UNHCR is very similar to the concerns put forward by authors like Tracy King. The articulation of the UNHCR’s position thus clearly entails an element of censoring. Albeit the severity of the problem and the acknowledgement of the hardness of the people’s plight, they are not to be labelled refugees. The UNHCR is extremely protectionist of this category and in fact this stance on rejecting the refugee terminology characterizes the core of the UNHCR discourse on climate change and displacement. While their position altered in other aspects, they continue to stand strong on the rejection of the refugee terminology.

In particular, the last sentence of the above quote points to the “current political environment” under which the convention should not be re-negotiated. With ever limiting quotas and public concerns about excepting refugees and a tightening of migration regimes the UNHCR does not believe in a successful broadening of their

mandate while at the same time being able to maintain the generous rights reserved for refugees. The expert interview revealed:

“... The Refugee Convention has been around for sixty years, even though some states are now saying that they have difficulty in implementing it in the world of mass migration and mass movement and multiple causes for movement; In our governing body ... states have expressed concern about touching the refugee convention in any way. And so we don't think it is a wise approach [to change it]” (Interview 1, Expert A).

So, apparently the opening up of the refugee conventions for re-negotiations is treated with utmost prudence by the agency and its member states. Hence, it is more than unlikely that a broadening of the convention will happen anytime soon.

Two more crucial points were made in the expert interview with regard to the terminology challenge:

“...Also let's remember that the institutional architecture around the issue of ...”migration”/”displacement” was set many many years ago when IOM and UNHCR were created. With this notion somehow that ... migrants are voluntary movers and somehow refugees -and now in today's world- internally displaced are in fact affected by forced ... displacement. But we know that those who have the most resources, the best networks etc.etc... and begin to feel the pinch of climate change...in fact in a first incidence would probably be more migrants than “displaced” (Expert A, Interview 1).

The idea of clear cut edges between migrants/displaced persons is thus rejected. Rather, echoing for example Diana Bate's understanding of the issue:

“... a continuum where you have you know completely voluntary on the one end and completely forced on the other. But the problem is where do we ... where do we draw the dividing line?” (Expert A, Interview 1).

Thus, the agency refers to “displacement” throughout their policy statement to avoid the contested “refugee” term and to equally avoid a too harmless wording like “migrant”. People who have to flee because of climate change, are thus in-between categories. This point was taken up in the interview again.

“... in our own thinking ah we would prefer to talk about, when it comes to cross border movements linked to the environment, to talk about environmentally related external displacement, to distinguish it from internal displacement” (Expert A, Interview 1).

The Way Ahead: Advocacy and Financial Constrains

Finally, the UNHCR policy paper turns to the economic dimension of getting more involved with a new category of people in need for assistance. It is pointed out that additional funding is much needed in the future and even now to implement protection measures for people displaced by environmental factors (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 10). The UNHCR is aware that climate change and economic crisis, including a global recession, fall together and that economic and environmental measures work hand in hand in displacement schemes. The agency urges states to keep up their humanitarian obligations under international law and base any new protection measures on human rights standards (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 9). When it comes to financing, another chance to address greater responsibilities of Western states passed. While authors like Conisbee and Simms advocate for making developed countries pay; the UNHCR does not explore this.

The way forward for the UNHCR is highlighting the role of developing technology for adaptation, as well as early warning measures (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 10). This faith in technological progress is accompanied by a strong commitment to advocacy, awareness raising and political dialogue within UN forums (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 12).

“While 2009 is a critical year in negotiating a more effective response to the challenge of climate change, the outcome of the UNFCCC Conference in Copenhagen (‘COP 15’) in December 2009 needs to be awaited. [...]Much will indeed depend on whether human displacement and humanitarian aspects of climate change, and the protection needs of persons of concern to UNHCR, will be properly referenced as issues that the international community must factor in” (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 12).

The UNHCR thus sought to promote their policy approach in other international forums, as will be demonstrated in the next subchapter and which neatly falls into the “ideological domination/ legitimization” category of the phases outlined which mark a *hegemonic project*.

Climate Justice

After exploring the paper and assessing how it would fit into the sketched clusters of the previous literature review, let us now consider how or if the UNHCR is addressing the notion of “climate justice” within it.

While the policy paper does mention green house gas emissions as one of the root causes for climate change, the paper remains awkwardly silent about who causes

them. Curbing GHG is seen as most necessary (UNHCR, 2009 (a); 10). However, with no word it is mentioned that Western countries contribute more to those emissions and the question of responsibility for climate change is completely left out. When confronting Expert A with this finding the answer was as following:

“... it is not our job to point the finger at anyone. Even when... even [*with emphasise*] when we're talking about conflict related refugee movements or displacement, we only go public with observations about state conduct when we have exhausted all over kinds of soft diplomacy and soft engagement. And of course it is not for UNHCR to start talking about polluter pays. ... That is not the way we work and that's why it [the policy paper] wasn't addressing the cause of climate change, because it is just not something we do” (Interview 1, Expert A).

The policy paper of the UNHCR hence has to leave out the justice implications of this topic and rather focuses on the international law and protection dimension of the problem. This makes sense from the perspective of a humanitarian agency. However, climate change is a phenomenon which is very different from conflicts and war. Climate change is an event triggered by decades of GHG accumulation of a specific group of countries. Respective international forums have already established certain responsibilities. The UNHCR as one of the most important humanitarian agencies within the UN system could acknowledge these responsibilities. And advocate for a more explicit (financial) engagement of Western states with the topic. The neglect of the aspect of responsibility is also remarkable as it forms the very reason for the involvement of the international community with the topic for authors like Conisbee and Simms, Biermann and Boas and others. The adverse effects of climate change and the historical dimension which clearly demonstrates that some countries contribute more to GHG is their central argument for protecting what they label “climate refugees”. Furthermore, the fact that some countries bear more responsibility than others is internationally accepted and even reflected within international treaties like the Kyoto Protocol. And in fact expert A reassures that:

“The climate change discussion of the Conference of Parties [COP] is the forum to talk about the causes and the mitigation angle it is not [us]. .. We don't even need to have an opinion on it. There are other agencies involved and it is very far away from our concerns” (Interview 1, Expert A).

This shows that a discourse about “climate justice” is not part of the UNHCR strategy. Their impartiality forbids taking sides as it was designed as an apolitical protection agency. In times of conflict this seems in fact the only feasible way of securing an atmosphere in which later reconciliation is possible. As the UNHCR is

increasingly drawn into conflicts and present in countries of massive human rights violations and civil-war like situations this impartiality is more necessary than ever to secure successful missions as well as the well-being of the staff. However, with respect to climate change the matter may lie differently. The Kyoto Protocol has already established that a greater responsibility has to be shouldered by Western states. The debate about climate change in public has long been focused on the different responsibilities of developed and developing states. Media, politicians, development agencies and even the industry have realised that the adverse effects of climate change need to be central for addressing the *problematique* as such. When climate change leads to displacement this is inherently a matter of justice. Despite the firm rejection of the UNHCR to advocate for principles like “polluter pays” we will investigate how greater engagement with other actors within the climate change and displacement nexus made addressing matters of justice possible for the UNHCR.

At the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen High Commissioner Guterres gave a press interview in which he took yet another approach towards the adverse effects of climate change. While he underlined that countries of the Global South will be most effected, the article mentions that Guterres said: “climate change should not be considered a distant worry” (Fleming, 2009; online). People living in the Global North will also feel changes in weather patterns and more severe climatic events.

Summing up their approach it seems fair to argue that the UNHCR is not politicising the topic in its policy paper. Questions of global justice, equality and responsibility are not raised. The discourse of justice is sacrificed for a discourse that is much more UNHCR-inherent: namely that of political practicality and of international law. However, the organisation is keen to present itself as aware of the problem, reflecting this also in its own practical measures. It seems like apart from the climate justice notion a lot of the academic arguments of the literature review have found their way into the policy paper. The paper frames the issue through a legalist lens. The starting points for the engagement are concrete protection concerns instead of reflections about justice. As explained in section 3 of this thesis the aim is to investigate the process and developments within the UNHCR’s approach to climate change related displacement. While the UNHCR’s approach to terminology was only centred around rejecting the “refugee” terminology during the phase of *discursive communication*, the policy paper exclusively elaborates on this. As it also became apparent in the expert interview

the agency slowly settled for the “displacement” terminology and thus coined its own rhetoric about the issue. Furthermore, a decisive turn to climate change instead of broader environmental issues is noticeable and finally the minimalist even denying attitude of the *minimalist* sentiments expressed within the research series is abandoned. This proves that we need to consider the work of the agency as “in-flux” rather than as static over time. And it also gives a first hint of “where” and “how” the agency gets input for their work. Apparently the research publications were not as influential as the early conference with IOM, as the UNHCR continued working on the terminology issue raised at the conference but did not extend the minimalist approach to the topic expressed in the research series.

4.4) Ideological Domination: UNFCCC outcomes

In this chapter the focus is on how the UNHCR seeks domination within the international community for their *hegemonic project*. As mentioned before: the phase model has some weaknesses as the different phases are not as neatly separable in practice. While the UNHCR was successful promoting its discourse in the wider arena; it had to overcome *inter-discursive struggles* which will also be analysed in the next chapter.

The sentiments of the policy paper are reflected in the submissions of the UNHCR to the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group On Long-Term Cooperative Action Under The Convention (AWG-LCA). The UNHCR submitted ideas and proposals for the negotiations of the meeting. The UNFCCC and the COP meetings are by far the highest profile global meetings for the climate change problem, thus promoting ones position in this forum bears quite some magnitude and outreach.

With respect to climate change and displacement the UNHCR, in cooperation with the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Representative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and the United Nations University wrote a paper which aimed at providing state parties with some key insights to be taken into account during the Copenhagen negotiations (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 2). This paper highlights that although there is no causal relationship between climate change and displacement, there is a clear link between the two factors. Hence, states are encouraged to act upon this realisation. The UNHCR sets out its recommendations by stressing that cuts in GHG emissions as envisaged in the Kyoto Protocol and following international

treaties is an appropriate and effective way of reducing the risk of displacement (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 2). It is interesting that in the forum of the UNFCCC meeting the UNHCR actually starts its recommendations with highlighting the cause for climate change, while more or less ignoring this topic within their policy paper. Maybe the shared authorship (with the IOM and United Nations University), as well as the UNFCCC setting gave more leverage to the agency and made this call possible. Later in the paper the reference to GHG emissions is repeated but here it says:

“Considering that climate change does not halt at borders but concerns all States and is also a common heritage, such mitigation obligations should be enhanced in the agreed outcome” (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 5).

The notion that climate change is a “common heritage” and affects all states is obviously true. However, once more remarks about who accumulated that heritage are avoided. Hence, as it was demonstrated in the interview with expert A: other agencies are concerned with “polluter pays” principles. The refugee agency does not address responsibilities at the UNFCCC forum; it is rather busy to urge the international community to incorporate displacement scenarios and follows the line of argumentation of the High Commissioner who also characterized climate change as a common threat.

In this paper the authors continue to place the paramount responsibility for supporting and protecting climate change related IDP movements on the nation states, with the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as the instrument for securing their well being (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 2). These put special focus on the most vulnerable groups of society which are characterized by weakened adaptation capacities and usually most affected by natural hazards and climate change (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 8). International actors are only seen as secondary actors within IDP emergencies (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 5). In particular with regard to emergency situation the paper highlights the challenges for nation states to a) fulfil their obligations to protect their citizens and b) to respect their citizens’ right to freedom of movement, even within or back to disaster prone areas (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 7). The agencies advocate for a rights-based approach which highlights transparency of decision making and advocates for relocation schemes only if there is absolute necessity to resettle people. This is in line with the general legalistic attitude of the agency.

The recommendation to state parties reminds politicians that most people affected by climate change will fall outside existing, binding conventions, which leaves a

protection gap in the international law. Instead of renegotiating the 1951 Convention the paper argues that the principle of *non-refoulement* should be extended to those displaced by climate change on at least a temporary basis. This means: people displaced across borders due to climate change events or natural disasters must not be forced to leave a host state until the situation in the home country has been resolved (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 11). This principle is extended to people who have been in a foreign country at the time of a natural disaster at home. The paper concludes with some best-practice examples of such a temporary protection mechanism.

For all the persons who do not qualify as refugees, the paper urges the state parties to think about new protection schemes and to ensure their financing and implementation under the international migration management system (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 2). This is remarkable: while in the policy paper the UNHCR refers mostly to displacement, the agency now seems to pay greater attention to the issue as a migration policy matter, which would defer the topic somewhat to the responsibility of the IOM. Later in the text it is mentioned again that not all movement due to climate change can be seen as displacement, but some would more appropriately be labelled as migration, as some movements demonstrate a certain voluntary nature (UNHCR, 2009 (e); 3). One should keep in mind the IOM was co-author of the paper and thus placing migration into the part of the climate change/movement nexus might simply reflect their approach to the topic.

The paper also highlights the need for new funding mechanisms and talks about:

“the need to allocate some adaptation funding to disaster risk reduction and humanitarian response since none of the already established humanitarian funding mechanisms are currently sufficient to meet the coming challenge” (UNHCR (e), 2009; 3).

Also in dating back to 2009 one can find a submission of the UNHCR towards the UNFCCC AWG-LCA online which provides a concrete suggestion for how to address the issue of climate change induced displacement within the UNFCCC framework. With regard to adaptation measures the suggested wording is:

“The adaptation {framework} {programme} shall support and enhance the implementation of national adaptation plans. Adaptation action includes: Activities related to national and international migration and displacement or planned relocation of persons affected by climate change” (UNFCCC, 2009; 5).

While the COP 15 Copenhagen outcomes did not pick up the issue of displacement, in the year 2010 the COP 16 meeting took place in Cancun and here the issue of displacement was introduced into the outcomes. Using the policy paper as a starting point, the UNHCR used its advocacy capacities for drawing the attention of the international community towards the topic at the COP 16 meeting. For this meeting the UNHCR and IOM prepared a submission on Climate Change and Statelessness. This submission also places great focus on the prevention of statelessness by reducing GHG. The submission found acceptance among the delegates of the Cancun meeting. And finally a paragraph was introduced into the outcomes which points to the connection between climate change and movement of people. Article 14 invites all parties to enhance their adaptation measures and in paragraph (f) of this article it is written:

“Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels” (UNFCCC, 2010; 5).

The UNHCR perspective on the topic is clearly noticeable in the wording of this paragraph. Human movement is mentioned as an adaptation strategy. The movement is differentiated into different forms (“displacement”, “migration”, “planned relocation”). The undesired terminology “climate/environmental refugee” is not used. This is in particular a “success” for the UNHCR, as Koko Warner from the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security stresses in a paper that during another draft text for the UNFCCC discussion of 2009 the term “climate refugee” was used (Warner, 2011; 12). Instead of framing the issue as a refugee matter, the Cancun outcomes painted a more nuanced picture: The different levels of where action (“enhance understanding”, “coordination”, “cooperation”) should be taken include national/regional as well as global structures. This makes clear that a simple one-fits-all policy approach was tried to be avoided.

The Cancun outcomes are thus an incident in which once again the norm setting power of the UNHCR is noticeable. Together with the other afore mentioned bodies the UNHCR clearly was in a position to inform the outcomes with its perception of the issue. Koko Warner from the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security published a research paper on how the Article 14 (f) of the Cancun outcomes was formulated and agrees that the humanitarian community was

instrumental in shaping the outcome (Warner, 2011; 7). She in particular stresses the IASC of which the UNHCR was and still is a member as influential in the outcomes. In the interview with expert A we briefly talked about the Cancun outcomes. Article 14 (f) of the outcomes is currently being addressed within the Nansen Initiative of some selected nation states and the UNHCR, as it will be demonstrated in the respective sub chapter. It is remarkable that the UNHCR was able to form so quickly and decisively a position on this emerging policy field and to promote its position on it in the international arena.

Again this chapter should end with highlighting the changes and the evolution within the UNHCR's approach to fully bring the in-flux character of the policy approach to the front. For the promotion of the topic within the broader UNFCCC framework the UNHCR had to seek alliances with the humanitarian community. As explained within chapter 3 of this paper this is a predictable move for powerful actors within *hegemonic projects*. Rarely, an actor is capable of installing a new "common sense" without the support of like-minded groups. The UNFCC outcomes thus seem to reflect a consensus established first among the humanitarian community. While the IOM probably pushed for including migration scenarios, the UNHCR successfully censored the "climate refugee" term. Furthermore, we need to see the decisive engagement of the UNHCR with the UNFCC forum as a development within their agency's work. The UNHCR confirms its role and importance in the subject matter by promoting its ideas within the meetings and by directly issuing a policy briefing for participating states the agency also seeks to directly "teach" them.

4.5) Inter-Discursive Struggle: ExCom Results

While the UNHCR was clearly able to advance the topic in the UNFCCC arena by putting forward own notions of the issue, the agency had to see setbacks within the organization itself. During the yearly ExCom meetings it was tried to engage the governing body of the agency with the topic. However, as Expert A summarizes the Ministerial conference, this was not easy.

"The High Commissioner sought in March of 2011 and then more formally in June of 2011 and during the June Standing Committee ... to put on the table the

question of whether the UNHCR should in fact not assume a lead role of the protection cluster...in natural disaster scenarios. And basically that gave rise to a ... politicised debate but there it was clear that to try to receive a green light from our governing body today is not possible...” (Interview 2, Expert A)

While the UNHCR was able to promote an UNHCR engagement in other settings, discontent between the governing structure, the High Commissioner and the different divisions had to be resolved. The ExCom consists of 87 states and is the arena where national interests are articulated most clearly within the organisations. The role and power of this body is disputed. Raimo Väyrynen (2001; 147) characterizes the ExCom as too big and unstructured to develop much power over the agency. Moreover, he elaborates on the intransparent structure of this body, the often dominant national interests expressed in its meetings (Väyrynen, 2001; 147). However, the ExCom functions as the governing body of the agency. During their annual meetings (usually during the first week of October) the member states meet to review and approve the activities of the agency (UNHCR, The Executive Committee’s Structure and Meeting, online). Expert A remarks that:

“... states were really, really against ... talking about new causes of displacement. We when included a listing including climate change as well as other issues and we simply got shut down in flames. We drafted the text rather carefully. I think it is paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Communiqué there is a ... light reference to new causes of displacement...” (Interview 2, Expert A).

The outcomes of these annual ExCom meetings are directly submitted to the General Assembly meeting of the United Nations. Online this report can be accessed and the only reference to the environment-displacement nexus is:

“Member States also recognized that UNHCR works in an increasingly complex environment. Trends such as climate change, natural disasters, food and water insecurity, as well as growing vulnerabilities and armed conflicts, stretch the humanitarian system” (ExCom, 2011; 9).

The report does not elaborate on the issue of climate change any further. None of the policy recommendations made in the policy paper or to the UNFCCC meetings are made. Reasons for this can be seen in the general fear of the ExCom of an increasing strength of the agency’s capacities. Instead of focusing on new tasks, the ExCom prefers the UNHCR to stay in the limits of its mandate. The cautious position of the ExCom should be kept in mind when judging the agency’s work on climate

change induced displacement. Expert A made the following statement to summarize the unenthusiastic ExCom reaction to further increase the UNHCR's work on the topic:

“Again: No joint forces across North-South-East-West. “We don’t want any more new norms”; “You need to work on what you are doing now and not look for new clients” etc. etc.” (Interview 2, Expert A)

“...and when we speak about it we get our hands of it because they [ExCom] get concerned about resources, they get concerned about capacities, they get concerned about mission creep” (Interview 2, Expert A)

This demonstrates that the fear expressed by the agency earlier to incorporate climate change related displacement scenarios into the reach of the convention. The stakeholders of the agency seem to be very concerned and protectionist of the original tasks of the agency and renegotiations seem to be undesired due to political and financial reasons. Despite the relatively high level of the agency's independence the ExCom has to give its consent for widening the tasks of the UNHCR.

“So, just to summarize it up: Our governing body has not yet really engaged on the issue of climate change at all” (Interview 2, Expert A)

So, while the agency and the High Commissioner were active in promoting the topic in the international community, the governing body of the agency was more hesitant to get involved. In their outcomes of the year 2011 they only used vague and rather soft words to acknowledge the new causes for displacement, such as climate change. It feels like the ExCom has both strategic as well as material concerns (“mission creep”/ “budgets”) here which seem hard to overcome.

4.6) The Way Ahead: Bellagio Expert Meeting and Nansen Conference

This last sub chapter will highlight the further development of the *hegemonic project*. It will focus on how new alliances were made to further engage with the topic. Moreover, this last subchapter is instrumental as these new alliances seem to allow for a reconsidering of “climate justice”. Moreover, this chapter necessarily has to deal with the question whether the *hegemonic project* was successfully established or not.

Despite the hesitant manner of the ExCom some member states displayed greater interest in the topic. Namely Norway and Switzerland were instrumental to launch the so-called Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement.

Moreover, an expert meeting was held in Bellagio, Italy on the topic in 2011 which was also supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. Expert A explained:

“...the good story coming out of this Ministerial [meeting, ExCom] as relates to climate change is that Switzerland and Norway ... [made] concrete pledges of support of [and] called [for] dialogue in 2010 Bellagio in 2011 and the Nansen conference in 2011...” (Interview 2, Expert A)

Thus, in this last subchapter we will explore how both the Bellagio expert meeting and the Nansen Initiative and see how they are altering the position of the UNHCR expressed in the policy paper.

The Bellagio expert meeting was part of a series of these meetings conducted by the UNHCR's Division of International Protection “leading up to the commemorations of the 60th anniversary of the 1951 “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” and the 50th anniversary of the 1961 “Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness” (UNHCR, 2011 (a); 3). The expert meeting is documented online: One can find a list of participants, some background papers and a summary of outcomes. The participant list is interesting as it reveals that 19 experts from 15 countries “drawn from governments, NGOs, academia and international organizations” (UNHCR, 2011 (c); 1) were present. While they came from all regions of the world, the participant selection favoured government and inter governmental organisations to NGOs. Furthermore, the list does demonstrate the participation of any environmental expert coming from either academia or an NGO. Rather, the conference was instrumental for further developing the discussion within the UNHCR as it introduced the perspective of small island states (Inviting the Ambassador of Kiribati) and a development perspective. Both will be elaborated below. Moreover, the goal of the conference was to address possible legal gaps in the climate change- displacement scenario and to develop strategies to bridge these gaps (UNHCR, 2011 (a), 4).

In a background paper prepared for the conference by Elizabeth Ferris from the Bern University the development perspective is offered to get a better understanding on climate change induced internal displacement. Ferris highlights that a co-operation between development agencies and humanitarian agencies in the matter of planned relocation of people could be very fruitful. Since decades developing agencies deal with displacement scenarios linked to e.g. large scale infrastructure projects. These “involuntary displacements” always affect whole communities of people and thus bear

similarity to possible displacement scenarios due to climate change (Ferris, 2001; 4). In her paper she offers a “Lesson Learned” section about development-induced displacement. Most development Banks who have been involved with infrastructure project leading to displacement developed guidelines and certain standards for this practice, aiming to ensure that:

“Displaced persons should be assisted to improve their livelihoods and living standards at least to the levels they enjoyed before the displacement” (Ferris, 2011; 10).

An increased cooperation of the UNHCR and UNDP is not altogether new. In particular in protracted refugee situations the refugees’ fate and overall development strategies need to be linked. UNDP and UNHCR thus often work together closely (Maurer, 2008; 10). However; this approach might become a hindrance to the UNHCR’s clear legal protection mandate. Human rights standards, status determination and refugee rights might become jeopardized in development projects which aim at economic growth and not at protection and assistance in displacement scenarios (Maurer, 2008; 11). While refugee aid and development strategies obviously need to be coordinated; They must not be confused with one another.

So far most UNHCR statements have explored the impact of climate change on small island states. Not one of the Pacific states is part of the ExCom of the UNHCR. However, in the Bellagio conference the Ambassador of such a state was present. One can notice that thus the conference paid greater attention to the issue and also reflected on terminology and use of language here. One of the conference outcomes hence reads:

“In relation to small island and/or low-lying coastal states, the legal presumption of continuity of statehood needs to be emphasized and the notion and language that such states will “disappear” (i.e., lose their international legal personality) or “sink” ought to be avoided” (UNHCR, 2011 (b); 2).

Furthermore, the conference came to the conclusion that migration schemes or community resettlements all have to be addressed in cooperation with the population of these nations (UNHCR, 2011 (b); 7). UNHCR urges for a holistic approach which embraces all possible adaptation measures and which emphasises the right to self-determination of the nation. Moving from the affected islands to more secure places is noticed as a “rational adaptation response” (UNHCR, 2011 (b); 9), which is often times obscured by tight immigration rules of neighbouring states. Thus, tight migration regimes are a severe constraint for the islanders to adapt and a need for reconsidering

them arises in a climate change affected world. This resembles the positions out forward in subchapter 2.4 in this paper. Self-determination and adaptation strategies are seen as essential to combat climate change in the Pacific. In the interview with the expert this notion was confirmed:

“... most of the Islands states do not want to have their population be “refugees” or “displaced persons”... they do not want refugee eyes on the problem” (Interview 2, Expert A).

Finally, the Bellagio conference explored arising protection gaps and comes to the conclusion that in fact no additional protection mechanisms for IDPs are necessary as the existing ones are applicable to climate change induced internal displacement (UNHCR, 2011 (b), 2).

This sentiment is echoed in one of the background papers for the conference, in which Koko Warner concludes her policy recommendations with an urge to establish “guiding principles” to help states identify possible adaptation and resilience building measures (Warner, 2011; 19). These statements clearly determine the future direction of work. Within international law it is the phenomenon of external (not internal) displacement which apparently requires greatest attention. A new category of people (linked to a special status within international law) seems to become established here. So far, these guidelines for external displacement have not been issued. They do not yet exists, however the International Law Commission¹⁶ is currently drafting principles for the treatment of people who are displaced across borders by sudden-onset events (UNHCR, 2011 (b); 3). Here agencies like the UNHCR are called upon to submit ideas and proposals due to their many years of legal expertise within humanitarian protection. This draft will also bear great significance for people displaced by climate change. It remains open to this point when and where these principles will be released.

Apart from the Bellagio conference, the Nansen initiative is another contemporary forum in which the UNHCR works on the link between climate change and displacement. The Nansen Initiative goes back to the Nansen conference (June 5-7, 2011) which took place in Oslo and was launched by CICERO, the Norwegian Refugee

¹⁶ International Law Commission: The International Law Commission is a part of the UN body and aims at filling the holes in customary international law by seeking for more predictable rules and procedures. The idea for this Commission however goes back to the late 18th century (<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/>)

Council and the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment. UNHCR played a prominent role in the conference, as they their part of the advisory board to the conference.

The most central achievement of this conference was to establish guiding principles for further international cooperation on the topic. While the Bellagio was probably more important as an internal UNHCR event; the Nansen conference and subsequent Nansen Initiative aims at developing a practical “road map” for future cooperation on the subject matter. As Expert A puts it:

“Nansen was the first United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and a polar explorer and he is also renowned as having done ground taking research about weather patterns in the arctic region. So, he also personifies a “can-do”, hands-on, pragmatic approach in the face of very new and difficult challenges” (Interview 2, Expert A).

As mentioned above the Nansen conference was launched by Norway and Switzerland. When two ExCom members and thus stakeholders of the UNHCR single themselves out and launch a costly initiative on a new topic within the refugee work, it needs to be permitted to inquiry why they are doing so. Switzerland apparently helped to launch the initiative for political reasons:

“Geneva sees itself as the humanitarian capital of the world and Switzerland itself is also quite active in the climate talks and at national level has already gotten quite far in terms of adaptation and mitigation” (Interview 2, Expert A).

Norway is traditionally one of the largest donor states within the UNHCR and “luckily both of them are not the poorest countries in the world” (Interview 2, Expert A) Roper and Barria (2010) conceptualize refugee aid as an “impure public good”. That means: states who contribute to the UNHCR usually do so due to a combination of private and public interests. In this case “private” interests could be: geo-strategic reasons; the need for help to deal with refugee populations within one’s state or at its borders; the want to channel international refugee aid through national refugee NGO’s (Roper/Barria, 2010; 624). There as “public” motives are: altruisms, the believe in a humanitarian community, believe in human- and civic rights and the awareness that international refugee aid is beneficial for all countries (Roper/Barria, 2010; 626-627). Without being able to go into anymore detail here; it just needs to be mentioned that refugee aid is often connected to a multitude of motives.

The first Nansen principle demands to meet the challenge of climate change induced displacement by the principle of international cooperation, enhanced

cooperation and research in a manner which is based on human rights and human dignity. Principle No. 4 calls on the international community and regional structures to support nation states with weak or insufficient own funds and resources for adaptation measures. The conference is hence the breakthrough which aims to enhance understanding on the:

“terrible questions that ah the academic community has been writing about and grassroots organisations have been screaming about; but that states and organisations appeared to be ignoring” (Interview 2, Expert A).

The Principles also tie-in already existing co-operation and protection measures linked to the topic of climate-change induced displacement. The Hyogo-Framework for Action¹⁷ is mentioned as the most appropriate tool for enhanced resilience for sudden-onset disasters and the Guiding Principles for Internally Displaced Persons are seen as the adequate tool to ensure protection for climate-change related IDPs (UNHCR, 2011 (d); 5). The UNHCR is mentioned in Principle 9 as a relevant stakeholder in exploring protection possibilities for those “externally displaced” by climate change and sudden onset scenarios. The UNHCR thus obviously was able to present itself as a lead agency within the issue and capable of establishing and mediating a coherent approach to the topic within the international state and humanitarian aid community. Clearly, the agency succeeded in introducing their notion of the challenge into the relevant forum. When it comes to terminology the Nansen Conference reproduces and confirms the preferred “displacement” term to “inaccurate and often confusing terms “climate refugees” or “environmental refugees”” (UNHCR, 2011 (d); 14).

The conference will now be followed by the Nansen Initiative as I was informed during the expert interview:

“[The] Nansen [Initiative] will be structured as a decentralized, inclusive, bottom up [process]. Going to the five affected regions and talking to central governments, local governments [to find out whether there] are policies in place? Is their legislation? What is their practice? What are the NGOs telling us? What are the things telling us in this particular region? And most importantly what are the affected populations telling us about the environment?” (Interview 2, Expert A).

“...hope now will actually pilot-steer and promote the initiative globally. And on the Second of October, during our second side event at our governing body (so not a formal session), of our executive committee Switzerland and Norway as

¹⁷ The framework aims to make the world safer for natural disaster by enhancing the preparedness of member states. The framework was signed by 168 UN member states and was established in 2005. (<http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa>)

states will be formally launching the Nansen initiative. We hope that this is the vehicle that everyone's been waiting for..." (Interview 2, Expert A).

Hence, the UNHCR and the international community are apparently now at a point where they engage on the topic in a more structured and policy oriented manner. However, as it becomes obvious: states are not yet at a point where they built new institutions to deal with the matter. Rather there is a felt need for more research and evidence gathering. The Nansen Initiative is linked into already existing instruments and as expert A said with respect to the link between the Nansen process and the COP meetings:

"...In the sense that we want this Nansen Process -or Switzerland and Norway want this Nansen process- to be the place where states can talk about implementation of article 14 (f) of the Cancun adaptation framework" (Interview 2, Expert A).

So, while in the academic circles various initiatives and new co-ordination mechanisms were envisioned, politics seem to go another way. In particular authors of the legalistic cluster put ideas forward how to design new instruments for ensuring co-operation on climate change induced displacement. States seem to be more sceptical of creating new, binding instruments. Expert A highlighted in the interview that:

"The first questions raised by one of the states was: "well where is this heading"? Are we working on a new treaty?" (Interview 2, Expert A).

The Nansen Principles are not binding by now. They are not designed to become international law. As High Commissioner Antonio Guterres said in his opening speech held at the Nansen Conference:

"There is a general recognition that in the current context, it will not at all be easy to establish a binding new international instrument relating to the rights of such people. Xenophobia is already widespread, fuelled in many instances by populist politicians and irresponsible elements in the media" (UNHCR, 2011 (d); 4)

Thus, the Nansen Principles are rather meant to be guidelines for establishing a sound, empirical underpinned base for further cooperation:

"... [they are] a path with a sort of protection agenda when it comes to environmentally induced displacement" (Interview 2, Expert A).

This cooperation is envisioned to be expanding over time and other actors are asked to join:

“I had a good meeting ... with IOM where we are trying to encourage them to enter this initiative shoulder to shoulder with us. Because a more holistic look is of course preferable to just looking at the issues from our respective institutional mandates which would probably narrow our ... vision and in a way impede us from looking at the actual issue of the environmental and human mobility in all of its dimensions” (Interview 2, Expert A).

Reconsidering Climate Justice?

While the notion of climate justice did not play a part in the policy formulation of the UNHCR, it seems worth looking at how they see the issue in 2012. In fact at the Nansen Conference High Commissioner Antonio Guterres said in his speech:

“If governments in the developing world are to protect the rights and meet the needs of displaced citizens, they will need strong support from the world’s industrialized and industrializing states: those countries which bear primary responsibility for the process of climate change” (UNHCR, 2011 (d); 4).

It is not clear whether this sentence was actually said during the conference, as only a written version of the speech is accessible online which clearly says: “Check against delivery” and the spoken word is what will be put into the protocols. However, from own experiences with speeches given in those conferences, delegates tend to be rather close to the written wording. The cooperation with nation states and the UNFCCC framework (Article 14 (f)) in which the Nansen initiative is linked into thus make it apparently possible for the agency to address responsibilities. Although this is a remarkable break from the before outlined position, it might be hard to stress the point further, as it is not able to prove whether the exact formulation has been used in the speech. Hence, at this point it only needs to be mentioned that the UNHCR adopts its discourses somewhat according to the forum they are working in. As the notion of “shared but differentiated responsibilities” is essential within the UNFCCC approach, the Nansen Initiative which is linked to this gives greater leverage to engage with the causes of climate change.

In sum the Nansen Principles will serve as the internationally promoted and gradually accepted framework for interpreting the issue of climate change induced displacement. The UNHCR thus was instrumental in promoting the topic in the international community, building alliances with sympathetic states and other humanitarian actors and establishing their view of the protection challenges and appropriate terminology within the international community. By promoting the

establishment and use of the “external displacement” category, the UNHCR is able to protect their core refugee work and at the same time expand their agency’s capacities. If predictions are correct, climate change induced displacement will be massive in numbers. For an international agency like the UNHCR it would be damaging to side-step the problem longer. In fact non-engagement with the issue might jeopardize their relevance in the international humanitarian world. The agency hence –late- but all the more decisively embraced the climate change- mobility nexus and put forward their framing of the issue. While five years ago the agency had no official position towards the issue they have by now established themselves in the discourse and are seen as crucial stakeholders within the international community for addressing the challenge. The Nansen Principles are thus a crucial next step within the agency’s *hegemonic project*. The UNHCR achieved to establish their terminology within the Cancun Outcomes and enshrined their role in this emerging policy field within the Nansen Principles.

5) Conclusion

This paper has tried to answer the following cluster of research questions employing a neo-Gramscian perspective:

When and why did the UNHCR turn to questions of climate change and displacement scenarios? Which positions of the academic discourse found entrance into the “discursive communication” and “discourse” of the UNHCR? How is *hegemony* sought for; How does the UNHCR promote its’ position? Which role does the notion of “climate justice” play?

The literature review has demonstrated that various actors put forward their perceptions of the phenomena of climate change induced displacement. Much of the publications also put forward ideas for concrete policy recommendations. These are influenced by security concerns, ethical considerations, legal perspectives and human rights notions –to name just a few. Most prominently the securitization of the phenomena, and the ethical concerns related to it have been mentioned in this paper. These approaches to the problem found most support with policy makers and advocacy groups, as explained by White (2011). The neo-Gramscian perspective and the methodology employed for the case study make some critical remarks regarding the reviewed literature necessary.

Through the securitization of refugee and migration policies in Western countries since the 1980s a more hostile policy environment for “newcomers” has emerged. Gregory White (2011) has elaborated on that extensively in his book. Furthermore, Gil Loescher (2001), Astri Suhrke and Kathleen Newland (2001) have elaborated on this development as shown in chapter 4.1. It is behind this back drop that we have to evaluate the UNHCR’s strategy. As pointed out in the literature review talking about “climate refugees” might thus not necessarily inspire solidarity amongst countries but might rather trigger fears and lead to a further tightening of borders (White, 2001; 148). The working definition put forward in the review of this paper tried to avoid an overestimation of possible conflict scenarios. It also rejected the notion of “climate refugee” as there are several strong arguments against using that terminology. Rather this paper talks about (internal or external) climate change induced displacement.

Keeping this in mind we can now turn to concluding remarks on the case study.

The theoretical perspective demonstrated how the ideological aspect of the policy process can be described as a *hegemonic project* which is established in consecutive phases: 1) *discursive communication*, 2) *discourse*, 3) *ideological domination*.. Furthermore, the graphic representation within the theory section tried to combine these sequences with the linguistically enriched perspective on Gramsci by Peter Ives (2004). It was moreover outlined that such a project is carried out by a particular actor (which in reality is often more a group or cluster of individual actors) in a specific time frame, context and place, as mentioned by Scherrer (2007).

Subchapter 4.1. talked about this context and made clear that the greater engagement with IDPs was a crucial step to make the UNHCR become engaged with climate change related displacement. The turn to IDPs was a significant step to broaden the agency’s activities. Without this new engagement the UNHCR would have much more trouble to justify its engagement with climate change related displacement. The establishment of the Guiding Principles for IDPs as a soft law instrument was a decisive turn to new challenges in very different conflict environments. As it was made clear within chapter 4.1. this turn was only possible because donor states like the EU backed this processes. Here “structural” (as in: the power of stakeholders) and “material” (the support by donors) forces become very apparent.

Moreover, it was explained how important the support of the High Commissioner for a specific policy is. Historical incidents show: Without his or her leadership the agency does not turn to new activities. Another crucial point made in the chapter is the dependency of the agency on their donors. This point will be discussed later in this chapter as it has severe implications for conceptualizing the agency as a relatively independent and powerful actor as it was done throughout the study.

The consecutive phases of a *hegemonic project* were then traced throughout the case study. The earliest encounters of the agency with the topic (discussed in sub chapter 4.1.) highlight this hesitant engagement. The only direct involvement of the agency that could be detected in that phase is the mentioned 1996 conference with IOM. This conference, however, focused more on environmental issues of a very different nature than climate change. One of the questions the UNHCR was concerned with at this time was how to minimize the negative impacts of refugee settlements on local environments. The question how climate change might lead to displacement was only of secondary importance. This is remarkable as academic discourses on this topic were already much evolved during this time. Apparently, they had little impact on the agency. In an issue of the *Forced Migration Review* of the Oxford University, scholars pointed out that:

“Its complexity, definitional issues as to what constitutes an ‘environmental migrant’ as well as the difficulty of predicting its scale have in some respects worked against building awareness and momentum for practical action” (Morton/Boncour/Laczko, 2008; 5).

This might partly explain the relative neglect of the agency for this topic until recently.

However, this early conference called for better co-ordination among humanitarian actors in this field. In particular the importance of the IASC was mentioned. As it was demonstrated in the following parts of the case study this platform indeed became crucial for advancing policies in this field. Moreover, this conference already rejected the notion of “climate or environmental refugees”. While the conference failed to put forward a convincing alternative terminology, this aspect became a crucial element of later the UNHCR discourse. The publications within the *New Issues in Refugee Research* apparently were only of minimal influence. The *minimalist*

sentiments expressed here are not dominating the policy paper. This permits to speculate that in fact the “location” where policy approaches emerge is rather within meetings and conferences than within research publications. At least in this early phase the conference seem to have had a greater impact than the publications. This speculation is further backed up by the mentioning of the conference during the first expert interview, there as the research publications were not mentioned. This trend that it is meetings/conferences where important policy decisions are taken becomes confirmed within the rest of the case study: the UNFCCC meetings, COP summits and expert meetings were all crucial scenes of policy formations within the case study.

Within the expert interview a convincing answer to the first research question (“when/ why did the UNHCR get involved with the topic”) was given: The personal engagement of the High Commissioner, the change in the US government, the IPCC report and the involvement of the UNHCR within the IASC were mentioned. Here Scherrer’s urge to also pay attention to time/contextual settings for *hegemonic projects* becomes visible. Only within the conjunction of external and internal factors, the UNHCR was able to establish there own approach. The year 2008/09 can thus be seen as a window of opportunity to engage with climate change induced displacement for the UNHCR that the agency decisively took advantage of.

Since 2008 the UNHCR got increasingly involved with climate change induced displacement. Here we can locate the beginning of their efforts to seek for a establishing a *hegemonic project*. The chapter 4.2. thus aims at answering the second research question: Which parts of the academic discourses found entrance into the *discourse* of the UNHCR?

It was already mentioned that the *minimalist* understanding of the topic was most pronounced within the phase of *discursive communication*. However, the core of the policy paper and the parameters for the *discourse* set by the agency are rooted in their legalistic approach to the topic. As the UNHCR is a right based organisation they treat legal categories with utmost respect –even prudence. The notion of “climate refugee” is rejected and the agency rather uses concepts like internal and external displacement to characterize the people forced to leave home due to climate change. Core of the debate and *hegemonic project* would thus be the legal arguments surrounding the issue. The UNHCR stands strong on the notion that “climate refugees” are an unfavourable term.

The policy statement, the expert interview and the 2011 Bellagio and Nansen conferences outcomes all reject that terminology. The prudence regarding the term “climate refugee” is based on the fact that the original 1951 Refugee Convention does not cover environmental/climate reasons as means of persecution and is grounded in the (possibly very right) fear of delusion of the original convention. As already mentioned, several sources stress that in the current political climate it would be dangerous to re-open this convention, as it would likely jeopardize existing protection guarantees. We can interpret this decisive reaction as a visible element of “censoring” within the UNHCR. In all UNHCR documents reviewed here the embargo against the term “climate refugee” is repeated.

The typology put forward within the policy paper does entail security notions, as it warns for potential conflicts related to resource scarcity. As the UNHCR is familiar with conflict related displacement scenarios and has a confirmed mandate to assist those, it seems obvious for the institution to include this aspect. However, the focus (as also confirmed within the interview) is not constraint to this displacement scenario. The agency does not seem to echo the securitized discourse of Western policy makers as identified by White (2011). The agency also looks into other sources of displacement. Their attention is more on sudden onset disasters as they are conceptually easier to identify than slow onset disasters. This sentiment can also be traced in the literature review (e.g. King says that disasters are more likely to cause “refugee-like” situation whereas slow-onset phenomena are more likely to cause migration). With regard to the typology one more thing deserves mentioning. From a Gramscian point of view the policy paper is moreover interesting as it not only entails first elements of censoring but also prepares for “teaching” as it calls for advocacy and further research.

The subchapters 4.4. to 4.6. look at very recent developments and try to investigate both *inter-discursive struggles* and the agency’s attempt to reach *ideological domination* for their approach. These chapters thus try to answer the following research question:

“How is *hegemony* sought for; How does the UNHCR promote its’ position?”

The neo-Gramscian perspective within this paper allows for the understanding that the agency’s position may not be seen as static. The material analysed in this paper

demonstrates how the debate and the position is developing and reaching deeper sophistication and complexity, as more and more research is done and experts get a chance to enhance the debate within the agency. Here the sentiments of the theoretical reflections of establishing consent, including feedback and incorporating other positions to achieve ones outcome by compromises are all noticeable. Chapter 4.3. demonstrated how the UNHCR has to defend their policy approach externally as well as internally. It also shows that a *hegemonic project* permanently has to seek support from various actors. While the UNHCR with other actors of the humanitarian community was very successful in pushing through its framing of the policy issue within the UNFCCC meetings; the agency struggled internally to seek support (ideologically and financially) from the governing body ExCom. The close cooperation under the IASC setting can be seen as a strong incident in which the UNHCR seeks to establish consent with supposedly like-minded humanitarian actors. Paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Outcomes became widely accepted by the international community. Furthermore this article sets the parameters for further work on the topic and these parameters are based on the UNHCR's approach to the topic. Therefore this chapter most clearly shows how the hegemonic project had a first successful outcome. Obviously, the sources (the expert interview and the article on the topic by Koko Warner and the material found online) are too scarce to prove the exact dynamics of the negotiation processes in Cancun. While it is impossible to verify completely that it was the UNHCR who sat in the driving seats of the outcome, it is possible to prove that the outcome is to the UNHCR's content. This becomes evermore obvious in chapter 4.6 when the Bellagio and Nansen Conference are discussed which confirmed the UNHCR as important actor within any further actions on the topic. And confirmed the censoring of the unfavourable "refugee" term. The Nansen Conference and subsequent Nansen Initiative is then the tool which enables the international community and the UNHCR to further explore the topic and present solutions for it. Principle 9 of the "Nansen Conference Outcomes" confirms the importance of the UNHCR as the agency to promote further research on this topic. The UNHCR this has confirmed its role as a global player for policy formations in the displacement field. Moreover, their expertise is called for by the International Law Commission to explore the possibility of creating the category of "externally displaced people". This category represents the desired terminology and approach of the UNHCR. These incidents strongly speak for a successful realization of a *hegemonic project*. Through mechanisms of teaching and censoring the UNHCR achieved consent in the international humanitarian community

to frame the topic of climate change induced displacement according to the UNHCR's understanding of the issue. In addition to that the agency advocated successfully for further research on the topic. This neatly ties back to the general perception on global institutions as outlined in the beginning of the third chapter. Global institutions are particularly resourceful actors as they harbour great *productive power*. They are often called upon as "experts" with leading expertise in respective fields. By promoting the topic of "climate refugees" the UNHCR thus was able to enshrine its significance within the research projects to come on this subject matter.

The last research question tried to investigate whether climate justice plays a role within the UNHCR's approach. Despite the fact that various academic arguments can be found in the policy paper and subsequent engagement of the UNHCR with the topic, the notion of "climate justice" does not play a role in their policy paper. While academia looks at the responsibilities and builds its arguments for supporting climate change induces displaced person, the UNHCR side-steps this issue completely and approaches it from a purely protectionist perspective. As demonstrated in the interview, the agency even goes so far as to reject the notion of climate justice in their work. However, despite the fact that most academic points raised found one way or another into the UNHCR approach and got merged into the hegemonic discourse, all incidents which called for a greater responsibility of Western nations did not. It seems to be a "grammar" or a discourse which is not consumable for the discourses of the UNHCR. The very logic of the agency of impartiality and neutrality permits this understanding.

The concept of "Climate Justice" entails the notion that the West owes to the rest. And that the countries of the global north are responsible for displacement scenarios in the global south. The UNHCR is not the platform or actor who would welcome such a discourse and actively promote it, as it was pointed out in the interviews for this paper. This marks the crucial difference between the academic papers this work is based on and the policy of the UNHCR. While the UNHCR expresses a concern for the people affected by climate change and sees itself as responsible for their fate, the agency refrains from addressing deeper causes of climate change. This could be seen as the political bargain an institution like the UNHCR has to be willing to do in order to gain support from its stakeholders. However, what is right in conflict situations might not be right in a climate change affected world? In particular with regard to funding and burden sharing the UNHCR might actually be in a position to (collectively with other

actors) use its international credibility, fundraising expertise and diplomatic capacities for promoting fairer financing.

The greater engagement with the UNFCCC body in the form of the Nansen Initiative might open new space for addressing issues of justice. The remark by the High Commissioner at that conference might signal this. This development again links with the theoretical outline. As argued before establishing a *hegemonic project* means that one needs to negotiate and incorporate wider perspectives to seek consent for one's own ideas. The Nansen initiative was financed by Norway and Switzerland. Both countries have a long history in championing climate policies and the Kyoto Protocol which can be seen as an attempt to bring climate justice into an international treaty. In this setting other rhetoric and ultimately other policies might be possible. It will be interesting to follow these developments.

In conclusion I would say that while it was relatively easy to trace the beginnings of the UNHCR's *hegemonic project*; it is much harder to determine whether this project has already come to a successful "end". In the outlined theoretical section it was explained how ideological domination is achieved. Three different ways were portrayed by Hajer. Let us recall: Either it is sought to establish the particularistic interest of a specific discourse as universal (Hajer, 1989; 42). Or dominant classes try to "obscure contradictions" and thus present their policy approach as coherent and unquestioned (Hajer, 1989; 42). Finally, they might also strive to "naturalize" the discourse and by thus make it sound as if there were no alternatives (Hajer, 1989; 42). One can trace aspects of these strategies within the UNHCR's discourse. The High Commissioner and its agency repeatedly remark that climate change is a common challenge which will affect people all over the planet and not only the population of the Global South. This is an interesting step to engage all policy makers and to call for attention towards the topic. The UNHCR definitely tries to engage the wider community and to universalize the topic to an extent that it becomes of importance to all UN members. Also, one can guess that the agency is trying to demonstrate a solidified approach. The inter-discursive struggle with the ExCom would probably have been unnoticed without the expert interview. Thus, to the public the UNHCR displays a firm awareness and readily engagement with the topic on their webpage and through their publications. Only when engaging in deeper research one can notice the discontent between the different parts of the agency.

However, the last step of “naturalization” is harder to proof. As there are no final policies or regulations in place yet and the Nansen Initiative is by far too recent to be fully analysed yet, it might be more fruitful to perceive what we can witness as a phase of struggle for the “right” response to new challenges. The *hegemonic project* has not come to a visible end; rather we witness a continuous hegemonic struggle for framing the climate-change and displacement nexus. So far the UNHCR proved itself as a powerful actor in this struggle. However, it remains open to see whether the proposed categorization (internal/ external displacement) of the UNHCR and their proposed policies will prevail in the international community. It seems crucial for the UNHCR to engage the ExCom with climate change induced displacement in order to sustain funding for continuous leadership in the work on that topic.

In further research more time and space needs to be devoted to fully develop the theoretical perception. When working with Gramscian concepts one does not work with one coherent and neatly summarized theoretical idea. In particular the aspect of “success” with in a *hegemonic project* is still under-theorized as mentioned above. Moreover, the “filtering mechanisms” between the separate phases are still shallow. Here a more sophisticated analysis of co-operations between individuals, UNHCR sections and non-UNHCR actors would have been interesting. However, as this is only a MA thesis time and resources did not permit for it.

As most scholars working with a neo-Gramscian concepts would probably agree; his ideas are very fragmented and are employed very differently by various academics (Heise/Fromberg, 2007; 110). Despite the need for more work here the perspective bears great potential and has made writing this paper an interesting endeavour with preliminary results worth continuing research. While the analytical preciseness needs improvement, the neo-Gramscian perspective seems to be a solid starting point for investigating questions of *hegemonic projects*.

The expert interviews conducted proveded extremely useful and shed light on the aspects of the policy formation which otherwise would have been impossible to investigate. Obviously, however, it is problematic to base much of the arguments this paper made on only one source. Within a subsequent project the number of expert

interviews thus definitely needs to be enlarged. Nevertheless, conducting and transcribing the interview was a profound and useful exercise.

Since the topic is developing so fast in both academic and policy maker circles the literature review was challenged with taking both “classical” texts and very recent publications into account. At some point the research had to come to an end which explains why McAdams 2012 publication could not fully be included.

Furthermore, the notions of climate justice and the securitization of the “climate refugee” discourse need greater consideration. One could possibly argue that the UNHCR’s policy approach is somewhere in-between the dominant securitized discourse of individual governments, the EU and UN General Assembly/ Security Council (as portrayed by White (2011) and McAdam (2012)) and the counter perspective embraced by some NGOs and scholars devoted to climate justice. Unfortunately, the contributions by White and McAdam were only discovered close to the deadline for this thesis and thus could not fully be incorporated. This line of thought might be continued in a later dissertation project.

6) Bibliography

Adler, E./Bernstein, S.: "Knowledge in Power : the Epistemic Construction of Global Governance". In: Barnett, M./ Duvall, R. (ed): *Power in Global Governance*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, No. 98, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2005, pp. 294-318.

Bates, D. C.: "Environmental Refugees? Classifying human migrations caused by Environmental Change". In: *Population and Environment*, Vol.23, No.5, 2002; pp. 465-477.

Barnett, M.: "Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow". In: *International Migration Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Special Issue: UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance, 2001, pp. 244-277.

Barnett, M/ Duvall, R.: "Power in Global Governance". In: Barnett, M./ Duvall, R. (ed): *Power in Global Governance*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, No. 98, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2005, pp. 1-32.

Bieler, A./Morton, A.D.: "The Gordian Knot of Agency – Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective". In: *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol 7, 2001, pp. 5-35.

Bieler, A./ Morton, A.D.: "A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations". In: *Capital & Class*, Vol. 28, 2004; pp. 85-113.

Biermann, F./ Boas, I.: "Preparing for a Warmer World. Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees". In: *Global Environmental Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2010; pp. 60-88.

Black, R.: "Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?" In: *New Issues in Refugee Research*, Working Paper No. 34, United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR), Geneva, 2001.

Blommaert, J./ Bulcaen, C.: „Critical Discourse Analysis". In: *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 29, 2000, pp. 447-466.

Brown, A. / Kütting, G.: "The Environment". In: Salmon, T. C. /Imber, M. F.(ed.): *Issues in International Relations, 2nd Edition*, Routledge, 2008, pp. 153-168.

Brown, O.: "Migration and Climate Change". For: International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Geneva, 2008.

Available at: http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MRS-31_EN.pdf

[Accessed : 16 October 2012]

Buckel, S./ Fischer-Lescano, A.: "Gramsci Reconsidered: Hegemony in Global Law". In: *Leiden Journal of International Law*, Vol. 22, 2009, pp. 437–454.

Bwakira, N.: "From Nunsen to Ogutu: UNHCR'S Role in a Changing World". In: *International Migration Review*, Vol. 35, No 1, Special Issue: UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance, 2001; pp. 278-283.

Candeias, M.: "Gramscianische Konstellationen: Hegemonie und die Durchsetzung neuer Produktions- und Lebensweisen". In: Merken, A./ Diaz, V.R. (ed.): *Mit Gramsci Arbeiten: Texte zur Politisch-Praktischen Aneignung Antonio Gramscis*. Argument Verlag, Hamburg, 2007, pp. 15-32.

Castles, S.: "Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate". In: *New Issues in Refugee Research*, Working Paper No. 70. United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR), Geneva, 2002.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ff3f8022.html>

[Accessed: 15 November 2012]

Cohen, R.: "An Institutional Gap for Disaster IDP's". In: *Forced Migration Review*, Published by: Refugees Study Centre, University of Oxford, No. 32, 2009, pp. 58-60.

Conisbee, M./Simms, A.: "Environmental Refugees. The case for Recognition". For the: New Economics Foundation, London.

Available at:

http://www.neweconomics.org/sites/neweconomics.org/files/Environmental_Refugees.pdf

[Accessed: 10 October 2012].

Corlett, D.: "Stormy Weather: The Challenge of Climate Change and Displacement". University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2008.

Crisp, J./ Kiragu, E./ Tennant, V.: "UNHCR, IDPs and Humanitarian Reform". In: *Forced Migration Review*, Published by: Refugees Study Centre, University of Oxford, No. 29, 2007, pp. 12-14.

Cuny, F.C.: "The UNHCR and Relief Operations: A Changing Role". *International Migration Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1/2, 1981, pp. 16-19.

Davies, A.: "Is Humanitarian Reform Improving IDP Protection and Assistance?" In: *Forced Migration Review*, Published by: Refugees Study Centre, University of Oxford, No. 29, 2007, pp. 15-16.

Docherty, B./ Giannini, T.: "Confronting a Rising Tide: a Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees". In: *Harvard Environmental Law Review*, Vol. 33, 2009; pp. 349-403.

Döös, B.R.: "Can Large-Scale Environmental Migrations be Predicted?". In: *Global Environmental Change*, Vol.7, No. 1, 1997; pp.41-61.

Dun, O./Gemenne, F.: „Defining ‘Environmental Migration’". In: *Forced Migration Review*. Published by: Refugees Study Centre, University of Oxford, Issue 31, 2008, pp. 5-7.

Ebi, K. L./Lewis, N. D./ Corvalan, C.: "Climate Variability and Change and Their Potential Health Effects in Small Island States: Information for Adaptation Planning in the Health Sector". In: *Environmental Health Perspectives*, Vol. 114, No. 12, 2006, pp. 1957-1963.

Evans, Geoff: "A Rising Tide: Linking Local and Global Climate Justice". In: *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, No. 66, University of NSW, Sydney, 2010, pp. 199-221.

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner for Refugees (ExCom): "Report of the sixty-second session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme Report of the Executive Committee, A /AC.96/1107", 11 October 2011.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4eb10f3a9.pdf>

[Accessed 12 October 2011]

Farbotko, C.: "Tuvalu and Climate Change: Constructions of Environmental Displacement in the "Sydney Morning Herald"". In: *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*, Vol. 87, No. 4, Special Issue: Islands: Objects of Representation, 2005; pp. 279-293.

Farbotko, C.: "Wishful Sinking: Disappearing Islands, Climate Refugees and Cosmopolitan Experimentation". In: *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2010; pp. 47-60.

Farbotko, C./ Lazrus, H.: "The first climate refugees? Contesting Global Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu". In: *Global Environmental Change*, Vol. 22, 2012; pp. 382-390.

Fleming, M.: "Climate change could become the biggest driver of displacement: UNHCR chief". Copenhagen, 16th December 2009.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4b2910239.html>

[Accessed: 16 October 2012]

Francese, Joseph: "Gramsci Now". In: Francese, Joseph (ed): "Perspectives on Gramsci: Politics, Culture and Social Theory", *Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought*, No.64, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, pp. 1-6.

Friends of the Earth, Australia: "A Citizen's Guide to Climate Refugees". 2004.

Available at: http://www.safecom.org.au/pdfs/FOE_climate_citizens-guide.pdf

[Accessed: 16 October 2012]

Goldstein, K.: "Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews". In: *PS Online*, No. 4, 2002; pp. 669-672.

Greenpeace, Germany: "Klimaflüchtlinge: Die Verleugnete Katastrophe", Hamburg, 2007.

Available at:

http://www.greenpeace.de/fileadmin/gpd/user_upload/themen/klima/klimafluechtlinge_endv.PDF

[Accessed: 16 October 2012]

Hajer, M.A.: "City Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourses". Avebury, England, 1989.

Hajer, M.A.: „Diskursanalyse in der Praxis: Koalitionen, Praktiken und Bedeutung“. In: Janning, F./ Toens, K. (ed): *Die Zukunft der Policy Forschung. Theorien, Methoden, Anwendung*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2008., pp. 211-222.

Available at: http://www.politikwissenschaft.tu-darmstadt.de/fileadmin/pg/arbeitsbereiche/policy/Muench_SS10/06_Hajer_2008.pdf

[Accessed: 16 October 2012]

Harvey, W.S.: "Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews". In: *Qualitative Research*, Vol. 11, 2011; pp. 431-441.

Heise, M./ Fromberg, D.: "Die Machtfrage Stellen". In: Merkens, A./ Diaz, V.R. (ed.): *Mit Gramsci Arbeiten: Texte zur Politisch-Praktischen Aneignung Antonio Gramscis*. Argument Verlag, Hamburg, 2007, pp. 110-125.

Holmes, John: "Humanitarian Action: A Western-dominated Enterprise in Need of Change". In: *Forced Migration Review*, Published by: Refugees Study Centre, University of Oxford, Issue 29, 2007, pp.4-5.

Homer-Dixon, T.F.: "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict". In: *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1991, pp. 76-116.

Hurrell, A.: "Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality". In: Barnett, M./ Duvall, R. (ed): *Power in Global Governance*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, No. 98, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2005, pp. 33-58.

Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC): "About the Inter Agency Standing Committee".

Available at: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-default>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

International Law Commission (ILC): "International Law Commission".

Available at: <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/>

[Accessed 17 October 2012]

International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Fourth Assessment Report 2007.

Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf

[Accessed: 16 October 2012]

Ives, Peter: "Language & Hegemony in Gramsci", Pluto Press London, 2004.

Johnstone, S./ Mazo, J.: "Global Warming and the Arab Spring". In: *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 11-17.

Jouzel, J.: "Preface" In: Collectif Argos (ed): "Climate Refugees", Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010, pp.7-9.

Jury, A./ De Maio, G.: "Cluster approach – a vital operational tool". In: *Forced Migration Review*, Published by: Refugees Study Centre, University of Oxford, No. 29, 2007, pp. 37-38.

Kapp, C.: "Funding squeeze forces UNHCR cutbacks". In: *The Lancet*, Vol. 358, 2001; p. 1177.

Karns, M.P./, Mingst, A. K.: "International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance". Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., Boulder, 2004.

Kibreab, G.: "Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of the Current Debate". In: *Disasters*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1997; pp. 20-38.

King, T.: "Environmental Displacement: Coordinating Efforts to Find Solutions". In: *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review*, Vol. 18, 2006; pp. 543-565.

Kälin, W.: "Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement". In: Mc Adam, J. (ed): *Climate Change and Displacement –Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, Hartpublishing, Oxford, 2010; pp. 81-104.

Kälin, W./ Schrepfer, N.: "Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches". In: UNHCR (ed.): *Legal and Protection Policy Research Series*, 2012.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f38a9422.html>

[Accessed: 16 October 2012]

Lewis, J.: "Sea-Level Rise: Some Implications for Tuvalu". In: *Ambio*, Vol. 18, No. 8, 1989, pp. 458-459.

Liguori, G.: "Common Sense in Gramsci". In: Francese, Joseph (ed): "Perspectives on Gramsci: Politics, Culture and Social Theory", *Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought*, No.64, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, pp. 122-133.

Loescher, G.: "The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path", Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.

Loescher, G./ Betts, A./ Milner, J.: "The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – The Politics and practice of refugee protection into the twenty.first century". In: Thomas G. Weiss(ed): *Routledge Global Institutions Series*. Routledge, Oxon, 2008.

Loescher, G.: "The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy". In: *International Migration Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Special Issue: UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance, 2001; pp. 33-56.

Marchart, O.: "Gramsci und die Diskursanalytische Hegemonietheorie: Ein Fragmentarisches ABC". In: Merckens, A./ Diaz, V.R. (ed.): *Mit Gramsci Arbeiten: Texte zur Politisch-Praktischen Aneignung Antonio Gramscis*. Argument Verlag, Hamburg, 2007, pp. 175-189.

Maurer, T.: "Unity in Diversity –the one UN, UNHCR and Rwanda". In: *Forced Migration Review*, Published by: Refugees Study Centre, University of Oxford, No. 29, 2007, pp. 10-11.

McAdam, J.: "Disappearing States', Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law". In: Mc Adam, J. (ed): *Climate Change and Displacement –Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, Hartpublishing, Oxford, 2010; pp. 105-130.

McAdam, J.: "Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection Standards", In: UNHCR (ed): Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, 2011.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4fdf20022.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

McAdam, J.: "Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law". Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012.

McNally, Mark: "Conclusion: The Enduring Attraction of Gramscian Analysis". In: McNalley, Mark/ Schwarzmantel, John (ed): "Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance", *Routledge Innovations in Political Theory*, No.33, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, pp. 187-199.

McNamara, K.E.: „Conceptualizing Discourses on Environmental Refugees at the United Nations". In: *Popular Environment*, No. 29, 2007; pp. 12–24.

McNamara, K.E./ Gibson, C.: "“We do not want to leave our land’: Pacific ambassadors at the United Nations resist the category of ‘climate refugees’". In: *Geoforum*, Vol. 40, 2009; 475–483.

Mikecz, R.: "Interviewing Elites : Addressing Methodological Issues". In: *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol. 18, 2012; pp. 482-493.

Millar, I: "There's No Place Like Home: Human Displacement and Climate Change". In: 14 *Australian International Law Journal*, No. 71, 2007; pp.71-98.

Morton, A./ Boncour, P./ Laczko, F.: "Human Security Policy Challenges". In: *Forced Migration Review: "Climate Change and Displacement"*. Published by: Refugees Study Centre, University of Oxford, Issue 31, 2008, pp. 5-7.

Myers, N.: "Environmental Refugees: a Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century". In: *The Royal Society*, 2001; pp. 609-613.

Myers, N.: "Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World". In: *Bioscience*. Vol.43, 1993; pp. 752-761.

Norwegian Refugee Council: "The Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century, Oslo, Norway, June 5-7, 2011".

Available at:

<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4ea969729&query=Nansen%20Conference>

[Accessed: 10 October 2012]

Nuteleers, S.: "Environmental Refugees: A Misleading Notion for a Genuine Problem". In: *Ethical Perspectives*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011; pp. 229-248.

Ott, Hermann E: "Climate Change: An Important Foreign Policy Issue". In: *International Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 2, 2001, pp. 277-296.

Peters, B.G./ Pierre, J.: "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life". In: B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre (ed): *Institutionalism: Volume 1*, Sage Publications, London, 2007, pp 83-109.

Piguet, E.: "Climate Change and Forced Migration". In: UNHCR (ed): *New Issues in Refugee Research*. Working Paper No. 153. Geneva, 2002.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c2325630.html>

[Accessed: 29.11.2012]

Reuveny, R.: Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict. In: *Political geography*, 26, 2007; pp. 656 – 673.

Roper, S.D./ Barria, L.A.: "Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good". In: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, No. 54, 2010; pp. 616-637.

Scherrer, C.: "Hegemonie: Empirisch Fassbar?". In: Merkens, A./ Diaz, V.R. (ed.): *Mit Gramsci Arbeiten: Texte zur Politisch-Praktischen Aneignung Antonio Gramscis*. Argument Verlag, Hamburg, 2007, pp. 71-84.

Schwarzmantel, John: "Introduction: Gramsci in His Time and in Ours". In: McNalley, Mark/ Schwarzmantel, John (ed): "Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance", *Routledge Innovations in Political Theory*, No.33, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, pp. 1-16.

Schwarzmantel, John: "Gramsci and the Problem of Political Agency". In: McNalley, Mark/ Schwarzmantel, John (ed): "Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance", *Routledge Innovations in Political Theory*, No.33, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, pp. 79-92.

Selznick, P.: "Institutionalism "Old" and "New"". In: B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre (ed): *Institutionalism: Volume 1*, Sage Publications, London, 2007, pp. 3-11.

Silverman, David: "A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book About Qualitative Research", Sage Publications, London, 2007.

Silverman, David: "Interpreting Qualitative Data: "Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction", Sage Publications, London, 1993.

Smith, P.: "Climate Change, Mass Migration and the Military Response". In: *Orbis*, Vol.51, No. 4, 2007; pp. 617–633.

Sørensen, Eva: "Governance and Democracy". In: Centre for Democratic Network Governance, Roskilde University, Danmark, Working Paper Series No. 2, 2010.

Available at: http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/6375/1/Working_Paper_2010_2_Sorensen.pdf

[Accessed: 16 October 2012]

Suhrke, A.: "Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict", 1993.

Available at: http://www.cmi.no/publications/1993%5Cpressure_points.pdf

[Accessed: 16 October 2012]

Suhrke, A./ Newland, K.: "UNHCR: Uphill into the Future". In: *International Migration Review*, Volume 35 Number 1, 2001; pp. 286-302.

Tischer, S./ Wodak, R./ Meyer, M./ Vetter, E.: „Methoden der Textanalyse: Leitfaden und Überblick“, Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1998.

Tolba, M. K./ El-Kholy, O.A. (ed.): "The World Environment 1972-1992", United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), Chapman&Hall, London, 1992.

Trolldalen, J.M.: "International Environmental Conflicts and Environmental Refugees". In: *Refugees and Environmental Change*. Royal Geographic Society, London, 1993.

Available at:

http://www.google.at/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Frepository.forcedmigration.org%2Fpdf%2F%3Fpid%3Dfmo%3A1110&ei=sYu3UJP-DobQtAbP4oDgAQ&usq=AFQjCNHKnoAPwNy_mMVpMBlpDbW2wAoyjA

[Accessed: 11 November 2012]

Tully, S.: "The Contribution of Human Rights as an Additional Perspective on Climate Change Impacts within the Pacific". In: *New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law*, Vol. 5, 2007; pp. 169-200.

UN Framework of Climate Change Conventions (UNFCCC): "Kyoto Protocol".

Available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php

[Accessed: 16 October 2012]

UNFCCC: "Ideas and proposals on the elements contained in paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, 7 July 2009", Document No.: FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.5/Add.1, 2009.

Available at:

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/misc05a01.pdf>

[Accessed: 12 November 2012]

UNFCCC: "Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010", Document No: FCCC /CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011.

Available at: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf>

[Accessed: 12 November 2012]

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees": Text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Text of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, UNHCR, Geneva.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf>

[Accessed 10 September 2012]

UNHCR: “Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons”, 1954.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb25729.html>

[Accessed: 10 November 2012]

UNHCR: “Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness”, 1961.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb286d8.html>

[Accessed: 10 November 2012]

UNHCR: “Environmentally-Induced Population Displacements and Environmental Impacts Resulting from Mass Migrations”, 1996.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a54bbd6d.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Objectives and key provisions of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness”, 2001.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/3bd7d3914.html>

[Accessed 15 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: A UNHCR Perspective”, 2009 (a).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a8e4f8b2.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Environmental Issues, 2009”, Document No. EC/60/SC/CRP.12, 2009 (b).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a5c594c0.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR: “In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement”, 2009 (c).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ddb65eb2.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR: „Climate Change and Statelessness: An Overview“, 2009 (d).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a2d189d3.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States Under International Law”, 2009, (e).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a2d189ed.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR; “Note on International Protection, 26 June 2009”, Document No.: A/AC.96/1066, 2009, (f).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a5c594d3c.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Background Paper: 2010 High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges, "Protection Gaps and Challenges", 2010.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ccf89242.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Climate Change and Displacement: Identifying Gaps and Responses Expert Roundtable (Concept Note)”, 2011 (a).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d7604ec2.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement”, 2011 (b).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9f22b32.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Expert Meeting on Climate Change and Displacement, 22-25 February 2011, Rockefeller Center, Bellagio, Italy, List of participants”, 2011 (c).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4da2b5899.html>

[Accessed 10 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement, Statement by António Guterres United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Oslo, Norway 6 June 2011”, 2011 (d).

Available at:

<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opensslPDFViewer.html?docid=4def7ffb9&query=Nansen%20Conference>

[Accessed: 10 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Global Report: 2011 –Addressing Statelessness”, 2011 (e).

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4fc8808b0.html>

[Accessed: 10 October 2012]

UNHCR: “UNHCR project brings light, security and fuel-efficient cooking to refugees –News Story”, 2012.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4f21850e6.html>

[Accessed 12 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Media Backgrounder: Millions Are Stateless, Living in Legal Limbo”.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4e54ec469.html>

[Accessed 17 October 2012]

UNHCR: “On the Run in Their Own Country”.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html>

[Accessed 12 October 2012]

UNHCR: “The Executive Committee’s Structure and Meetings”.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c8f.html>

[Accessed 15 October 2012]

UNHCR: “Policy Development and Evaluation Service, UNHCR Information and style guide for research paper series”.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4f1fd30b9.html>

[Accessed 10 October 2012]

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR): “Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)”.

Available at: <http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa>

[Accessed 18 October 2012]

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):

“Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”, 2004.

Available Online: <http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html>

[Accessed 17 November 2011]

Vayrynen, R.: “Funding Dilemmas in Refugee Assistance: Political Interests and Institutional Reforms in UNHCR”. In: *International Migration Review*, Volume 35 Number 1, 2001; pp. 143-167.

Walker, P./ Pepper, K.: “The state of Humanitarian Funding”. In: *Forced Migration Review*, Published by: Refugees Study Centre, University of Oxford, No. 29, 2007, pp. 33-35.

Warner, K.: “Climate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations”. In: UNHCR (ed): *Legal and Protection Policy Research Series*, 2011.

Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e09a3d32.html>

[Accessed 16 October 2012]

Weiss, T. G.: Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges. In: *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 5 (Oct., 2000), pp. 795-814.

White, G.: “Climate Change and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming World”. Oxford University Press, New York, 2011.

Worth, O.: “Beyond World Order and Transnational Classes: The (Re)application of Gramsci in Global Politics”. In: McNalley, Mark/ Schwarzmantel, John (ed): “Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance”, *Routledge Innovations in Political Theory*, No.33, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, pp. 19-31.

Worth, O.: “Recasting Gramsci in International Politics”. In: *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, 2011; pp. 373–392.

Annex

Transcript Interview 1, 13th September 2012, Expert A

The interview was conducted via the online telecommunication service Skype and recorded with the consent of the Expert. It was later transcribed using a standard transcription programme (f4).

Expert A: ... give you a second call. where we can adress the other questions #00:00:11-0#

Interviewer: all right. that sounds like a wonderful idea. great #00:00:16-3#

Expert A: ok. lets dive right into it. ahhmmm. i was the auhtor of that ahh unhcr policy statement. so you are asking the right person #00:00:30-3#

Interviewer: ok. that's wonderful. yeah. #00:00:32-4#

Expert A: so how and when was the debate about climate change induced migration was introduced to the UNHCR? In fact the topic goes back to 1994 or 1995 where we first did a first joint sort of joint colloquium with IOM ahh where we first looked at environmental factors as a cause of displacement. it looked more at the environmental degradation rather than climate change per se. and in fact it was not until really 2008 because the 2009 document you are referring to is simply an amended version of the first draft from about October or November 2008. that was the year in which ahh the i think it was the fourth report which really confirmed ...the IPCC report... which really confirmed that we were facing a dynamic of global warming. and it was also a time when our high commissioner ahh began to speak about the link between ahh climate change the multiplication of natural disaster scenarios and ahh increase and movements of population soo and finally again it was the year in which the US seemed to be ahh let's say accepting the reality of climate change which as you know the Bush administration had been vastly denying. #00:02:25-7#

Interviewer: exactly #00:02:38-1#yea

Expert A: so i was working at the time at UNHCR' Policy Development and Evaluation Service and was struck at the fact that a lot of the literature ahh around this issue actually specifically mentioned the UNHCR or speculated about a UNHCR role in this area #00:02:46-5#

Interviewer: yeah #00:02:49-8#

Expert A: and jet in looking around i was struck that the UNHCR had never really pronounced itself ahh on the debate and on any of the points raised in the scholarly literature. so the first policy statement was really just an initial contribution to this debate. #00:03:17-6#

Interviewer: aha #00:03:19-7#

Expert A: ahh just to make some key points that we found were important. for example the statelessness dimension of the drowning islands scenario ahh in the pacific and elsewhere ahhm but i come to some of the other points when i ansvere your later questions #00:03:30-9#

Expert A: ahm in addition ahh we were also part of the Inter Agency Standing Committee... i mean we are... which is a coordination body basically bringng together UN and non-UN actors from the humanitarian world together to see how to better coordinate humanitarian response and particularly in IDP situations but not only. so at that point we were also participating in an IASC working group which was looking at the possible typologies of movement and terminology surrounding the climate change issue. so in a way the time was right suddenly ahh for ahh the UNHCR to make a policy statement #00:04:26-7#

Interviewer: ok #00:04:27-7#

Expert A: ahh in 2009 when the update was presented which i think only ammented about one paragraph [laughing] from the innitial policy at this point in time i was no longer in the policy development and evaluation service #00:04:44-2#

Interviewer: all right #00:04:44-2#

Expert A: ahh. that policy statement was in fact spearheaded by our division of Programs Support and Management which looks ahh in within our architecture our lets say organisational architecture which has primary responsibility for issues like environmental conservation in refugee settings and IDP settings. you know the solar cookers, solar lightning and all of the reforestation and all the things we are trying to do but as a part of our environmental conservation agenda as opposed to lets say a climate change adaptation type agenda #00:05:30-6# #00:05:29-0#

Interviewer: aha #00:05:29-0#

Expert A: ahhm, ahhh so at that point in time it was the division of Policy Support and Management ahhh obviously the High Commissioner office was also involved and commented on ahh the regional bureaus ahh within our structure which are responsible for our operations in the five regions of the world which we work on this planet earth they were also involved #00:06:01-1#

Interviewer: exactly, ähmm. the regional offices would you say that ähm their approach to the topic #00:06:06-2#

Expert A: sorry. i cant hear you very well #00:06:08-5#

Interviewer: oh. oh, i am sorry. ähmm is it better now? can you hear me? #00:06:11-2#

Expert A: a tiny bit #00:06:11-2# yes #00:06:12-3#

Interviewer: ok. i was just wondering whether the approach of the regional offices would actually be different than that of the headquarters? as in... #00:06:28-7#

Expert A: ahh no. because of that point in time if you like in fact the topic climate change ahhh when i would speak to people and say that i was working on this topic they would look at me like i was crazy. and while ahh while lets say the environment or the recognition that the environment and the climate was changing therefore let's say provoking more natural disaster scenarios etc.etc.etc. I think there was not a clear understanding at that point in time or appreciation at ahh our field level ahh that this was something real or something that would actually would effect UNHCR's operations.

so when you know people would think you know there is another headquarters guy talking about outer-space issues. ahh. but now the reality has sunk. *[problems with the recording]* #00:07:27-3#... a greater appreciation and engagement even of important offices and operations. for example the Asia bureau has ah is actively participating now in ahhh looking at national disaster response in the Asia- Pacific region. and the Philippines asked us to become directly involved in the flood response when ahh when Manila and another part of the country was hit by flooding a couple of years ago. #00:08:05-1# so if you like ah I would say the the perception of the reality of climate change and also the realization that it would have a very direct impact on operations ah has only now or is only now beginning to crystallize if you like. #00:08:26-5#

Interviewer: i see. ok. #00:08:27-4#

Expert A: ahhm. now in your question three "when reading the paper it is interesting that the responsibility of Western states is not mentioned". ahh. it is not our job to you know point the finger at anyone. even when even *[with emphasise]* ahh when we're talking about conflict related refugee movements or displacement ahhm we only go if you like public with observations about state conduct ahh when we have exhausted all over kinds of soft diplomacy and soft engagement. and of course it is not for UNHCR to start talking about polluter pays or you know ahh it is just not what the paper was about. so you know that is not the way we work and that's why it wasn't addressing the cause of climate change because it is just not something we do. #00:09:30-9#

Interviewer: yeah. I was just posing the question because ahhm yeah actually so much of the literature which is talking about climate change is always sort of pointing to this centrality. so I was just wondering whether this would be a part of the UNHCR debate or whether it is yeah as you just said #00:09:49-2#

Expert A: no. no it is not. the climate change discussion of the conference of parties is the forum to talk about the you know the causees and the mitigation angle it is not ahh you know it is just we dont even need to have an opinion on it. there are other agencies involved and it is very far away from our concerns yeah #00:10:13-0#

Interviewer: alright. ok. #00:10:14-8#

Expert A: four. you say "your policy paper says that some states and NGOs have tried to adjust the refugee convention and that it simply could be amended. ahh yes! yeah. that's the case. for example as i was writing the first draft in early 2008 i noticed that ahh for example if i recall correctly it was the Maldives that was calling for some sort of new convention in this area #00:10:45-4#

Interviewer: oh yeah? ok. #00:10:46-1#

Expert A: ahh and also i mean i to draft text and even an unhappy formulation where someone just tried to amend article one of the refugee convention and add a few words as if that was sufficient ahhh to bring all of those into the refugee sphere ahm we do not think that this is the correct approach. ah the refugee convention has been around for sixty years ahh even though some states are now saying that they have difficulty in implementing it in the world of mass migration and mass movement and multiple causes for movement ahh in our governing body for example ahh states have expressed concern about touching the refugee convention in any way and ahh so we don't think it is a wise approach #00:11:52-8#

Interviewer: yeah #00:11:52-8#

Expert A: ana ahh and i will also tell you why when i respond to some of your later questions when i give you some more information #00:12:02-1# ahh now the policy paper ah that mention yes some of the displacement scenarios and you say why didn't we mention ecocide and large scale development projects. ahh first of all i don't know what ecocide is so ahh i cannot answer that #00:12:22-9#

Interviewer: ok. ok. sure #00:12:22-9#

Expert A: ahh but on people displaced by large scale development projects ahh we thought these were not quote/unquote climate change related displacement scenarios and the whole purpose of the paper was to focus on climate change #00:12:42-5#

Interviewer: exactly yeah #00:12:43-0#

Expert A: soo. you know it essentially wasn't on point and we didn't want to become

involved into a debate which was not central to what the policy paper was talking about. soo ah it is not that we quote/unquote neglect these categories as you are listed question says ahhh but more that ahh #00:13:09-2#

Interviewer: yeah they were just not relevant for this specific #00:13:12-2#

Expert A: ahh yeah and we can have a chat about ecocide when i have a bit more time to speak #00:13:18-0#

Interviewer: al right #00:13:18-5#

Expert A: now ahh you say nontheless these groups are frequently mentioned as environmental refugees within the literature on this topic why does the UNHCR neglect the categories. ahmm.. first of all we really take issue with this term environmental refugee and that was another point of the paper ahh to come back to the categorization question we actually work very closely with Walter Kälin from the University of Bern who was at the time the Secretary General Representative for the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and ah Walter and one a member of his staff ahh myself ah IOM ahh IASC and the Norwegian Refugee Council were participating at this Inter Agency Standing Committee Group which was looking in the issues of typology and terminology and so we basically as a group ahh accepted to work on the categories that Walter Kälin had then kindly ahh identified and we thought that they were categories we could work with. so that is why only those typologies also were included in the paper #00:14:50-0#

Interviewer: ok. #00:14:51-7#

Expert A: on the refugee side ahh as the paper says we really take issue with the quote/unquote refugee label for a number of reasons. ahh first of all we know ah or it is now commonly lets say ahh it is a commonly held assumption that most ahh movements ahh would infact be internal in nature and as you know the term refugee ah is only used when people cross the border. #00:15:26-4#

Interviewer: exactly yes #00:15:26-9#

Expert A: secondly the environmental refugee label has simply no foundation ah in international law it may be a catchy term for journalists and for people who want to dramatize the plight of those affected and of course it is ah a catastrophic situation and ahh if people are lost ahh but we thought that if we as an agent introduce that typology would endanger the acqui of the refugee convention and simply add confusion to what we are talking about. so in fact ahhm in our own thinking ah we we would prefer to talk about when it comes to cross border movements linked to the environment ahh to talk about ah environmentally related ah external displacement. to distinguish it from ah internal displacement ah #00:16:40-9#

Interviewer: are there.. #00:16:40-9#

Expert A: also let's remember that ah the institutional architecture around the issue of unquote migration quote displacement ahh was set many many years ago when IOM and UNHCR were created with this notion somehow that you know migrants are voluntary movers and somehow refugees and now in todays world internally displaced are in fact affected by forced quote/unquote forced ahm displacement ahh but we know that ahm those who have the most resources ah the best ah networks etcetra and begin to feel the pinch of climate change ahh in fact in a first incidence would probably be more migrants than quote/unquote displaced. ahh in other words that a while there is a cause that ahh i think there is an agreement now on and i know the human rights council ah and in the work of LUKE?..... the representative of IDPs ahh he preferred to think of the sort of motivation and causality to be more like a ah a continuum where you have you know completely voluntary on the one end and completely forced on the other. but the problem is where do we ... where do we draw the dividing line? #00:18:27-7#

Interviewer: exactly #00:18:27-7#

Expert A: because human beings are not chairs or bricks ah we are individual human beings but because of our individual character our networks and resources etc etc we'll react very differently in the same situation completely differntly #00:18:47-1#

Interviewer: ok #00:18:47-6#

Expert A: ok. so. at too lets say the problem of distinction has often come up in the literature. how can you seperate out the environemtent quote/unquote environmental cause from any other ahh a complex set of other causes related to livelihood degradation ah you know ah precarious income ah ah etc. so that is why the natural disaster type scenario sudden-onset event is much clearer and much let's say clearly in the row of the forced displacement because you have a triggering event which is clearly distinguished, visible ah there is no question whether it was the natural disaster that was the cause but we know then that there are other impacs but at least in sudden onset natural disasters you got the smoking gun you got the ... you got the movement so. the whole issue of that contributinal causality is simply not raised at all #00:20:01-5#

Interviewer: yeah #00:20:02-0#

Expert A: so look. i give you three minutes to react and then i have to go #00:20:04-0#

Interviewer: *[laughing]* wonderful. i actually do have a question ähm regarding a the external displacement because I I can totally understand how the term environmental or cliamte refugee is very uneasy for the unhcr because it just simply bears ground in international law. i was just wondering how the term "external displacement".. ähmm. is that an established category within international refugee law? #00:20:32-5#

Expert A: No. no. absolutely not. but what we are trying to do ah at least by suggesting it and i think a couple of states are now thinking along the same lines and I know walter Kälin does as well that ahh there will be migration provoked by climate change the problem is that states havent recognized that jet in large numbers so they know immigration categories that ah and of course that a to call people forced across the border to call them a migrant is inaqurate (laughs) ah to call them a refugee is inaqurate and for the time being there is no other terminology so at least as a placeholder just to mark a difference ah what we are suggesting is look let's use external displacement for environemental reasons and if something that makes it clear that we are not talking about internal displacement internal migration that we are not talking about cross-border migration that we are not talking about the refugee category which is clearly esablished in international law that there is this new group of people about whom we need to be giving attention and discussion and acting #00:22:00-5#

Interviewer: ok #00:22:02-2#

Expert A: so.. anyway. i hope that explains why i have a whole other story to tell you when i answe the five remainig questions #00:22:11-8#

Interviewer: alright ah #00:22:11-8#

Expert A: ahh the Nansen initiative which i am in the process of working on now which Switzerland and Norway will launch and you will be very happy about it when you get more information #00:22:32-1#

Interviewer: ok. at what time #00:22:32-1#

Expert A: may i suggest that we try to talk next week just so we get to all of your questions at least and once we have spoken i can send you some of the background literature ah on Nansen and the latest developments because all of this has happend in the last year and simply now some key states are aware of i on francesca fitz ahh invitation did a lecture last week ah at the OSCE and i can share with you now my presentation but i have to go #00:23:06-9#

Interviewer: alright. ok. at what time would a call next week be good for you?

Expert A: just send me an email with time and date that would be good for you and i will respond with the time that suits me #00:23:26-6#

Interviewer: wonderful. thank you very much and i you will have a very plesant lunch now thanks for sharing your time with me #00:23:33-3#

Expert A: laughs. Thanks! ok. bye bye

Transcript Interview 2, 20th September 2012, Expert A:

The interview was conducted via the online telecommunication service Skype and recorded with the consent of the Expert. It was later transcribed using a standard

transcription programme (f4).

Interviewer:yes, yes of course. hold on. just a second. ahm the question number six ahm was "due to the adverse effects of climate change "climate justice ahm is a key issue in the debate". but i actually think that we touched upon the climate justice aspect already. #00:00:23-4#

Expert A: ok #00:00:23-4#

Interviewer: ahm and then another question i had was ahm yeah the connection between climate change and displacement and security concerns? #00:00:35-2#

Expert A: ok. ah i will share with you ahh something that i just presented at the OSCE ah two weeks ago now which is in a way a synthesis of how we see those linkages so i suggest that i share that with you. #00:00:56-4#

Interviewer: yeah #00:00:56-4#

Expert A: ah and that might be the best and shortest way and you have it from the horses' mouth and you can cite it. cite the event etc etc #00:01:07-2#

Interviewer: ok. that sounds great. ahm and then another thing i was wondering about ahm the role of the executive committee within the UNHCR and within the debate; how would you see that? #00:01:21-2#

Expert A: very good. ah. we actually tried during the ministerial preparatory process our know we had a big ministerial meeting last year on the address of the 60th ah anniversary of the refugee convention and ahm in preparation for that we organised ah in December 2010 one of the high commissioners annual dialogues on refugee protection exploring protection gaps and responses and already in that paper ah we foreshadowed and the discussion confirmed that people who cross borders owing environmental factors ah under present international law ah basically ah you know are not protected they don't necessarily automatically fall into the refugee convention and according to Walter Kälin ah perhaps they right to life or something like that but

they say they have a right to cross the border and now in present international law that is not the case. #00:02:44-8#

Interviewer: ok. yeah #00:02:44-8#

Expert A: we decided to take the debate a bit further in the commemorations process by having a specific set of meetings in order to highlight climate change and displacement. ah with the support of *the [problems with recording]*foundation we did a ah an experts meeting on climate change and displacement in Bellagio Italy which brought together a broad let's say range of government officials, IOM, UNHCR, IASC ah that meeting ah confirmed quote/unquote legal gap about which we were talking. #00:03:27-3#

Interviewer: yeah #00:03:27-3#

Expert A: and that ball was picked up by ahhh the Norwegian government who wanted to do something to help us you know in our commemorations process surrounding the refugee convention and decided to organise as a contribution to our commemorations and as a further let's say more in depth conversation on the topic of climate change and displacement to organize a conference in Oslo which was called the Nansen conference. #00:04:01-0#

Interviewer: yeah #00:04:01-4#

Expert A: now i am going to send you something ahh... ah in fact you should google it the report of the conference. #00:04:09-1#

Interviewer: exactly. yeah I've found that one. it is online on your web page. #00:04:14-0#

Expert A: Walter Kälin has just an superb, absolutely superb and concise analysis ah of the principles which i think in a masterful way ah helps to set them in context and really shows their importance in the further developments of a ahh approaches and cooperation and eventually ahh agreements or norms in this particular area. #00:04:45-6#

Interviewer: yeah #00:04:45-6#

Expert A: now. our governing body ah to come directly to your question after having done this introduction was ah in fact and remains very wary of ah say an UNHCR ah very expressed role ah regarding the issues surrounding mobility and climate change. as i told you in our last conversation ah the high commissioner sought in march of 2011 and then more formally in June of 2011 and during the June standing committee which tends to be the protectionist within our governing body ahm to put on the table the question of whether the unhcr should in fact not assume a lead role of the protection cluster... #00:05:49-2#

Interviewer: yeah #00:05:49-6#

Expert A: in natural disaster scenarios. and basically that gave rise to a pretty ah fractious and politicised debate but there it was clear that ah to try to receive a green light from our governing body today is not possible. #00:06:10-4#

Interviewer: all right. i see. #00:06:12-3#

Expert A: secondly during the negotiations on the ministerial communiqué which was formally adopted at the end of our ministerial last year we had also tried to negotiate with states and this group was broader than just our governing body but of course we are speaking to the subsequent people ahmm ah adult quote/unquote new causes of displacement and there is where perhaps we also are seeing gaps and we needed to reflect upon for example post conflict scenarios let's take Sri Lanka ah we are immediately after the quote/unquote end of the conflict we were still seeing people leaving Sri Lanka ehh are they refugees? are they not? are they so there are issues that go beyond just the environmental gap. #00:07:16-1#

Interviewer: yeah #00:07:16-1#

Expert A: ahm there again the negotiations were not particularly paragraph looking at the causes of displacement in this ministerial communiqué the ah states were really really ah against ah either talking about new causes of displacement we when included a

listing including climate change as well as other issues and they simply got shut down in flames. we drafted the text rather carefully i think it is paragraph 10 of the ministerial communiqué there is a grudge in and the light reference to new causes of displacement. without going much into detail. #00:08:06-1#

Interviewer: and and how would you explain that? i mean how would you... #00:08:10-6#

Expert A: again: no joint forces across north south east west we don't want any more new norms you need to work on what you are doing now and not look for new clients ah etc etc #00:08:24-6#

Interviewer: ok #00:08:24-6#

Expert A: i think they confused ah in hindsight ah ah lets say the mandate of UNHCR or issues surrounding the mandate with institutional questions #00:08:39-1#

Interviewer: yeah? #00:08:39-1#

Expert A: ahhh from the general concern that we have and the fact that more people will move the more will cross borders and we must begin to think and talk about it now ahh it could recover the freckled and fractious debate in the future once we have ahh ah movements people in certain states that are confronted with the problem and are part of it #00:09:15-0#

Expert A: so. so just to summarize it up our governing body has not jet really engaged on the issue of climate change at all #00:09:24-2#

Interviewer: aha. #00:09:24-8#

Expert A: and when we speak about it we get our hands of it because they get concerned about resources they get concerned about capacities they get concerned about mission creep #00:09:39-7#

Interviewer: ok #00:09:40-0#

Expert A: and a whole bunch of other issues which basically have not enabled us really to have a i would say a calm and intelligent conversation within our government body.
#00:09:55-0#

Interviewer: alright. i see. #00:09:56-2#

Expert A: ah now. the good story coming out of this ministerial as relates to climate change is that Switzerland and Norway to help out challenge to make concrete pledges of support of improvements for refugees and stateless people on their territory and as we listened the call of ah our dialogue in 2010 a Bellagio in 2011 and the Nansen conference in 2011 and the Nansen principles and actually said we now as states want to set out a conversation about all of these issues. and today even later today when i have a moment to breath i will send you a pdf version of the foundation documents of the Nansen initiative that is how it is going to be called #00:11:02-5#

Interviewer: ok. that would be great #00:11:03-7#

Expert A: ah we had our first meeting of ambassadors of ah six to eight states that we hope now will actually pilot ah steer and promote the initiative globally and on the second of October during our second side event at our governing body so not a formal session #00:11:25-2#

Interviewer: aha #00:11:25-9#

Expert A: of our executive committee Switzerland and Norway as states will be formally launching ah the Nansen initiative. we hope that this is the vehicle that everyone's been waiting for. ahh to deepen research ah in the area of ah how environmental change impacts on individual family and community decisions to move or not to move ah in five regions of the world where we are already have displacement and ahh adaptation ah and are beginning to see the... the problems that will appear in all of their complexity already ahh Nansen will be structured as a decentralized, inclusive, bottom up going to the fife affected regions and talking to central governments local governments are their policies in place? is their legislation? what is their practice? what are the NGOs telling us? what are the things telling us in this particular region? and most importantly what

are the affected populations telling us about how the environment is affecting their lives their livelihoods and ah may affect their ability to remain where they are or will in fact force hard choice on them. #00:13:02-8#

Interviewer: alright #00:13:02-8#

Expert A: now, this will be a long journey. #00:13:08-4#

Interviewer: yeah #00:13:08-4#

Expert A: you know that states are very ahh wary of assuming new obligations in fact one of the first questions raised by one of the states was well there is this heading? are we working on a new treaty? #00:13:23-1#

Interviewer: aha #00:13:23-1#

Expert A: and it is made clear it was made clear that we are not pre-judging any outcome. #00:13:32-6#

Interviewer: alright #00:13:32-6#

Expert A: the whole point to this is to do a bottom-up "what is happening? "what is working? what is not? ahh such that we come up at the end of the day with a game path with a sort of protection agenda when it comes to ah environmentally induced ah displacement. ahm i had a good meeting yesterday with IOM where we are trying to encourage them to enter this initiative shoulder to shoulder with us because a more holistic look is of course preferable to ahh just looking at the issues from our respective institutional mandates ahh which would probably narrow our lets say our vision and ah in a way impede us from looking at the actual issue of the environmental and human mobility in all of its dimensions. #00:14:35-7#

Interviewer: yes. is the Nansen initiative somehow linked to ahm a wider lets say UNFCCC meetings or is it somehow linked to... #00:14:46-2#

Expert A: yes! in the sense that we want this Nansen Process or Switzerland and

Norway want this Nansen process to be the place where states can ahh talk about implementation of article 14f #00:15:04-9#

Interviewer: exactly #00:15:04-9#

Expert A: of the Cancun adaptation framework ahhh the only home for those conversations within the appeal process are discussions on loss and damage ahh but you know we are not talking about roofs being ripped of a house, ahh we are talking about the people within that house. and ahh we would like this place to be inquiries that brings in ahh ... *[technical problems with recording]* community, development community, the actual humanitarian community, and is bottom up ahh and does not come up with someone high ah but rather makes ah policy relevant ah recommendations based on sound ah scientific underpinnings ah there is a research agenda that also ah engagement and work on recommendations coming right from the people most affected. #00:16:05-8#

Interviewer: i see ok. ahmm another thing i was wondering about. is when i looked at your list of members of the ExCom i saw that most of the ahm countries which are usually quoted as most affected by climate change namely those Pacific Islands states are not members of the ExCom. would they still have a voice within your governing body then? #00:16:34-0#

Expert A: ahh. as i said out governing body is keeping its nose clean on this topic for now. so what we are seeking to do is to have those states join the initiative. #00:16:47-4#

Interviewer: ok #00:16:47-7#

Expert A: and in fact Walter Kälin whom you know #00:16:51-9#

Interviewer: yes #00:16:52-2#

Expert A: ahh walter is in fact the envoy of the two governments for the Nansen initiative #00:17:01-7#

Interviewer: ok #00:17:02-1#

Expert A: and has already begun consultations with Australia and with some of these islands states so in fact he travels to the pacific in late October/ November. Because our first destination of this Nansen global will be the Pacific. #00:17:23-6#

Interviewer: ok. yeah i was just wondering how they would sort of be tied into this initiative as they are not you know like formal members of the ahm the ... #00:17:35-6#

Expert A: yeah. they are affected states. now lets be clear: ah most of the islands states do not want to have their population be quote/unquote refugee or displaced persons #00:17:47-6#

Interviewer: yes. yeah. #00:17:47-6#

Expert A: they do not want refugee eyes on the problem and to someone even in our governing body said you of the UNHCR appear to be trying to turn into a refugee problem what is not a refugee problem. #00:18:05-8#

Interviewer: ok #00:18:05-8#

Expert A: so. there is a kind of misunderstanding and outward rejection ah what we got within te same governing body. but i was very excited about the Nansen initiative because it hopefully ahh Switzerland and Norway will be strong enough, convincing enough ah to create ah a core group of states and then a a broader group who understands that this is serious about looking at how to better protect and serve those who are affected by environmental changes and ahh we managed to get ah generous grant we the UNHCR, the NRC -the Norwegian Refugee Council- [*problems with recording*] the European Commission in order to push forward and help fund the Nansen process and we got the grant. so this is one of the only processes i see in my 27 years of my UN career ah which is funded from the outside and which ah begins to look at all of these terrible questions that ah the academic community has been writing about and grassroots organisations have been screaming about ah but that states and organisations appear to be ignoring. so ah the Nansen train will be an important one in this very very complex ahh ah discussion #00:19:56-0#

Interviewer: yeah. it seems like a very good and sound forum to actually discuss this all these overlapping and interrelated questions. #00:20:03-7#

Expert A: yes #00:20:03-7#

Interviewer: ahm. i was just wondering why would it be Norway and Switzerland launching this initiative? is there a history.. #00:20:11-9#

Expert A: ah.. Norway because of Nansen himself. Nansen was the first united nations high commissioner for refugees and a polar explorer ah and he is also renowned as having done ground taking research about weather patterns in the arctic region. so he also personifies a can-do, hands on pragmatic approach in the face of a very new and difficult challenges. ah. in the case of Switzerland. ahh Geneva sees itself as the humanitarian capital of the world and Switzerland itself is also quite active on the in the climate talks and at national level has already gotten quite far in terms of adaptation and mitigation ahh and luckily both of them are not the poorest countries in the world #00:21:20-1#

Interviewer: true #00:21:20-5#

Expert A: so.. (laughing) ahh so #00:21:25-2#

Interviewer: ... oh and i believe they #00:21:25-7#

Expert A: so. but an interesting angle is that Germany also made a similar pledge and we thought that it would join the Nansen initiative and support it as one of the core groups of states. and we only just learned that even though Germany made the pledge in the ministerial it is declining on this thing #00:21:50-9#

Interviewer: ok. did it give any reasons for that behaviour #00:21:53-9#

Expert A: ah. i think this is not anything which they put down in writing #00:22:00-3#

Interviewer: ah. i see #00:22:00-3#

Expert A: but it is mine suspicion that Germany and Bonn in particular ah are keen on having Bonn become sort of a climate change hub on this planet earth and to join actually to host the green climate fund #00:22:24-0#

Interviewer: oh. i see ok #00:22:24-4#

Expert A: and i think Germany wants to do nothing for the time being which might distract attention from this ambition and might make it look like Geneva would be a more natural home ah for some of these ah funding mechanisms ah and home of the green climate fund. #00:22:46-0#

Interviewer: i see #00:22:47-2#

Expert A: that is our analysis. #00:22:48-7#

Interviewer: so it is a political purely political ahm issue then? #00:22:53-0#

Expert A: as usual... and a matter of competition as well. now ... today some of the key documents you are one of the only people within the research community who is seeing these documents #00:23:15-3#

Interviewer: thank you very much #00:23:15-3#

Expert A: so ahh and i will also send you the speech i did at the OSCE and i also send you a presentation that Walter will be doing ah next week so please don't quote it now. #00:23:32-3#

Interviewer: yeah #00:23:32-7#

Expert A: but for the Nansen principles i think it is really one of the most masterful thing i have seen #00:23:40-2#

Interviewer: great #00:23:40-2#

Expert A: so there is now a red threat that has begun to be sort of woven ah around this issue we hope that ahh Nansen will be the vehicle that all have been waiting for.
#00:23:57-9#

Interviewer: ok. good good luck with your initiative sounds like a very sound...
#00:24:06-2#

Expert A: yeah. in fact i have to go back to Nansen now #00:24:07-5#

Interviewer: ok. thanks again for your time #00:24:10-1#

Expert A: ok. an we will probably have another conversation once you had time to digest all of this #00:24:15-9#

Interviewer: ok #00:24:15-9#

Expert A: and Nansen now i have to go back #00:24:19-2#

Interviewer: great #00:24:19-9#

Expert A: and ah yeah! #00:24:24-8#

Interviewer: thank you very much #00:24:25-3#

Expert A: ok. bye bye #00:24:25-3#

Interviewer: bye bye #00:24:25-3#

Leonie Tuitjer,
Rubensstraße 9,
30177 Hannover, Germany

Mobil: +43 68183716595
Email: Leonie.Tuitjer@gmx.de

CV

Leonie Tuitjer

Position applying for **EDP/III Doctoral Program**

Education

M.A. Erasmus Mundus Program „Global Studies – From a European Perspective“

2010-2011	Roskilde University, Roskilde	Denmark
2011	Macquarie University, Sydney	Australia
2012-2013	University of Vienna, Vienna	Austria

Expected graduation: April 2013

Exchange Semester

2009	University of Pune, Pune	India
------	--------------------------	-------

B.A. Political Science and English; Average Grade 1,5

2006-2009	Georg-August University, Göttingen	Germany
-----------	------------------------------------	---------

Internships and Work Experience

18th March 2012- 8th June 2012

Internship at the Liaison Office of the UNHCR to the OSCE and other Vienna based UN agencies

- Summarizing OSCE discussions and supporting secretarial tasks of the liaison office
- Supporting information management flows and networking efforts of the UNHCR

2. May 2011-30. June 2011:

- Internship: BUNDjugend, Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Berlin, Germany
- Organising an international youth conference on „Climate Justice“
 - Promoting a fair trade campaign

March-October 2010:

- Organising the annual student conference of the Heinrich-Böll Foundation
- Main responsibilities: organising/moderating work meetings, logistics
 - Moderating the congress program

May-September 2009:

- Student Assistant for Prof. Dr. Carola Suhrkamp
Georg-August University, Göttingen, Germany
- Research
 - Editing of articles for an encyclopaedia

**Volunteering and
Scholarships**

2011: “Global Leadership Certificate” of the Macquarie University, Sydney

2010/12: Fee reductions for the Erasmus Mundus MA program granted by the program’s consortium and the European Commission for excellent grades

2009/10: Spokesperson for the Student Council of the Social Science Department, Georg-August-University Göttingen

2009: Scholarship from the University of Göttingen and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for studying abroad in India

2008- 2012: Scholarship holder of the Heinrich Böll Foundation

2006/07: Spokesperson of the Environmental Youth Network Lower Saxony (Janun e.V.)

Languages

Skills

Academic Experience

Languages:

German: mother tongue;
English: C2;
French B1

Skills:

- Competent use of Microsoft Word, Excel, Power Point
- Extended research experience with various online tools and data bases (e.g. research data-base of the UNHCR; refworld.org)



- Practical experiences with project and information management in international settings

Academic Experience

Participation and poster presentation at the international conference:

“Tracing Social Inequalities in Climate Change Induced Displacement”, Bielefeld (Germany) from 9th December- 12th December 2012, Organised and funded by the European Science Foundation, University of Bielefeld (ZiF) and ECOST.

Title of presented poster:

“The UNHCR’s Approach to “Climate Refugees” and Climate Justice”.