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Katharina Küronya

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1. Introduction

Much has been written on the complex subject of modality, which seems to be an essential and omnipresent facet of human language. In the broadest sense, modal expressions "can […] be seen as having some kind of evaluative function" and are used by speakers to "express" their "opinion and attitude" towards the reality described by a sentence. (Lyons 1977: 452). The use of modality by a speaker thus refers to her/his engagement with or belief about reality. It gives insight into what a speaker wants or thinks the world to be like. The expression "modal colouring", which can be found in literature again and again hints at the idea of modal expressions as a means of dying a colourless reality according to one's own purpose or belief. In this sense, Hoye (2005a: 1298) proposes a lovely analogy:

> Perhaps a more concrete way of viewing the role of modality in natural language and everyday life is by analogy to photography and the use of filters to manipulate how film responds to or represents subject colours and hereby creates an array of special effects, all of them a more or less significant departure from objective 'truth'. In language, modality deploys various kinds of 'meaning filter' – types of modal expression – which variously colour and modify our conceptualizations of the world and enable us to represent it with such purposeful diversity.

Modal expressions thus offer an important tool for uttering one's perception of and opinions on reality.

In a more specific sense, Hoye (2005a: 1298) points out that "modal concepts" are those "of *possibility*, *probability*, *certainty*, and *necessity".* Those concepts, he (2005a: 1298) argues, are "actually deployed in everyday human thought and talk". Referring to Perkins (1983: 3), he argues that such concepts arise due to a "marked human tendency to conceive of things as they might be, may be or must have been or could be, should or ought to have been" (Hoye 2005a: 1298). The perception of reality in the framework of these concepts, he emphasises (Hoye 2005a: 1298), "constitutes an essential part of the fabric of our everyday lives" (Perkins: 1983:3). In other words, there is a desire for experiencing reality not in a neutral way but through the lense of modality, thus by automatically judging a situation in one way or another. This manner of

perceiving and commenting on the world seems to be tied inevitably to human behaviour and thus reveals a lot about it. Unsurprisingly, Steven Pinker devotes some paragraphs in his book *Stuff of Thought: Language as a window into human nature* (Pinker 2007: 195f.) to the use of modal auxiliaries. The book itself explores – as the title already suggests – what can be derived about human thinking by having a look at language and its underlying concepts, one of those being the modal verbs system.

Since modality appears to be such a crucial facet of human communication, it seems fair to devote a considerable amount of research to it. And indeed, there is a great number of publications concerning modality; mostly investigating modality as it occurs in the English language. Hoye (2005a: 1298) ascribes the prominent role of English to its considerable usage all around the world. “Given the present role of English as the global lingua franca and its status as the most widely studied language in history”, he says (2005: 1298), “it is hardly surprising that the bulk of scholarship on modality is about the expression of modality in English.” He most certainly is right. What is surprising, however, is that research has almost exclusively focused on English as it is used by native speakers only, even though English is nowadays being used by more non-native than native speakers (cf. Crystal 2003). Linguistic research being reduced to the English spoken by native speakers is of course not exclusive to modality research but holds true for many fields of investigation. In recent years, however, interest in English used as a language for communication by non-natives has grown and has established itself as a crucial field of research. As Barbara Seidlhofer (2005: 39) points out, “the term ‘English as a lingua franca’ (ELF) has emerged as a way of referring to communication in English between speakers with different first languages”. Firth (1996: 239-240) underlines the importance of ELF as “a contact language” used by speakers who do not have “a common native tongue” or “a common (national) culture” and “for whom English is […a] foreign language […].” Nowadays approximately three out of four English speakers are non-natives (cf. Crystal 2003). Investigating and describing ELF seems to be of great relevance since it constitutes an important communication tool for so many people around the globe. Even more so, one might argue, ELF research should pay more attention to areas which are as essential to communication as modality. Hoye (2005a: 1297) underlines its importance and

states that modality is nowadays seen on the same level as tense and aspect. But although evidence of research in the field of modality is ample and even though there has been considerable interest in ELF studies recently, these two aspects have not yet been combined in research. Hardly any scholars have written about modality within the ELF realm. Most of these studies are then of comparative nature, meaning they compare one feature of ELF to how it is realised in another language. This paper, however, will investigate how ELF speakers apply modality in their interactions without references to other languages apart from English. Chapter 2 outlines the research interest of this paper in more detail. The following sections then discuss and define the two main components of this paper in more detail: ELF and modality. Chapter 3 gives insight into the phenomenon of English as a Lingua Franca and explains it on a conceptual level. The question of what modality is has already been brought up in the beginning of this section and will be addressed in more detail in chapter 4 before discussing basic concepts concerning the different kinds of modality (this being the distinction between epistemic and deontic modality and the related categories of meaning) in chapter 5. Afterwards, a section is devoted to listing the linguistic realisations of modal meanings offered by the English language. The greater part of this paper then investigates modality in the context of ELF by the help of a corpus analysis. The corpus which will be employed is the Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English (VOICE) compiled at the University of Vienna (more information concerning the corpus can be found in section 7.1.). In a final section, then, the results will be summarised and commented on.

2. Research interest

The preceding chapter has already outlined that modality constitutes a vital part of human nature. It is tightly interwoven with person's perception of reality but also – and this is perhaps even more important as far as discourse is concerned – with *uttering* one's take on reality. Modality reveals speakers' opinions, their commitment to what they are saying as well as what they wish the world to be like – thus very often what they want other people to do. Investigations of modality are consequently not only interesting because they shed light on human thinking and perception as such but also because they give insight into how people socially interact. What reveals itself as particularly intriguing is the question of how speakers of English as a Lingua Franca use the tools of modality for communicative purposes. In fact, ELF speakers' non-native language proficiencies as well as their different language backgrounds arguably bring a fresh dynamic to modality and to how it is communicated.

The preceding section has already mentioned that the phenomenon of English as a Lingua Franca has only gotten in researchers' focus of attention during the last couple of years. Description of it is consequently comparatively restricted, even more so because for a long time no corpus has been available for undertaking descriptive endeavours. It has also been explained that in particular the field of modality in ELF has not been investigated much. This paper thus aims at providing a description of ELF speakers' usage of modality. In order to be able to do so the questions of which types of modal carriers (auxiliaries or others?) as well as which modal expressions in particular are used by ELF speakers. Which are the most frequent ones? Which are not used at all? Furthermore, the question of what type of modal meaning is expressed by which modal carrier should be answered. For this purpose, the most frequently used carriers should be assigned to the respective meaning signalled by them. At this point, obviously the question of what can be concluded about ELF speakers because of their choices for particular modal expressions arises. It has been explained that modality reveals a lot about its user. Considering examples of ELF discourse then should give insight into the nature of ELF speakers as language users. Are they straight-forward and confident or do they reveal themselves as being rather tentative and vague? Moreover, also the

question of how ELF speakers make sure that their addressees receive the intended modal meaning should be given attention.

Finally, it should be mentioned that this paper is to be seen as a work in progress. Consequently, another aim of this paper is to identify interesting areas for research in the future.

3. Understanding English as a Lingua Franca (ELF)

The title of this chapter is also the title of Barbara Seidlhofer's work on English as a Lingua Franca (Seidlhofer 2011). Her main aim of writing and publishing this book was to "arrive at 'a certain level of understanding' of ELF" (2011: ix). This is primarily done by commenting on and explaining ELF on a conceptual level. Moreover, however, the inclusion of actual data as an illustration of discussed concepts, meaning a linguistic description of ELF speech, was important to her (cf. 2011: ix, xii). This chapter was given the same title as Seidlhofer's book for two reasons. This section in particular was included in this paper for the same reason that motivated Seidlhofer to write her book, namely to outline the crucial concepts of ELF and consequently to give insight into this phenomenon. Moreover, linguistic description for a larger understanding of ELF consitutes the major part of this paper. Besides this section (and this paper in general) aiming at the same purpose as Seidlhofer's book, this section was given the same title because it is largely indebted to Seidlhofer's work in terms of argumentation and opinion.

3.1. English: A global phenomenon

There is no doubt that English nowadays constitutes an integral part of many people's lives all around the world and an indispensable tool for communication at the same time. Although attitudes towards the development of English becoming a language spoken all around the world (also by non-natives) may be of varying nature, there is no doubt that English as a means of understanding each other looms large. Seidlhofer (2011: ix) stresses that "[n]obody is likely to deny that English has, in one way or another, in some shape or form, become a global lingua franca in the contemporary world." And considering the numerous occasions in which English is being used for obtaining mutual understanding and how such communicative encounters happen in the most differing contexts, it seems obvious that English is nowadays literally everywhere. Alessia Cogo (2012: 97-98) provides numerous examples for the different contexts in which English is used by saying that

> [...] encounters [using English as the language of communication], for example, can take place over the internet, on Facebook, as well as in an office in Beijing, a university lecture in Amsterdam, a market stall in Marrakesh, a bar in Milan, and a hostel in São Paulo.

Giving exact numbers of English speakers around the world seems to be an impossible endeavour. This is not at least due to the difficulty of defining "English speaker" as such, since the dividing line between those who "qualify" as English speakers and persons who do not appears to be "arbitrary" (Seidlhofer 2011: 2). Whereas concrete figures must be seen as vague estimations, it seems to be obvious, however, that "'native speakers' of English are clearly outnumbered by 'non-native speakers'. (Crystal 2003: 69, Seidlhofer 2011: 2). According to Crystal (2006: 425) nowadays about one fourth of the world's population is capable of a useful communication in English and out of these speakers of English roughly only one out of four is a native[1]. English has obviously reached tremendous importance and become a useful tool of communication around the world – not only by being a native tongue used by native speakers but also by serving as a lingua franca used by numerous non-natives around the world.

Whereas history has seen many important "world languages" such as Latin, French or Arabic, it seems that none of them can compare to English (cf. Seidlhofer 2001: 3). This is so because English on the one hand is nowadays more widespread than any other of the aforementioned languages has ever been, on the other hand it has conquered many areas of social life. Seidlhofer (2011: 3) points out that no other language before "has ever had both the global expansion and the penetration of social strata and domains of use that English has now."

A question that inevitably occurs at this point is how English has gained its status of a worldwide phenomenon. Seidlhofer (2011: 3) explains that the

[1] The "exact" figures of speakers of English as estimated by Crystal (2003: 69) on the basis of Kachru's (1992) model of 'concentric circles' are the following:

a) "Inner Circle": English is first language; as for instance in the USA or the UK: 320-380 million
b) "Outer Circle": English is not the native tongue but an additional language; as for instance in India, Nigeria or the Philippines : 300-500 million
c) "Expanding Circle": English is a foreign language; as for instance Russia, China or most of Europe: 500-1000 million

spread of English has happened (and perhaps still is happening) in two processes. She says that

> it [English] has been ‘exported’ to many regions of the world by its ‘native’ speakers, primarily through colonialization, and so has invaded these places. It has, however, to an even larger extent been ‘imported’ by people all over the world who decided to learn it as a useful language in addition to their first language(s).

Quite obviously, colonialisation has played a considerable role in the expansion of English all over the world. As a consequence, then, the world has reacted to this development by learning English, thus, re-enforcing the role of English as a global language.

Taking into consideration that the spread of English has happened in somehow three ways (namely “native speakers speaking English” – “colonialisation of countries by English native speakers’ country” – “people learning English”) , we arrive at three different “types” of English, or what Kachru (1992) describes as three different circles of English in his concept of “concentric circles”:

- “Inner Circle”: This circle describes regions in which English is spoken as a first language, e.g. the UK. It thus describes native speakers’ English.
- “Outer Circle”: This circle describes regions, where English nowadays plays an important role in addition to a native language of the respective area and is for instance a second official language. In particular, this circle describes former colonies, e.g. India.
- “Expanding Circle”: This circle describes all countries or areas where English is not an official language but where people learn/ speak English as a foreign language, e.g. China. English speakers of this circle are obviously non-native speakers.

Thus, one can see how English has become a global phenomenon, its “circles” covering almost the whole globe. A recent driving force behind the spread of English is unsurprisingly constituted by the emergence of new technologies and communication devices as well as the desirable image that is ascribed to users of these developments. Seidlhofer (2011: 7) notices that English reaching “truly global dimensions [...] has obviously been accelerated by the dramatic

expansion of electronic communication through the internet, which has so far enhanced the social prestige attributed to typical global users of English [...].” Moreover, it seems that English has not conquered the internet only but has also affected many other “public domains” such as “the media [...], advertising, popular youth culture, and entertainment” (Seidlhofer, Breiteneder & Pitzl 2006: 5).

Since English has obtained this tremendous size, it makes sense that it is widely studied. Clearly, most research has been carried out on the English spoken in the first circle (ENL), but also the second circle has established itself as a fixed field of investigation. This paper, however, concentrates on a phenomenon which is to be situated in the expanding circle mostly, but also stretches out over the other circles, namely English as a Lingua Franca.

3.2. Defining English as a Lingua Franca

Basically, the term *lingua franca* is used to refer to language as a communication device between people who speak different native tongues and for whom this communication language is a second language (cf. Samarin 1987: 371). Seidlhofer (2011:7) points out that lingua francas can be found in many parts of the world in the form of “fairly stable combinations of first languages rather than the truly global phenomenon of English as a lingua franca.” A definition as the one by Samarin is suitable for lingua francas that are restricted in terms of region. Nonetheless, this notion of defining has been transferred to the global phenomenon of ELF. Thus, definitions of ELF such as the following have been suggested:

> [ELF is] a ‘contact language’ between persons who share neither a common native tongue nor a common (national) background, and for whom English is the chosen foreign language of communication. (Firth 1996: 240)

> ELF interactions are defined as interactions between members of two or more different linguacultures in English, for none of whom English is the mother tongue. (House 1999: 74)

As Seidlhofer (2011:7) mentions, such descriptions underline that the greater part of ELF speakers are non-native speakers of English and this is to be

regarded as a crucial aspect of ELF. She (2011: 7) highlights, however, that ELF communication may also include speakers from Kachru's Inner and Outer Circles, since ELF interactions may also occur in "contexts [...] such as meetings at the United Nations headquarters in New York, tourist cruises around Sydney harbour, or academic conferences in Hyderabad." Consequently, Seidlhofer proposes a definition of ELF which includes speakers from the aforementioned circles as well, which seems to be useful. She (2011: 7) thus defines ELF as

> any use of English among speakers of different first languages for whom English is the communicative medium of choice, and often the only option.[2]

Another crucial aspect that needs to be considered when defining ELF on a conceptual level is the distinction between English as a *lingua franca* and English as a *foreign language* (EFL). It seems that these two concepts of English get mixed up and thus provoke emotional reactions in terms or certain norms and standards which allegedly need to be kept.

Considering English as a foreign language means viewing English closely linked to where, how and by whom it is spoken (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 17). It is much the same with other languages which are spoken within a restricted area, such as Czech or Thai. In such cases, the cultural background, the regional area as well as the native speakers of a language are central to learning this language. Conceiving of English as a foreign language means recognising the centrality of native speakers as well as their norms. These norms do not only describe (or rather prescribe) what is "grammatically correct, but also [...] what is situationally appropriate and typical" (Seidlhofer 2011: 17). Learning English as a foreign language means "to strive to 'do as the natives do'" as well as "accept[ing] their authority as distributors of their language, on which they have a sort of a franchise" (Seidlhofer 2011: 17). Obviously, considering English this way is of great relevance for learners of English who appreciate the language

[2] Whereas this paper approves of Seidlhofer's definition of ELF as interactions including speakers from the First and Second Circles as well, it will focus on ELF used by non-native speakers of English and investigate their uses of modality. This is predominantly due to one very practical reason which is that the corpus used in for this study (VOICE) is comprised of transcription of speech predominantly produced by non-native ELF speakers. Still, it needs to be highlighted that ELF contacts between native and non-native speakers of English constitutes another interesting field of research.

as well as the connected culture (thus people who have a particular interest in English, the literature, have friends in an English-speaking country, and the like; (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 17)) and want to become part of this culture. They therefore submit themselves to native speakers' norms, which – if conforming to them correctly – function as "membershipping devices" (Seidlhofer 2011: 17).

The implications of English as a lingua franca, now, are fairly different to those of EFL. Central to the perception of English in this sense are essentially two things: namely that English is above all used in order to fulfil a communicative purpose and that English constitutes the only possibility to communicate since it is the only "language shared by all interactants" (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 18-19). It is to assume that ELF speakers' command of English will be of different proficiency and thus one might think that communication and mutual understanding cannot be obtained in ELF interactions. Quite the contrary is true, however. Even though ELF communication does not adhere to native speakers' norms and rules (thus has no standard imposed from above to hold on to), ELF interactants work out their own norms in the event of communication. Seidlhofer (2011: 18) explains ELF communication as such:

> What [...] happens is that the participants gauge a level of language at which they can operate, and settle on ad hoc, pro tem norms that are adequate to the task and commensurate to the command of the linguistic resources they have in common. The crucial point in all this is that these norms are tacitly understood to be established during the interaction, within the current possibilities, and that they are primarily regulated by interactional exigencies, rather than by what native speakers would say, or would find correct, or 'normal', or appropriate.

English as a lingua franca is thus to be understood as a flexible and quite creative use of English, which does not necessarily conform to native speakers' norms and which is motivated by the desire for mutual understanding. ELF is very goal-oriented (the goal being mutual intelligibility) and 'the rules of the game' are negotiated and established in a mutual process.

Seidlhofer (2011:18) summarises the differences between English as a foreign language and English as a lingua franca in the table presented on page 12. The distinction between the two concepts is not of utmost importance for this paper,

nonetheless the table (and also the juxtaposition of both concepts) helps to understand the implications of ELF.

Table 1 Conceptual differences between EFL and ELF

	Foreign language (EFL)	**Lingua franca (ELF)**
Linguacultural norms	pre-existing, re-affirmed	ad hoc, negotiated
Objectives	integration, membership in NS community	intelligibility, communication in a NNS or mixed NNS-NS interaction
Processes	imitation, adoption	accommodation, adaptation

3.3. Re-thinking attitudes towards ELF

English as a lingua franca often has to face negative attitudes and rejection. It is certainly an issue which provokes emotional reactions and a fear of losing 'proper' English (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 28-41). This is so mainly for two reasons (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 94):

On the one hand, many view English as a Lingua Franca as a threat to Standard English since ELF – as has been mentioned in the previous section – does not submit itself to native speakers' norms but creates a set of rules throughout the communication process, suitable for the interactants, their language proficiency and communicative intention. Seidlhofer (2011: 42-46) challenges the idea of a Standard English by pointing out that linguists have not arrived at a supportable definition of this *standard.* Still it is the case that many people (laypersons, linguists, teachers as well as learners) adhere to the belief of the British (or English) or American variety being the English that is ought to be obtained by (non-native) learners (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 28-43). ELF communication, however, does not follow what such a normative view prescribes.

The second aspect of ELF which is disturbing to many people is the fact that ELF cannot be described as a variety of English and thus causes trouble in perceiving and understanding it as a linguistic phenomenon. There seems to be a desire to categorise linguistic phenomena, which in the case of ELF is

impossible by considering only old concepts such as the one of variety. English as a lingua franca does not correspond to the idea of variety since it can neither be ascribed a distinct set of linguistic forms nor can it be assigned to a distinct speech community in a classic sense (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 74-88). The linguistic choices made do not adhere to a prefixed standard but are always different, depending on the communicative situation and the interactants. So clearly, ELF speakers do not share a pre-established, stable linguistic repertoire as it would be typical of a variety. The notion of a speech community hinges on the idea that members of one community are in more or less the same geographic area, engaging in face-to-face communication (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 83-84). This is of course anything but true for ELF users as they are scattered all around the globe and a great part of interactions using English happens via the internet (in chatrooms or Skype, for instance) (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 83-87). ELF, thus, cannot be categorised as a variety of English. Seidlhofer (cf. 2011: 46-47) further points out, however, that the concept of variety is elusive anyway as it is much more a social construct than a linguistic one and drawing the lines between the respective varieties is, once again, quite arbitrary. Furthermore, the discussion of variety-status of ELF seems redundant since speakers' usage of the English language is of greater interest than where they come from or which community they belong to (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 75-76; Bruthiaux 2003: 174).

In a response to outdated models and a categorisation of English into standard varieties and non-standards, Seidlhofer advocates a democratic, fluid, if you will postmodern concept of English as a lingua franca (and English in general). Three notions seem to be central for a re-conceptualisation of English and understanding of ELF and for a change in attitudes towards it.

Firstly, one must recognise that English does not belong to the native speakers' community only, but to everybody out there using the language. This, of course, includes ELF speakers just as much as an English, American or Indian person. At the same time, this means that native speakers have no longer a copyright on the English language but that it can be shaped and changed by ELF speakers as well. This entails that native speakers' norms are not the ones who count in lingua franca interactions but that ELF speakers can appropriate and adapt English to their wishes and needs (cf. Seidlhofer's table of differences between EFL and ELF). Widdowson (2003: 50-51) compares the native speaker

centred approach to a franchise system of fast food chains, with every user of the English language being obliged to keep pre-set norms. He says that English should not be “controlled by the inventors” as it is the case considering “the franchise [systems of] Pizza Hut and Kentucky Fried Chicken.” The shift towards a more democratic handling of linguistic resources and their usage “inevitably involves a transfer of ownership and with it the natural consequence of variable adaptation” (Seidlhofer 2011: 67).

Of course, claiming authority and regarding English as one’s property means holding power over an influential economic tool (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 28-29). The second crucial point to be made, however, is that keeping control over a global phenomenon such as English for communicatively driven situations has proven itself impossible since ELF speakers *do* adapt English in their personal ways, despite any endeavour of prescriptivism of native speakers’ norms. In the end, the process of change and adaptation of a language is an inevitable and natural process, since only because of such developments English constitutes a useful tool for the particular purposes it is needed for at particular points in time. If it were otherwise, English could no longer serve its purpose of being a communication device. Considering that English is spoken by more non-natives than natives, this consequently means that the English language in general is changed considerably by the former. Seidlhofer (2011: 66-67) summarises the natural process of language adaptation by ELF speakers as such:

> It is a commonplace to say that language variation and change are inevitable processes intrinsic to the very use of any living language. Given the fact that English is undoubtedly a living language, and given the fact that its global spread is happening, and indeed gathering pace at a quite unprecedented rate, it is quite obvious that it will vary and change. To put it simply, language variation and change will happen wherever a language is used, and since English is used globally, it is also developing globally rather than only within native-speaker communities.

Not acknowledging ELF and its contribution to the natural variation of English, thus, means undermining its status of a global phenomenon and a globally used tool of communication. Since it is in particular the quality of adaption that has given English as a Lingua Franca (and at the same time English overall) its powerful position, it must be accepted and appreciated as such.

Thirdly, it needs to be recognised that ELF communication is not dependent on a standard imposed from above in order to ensure an interaction of mutual understanding. In the end, this is proven every day by ELF speakers successfully engaging in interactions. Seidlhofer (2011: 48-49) points out that it seems erroneous to believe that "unless there is a norm that controls the way people speak, things fall apart", since people usually co-operate in order to obtain mutual understanding. Even though misunderstandings might occur in ELF interactions, speakers seem to adjust their behaviour in order to establish a common ground on which the interaction can be successful. Such co-operation often happens unconsciously on various levels (for instance concerning speech or intonation) and seems to be of great importance for ELF encounters (cf. Jenkins 2000: 165-194). Indeed, researchers have identified numerous strategies that ELF speakers use in order to ensure mutual intelligibility (cf Seidlhofer (2011: 99-107). Seidlhofer (2011: 99-100) emphasises that the most obvious strategies of reaching clarity in communication are simply to paraphrase or repeat a certain word or phrase. Moreover, she mentions what House (2002) calls 'represents' to be another method for ensuring clarity. Those are back-channelling reactions in the form of repeating what a communication partner has just said.

Despite a great variety of strategies to ensure mutual understanding, it must be noted, however, that there might be occasions where at least one of the communication partners is unwilling to co-operate. In such situations obtaining mutual understanding becomes problematic or even impossible (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 49). Yet, in cases of co-operative speakers/listeners, ELF seems to function appropriately, even without any norm "to hold on to".

4. Defining Modality

The introduction to this paper has already addressed the question of what modality is on broader terms. And already when considering this subject on a superficial level, it becomes obvious that modality is neither something definite or tangible nor something you can easily point your finger on. Even more so, problems of definition arise when digging deeper into the field of modality. Finding such a definition presents itself particularly difficult due to the multilayered nature of modality. Different facets to it are its manifold linguistic representations in the English language (that is not only the modal auxiliaries, but also lexical modals, subjunctive forms, etc.) and their various modal meanings. In addition, organising the items of both of these categories into a logical framework has revealed itself as a complicated endeavour.

This chapter gives insight into the "basics" of modality studies and tries to explain the conceptual idea of modality by relating it to the concept of mood as well as by discussing its semantic implications.

4.1. Mood: a grammatical category

One approach to answering what is meant by modality is contrasting it to mood, a term that shows up frequently in literature. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 172) explain that "[t]he distinction between mood and modality is like that between tense and time, or aspect and aspectuality: mood is a category of grammar, modality a category of meaning." They (2002: 172) state that mood simply is the „grammaticalisation of modality within the verbal system". This description would for instance include the modal auxiliaries as well. However, they (Huddleston, Pullum 2002: 172) point out that "[t]he term 'mood' is most usually applied to inflectional systems of the verb, as in the contrast between indicative, subjunctive, and imperative [...]." This is in line with Palmer's distinction between mood and modality (Palmer 2001: 4):

> Basically, there are two ways in which languages deal grammatically with an overall category of modality. These are to be distinguished in terms of (i) modal system and (ii) mood. Both may occur within a single language, e.g., in German, which has a modal system of modal verbs and mood (indicative and subjunctive) [...] ".

In other words, Palmer suggests two grammatical categories as means of conveying modal meanings. One of them is modal systems (as for instance the modal auxiliaries system), the other being mood (that is subjunctive forms). Hoye (1997: 38) notices that many languages apart from English use verb inflection for signalling modal notions (as for instance German which was mentioned as an example by Palmer in the quote above). He says (Hoye 1997:38) that "[m]ood may thus be formally defined as a morphosyntactic category" on a level with tense and aspect, as proposed by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 172). Lyons (1977: 848) agrees that "mood is a grammatical category". He (1977: 848) emphasises, however, that this grammatical device of conveying modal meaning can be "found in some, but not all languages." Palmer (2001: 4) outlines that languages can have both tools (mood and a modal system) at the same time. Mostly, however, only one device occurs or at least usually one of the two is prominent. He (2001: 4) furthermore explains that the subjunctive mood seems "to be falling into disuse" in the case of many European languages "while in English it has virtually disappeared [...]". Hoye (1997:39) is of the same opinion and says that "only vestiges" of the subjunctive mood as a means of a marking modal notion still remain in the English language. Moreover, Palmer (2001: 4, 104) notices that while in English the subjunctive mood has been disappearing, a system of modal verbs has been installed, which has taken over the modal functions formerly realised by the subjunctive. In line with this argument, Hoye (1997: 39) summarises:

> Originally, the subjunctive was used to convey a wide range of attitudes on the part of the speaker towards the factual content of his utterance, such as doubt, certainty, vagueness, and possibility, which over time have come to be conveyed by modal expressions, including the modal auxiliaries.

Hoye (1997: 39) points out how Huddleston (1984: 164) thus proposes a different concept of a mood system, namely "an analytic mood system". In such a grammatical system of mood, auxiliaries instead of inflection are the grammatical devices for the expression of modal contrasts. Huddleston (1984: 164) explains:

> We are taking the view that there is no inflectional system of mood in modern English, but the contrast between *He is downstairs, He may be downstairs, He must be downstairs*, and so on, also falls within the semantic area and we will accordingly regard the VPs is, may be and must be as differing in mood; since the terms in the VP system are differentiated not inflectionally but by means of auxiliaries, we will talk of an analytic mood system.

Jespersen (1924: 320-321) suggests an even broader definition of mood, including not only the modal auxiliaries but any possible modal manifestation.

This section has so far outlined the difference between mood and modality, which is that mood is a grammatical category whereas modality is concerned with semantics. Traditionally, mood describes the choice of using the subjunctive, indicative or imperative form of a verb. Since the English language does not rely on the use of an inflectional mood system any more, other definitions of mood have been suggested. Huddleston (1984: 164) proposes to base the system of mood on the modal auxiliaries, as they nowadays denote contrasts in modal meaning. Jespersen (1924: 320-321) brings forward an even wider definition by including additional modal carriers. This paper, however, will follow the traditional convention of regarding mood as the grammatical category, which – in the case of modal meaning – is realised by the subjunctive. This is due to the fact that it seems to be the generally agreed upon convention. Hoye (1997: 40) underlines this by saying that "it is worth noticing that the traditional characterization of mood as a uniquely inflectional category [meaning the subjunctive mood] is widely preferred."

To sum up, the term mood in this paper is used to refer to the subjunctive mood only, whereas modal system (as proposed by Palmer) is used to refer to other grammatical systems denoting modal meaning such as the system of modal auxiliaries; even though there is no terminology to cover the whole span of linguistic manifestation of modal meaning. Whenever modality is discussed from a semantic point of view (that is, in terms of meaning) and not from a grammatical point of view, the paper will use the terms "modalities" or "categories of modality", as suggested by Hoye (1997: 40).

4.2. Realis and Irrealis

Since the subjunctive/indicative distinction seems to be of less importance within the English language, there is a demand for a terminology to describe the contrast between "modal" (as denoted by the subjunctive mood in many languages) and "non-modal" (as indicated by the indicative mood in many languages) utterances. For being able to makes such as a distinction, the terms "realis" and "irrealis" will be used in this paper. Palmer (2001: 1) mentions a couple of suggestions for describing the "binary distinction" when it comes to analysing language in terms of modality: "modal" and "non-modal, "declarative" or "non-declarative", "factual" and "non-factual" or "real" and "unreal". He does, however, explain that these terms are not necessarily appropriate and that therefore "realis" and "irreals" have come into usage. He outlines (2001: 3-4) that these are closely linked to the idea of "assertion" and "non-assertion" and emphasises that analysing a language in terms of realis (or indicative) and irrealis (or subjunctive[3]) is not dependent on "the distinction between what is factual and what is not (and still less on what is true and what is not true)" but that "[i]t depends on the distinction between what is asserted and what is not asserted." This should become clearer when considering the following example: When a speaker utters "This cake might taste good.", s/he describes a situation that has the potential of being the actual truth (being "real"), whereas the speaker does not commit her/himself to the fact that the proposition necessarily is the case, or in other words to the truth of the proposition. The proposition is thus not asserted by the speaker. The indicative (that is a non-modal) statement "This cake tastes good.", however, describes the circumstance of her/him thinking that the cake *actually* tastes good. The statement is thus asserted by the speaker (cf. Hoye 1997: 40). Since particularly terminology such as "true" and "not true" are somewhat besides the point and misleading (since modality is not concerned with actual reality but speakers' takes on reality) the terms "realis" (for "The cake tastes good.") and "irrealis" (for "The cake might taste good.") have proven themselves useful as well as satisfying due to their technical nature (Palmer 2001: 1). Because of this quality of this terminology

[3] Palmer (2001: 5) explains that indicative and realis as well as subjuncitve and irrealis in general describe the same categories. There are some marginal differences however, which are outlined by him.

and the general agreement upon it in literature, this terminology will be used throughout this paper.

4.3. Modality: a semantic category

Whereas section 4.1. gives a clear definition of mood in contrast to modality, the latter term itself has not yet been discussed in more detail. Mood has been outlined as a grammatical category (thus the grammatical realisation of modal meanings). Modality, however, is concerned with the modal meaning itself. According to Hoye (1997: 38) the term modality is used to refer "to the entire semantic field of modal contrasts whether these be realized lexically, grammatically or prosodically." Modality is thus concerned with giving an opinion on reality. Or, more precisely, it is concerned with this opinion itself, a quality that sets it apart from the categories tense and aspect. Palmer states (2001: 1) that "[t]ense, rather obviously, is concerned with the time of the event, while aspect is concerned with the nature of the event [...]. Modality is concerned with the status of the proposition that describes the event." Modality thus does not refer to reality itself but to its description by a speaker.
Of interest for any research in the field of modality, now, is the question of how this "status" may be described by a speaker. That means, which different categories of modality are available or which modal meanings can be found in the English language. Before elaborating on the different categories of modal meaning in chapter 5., however, the conceptual framework of modality will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

In an introductory section on modality, Hoye (1997: 40) outlines how the concepts of modality have been intriguing philosophers for a long time now. Already Aristotle and Greek philosophy in general discussed concepts of possibility, probability and necessity; in other words the question of what is nowadays referred to by the term modality. The existence of such modal concepts, Hoye argues, seems to be determined by a human tendency of evaluating experiences and opinions in terms of these categories. Hoye says (1997:40) that "[the] capacity to envisage things other than they actually are or

were ('things being otherwise'[4]), to hold competing and incompatible world views, is fundamental to our everyday thinking." Modality thus offers the possibility to describe situations not only the way in which they actually occur, but also how they can be, could have been, should be, would be, must be and so on; how they are "otherwise". Hoye (1197: 40) illustrates this by the following example:

> When a speaker utters 'They may well have left' he expresses a state of affairs which is conceivably real even if it is not in fact the case. By contrast, in producing the unmodalized utterance 'They have left', he makes a factual assertion about a state of affairs which he considers to be the case.

Modalised utterances thus describe scenarios that are theoretically possible but not known by the speaker to be the actual case (irrealis). Unmodalised utterances, in contrast, are used by someone to describe reality in its actual circumstance. They denote that the speaker perceives a situation as true (realis).

Hoye (1997: 40-41) explains how philosophers and logicians have often analysed and dealt with modal notions, that is with realis in contrast to irrealis utterances and their connected meanings. A frequent illustration as an aid for grasping the notion of modality is the idea of "possible worlds" where "'things being otherwise' can be described in terms of what is true or real in another 'possible world'" (Hoye 1997: 41, also cf. Perkins 1983: 6-7). In this sense, modality is not so much concerned with saying "such and such may be the case" but rather with saying "a possible world exists where such and such *is* the case" (Hoye 1997: 4, emphasis added). It can be assumed, of course, that there is at least one possible world, namely the one we actually live in. One can, however, think of worlds alternative to this one; thus alternatives to the "real world". Considering such an idea naturally entails the question of whether possible worlds are as real as the actual one that we live in or whether they are merely abstract and alternative representations of a reality (cf. Hoye 1997: 41). Such issues, Hoye says, (1997: 41) are, however, more of a philosophical rather than a linguistic problem. In any way, it seems reasonable to keep the

[4] The expression "things being otherwise" has been cited by many authors who have written on modality and has originally been coined by Perkins (1983: 6)

view that situations may unfold in various differing ways. Hoye (1997: 41) underlines this idea by the following examples:

> In producing the modalized utterance ‘Josephine evidently must have forgotten the appointment’ or “Josephine might perhaps have forgotten the appointment’, the speaker operates with alternative worlds or scenarios in mind in which Josephine has forgotten the appointment. Similarly, in an utterance like ‘Josephine really should have remembered the appointment’, the speaker envisions a possible world in which things are as he would want them to be, namely a world where Josephine did not forget her appointment!

Perceiving things in one way or another, thus, is implemented by thinking of circumstances as real within a world that is not the one we actually we live in or real in this actual world but not at the present point in time. (cf. Hoye 1997: 41)

Hoye (1997: 41) points out that the idea of possible worlds illustrates the “conceptual dimension of modality” very well. A possible world, he says, describes a “contrast” to the “current actual world” that we live in. At the same time, however, both of these worlds (the actual and the possible one) are related in an abstract manner. Different modalities, now, are related to the real world in just that way. Applying different modalities to an utterance thus means playing out different scenarios (in possible worlds), as it has been shown by Hoye’s Josephine-example quoted above. Since there is the possibility of creating scenarios of different kinds, one has to speak of different modalities at the same time. Hoye (1997: 41) states that “[c]learly there are different types of possible world, each type corresponding to a particular modality.”

5. Categories of modality

Which categories of modal meaning can be found in the English language is an issue that has been brought up earlier in the previous chapter already. This very chapter will comment on which "different types of possible world", meaning which different modalities can be detected within the English language, thus coming closer to defining modality in its concrete and rather tangible sense, and at the same time creating a framework of modalities that can be used for an analysis.

When consulting literature, however, there is no definite consensus about what is to be called modality or which notions exactly are to be counted as modal. Salkie (2009: 79-80) summarises four attitudes towards this issue:

> (a) A broad interpretation. Palmer's extensive survey, for instance, says that "modality is concerned with the status of the proposition that describes the event" (2001:1). [...]
>
> (b) A narrow definition. Van der Auwera and Plungian, in their typological study, say that they "propose to use the term 'modality' for those semantic domains that involve possibility and necessity as paradigmatic variants", a definition which they describe as "relatively restricted" (1998: 80). [...]
>
> (c) A list of sub-types of modality. An example is Downing and Locke, who write: "modality is to be understood as a semantic category which covers such notions as possibility, probability, necessity, volition, obligation and permission" (2002: 382). [...]
>
> (d) Avoidance of the problem by focusing on a set of expressions, such as modal verbs in English; modality is then taken to include whatever these expressions mean. Coates (1983), for instance, analyses the meaning and use of English modals in corpus data, without attempting any definition of the term *modal*.

Again, it becomes obvious that categorising modality is not necessarily easy. There is one categorisation, however, that seems to be agreed upon by all scholars and therefore appears to be a good starting point for further structuring: the distinction between deontic and epistemic modality.

5.1. Deontic and epistemic modality

Considering examples such as the one by Palmer (2001: 7) presented below, it becomes clear that English modals can be interpreted in two very different ways; thus that the English language has two different kinds of modality.

(1) Kate may be at home
Kate must be at home

(2) Kate may come in now
Kate must come in now

Whereas the first *may* indicates the possibility of Kate being at home, the second *may* denotes that Kate is allowed to come in. The first *must* describes Kate being at home as a logical consequence of some other information that is known by the speaker, whereas the second *must* indicates a command. The sentences above may thus be paraphrased as the following (Palmer 2001: 7):

(3) It is possible (possibly the case) that Kate is at home now
It is necessarily the case that Kate is at home now

(4) It is possible for Kate to come in now
It is necessary for Kate to come in now

As Palmer notes (2001: 7), the important difference between the first and the second paraphrase pair lies in the words “that” and “for”. He says that “[t]his clearly suggests that the first pair are concerned with the speaker’s judgment of the proposition that Kate is at home, whereas the second are concerned with the speaker’s attitude towards a potential future event, that of Kate coming in.” Thus, a general distinction between “propositional modality” (being concerned with the first pair) and “event modality” (being concerned with the second pair) can be drawn.

Traditionally, at least one sub-type of modality is assigned to each of the aforementioned categories of modality, respectively. Those sub-types are epistemic and deontic modality and their different interpretations have basically been shown already by considering the examples of propositional and event modality. For further clarification, however, there is another example taken from Hoye (1997: 42):

(5) You must be very patient

Again, this instance might be interpreted in two different ways and paraphrased (in the words of Hoye) as either “I confidently infer/ am forced to conclude that you are very patient” or as “You are required to be very patient”. The first meaning is epistemic whereas the second is deontic.

Hoye (1997: 42) explains that “[e]pistemic modality is concerned with matters of knowledge or belief on which basis speakers express their judgements about states of affairs, events or actions”. In the epistemic version of the example above, the speaker thus does not present a fact about reality (i.e. not an asserted statement such as “You have a car”, thus a realis), but presents her/his subjective take on reality. In Palmer’s (1990: 6) words, epistemic modality “essentially make[s] a judgement about the truth of the proposition.”
Deontic modality, on the other hand, “is concerned with the possibility or necessity of acts in terms of which the speaker gives permission or lays an obligation for the performance of actions at some point in the future” (Hoye 1997: 43). Palmer (1990: 6) underlines that deontic modality is “concerned with influencing actions, states or events.” He mentions that deontic modality denotes what Speech Act Theory calls “directives” (cf. Searle 1983: 166).
Palmer (1990: 6) explains how philosophers have dealt with modality and introduces in particular one concept of modality, namely the “pioneering work” on modal logic by von Wright (1952). Von Wright (1952: 1-2) distinguishes four “modes” of modality, epistemic and deontic modality being two of them and lists them as such:

[i] The alethic modes or modes of truth
[ii] The epistemic modes or modes of knowing
[iii] The deontic modes or modes of obligation
[vi] The existential modes or modes of existence

These modes are then arranged in the form of a table, which can be found on the following page (cf. Von Wright 1952: 1-2):

Table 2 Modes of modality according to von Wright

Alethic	***Epistemic***	***Deontic***	***Existential***
necessary	verified	obligatory	universal
possible		permitted	existing
contingent	undecided	indifferent	
impossible	falsified	forbidden	empty

Although these categories are certainly of great importance for logician's work, they do not readily lend themselves to linguistic purposes and thus also not as a reference frame for the analysis of modality in this paper. Mainly, this is so because not all of these categories can be observed in language and Palmer (1990: 6) outlines that "the aim of the linguist must be simply to investigate the kind of modalities that are clearly recognizable in language and the systems which they exhibit." Therefore, the following paragraphs discuss von Wright's categories of modality and which of them can be detected in English and therefore be included in a framework for this paper's analysis.

The **existential mode** seems to be of less interest for linguistic modality studies in particular, as it concerns linguistic items such as "*some*, *any* or *all*" rather than linguistic modality (cf. Palmer 1990: 7).[5] Thus, the existential mode will not be included as a modal category in this paper.

Considering von Wright's **alethic** and **epistemic mode**, it seems that – whereas they are clearly distinguishable on logical terms – they cannot really be detected as distinct categories in the English language. However, both notions seem to blend into one category (cf. Palmer 1990: 6-7). A crucial aspect in understanding how von Wright's logic and linguistic modality are linked, is the fact that what von Wright calls the epistemic mode is not necessarily what linguists treat as epistemic modality. Actually, von Wright's category of alethic modality corresponds more to what linguists would call epistemic. At the same

[5] Although not of much relevance for this paper, Palmer outlines that the existential mode has a certain importance for modality studies since the modal *can* might be used in the sense of *some* or *sometimes*. E.g. "Lions can be dangerous." meaning "Some lions are dangerous." (cf. Palmer 1990: 7)

time, however, linguistic epistemic modality also includes notions of von Wright's epistemic mode.

The crucial difference between von Wright's epistemic and alethic mode is that the former is concerned with a speaker's judgement of the truth of a proposition. Thus, he lists *verified* or *falsified* as possible values, meaning something is deduced as true or false by a speaker. Von Wright's alethic mode in contrast is concerned with the objective or "necessary truth [...] of propositions. (The term 'alethic' is derived from the Greek word meaning "true"" (Lyons 1977: 791). In language, however, both of these concepts are intertwined, which becomes more obvious when considering the following example taken from Lyons (1977: 791):

> (6) Alfred is a bachelor, so he must be unmarried.

This sentence can be interpreted in three different ways (cf. Hoye 1997: 49, Lyons 1977: 791, Palmer 1990: 7). The first possibility refers to a deontic meaning of "must", which means interpreting the sentence as "Alfred is obliged to be unmarried." This possibility is of course not so much of interest as far as alethic and epistemic modality is concerned. The sentence can, however, also be interpreted as the following: "I (confidently) infer that Alfred is unmarried.", which is an epistemic interpretation of the sentence. Finally, this instance can be regarded as alethic modality by perceiving it as "In the light of what is known, it is necessarily the case that Alfred is unmarried." (the glosses are by Lyons 1977: 791). Both of the latter possibilities, alethic and epistemic modality, rely on deduction. The way of deducing is, however, of different nature in each case respectively. Hoye (1997: 49) explains:

> The last two modalities conform to rational laws of deduction and inference, although the alethic interpretation involves what is logically necessary while the epistemic interpretation involves what the speaker believes to be true; the one is a matter of logical argument, the other an expression of human opinion.

In the case of English, however, both of these modes are the same: they cannot be distinguished formally, nor can they be distinguished in terms of meaning as

there is no logical deduction without the personal belief of a speaker. "[... A]lethic interpretation is on par with a categorical assertion of what the speaker believes, as a matter of fact, to be true" (Hoye 1997: 49). Palmer (1990: 7) explains that "[t]his is related to what Lyons (1977: 792) calls 'subjective' in that it relates to an inference by the speaker, and is not simply concerned with 'objective' verifiability in the light of knowledge". In other words, objective and subjective judgement of truth cannot be separated in language; or, more specifically, any logical deduction is in the end embedded in subjective perception.

As far as the framework for the analysis in this paper is concerned, alethic modality will not be included as a distinct category of modality since it is not detectable as a mode in its own right in English. It is however, indirectly included in the category of epistemic modality since it lies – as has been pointed out in the last paragraphs – in the nature of a speaker's judgement concerning the truth of a proposition.

Von Wright also suggests a **deontic** mode, which is similar to what linguists commonly call deontic modality. It is, as has already been pointed out, concerned with giving permission or obligation. Von Wright as well includes values like *obligatory* or *permitted* in his deontic mode. Concerning deontic modality, however, there is one special feature which has been acknowledged by linguistics as a distinct kind of modality. Although being formally similar to deontic modality, it is still concerned with conveying a different meaning. This kind of modality is referred to by **dynamic modality** (cf. Palmer 1990: 7-8) and has also already been detected by von Wright (1951: 28); yet he did not include it in his table as a distinct mode. Palmer (1990: 7) explains that dynamic modality is "concerned with ability and disposition". Considering the following pair, it becomes obvious how much deontic and dynamic modality are interrelated:

(7) Sally can go to the party.
Sally can juggle.

As has been mentioned, there is no formal difference, since *can* is used in the same way in both cases. Also, what both of them have in common is that they

“are concerned with enabling the subject of the sentence to act.” (Palmer 2003: 7). So both “relate directly to the potentiality of the event signalled by the proposition” (Palmer 2003: 7). The crucial difference between the two, however, is that when it comes to deontic modality “the event is controlled by circumstances external to the subject of the sentence, whereas in the case of dynamic modality “the control is internal to the subject.” (Palmer 2003: 7). The first instance of the pair above presents a deontic usage of *can*, since the situation is controlled by the speaker (or some other instance that is not the subject). It denotes a permission that is given to Sally (by someone else). The second instance of the pair shows dynamic modality. In this case, Sally is not given any permission but *can* refers to her being able to juggle, thus to her internal ability.

Although the example above shows that dynamic modality is usually concerned with the ability of a subject, this kind of modality also includes – as has already been mentioned in passing – the expression of volition. So, instances such as the following are also referred to as dynamic modality:

(8) Sally will help you.

This sentence again can be read as an order, namely as imposing the obligation on Sally that she has to help somebody. If it is read in the sense of “Sally wants to help you”, however, *will* clearly denotes volition and thus dynamic modality.

Palmer (1990: 8) points out that the “binary distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic [meaning deontic] modality” is agreed upon by scholars, since it is “[...] semantically the clearest distinction” as far as modality is concerned. Nonetheless, he sees the distinction of dynamic modality as “perfectly valid”. So just like literature traditionally distinguishes epistemic, deontic and dyamic modality, these three categories will form the basis for the empirical analysis in this paper. What still needs to be considered in terms of this framework, however, are the related sub-categories of each of these three categories, which will be done in the following section.

5.2. Sub-categories of epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality

This chapter is concerned with the various notions of modality that can be observed in the English language. In other words, what is suggested here is the idea of listing sub-types of modality which together should represent the complete semantic spectrum of modality, thus, the complete range of modal meanings. Such an approach has already been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, as for instance Downing and Locke (2002:382) propose to explain modality this way[6]. Salkie (2009: 80), however, criticises such an approach – in particular the one by Downing and Locke, yet regarding theirs as a representative of the sub-type approach in general – by saying that it "gives an indication of the domain, but fails to set clear boundaries." He seems to be right when saying that the sub-category approach does not accurately mark off the distinct sub-types respectively. This becomes obvious when considering how different scholars have suggested lists of sub-types that do not only differ in the quantity of sub-categories but also concerning the kinds of categories. Still, one has to bear in mind that Salkie's paper, in which he utters his criticism concerning the sub-type approach, pursues a specific objective. What he has tried to create is a typologically tenable definition of modality. For this purpose, he outlines criteria which need to be fulfilled by a linguistic item in order to count as modal. It seems obvious that for such a purpose, definitions have to be absolutely clear-cut. Also, it might not be the right approach at all to extract the semantic categories of modality of one language (in this case English) and then transfer such a definition of modality to another language, since the second language might expose different semantic categories. In such a case, Salkie's idea of defining prototypes of modality seems far more useful than the sub-type approach which appears to be too fuzzy. Still, for the purpose of the study presented in this paper (which is also solely concerned with English), the sub-type approach seems to be just right as well as useful mainly for the following three reasons:

1. It underlines the semantic range of modality and makes obvious how modality is observable in various kinds of ways. Also, given that the right

[6] Downing and Locke (2002: 382) suggest the sub-categories possibility, probability, necessity, volition, obligation and permission.

sub-categories are chosen, the whole spectrum of modal meaning is represented by this approach.

2. It is easy to work with since one is usually familiar with the sub-categories (e.g. with the notion of *obligation* or *necessity*). The related concepts need not necessarily be strictly technical and are therefore easy to handle (e.g. there is no need for an in depth explanation in order to understand the concept of obligation as the act of imposing a certain duty on somebody, since it is known from everyday language use). Being acquainted with the concepts in general comes in handy for both carrying out the analysis in this paper and for the reader to comprehend what is being argued. Of course, the convenience of this approach is linked to the condition that the set of sub-categories used is manageable in terms of quantity and that the selected categories themselves are easily accessible.

3. The sub-category approach is employed by many scholars. Of course, this does not automatically justify its usage or make it the best approach to choose. Also, many scholars do not explicitly list sub-types in their definitions of modality. Yet, semantic categories are mentioned again and again as a way of depicting and explaining modality (cf. for instance the quote by Hoye 2005a: 1298 presented in the introduction, in which he mentions the “modal concepts of possibility, probability, certainty, and necessity.”). Consequently, one can say that it seems impossible to represent the semantics of modality without listing such sub-types. Or, regarding it the other way around, it seems that a list of sub-types captures the idea of modal meanings best.

Points 1. and 2. already point out that the quality of this approach is very much dependent on which and how many sub-categories are created. Many scholars have commented on modality by using sub-types and proposed different lists of them. In order to find one that is suitable for this paper, some of them will be considered on the following pages.

One of the perhaps most extensive lists of modal categories has been suggested by **Jespersen** (1924). He (1924: 329-331) outlines twenty different sub-categories, which he divides in "containing an element of will" and "containing no element of will" (similar to the distinction between deontic and epistemic modality). Among those categories are for instance the "compulsive" mode (*he has to go*), the "obligative" (*he ought to go*), the "necessitative" (*he must be rich*) or "dubative" (*he may be rich*) (also cf. Palmer 1999: 229). Jespersen's set is certainly elaborate, however, it seems too complex for the analysis in this paper. Also, most categories are of highly technical nature[7]. Of course technical terminology as such is not to be criticised at all, nonetheless it seems obvious that Jespersen's categories do not readily lend themselves for a qualitative corpus analysis. This is not least due to the great number of categories.

Similarly extensive is the list of semantic categories suggested by **Coates** (1983). She is concerned with the English modal auxiliaries and the semantic categories they exhibit. Coates (1983: 5) summarises her categories (and their connections to the modal auxiliaries, which, however, are not of interest at this point) in a diagram. This diagram is presented on the following page. The right column lists a quite considerable number of modal categories and yet again it seems that such a set is too detailed for the purpose of this study. A distinction in terms of "strong" and "weak", as suggested by Coates for "obligation", for instance, will not be featured in the framework for this analysis in the form of distinct sub-categories.[8] Also, awkwardly, Coates's list of modal meanings (thus a list of semantic functions) includes the category of "quasi-subjunctive"[9], which is more of a grammatical than a semantic category.

[7] Jespersen's (1924: 320-321) complete list of "moods": 1. "Containing an element of will": *Jussive, Compulsive, Obligative, Advisory, Precative, Hortative, Permissive, Promissive, Optative, Desiderative, Intentional*, 2. "Containing no element of will": *Apodictive, Necessitative, Assertive, Presumptive, Dubitative, Potential, Conditional, Hypothetical, Concessional*

[8] The issue of modal strength is briefly taken up again and discussed on pages 38-39 of this paper.

[9] Coates (1983: 67) explains the quasi-subjunctive as the modal auxiliary *should* being used in subordinate *that*-clauses; as in the following instance presented by her (1983: 68):
"it is most necessary that we should have the funeral bill"
Coates (1983: 68) explains that in some cases the quasi-subjunctive "is semantically empty", whereas in some word combinations "weak obligation" is denoted. This again underlines that the quasi-subjunctive is to be seen as a grammatical item denoting semantic meaning rather than as a category of meaning itself.

Figure 1 Modal auxiliaries and their related semantic categories, according to Coates



Another approach towards a classification of modality is **van der Auwera and Plungian**'s (1998), which has already been mentioned at the beginning of chapter 5. They do not list certain categories as sub-types of epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality, but rather do it the other way around. This means that they (1998: 80) suggest using "the term "modality" for those semantic domains that involve possibility and necessity as paradigmatic variants". They then make sub-divisions into what they call "four domains". These domains are based on the distinction between epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality. Their semantic categories of modality are summarised and presented in Table 3 on the following page (1998: 82). Although their idea of including categories such as obligation, necessity, permission or ability seems to be a suitable and easy to handle approach, the overall composition of van der Auwera and Plungian's framework appears to be unstructured. In particular for the analysis in this paper, the distinction between epistemic and deontic modality is central. Yet, this distinction is not necessarily prominent in the arrangement they suggest.

Table 3 Modality types, according to van der Auwera and Plungian

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">Possibility</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Non-epistemic possibility</td><td rowspan="3">Epistemic possibility
(Uncertainty)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Participant-internal possibility
(Dynamic possibility, Ability, Capacity)</td><td colspan="2">Participant-external possibility</td></tr>
<tr><td>(Non-deontic possibility)</td><td>Deontic possibility
(Permission)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Participant-internal necessity
(Need)</td><td>(Non-deontic necessity)</td><td>Deontic necessity
(Obligation)</td><td rowspan="3">Epistemic necessity
(Probability)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Participant-external necessity</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Non-epistemic necessity</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Necessity</td></tr>
</table>

In contrast to the aforementioned approaches which suggest sets of sub-categories that seem too complex as well as extensive for being used in this paper, other scholars have proposed much shorter lists of sub-types. **Palmer** (1990: 36) for instance makes distinctions merely "between 'kinds' of modality (epistemic, deontic, dynamic) and 'degrees' of modality (possibility and necessity)". Thus, he only proposes two sub-categories[10] (the overall idea of categorisation seems similar to van der Auwera and Plungian's). Whereas the preceding sets of sub-categories introduced are too comprehensive, Palmer's approach is perhaps not detailed enough for a useful corpus analysis.

Consequently, an ideal set of sub-categories for this paper seems to be located somewhere halfway between a very restricted approach and an in-depth sub-categorisation. One that comes close to the optimum framework is suggested by **Bybee and Fleischmann** (1995). Although they (1995: 2) describe modality by listing "a broad range of semantic nuances" reminiscent of Jespersen's categories (e.g. jussive, desiderative, obligative, etc.) first, they later (1995: 4-5) propose a shorter set of sub-categories divided into deontic and epistemic meaning. Similar to van der Auwera and Plungian, they ascribe the sub-types of possibility and necessity to both deontic and epistemic modality. In the case of deontic modality, however, they (1995: 4) point out that those two concepts are

[10] Palmer (cf. 1990: 37) actually outlines a third "degree" (or sub-type) of modality, which he calls "neutral" or "circumstantial". It is used to "indicate what is possible or necessary in the circumstances". He does, however, treat it as a sub-class of dynamic modality.

"associated with the social functions of permission and obligation." Concerning epistemic modality, they treat the notions of possibility and necessity as central sub-categories. Nonetheless, they highlight how those are to be seen as two sections of a continuous spectrum of epistemic modality which may also include the category of evidentiality[11]. Besides permission, obligation, possibility and necessity, they also mention the categories of ability and desire, thus sub-categories of what has been outlined as dynamic modality in this paper. Instead of introducing this third kind of modality (besides deontic and epistemic), however, they suggest the category of agent-oriented modality, which encompasses deontic as well as dynamic meanings. Despite diverging from the overall distinction in deontic, epistemic and dynamic modality, they nonetheless present a concise set of six sub-categories.

The approaches that perhaps come closest to the one that will be adhered to in this paper are the one suggested by **Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartik** (1985: 219-221) as well as the one by Downing and Locke (2002, also cf. 2008). Quirk and his colleagues list the sub-categories of permission, obligation, volition, possibility, necessity and prediction. One sub-type among those, however, is somewhat critical. Traditionally, prediction is not counted as modality by most scholars, perhaps because it is not necessarily concerned with a speaker's judgement of a proposition. Yet, prediction (thus talking about future events) fulfils the criteria of non-factuality. Prediction - unlike other types of modalities - does not correspond to an alternative possible world but refers to the one that we actually live in. Still, it makes a statement about a point in time which is not the present moment, and may thus be regarded as irrealis or modal. (cf. page 22 of this paper, cf. Hoye 1997: 41). For this paper, however, it

[11] Palmer (1999: 231-232) explains that some languages have "evidentials", which are "devices" by which the speaker "provide[s] evidence for the proposition [...] presented". Possible evidence might be sensory perception (seeing something with one's own eyes or hearing it), hearsay (being told by someone), finding indices and so on. In some languages such notions are manifested in grammatical forms (e.g. suffixes), which provide support for the evidentiality of a proposition, thus, for the objective/logical truthfulness of a proposition (cf. Palmer: 1999: 231-232). Since English does not have such a mode, the inclusion of evidentiality as a distinct category is as critical as including von Wright's alethic mode. Both of them correspond to the idea of a speaker commenting on the truth of a proposition, not by personal judgement, however, but by using information beyond their personal assessment. Since this – as has been outlined in section 5.1. on von Wright's modes – seems to be impossible due to an inevitable involvement of the speaker's perception, including evidentiality as a distinct category of modality in English appears to be controversial.

will not be included as a distinct category but the sub-type of volition will encompass some notion of prediction as well, since prediction and volition are sometimes difficult to tell apart anyway. Quirk and his colleagues (1985: 219) outline how these two notions often blur into one. They give the following example:

(9) I'll see you tomorrow then

In this case, it is not clear whether the speaker *wants* to see the listener the following day or whether he is merely making a predictive statement about the next day. Often, not even the context of an occurrence can give insight into which notion is predominant.[12] It seems that many predictive uses of *will* still contain some of its original meaning of volition. Greenbaum and Quirk (2004: 57), for instance, point out that although the construction *will+infinitive* is "the closest approximation to a colourless, neutral future [thus denotes prediction]" it "also covers a range of modal meanings." Since this paper is not so much concerned with the distinction between volition and prediction, the latter will not be given its own sub-category.

As has already been mentioned, **Downing and Locke** (2002, 2008) suggest the sub-categories of possibility, probability, necessity, volition, obligation and permission. This set also seems suitable for the purpose of this study as well as easy to use. However, they do not include ability in their list of semantic sub-categories[13]. For reasons of completeness, ability will be included in this paper as a sub-category of dynamic modality.

Palmer (1999: 229) highlights that "semantics is often vague and diffuse". This should have become obvious throughout the discussion of the various different approaches. Considering what has been argued in this chapter so far, however, one arrives at a list of modalities consisting of a distinct number of easily comprehensible semantic categories, which can be arranged in terms of a

[12] It needs to mentioned, however, that in some cases it is clearly recognisable which notion is expressed. This means that in some cases the usage of *will* definitely does not denote volition but the distinct notion of prediction. This is particularly the case when the prediction is not used subjectively, as for instance in: "It will rain tomorrow." Clearly, there is no subject involved which would express a notion of volition.

[13] They do, however, consider it later in a separate section: cf. Downing and Locke (2008: 390-391)

distinction between deontic, epistemic and dynamic modality. Those are the ones that Palmer (cf. 1999: 229) mentions to be frequently suggested by scholars; namely: possibility, necessity, permission, obligation, volition, and ability. Taking the classes of deontic, dynamic and epistemic modality, which have been discussed in the preceding sub-chapter, into account, these sub-classes may be arranged in the following manner:

Table 4 A categorisation of modality

Modality : "concerned with the status of the proposition that describes the event"		
Propositional modality	Event modality	
Epistemic	**Deontic**	**Dynamic**
necessity	obligation	Ability
probability	permission	volition
possibility		

In general, the table is best approached reading it from above. As has been outlined in the previous sub-chapter, modality – following Palmer's (2001:1) definition – is "concerned with the status of the proposition that describes the event", and it can be subdivided into propositional and event modality. Central to this framework is the additional classification into epistemic, deontic and dynamic. Then sub-types are ascribed to each of them. In the cases of deontic and dynamic modality, they comprise two different notions, respectively. The concepts of ability and volition are both concerned with the interior qualities of a person, thus what somebody can do or what someone wants to do. Obligation and permission, on the other hand, are both concepts concerned with indicating how the speaker wishes the world to be. Obligation denotes the act of committing someone to a certain action, whereas permission indicates someone's (either the speaker's or some other instance's) approval for undertaking a certain action. In the case of epistemic modality, the sub-categories are not necessarily different concepts overall but they rather

describe different degrees of the same concept. Unsurprisingly, some authors suggest only one category (namely possibility) as a sub-category to epistemic modality (cf. Palmer 1990; van der Auwera & Plungian: 1998; Bybee & Fleischmann: 1995). It has already been mentioned, that particularly Bybee and Fleischmann (1995: 4) underline that epistemic modality and its related concept of possibility are to be regarded as a continuum, one notion (e.g. possibility) gradually merging into the next (e.g. necessity). In the case of this framework, three degrees (possibility, probability and necessity) have been included since these notions are – although strictly speaking referring to the same concept – quite different in their implications. Possibility simply denotes that there is an overall chance that a proposition is the actual case, whereas probability entails some more commitment of the speaker to what is being said. Necessity means a speaker's strongest conviction of the proposition being true. Since these three degrees of epistemic modality appear to be quite distinct notions they have been included as separate sub-categories.

It has been mentioned earlier in this chapter that degrees of modality will not be manifested in the categorisation used in this paper. Strictly speaking, this is of course not true, as has just been outlined concerning the epistemic sub-types. What needs some consideration, however, is that these categories (the epistemic sub-categories as well as the deontic ones) yet again are not fixed entities but themselves continuous scales of modal strength. Considering the following pair this should become more obvious:

(10) You should come
You must come

Both of these instances refer to some kind of order and may thus be assigned to the category of obligation. Yet, however, the two examples are different in their strength, or – more precisely – differing in the speaker's force. It seems that in the second instance the speaker is committing the addressee to the act of coming in a more definite and forceful manner than in the first one.[14]

[14] It must be noted, however, that such an interpretation is critical since instances of that kind and their related meanings are highly dependent on the context. The second instance may thus also be read, for example, as a friendly invitation to a party and not as an act of strongly committing the addressee to undertaking a certain future action. The issue of the discrepancy

Although different in their strength, both instances present a notion of obligation. One could thus subdivide each sub-category once again into sub-sub-categories according to their strength. To include such distinct types is, however, not necessary for the purpose of this study. Still, if necessary in the qualitative analysis of instances, such differentiations in terms of modal strength might be made and discussed. Thus it seems helpful that this issue has been mentioned and that readers are familiar with the idea of modal notions being gradual scales of different strengths.

Coming to the end of this sub-chapter and the discussion of the various approaches towards modality, one further point still lacks consideration. Since scholars have suggested different ways of explaining, defining and categorising modality, the question of whose way is best or the right one arises. In answer to this question, two crucial aspects should be outlined.
Firstly, it needs to be recognised that although the respective approaches seem different, they usually describe more or less the same perception of modality. It seems helpful to recall the quote of Salkie (2009: 79-80) from the beginning of this chapter. Summarising his view, literature has defined modality as such:

1. "Modality is concerned with the status of the proposition that describes the event." (Palmer 2001:1)
2. Domains that correspond to the concepts of possibility and necessity (cf. van der Auwera & Plungian 1998)
3. Sub-types such as possibility, probability, necessity, obligation and permission (cf. Downing and Locke 2002: 283)
4. Avoidance of attempting any definition at all (This means simply investigating what is traditionally regarded as modal by scholars, without explicitly defining what exactly is being examined. Salkie mentions Coates (1983) as an example of this approach.[15])

between the "core meaning" of a modal expression and its meaning dependent on the context will be taken up again in the following chapter.
[15] Salkie (2009) seems to be right when saying that Coates (1983) does not provide an explicit definition of modal or modality as such. She nonetheless also uses sub-categories of modality for her investigation, as has been pointed out page 32 of this paper.

Salkie introduces these approaches as different to each other. Without a doubt, approach 4 is unlike any of the others, since it does not even address the issue of definition. The other suggestions also appear different to each other, yet, considering the framework of analysis proposed for this paper (Table 4) they seem to illustrate the same idea, only on different levels: It has been shown that the sub-type approach (number 3) is in the end embedded in the more restricted approach of creating only the categories of possibility and necessity (number 2). Possibility, probability or necessity, for instance, may be seen as sub-categories or degrees of epistemic possibility. Actually, van der Auwera and Plungian, who are mentioned as representatives of this approach, even outline the relation of the two wider categories and their sub-types themselves (cf. their table on page 34 of this paper). The concepts of possibility and necessity (number 2) then are encompassed by Palmer's definition (number 1), since they are both concerned with the speaker's judgement of a proposition. It thus becomes obvious that different approaches towards explaining modality do not necessarily contradict each other but actually describe the same thing by explaining it in different steps or on different stages. Or to say it in Perkins' frequently quoted words (1983: 10): "[...T]he number of modalities one decides upon is to some extent a matter of different ways of slicing the same cake."

Since various definitions of modality are neither necessarily exclusive of each other nor completely different, it seems obvious that none of the approaches per se may be judged as right or wrong. This is the second important aspect that must be mentioned in a discussion of modal concepts. Van der Auwera and Plungian are of the same opinion, as they (1998: 80) state:

> Modality and its types can be defined and named in various ways. There is no one correct way. The only requirement is that one makes clear how one uses one's terms.

Perkins (cf. 1983: 1) as well outlines that the approach one decides upon is always determined by the purpose of the respective study and that therefore the question "What is modality?" has yielded different answers. Different definitions or categorisations of modality may thus rather be assessed in terms of appropriateness and usefulness for a certain purpose rather than as correct or incorrect as such. Salkie's (2009) approach of outlining criteria of modality for

typological intentions therefore is just as justified and right as Palmer's (2001) broader definition for his purpose of generally introducing modal concepts.

As far as this paper is concerned, it has been pointed out that the set of sub-categories and the overall arrangement of them (as summarised in Table 4) seems most useful for the qualitative analysis in this paper as well as handy to work with. Before actually applying such concepts in an analysis, however, the following chapter will outline the various linguistic manifestations of modal meanings in English.

6. Modal expressions in English

This chapter aims at outlining the various linguistic forms by which modal meaning is signalled (henceforth referred to by 'modal carriers' or 'modal expressions') in the English language. For undertaking such an endeavour, there are in principle two approaches towards it; namely a syntactically/ formally oriented one and a semantically oriented one (cf. Perkins 1987: 25-26). In particular early research into modality has engaged itself with the first approach, thus yielding a considerable amount of literature on the modal auxiliaries which "constitute [the only] reasonably well-defined class" (Perkins 1987: 25). It is particularly rather recent research which has focussed on modality from a semantic point of view and outlines its carriers according to such a purpose (cf. Perkins: 1987: 25-26; Hoye 2005b: 1481). Thus Hoye (2005a: 1299) states:

> The centrality of modal verbs to the expression of modal concepts in language accounts for the prevalence of this focus in the works under review in [...] this article [Hoye's article is a survey of recent publications on modality]. That said, in what can be seen as a counter trend, there is a growing recognition of the need to provide accounts of modality which move the discussion beyond examination of its most grammaticalized exponents, namely the modal auxiliaries, to take into account other carriers of modal meanings.

The semantically oriented approach is the one that will be adopted in this paper. Thus, this chapter will not only be concerned with the modal auxiliaries but also with other kinds of modal carriers. Also, the analysis in this paper will rather be oriented semantically than formally (although some formal aspects concerning the modal auxiliaries will be mentioned in the theoretical part). In particular since there is no formal approach to hold on to, outlining modal carriers presents itself as indeed challenging. The difficulty definitely lies in the manifold possible ways of realising modal meaning. Bybee and Fleischmann (1995: 2) point out that "[m]odality is expressed in language in a variety of ways: morphological, lexical, syntactic, or via intonation." The list of modal carriers is perhaps literally infinite and treating every item specifically is way beyond the scope and possibilities of this paper. Therefore, this paper and this chapter in particular will concentrate on the modal auxiliaries (syntactic) as well as lexical carriers of modality. Certain carriers of modality such as the subjunctive (morphological) or intonation consequently will be left out. The reasons why in

particular the former will be neglected lies in its relative unimportance. It has been outlined already that in English the mood system has almost completely been replaced by a system of modal auxiliaries. Thus, it appears logical that this carrier of modality is left out first. Intonation will not be considered in this paper since it would involve a completely different manner of analysis (e.g. including phonetic transcription of ELF language samples). Because certain aspects of modal realisation will be left out, it needs to be underlined that this paper does not raise any claim to completeness as far as modal usages are concerned (if such is even possible at all) but is to be seen as a first glimpse into ELF speakers' usage of modality.

Despite limiting the focus to modal auxiliaries and lexical modals, still some more issues concerning an outline of modal carriers need consideration. The problem is threefold:

One issue is specific to the area of research of this study, namely the fact that this paper investigates English as a Lingua Franca. What is known about modality, the modal carriers and the meaning they denote is exclusively concerned with English spoken by native speakers. Grammar books only give insight into the modal carriers of what many authors would call 'Standard English'. As has been pointed out in chapter 3, ELF is very fluid in its nature and does not necessarily stick to the rules and mechanisms which may be observed in English used by native speakers. In other words, what grammar books outline might not necessarily be reflected by ELF discourse. Since, however, there is no literature on the modal carriers of ELF up to the present point, the only available approach of accessing modality in ELF is through the modal carriers of English used by native speakers. Thus, this chapter lists modal expressions as they have been detected in native speakers' English, even though there is the possibility that some aspects of modality specific to ELF might be left out. Nonetheless, such an approach seems justified since it can be expected that the expressions used in ELF discourse as signals of all types and shades of modality are the same as those used in native speakers' English. Particularly when regarding ELF from a historical perspective, it is closely related to the English spoken by native speakers - considering Seidlhofer's (2011: 7) definition of ELF which includes native speakers just as much as non-natives,

those two notions of English appear to even overlap. In the end, ELF is not a completely new language but has developed out of native speakers' English. Thus, it seems legitimate to access ELF through the modal carriers outlined in this chapter, namely the ones that are applied in English spoken by native speakers (but which are also likely to be used in ELF communication as well).
Secondly, linking the outlined modal carriers to their respective meanings is problematic since a modal expression might denote different meanings in different contexts. Perkins (1983: 26) outlines two approaches towards the discussion of word-meaning:

> Analyses of word-meaning can usually be divided into those which assign a meaning to a word *in isolation from* a specific context of use, and those which regard the meaning of a word as being largely, if not entirely, *dependent upon* a specific context of use.

Word-meaning may thus be approached mono-semantically (assigning a single meaning to a word) or poly-semantically (assigning multiple meanings to a word, dependent on its context) (cf. also Coates 1983: 9). In the case of modality, some scholars have attempted the first approach by determining a "core" or "basic meaning" of each modal expression (cf. Palmer 1990: 14-17). Palmer (1990: 15) explains, however, that such approaches neglect the nature of modal carriers (in particular of the modal auxiliaries) which cannot be reduced to only one meaning in a justified way (cf. also Figure 1 on page 33 of this paper, in which Coates outlines the multiple connections between the modals and semantic categories). Furthermore, it seems that the context of a modal expression is of great importance as far as its interpretation is concerned. Bybee and Fleischmann (1995: 3) highlight this by saying that

> [...] many of the functions of modality are inextricably embedded in contexts of social interaction and, consequently, cannot be described adequately apart from their contextual moorings in interactive discourse.

The fact that determining core meanings seems erroneous and the importance of context for interpretation are two reasons for not drawing connections between modal carriers and their semantic meanings in this theoretical chapter. Moreover, such connections would once again be determined by scholars'

descriptions of English spoken by native speakers. It is the intention of this study to detect relations between modal carriers and their meanings in ELF discourse. Outlining them for 'Standard English' uses thus seems to be beside the point.[16] Consequently this chapter merely lists modal carriers that have been identified by scholars as such, without commenting on their connected meanings. A description of them in terms of their semantic and/or pragmatic meanings (in ELF discourse) will then be carried out in the empirical part.

Thirdly, it has already been mentioned that the list of modal manifestations seems virtually infinite. This is particularly true concerning lexical modals. And even more so, it should be true for ELF which shows great creativity in its usage. Nonetheless, sub-chapter 6.3. aims at making an extensive list of such carriers (despite, yet again, not being able to represent the complete range of lexical modals). Information for creating these lists (as well as for the outline of the modal auxiliaries) will be drawn from various scholars.

6.1. Modal auxiliaries

As has been mentioned earlier, modal auxiliaries are easily defined in a formal sense since they (like all auxiliaries) – in contrast to lexical verbs – correspond to what Huddleston (1976: 333) has outlined as the 'NICE' properties[17]. NICE is an acronym, which stands for the following words (explanations as well as examples are taken from Greenbaum & Quirk 2004: 34-35):

1. Negation: Auxiliaries form the negation by being followed by *not*
   She may do it. → She may *not* do it.
2. Inversion: Interrogative clauses are formed by an inversion of the subject and the auxiliary
   He will speak first. → *Will* he speak first?
3. Code: Auxiliaries may be used in an elliptical clause where the main verb has been left out
   Won't you try again? – Yes, I *will*./ No, I *can't*.

[16] Also, it is to be expected that readers will be – at least intuitively – familiar with the 'standard' meanings denoted by the respective modal expressions in native speakers' English.

[17] Moreover, there are further criteria which apply exclusively to *modal* auxiliaries – cf. for instance Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartik (1985: 136-137)

4. Emphasis: Auxiliaries may be used for positive emphasis.
   Won't you try again? – Yes, I *will* try again.

There seems to be a consensus among scholars about which auxiliaries are to be included in this category. Quirk and his colleagues (1985: 135) have outlined them (and their negations) in the following table:

Table 5 Modal auxiliaries in English

NONNEGATIVE	UNCONTRACTED NEGATIVE	CONTRACTED NEGATIVE
can, could	cannot, can not, could not	can't, couldn't
may, might	may not, might not	(mayn't), mightn't
shall, should	shall not, should not	(shan't), shouldn't
will, 'll	will not, 'll not	won't
would, 'd	would not, 'd not	wouldn't
Must	must not	mustn't

6.2. Verbs of intermediate status

As has been explained in the preceding sub-chapter, there is a set of criteria that distinguishes modal auxiliaries from lexical verbs. However, there are some verbs that correspond only to some but not all of these points. Thus, they are not to be counted as proper modal auxiliaries. Quirk et al. (1985: 136) point out that there are "verbs whose status is in some degree intermediate between auxiliaries and main verbs". Most authors (cf. Quirk et al. 1985; Downing & Locke 2008: 380, Palmer 1990) outline a handful of verbs (and verbal constructions) that are to be located somewhere in between these two extremes. Overall, these modal expressions might be assigned to three categories: marginal modals, modal idioms and semi-auxiliaries.[18] Quirk et al.

[18] The categories for arranging such modal expressions are to some degree dependent on the author. Since the categorisation itself is not of great importance for this paper, however, it will not be commented on any further. What is important in the end is that most scholars mention the same modal expressions, which are presented in this chapter. The categories suggested

(1985) outline the following verbal constructions (explanations of the categories are also based on theirs):

1. **Marginal modals**: Those are expressions which - from a formal point of view - may be counted as modal auxiliaries; yet, they do not fulfil all of the aforementioned criteria or may additionally occur in main verb constructions.

- dare
- need
- ought to

In the case of the first two expressions, it needs to be mentioned that – although they behave as auxiliaries in certain contexts - for each of them "there is also a homomorphic verb [...] constructed as a main verb" (Quirk et al. 1985: 138, also cf. Palmer 1990: 111-112; 127-129). This means that they may "be constructed either as main verbs (with *to*-infinitive and with inflected *-s*, *-ing* and past forms)" or as auxiliaries (Quirk et al. 1985: 138).[19] Quirk and his colleagues (1985: 138) illustrate the difference in a table:

Table 6 *dare* and *need:* modal auxiliary vs. main verb

	MODAL AUXILIARY CONSTRUCTION	MAIN VERB CONSTRUCTION
Positive	—	He *needed*/*dared* to escape.
Negative	He *needn't*/*daren't* escape.	He *doesn't need*/*dare* to escape.
Interrogative	*Need*/*Dare* we escape?	*Do* we *need*/*dare* to escape?
Negative-interrogative	*Needn't* he escape after all? *Dare* he *not* escape?	*Doesn't* he *need* to escape after all? *Doesn't* he *dare* to escape?

here are taken from Quirk et al. (1985: 137) since their explanation is very structured as well as extensive.

[19] It needs to be highlighted, however, that *dare* and *need* denote modal meaning as both auxiliaries as well as in the form of main verbs. Therefore, they will also be included as lexical carriers of modality in the empirical part.

2. **Modal idioms**: Those are “multi-word verbs” signalling modality (cf. Quirk et al: 1985: 141). Quirk and his colleagues mention the following:

● had better
● would rather
● have (got) to

1. **Semi-auxiliaries**: This category describes “verb idioms which express modal [...] meaning and which are introduced by one of the primary verbs HAVE and BE” (Quirk et al. 1985: 143). Quirk and his colleagues mention some examples (a few of them are added below for exemplification). It needs to be highlighted, however, that for the analysis in this paper these constructions will not be searched for in the corpus as such. Since they all include an adjective listed as a ‘lexical item denoting modality’ in chapter 6.2., they will be covered by the latter in the analysis.

● be able to
● be likely to
● be supposed to

6.3. Lexical items denoting modality

According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 173) lexical modals “express the same kind of meaning as the modal auxiliaries but do not belong to the same syntactic class”. They comprise adjectives, adverbs, verbs as well as nouns. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 173) list some examples for each category, which are presented below. Additionally, further instances of each category as outlined by other scholars (Downing & Locke 2002: 380-381, Perkins 1987: 66-99, Hoye 1997: 306-312) have been included.[20]

[20] Since the complete list of lexical carriers of modality suggested by literature would have been far beyond the scope of this paper (cf. for instance Hoye (1997), who alone lists six pages of modal carriers in the index), only the ones that appear most frequently in literature have been included.

a. Adjectives

possible, likely, probable, presumable, legitimate, apparent, evident, doubtless, permitted, permissible, empowered, entitled, necessary, bound, supposed, obligatory, obliged, demanded, requested, compulsory, mandatory, able

b. Adverbs

perhaps, possibly, maybe, probably, presumably, seemingly, necessarily, certainly, surely, obviously, apparently, evidently, clearly

c. Verbs

insist, require, need, command, demand, allow, dare, prohibit, permit, forbid, guarantee, affirm, assert, promise, claim, doubt, think

d. Nouns

possibility, chance, probability, doubt, likelihood, necessity, evidence, certainty, conviction, permission, compulsion

7. Empirical Study

This chapter is devoted to a description of how the modal expressions outlined in the preceding section are employed in English as a Lingua Franca discourse, and particularly what kind of modal meaning they denote. The first sub-chapter will comment on the corpus that will be used as well as the data, the second is concerned with the methods of analysis. The greater part then will present and discuss findings of the analysis.

7.1. Corpus and data

The data that will be investigated in this analysis is retrieved from the Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English (VOICE). This corpus has been compiled at the English Department of the University of Vienna between 2001 and 2007. Whereas numerous English corpora of language used by native speakers are available, there has long been no corpus focussing on ELF; thus, there was no possibility for a description of ELF. "The compiling of VOICE", however, "was undertaken to provide such a descriptive basis" (Seidlhofer 2011: 23 [21]).
VOICE comprises transcripts of spoken ELF discourse. According to Seidlhofer (2011: xii) it seems that it is spoken language usage which best exposes "emergent processes of variation and change". Thus VOICE – being the first ELF corpus – concentrates on spoken rather than written language (cf. Seidlhofer 2011: 23). Further information on the corpus is taken from the VOICE website (VOICE 2011: Corpus Information):

> VOICE is based on audio-recordings of 151 naturally-occurring, non-scripted, face-to-face interactions [this equals a total of roughly 111 hours of speech or 1,000,000 orthographically defined words] involving 753 identified individuals from 49 different first language backgrounds using English as a lingua franca (ELF)

All data had to fulfil the following criteria for being included in the corpus:

- English as a lingua franca (operationally defined as involving speakers of different first languages who use English as a common means of communication and for the majority of whom it is an additionally acquired language)

[21] Barbara Seidlhofer is the VOICE project director.

- Spoken
- Naturally occurring
- Interactive
- Face-to-face
- Non-scripted
- Self-selected participation (i.e. the speakers decided for themselves that they are capable of using ELF to accomplish specific participant roles in the speech event they are taking part in)

The data comprises language occurring in different domains (that is "socially defined situations or areas of activity"):

● **25% - ED (educational):**
The educational domain includes all social situations connected with institutions or people involved in teaching, training or studying.

● **10% - LE (leisure):**
The leisure domain includes all social situations occurring during the time that is spent doing something one chooses to do when one is not working or studying.

● **65% - P (professional):**
The professional domain includes all social situations connected with an activity that needs special expertise.

○ 20% PB (professional business):
The professional business domain includes all social situations connected with activities of making, buying, selling or supplying goods or services for money.

○ 35% PO (professional organizational):
The professional organizational domain includes all social situations connected with activities of international organizations or networks which are not doing research or business.

○ 10% PR (professional research and science):
The professional research/science domain includes all social situations connected with the careful study of a subject, especially in order to discover new facts or information about it.

For the analysis in this paper, the subdivision of the category P (professional) will be neglected. This means that comparisons will be made on the distinction between ED (educational), LE (leisure) and P (professional) only.

7.2. Methods of analysis

The expressions of modality will be investigated both quantitatively as well as qualitatively. First, in order to give an overview of modal expressions in VOICE, the frequencies of those modal carriers (outlined in chapter 6) will be detected. At this point, the difference between the occurrences of modal carriers in VOICE and the actual number of utterances needs to be highlighted. Since spoken language typically features repeats (cf. Biber et al 1999: 1055), not every token of a modal carrier is to be counted. This should become clearer by considering the following example (taken from VOICE):

(11)

EDwsd15: 503

S24: can you imagine little johnny. (.) little johnny can (.) can learn about three languages now he's only SIX <5> years old </5>

Obviously, the two instances of *can* do not refer to distinct utterances but are merely repeats typical of spoken language. They may thus not be counted as extra instances of *can*. Consequently, such repeats will be subtracted from the total number of tokens in order to obtain the actual number of utterances in which a modal expression – in this case *can* – was used. Since a modal expression is not necessarily repeated instantaneously after its first occurrence (e.g. “can you well can you go”), the wildcard search function asterisk (*) will be used in a search query of this kind: ‘can * * can’. By undertaking such a query, also repeats that are separated by a maximum of two words should be captured.[22] Once the number of repeats of a modal carrier has been determined, the repeats are subtracted from the total number of occurrences, as summarised below:

[22] It needs to be mentioned that using such a query might not be completely accurate, since each of the instances of *can* perceived as a repeat here might actually be used in an extra utterance; or - vice versa - there might be repeats separated by even more than two words. Generally speaking, however, this query should yield results that come quite close to the actual number of repetitions of modal carriers.

Tokens of ‘can’
− Tokens of ‘can * * can’

_____
Actual number of utterances of *can*

This first quantitative step of investigation also constitutes a process of selection, since only those modal expressions used most frequently (that is those which occur at least 300 times in VOICE) will be analysed qualitatively. Those modal carriers will be granted a closer look by describing them in terms of the following questions:

- Are they used in a deontic, epistemic or dynamic sense?
- Which modal-subcategory (outlined in chapter 5) may they be assigned to?
- Do they co-occur with other modal carriers?
- Are there any strategies that speakers use in order to ensure mutual understanding?

Since instances of the selected modal carriers in VOICE will be too numerous to analyse them all qualitatively within the framework of this paper, only 30 occurrences of each modal expression (which occurs at least 300 times in the corpus) will be examined. Equal shares of occurrences will be selected from each domain. Within the domains, however, occurrences will be chosen randomly.

The analysis will also include different morphological variants (past tense forms, 3rd person singular inflection,...) of the modal expressions outlined in the preceding chapter. The search queries employed to access those may be found enclosed in the appendix. Moreover, it is necessary to highlight that not all of the expressions of modality outlined in chapter 6 could be readily accessed. The lexical verb *think* for instance does not denote modality in every occurrence

which is why it is not included in statistical description. It is, however, investigated qualitatively. Further problems occur when trying to search for the auxiliaries *dare* and *need* in VOICE. Since the corpus did not feature POS-tagging at the time of writing, queries such as “need VERB” were impossible. Searching for them by using the query “need” only, however, also yields results in which *need* is not used for modal expression. Consequently, in the cases of the auxiliary *need* only the occurrences of its negative form were retrieved from the corpus. Since *dare* only yields a very restricted number of occurrences, it could be investigated manually.

7.3. Frequency of modal expressions in VOICE

For each modal expression outlined in the preceding chapter, their frequency in VOICE was detected. This means that the general frequency of the modal expressions as well as how often they have been used in each domain was measured. The absolute number of tokens (minus the repetitions) is presented in Table 7 on pages 55-56 (VOICE for the complete corpus, ED for the educational domain, LE for the leisure domain, P for the professional domain). Since, however, the respective domains are not of the same size, figures were normalised by 10 000 words in order to be comparable. This information has also been included in the aforementioned table (VOICE norm., ED norm., LE norm., P norm.) Having a look at the column VOICE (or VOICE norm.) which presents the usage of the modal carriers in the complete corpus, it becomes obvious that frequencies of the different modal expressions vary considerable. Whereas there are some modal carriers that have not been used at all, there are some that seem to be essential for the expression of modality in ELF discourse. It is lexical items as well as verbs of intermediate status (marginal modals and modal idioms) that seem to be of less importance whereas the modal auxiliaries appear to be central to uttering modal meaning in ELF communication. Figure 2 on page 57 summarises how often items from each class of modal expression have been used in VOICE. For this purpose, the tokens of each category have been added. Roughly 10,2% of the modal expressions used were marginal modals or modal idioms , which equals 26 instances per 10 000 words. Lexical carriers of modality were more common with about 21,1%, which equals 54 instances per 10 000 words. The class of

Table 7. The frequency of modal expressions in VOICE (absolute and normalised per 10 000 words)

Modal Expression	VOICE	VOICE norm.	ED	ED norm.	LE	LE norm.	P	P norm.
can	5672	55	1949	76	486	48	3237	49
could	1532	15	392	15	73	7	1067	16
may	471	5	105	4	7	1	359	5
might	373	4	113	4	19	2	241	4
shall	131	1	29	1	19	2	83	1
should	1986	19	563	22	94	9	1329	20
will	4602	45	967	38	273	27	3362	51
would	2909	28	883	35	148	14	1878	28
must	371	4	75	3	39	4	257	4
dare	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
need	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
ought to	14	0	3	0	0	0	11	0
had better	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
would rather	30	0	16	1	3	0	11	0
have (got) to	2616	26	755	30	242	24	1619	24
possible	384	4	107	4	14	1	263	4
likely	83	1	39	2	0	0	44	1
probable	8	0	5	0	0	0	3	0
presumable	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
legitimate	8	0	1	0	0	0	7	0
apparent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
evident	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
doubtless	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
permitted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
permissible	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
empowered	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
entitled	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
necessary	122	1	24	1	2	0	96	1
bound	9	0	0	0	1	0	8	0
supposed	98	1	28	1	23	2	47	1
obligatory	23	0	2	0	0	0	21	0
obliged	14	0	3	0	3	0	8	0
demanded	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
requested	7	0	2	0	0	0	5	0
compulsory	27	0	10	0	0	0	17	0
mandatory	23	0	0	0	0	0	23	0

able	304	3	64	3	19	2	221	3
perhaps	347	3	24	1	11	1	312	5
possibly	32	0	10	0	0	0	22	0
maybe	1758	17	572	22	134	13	1052	16
probably	523	5	136	5	55	5	332	5
presumably	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
seemingly	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
necessarily	58	1	14	1	4	0	40	1
certainly	93	1	17	1	1	0	75	1
surely	20	0	2	0	1	0	17	0
obviously	128	1	29	1	9	1	90	1
apparently	23	0	3	0	6	1	14	0
evidently	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	0
clearly	37	0	0	0	1	0	36	1
insist	13	0	6	0	1	0	6	0
require	38	0	4	0	2	0	32	0
need	693	7	147	6	32	3	514	8
command	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
demand	48	0	5	0	0	0	43	1
allow	176	2	26	1	13	1	137	2
dare	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
prohibit	4	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
permit	7	0	2	0	2	0	3	0
forbid	5	0	1	0	1	0	3	0
guarantee	30	0	3	0	0	0	27	0
affirm	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
assert	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
promise	47	0	2	0	3	0	42	1
claim	14	0	1	0	0	0	13	0
think	5500	54	1638	64	481	47	3381	51
possibility	78	1	11	0	0	0	67	1
chance	96	1	17	1	3	0	76	1
probability	3	0	1	0	0	0	2	0
likelihood	96	1	17	1	3	0	76	1
necessity	3	0	1	0	0	0	2	0
evidence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
certainty	13	0	0	0	0	0	13	0
conviction	26	0	5	0	0	0	21	0
permission	4	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
compulsion	10	0	3	0	1	0	6	0

modal auxiliaries was used most frequently with about 68,7% which corresponds to 176 instances per 10 000 words. Obviously, the modal auxiliaries play an important role when it comes to the realisation of modal meaning in ELF discourse. Unsurprisingly, they are (with the exception of *shall*) one of the main concerns in this analysis.

Figure 2 Classes of modal expressions in VOICE[23]



In the preceding sub-chapter, it has been mentioned that those modal carriers used most frequently (the line was drawn at a minimum of 300 occurrences in VOICE; that is roughly three tokens per 10 000 words) will be analysed qualitatively. Whereas eight lexical carriers of modality cannot be found at all in the corpus (marked red in the table), most lexical expressions denoting modal meaning do occur. Nonetheless, there are only seven which seem to be essential when it comes to expressing modality in ELF discourse; namely *possible*, *able*, *perhaps*, *maybe*, *probably*, *need*, *think*. [24] As far as the verbs of intermediate status are concerned, it has already been mentioned that they were used considerably infrequently. In contrast to the other expressions of this class, however, *have (got) to* stands out as it was used 2500 times (or about 26 times per 10 000 words) and will consequently be given closer attention. The

[23] Readers should be reminded that – as explained in the preceding sub-chapter – the occurrences of *think* in VOICE are neglected for this statistical investigation.
[24] Those modal expressions that were used at least 300 times in VOICE are highlighted in green in Table 7.

same is true for the modal auxiliaries which were – apart from *shall* – all uttered at least 300 times.

Before coming to the qualitative analysis of the most frequently used modal expressions in the following sub-chapters, a couple of words should be said concerning the occurrences of the modal expressions within the respective domains. Considering the frequency of the individual modal expressions in each domain separately, it already becomes obvious that mostly the frequency of carriers in the leisure domain is – sometimes drastically, sometimes only slightly – lower than in the others. The opposite is true for the frequency of modal expressions in the educational domain. Certain modal carriers in this domain were often more frequently used than in discourse of the professional domain. To get an overview of the frequency of modal carriers in the respective domains, their occurrences per 10 000 words have been added up. The results are summarised below in Figure 3.[25]

Figure 3 Occurrences of modal expressions per domain in VOICE, per 10 000 words



Considering Figure 3, it becomes obvious that discourse in the leisure domain features less modal carriers than the other domains. Although discourse in the professional domain shows less modal expressions than the educational

[25] Once again, the occurrences of *think* have not been considered here.

domain, modal carriers were used more than 250 times per 10 000 words in both of them – in the case of the educational domain that is 280 instances per 10 000 words whereas in the case of the professional domain, that is 257 occurrences per 10 000 words. Only the number of modal expressions in discourse of the leisure domain is with 168 instances per 10 000 words considerably lower than in the other two domains. This might be explained considering that the leisure domain refers to discourse which happens in one's private life and free time. Discourse under such circumstances does not require what could be of more importance in the other two domains; namely making explicit how much one is committed to the truth of what one is uttering. Discourse in the professional and educational domain means communication at work, university, professional conferences, and the like. In such situations, one might feel uncomfortable presenting ideas as facts although one is not completely sure whether they actually are any. Or even in case speakers do possess the information that their proposition is true, they might feel on the safe side simply stating that something is only 'probably' or 'perhaps' the case. In other words, speakers might use expressions denoting epistemic modality in order to denote vagueness and their uncertainty concerning the truthfulness of what they are uttering. In the end, passing on wrong information in those two domains might be fatal for a career or might ruin a speaker's reputation in a working group. As far as communication in the leisure domain is concerned, it can definitely be argued that here giving information about the truth status of a proposition is not at all as important as in the other domains. Such discourse happens among friends and what is being discussed must not necessarily be of great importance. It thus seems reasonable that speakers care less about whether their communication partners might get the wrong impression of how true a proposition is. In the end, communication partners are one's friends who are unlikely to 'press charges' against the speaker in case some information is not completely accurate. In other words, one might use fewer expressions denoting epistemic modality since one's commitment to the truth of what is being said is not central for the matter being discussed.

It can be argued, that consequently the table above shows a considerably lower frequency of modal expressions in the leisure domain. Since speakers probably did not opt for the expression of epistemic modality as much as speakers in the

educational or professional domain, there is this discrepancy of frequencies concerning modal expressions between the leisure domain and the other two domains.

7.4. Expressing obligation

This section will present how and by the means of which modal carriers the notion of deontic obligation was realised in VOICE. It needs to be mentioned that denoting deontic obligation does not necessarily mean that the speaker lays her/his communication partner under obligation. Of course speakers do have the possibility to do that and actually the data retrieved from VOICE for this paper shows that they modal expressions in various ways for such purposes. This aspect, however, will be treated separately in chapter 7.10. This sub-chapter will deal with the question of how deontic obligation may generally be expressed in ELF discourse. Also, it must be noted – and this is not only true for the expressions in this sub-chapter but for the following ones as well – that some modal carriers might occur not only in this chapter but in another one as well. In the theoretical section of this paper, it has already been pointed out that in particular the modal auxiliaries seem to be naturally poly-semantic. Since sections in this sub-chapter are arranged according to semantics, it is not surprising that some modal carriers might occur in more than just one of them.

7.4.1. *must*

The 30 instances of *must* retrieved from the corpus do not all express deontic meaning. About half of them (the exact number is 17 of 30 instances) were used to express obligation whereas the others were used to denote epistemic necessity. Consequently *must* will be considered again in section 7.6.. To decide which of the two notions is being expressed may be derived by considering the context. Nonetheless telling those two modal notions apart is not always easy or at least it often seems that both interpretations might be justified. This is for example true for the instance presented below.

(12)

EDint328: 453- 458

S3: these clashes (.) you know (.) there were they were very very ve- very serious (.) and (.) luckily there were a lot of maltese who had good sense at that time (.) and then they started <imitating> hey (.) how about (.) we don't fight er between (.) italian and english what about our language?</imitating> (.) you know? (.) so they started to erm PROMOTE the language (.) and children erm were LEARNing the language you know? and this is how it started (2)
S1: <8> yes </8>
S2: <8> at one time </8> my sist- not my sister my daughter-in-law (.) her (.) {points to a picture} she came over here she is talking to us in eng- in english all the time i said <9> HEY </9> (.)
S1: <9> yes </9>
S2: you know i mean you must know some maltese you know?
S1: @@ <@> yes </@> (.)

The speakers obviously discuss the role of Maltese in Malta. According to S3, who is from Malta, the role of Maltese has reached a certain importance among Maltese people. S2, who is Maltese as well, then explains how her daughter-in-law spoke English to her and explains her reaction. S2 outlines that she responded to her relative's behaviour by saying *HEY [...] you must know some Maltese*. At this point, both interpretations of *must* are theoretically possible. On the one hand, S2 could have put her daughter-in-law under the obligation of knowing Maltese, meaning that the daughter – in the future – should study Maltese. On the other hand, however, *must* could be interpreted as denoting epistemic necessity in this instance. This is to mean that S2 simply had no other possibility but to conclude that – given the fact that her daughter-in-law is Maltese – she is able to speak at least a couple of words in the Maltese language. Thus, communication between S2 and her relative could have happened in Maltese, which is why S2 was surprised that her daughter-in-law spoke English to her. Both interpretations seem to be possible here. Nonetheless, the latter epistemic interpretation appears to be more likely than the deontic one. Although formally as well as in terms of the immediate context both interpretations make sense, a deontic interpretation seems inappropriate regarding the speaker's relationship to her daughter-in-law. Considering that S2 was speaking to her daughter-in-law (thus an adult person), it seems unlikely that she would command her to learn a language. One could argue that such an

order would break the rules of how one speaks to an adult member of one's family. Since the notion of epistemic necessity seems prominent in this instance, strictly speaking it does not even belong to this sub-chapter concerned with obligation. Still, it is included here to show how it is difficult at times to decide for the prominent modal notion in certain instances. This is not only true for *must*, but many other modal carries, as will become obvious throughout the following sub-chapters.

Of course, there are also numerous instances to show that *must* can also denote deontic obligation very clearly. This is so in the following example (13).

(13)

LEcon229: 84- 89

S1: <3> you </3> you have to do an ori- oral exam? (1)
S2: <4> yeah.</4>
S1: <4> in </4> (.) for your uni- for the university?
S2: no not for the university but for the: (.) the: erm <smacks lips> hhh official academy from spain (.) in september i i must er pass pass the exam
S1: in your home university. (.) and it's in in english.
S2: in my university th- there wasn't a a subject (.) er english? (.) like er a subject but er it was not so hard. (.) like er (.) the exam er (.) that i must er pass. (.) now. (2)

Here it is quite obvious that the modal notion denoted by *must* is deontic obligation. It is universally known that universities and study plans require their students to pass exams in order for them to finish their studies. According to S2, he *must [...] pass the exam* in September. In other words, he is obliged to do so. Thus it is justified to say that *must* expresses deontic obligation in this case.

Whereas the university as the source of obligation is obvious in the example above, the instance that gives the obligation must not necessarily be recognisable. This becomes obvious considering the instance below:

(14)

LEcon417: 93 - 104

S4: so <4> maybe </4> it's cheaper by train?
S3: <4> but er </4>
S3: yes but (.)

S4: not really worth the:<5> time </5>
S3: <5> seven </5> hours <6> ooph </6> (.)
S4: <6> okay @@ </6>
S3: to to meet a a uncle that @@@
S4: @@ <@> you haven't seen for fifteen years </@> (.)
S5: but i think there are (.) er tickets for twenty-nine euros so:
S3: a:h yes i f- (.) i'm i'm searching. the erm (.) er red- cheaper prices (.) but (.) i'm <smacks lips> i'm (.) perhaps i must e:r look er more (.)
S5: yeah
S3: because er it's strange (1) so (.) so much i think it's er one hour (.) one hour (.) one hour and half of flight

S3 is going to take a trip to Italy in order to visit her uncle. She is looking for a plane ticket on the internet but the ones she has found so far are too expensive. She thus says that she *must look more* in order to find a cheaper one. Obviously, S3 is obliged to keep on searching if she wants to get her ticket for a lower price. Nonetheless, it does not become clear what or who compels her to doing so. It could either be her mother who is paying for the tickets, it could be S3 herself because she always wants to get the cheapest tickets or it could simply be the circumstance of not having found a cheap ticket yet that makes her continue her search. Who orders S3 to keep on searching is not explicit in this instance, just as it is not in many others. Thus, the source of obligation must not always be detectable when *must* is used in a deontic sense.
Taking into consideration that *must* only occurs 12 times per 10 0000 words and that of those roughly only the half is used in a deontic sense, it seems likely that there are other carriers of modality expressing obligation.

7.4.2. *need*

In contrast to *must*, (the lexical verb) *need* is used mono-semantically in VOICE. This means that the latter is exclusively used to denote deontic obligation, as for example in the instance below.

(15)

EDwgd497: 1- 2

S4: does anybody have the erm: (3) like the handbook what things we need to do? (.)
S2: nope (1) <1> i <un> x xx xx </un></1><8> from blackboard </8> (2)

The extract is taken from a working group discussion. It appears that the group has received a list of questions to discuss or tasks to work on. S4 asks her colleagues whether they know what there is to do. In other words, she asked the other members of her group whether they knew what they are obliged to work on. Thus, *need* expresses – just like all of its other instances that were analysed for this study – deontic obligation.

In the example above, it seems quite obvious that a teacher is the instance which has told the members of the working group what to do. In the end usually a teacher is the one to set the tasks for working groups. Similarly to *must*, however, there are cases where *need* is used for expressing deontic obligation and at the same time the instance that gives the obligation is not clearly recognisable. This can be seen when considering example (16).

(16)

EDcon496:505

S2: i need to go ho:me i miss home. (.) i need to (.) i <8> miss the sun </8>
S1: <8> what home.</8> (.) oh HOME home (1)

Obviously S2 is not at home and feels homesick. At a first glance one might say that *need* here denotes a certain degree of volition, since – because of being homesick – S2 arguably *wants* to visit her hometown. At the same time, however, it can be argued that actually S2 would like to stay where she is at the present moment but that the circumstances do not allow her to do so. They even force her to go back home. At this point, of course, the question of what those circumstances are arises. Identifying the instance which puts somebody under a certain obligation is always easier in case it involves a human being or an actually existing instance in the form of a university or law. In example (16), however, it seems to be an abstract instance that is not necessarily detectable. The circumstance that forces her to go back home might be stress at university, problems concerning her personal life or the like. What seems to be one likely circumstance that compels S2 to visit her home country is the bad weather at her current whereabouts, since she says that she misses the sun. In the end,

however, one cannot definitely conclude what or who it is that makes S2 go back home. And this is true for a number of cases in which *need* was used.

7.4.3. *have (got) to*

A further way of denoting deontic obligation is *have to*, which is also used mono-semantically; that is solely for the expression of deontic modality. Comparing the frequencies of *have to* to those of *must* and *need*, it seems that *have to* plays a considerable role when it comes to denoting the idea of obligation. Figure 4 presents the frequencies of the three modal expressions denoting obligation discussed in this chapter. For this purpose the frequencies of the respective carriers in VOICE per 10 000 words has been added (in the case of *must*, only half of the occurrences were taken into consideration since only roughly half of them is used in a deontic sense). Obviously, *must* is not particularly important with a frequency of 2 instances per 10 000 words which equals 5,7% of all expressions of deontic obligation. *Need* was used 7 times per 10 000 words which corresponds 20%. Obviously, *have to* is central to expressing obligation since it was used 26 times per 10 000 words. This equals a frequency of 74,3%.

Figure 4 Modal expressions denoting deontic obligation



Since *have to* has already been included as a carrier of deontic obligation in Figure 4, an instance of this expression denoting obligation should be discussed for exemplification. Thus, example (17) is included below.

(17)

EDsed31: 856- 868

S6: <3> we have another </3> impression of <4> what </4> (.)
S1: <3><soft> people are different </soft></3>
S1: <4><soft> yeah </soft></4>
S6: you have in (.) <6> linz </6> or in innsbruck or so (.)
SX-f: <6><un> x </un></6>
S1: yeah
S6: <7> so this </7> (1)
SX-f: <7> mhm </7>
S6: <8> i mean </8> (.)
SX-f: <8> mhm </8>
S6: i don't know (.) how to put that but (.) you have to keep that in mind (.)
S1: yeah so there i- there're REgional differences withIN a national culture al<5>so </5> hh erm (9) {S1 draws an equilateral triangle on the blackboard and writes the words situation, culture and person along each of the three sides (9)}
S6: <5> yeah </5>

This extract is taken from a discussion about differences between cultures. S6 suggests the idea that there might also be regional differences within one national culture. He then mentions that the idea of such differences has to be kept in mind. That is to say that *you* is under obligation to bear this idea in mind. It is once again interesting, however, that it is not absolutely clear who is committing *you* to do so. In the end it could either be S6 himself or once again a circumstance that obliges to such a behaviour. One such circumstance would for instance be the fact that one wants to produce a good paper in a university course dealing with the subject of cultural differences. Another such circumstance might be the wish for judging situations and experiences with as much knowledge as possible, since this would give greater inside into the world. Having one of such goals then obliges to a certain behaviour. In the case of example (17), it obliges to keeping the idea of regional differences in mind. It may thus be said, that *have to* used in a deontic sense does not always reveal who or what is the source of obligation.

A further aspect that is interesting as far as this instance (and the examples of *have to* under investigation in this paper in general) is concerned, is the use of *have to* with the subject *you*. This second person pronoun, however, does not necessarily refer to one or all of S6's communication partners but it is used in an impersonal manner and might thus be rephrased "one". *You* consequently refers to any person – if we consider the goals and circumstances outlined in the preceding paragraph, this means that any person who has such motivations is obliged by them to *keep that in mind*. The impersonal use of *you* in combination with *have to* seems to be relatively frequent (5 of the 30 instances under investigation in this paper).

7.5. Expressing epistemic possibility, deontic permission and dynamic ability

At first glance, it might seem odd to group those notions of modality into one chapter. This, however, was done because the modal expressions discussed in this sub-chapter were used for expressing each[26] in VOICE: epistemic possibility, deontic permission and dynamic ability. What has revealed itself as quite challenging as far as the qualitative analysis in this paper is concerned, is determining which sub-category of modality is denoted by the respective carriers of this chapter. The problem is, however, unlike the issue presented in instance (14). That example has shown that *must* might be interpreted in two different ways, thus as two different categories of modality. Yet, in the case of the modal expressions presented in this sub-chapter, it seems that the notions of possibility, permission and ability blur – or in other words, it seems that not only one modal force is at work in the case of some instances but sometimes two or even three modal notions are denoted at the same time. In the end, telling the three modal sub-categories discussed in this chapter apart should be difficult since all of them correspond to possibility (epistemic possibility, permission = what is possible in a deontic sense, ability = what is possible in a dynamic sense). The difficulty should become clearer when considering the following instance of *can*:

[26] *May* is an exception here since it was only used for denoting epistemic possibility and deontic permission. Still, it was included here because this seems to be the chapter it fits in best semantically.

(18)

EDsve423: 256- 265

S1: er (.) is this a STUdents hostel?
S2: <soft> yes.</soft>{S5 stops talking on the phone}
S1: e:r yeah (.) then the: (1) there they have a reCEPtion or something like that the and they should sign <5> it for you.</5>
S2: <5> it is </5> enough the: (.) <6> is it </6> enough the:
S1: <6> or the </6>
S1: <L1ger><spel><10> oe a t </10></spel></L1ger>
S2: <LNger><10> portier </10> {receptionist} </LNger> erm =
S1: = yes maybe (.) i don't know who (.) <7> who is responsible </7>
S2: <7> who is running the:</7> (.) the chefs or
S1: i don't know who is responsible (1) and who CAN (1) sign (.) so you have to check there

S2 needs her certificate of residence (a form attesting that a person has a fixed residence in a certain country) signed by somebody responsible for matters of this kind at her students' hostel. S1 gives her the advice that perhaps somebody at the reception of the hostel might do that. S1 underlines, however, that she is not sure who *can sing* the form. The most natural interpretation of *can* in this case is perhaps of deontic nature. Obviously, signing an official document must be allowed by an official instance or by law. Even more so, the manager of a hostel might give a receptionist the permission of doing so. So obviously an interpretation in the sense of "who is *allowed* to sign the form at the hostel" makes perfect sense. The intriguing facet about the concept of permission, however, is that it always entails dynamic ability. In the end, this is what is usually permitted: that another person has the ability to undertake a certain task himself eventually. In the case of the example above, one could argue that the speakers are not so much interested in who has permission but in who is actually able of doing so. Also, the manager of the hostel himself could be responsible for signing official forms and he has perhaps not been given permission by anybody since he is hierarchically in the highest position of the business. Thus, an interpretation in a dynamic sense would also be possible. In addition to those two ways of interpreting, there is always the possibility of conceiving of a matter in an epistemic sense. Speakers are always – at least implicitly – revealing their commitment to the truth of a proposition. Even more

so this is the case when a rather explicit carrier of epistemic possibility such as *can* is being used. In the example above, *who can sign* could theoretically be rephrased as “who possibly signs”. As has already been mentioned, deciding which modal interpretation is the most prominent one is not easy. It was always tried, however, to detect the prevailing modal notion. In this case, that would have to be deontic permission, as has been explained in the beginning. Nonetheless, it needs to be kept in mind that in the semantic field of possibility, not necessarily only one modal notion might be expressed by one carrier. The qualitative analysis for this sub-chapter was consequently very much a matter of “rather X or Y” than “clearly X or Y”.

7.5.1. *can*

As has been shown by discussing example (18), *can* may denote deontic permission. This way of using *can* occurred 6 times in the 30 instances analysed for this paper. Slightly more often (8 out of 30 instances) *can* was employed to express epistemic possibility, as for instance in the example below:

(19)

LEcon575: 55- 57

S1: hm (4) {S1 cuts something on her plate (4)}{starts chewing} so how did (.) er (.) [first name2] know that [first name3] had finished.{stops chewing} (1)
S2: don't know? (.) (4) {S1 is cutting something on her plate}
S1: {starts chewing} it CAN be that [first name2] just ASSUMED . (7) {S1 is cutting the potatoes (7)} this potato are only half cooked @@ (.) hm. (4) i think the other recipe will better (5) {stops chewing}

S1 and S2 are talking about somebody who has knowledge about yet another person. They do not know, however, how this person has received this information. S1 thus states that *it can be that [first name 2] just assumed*. Obviously, a dynamic or deontic interpretation of *can* does not make any sense here. Neither “it is allowed to be” nor “it is able to be” appears to be a meaningful alternative. Interpreting *can* epistemically, however, the utterance might be rephrased “it is possible that [first name2] just assumed”, which seems suitable. In the end, S1 wants to express that she is not sure how this person has received the information. Therefore she underlines that the possibility exists

that this person does not even know but simply assumes a certain circumstance to be the case.
The epistemic interpretation is also supported by the fact that *can* is used with the impersonal subject *it*. This pronoun does not refer to any person, institution or the like. Since there is no such instance, of course there is nobody to be allowed or able to do something. Consequently, the only possible interpretation here is the epistemic one.

In most of the cases (that is 16 times in 30 instances), however, *can* was used to express dynamic ability. For exemplification, this is shown in the example below:

(20)

LEint555: 80- 84

S2: were you using english to talk to each othe:r in: (.) with the austrians?
S1: yah <8> yah </8> yah yah (.)
S2: <8> yah.</8>
S1: yah (.) i can understand somethi:ng also from german but we talked <4> more or less english yeah yeah </4> yeah yeah
S2: <4><soft> you talked more english i see.</soft></4>

S1 explains that – although she spoke English to Austrian people (German is not S1's first language) – she *can understand* some words in German. *Can* here quite obviously refers to S1's dynamic ability of understanding this language. A deontic interpretation in the sense of S1 being allowed to understand German simply makes no sense in the given context. An epistemic interpretation ("it is possible for S1 to understand German") is okay to the degree to which any instance may be interpreted epistemically, as has been pointed out in the introduction of this sub-chapter. Obviously, however, a dynamic reading of *can* is dominant, as it is the case in most instances using this auxiliary.

7.5.2. *could*

The auxiliary *could* may also be used for denoting any of the three modal sub-categories discussed in this section. Whereas the use of *could* for dynamic ability (2 in 30 instances) or deontic permission (3 in 30 instances) is

comparatively seldom, this auxiliary is predominantly used for expressing epistemic possibility (23 times in 30 instances). Consequently, an example of this way of employing *could* is to be found below.

(21)

EDsed362: 149- 151

S4: […] and we believe these are the WAYS (.) or (passes) (.) to tackle this problem. thank you
SS: <applauds> (1)
S1: question? (4)
S5: er (.) you know first point was about the <spel> u s </spel> playing such (.) <fast> you know a large role for the <spel> u n </spel> paying so much attention to <spel> U S.</spel></fast> (.) but at the same time the <spel> u s </spel> is the largest (1) er contributor financially of the <spel> u n </spel> if (.) the <spel> u s </spel> stopped playing (.) such a LARGE role (.) it will probably reduce its funding do you think? (.) that could hurt the organization? (1)

S5 comments on S4's presentation by asking how he assesses the consequences of the U.S. losing their prominent global role. S5 mentions that in case the U.S. underwent such a development *that could hurt the organization*. Obviously, this instance of *could* denotes epistemic possibility, since the sentence might be paraphrased "it is possible that a smaller role of the US hurts the organization". Although a certain nuance of ability may be argued here ("such a development has the ability to hurt the organization"), the epistemic notion is clearly prominent.

What is remarkable concerning *coul*d is that it might not only be used for the present or (as in the example above arguably for future reference) but also for expressing deontic permission as well as dynamic ability in the past. Dynamic uses with past reference were only found once in the 30 thirty instances investigated, whereas permission referring to the past was found four times as for example in the extract below.

(22)

LEcon548: 387- 395

S3: ah not like here (.) you're you are still allowed to smoke in pubs

S2: not here
S3: i know i know
S2: oh there over <7> there </7>
S3: <7> serbia </7> yeah
S2: yeah (7) {voices from tv can be heard}
S3: you could even smoke at the office (.) er (.) until er some time <8> ago </8>
S2: <8> well we </8> used to it here but not any <9> more </9> in fact they just <un> xxx </un>
S1: <9> not any more </9>

This is a conversation about smoking in public places. S3 explains that *until some time ago* one *could even smoke at the office.* Obviously, *could* denotes deontic permission. Where or whether one might smoke in public places is prescribed by law. Thus, being able to smoke in a public space is inevitably a permission one was given. This idea is underlined by S3 saying that it is *allowed* to smoke in pubs. What is interesting here, however, is that *could* is used to refer to the past tense. This becomes evident when S3 says that you could smoke *until some time ago*. Obviously smoking in offices is now forbidden, but was accepted back then (some time ago). It has thus been shown that c*ould* may be used for past tense reference.

7.5.3. *able*

The adjective *able* is unsurprisingly used for expressing dynamic ability. This was done in 15 of the instances analysed for this paper. In 13 cases, however, able was used to denote epistemic possibility whereas it was used only two times for signalling deontic permission.
One of the instance in which possibility was denoted is included below.

(23)

EDcon4: 1023- 1029

S1: @@@@ <@> it's good that </@> (.) we are having classes at second THIRD floor. (.)
S2: second floor
S3: second floor (1)
S2: why? (.)
S1: cos i wouldn't be able to visit you <un> xx </un> (1) (but) that's good (2)
S2: on the FIRST floor (.)
S1: yes (.)

In this instance actually all three ways of interpretation are possible. S1 explains that she is glad to have her university course on the second floor since if she had it on the first floor she could not visit her friend. In S1's words, she *wouldn't be able to visit* S2. Actually a deontic or dynamic reading of *able* in this case is possible. Students could theoretically not be allowed by the university management to enter another classroom on the first floor, but are allowed to do so on the second floor. Thus, *able* would be used to denote *permission*. There is also the theoretical possibility that S1 has broken her leg and is consequently unable to visit her friend on another floor, since taking the stairs is impossible for her. In such a case, *able* would refer to S1's physical ability. Since, however, such theoretical cases are very unlikely and not reflected in the speakers' conversation, an epistemic reading is prominent here. The sentence may thus simply be paraphrased as "I wouldn't have the possibility of visiting you."

As has been pointed out, other instances of *able* express dynamic ability; just like instance (24) presented below:

(24)

EDwsd302:301

S18: all right. (3) er to come back to the friendship i think that friendship is a nice idea. i like that. (1) cos i think especially (.) nowadays that's really an important value. i think if somebody's ABLE to (.) have friendships to be (.) OPEN for others to be close to each other (1)
S20: o:h <fast> so </fast> (.) we can er include to to: (1) (open) <un> xxx </un> (.) <4> no?</4>
S18: <4> but i </4> i don't know I think friendship is another thing again. it's like the ability: to (.) let somebody be close to you: to be close to somebody else (.) to sha:re (.) feelings to share thoughts <5> to <un> xxxx </un></5> thoughts

This extract is taken from a discussion about the most important values for society. S18 explains that he thinks that it is important for someone to be *able to have friendships*. Of course, also an epistemic interpretation is possible, meaning that somebody should generally have the opportunity to become friends. In this instance, however, the speaker himself paraphrases and explains what he means by *able to have friendships*. He says that *able* refers to

a person's *ability to let somebody be close to you*. Thus, *able* clearly corresponds to a person's dynamic ability here.

One remarkable aspect concerning *able* is the fact that it solely occurred with human beings as the subject in the 30 instances analysed for this paper. This can be observed in examples (23) and (24): "*I* wouldn't be able to" and "*somebody*'s able to". The instance that is able to undertake a certain task always referred to a person. Thus objects such as a washing machine or a car were not used in combination with *able*. Still, there were two instances that revealed combinations that are somehow in between. They are included below:

(25)

PBpan25: 18

S7: […] some of these countries (would) would for some REASON would not be ABLE to join in er (.)

(26)

PBmtg3: 2867- 2870

S4: so wi- with that i guess your sales force
S2: mhm
S4: should be able to to get that five per cent through
S2: hm

Countries as well as *sales forces* are not human beings in a direct sense, but rather abstract entities. Those, however, yet again refer to or consist of human beings. In the end, the term *country* could be interpreted as the people who live in this particular geographic area. Even more so, this is the case in example (26). The term *sales force* definitely refers to the people working in the sales department, and it is those human beings that should be *able to get that five per cent through*.

7.5.4. *possible*

In the 30 instances analysed, the adjective *possible* was employed 6 times for denoting dynamic ability and 7 times for expressing deontic permission. Mostly,

however, it was used for expressing epistemic possibility (17 times). One instance for exemplification of the latter use is presented below.

(27)

POcon543: 692- 695

S1: i think it would be nice if we could (2) <smacks lips> be around the table as we look at the <5> the final </5> documents (.)
SX-6: <5><soft> mhm </soft></5>
S1: if it's NOT possible we'll have to (relay) on (2) cyberspace but (.) all things equal =
S6: = yeah (.)

This is an extract of a conversation in the professional domain. It seems that the company employing S1 is working on a certain task that will eventually result in *final documents*. S1 explains that he thinks it to be a good idea that the final result is presented to everybody at the same time, sitting at the same table. He states, however, that in case this is *not possible*, they will have to do that via the cyberspace, perhaps in a video conference on Skype, for instance. In this case *possible* perhaps most readily denotes epistemic possibility. Interpretations in the sense of "if being around the same table is not allowed" (thus denoting permission) or "if everybody working on the project is not able to be around the same table" (thus denoting ability) are theoretically possible as well. Still, it seems that S1 is making a general statement concerning the possibility of being at the same table when the final documents are ready. There is no indication to believe that S1's co-workers might not be allowed or able to come and see the final result. Thus, this instance of *possible* might be counted as denoting epistemic possibility, like it is the case in many of its other uses.
Another noteworthy aspect concerning *possible* is observable in example (27), namely that many occurrences of possible were used in if-constructions. This was the case in 7 of the 30 investigated examples.

7.5.5. *may*

In this case, only 27 instances of the auxiliary were analysed since it was only used 7 times in the leisure domain of the corpus. In those 27 instances, *may* was either used for epistemic possibility or deontic permission. Each of these

notions was expressed half of the times: 13 uses for epistemic possibility, 14 uses for deontic permission. Remarkable at this point is that in the leisure domain only one instance was used in an epistemic sense. This supports the idea suggested in chapter 7.3. that concerning communication in the leisure domain, speakers pay less attention to commenting on how much they are committed to the truth of their proposition (cf. pages 58-60 of this paper).

Since both uses of *may* seem to be prominent, examples for both will be discussed. Below there is an instance of *may* denoting epistemic possibility.

(28)

EDsed363: 1

S1: {soft background noises, people are whispering to each other, chairs moving} okay. first of all i'd like to introduce our GUEST (.) er some of you may know her from yesterday evening (.)
(gap 00:00:06) {voice; S1 gives some information about the voice project}

This extract is taken from a seminar discussion. S1 introduces the person who does the recording for the VOICE project. Obviously there has already been another possibility where students might have gotten to know this woman. S2 thus explains that some of them *may know her from yesterday evening*. It is obviously not the case that students are *allowed* to know her from yesterday evening. Thus, permission is clearly not expressed here. S1 rather states that it is possible that students know the VOICE team member already. Thus this instance of *may* – like many others – denotes possibility.

Many of the utterances in which *may* denotes permission were used for quite specific purposes. On the one hand, *may* was used for being particularly polite (example (29)). On the other hand, speakers used *may* in order to take the turn in the conversation (example (30)).

(29)

EDwsd302: 1891- 1898

S17: <4> we're </4> we're ranking them
S4: <4> may i </4>

SX-f: yeah
S4: may i ask you to er (1) finish
SX-f: yeah we're ranking
S4: <soft> two minutes?</soft>
S17: we<5>'re rank</5>ing them
S4: <5> okay?</5>

The extract is taken from a working group discussion. The students are obviously still working on a task when S4 – he appears to be a teacher – interrupts the discussion by saying *may i ask you to finish*. Obviously, S4 *is* already asking the working group to finish their task by uttering this sentence. Nonetheless, in a literal sense he asks for the student's permission to tell them to finish. This is arguably done for reasons of politeness. S4 is in the end literally not giving an order (for instance in the form of an imperative) nor is he commenting on giving them an order (in the form of only saying "I ask you to finish", for example). By using *may* here, S4 is literally merely asking a question, which appears to veil the deontic force underlying this statement by being polite.

(30)

EDwsd15: 691- 698

S18: yeah (1) because er (.) being isolated and being diverse just for your own. (2) <soft> it's not good </soft>
S1: okay (1)
S4: well (.) erm (.) i think we'll (1) e:r (.)
S18: but may i just say =
S1: = yeah
S18: something
S1: of course
S18: (well) (.) watching the presentation and seeing how er innovative and how creative all (.) the young europeans here are (.) it just made me optimistic about the future of europe

In this instance *may* is once again used for asking permission. The actual function that is fulfilled by the utterance *but may I just say,* however, is taking the turn in a conversation. S4 is just in the middle of making a statement, when S18 interrupts in order to make a comment herself. For doing so, she asks for her communication partners' permission using *may*. Once again, the fact that

may appears to be used for being particularly polite (as explained above) seems to play an important role.

7.6. The speaker's commitment: epistemic possibility, probability and certainty

As has been explained in the theoretical part of this paper, epistemic modality is concerned with the speaker's commitment to the truth of a proposition. In other words, expressions of epistemic modality denote a speaker's conviction or uncertainty concerning the factuality of what is being described. This means that what is being uttered is believed to be necessarily, probably or possibly true by the speaker. It has been shown in the preceding sub-chapter that the auxiliaries *can*, *could* and *may* as well as the adjectives *able* and *possible* can be used by a speaker to express the notion of possibility. This sub-chapter will comment on how epistemic certainty as well as probability might be denoted in ELF communication. Also, additional ways of denoting epistemic possibility will be discussed. Indeed, it will be shown that the list of possibilities for expressing one's uncertainty is quite lengthy.

7.6.1. *must*

It has already been mentioned in chapter 7.4.1. that *must* may not only be used for expressing deontic obligation but also for revealing a speaker's strong commitment to the truth of the proposition. Using epistemic *must* in the utterances discussed for this paper thus always meant that considering everything known at the point of speaking, there was no other way for the speaker but to believe what he said was actually the case. This has already been shown by considering example (12) on page 61 (the Maltese woman who had no reason to believe that her daughter-in-law did not speak any Maltese) and thus no further instances will be discussed here.

7.6.2. *probably*

As one may already guess when thinking of which carriers may denote probability, *probably* is one of them. All the 30 instances analysed for this paper

were used for the expression of epistemic probability. One of those examples is included below.

(31)

EDcon250: 318- 320

S5: <4> and i- er </4> is there any difference (.) on language? (.) between austrian (.) german and (.) <5> german </5> german
S2: <5><smacks lips> well </5>
S2: probably like czech and slovak <6> er it i- there </6> is like people can UNDERSTAND each other but sometimes you have different <7> phrases </7>

In this extract of a conversation, S5 wants to know whether there is a difference between German spoken in Germany and German spoken in Austria. S2 answers that they are as similar as Czech and Slovak appear to be. Or to put it in S2's words, they are *probably like Czech and Slovak.* Obviously epistemic probability is expressed here. S2 has some information that Czech and Slovak have many features in common and she might have heard or read somewhere that speakers of each language are able to understand each other. Yet, it seems that the information that S2 possesses is not enough for her to make a realis statement in the form of "like Czech and Slovak". She thus does not commit herself fully to the truth of the proposition – this means she does not guarantee S5 the truthfulness of her comparison – by using the adverb *probably*.

7.6.3. *might*, *perhaps*, *maybe*

The auxiliary *might* as well as the adverbs *maybe* and *perhaps* were found to denote exclusively epistemic possibility in the 30 instances that were analysed of each of the expressions respectively. For exemplification, instances of each of them will be discussed. Firstly, there is an instance of *might* included below.

(32)

EDcon4: 530- 532

S2: <LNger><4> der zoellner </4> befiehlt dem reisenden den koffern zu bes- {the customs officer commands the passenger to put the luggage} </LNger> it's like he (.) he ASKS i guess (1) like the custom: =

S1: = oh jesus i think i lost that. (2) sh:it
S2: i have i MIGHT have two of them. (3) <soft> let me (check) </soft> (10) hh
{S2 leafs through his study material}

This extract is taken from a conversation about supposedly a text that has to be interpreted for a university course. S2 appears to be reading the text as well as commenting on it when S1 explains that she cannot find her copy. S2 reacts by explaining that *he might have two of them,* thus an additional version of the text for S1. Obviously, *might* is used for expressing epistemic possibility here because S2 is not sure whether he really has an additional copy of the text. This is revealed by S2 saying *let me check*. It seems that it is still necessary for him to check because he is not convinced of the text actually being there. This idea is also underlined by rephrasing the initial start of his utterance (*I have*) with the words *I might have* (note that in the transcript it is indicated that there was an extra stress on the auxiliary *might*). It thus becomes obvious that S2 is not completely sure of having an extra copy which is why he uses *might* to express epistemic possibility in order not to make any promises to S1 that he might not be able to keep.

Other ways of expressing epistemic possibility found in the data were using *perhaps* and *maybe*. Instance (33) exemplifies that.

(33)

LEcon417: 230- 233

S3: <6> it </6> was a good experience for her (1) she said it was good (1) and so (1)
S4: maybe SOME time it will work out @@
S3: yes (.) perhaps
S4: now i'm here @@

Earlier in this conversation S4 has explained how she would like to live in New York for a while some time in the future. S3 thus tells her that her sister has also spent some time in America and that she enjoyed this experience. S4 then appears to leave the topic by making the comment *maybe some time it will work out*. S3 agrees and answers *yes perhaps*. *Maybe* here most likely expresses

possibility since it is neither probable nor definitely the case that S4 will actually live in New York some day. In the end, living in New York is more of a dream for S4 than an actual elaborate plan. Nothing has been organised so far. Consequently, it is not necessarily likely but rather only possible that S4 will move to the United States. S3 then seems to merely agree with what S4 has said, namely that there is the possibility that she moves to New York some day. Consequently, *perhaps* is also to be interpreted as denoting epistemic possibility.

7.6.4. *think*

The 30 instances of the verb *think* analysed for this paper were given special treatment since not all of them denote modal meaning. Thus, some instances had to be sorted out before analysing how the rest expressed modal meaning. Three examples of *think* in which it is not used for modality were found. One of them is presented below:

(34)

LEcon352: 25

S4: <2> think about it </2> when somebody tells us (.) well you're german i say no my GOD i'm austrian. (1)

In this case S2 invites her communication partners to consider her proposition by uttering *think about it*. Obviously in this case *think* does not refer to the commitment to the truth of a proposition, but merely corresponds to the act of thinking *about* something. *Think* is thus to be seen as a verb describing a process similar to reading or talking and not as an expression of modality.

Out of the remaining 27 cases, however, 21 showed how modality was used for expressing epistemic probability. One of these instances is example (35).

(35)

EDint328: 70- 77

S1: and maltese families are big (.) am i right (.) i mean you have a lot of children
S2: not nowadays i mean

S3: it used to be
S2: forty years ago i mean we had three you know? so erm er maybe: all our friends (1) <4> two or three </4> (.)
S3: <4> it used to be </4>
S3: something which was very common not only in malta (.)
S4: everywhere <5> i think <un> x </un></5>
S3: <5> you know especially </5> erm you know in mediterranean area hh and families like the south of sicily you know and er greece you know (.) hh families were big (.) erm it was very common here in malta for example to find families? who had erm (.) hh thirteen twelve children

This conversation is about the size of Maltese families, in particular about how many children people used to have in past times. S2 explains that about forty years ago people used to have two to three children. S3 and S4 then add that large families were not only common in Malta but many other places as well. S4, however, seems not completely convinced of his utterance, thus of the fact that people actually had a great number of children in other countries as well. This becomes obvious as he does not only make a realis statement (*everywhere*) but expresses his slight uncertainty by uttering *I think*. In the end, *thinking* something to be the case is not knowing it to be. Arguably, however, S4 is quite convinced of what he is saying. Actually, already S3 has suggested the same idea. Also, there is not necessarily anything contradicting the fact that families in other countries used to be large as well. Consequently, S4 must think that his proposition is probably true. In other words, *I think* seems to be added to an utterance in order to express epistemic probability.

What is interesting concerning *think* as an expression of modality is the fact that it was often used as part of parenthetical constructions. Parentheticals describe subordinate constructions dependent on a verb (cf. Downing & Locke (2006: 381) or Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 175)). Thus, the instance of *think* above might be counted as such since the utterance might be rephrased “I think that large families where common everywhere”. Of the 27 instances of *think* denoting modal meaning that were analysed for this paper, 16 were used in the form of *I think* as part of parenthetical constructions. This corresponds to a comparatively high general frequency of 36 instances per 10 000 words in VOICE.[27]

[27] For more information concerning the frequency of I *think* cf. footnote 28

Another interesting aspect of *think* for the expression of modality is that – if used in the past tense – it seems to denote epistemic certainty rather than probability. This should become clearer considering one of the 6 instances that have not been discussed yet.

(36)

EDcon496: 552- 556

S2: yeah (.) and then erm (.) cos they're changing our class to monday? (1)
S3: what class?
S2: spanish (2)
S3: i thought we have it today.
S2: no: they're changing it erm (.) next week it's going to be on monday. (1) <6> at twelve </6> thirty

In this situation, S3 learns the new fact that his Spanish course does not – as he had thought – take place on that particular day. Obviously, no one but S3 himself really knows how committed he is to the belief that the Spanish course takes place on this day. It seems, however, that he was surprised to hear that the class is not taking place on Monday instead of this day. Consequently, it may be assumed that he was quite convinced – if not fully convinced – of the fact that the course was taking place that day. In the end, before learning the fact that Spanish had been postponed there was no reason for him to believe that Spanish would not take place on this particular day. Thus, this instance (like the other 5 past tense uses of *think*) might be interpreted as epistemic necessity.

7.6.5. Epistemic modality in the leisure domain

Towards the end of chapter 7.3. the frequencies of the modal utterances under investigation in this paper were measured for the respective categories and summarised in Figure 3. It has been shown that the frequency of modal utterances (no attention was given to the type of meaning they denote) is considerably lower in the leisure domain as compared to the professional as well as educational domain. It has been suggested that discourse in the leisure

domain comprised less modal utterances since speakers cared less about communicating their commitment to the truth of the proposition than in the other two domains.

This sub-chapter has so far outlined those carriers of modality that are solely used by speakers to express how much they believe what they are uttering to be true. It thus means that the expressions *must*, *perhaps*, *might*, *maybe*, *probably* as well as *think* (in those cases in which it actually expresses modal meaning) should be less frequently used in the leisure domain of VOICE as compared to the other two. This was of course checked and the information may be found summarised in Figure 5.

Figure 5 Expressions of epistemic modality in VOICE[28]



For this diagram, the frequencies (per 10 000 words) of the modal expressions discussed in this chapter were added up for the respective domains. One can see that the frequency of epistemic modality is clearly lower in the leisure

[28] In the beginning of the empirical part, it has been mentioned that *think* is not included in statistical analyses because the frequencies given for *think* also include those occurrences that were used for realis statements. For this figure, however, the construction *I think* was included. This seems justified since out of the 19 occurrences of *think* denoting epistemic possibility analysed, 15 took the form *I think*. Since this construction seems to be so essential when it comes to the expression of probability with *think*, it was included here. The frequencies of *I think* were detected in each domain of the corpus as well as the repetitions subtracted. It has been found that in the educational domain this construction was used 1023 times (40 times per 10 000 words), whereas in the leisure domain it occurred 298 (29 times per 10 000 words). In the professional domain it was found 2314 times (35 times per 10 000 words).

domain (54 instances per 10 000 words) as compared to the number of occurrences of epistemic modal carriers found in discourse in the professional domain (69 instances per 10 000 words) as well as in the educational domain (75 per 10 000 words). Figure 5 thus reflects the findings and interpretation of Figure 3 – not just in terms of the low modal frequency found in the leisure domain, since also the frequencies detected for the educational (highest modal frequency) as well as the professional domain (slightly lower modal frequency than ED) are mirrored.

It may thus be concluded that in the leisure domain speakers indeed use less modal expressions for epistemic modality – and at the same time make their commitment to the truth of their proposition explicit to a lesser extent – as compared to the educational or leisure domain.

7.7. *will*: Futurity or volition?

In the 30 instances analysed for this paper, the auxiliary *will* predominantly denotes prediction and may thus not be assigned to one of the modal sub-categories outlined in the theoretical part of this paper. It seems that ELF discourse reflects the general semantic bleaching that *will* has been undergoing ever since the Old English period – namely a development from denoting volition towards denoting plain prediction (cf. for instance Gotti 2006). Out of the 30 examples under investigation, 18 were used for such predictive purposes only. Still, however, a certain nuance of volition – sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker – is traceable in some of the utterances in which *will* was used. Such a blend of volition with prediction was found in 11 out of the 30 instances of *will* analysed for this paper. The example below presents one predictive use of *will* as well as one occurrence of it suggesting some shade of volition at the same time.

(37)

EDsed251: 184 - 186

S1: just (.) going abroad and studying in a different (1) kind of s:etting and culture? and e:r (.) having these experiences? (1) e:r (1) making the experience that maybe people there in kiev in paris in in london i don't know where? (.) e:r have maybe the same problems than me: my family (.) hh e:r my own society at home has? (1) the same basic needs er fears hopes? (1)

and THIS kind of things huh (.) which (1) HAVE an impact on (1) as i (.) said (1) think that we are er or FEEL that we are (2) <fast> and and as </fast> regards contents (2) we're exactly (.) within? (.) this kind of process of also? (.) harmonizing (.) methodologies and contents that are taught in our universities.

S12: this is <pvc> unpossible {impossible} <ipa> ʌnˈposɪbl </ipa> </pvc>

S1: we will hear it in the afternoon (.) bologna process (.) lifelong learning program which will be the (1) the: the successor of of the: now socrates program? (1) er (1) they also (1) start (.) to harmonize contents and metho- methodologies. (1)

This example is taken from a workshop discussion about academic mobility. S1 raises the topic of synchronising the contents taught as well as the methodologies applied at universities. S12, however, interjects that he thinks such a harmonisation to be impossible. S1 then explains that the participants of the workshop discussion *will* hear about a learning programme that aims at synchronising courses later in the afternoon. Without a doubt, the first instance of *will* is used for making a predictive statement. S1 refers to what the participants are doing at a later point of the day, thus in the future. Consequently, this use of *will* is to be counted as predictive. At the same time, however, a certain nuance of volition is arguable. In the end, the persons present are taking part in the workshop discussion because they *want* to enlarge their knowledge about the topic of academic mobility. In particular S1 himself as well as S12 appear to be interested in field of synchronising contents and methodologies at different universities. It is thus likely, that the participants are not only going to hear the presentation it in the afternoon, but also want to. Thus, a certain idea of volition may be found in the first instance of *will* in addition to the predictive function it fulfils.

This is, however, not true for the second instance. S1 explains that the “Lifelong Learning Program” *will* be the successor of what is now the “Socrates Program”. Once again, reference to the future is made, thus prediction denoted by *will*. Since an inanimate instance such as a learning program, however, is unable of feeling or expressing volition, it becomes obvious that *will* in such a case does not denote this kind of modal meaning. The second instance of *will* may thus be seen as a expressing merely prediction.

In the data, only one instance of *will* was found to express volition rather clearly. Indeed, the meaning denoted by it appears to be closer to plain volition than to futurity. This instance is discussed below.

(38)

LEcon560: 2601- 2608

S1: <3> but ac</3>tually (1) er when you <slow> (hear it) </slow> it's (1) <un> x </un> (.) but when you drink it's really good =
S5: = yah (.)
S2: really? (.)
S5: yah =
S1: = o<4>kay <un> xxxxxxx </un></4>
S5: <4> i really liked it we all really liked it </4>
S2: i will try it (.)
S1: <un> xxx </un> (.) i (.) like (.) when i go home? (.) i will bri:ng (.) <slow> some good real </slow> polish <5> vodka and we </5> can for a <6> party </6>

This extract of a conversation is about an alcoholic drink consisting of vodka, tabasco and cranberry syrup. Apparently, this syrup can only be bought in shops in Poland. Some speakers have already tried it and talk about how good it tastes. S2, however, has not yet tried it and thus makes the comment that she *will try it*. At this point, however, there is no indication that she is actually going to put this plan into action. In the end, S2 – being from Spain – does not even seem to have the possibility to buy the syrup. It thus seems quite unlikely that *will* actually denotes future reference. On the hand, however, it is arguable that S1 *wants* to try the drink in the future. Her communication partners have been praising it a lot and it is thus only logical that S2 is interested in what it tastes like. Consequently it is fair to say that *will* expresses volition here, indeed even more than it denotes futurity.

Finally, it can be said that – since *will* is hardly used for expressing dynamic volition – it is to assume that ELF speakers use other expressions for signalling this category of modality.

7.8. The 'misfits': *should* and *would*

Whereas the other modal expressions under closer investigation in this paper could be assigned to one general field of modal meaning (thus, either to a.

deontic obligation; b. epistemic possibility, deontic permission, dynamic ability; c. all shades of epistemic modality for expressing a speaker's commitment; d. volition), this was not possible in the cases of the auxiliaries *should* and *would*. Thus, these 'misfits' will be discussed in this separate chapter. Apart from being unable to be assigned to one of these categories, however, they share another quality. Namely, that in their core they seem to denote epistemic modality, whereas if considered on a discourse level they are used to fulfil another function. And indeed, it appears that both of their mechanisms of denoting a certain meaning are rather complex. This should become clearer when considering each of the auxiliaries respectively by analysing examples of them.

(39)

EDint330: 160- 167

S3: er there is a big difficult of there is bit er big el- a big difficulty:<4> for </4> translators because not everybody knows how to translate (.)
S1: <4> yes </4>
S3: malt<5>ese </5> to english or vice versa (.)
S1: <5> yes:</5>
S3: which is: totall<6>y diff</6>icult (2)
S1: <6> mhm </6>
S3: i think i would say that by the time it start changing but: e:r i have my doubts that because everybody wants: (just) gets to know (.) <7> ano</7>ther language (1)
S1: <7> yes </7>

In this interview session, the role of Maltese in Malta is discussed. S3 raises the topic of translators and their difficulties of translating English into Maltese and vice versa. He then suggests the idea that this situation might, however, be changing. In his words: *I think I would say that by the time it started changing*. Still, it seems that something holds S3 back from being fully convinced of his idea (*but I have my doubts that...*). Usually, *would* describes hypothetical situations. Thus, it relates to what one would do if one was not under the given circumstances at the present moment. When recalling the idea of possible worlds introduced in the theoretical part of the paper, this means that a world exists in which the hypothetical scenario actually unfolds. In the case of the instance above, this means that a world exists in which S3 actually does say that things in Malta are changing. The feature that distinguishes this possible

world from the actual one, is the fact that in the possible world S3 does not have any doubts concerning his proposition. In such a world, he necessarily says that things are changing, since there is no reason (thus no doubt) to prevent him from doing so. In fact, the speaker expresses epistemic necessity in a possible world when using *would*. The fact that S3 lives and participates in the conversation in the actual world, however, means that he does *not* actually say that things are changing. In the end, this means that a speaker communicates his uncertainty concerning the truth of the proposition when using *would.* This is so because *would* seems to underline the fact that something is preventing the speaker from being fully committed to his statement (thus, does not behave as if s/he was in the ideal possible world). Since at the same time, however, the necessity of the truth of the proposition is communicated, one might say that *would* overall denotes epistemic probability. As far as its function on a discourse level is concerned, *would* therefore clearly denotes vagueness and may thus be considered a hedging device.

The second auxiliary under investigation in this sub-chapter is *should*. Whereas 3 of the thirty instances investigated were found to express epistemic modality, the remaining 27 revealed a quite interesting dynamic. One of these 27 instances is discussed below.

(40)

POcon591: 187- 192

S19: <2> yeah (.) well doesn't matter </2>
S5: @@@ (1) yeah it's finished anyway probably
S9: i think that we should START (.) because (1)
S19: ah yes =
S5: = yes [S9] . we are ready
S11: mhm =

This extract is taken from the end of a longer conversation during lunch break. S5 and S19 are still casually talking to each other. S9, however, apparently thinks that it is time to go back to work and thus utters: *I think that we should start.* In the end, S9 is obliging her colleagues to stop their conversation and orders them to start their work. Arguably, however, the deontic force of *should*

must be very weak since it was used among colleagues. This idea becomes supported when considering the actual modal meaning denoted by *should* to be epistemic. Perceiving of *should* as such, means that S9's utterance can be paraphrased as the following: "In the light of what is known (it might be 2 o'clock, for instance, thus the official end of the lunch break), we probably start". It might be argued now, that the deontic force arises from the discrepancy between what is epistemically seen to be probably the case and what is actually the case. S9's communication partners perhaps understand that given the circumstances (it is already 2 o'clock) it would only be logical that they are at their desks right now. Since they are not, they feel obliged to finally stop their conversation and start work. It thus means that in the end *should* clearly denotes deontic obligation. The fact that S9 wraps the obligation in an epistemic statement, however, tones down the deontic force considerably. In the end, it is not even S9 who is giving an order but she simply comments on what is probably the case. *Should* can thus be seen as expressing a tentative notion of obligation, which appears to not commit the communication partner too much.
The instances of *should* analysed in the data may thus often be described as advices rather than orders. Advices are in the end nothing else but saying what should be done (an epistemic statement) without necessarily committing the addressee to carrying out what has been suggested (only weak deontic obligation).

Considering the discussions of *would* and *should*, it becomes obvious that they are both used for being tentative. *Would* is once again a device available for making explicit that one is not absolutely convinced of one's utterance. *Should* may be used as a device for elegantly putting people under obligation. The fact that both auxiliaries are used quite frequently as compared to other modal expressions under investigation here (*would*: 28 instances per 10 000 words, *should*: 19 instances per 10 000 words), makes it very likely that ELF discourse overall can be seen as rather vague and tentative.

7.9. Co-occurrence of modal expressions for hedging

Hedging refers to the act of being vague by means of language. Downing and Locke (2006: 198) point out that utterances become "less explicit" when they

are “modalised”. The preceding chapters have clearly shown this to be the case in ELF discourse, as they outlined that expressions such *I think*, *might*, *maybe*, *perhaps*, *would* etc. (thus, those expressing epistemic modality) are used to indicate a speaker’s uncertainty concerning the proposition. In the data investigated, however, not only realis utterances were hedged by the means of modal expressions, but even irrealis utterances already denoting modality were found to be combined with yet another modal carrier denoting epistemic modality. In other words, modal carriers were frequently found to co-occur with expressions of epistemic modality in the data.

7.9.1. Hedging *must* and *have (got) to*

Particularly frequent co-occurrence of modal utterances was found in those modal categories of epistemic certainty and deontic obligation. It seems that this type of modality is naturally very explicit. In the end, speakers comment on what a person definitely has to do or what is necessarily the case. Since there appears to be an overall tendency towards reaching a certain level of vagueness in ELF discourse, it is not surprising that the modal expressions *must* and *have (got) to* frequently co-occur with another modal carrier denoting epistemic possibility. One instance for each of these co-occurrences is presented below.

(41)

PBmtg463: 1794- 1800

S1: <4> @@@ </4>
S4: <5> i mean <loud> it's very it's very yah yah </loud> i fully </5> agree but it's very dangerous because then they put us in this direction <6> or in this corner and that's very that's very right </6> that's very dangerous yeah yeah yeah
S2: <6> yes yes yes that's why i said no of course immediate </6>
S2: <fast> i know </fast> art must be <7> i think </7>
S4: <7> yah </7> yah yah yah =
S7: = like this (.)
S4: like this <1> right </1> right

In this conversation at work, S2 is joking about how the company he works for should sell a special edition of their products. He suggests a special art design

in the form of tasteful nude images. He then explains, "*art must be I think like this*". Obviously *I think* is used here for making the statement less explicit, thus for hedging the original statement. In the end, compelling any artistic creation to be nude photography seems to be a critical statement, particularly in a professional environment. Even more so, it seems that S4 does not understand that S1 is merely joking about the design, since he reacts as if S1 was seriously suggesting his idea. This would be another reason for S1 to step back from his statement. It seems that thus *must* was hedged here in order to make the original utterance denoting obligation less straightforward. The same is true for *have to* in the instance below.

(42)

LEcon545: 77- 80

S1: my boyfriend does a very good thing (.) well like i have to squeeze his hand? (1) i might then have to concentrate on squeezing his hand as <3> hard as i can </3>
SS: <3> @@ </3>
S3: <3> @@ </3> @@
S1: because (.) then i'm concentrating on THAT <4> rather than </4>

S1 explains her remedy for hiccups, which is that her boyfriend tells her to squeeze his hand as hard as she can. She explains this procedure in the following words *I might then have to concentrate on squeezing his hand*. *Have to* obviously refers to her boyfriend obliging her to squeeze his hand in case of hiccups. It is arguable, however, that not hedging such a statement (namely the statement that S1's boyfriend compels her to do so) might give the wrong impression of S1's partner. Obviously, the obligation denoted by *have to* is way too strong as to describe the actual playful manner in which S1's boyfriend probably tells her to squeeze his hand. It seems that consequently S1 makes her utterance less explicit by putting *might* (denoting epistemic possibility) in front of it.

An additional aspect found when analysing the corpus data should be mentioned here. Whereas *have (got) to* and *must*, which both denote deontic obligation, frequently occur in combination with another modal expression

denoting epistemic modality, this is not done when *need* is used. Although all three modal expressions denote obligation, only the former ones appear to be hedged. Thus, one could argue that *need* naturally denotes weaker obligation than the other two modal carriers.

7.9.2. *I think* and other expressions used for hedging

As has already been pointed out, the construction *I think* was used frequently in the examples of *think* analysed for this paper. The fact that the overall frequency of *think is* comparatively high (cf. Table 7) shows that this construction is often used in VOICE for denoting a speaker's uncertainty towards her/his proposition. In addition, the data retrieved from the corpus reveals that *I think* often co-occurs with other modal expressions. Actually, it was the one modal carrier that was found to be most frequently used in combination with another modal expression. Discussing example (41) has already shown that *I think* might be used in combination with *must*. Moreover, however, co-occurrences were found with *have to*, *can*, *would* as well as with expressions already denoting vagueness; those being *perhaps*, *probably*, *maybe*, *might*.

Apart from *I think*, in particular the latter four modal expressions were found in the data to co-occur with another modal expression. Considering those four modal carriers, it becomes obvious that in particular mono-semantic expressions of epistemic modality were used for denoting vagueness in cases of co-occurrence. This observation also holds true for *I think*, since this construction as well expresses only epistemic probability. Furthermore, this idea is supported by the fact that devices for denoting possibility among other modal meanings (those being poly-semantic expressions such as *could* or *can*) were not found to co-occur with another modal expression for hedging.

7.10. Directives: expressing deontic obligation towards communication partners

Whereas chapter 7.3. already discusses the expression of deontic modality in general, it seems necessary to devote a chapter particularly to the case of a speaker expressing obligation towards her/his communication partner, or what

speech act theory would call directives[29]. It is to assume that the act of compelling the person sitting face-to-face to someone has different implications than merely telling the listener about an order that has been given to another person. Politeness seems to be the keyword here. Compelling one's communication partner may indeed be of difficult nature since one does not want to "[invoke] power and status" (Downing & Locke 2006: 198).

How this is done in ELF discourse is an interesting question since one might assume that not having a native speaker's proficiency might make it more difficult to find the right wording for such an intricate matter. Indeed, however, data shows that speakers formulate obligations directed at their communication partners very tentatively. Overall, this happened either in direct speech acts or indirect ones. Each of those will be considered in a separate section. Moreover, it must be highlighted that modal hedging expressions play an important role as far as directives are concerned.

7.10.1. Direct speech acts

In the instances investigated, direct speech acts using *must*, *have (got) to*, *need* as well as *should* were found to oblige a speaker's communication partner to future actions. However, not all of them could be readily used for such a purpose but needed relativisation in the form of hedging.

Chapter 7.9.1. already mentions that *need* does not co-occur with other modal expressions in the data. As it does not require hedging, it may be seen as naturally vague. Also, *need* was found to be used in directives such as the one below:

(43)

EDcon496: 261- 263

S2: you guys you guys need to go home and sleep and rest yourself (.) otherwise you will be l- (.) tired tomorrow and look like <ono> hm </ono> (.)
S3: yeah =
S1: = thank you (.)

[29] For more information on speech act theory or directives cf. for instance Searle (1983: 166) or Searle (1969)

In this instance of *need* used in a directive, S2 tells her friends who are planning to go out (although it is obviously already quite late) to go home instead. It seems that in this case the illocutionary force of *need* is so weak that S1 interprets S2's statement more as a good advice than a real order (and thus thanks S2). This weakness perhaps derives from the fact that the lexical meaning of *need* in the end refers to the lack of something and the associated longing for it. Considering this, S2's directive might rather be interpreted as merely pointing out the lack of sleep the other speakers might experience if they did not go home. Overall, this underlines the idea that need expresses obligation only very vaguely.

Have (got) to was mostly found in co-occurrence with modal hedging devices. It may thus be seen as somewhat more compelling than *need*. Arguably, however, the deontic force expressed by *have (got) to* seems to be rather weak as well because the data reveals instances in which it was used in a directive without any hedging. One of them is included below for exemplification.

(44)

EDint330: 286- 295

S1: w- where you live. (.) where you live. =
S3: = just <L1mlt> sliema {city in malta} </L1mlt> (4)
S1: some people li- used to write MALTA . @@@ hh
S4: that's why i in fact cos <6> you know when you see </6>
S1: <6><fast> no: no no </fast></6> (.) your your town your (.) place. (2) because i'm (.) interviewing only maltese (.) in <7> malta </7>
S4: <7> oh i see </7>
S3: unfortunately this is malt<8>ese </8>
S1: <8> yes.</8> (2)
S4: professional what's that <@> exactly </@> @@@
S3: no you have to go for this one (.) {S3 points at a line in the questionnaire}

In this instance, S3 is conducting interviews about the use of English in Malta. For this purpose, the interviewees receive a questionnaire concerning their demographic data. Obviously, some persons did not fill in the form correctly which is why S3 tells them: *no you have to go for this one.* Obviously, this utterance is to be seen as a directive since S3 is telling his communication partners what to do; namely to fill in a certain information on a particular line of

the questionnaire. As has already been mentioned, however, its force seems to be rather weak since S3 does not use any epistemic expression in order to tone down his order a little.

Should has already been pointed out in chapter 7.7. to be indirect and quite vague anyway. Directives including *should* may rather be seen as a speaker's advice than as a strict order. Nonetheless, it was found to yet co-occur with other modal expressions denoting uncertainty. This means that in directives it was still used in hedged forms, like instance (45) below.

(45)

PRqas495: 9-17

S13: okay? (.)
S3: okay (.) thank you very much for the question i think (.) first (1)
S1: er (.) excuse me (.) er before you continue (.)
S3: <soft> yah </soft>
S1: maybe you should speak s:lowly? (.)
S3: yeah =
S1: = because the er translator has then problems to: (.) follow you if you are <3> too fast (.) <un> xx </un> @@ </3>

This extract is taken from a question-answer session about youth issues in China. Since supposedly not all of the participants understand English, there is an interpreter to translate what is being said in English. S3 is just about to give his answer, when S1 interrupts him and tells him to speak slowly in order for the translator to be able to follow. In S1's exact wording: *maybe you should speak slowly*. As has already been pointed out, *should* functions as denoting weak obligation in the form of an advice. It seems, however, that S1 still thinks the order to be too explicit. It can be argued that especially in the professional domain in front of an audience of colleagues, it is particularly difficult to utter obligation since people naturally see themselves on a level of solidarity. Consequently, S1 hedges his directive by putting *maybe* at the beginning of his utterance. It may thus be said, that under certain circumstances even expressions of very weak deontic meaning might still be toned down further.

In contrast to the three aforementioned expressions of modality, *must* was not found to be used in a directive in the actual conversations presented. However, one instance of it as a directive was found by a speaker imitating her mother. This example is discussed below.

(46)

LEcon417: 134- 141

S3: three days er (.) so i think it will be (.) tiring (1) from (.) friday to:: (1) e:r (.) monday. (.) perhaps
S4: mhm
S3: but (.) i must
S4: probably not really worth the time @@ (.)
S3: erm (1) my mother (.) e:r said (.) <imitating> you MUST (.) be HERE </imitating> @@
S4: o:h then maybe she can pay <@> for it </@> @ =
S3: = yah (.) no (.) she PAY <4> for me </4>
S4: <4> o:h o</4>kay <5> @@@ </5>

In this conversation, S3 explains that she is going to visit her uncle in Italy. Actually, she does not want to go, but her mother has still told her to do so. This becomes obvious as S3 imitates her mother saying *you must be here*. Obviously, this can be seen as a directive since in the end S3's mother is "talking" to her daughter, giving her an obligation. Arguably, *must* is used in a very compelling manner with great deontic force here. This becomes obvious considering that S3 really does not want to go on this holiday but will still do it.
Considering the example above and the fact that *must* was not found anywhere else in the data to be used for uttering a directive, one might say that *must* seems to denote obligation via directives in a too forceful manner for being used in the overall rather tentative ELF discourse of solidarity.

Comparing the four expressions of deontic modality as used in ELF communication discussed in this chapter (*need*, *have (got) to*, *should* and *must*), it can be argued that in general (not just as far as directives are concerned) there is a difference in modal strength concerning those carriers. Since *need* never occurs with hedging, it is to be seen as the weakest of those four. *Have to* as well as *should* sometimes co-occur with hedging devices but may also be used without any in directives. One can thus conclude that those

are stronger in their deontic force than *need*, but still rather vague. *Must* on the contrary was only used for expressing strong obligation and is consequently to be seen as the strongest modal expression for denoting this type of modal meaning.

Considering the frequencies of these expressions in VOICE now, it becomes obvious that ELF speakers seem to use expressions denoting vague obligation far more often than *must*. For this purpose a diagram similar to Figure 4 in chapter 7.4.3. has been created; this one also including *should*.

Figure 6 Expressions of deontic modality including *should* [30]



The prominent role of *have (got) to* has already been discussed in chapter 7.4.. Considering these four modal expressions, it has been used for 50% of all cases denoting obligation. However, also *should* seems to play a considerable part in realising modal meanings as it has been used in 32, 7% of all cases. *Need* still occurs in 13,5% occurrences expressing deontic meaning whereas *must* was only used in 4% of all cases. Adding up those expressions denoting weak obligation (*have (got) to*, *should*, *need*), it becomes obvious that speakers

[30] Since not all occurrences of *must* and *should* denote deontic meaning, those were calculated on the basis of the 30 instances of them investigated. Of the 30 examples of *must*, 60 % were used deontically. This means roughly 2 times per 10 000 words of an overall frequency of 4 per 10 000 words. Of the 30 instances of *should*, 90% were used in a deontic manner. This corresponds to roughly 17 instances per 10 000 words of an overall frequency of 19 instances per 10 000 words.

in VOICE favoured a weak expression for signalling obligation in 96% per cent of the cases over expressing strong obligation in the form of *must*. It is thus justified to conclude that ELF discourse is indeed vague when it comes to expressing deontic modality – not just as far as directives are concerned.

7.10.2. Indirect speech acts

Expressions of deontic obligation towards a communication partner have also been found in the form of indirect speech acts. In particular at this point, it seems necessary to differentiate between the discourse function of such an utterance (thus being a directive) and the underlying modal meaning expressed by the utterance. As discussed below, in fact many modal expressions which do not naturally denote obligation were found to fulfil the function of directives (thus, in the end do express obligation).

This was in particular the case concerning those modal expressions denoting epistemic possibility, deontic permission or dynamic ability. The auxiliaries *can*, *could* and *may* were frequently found to be used in the form of the directive constructions *Can you...*, *Could you...* or *May I...*. An example of each of them is included below.

(47)

EDint331: 327- 328

S1: <8> okay?</8> (.) can you pause it a little?
S2: yeah
(nrec 00:05:00) {change of minidisc; S1 talks to person who has knocked at door}

In this instance, S1 obviously tells S2 to pause the minidisc recorder for a while. It may thus be seen as a directive compelling S2 to comply with S1's wish. Considering the modal auxiliary closer, however, it may rather be interpreted as denoting dynamic ability. In a literal sense, S1 merely asks whether S2 has the internal ability of pressing the button of a minidisc player. The deontic force is thus once again elegantly veiled by using the dynamic auxiliary *can* for expressing obligation. The same is true for the following occurrence of *could* in (48).

(48)

PBqas523: 3- 4

S1: […] if there is a question here please (.) yes here. the gentleman there? is there somebody with a microphone yeah. (.) i:t's coming. (2) and could you introduce yourself briefly? =
S3: = y:eah okay. (.) [S3] [S3/last] from [org1]

In this instance, S1 asks S3 to introduce himself. Obviously, once again this utterance reveals an underlying modal force taking over the function of a directive. Similar to example (47), S1 is actually asking for S3's dynamic ability of introducing himself. Arguably, also, he expresses a certain notion of epistemic possibility. The instance might thus also be paraphrased "Is there a possibility of you introducing yourself". In the end, however, the modal notion conveyed to the addressee is deonitc obligation hidden in this epistemic/dynamic statement.

(49)

LEcon420: 789- 793

S4: <3> okay </3> may i just ask you: to sign <@> something?</@>
S1: <@> WHAT ?</@> @@@
S4: i have those (.) information and agreement forms (.) just you know (1) that it's (1) e:r =
S3: = that it's okay
S1: <4> A:H </4> OKAY : (.)

In this instance, S4 asks S1 and S3 to sign an agreement form. Obviously, she is obliging them to signing, or in other words she is uttering a directive. By inserting *may I* at the beginning of the utterance, however, the order becomes less explicit. In this case the auxiliary *may* denotes deontic permission and the utterance could therefore be paraphrased "Am I allowed to ask you to sign this". In a literal sense, now, S4 is not giving them an obligation but asking them for their permission. This obviously leaves S1 and S3 in the more powerful position and may therefore be regarded as very polite. It may thus be said that the

construction *May I* functions as a hedging device for the expression of deontic obligation.

7.11. Ensuring mutual understanding

The theoretical part of this paper mentions that ELF speakers were found to show great communicative effort as well as to follow certain strategies in order to ensure mutual intelligibility and clarity. Indeed, this could also be observed in some of the instances under investigation for this paper concerning the communication of modal meanings. Some of them will be discussed in this section for exemplification.

(50)

EDwsd302: 301- 304

S18: all right. (3) er to come back to the friendship i think that friendship is a nice idea. i like that. (1) cos i think especially (.) nowadays that's really an important value. i think if somebody's ABLE to (.) have friendships to be (.) OPEN for others to be close to each other (1)
S20: o:h <fast> so </fast> (.) we can er include to to: (1) (open) <un> xxx </un> (.) <4> no?</4>
S18: <4> but i </4> i don't know I think friendship is another thing again. it's like the ability: to (.) let somebody be close to you: to be close to somebody else (.) to sha:re (.) feelings to share thoughts <5> to <un> xxxx </un></5> thoughts =
S20: <5> okay </5>

This example has already been presented before when discussing the auxiliary *able*. In order to explain the meaning denoted by *able*, it has been outlined that the speaker later paraphrases the word himself. Indeed, the act of paraphrasing is done in a consciously explicit manner by S18. Obviously, this is one way of making sure that communication partners interpret a modal utterance according to one's intention.

In some cases, however, the act of paraphrasing appears to happen much more implicitly. This is the case in the example discussed below.

(51)

PRcon29: 114- 117

S2: so where is a is a guess? (1) we have to: (.) to guess? =
S3: = it's difficult (.)
S2: yeah <1> sure </1>
S1: <to S3><1> i think </1> YOU could know </to S3> (.) <to S2> i don't know if you (.) if you know about it </to S2> but

In this instance S1 wants his communication partners to guess where he is from. The only hint they have is the fact that German is his first language. Since he is not sure, however, whether the other speakers are aware of the fact that German is spoken in Italy (his home country), he utters that they only might guess the correct answer. In order to get this thought across to the other speakers, he actually offers them three different expressions of the same meaning. Obviously, *you could know* expresses epistemic possibility. It thus means that the speaker is not fully convinced of them guessing the right answer. Even before saying that, however, he has already expressed his uncertainty by uttering *I think*. Moreover, he paraphrases his uncertainty by saying *I don't know if you know about it*. It seems that by offering a variety of expressions denoting the same modal meaning, communication partners are perhaps more likely to get an idea of what it is that the speaker wanted to convey.

(52)

EDwsd304: 245-

S3: i wrote <reading_aloud> fall of <4> america </4></reading_aloud> is this? =
SX: <4> @@ </4>
S1: = yeah (1) that MIGHT <5> be </5>
S3: <5> yah?</5>
SX: <soft> @@ </soft> =
S1: = i mean (.) <6> we don't know but it </6> MIGHT <7> be a trend </7>
SX-m: <6> (fall of an empire) </6>
SS: <soft><7> @@@ </7> @@ </soft>
S1: could happen
S5: and =
S3: = and =
S5: = rise of (.) europe (.) latin america and asia

Instance (52) is an extract from a workshop discussion about global trends. S3 suggests the possible development of the USA losing their prominent role. S1 seems to rather agree with S3, yet she is not completely convinced of this trend. She thus says that it only *might be* the case that this trend actually exists. Thus, she expresses epistemic possibility. In order to make sure that her addressees notice her uncertainty she repeats *might* in a later utterance as well as stresses the auxiliary in both cases. Moreover, she offers two paraphrases as additional expressions signalling that she is not fully convinced. On the one hand, she explicitly says that they *don't know* whether America will actually lose its prominent role. She thus, once again, denotes her uncertainty concerning the proposition. On the other hand, she says that such a development *could happen*. *Could* is to be seen as yet one more way of conveying that there is only the possibility that things unfold in the way suggested by S3 in the beginning. In this example, one consequently finds an interplay of different strategies to ensure that addressees understand the notion of modality that is intended by the speaker. Those are repetition, emphasis as well as paraphrase.

Finally, instances of what House (2002) calls 'represent' have been found in the data. One of those is example (53).

(53)

EDcon4: 820- 822

S2: i think i'm (.) i will be able to swim today. (.)
S1: you will be able?
S2: mhm (2)

In this example, S1 basically merely repeats what S2 has just said. In doing so, however, S1 can make sure whether he has understood correctly. In the end, it gives S2 the possibility of rephrasing and explaining what she has intended to convey. Indeed, Pitzl (2010) notices that represents are used by speakers as a means of asking for clarification. Also, it can be argued that because of the represent S1 is given additional time to re-consider what kind of modal meaning S2 intended to express.

8. Conclusion

It was the aim of this paper to provide a description of how speakers of English as a Lingua Franca realise modal meanings. Thus, to get an overview, first of all the frequencies of the modal carriers under investigation in this paper have been detected. Those reveal that the set of modal auxiliaries (with the exception of *shall*) are central when it comes to uttering modal meaning in ELF communication. Other types of modal carriers (marginal modals, modal idioms or lexical items), however, were not so important overall. Still, when considering the separate modal expressions that were used most frequently, also a couple of carriers of the less frequently used types stood out. At the same time, however, some modal expressions were not found to occur in the corpus at all.

When considering the semantics of the most frequently used modal carriers, they could be assigned to four clusters of modal meanings. One of them is deontic obligation. This notion was found to be realised by the auxiliary *must* as well as by *have (got)* to and *need.* Interesting about them is the fact that the source of obligation is not always clearly detectable. The second field of modal meaning is the one of epistemic possibility, deontic permission and dynamic ability. It was shown that – although apparently distinct notions of modality – they seem to be closely interrelated. In the instances under investigation, these notions are signalled by the modals *can*, *could*, *may* as well as by the adjectives *able* and *possible*. The third field was the one of different shades of epistemic modality. Of course, the expressions of the aforementioned categories strictly-speaking also belong to this cluster. Indeed, it can be said that the list of expressions denoting epistemic modality in ELF is quite lengthy. The additional modal carriers listed for the third category are *must* and the past tense form of *think* for epistemic necessity, *probably* and *think* for epistemic probability as well as *might*, *perhaps* and *maybe* for signalling epistemic possibility. The fourth cluster is volition. *The* auxiliary *will* can be assigned to this category although it denotes this modal notion only to a very restricted extent. Most instances of *will* have predominantly predictive function. Finally, the auxiliaries *would* and *should* could not readily be assigned to any of the aforementioned clusters since their mechanisms of denoting meaning are quite complex ones. However, they were found to denote weak obligation (*should*) and epistemic probability (*would*).

Considering the frequencies of certain modal expressions in connection to the meaning they denote, it becomes obvious that speakers of ELF are very vague and tentative concerning their utterances. This is to mean that epistemic modality used for hedging seems to play a considerable role as well as that deontic modals of lower modal strength are preferred over those with greater force.

Overall, it seems that ELF discourse has an extensive as well as frequently used list of carriers expressing epistemic modality for hedging. This is already true for hedging realis statements. Moreover, however, also modal expressions frequently co-occur with epistemic hedging devices. Above all, expressions of deontic obligation and epistemic necessity are often toned down a little by the means of epistemic modality. Nonetheless, also expressions of a speakers' uncertainty (thus epistemic probability or possibility) have been found to be hedged once again by applying epistemic modality to it. Noteworthy is also, that those modal expressions used for hedging purposes are mono-semantic, thus only express epistemic modality. Those found most frequently were *perhaps*, *probably*, *maybe*, *might* as well as parenthetical constructions with *I think*.

As far as deontic obligation is concerned, it seems that speakers select rather weak forms for signalling this type of meaning. Whereas *need* has been shown to be the one signalling the weakest deontic obligation, *have (got) to* as well as *should* were found to be a little stronger. Still, however, they are rather weak compared to *must*, which seems to be of very strong deontic force. Interestingly, *must* is hardly used for denoting obligation whereas in particular the vague *have (got) to* is very frequent.

The same was found to be true in cases where speakers obliged their communication partners to future actions. Whereas *must* is not used at all for directives in ELF discourse, the remaining three expressions seem to be central. Moreover, it was found that directives also occur in the form of indirect speech acts using modality. Most frequent are the constructions *Can I...*, *Could I...* as well as *May I...*, thus those of the cluster of possibility, ability and permission. Once again, also these constructions appear to be rather vague since their deontic force is expressed in an indirect manner.

Although ELF speakers' use of language appears to be indeed indirect and tentative overall, the frequency of epistemic modality is considerably lower in

the leisure domain as compared to discourse of the educational or professional domain. This observation could be explained by the fact that in private leisure conversation one naturally cares less about making one's commitment to what is being said explicit.

Furthermore, it was found that speakers of ELF appear to use strategies to ensure mutual understanding. Repeating a modal expression as well as paraphrasing the signalled modal notion seem to be two ways of achieving clarity and in consequence mutual intelligibility.

Considering the contribution of this paper, some further areas of research concerning modality are revealed. One might be to identify modal expressions that were not discussed in this paper – as has been pointed out, the list is literally infinite. Also, whereas this paper has been concerned with the most frequently occurring modal expressions in ELF, it seems particularly interesting to clarify why some modal expressions are only rarely employed or do not even occur at all. Also, the strategies employed by ELF speakers to ensure mutual intelligibility of the expressed modal meanings deserve additional attention.

Although many questions concerning modality in ELF still need to be answered, it can, however, be concluded in this final paragraph that ELF discourse is in general vague, indirect, tentative and implicit. The fact that epistemic hedging and weak forms of obligation in particular are so frequent, however, simply underlines the egalitarian concept of this way of using English. Indeed, solidarity seems to be a major principle of ELF. This idea is furthermore supported by the fact that speakers seem to use strategies in order to negotiate modal meaning. Both speakers as well as addressees show great effort to ensure a functioning communication and mutual intelligibility, which underlines the interactivity of ELF discourse.

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Appendix

Search queries for the respective modal expressions

Modal auxiliaries	
can	can cannot can’t
could	could couldn’t
may	may
might	might mightn’t
shall	shall
should	should shouldn’t
will	will *’ll won’t
would	would *’d wouldn’t
must	must mustn’t
Marginal modals	
dare	daren’t dare * not
need	needn’t need * not
ought to	ought to oughtn’t to oughtn’t ought * to ought not
Modal idioms	
had better	had better *’d better
would rather	*’d rather would * rather (minus **would)**
have (got) to	*‘ve got to *’s got to have got to have to had got to had to has got to has to

Adjectives expressing modality	
possible	possible impossible
likely	likely unlikely
probable	probable improbable
presumable	presumable
legitimate	legitimate illegitimate
apparent	apparent
evident	evident
doubtless	doubtless
permitted	permitted
permissible	permissible
empowered	empowered
entitled	entitled
necessary	necessary unnecessary
bound	bound
supposed	supposed
obligatory	obligatory
obliged	obliged
demanded	demanded
requested	requested
compulsory	compulsory
mandatory	mandatory
able	able unable
Adverbs expressing modality	
perhaps	perhaps
possibly	possibly
maybe	maybe
probably	probably
presumably	presumably
seemingly	seemingly
necessarily	necessarily
certainly	certainly
surely	surely
obviously	obviously
apparently	apparently
evidently	evidently
clearly	clearly
Verbs expressing modality	
insist	insist*
require	require requires required requiring

need	need* to
command	command*
demand	demand demands demanded
allow	allow*
dare	dare* to
prohibit	prohibit*
permit	permit*
forbid	forbid* forbade
guarantee	guarantee*
affirm	affirm*
assert	assert*
promise	promise*
claim	claim*
think	think* thought
Nouns expressing modality	
possibility	possibility
chance	chance
probability	probability

likelihood	likelihood
necessity	necessity
evidence	evidence
certainty	certainty
conviction	conviction
permission	permission
compulsion	compulsion

Instances of the most frequent modal carriers analysed for this paper and their respective meaning. The examples can be accessed at www.univie.ac.at/voice/ (29.1.2013)

MUST: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon250:414 - epistemic: necessity

EDint328:457 - epistemic: necessity

EDwsd499:186,189 - deonitc: obligation/ deontic: obligation

EDwsd499:802 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

EDwsd304:415 - epistemic: necessity

EDint331:285 - epistemic: necessity

EDsed251:433 - deontic: obligation

MUST: LEISURE

LEcon229:87 - deontic: obligation

LEcon329:136 - epistemic: necessity

LEcon405:75 - deontic: obligation

LEcon417:102 - deontic: obligation

LEcon417:136,138 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

LEcon548:57 - epistemic: necessity

LEcon560:1990 - deontic: necessity

LEcon562:526 - epistemic: necessity

LEcon565:187 - epistemic: necessity

MUST: PROFESSIONAL

PBcon594:125 - deontic: obligation
PBmtg463:1797 - deontic: obligation
PBpan25:8 - deontic: obligation
PBqas410:25 - deontic: obligation
POcon543:193 - epistemic: necessity
POmtg314: 536 - epistemic: necessity
POcon549:399,412 - epistemic: necessity/ epistemic: necessity
POmtg546:422 - deontic: obligation
PRqas224:1 - deontic: obligation

NEED: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon4:662 - deontic: obligation
EDcon496:261 - deontic: obligation
EDcon496:505,505 - deontic: obligation/deontic: obligation
EDcon521:585 - deontic: obligation
EDsed251:460 - deontic: obligation
EDint605:200 - deontic: obligation
EDsed251:533, 533 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation
EDwgd497:1 - . deontic: obligation

NEED: LEISURE

LEcon229:91 - deontic: obligation
LEcon560:2609 - deontic: obligation
LEcon562:2063 - deontic: obligation
LEcon575:187- deontic: obligation
LEcon329:743 - deontic: obligation
LEcon575:257,257,257 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

LEcon575:269 - deontic: obligation

NEED: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:1950 - deontic: obligation
PBmtg280:204 - deontic: obligation
PBmtg300:2183 - deontic: obligation
POcon543:413 - deontic: obligation
POmtg314:540 - deontic: obligation
POmtg314:1017,1019 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation
PRcon534:118 - deontic: obligation
PRpan13:169 - deontic: obligation
PRqas19:24 - deontic: obligation

HAVE (GOT) TO: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon4:181 - deontic: obligation
EDcon250:896,904 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation
EDcon521:1082 - deontic: obligation
EDint330:295 - deontic: obligation
EDint331:644 - deontic: obligation
EDsed31:866 - deontic: obligation
EDsve421:452 - deontic: obligation
EDwgd5:17 - deontic: obligation
EDwgd5:81 - deontic: obligation

HAVE (GOT) TO: LEISURE

LEcon8:481 - deontic: obligation
LEcon560:1566 - deontic: obligation
LEcon560:2042,2046 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation
LEcon562:1806 - deontic:obligation

LEcon566:258 - deontic: obligation

LEcon560:2013 - . deontic: obligation

LEcon420:485,487,489 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation/ deontic obligation

HAVE (GOT) TO: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:3846 - deontic: obligation

PBmtg269:665,668,668,670 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

PBmtg280:242 - deontic: obligation

PRint595:418 - deontic: obligation

POmtg314:231 - deontic: obligation

POwsd257:373,373 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

CAN: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon250:317,320 - dynamic: ability/ dynamic ability

EDcon521:668 - epistemic: possibility

EDint331:327- dynamic: ability

EDsve421:53,56,59 - epistemic: possibility/ dynamic: ability/ deontic:perission

EDsve423:265 - deontic: permission

EDwgd241:975,977 - dyamic: ability/ dynamic: ability

CAN: LEISURE

LEcon227:124,125,127 - deontic: permission/ deontic: permission/ epistemic: possibility

LEcon548:558 - deontic: permission

LEcon560:396 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon565:262,266,268 – dynamic: ability/ epistemic: possibility/ dynamic: ability

LEcon575:57 - epistemic: possibility

LEint555:83 - dynamic: ability

CAN: PROFESSIONAL

PBcon594:303 - deontic: permission
PBmtg3:2002,2005- epistemic possibility/ epistemic: possibility
PBmtg3:2838,2839 - dynamic: ability/ dynamic: ability
PBmtg27:501,504,505 - dynamic: ability/ dynamic: ability/ dynamic: ability
PBmtg269:127,127 - dynamic: ability/ dynamic: ability

COULD: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon250:190 - epistemic: possibility
EDcon521:1536,1537 - dynamic: ability/ dynamic: ability
EDsed362:151 - epistemic: possibility
EDsve421:366 - dynamic:ability
EDwgd241:1261 - epistemic: possibility
EDwgd305:448 - epistemic: possibility
EDwsd15:672,675 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility
EDwsd302:1058 - dynamic: ability (used as obligation)
EDwsd304:253 - epistemic: possibility

COULD: LEISURE

LEcon545:348 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon548:393 - deontic: permission
LEcon560:250,250 - deontic: permission/ deontic: permission
LEcon560:949 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon229:252 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon573:144 - dynamic: ability/ epistemic: possibility
LEcon545:886 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon560:102 - epistemic: possibility

COULD: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:3321 - epistemic: possibility
PBmtg280:339 - epistemic: possibility
PBmtg300:2388 - dynamic: ability
PBqas523:3 - epistemic: possibility
POmtg314:33 - epistemic: possibility
POmtg315:509 - epistemic: possibility
POmtg403:741 - epistemic: possibility
PRpan1:10 - epistemic: possibility
PRpan294:73 - epistemic: possibility
PRqas407:11 - epistemic: possibility

ABLE: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon4:820 - epistemic: possibility
EDcon4:1027 - epistemic: possibility
EDsed363:114 - epistemic: possibility
EDwgd5:333,333 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility
EDwsd302:301 - dynamic: ability
EDwgd497:423 - epistemic: possibility
EDsed251:296 - dynamic: ability
EDsed251:536,541 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility

ABLE: LEISURE

LEcon417:218 - dynamic: ability
LEcon562:2169 - dynamic: ability
LEcon560:777,779 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility
LEcon417:149 - dynamic: ability
LEcon547:114 - dynamic: ability
LEcon548:928 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon562:50 - dynamic: ability

LEcon227:201- deontic: permission
LEcon329:324 - epistemic: possibility

ABLE: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:2869 - dynamic: ability
PBmtg414:1481 - dynamic: ability
PBpan28:4 - dynamic: ability
PBpan25:18 - deontic: permission
POmtg314:90 - dynamic: ability
POmtg542:289 - dynamic: ability
POmtg546:987 - epistemic: possibility
PRpan585:33 - dynamic: ability
PRpan252:138 - dynamic: ability

POSSIBLE: EDUCATIONAL

EDsed31:1066 - deontic: permission
EDsve421:447 - deontic: permission
EDwgd241:1276 - epistemic: possibility
EDwsd303:757 - epistemic: possibility
EDwsd499:217 - epistemic: possibility
EDwsd464:757 - deontic: permission
EDwsd304:145 - dynamic: ability
EDwsd464:554 - epistemic: possibility
EDwsd242:27 - epistemic: possibility
EDsed363:96 - dynamic: ability

POSSIBLE: LEISURE

LEcon227:133,135,138 - deontic: permission/ epistemic: possibility/ deontic: permission
LEcon329:286 - deontic: permission

LEcon417:291- dynamic: ability

LEcon420:106 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon560:1852 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon562:824 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon562:2622 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon573:158 - dynamic: ability

POSSIBLE: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:672 - deontic: permission

PBmtg269:89 - epistemic: possibility

PBmtg269:1092 - epistemic: possibility

PBmtg414:3400 - epistemic: possibility

PBmtg463:1919 - dynamic: ability

POcon543:694 - epistemic: possibility

POwgd243:59 - dynamic: ability

PRpan585:35,42,42 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility

MAY: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon4:157 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed301:171,173 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility

EDsve421:372 - deontic: permission

EDwsd302:1894 - deontic: permission

EDwsd464:619 - epistemic: possibility

EDwsd499:769 - deontic: permission

EDwsd15:694 - deontic: permission

EDsed363:1 - epistemic: possibility

EDint330:609 - epistemic: possibility

MAY: LEISURE

LEcon8:285 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon8:339,340,341 - deontic: permission/ deontic: permission/ deontic: permission

LEcon420:464 - deontic: permission

LEcon420:789 - deontic: permission

LEcon545:484 - deontic: permission

MAY: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg27:415 - deontic: permission

PBmtg269:164,164 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility

PBmtg269:263 - epistemic: possibility

POcon543:315 - epistemic: possibility

POmtg314:941 - deontic: permission

POmtg314:222 - deontic: permission

PRcon535:17 - epistemic: possibility

PRpan585:27,28 - deontic: permission/ epistemic: possibility

PROBABLY: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon4:276 - epistemic: probability

EDcon250:320 - epistemic: probability

EDsed31:1119 - epistemic: probability

EDwsd302:563 - epistemic: probability

EDwsd302:1918 - epistemic: probability

EDwsd464:488 - epistemic: probability

EDwsd499:382 - epistemic: probability

EDwgd305:1605,1605,1608 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability

PROBABLY: LEISURE

LEcon417:137 - epistemic: probability

LEcon548:235 - epistemic: probability

LEcon560:729 - epistemic: probability

LEcon562:1830 - epistemic: probability

LEcon566:156 - epistemic: probability

LEcon560:1544 - epistemic: probability

LEcon227:188 - epistemic: probability

LEcon420:284 - epistemic: probability

LEcon417:296 - epistemic: probability

LEcon562:1655 - epistemic: probability

PROBABLY: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:192 - epistemic: probability

PBmtg269:980 - epistemic: probability

PBmtg280:59 - epistemic: probability

PBmtg280:146 - epistemic: probability

POmtg403:582 - epistemic: probability

POmtg404:911 - epistemic: probability

POmtg546:299 - epistemic: probability

PRcon599:273 - epistemic: probability

PRpan252:171 - epistemic: probability

PRqas409:13 - epistemic: probability

MIGHT: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon4:532 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed31:966 - epistemic: possibility

EDwsd15:376 - epistemic: possibility

EDwsd242:84 - 4. epistemic: possibility

EDwsd304:247,250 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility

EDwsd499:451 - epistemic: possibility

EDint331:738 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed364:344 - epistemic: possibility

EDwgd497:646 - . epistemic: possibility

MIGHT: LEISURE

LEcon545:383,387 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility

LEcon545:712 - epistemic: modality

LEcon547:138,138 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility

LEcon562:2277 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon548:503 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon227:10 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon545:77 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon560:824 - epistemic: possibility

MIGHT: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:1970 - epistemic: possibility

PBmtg300:797 - epistemic: possibility

PBsve437:25 - epistemic: possibility

POcon543:477 - epistemic: possibility

POmtg314:233,233 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility

POwgd524:992 - epistemic: possibility

PRpan294:45 - epistemic: possibility

PRqas409:12 - epistemic: possibility

PRint597:490 - epistemic: possibility

PERHAPS: EDUCATIONAL

EDwsd304:810 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed31:641 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed31:458 - epistemic: possibility

EDwsd304:832 - epistemic: possibility

EDwgd5:713 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed363:412 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed31:411 - epistemic: possibility

EDwsd302:1888 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed31:1157 - epistemic: possibility

EDint328:572 - epistemic: possibility

PERHAPS: LEISURE

LEcon405:77 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon405:155 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon405:170 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon405:209 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon417:91 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon417:102,106 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility
LEcon417:134 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon417:232 - epistemic: possibility
LEcon418:82 - epistemic: possibility

PERHAPS: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg414:886 - epistemic: possibility
PBpan25:15 - epistemic: possibility
PBpan581:50 - epistemic: possibility
PBpan581:53 - epistemic: possibility
POcon549:529 - epistemic: possibility
POmtg314:901 - epistemic: possibility
POmtg403:1019 - epistemic: possibility
PRcon29:320 - epistemic: possibility
PRpan294:133 - epistemic: possibility
PRpan13:205 - epistemic: possibility

MAYBE: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon496:543 - epistemic: possibility
EDcon521:238 - epistemic: possibility
EDint328:582 - epistemic: possibility
EDint604:87,93 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility
EDsed251:93 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed301:81 - epistemic: possibility

EDsed363:84,88 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic possibility

EDsed364:91 - epistemic: possibility

MAYBE: LEISURE

LEcon8:190 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon229:2 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon417:93 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon548:584 - epistemic: possibility

LEcon560:2272,2272 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility

LEcon565:391,392,392 - epistemic: possibility/ epistemic: possibility/. epistemic: possibility

LEcon566:229- epistemic: possibility

MAYBE: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:4099 - epistemic: possibility

PBmtg27:503 - epistemic: possibility

PBmtg269:919 - epistemic: possibility

PBmtg300:279 - epistemic: possibility

POcon591:108 - epistemic: possibility

POmtg314:769 - epistemic: possibility

POmtg316:8 - epistemic: possibility

PRcon29:316 - epistemic: possibility

PRpan225:146 - epistemic: possibility

PRpan585:102 - epistemic: possibility

THINK: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon4:42 - no modality

EDcon250:63 - epistemic: probability

EDcon496:104 - epistemic: probability

EDcon521:51,51 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: necessity

EDint328:76 - epistemic: probability

EDint330:166 - epistemic: probability

EDint331:88 - no modality

EDcon250:366 - epistemic: necessity

EDcon496:555 - epistemic: necessity

THINK: LEISURE

LEcon8:192,196,196 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability

LEcon227:46 - epistemic: probability

LEcon229:96 - epistemic: probability

LEcon329:164 - epistemic: probability

LEcon352:25 - no modality

LEcon405:28 - epistemic: probability

LEcon351:112 - epistemic: necessity

LEcon405:59 - epistemic: necessity

THINK: PROFESSIONAL

PBcon594:28 - epistemic: probability

PBmtg3:333 - epistemic: probability

PBmtg27:13,13 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability

POcon543:37- epistemic: probability

POcon543:651 - epistemic: necessity

POmtg316:113 - epistemic: necessity

PRcon29:117 - epistemic: probability

PRcon531:70 - epistemic: probability

PRcon535:107 - epistemic: probability

WILL: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon4:820,821 - prediction/ prediction

EDcon496:261 - prediction

EDcon521:185 - prediction

EDsed31:230,230,230 - prediction + volition/ prediction + volition/prediction + volition

EDsed251:186,186 - prediction + volition/ prediction

EDsed251:662 - prediction + volition

WILL: LEISURE

LEcon8:491- prediction

LEcon353:201 - prediction + volition

LEcon420:193 - prediction + volition

LEcon548:666 - prediction + volition

LEcon560:71 - prediction

LEcon560:26076,2607 - volition (+ prediction)/ prediction + volition

LEcon562:794,795 – prediction/ prediction

LEint554:72 - prediction + volition

WILL: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:171,175 - prediction/ prediction

PBmtg27:868,877 - prediction/ prediction

PBcon594:3 - prediction

PBmtg3:199 - prediction

POcon543:42 - prediction

POcon549:119 - prediction

PRcon29:98 - prediction

WOULD: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon496:689 - epistemic: probability
EDcon521:21,23,23,23,23 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability
EDint330:166 - epistemic: probability
EDint330:1080,1082 - epistemic: probability
EDsed31:552 - epistemic: probability

WOULD: LEISURE

LEcon329:560,560 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability
LEcon405:125 - epistemic: probability
LEcon420:497,500 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability
LEcon545:975 - epistemic: probability
LEcon548:221,224 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability
LEcon560:853 - epistemic: probability
LEcon562:2173 - epistemic: probability

WOULD – PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:1635,1635 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability
PBmtg3:4110 - epistemic: probability
PBmtg27:241 - epistemic: probability
POcon543:450 - epistemic: probability
POcon549:529 - epistemic: probability
POmtg444:518,518 - epistemic: probability/ epistemic: probability
PRcon535:225 - epistemic: probability
PRpan1:80 - epistemic: probability

SHOULD: EDUCATIONAL

EDcon496:50 - deontic: obligation
EDint330:168,170 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

EDsed362:160,161,161 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

EDsed363:208 - epistemic: probability

EDsve421:475 - deontic: obligation

EDsve423:134 - deontic: obligation

EDwsd302:1859 - deontic: obligation

EDwsd304:1526 - deontic: obligation

SHOULD: LEISURE

LEcon545:350- deontic: obligation

LEcon566:395 - deontic: obligation

LEcon562:2169,2169 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

LEcon575:103,105,107 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

LEcon565:56 - epistemic: probability

LEcon8:109 - deontic: obligation

LEcon548:399 - deontic: obligation

SHOULD: PROFESSIONAL

PBmtg3:1775 - deontic: obligation

PBmtg269:444 - epistemic: probability

PBmtg269:1104 - deontic: obligation

POcon591:189 - deontic: obligation

POmtg444:1012,1012 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

PRpan1:107,107,107 - deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation/ deontic: obligation

PRqas495:15 - deontic: obligation

German summary

Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Beschreibung von Englisch als Lingua Franca (ELF) hinsichtlich der Verwendung von Modalität. Sie erforscht, welche Modalausdrücke in ELF-Kommunikation Verwendung finden und verbindet die häufigsten mit ihrer jeweiligen semantischen Bedeutung. Des Weiteren erforscht sie, was aufgrund der Verwendung gewisser Modalitätsausdrücke über die SprecherInnen beziehungsweise ELF-Kommunikation im gesamten geschlossen werden könnte.

Dazu werden zuerst die zwei Hauptkomponenten *Englisch als Lingua Franca* und *Modalität* separat beleuchtet. Ersteres beschreibt die Verwendung von Englisch von hauptsächlich (aber nicht exklusiv) nichtmuttersprachlichen SprecherInnen mit dem Hauptziel der Kommunikation und des beidseitigen Verständnisses. Englisch stellt dabei oft die einzige Möglichkeit dar, miteinander zu kommunizieren. Klassische Kommunikationssituationen finden sich daher zum Beispiel in internationalen Arbeitskontexten, in Situationen eines akademischen Auslandaufenthalts oder auf Reisen. Bemerkenswert ist, dass bei ELF-Kommunikation sprachliche Normkonformität nicht unbedingt im Mittelpunkt steht. Verstöße gegen Regeln, die vom muttersprachlichen Englisch vorgegeben werden, sowie damit verbundene Verständnisprobleme können vorkommen. Diese werden jedoch durch Bemühung aller KommunikationspartnerInnen in Form von kreativer Sprachverwendung oder auch durch Anwendung verschiedener Strategien (wie etwa dem Paraphrasieren oder Wiederholen) kompensiert, sodass gegenseitiges Verständnis gewährleistet werden kann.
Die zweite Hauptkomponente der Arbeit ist Modalität. Diese beschreibt im weiteren Sinne die Haltung des Sprechers zum Gesagten. Zentral ist dabei die Unterteilung in epistemische, deontische und dynamische Modalität. Welche konkreten Kategorien von Modalität der englischen Sprache zugeschrieben werden, hängt zu einem gewissen Maß vom Forscher ab. Für die Analyse in dieser Arbeit werden folgenden Kategorien definiert: Möglichkeit, Wahrscheinlichkeit, Notwendigkeit (epistemisch); Erlaubnis, Verpflichtung (deontisch); Wollen, Fähigkeit (dynamisch).

Für die empirische Untersuchung wird dann eine Liste an Modalausdrücken, welche anschließend genauer analysiert werden sollen, angeführt. Diese beinhaltet Modalverben, lexikalische Modalausdrücke, sowie einige Konstruktion, welche formal zwischen den beiden ersten Kategorien anzusiedeln sind. Die Analyse besteht aus einem quantitativen sowie einem qualitativen Teil. Zuerst werden die angeführten Modalausdrücke im Hinblick auf ihre Häufigkeit untersucht. Anschließend werden die am häufigsten vorkommenden an Hand einer Diskussion ausgewählter Beispiele qualitativ analysiert.

Es ist feststellbar, dass - obwohl vereinzelt Modalausdrücke aus dem lexikalischen Bereich sehr häufig verwendet werden – in ELF-Kommunikation vor allem Modalverben zentral für den Ausdruck von Modalität sind. Im Zuge der Zuordnung der beliebtesten Modalausdrücken zur jeweils signalisierten semantischen Bedeutung, war vor allem auffällig, dass sehr viele epistemische Formen Verwendung finden – vor allem in beruflichen sowie schulischen/universitären (nicht aber so sehr in Freizeit-) Kontexten. Epistemische Formen drücken meist Zweifel am Gesagten aus und schwächen die gemachte Aussage somit ab. Für solche Zwecke werden scheinbar vor allem mono-semantische Ausdrücke (z.B. *might*, *probably*, *maybe*, *I think*) verwendet. Neben einer starken Nutzung epistemischer Ausdrücke, werden auch zum Ausdruck deontischer Verpflichtung eher solche Ausdrücke von schwächerer Modalität (*have (got) to*, *need*, *should*) den stärkeren (*must*) vorgezogen. Um sein Gegenüber zu etwas zu verpflichten, wurde auch oft auf indirekte Sprechakte mit Verwendung von unter anderem dynamischen Modalverben (z.B. in der Form *Can you…*) zurückgegriffen. Es lässt sich allgemein also behaupten, dass ELF-Kommunikation eher vage und indirekt ist. Es scheint, dass die Solidarität aller SprecherInnen von großer Bedeutung ist und darum vor allem deontische Modalität (Verpflichtung) gegenüber GesprächspartnerInnen eher zögerlich ausgedrückt wird.
Darüber hinaus wurden Strategien bemerkt, welche ELF-SprecherInnen benutzen, um gegenseitiges Verständnis sicherzustellen. Das wiederum verweist auf eine große Interaktivität im ELF-Diskurs.

Curriculum Vitae

Angaben zur Person

Name	Katharina Küronya
Geburtsdatum/ -ort	24.7.1987/ Wien
Nationalität	Österreich

Bildung

1993 – 1997	Volksschule: Salvatorschule in 1220 Wien
1997 – 2005	Allgemein bildende höhere Schule: Sigmund Freud - Gymnasium in 1020 Wien
2005 - …	Studium der Anglistik und Amerikanistik an der Universität Wien
2010 – 2012	„Deutsch als Fremdsprache“- Modul am Institut für Germanistik der Universität Wien, inkl. Praktikum im International Office der Technischen Universität Wien

Berufserfahrung

2011 - …	Mitarbeit in der Abteilung „Marketing und Kommunikation“ der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, geringfügig
2011 - …	Kursleiterin von Englischkursen für Erwachsene und SchülerInnen an der VHS Urania: - Englisch A1 - Pronunciation - Vorbereitungskurs für das Cambridge First Certificate (Niveau B2) - Ferienkurs für SchülerInnen (Oberstufe)