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# 1. Introduction

The inspiration for the topic of this thesis was provided by the assumption that Scottish national identity is said to be constructed in newspaper discourse. On second glance, however, the idea of 'national identity' proved to be more intricate and the boundaries for definition more blurred than originally anticipated. Venturing into the realm of national identity, nationalism became an increasingly important theme and turned into the second most important concept dealt with in this paper. Apart from the assumption mentioned above, a number of questions guided this research: Which groups or individuals are responsible for the construction of nationalist ideologies? In what ways can journalists be assumed to play into the whole dynamic of (re-)producing ideological language? Is there textual evidence for words/phrases that are said to be responsible for constructing and reinforcing national identity?

As far as methodology is concerned, I had to take up the challenge of choosing an approach that enabled me to uncover inherently tricky notions like national identity and nationalism. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) seemed to provide the tools needed in order for ideological language to be revealed and analysed. Given that the methodologies of CDA have attracted a certain amount of criticism over the years, questions as to their applicability and validity were raised that fundamentally changed the way of looking at texts and the allegedly apparent meanings conveyed by them.

While chapters 2 and 3 mainly account for the theoretical parts of this thesis, chapter 4 is concerned with the actual analysis of articles from two Scottish (*The Scotsman*, *The Herald*) and two London-based newspapers (*The Guardian*, *The Independent*). The analysis itself is split into two parts, with part one consisting of a corpus analysis and part two offering a qualitative approach to newspaper analysis, featuring examples from the selection of texts that were gathered during the past few months.

A side effect accompanying this research is the aim to reveal apparent and perhaps not so apparent weaknesses and controversies relating to both the analytical framework as well as to the theories and concepts provided here. The consideration of different points of view, supporting and opposing, will hopefully allow for a versatile insight into the topic dealt with in this thesis.

# 2. National identity & Nationalism

## 2.1 Concepts & Terminology

The present chapter deals with the terms and concepts that need to be dealt with before tackling more complex notions like 'banal nationalism' and 'ideology', for example. Since the term 'national identity' is located at the core of this thesis and plays a significant role in the analysis of newspapers, it seems only sensible to dedicate a fair amount of time to the definition of sometimes rather abstract but much talked about concepts. Starting with the explanation of basic terms like nation and nation-state, this chapter ventures into the discussion surrounding (Scottish) nationalism as an ideological concept and the means by which it is assumed to be expressed in discourse.

### *2.1.1 Nation(-states) & forms of nationalism*

One of the most basic distinctions that need to be made when talking about Scotland, it seems, is that between nation and nation-state. However, definitions of terms like 'nation' and 'state' remain rather blurry, with different scholars presenting their very own version of what they perceive these concepts to be all about. While a nation, in the most quintessential sense, can be used to refer to a country made up of a group of people speaking the same language, having the same culture and history and who live in a particular area under one government (Oxford Advanced Learner's Compass 2005), it can also be described as a community of people claiming "some form of collective, bounded, territorial sovereignty" (Roshwald 2006: 3). According to Giddens (2006: 1036), a state is a political apparatus that rules over a given territory, whereas a nation-state is

> [a] particular type of state, […] in which a government has sovereign power within a defined territorial area, and the mass of the population are citizens who know themselves to be part of a single nation. Nation-states are closely associated with the rise of nationalism […] and developed as part of an emerging nation-state system, […] [currently] spanning the whole globe. (ibid.: 1026)

Essentially, nation and nation-state only appear to be differing with respect to the 'sovereign' aspect of it. In the case of Scotland, the term 'nation-state' is therefore not applicable since Scotland is still not entirely independent from England, regardless of

the fact that Scotland has had its own government ever since devolution took place in 1999, an issue that will be discussed in section 2.2.4. Taking into consideration the definitions stated above, Scotland could accordingly be classified as “a nation without a state” (Giddens 2006: 873). Among all the popular concepts out there, Benedict Anderson’s (2006: 6-7) theory of the nation as an “imagined community” can easily be described as a crucial starting point. The nation is termed ‘imagined’ since members of even the smallest nation will probably never get to meet their fellow members, still, “in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (ibid.: 6). Moreover, a nation is considered to be ‘limited’ because of its boundaries, beyond which other nations lie. In addition, it is imagined as ‘sovereign’ (not the case in Scotland, however), which can be traced back to the Age of Enlightenment and Revolution where the concept was born. Most importantly, the nation is imagined as a ‘community’ that represents comradeship.

Given that nation-states are commonly associated with the rise of a nationalist agenda, which certainly applies to Scotland, this chapter will also delve into the concept of nationalism. As a notion that is repeatedly discussed in the following sections, it can have a rather negative connotation when viewing it in terms of considering your country to be better than any other (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Compass 2005). Quite contrary to that definition, it can also mean the desire by a group of people to establish an independent country (OALC 2005), which has always been a topic of interest in Scotland. A less radical characterisation is provided by Giddens (2006: 1025) who refers to nationalism as “a set of beliefs and symbols expressing identification with a given national community”, which is close to defining it as “any ideology or set of attitudes, emotions, and mentalities based on the assertion of such claims” (Roshwald 2006: 3). Similarly, nationalism can be used to describe “a consciousness of belonging” that is closely linked with “sentiments and aspirations for its security and prosperity” (Smith 1991: 72).

With regards to a more politically-based definition, nationalism is described as “the outcome of political mobilization of national identity” (Lynch 2001: 445), implying that its most distinct expression comes in its form as a parliamentary movement, striving to create a state with clear-cut geographical boundaries. Since the main objective of nationalism is to set up an independent nation-state, Scotland can be depicted as a country maintaining a strong bond with nationalist ideas and goals. Exhibiting some

appealing qualities, “[nationalism] is probably the most influential political ideology of the 19th and 20th centuries” (Lynch 2001: 445), but it is also about a homeland being handed down from one generation to the next. This reasoning is partly consistent with Gellner’s (1983: 125) prominent work, stating that nationalism is “the [foundation] of political life” and that it is “inherent in a certain set of social conditions”, conditions which he argues “are the conditions of our time”.

Having clarified some of the themes relating to national identity, the aim is to provide a definition for the term itself. In an attempt to describe identity, Jeffrey Richards (1997: 1) says that “[each] individual has a set of multiple identities which operate at different times and under different circumstances”. Factors that need to be taken under consideration are gender, religion, family, ethnic group, status, class, region and, most importantly, nation. Of all the collective identities that people share with others, which are as mentioned above, “national identity is perhaps the most fundamental and inclusive” (Smith 1991: 143). Referring to a modernist version of the nation, Smith claims that nationalism as an ideology is responsible for the creation of national identity. Being relatively modern itself, nationalism has merged into the political sphere, but since it can operate on more than only one level it can be regarded as “a form of culture as much as a species of political ideology and social movement” (ibid.: 71). As such an ideological movement it is the driving force that attains and maintains “the *autonomy*, *unity* and *identity* of a nation” (ibid.: 74).

> Not only has national*ism*, the ideological movement, penetrated every corner of the globe; the world is divided, first and foremost, into nation-states […] and national identity everywhere underpins the recurrent drive for popular sovereignty and democracy […]. (Smith 1991: 143)

Once more, it is made obvious that national identity and nationalism are co-dependent concepts correlating with each other, with the element of sovereignty to play an important part. Among other things, both concepts suggest a degree of belonging and imply unity and sameness. From a social standpoint, the national bond provides a sense of inclusion and being part of a community, which was already named as being fundamentally important. Said community determines boundaries within which social intercourse usually takes place and helps distinguish outsiders. Politically speaking, national identity is often the main influence on policy goals and administrative practices that “regulate the everyday lives of each citizen” (Smith 1991: 144). Given that the examination and analysis of the gathered material takes place

on a political level, I believe it is important to realise the impact national identity can have on several domains of life, including politically motivated decisions.

Leaving aside the fact that there are different points of view from which national identity and nationalism can be looked at, most historians and social scientists seem to agree on the fact that national identity is a social construct, meaning that the ways in which people define themselves and in relation to others is shaped by cultural, historical, social, as well as political factors (Roshwald 2006: 253). Similarly, scholars of nations and nationalism have spent most of the 20th century arguing that "there are many different traits that can provide the foundation for national unity and identity", on top of the fact that "nations differ in the mix of the traits that form the basis of their unity and identity" (Shulman 2002: 555). Typically, there is a distinction made between nations as civic, political, or territorial (common in Western Europe and the United States), as opposed to ethnic or cultural (common in Germany and some Eastern European countries). The key components marking the civic/political nation, which the whole of Great Britain appears to be an example of, involves factors like: territory, citizenship, will and consent, political ideology, as well as political institutions and rights. These five components form the basis for national unity and membership to be derived from, including a sense of attachment to a specific territory, the belief in the same ideological or political principles, and most importantly, the will to be part of a given nation. As for the last aspect mentioned here, the civic form indeed seems to be commonly associated with

> liberal, tolerant, inclusive values, because of its criteria for membership can theoretically be met by any resident of a nation-state's territory; it's simply a matter of individually choosing to *subscribe* to a common set of principles. (Roshwald 2006: 258)

According to this, other than having forced upon them a sense of commitment, individuals voluntarily choose to be part of something that makes them feel connected to a community of people, binding them together and suggesting a sense of unity and belonging. Cultural identity, on the other hand, is based on non-political cultural traits alone (language, religion, traditions), while the criteria determining membership of the ethnic form involve a sense of shared ancestry and race (cf. Shulman 2002: 559).

Apart from the fact that critics like to criticise the civic/ethnic and West/East dichotomies for their normative and ethno-centric bias[1], every type of nationalism is said to have both civic and ethnic elements that vary according to form and degree. Often the civic and territorial prevail, while at other times ethnic and vernacular components are emphasised (cf. Smith 1991: 13). Although distinguishing between these two forms is anything but straightforward, most scholars seem to agree on the fact that Scotland does indeed exhibit forms of national identity and nationalism that appear to be primarily civic in nature (cf. Leith 2012; Soule et al. 2012). So, taking national identity and nationalism as a starting point, the following sections present the complexities and ambiguities involved in dealing with both these concepts.

### *2.1.2 'Banal nationalism'*

As suggested by Kiely et al. (2006), one of the central yet largely controversial concepts of studies of nationalism seems to be the alleged relationship between national identity and the way in which people perceive and consume media, as the following quote states:

> Newspapers have long been seen as binding people into 'national' political and cultural agendas, thereby helping to create and sustain a strong sense of national identity. (Kiely et al. 2006: 473)

National identity which, in Schlesinger's (1991b: 300) words, is to be understood as "a specific form of collective identity", involves the notions of exclusion as well as inclusion. While inclusion provides a boundary shielding 'us' from others, exclusion works the other way round and provides categories that distinguish 'us' from 'them'. As for the relationship between the media and national identity, he urges that, although work on the matter has shed some light on this connection, it also "makes gratuitous assumptions about the nation-state, national culture and national identity" (Schlesinger 1991a: 172). Talking of the media as "[a space] in which contests for various forms of dominance take place", Schlesinger sets out to discuss so-called communicate spaces of nations without states (e.g. Scotland), which are part of the public domain and as such "objects of public policy-making" (Schlesinger 1991b: 299). His working assumption is that of a collectivity which is said to be territorially confined and concentrated within a nation-state, or even spanning across boundaries

[1] cf. Shulman (2002: 557 ff) for an extensive account of critique directed at the civic/ethnic dichotomy

of two or more states. This collectivity believes itself to have a national cultural identity comprising several characteristics like:

- a meaningful sense of place
- a distinctive language (e.g. Scots)
- identifiable heroes (e.g. William Wallace)
- battles (e.g. Battle of Bannockburn) and traditions (e.g. Highland Games, kilts, bagpipes) that are part of a national history or collective memory
- specific economic, cultural and political institutions (e.g. Holyrood)

Some of these characteristics are confirmed to be important markers for national identity in a study by Kiely et al. (2001), adding that place of birth and length of residence (pertaining to those having moved to Scotland) are crucial factors.

Repeating his line of argument, Schlesinger (cf. 1991a: 172ff) reminds his readers that they should first concern themselves with the way in which collective identities are established and only then think about how culture and communication (e.g. the media) feature within that problematic. This consideration arguably entails that people should abstain from making assumptions regarding the "linkages between media and collective identities that we are actually obliged to demonstrate" (Schlesinger 1991b: 307), adding that work like this still remains to be done. In support of Schlesinger's statement concerning haphazard assumptions about the media-national identity relation, Law (2001: 299) states that these "gratuitous assumptions continue to hold sway" and that only little research has been done ever since Schlesinger[2] called for a re-evaluation of the alleged connection.

Returning to some of the key figures involved in this line of research, it is pointed out that authors like Benedict Anderson and Michael Billig make the media-national identity relationship their main point of focus (cf. Kiely et al. 2006: 474), developing their theories based on their own understanding of what nations are and which role national identity thus plays. For Billig's concept to work, he claims to have stretched the term 'nationalism' when introducing the notion of 'banal nationalism' to include "the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced" (Billig 1995: 6). He argues that these very habits are not removed from everyday life, but that, in fact, the nation is 'flagged' on a daily basis in order to remind its citizens of their nationhood. The idea is raised that nationhood provides

[2] For a more detailed account see Schlesinger (1991b: 303ff)

the background for political discourses, cultural products and even the structuring of newspapers, which is an appealing statement considering the topic of this thesis. Citizens of a country are daily reminded of their home, their national place; reminders that are so familiar and continual that they almost go unnoticed and are not detected as such. What is more, claiming to possess a national identity implies being situated legally, physically, socially, and most importantly (I believe) emotionally within a homeland. It is argued that with globalization coming to the fore, nationalism is no longer a major force and nation-states are in fact declining, according to a growing body of opinion. Here, Billig (1995: 8) argues that a reminder is necessary, for "[n]ationhood is still being reproduced" and its symbols are flagged on a regular basis.

Since nationalism can be viewed as having a sense of the extreme attached to it, Western academics tend to find a nationalist quality in others rather than in themselves (Billig 1995: 15). Nevertheless, if we take a closer look at Scotland's constant pursuit of independence and the developments succeeding devolution in 1999, it is fair to say that the Scots (or at least their leading political party) could indeed be considered nationalists, that is people who want their country to achieve independence (see OALC 2005). Nationalism, which was defined as the desire to create an independent nation-state with sovereign power, is hence seen as the force that establishes nation-states, or poses a threat to the stability of existing states, which is interesting in the case of a united England and Scotland (and the rest of the UK). A quite intriguing idea is presented in the claim that once a nation-state has been established, the nationalist idea (transforming a nation into a nation-state) seems to suddenly vanish. Nationalism could therefore be seen as a developmental stage that is overcome as soon as the goal or the final stage is reached. It is argued, however, that nationalism cannot disappear from one day to the other, but remains visible in everyday life which is claimed to be a threat. Nationalism, as opposed to normal and ordinary life, is emotionally as well as politically charged and therefore rather extra-ordinary (Billig 1995: 43-44). However, since Scotland has not yet established a commonly acknowledged nation-state, is this not the indicator for nationalism to be as present as ever? With regards to that issue, McCrone (1992: 159), just like Gellner (1991), draws attention to the fact that most modern societies are in fact nationalist, although if practised correctly, nationalism tends to remain implicit which is what Billig essentially proposes.

The controversy and disagreement over the meaning of nationalism seems to come down to what national identity is perceived to be. 'Flagging' the nation, in a banal or implicit way, is claimed to strengthen 'national identity' in any given nation-state, which was established that Scotland is clearly not. Even so, the dividedness surrounding an abstract and much discussed concept like 'national identity' remains. Scholars have long since tried to find answers to questions like 'What is national identity and what does it mean to claim one?' Nevertheless, it is made clear that questions concerning one's own national identity always correlates with the way in which 'others' are viewed and from whom 'we' aim to identify 'ourselves' as different (Billig 1995: 60-61). I find it convincingly argued that in Scotland's case, this is done by establishing a distinct and exclusive group, which Scots themselves have access to and a group that 'others' (the English in particular?) are consciously excluded from (Douglas 2006: 11). Venturing even further into the realm of 'national identity', the question that is deemed crucially important is how the national 'we' is constructed and what this construction is meant to achieve. It is suggested that 'we ourselves' can only claim to have a distinct national identity if the nation we live in is imagined to have one. Here, Billig (1995: 70) declares Benedict Anderson's idea of the 'imagined community' to be a useful starting point for exploring this theme. With newspapers being sold to a mass audience, they can be accredited with being popular "one-day best-sellers" (Anderson 2006: 35). For this very reason (i.e. newspapers as commodity for the masses), a mass ceremony is created that involves an unknown number of people all taking part in the same ritual that is reading a newspaper. Although the consumption of a paper is probably done in a private sphere, the reader is supposedly aware of the fact that others pass through the same process of consuming a piece of print-media at the same time. Thus, the reader "is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life" (ibid.: 35-36). Anderson assigns to newspapers the ability to create a shared sense of national community, relying on the assumption that "[its readers] will indeed imagine a community of fellow readers" (Rosie et al. 2004: 438). Billig (1995), in addition to what Anderson proposes, puts forward the idea that a nation is more than an imagined community of people, since a place or homeland has to be imagined, too. Nationhood therefore seems to involve "a distinctive imagining of a particular sort of community rooted in a particular sort of place" (ibid.: 74). Countering Agnew's (1989: 167) argument that nationalism never goes beyond geography, Billig (1995: 74)

asserts that the national place has to be imagined, just as the community of people does. Essentially, the theory of nationhood implies there to be a unity of people, place and state, with nation-states around the world adhering to the same basic categories for their 'country' and their 'people'. This universal code of nationality presumably demands that particular people and their homelands are special. One and the same linguistic root produces the name of the country (e.g. Austria, Germany, Italy, etc.) and the collective noun referring to the people inhabiting it (e.g. Austrians, Germans, Italians, etc.) (ibid.: 77-78). An interesting exception to that rule is the United Kingdom, which is known not to be inhabited by 'United Kingdonians'. What is more, the UK's official and, indeed, long title, the 'United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland' is hardly ever used by its inhabitants, especially when referring to themselves (cf. Hall 1992 qtd. in Billig 1995: 78). One could now easily read into the seemingly unimportant fact that people living in the UK do not actually have a name for themselves, but that they are known for referring to themselves as English, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish or British, in fact. This is where the problem of dual-identity arises, meaning that the English, for example, do not only refer to themselves as being English but also British, an issue that was explored in one of the studies presented in section 2.3.

If nationalism is considered to be an ideology of the first person plural, telling 'us' who 'we' are, then nationalism is as much an ideology of the first as well as the third person, since there can be no 'us' without a 'them' (Billig 1995: 78). The question that now needs to be asked is why do 'we' not forget 'our' national identity so easily? The answer provided by Billig (1995: 93) is simple: "'our' identity is continually being flagged", which cannot merely be ascribed to the literal flag hanging quietly outside a building anymore, the metonymic image that is created to illustrate the concept of 'banal nationalism'.

> Small words, rather than grand memorable phrases, offer constant, but barely conscious, reminders of the homeland, making 'our' national identity unforgettable. (Billig 1995: 93)

Flagging the homeland thus involves words, words that may be small and seemingly unimportant. Hence, it is suggested that "[t]he crucial words of banal nationalism are often the smallest" (Billig 1995: 94) and come in forms like 'we', 'this', 'here', etc. Aside from easily visible personal pronouns (we, us, they, them, etc.), as well as

adverbs of place (here, there, etc.) and time (now, then, etc.), it is asserted that the English article 'the' plays a quiet but important part in a routine deixis, which points out the homeland in a banal (i.e. implicit) fashion. The role of the mass media now is to bring the flags to people's homes, metaphorically speaking of course. A case study of British national newspapers printed on a single day (i.e. 28th June 1993) that Billig draws from, reveals that "the deixis of homeland is embedded in the very fabric of the newspapers" (ibid.: 94). Although not consciously detected by the readership, these little deictic words make the nation more familiar and even homely. Words like 'I', 'you', 'we', 'here' or 'now' are generally used in a deictic way (Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990 qtd. in Billig 1995: 106) and point to something concrete, namely the here and now that the speakers and listeners are located in. In agreement with the observation that small words like personal pronouns, references to time as well as space and demonstratives play an important role as indicators, Law (2001: 301) adds that they also form the deictic centre of the nation and locate the reader within "a shared verbal universe". What makes homeland deixis special is that it places 'us' within 'our' homeland and appeals to the national 'we'. 'This', for instance, is often used deictically to signify place (e.g. 'this' country/nation; 'this', the greatest country in human history; etc.). Another form of deixis is the definite article 'the', which, because of its lack of metaphorically pointing at something, can hardly be said to count as deictic. When using 'the' in order to point to something "[n]o specification is necessary: *the* nation is *this* nation, 'our' nation" (Billig 1995: 107). Here, Brookes (1999: 255) voices disagreement saying that

> [it] would be wrong to suggest that whenever the words 'we' or 'us' are used in newspaper editorials it is the nation that is being automatically denoted.

Petersoo (2007: 419), who maintains that 'banal nationalism' has been one of the "most popular concepts entering the scholarly discussion of nationalism and national identity during the last decade", goes into detail about the use of the deictic expression 'we' in media discourse. His findings support the initial claim made by Brookes that 'we' should not prematurely be declared as exhibiting nationalistic properties, adding, however, that Brookes contradicts himself by implying that the use of 'we' should indeed be interpreted as national. After all, national newspapers are, by definition, distributed nationally and therefore appear in a context that is assumed to be national, thus within this context, deictic expressions (e.g. 'we' and

‘us’) “can be understood as referring to the nation”, or so Brookes (1999: 256) maintains. Petersoo’s (2007) corpus study analysing the occurrence of deictic expressions in Scottish national newspapers suggests that the situation is far from conclusive. The data set consists of 110 leading articles that appeared during the 1979 and 1997 devolution referenda and were published by self-proclaimed national newspapers *The Herald* (Glasgow) and *The Scotsman* (Edinburgh). Apparently, the evaluation of editorials proves to be especially interesting since they help “trace the formulation of opinions and the expression of ideologies [that have] persuasive, political, social, and cultural functions” (van Dijk 1993b qtd. in Petersoo 2007: 423). This particular study is limited to a month before and after the referenda dates and covers most of the debates concerning these decisive moments. During such moments, discussions about (national) identity flare up and become a point of interest for the public, as well as for the media. Petersoo reports that the actual analysis of the collected data was guided by the discourse-historical approach made popular by scholars like Wodak et al. (1999) and deCillia et al. (1999) and aimed at discovering which nation is discursively constructed and banally flagged in the newspapers under consideration. Petersoo distinguishes between three different types of deictic ‘we’ (i.e. exclusive newspaper ‘we’; inclusive Scottish ‘we’; all-inclusive British ‘we’), which adds another layer of complexity to the whole topic of deixis in the media. The first kind (‘we’ denoting the newspaper) represents the newspaper as the actor who provides readers with information that they ought to accept. The most crucial observation that needs to be reconsidered when entering the phase of analysis (see chapter 4) is the fact that “[there] is no obvious invitation to partake in the imagining of ‘us’; the ‘we’ does not try to encompass Scottishness” (Petersoo 2007: 425). The second kind of ‘we’ (referring to the newspaper and its readers) is said to be the most common in Scottish media, expressing a sense of national unity. Although ‘we’ and ‘us’ are usually meant to refer to ‘us, the Scots’, the third kind of ‘we’ (referring to Britain) does not necessarily address readers as Scottish. This is not surprising since Scottish and British identities co-exist alongside each other and dual identities are a common phenomenon in Scotland. In essence, the findings of the study suggest that the occurrence of deictic expressions like ‘we’ in Scottish national newspapers is “much more complex than Billig allows for” (Petersoo 2007: 428), which presents a challenge and will be taken into

consideration when interpreting seemingly obvious and conveniently convincing findings revealed by my own analysis in chapter 4.

According to Billig (1995: 108), the form of deixis used in flagging the nation functions as so-called “homeland-making” and creates a kind of homely feeling, it is argued. The nation, which is imagined as this homely place, is surrounded by borders protecting its citizens against the dangers of the outside world. It is claimed one can easily imagine oneself as being a part of this family (i.e. the nation), and that the homeland-making language must constantly be used in order to remind everyone of their own country. National identity is a form of life, it is reasoned, which usually closes the front door and seals a country’s borders.

> [Deictic language] help[s] to shut the national door on the outside world. ‘The’ shuts the door more tightly than ‘this’. Just as ‘we’ implies ‘them’, so ‘this country’ generally implies a contrastive ‘those countries’. (ibid. 109)

In his exploration of nationalism and the ways in which it has been observed to be expressed, Billig (1995: 109) reasons that flagging the nation is possibly restricted to political discourse only. Further investigation would be necessary in order to produce useful data and tangible evidence, showing that the media do in fact flag national identity as well. For this to be shown, various forms of mass media would need to be sampled and compared over a longer period of time in a number of countries. Typically, newspapers, very much like politicians, claim to be at the centre of the country and in the public eye. Especially in opinion and editorial columns, as was hinted at before, they attempt to speak for and to the nation simultaneously.

The deictic expressions used in the homeland-making are, however, not bound to the little words already mentioned (i.e. ‘the’, ‘this’, ‘us’, etc.), since there are other ways of presenting the nation as the centre of attention. In his book, Billig (1995: 116-118) lists three examples that are likely to function as homeland-making deixis:

- the nation

Unless they are told otherwise by the headline or first paragraph, readers commonly assume that the events being reported have occurred in the homeland. Here, the definite article could be used to point to a particular nation in question, which happens to be Britain, in this case. People (e.g. the Prime Minister) and locations known to be located within ‘the’ nation (i.e. Britain) are not specifically flagged as

British, whereas foreign places and people are ('The *American* business men'). In these instances, it is suggested that 'we' immediately know where we are situated ('here' or 'there').

- the weather

The very idea of the weather has a notion of the national attached to it, since typically a map the size and shape of Britain is featured that is assumed to be recognized by the readers of any 'British' newspaper. Sections reporting the weather normally do so without explicitly mentioning the nation, although sub-parts or districts may be identified. Usually, however, 'the country' is enough to indicate the location of the news and its readers (e.g. 'Rather cold throughout the country').

- the home news

The broadsheets commonly separate their sections by indicating to the reader whether they are confronted with 'Home News' or 'Overseas News' (*The Times*), 'News' or 'Foreign News' (*The Telegraph*), as well as 'Home News', 'European News', or 'International News' (*The Guardian*). All of the broadsheets, regardless of their politics, have made it their aim to treat home and foreign news separately and signpost events that take place within the national borders. Consequently, readers will immediately know whether news reports feature home-related content or not. The headings 'home' or 'foreign' not only tell the readers where they are situated in terms of news story, but also determine the home of the newspaper and flag it to their assumed readership.

Although one might expect a greater number of flaggings of the national name, a study would be necessary in order to establish the frequency with which items like 'Britain', 'British' and 'Brits' or phrases like 'we, the British', 'the nation' or 'the country' occur in broadsheets and tabloids. Nevertheless, Billig (ibid.: 118) admits that one should be cautious to assume that a high frequency of the occurrence of the nation's name is "an indicator of an increased level of banal nationalism", a statement that is repeatedly made by scholars investigating the field (see above). The deixis of homeland-making can also subtly be achieved by embedding it in "the structures of representation" (ibid.: 118), which make the explicit flagging of the national location unnecessary.

Interestingly, the sources mentioned in the day survey that form the basis for Billig's conclusions are exclusively English (e.g. *The Guardian*, *The Telegraph*, *The Express*, *The Independent*, *The Times*, etc.). None of the Scottish or, in fact, Welsh (national) newspapers are mentioned, much less reviewed in detail. Most of the newspaper under consideration cannot even be termed 'national', as some of them are known to report regional and local news. It is interesting to note here that Billig, for that very reason, is accused of having taken the easy way out by appointing words like 'Britain' and 'British' to be responsible for marking the nation (cf. Rosie et al. 2004: 441). Also, terms like 'here', 'we' or 'us' are readily interpreted as flagging the British nation, without explaining how exactly he arrived at that conclusion. Rosie et al. (2004) admit, however, that the indexical character of language and the refutable nature of intricate concepts like 'nation' seriously limit an objective categorisation of terms implying the national. Also, Billig's assumption that the given national context is British might not work well with readers "[who may] bring different national frames or reference to bear upon the same text" (Rosie et al. 2004: 443), a statement that is consistent with my initial reasoning on the matter. Concerning the issue of subsuming the newspapers published in England under the heading 'British press', Law (2001: 300) calls for 'banal nationalism' to be revised in the context of Scotland since Billig's approach to nationalism cannot randomly be transferred to Scotland as "a stateless nation" and an only semi-autonomous press. Also, he questions Billig's habit of ignoring the crucial difference between nation and state when ascribing banal nationalism to states like the UK and the United States. According to this, it appears to be up to the researcher to read into the occurrence of certain words (especially deictic terminology) and decide whether an implicit reference to nation is made, a task that is said to be utterly difficult and will therefore be approached with caution.

Although 'banal nationalism' with its extended meaning of nationalism may not be directly transferable to Scotland as a nation that has not yet achieved sovereignty, the concept as described by Billig is based upon the very principles that define nationalism, a type of nationalism that is rooted in Scotland's past and that has worked its way back to the top again. As can be seen in most of the newspaper extracts analysed in chapter 4, a sense of unity and shared destiny binding people together are among the factors determining the membership of a particular nation. What seems to be important here is that the Scottish version of nationalism, as was

explained before, is primarily being viewed as a modernist concept, putting an emphasis on the civic and territorial aspects rather than on the ethnic and tribal ones, which is also why anyone residing in Scotland can rightfully claim to be Scottish (cf. Soule 2012: 5). In fact, neo-nationalism or "sub-state nationalism" (Hamilton 2004: 658) was thought to be a phenomenon of the past but has apparently resurfaced, with many nationalist parties of the West being civic parties seeking autonomy or independence in order to secure development. The SNP is only one among such parties that aspires self-determination and that endorses a sort of nationalism that is marked by "a critique of the *status quo* based on the perceived flaws of the host state" (ibid.: 659), which in Scotland's case refers to the UK and the perceived fact that Scotland is not able to fulfil its potential being stuck in a union that treats them less favourably.

As far as national identity in Scotland is concerned, there are a number of issues that arise. One the one hand, Scottishness has seen a transformation from being anti-English in nature to becoming an exclusively policy-driven issue, meaning that "negative terms continue to be employed in political form" (Leith 2008: 89). Not only are Labour and the Conservatives (in Scotland) accused of being 'run' by London, but also are the latter referred to as anti-Scottish, concluding that they must be English instead. Apart from that, however, the days of directly attacking the English as 'other' are apparently over. Following the rules of civic nationalism, the sense of being Scottish that is proposed by the SNP, above all, has become quite inclusive, which is also evident in the party manifestos issued by the Scottish National Party. In the last one, issued in 2005, Scotland as a place was strongly featured in order to establish a sense of belonging, other than relating it to its people (cf. Leith 2008). Apart from the implications of Scottishness having changed, there also seems to have been a shift in terms of viewing one's own identity when compared to another. According to several studies[3] (forthcoming), Britishness as the overarching national identity appears to have declined when compared to Scottishness, with people in Scotland now tending to distinguish between their state identity (British) and their national identity (Scottish).

[3] See for example McCrone et al. (1998), Condor & Abell (2006), Soule et al. (2012)

Having outlined nationalism and national identity as they are perceived in Scotland, the following sections will provide some more information on the historical and political developments to shed some light on the complicated relationship that has marked England and Scotland over the past centuries. Moreover, they also address the notion of Scottishness and Britishness, asking whether these notions are mutually exclusive or in fact interrelated.

## 2.2 (Political) History

The present chapter is designed to illustrate how Scotland and England formed a union and portrays Scotland's struggle to break away from a dominant English neighbour in order to reach independence. Some of Scotland's and England's shared history will be outlined, starting with the Union in 1707 and leading up to the heatedly discussed issue of the independence referendum which will be held in late 2014. In fact, much of what is treated here is crucial to the understanding of Scotland's past and how national identity has remained to be a driving force, not only in politics but also in people's personal lives.

### *2.2.1 The Union*

The Treaty of Union, which became effective on 1 May 1707, abolished the Scottish Parliament and ensured that political sovereignty was transferred to a single British parliament instead, which caused understandable discontent north of the Scottish-English border. Essentially, the treaty set up a British state which was henceforth called 'the United Kingdom of Great Britain'. The newly created British parliament was intended to supersede the independent legislatures of both England and Scotland, but in reality it established an enlarged English parliament (Lynch 2001: 604). The Scots had to give up the traditions of their 500-year-old parliament and had to conform to new parliamentary procedures now dictated by England. This was apparent in the fact that only few Scots were incorporated into the new legislature. In addition to the 16 peers the Scots had sent, only 45 Scottish MPs, out of a total of 558 MPs at Westminster, were allowed to sit in on parliamentary sessions (Jackson 2012: 108). On the positive side, the treaty permitted Scotland to participate in free trade with England and the English colonies; however, Scotland was henceforth to follow English regulations regarding the payment of taxes and customs, in return for

financial compensation, whereas the treaty did not touch ecclesiastical matters. Both the Scottish and English parliaments had made sure of that prior to the union taking place by passing Acts preserving the integrity of their churches. The same applied for judicial institutions in Scotland which upheld their integrity as well (Lynch 2001: 604). Apart from unionism being said to be ideologically important when it comes to defending Scottish identity, it was also the trigger for Scotland being drawn into a relationship of dependency with England. British identity, it is claimed, relies to a large extent on the Union of 1707 which was not only responsible for establishing a new and consistently Protestant state but also created an empire based on free trade (ibid. 609).

As for identity issues, the Union gave rise to revolutionary Scottish thinking regarding national identity. Until then it had been possible to think of Scotland as a state with a well-defined, if jeopardised, sovereignty. After the union, Scots had to think of themselves as people who had given up their political independence to one of the enormous monarchies of that time. This line of thinking originated in the debate about whether a new union with England would be needed after the failure of the Darien Scheme in 1698 and the passing of the Act of Security in 1703, which was eventually concluded by the passing of the Act of Union in 1707. In the course of this debate, Scotland was painted as a failing nation whose political integrity had been put in jeopardy since the Union of Crowns in 1603, a time that was marked by the absence of kings, the corruption of the nobility and England's jealousy regarding Scotland's commercial success. Scots of different political convictions and parties feared that the Scottish economy would fail, people would start to emigrate and the civil society would collapse. It was a time when Scots started to believe that small countries could only survive if supported by larger ones and England appeared to be the right choice for making all that possible. People hoped that the union would put an end to the political and economic power of the nobility, bring faction to an end and boost the economy. Some even dared to hope that the union would strengthen Scottish independence and lead to a more favourable union between the two countries. These hopes were opposed by the fear that a union would further compromise independence, put the integrity of the church at risk, jeopardise the economy and legal system and undermine the culture of the northern part of Britain. The sense of national identity that arose out of these fears and hopes evoked a preoccupation with

the modernisation of Scotland's civil and ecclesiastical society, as well as its economy. The burgeoning interest in modernising Scotland was soon overshadowed by the fear of turning into an Anglicised province, which made Scots more sensitive and wary of their English counterparts (Lynch 2001: 441-442).

The Victorian and Edwardian era is said to have been shaped by the identification with the nation, regardless of how it was governed. As was already established in section 3.1.2, nationalism is the force that usually creates nation-states, allowing the nation to reach a level of independence. Although it is claimed that a British national identity had come to prevail by the beginning of Queen Victoria's reign in 1837, a strong sense of national identity continued to play a role within Scotland. The queen herself showed great interest in Scotland which was consolidated by her buying the Balmoral Estate in 1848 and helped romanticise the image of the Highlands and, thus, Scotland. Scottish national identity was explicitly stated on many occasions by proposing or building monuments to commemorate Sir William Wallace[4] in Lanark, Ayr, Stirling, Edinburgh and Aberdeen between 1820 and 1888. The 1880s also saw a revival of the clan societies, with a distinct antiquarian outlook and the clan name to function as a reminder of Scotland's historical past. The political change taking place at the time helped their cause by making sure to push the issue of the Home Rule[5] on all the major parties' agendas. In a nutshell, the Victorian and Edwardian period saw Scottish national identity to be preserved in many respects, which included literary output as well as using Scots in regional newspapers as a means of discussing contemporary matters, but coexisted with loyalty towards the British monarchy and Empire (Lynch 2001: 442-443).

The aftermath of World War I put national identity to the test when the ideas underlying Scottish self-perception were swept away in an instant. With the British Empire slowly falling apart, Scots found themselves being trapped in poor social and economic situations and emigration came to stand for escaping them. With the rise of the labour party, the political landscape changed as well and shed light on working class problems. The changed environment that Scots found themselves in allowed for debates surrounding the state of Scottish national identity to unfold. Due to

[4] Wallace rose to become one of the most important figures fighting the Wars of Independence between 1286 and 1353. Essentially, the term refers to the period of warfare resulting from England's attempted subjugation of the Scottish kingdom under Edward I (Lynch 2001: 333).
[5] The term refers to the right of a country to govern itself, especially after another country has governed it (Oxford Advance Learner's Compass 2005).

Scottish businesses moving southwards to the more flourishing markets of middle England, Scotland lost its position as a major manufacturing site for heavy industry, which only added to the overall dissatisfaction caused by long-term unemployment. The repercussions suffered as a result from economic dislocation reached a peak when the Great Depression struck in 1929. People felt that, due to limited government intervention of the time, only little could be done to improve Scotland's disastrous economic and social problems. In this context, voices claiming to be unfairly treated rose and soon nationalism was the order of business. Despite the fact that nationalism was associated with left-wing activities in the 1920s, the 1930s saw many middle-class Scots joining the chorus of disapproval bemoaning Scotland's decline (Lynch 2001: 443-444). Although there were nationalist intentions uttered, the National Party of Scotland and the SNP (its successor) "failed to mobilize this discontent into a significant political force" (444). Yet, the united national government feared that nationalism could grow to become a threat, which is why it was decided to move the Scottish Office[6] to Edinburgh in 1937 in order to calm the situation. However, the Scottish Secretary of State, in charge of the Scottish Office, admitted that nationalism would remain a potential threat unless the economic problems were solved.

Other than the implications of the first war, the Second World War was the indicator for Scottish politicians to realise that it would be a good time for their country to benefit from the Union again. The reverberation of the war induced a significant change in thinking about the unified nation and Scotland's part in it. Reconstruction plans were forged that saw the state regulating the economy and provide employment as well as welfare benefits for all Scottish citizens. The period leading up to the late 1960s might, according to historians, be classified as the 'New Britain'. The improvements of that time (i.e. introduction of the Welfare State, full employment and social reconstruction) made it relatively easy for Scots to think of themselves as being British, a situation that nationalism could only offer little against. When nationalism eventually did advance in the 1960s and mid-70s, it was because of repeated discontent with the economy. At that time, the SNP (Scottish National Party) gained a lot of votes, which was an ideal way for British politicians to become more aware of Scottish matters. Nonetheless, when people got to vote on the issue of

[6] Part of the central administration in Scotland until the Scottish parliament was established in 1999 as a result of devolution (cf. Lynch 2001: 579-580).

devolution in the late 1970s, the referendum showed that opinions were divided over whether Scotland should have an assembly. In fact, the government in London was expected to act on the agreed upon post-war deal including state intervention to guarantee a state of economic and social welfare. With the advent of 'Thatcherism' in the 1980s, people started to rethink what it meant to be Scottish or British, even. The Scots developed a habit of rejecting the Conservative Party in elections, which happened in defiance of the fact that socio-economic matters increasingly moved closer to England. For many, the solution to the growing problem of dissatisfaction was the establishment of a Scottish parliament in Edinburgh, Scotland's capital, which would allow for Scottish concerns to be voiced without being overrun by Westminster. In 1999, after passing the Scotland Act supported by Blair's Labour government, a Scottish parliament located in Edinburgh was finally created (Lynch 2001: 444).

### *2.2.2 Devolution*

Devolution essentially refers to "the transfer of power from a central government to a regional government" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Compass 2005), which took place in the UK in 1999, involving the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Undoubtedly, the nationalist parties of both countries, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Plaid Cymru, can be named the driving forces behind this process. Both had demanded that the centralized power of the parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain be transferred to their own assemblies (OALC 2005).

The last steps towards devolution were taken in 1997 when a referendum, held by Tony Blair's Labour government, was supposed to bring the decisive vote on whether Scotland should have its own parliament. As a matter of fact, a large majority of Scotland's population voted in favour of devolution, whereas only a small majority of Welsh people voted in favour of the same. Nevertheless, as of 1999, the Scottish Parliament started its work at Holyrood, Edinburgh, consisting of 129 MSPs (Members of the Scottish Parliament), 56 of which are elected by proportional representation every four years. The First Minister (currently Alex Salmond of the SNP) is head of office and chosen by the Parliament and who, in turn, is responsible for selecting the other members of the Scottish Executive (responsible for deciding policies). With devolution, the Scottish Office, which up to that point had had a lot of

control over Scottish affairs, was replaced. Up until today, Scotland and Wales still have MPs sitting in the parliament at Westminster, although some believe that they should not be involved in the decision-making process concerning English matters (OALC 2005).

Since devolution brought about a sense of home rule and has the support of a majority of Scots, it is not surprising that the event caused for a major re-evaluation of national identity, accompanied by thoughts concerning Scottishness and Britishness. Those who are content with remaining in the UK are willing to recognise their identity as both Scottish and British. To those who would end the membership in the union, devolution represents the stepping stone to ultimate independence and a significant progression along the continuum of self-government. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a straightforward connection between opting for independence, voting for the SNP, the party associated with a nationalist agenda, and defining oneself as Scottish (cf. McCrone & Paterson 2002).

A study executed by Bond and Rosie (2002), examines constitutional change and national identity as correlating with each other and reviews people's political attitudes, as well as their opinions regarding devolution. A large number of attitude surveys are usually designed to trigger responses regarding the Scottish-British dual identity in Scotland and the data gathered over the years reveal that the balance between the two has considerably shifted. The findings of this particular study are claimed to be consistent with other surveys on national identity in terms of changed perception. The number of respondents professing an exclusively Scottish identity almost doubled between 1992 and 2001. Similarly, the number of people claiming to hold a dual identity (Scottish AND British) has declined from a third to a quarter in that same period of time. Interestingly, and relevant for devolution as a turning point in Scottish politics, some question whether the rise in exclusive Scottishness has to be seen as a post-devolution phenomenon only.

Despite the seemingly clear connection, however, Scottishness gained significance when compared to Britishness in terms of indicating the nationality that 'best' described the participants of the survey. As for the political significance of national identities, I feel it is important to note here that strong levels of Scottishness do not necessarily correspond with people's support for political parties such as the SNP and their goal of an independent Scotland. In fact, the study found that only a small

minority (even exclusive Scots) of respondents did support both the SNP and independence, with a large proportion supporting neither. Those who prioritise their Scottishness, as opposed to their Britishness, clearly support the Scottish Parliament when asked to name the most influential institution. Despite some rather unexpected results pertaining to the importance and role of national identity, Bond and Rosie (2002: 52) conclude that it appears to have at least a clear influence on how the responsibilities and powers of the Scottish Parliament are regarded.

### *2.2.3 Independence*

Looking at Scotland's history, political endeavours seem to have always strongly featured the idea of independence and, as it happens, developments in recent years have turned the initial goal into a possible reality. This chapter is designed to offer an insight into a fast-paced debate regarding Scottish independence, which will be put to the vote in late 2014. Given the topicality of the issue, not much academic work has been published yet, which is why most of the information was taken from newspaper articles covering conferences, official debates and verbal exchanges between the key players involved.

A piece featured in *The Guardian* on 23 April 2012 ("Scottish independence: the essential guide"), for instance, reveals some of the key aspects relevant to the independence debate and lists its supporters as well as opponents. Regardless of the fact that the independence idea originated in Scotland's national party (SNP), a majority of Scots seem to think that Scotland is better off remaining in the UK, which is perhaps the most striking fact of all. Ever since the SNP won an overall majority in the decisive elections in May 2011, a referendum determining Scotland's and, thus, the UK's future have been on the table of negotiations. A brief historical overview supports the notion that Scottish-English relations have always been difficult and is characterised by Scotland feeling defeated and underprivileged in an unequal union. The key players include Alex Salmond, First Minister since 2007 and leader of the SNP, and David Cameron, the Tory prime minister. Although Cameron's party is the third largest in the Scottish parliament, it is widely unpopular in Scotland and suffers from only having one representative among the other MSPs. Also among the ones involved is Alistair Darling, former Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer and

Edinburgh-based lawyer who has emerged as one of the key figures in the pro-union campaign, as well as Johann Lamont.

Essentially, the options and arguments for and against independence can be split into three columns:

1. The status quo

   The status quo could be maintained which leaves the UK government (Westminster) in charge of taxation, welfare and economy, matters that more or less constitute the controversy of the debate. Obviously, the UK provides a certain amount of security, shared risks and a set of common values. On the other hand, Scotland's needs and interests have shown to be repeatedly disregarded, adding to the fact that the UK is run by a political party that Scotland rejected. Those in support of the status quo include Ruth Davidson (Scottish Tory leader), Lord Forsyth (former Scottish secretary), and Sir Malcolm Rifkind (former foreign secretary).

2. Devo-plus

   The so-called 'devo-plus' (devolution plus) option would ensure that Scotland be granted additional power with respect to raising taxes, pensions and foreign affairs at UK level. The arguments in favour of this option read that Scotland should finally be able to take responsibility for taxation and model policies according to their own needs. Arguments against this option signal concerns as to Scotland's control over taxation and welfare since it would, to a great extent, impact the UK and would demand a certain amount of reforms for the UK parliament. Those in favour of the 'devo-plus' option are the Reform Scotland think tank, Scottish Liberal Democrats, possibly Alistair Darling and some others.

3. Independence

   Independence presents the third option and would give Scotland full control over concerns like taxes, laws, and North Sea Oil while keeping the currency and the Queen as head of state. Those arguing in favour of independence clearly state that there is no reason why Scotland should not be allowed to take care of its own destiny and future and become equal to England. The potential risks involved in Scotland reaching independence would pertain to finance and losing the security of belonging to a(n) (economic) union. In this respect, Scotland could also

potentially suffer when engaging in competition with the strong English neighbour. Those who are in favour of the independence option obviously include Alex Salmond (leader of the currently governing nationalist party), Sir Brian Souter and others.

In the following, the major campaigns and groups taking sides in the independence debate are outlined for a better understanding of the involved parties and their interests (cf. *The Guardian* "The claymore count: the groups fighting for and against Scottish independence"). Essentially, there are only two official campaigns out there: first, the 'Yes Scotland' campaign which is run by SNP leader Alex Salmond himself; and second, the 'Better Together' campaign which is run by a coalition of Labour, Liberal Democrats and Tory politicians, including former Chancellor Alistair Darling. The pro-independence campaign has made it their aim to collect a million signatures for the self-proclaimed 'yes declaration' prior to the 2014 referendum, whereas the pro-union campaign promotes the message that staying in the UK is a positive choice. The other campaigns feature the self-explanatory 'Scottish Independence Convention' (non-party campaign) and 'Independence for Scotland' (organising rallies and marches) and 'Future of Scotland' guerrilla, a coalition of influential civic groups. Among the rest of the pro-UK campaigns are 'Devo Plus', set up by centre right think-tank Reform Scotland, 'Friends of the Union', which was launched by Scottish Tory leader Ruth Davidson, 'Unity Scotland', a grassroots campaign, and 'One Dynamic Nation' headed by Glasgow's only Tory councillor.

Where the key figures and their opinions on the debate are concerned, Alex Salmond, for instance, states that a movement towards an independence referendum will radically change Scotland's future that he believes will be prosperous. Further, he states that he is confident that Scotland will take control of its destiny and take its rightful place in the international community, which will, in turn, enable its people to

> work together to make the most of the incredible strengths that **our country** possesses – the skills of **our people**, the richness of **our heritage**, the beauty of **our landscape**, the wealth of **our resources**. (Alex Salmond qtd. in *The Scotsman*, "Scottish independence referendum: Where prominent figures stand on the issue")

Salmond's proclamation heavily features the use of the pronoun 'our' which, in this case, can unmistakably be linked to Scotland and its people. As a contrast, the leader of the Scottish Conservatives depicts Salmond as the one who likes to act as

“the agitator in chief”, “picking fights with Westminster [and] creating division to further his goal of separation” (Ruth Davidson qtd in *The Scotsman*, “Scottish independence referendum: Where prominent figures stand on the issue”). Making it sound almost like a playground fight, she adds that Scotland actually needs both the Westminster and Holyrood government in order to improve opportunities for all.

Considering the roles some of the key players have taken on, the stances and attitudes they have and taking into account what their opinion on the independence issue is, one can state without reservation that all of the political parties involved seem to be divided over the matter of Scotland wanting to leave the union. Since politicians and citizens within Scotland cannot seem to agree on the best course of action to be taken when it comes to the nation’s future, the independence debate will continue to be interesting just as much as decisions made on both the political and the civic side, will continue to be unpredictable, as a recent survey shows (cf. *The Scotsman* “Scottish independence: Support for referendum Yes vote slips to 30%”).

According to the latest Ipsos Mori poll, support for independence has fallen to a mere 30%, while the opinion poll conducted in June still revealed it to be 35%. The number showing support for the union, on the other hand, is almost twice as high (58%). On top of that, preference for the SNP seems to have decreased as well, with Salmond’s nationalist party coming in second (36%) behind Johann Lamont’s Conservative party (39%). Currently to take the lead is Scottish Labour with a total of 40%, leaving behind the other two parties in the running for Holyrood. Similarly, the British Social Attitudes report (qtd. in *The Scotsman* “Research: 32% support independence”) showed that at the moment “leaving the UK remains a minority preference”, not least because “people in Scotland are doubtful that it would bring them much material benefit”. Equally, even more recent findings revealed by the latest pro-UK survey (cf. *The Herald* “Pro-UK survey finds just 16% strongly back independence”) suggest that only 16% of those in favour of independence strongly support leaving the UK. By contrast, a dominant 37% ‘strongly’ oppose independence, which seems to confirm the current tendency of preferring the union as demonstrated by the previous surveys.

Even with the unanimous results displayed by the surveys and polls at hand, there are almost two more years to go until the actual independence referendum. Two years is a long time, a time during which support for or against independence can be expected to change some more, and as of now it is up to the Scots to decide which

path to tread. Only recently, on 15 October 2012 to be exact, English Prime Minister David Cameron and leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), Alex Salmond, met up in Edinburgh to seal the deal on the referendum that is likely to impact UK politics forever. Both statesmen gathered at St. Andrew's House to sign off on the deal that was dubbed the 'Edinburgh Agreement', a historic event that was later referred to as 'game on' by Scottish Secretary Michael Moore who played a key role in securing the agreement (cf. *The Scotsman* "Scottish independence: Handshakes and smiles all round…now it's game on"). With the independence referendum on its way for sure, only time will tell which way the pendulum is going to swing.

### 2.3 Scottishness vs. Britishness

Other than the more theory-laden parts of this thesis, this chapter aims at approaching the ever-present issue of Scottishness versus Englishness/Britishness and whether being part of the UK has any influence over people's perception of their own national identity. For that purpose, I will draw upon recent and not so recent case studies that provide information on opinions held by the Scottish public and Scottish officials. The intention is to show that there is much going on in terms of identity construction and that people have rather strong opinions governing their attitudes and decisions, which becomes particularly interesting when voting on such an important matter like independence and the future of one's own country.

Before we can even begin to understand loaded terms such as Scottishness or Britishness and whether people do in fact relate to either of these identities, one probably needs to ask questions as to the role of Scotland first. From a sociological viewpoint, Scotland is difficult to define since, according to McCrone (1992: 16), only nation-states can be considered societies. If a society is lacking, can Scotland even be described in terms of sociology? At the most basic level, it can be depicted as a place with geographical boundaries, defined by its topographic features and peculiarities. After all, Scotland is popular for its distinctive and powerful imagery of glens, mountains and natural resources, at least that is what the Scottish Tourist Board likes to promote. In terms of (national) identity, an essential feature remains to be a sense of place and belonging, asking 'what' and 'where' Scotland actually is. Just like England, Scotland is essentially rural and, more importantly, harbours myths and legends. When Scotland entered the Industrial Age in the late 18$^{th}$ century, the

Lowlands, which had become like many other urbanised regions, tried to hold on to these very myths and legends of the Highlands in order to maintain a sense of distinct Scottish culture. The part of the country that had previously been associated with barbarianism, savagery and being backward, suddenly became the one thing that characterised the 'real' Scotland (i.e. a land of heather, kilts and tartans). Some claim that it is because of the lack of autonomy and the right kind of formal political institutions that make Scotland particularly prone to myths and legends (McCrone 1992: 16-17). Nevertheless, if classifying Scotland as a society is problematic, how can it even be characterised as a nation? Among the identifiers listed by Benedict Anderson, belonging to a community seems to be the most important when approaching national identity and claiming to be Scottish. A sense of shared history, too, strengthens the bond that people imagine to have with one another. In this respect, "[there] can be little doubt of the ideological power of 'Scotland' as a nation" (ibid.: 28).

With independence increasingly becoming a viable option, Scotland's politicians are at the centre of attention, with the public closely watching. A relatively recent study therefore aims at revealing the views of the political elite, asking questions relating to what Scottishness is perceived to be and whether they are at all responsible for shaping the masses' opinion on national identity. The political elite is defined as those "who provide the intellectual element of the governing group within a given society" (Leith 2012: 41) and to whom the masses look for answers regarding social and political issues. With political parties and individuals being substantially involved in the decision-making process of a watershed event like the creation of an independent nation-state, the findings are highly interesting in terms of defining 'Scottishness' as well as a sense of belonging.

Surveys that have been conducted over the past 40 years seem to confirm that Scottish national identity has never ceased to play an important role in people's lives and that "the masses of Scotland can and do feel distinctly Scottish" (Leith 2012: 42). This might be due to the observed fact that the political elite are responsible for embedding concepts of national identity in their political messages, as can be seen in the analysis part in chapter 4. It is maintained that the nation, as it is portrayed by political representatives, "serves to connect individuals to a sense of national identity for political purposes" (Leith 2010: 298-299).

> Furthermore, it is clear that contending political parties at the Scottish and British levels are actively engaged in projecting ideas of the nation and a sense of national belonging – be that Britishness or Scottishness – in order to reinforce that connection. (Leith 2010: 299)

The continued conflict between supporters of the current political union (unionists) and those in favour of following through with independence (nationalists) has been taken to the wider UK political stage, aiming at attracting national interest in the matter. Since newspapers are hardly able to escape the 'duty' to report on the verbal exchanges made by the key players in the independence debate, the analysis in chapter 4 will show that several strategies are employed that help argue for each of the involved parties' cases. As these surveys and the present study show, national identity has not only been a key instrument in politics so far[7], but it also has continued to play that role in recent years, perhaps more so than ever.

Although many of the respondents in the study feel comfortable holding a dual identity, the majority of subjects consider themselves to be distinctly Scottish (53%). In addition, a sizeable group holds the opinion that Englishness equals Britishness and hence rejects both on the grounds that the difference between being Scottish and being English is due to differences in both behaviour and attitude. Also in support of this claim, many state that these differences are "based around negative attitudes towards Scotland's position within the UK" (Leith 2012: 47). As was outlined before, Scotland has undergone significant change with regard to both social and political matters over the past decades and centuries, even. It was Scotland's National Party (SNP) that has always sought to be at the forefront of such change, expressing an exclusive sense of being Scottish, an identity pertaining to anyone residing in Scotland. In accordance with this sentiment, the study reveals that being Scottish is very much inclusive and civic in nature, contending that it is a state of mind and less about where you are (ibid.: 48), which is also very aptly put in the following quote:

> Scottish nationalism is not merely a matter of territory, geography or even sovereignty – it concerns, at its heart, a very powerful force that continues to be reflected within the psyche of much of the population. National identity may well be difficult to define […], but it continues to be

[7] Interestingly, as pointed out by Leith (2012: 43), it was due to the efforts of Tony Blair's Labour party that devolution was eventually delivered; a party that also strongly advertised the theme of 'Britishness', but, nevertheless, ended up being responsible for Scotland getting its own parliament and thus helped promote a sense of renewed 'Scottishness'.

> an important factor in the politics and society of Scotland and the wider UK more than a decade on from the creation of the modern Scottish parliament. (Soule et al. 2012: 7)

Back in 1999 when devolution was finally executed, concerns were expressed that it would lead to a decline in ‘British identity’ which would further weaken the UK. Some also feared that the establishment of a devolved Scottish parliament would in fact cause a rise in Scottish identity. This in turn, it was assumed, would cause an increased desire for Scottish political independence (Condor & Abell 2006: 51). With regard to this matter, McCrone (2012: 76), too, states that “those who worried about where a devolved parliament might lead were on to something” and that it was feared to be “the slippery slope to independence”, although nationalists themselves preferred to consider it as “the stepping stone to full autonomy”. The SNP winning the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections with an overall majority came as a surprise to many, not least because it was the first government to have ever reached that outcome. Some wonder whether it was Labour’s failed election campaign that led to them coming in a close second or whether voting for the SNP was mere protest. Regardless of the opinions on the topic, there seems to be something more fundamental going on, McCrone (2012: 70) argues. Not only has there been a shift in electoral behaviour, but there also seems to be a clear response when asking people what they think about self-government, with many wishing for a more powerful Scottish parliament within the UK. Scots seem to have placed a lot more trust in the government at Holyrood than Westminster when it comes to deciding who should run Scotland’s affairs. Over two-thirds of Scots believe that the former should have more influence, a number that has steadily grown since devolution. Nevertheless, there does not appear to have been a rise in support for independence since 1999, just as there has not been a sudden rise in the amount of people claiming to be Scottish. In fact, having a parliament of their own has made people feel more Scottish than ever, it is reasoned. When asked about their identity, over 60 per cent of people prioritise being Scottish over being British, a fact that was already mentioned in the section on devolution. This trend seems to have been the pattern since the early 1990s, indicating that a shift in identity has, as a matter of fact, taken place long before the decade succeeding devolution.

> Indeed, there is a rather complicated relationship between people's national identity, their constitutional preferences [(e.g. independence, devolution, etc.)] and the political party they support. (McCrone 2012: 75)

The problematic nature of national identity versus 'state identity', as it is termed, has always been difficult to grasp, especially for the English who cannot relate to the difference between the two concepts, it seems. Given their shared history, a single legislature based at Westminster and a Scotland that was kept at arm's length for a long time, Scots have become what Graeme Morton (quoted in McCrone 2012: 73) described as "unionist-nationalists". Put differently, they maintained Scottishness in terms of national identity only, while embracing Britishness as their state identity. Even if independence is not realised after all these years of accepting a somehow subordinate role to their English neighbours, the establishment of the Scottish parliament in 1999 is said to have helped

> [create] and expand a deliberate space for Scottish issues, a set of concerns about Scotland's future in economic, social and constitutional terms, as well as debates about the national 'we'. (McCrone 2012: 76)

As was established earlier, it appears that Scots are currently rather content with the fact of remaining within the UK, but demand greater control and extended autonomy in exchange. McCrone concludes his account on Scotland's role within the Union by giving advice to the nationalists 'battling' at the front of independence, which says not to obsess over the issue and to seriously view devolution as the stepping stone that it had initially been regarded as.

Ichijo (2012: 23), too, offers a very current take on the effects devolution had on Scottish political discourse, comparing the differences between nationalist and unionist discourse and how they construct themes such as national identity and belonging. Although it has been ten years since devolution brought some sought-after autonomy and strengthened Scots' self-perception, the notion of national identity is apparently still going strong. Despite the fact that some neglect a causal relationship between the level of national identification and political change, I believe that the SNP's proclaimed interests and goals cannot possibly have gone unnoticed. The line of enquiry followed by this author is mainly directed at how the mode of representing national identity has changed since devolution and which elements are constitutive of it. As was admitted by political figures themselves and has so far been

widely acknowledged by academics (cf. Leith 2010), devolution has indeed had an impact on how political parties position themselves in Scotland. Although a shift in political discourse does not necessarily suggest a change in national identity, it does hint at the possibility that the ways in which certain ideas are promoted (in this case the importance of Scottish identity) are redeveloped. Ultimately, this article looks into how current devolutionary measures have transformed the "political discursive structure of Scottish identity" (Ichijo 2012: 24), a statement that I consider to be highly insightful considering the investigation of (political) newspaper discourse in chapter 4.

It is claimed that the current political discourse in Scotland has converged to be nationalist in nature and that most political actors "are expressing a nation-centric world view" (Ichijo 2012: 24; cf. Ichijo 2009). With respect to this, both unionists and nationalists tend to view Scotland as a nation, whereas the UK is 'merely' considered as a state, with both parties agreeing that being Scottish is a national identity and that the term 'nation' is never equated with anything but Scotland (Leith 2010: 294).

> If all political parties recognize Scotland as a nation and claim to work for Scotland as a nation, it follows that they are all operating in a nationalist or nationalized discursive framework in which the wellbeing of a nation is given the utmost priority. Devolution has, therefore, invigorated a nationalist discursive framework instead of killing nationalism stone dead. (Ichijo 2012: 24-25)

Regardless of the fact that unionist and nationalist parties hold similar views when it comes to Scotland as their homeland, their discourses on national identity appear to be radically different and shaped by contradicting points of view. While unionists portray the Union as a partnership of equals providing economic stability and sharing risks, nationalists tend to view it the other way round by claiming that the Union has caused most of the social ills and essentially prevents Scotland from realising its full potential. With regard to the issue of independence in particular, unionists hold the opinion that "patriotic Scots should strive to maintain the Union" (Ichijo 2012: 30), whereas nationalists consider independence as a liberation movement that is associated with phrases like 'freedom' and 'fight for equality'.

These diverging ideas and the fact that those in favour of the Union and those in favour of independence cannot seem to agree on what Scotland's future is supposed to look like raise questions as to the dichotomy of Scottishness and Britishness.

Clearly, those who support unionist ideas have less trouble identifying with both national identities, or else they would not make such a strong case for remaining within the Union, I believe. Contrary to what people might expect, with independence having come to the fore and all, “unionist political claims about national identity can be presented as both coherent and patriotic” (Ichijo 2012: 34), a quality that one would rather have ascribed to nationalists.

With regard to the matter of dual identities, researchers Condor and Abell (2006) discuss at great length a study that was carried out in collaboration with prominent figures like David McCrone, Richard Kiely and Frank Bechhofer. Over a period of five years, interviews with people born and living in Scotland and with people born and living in England were conducted, focussing particularly on what the researchers refer to as vernacular constructions of ‘national identity’ in post-devolution Scotland and England (see title of study). Respondents in Scotland tended to speak at length about issues like citizenship, nationality and their very own sense of national identity. They had to answer questions concerning their ‘sense of being Scottish’ or their ‘sense of identity’ in general, with a preferred response involving the element of ‘pride’. Moreover, respondents treated Scottishness as a case of “shared character, culture and identity with other co-nationals” (Condor & Abell 2006: 58). Another prominent notion was that of ‘the English as other’ where it was common for the Scottish respondents to positively differentiate themselves from the English out-group and to

> deflect potential changes of anti-English prejudice by shifting the object of their talk to a depopulated or spatially-defined category […], often presented in the form of euphemistic references to ‘south of the border’ or to references to England as ‘neighbour’ […]. (Condor & Abell 2006: 62)

While many respondents in Scotland viewed ‘British’ as synonymous with ‘English’ and used it as the ‘other’ against which they could define themselves, most respondents in England treated ‘British’ as a common in-group. Moreover, they were not as interested in talking about national issues and about their national identity in particular. Also, respondents in England tended to describe national identity as “something worn lightly, and only partially inhabited” as well as demonstrating a “semi-detached orientation towards nationhood” (Condor & Abell 2006: 69), whereas many respondents in Scotland viewed their sense of self as being consistent with

their Scottish national identity. Another interesting aspect revealed in the study is that respondents in England did indeed express a sense of “commitment to membership of an imagined community occupying a nationalised space” (ibid.: 72); however, they refrained from interpreting a nation-as-place (e.g. ‘England’ or ‘Britain’) or the membership of a real or imagined society as being consistent with ‘national identity’.

Condor and Abell conclude their study by making a few remarks concerning the difficulty of ‘national identity’ as a term and the fact that it has often been used synonymously to describe constructs such as nationality, citizenship and society. They claim that ‘national identity’ as a concept is frequently encountered in academic writing and political rhetoric, with the result that “it is easy to suppose that it constitutes an enduring feature of the lexicon of nationhood” (Condor & Abell 2006: 52). Considering that ‘identity’ is a highly ambiguous term and taking into account its use in the current literature on nationalism,

> a common tendency to elide the ‘national identity’ construct with pre-existing categories such as nation, nationality, nationalism, national character, citizenship or imagined community [is revealed]. (Condor & Abell 2006: 52)

After all, however, Scotland’s sense of a nation and Scottishness appointed as the national identity is undeniable and unquestioned. This concept of national identity as a basic bedrock remaining to be challenged is seen as “[illustrating] the banality of Scottishness in Scotland today” (Leith 2010: 299).

Overall, this chapter was designed to provide an insight into how Scots perceive their own national identity, how they tend to distinguish between Britain as their state (identity) and Scotland as their nation and how nationalism in Scotland exhibits fundamentally civic elements. Given that Scottish nationalism has converged to be a civic/political entity that political elites tend to embed in their political messages when addressing the masses and that nationalism in general can be regarded as ideology representing certain ideas, values, beliefs and attitudes, the analytical framework illustrated in the following chapter will give information on how ideologies can be disclosed. Critical Discourse Analysis, which is essentially concerned with power relations and the aim to uncover ideological language, is therefore featured as the framework providing the tools necessary to detect ideologies, forming the basis for a subsequent analysis of (political) discourse as portrayed by newspapers.

# 3. Theoretical & Analytical Framework

The methodology that I decided to apply in the analysis part turned out to be a two-edged sword in a way. As will be shown in the following sections of this chapter, Critical Discourse Analysis (hereafter CDA) seems to provide an appealing set of analytical tools for analysing discourse and ideology in particular, which could prove very useful when looking at how nationalism and national identity are expressed in newspapers. On second glance, however, CDA appears to attract quite some criticism, which is primarily addressed towards the inconsistencies and shortcomings of the methodologies within this field of research. In the end, applying any of the approaches suggested by the main researchers of CDA requires some reflection and careful thought concerning their validity. Also, what needs to be mentioned is that the following account of CDA and its practices, backgrounds and its (main) figures as well as critics is by no means extensive, much less complete. Within the framework of this thesis, the aim was to provide an insight into the controversies surrounding approaches to (critical) discourse analysis and to demonstrate that there are several opinions out there, frequently clashing and sometimes corresponding.

## 3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis: origins and aims

First of all, it needs to be clarified that the term CDA does not stand for a single approach to analysing discourse, which is why the different methodologies subsumed under this one term need to be considered independently. In the following, however, some of the basic assumptions underlying CDA as well as its overall aims will be presented, outlining some of the main ideas held by the key figures working in this field of research.

In essence, when reading about CDA, one is confronted with a group of leading scholars, each with a distinct background but nevertheless agreeing on some core principles for analysis and addressing similar issues. Some of the main areas of enquiry are ideology, racism, institutional or political discourse, and media. The leading researchers, all of whom have developed a set of tools for analysis, are usually considered to be Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Teun van Dijk, and Paul Chilton. Other important figures are Michael Billig, whose concept of ‘banal

nationalism' is discussed in more depth in chapter 3, Theo van Leeuwen and Gunther Kress, to name but a few. Fairclough's *Language and power* (1989), the work that is frequently named as the starting point of CDA, is primarily concerned with political discourse (Thatcherite political rhetoric), which has become one of the trademarks of CDA. Most of the work that has been done so far dates back to the late 1980s and 1990s; also, up to this point, it seems to have enjoyed a remarkable success with students and scholars alike, which manifests in the publication of journals like *Discourse and Society* (edited by van Dijk), *Critical Discourse Studies* (edited by Fairclough), and *Journal of Language and Politics* (edited by Wodak and Chilton) (cf. Blommaert 2005: 21-24).

As for the origins of CDA, Wodak (1995) makes reference to the 1960s and 1970s when a more critical perspective in language studies was adopted. The French scholar Michel Pêcheux (1982) was among the first to do so when he took up the work of Russian theorists Bakhtin and Vološinov, who had demanded the integration of language and social processes in the 1930s. The late 1970s saw a group of Hallidayan linguists at the University of East Anglia starting to use the term 'critical linguistics' (CL) when conducting research on language in different institutions (cf. Fowler et al. 1979; Kress & Hodge 1979). Kress and Hodge, for example, assumed there to be strong connections between linguistic and social structure, maintaining that discourse cannot possibly exist without social meanings. They rejected contemporary trends in pragmatics (e.g. speech act theory) and quantitative sociolinguistics as pursued by Labov. Since the connection between language and the social is believed to be very complex, many scholars think that research requires an interdisciplinary approach. With this in mind, Kress & Hodge's view that discourse should also include social aspects has subsequently been accepted by researchers coming from different traditions and backgrounds, such as formal linguistics, sociolinguistics, social psychology and even literary criticism (Titscher et al. 2000: 145).

Wodak (1995) points out that apparently the terms Critical Linguistics (CL) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) have frequently been used interchangeably, with an increasing number of people tending to prefer 'CDA'. Wodak herself would like to describe CDA as a research program or school and stresses that in order to understand what CDA means, the terms 'critical' and 'discourse' need to be

explained. As was mentioned above, CDA does by no means refer to a homogeneous approach to discourse analysis. The different methodologies under consideration here are based on different theoretical backgrounds and are aimed at different data, just as much as the definitions of elementary terms like 'discourse', 'critical', 'ideology', and 'power' differ, if only ever so slightly. According to the literature, CDA draws upon two sources of the 'critical': first, the notion of 'critical' is based on the ideas of the Frankfurt School and the work of Jürgen Habermas[8] in particular; second, it relies on a shared tradition with critical linguistics as outlined above. The theoretical basis on which CDA is built includes ideas of Noam Chomsky, Michel Foucault (power relations), the philosophical traditions of Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser's theories of ideology, Mikhail Bakhtin's genre theory, as well as Bakhtin & Vološinov's theory of ideology (i.e. every instance of language use is ideological) (cf. Blommaert 2005: 27; Titscher et al. 2000: 144ff).

Since CDA is characterised by different approaches (forthcoming) with different theoretical backgrounds and may therefore cause some confusion, the main principles and common aims will be summarised in the following (cf. Titscher et al. 2000: 146; Wodak 1996: 17-20):

- *CDA is concerned with social problems*: the focus is not on language use itself but on its linguistic character involving social and cultural processes. CDA is therefore essentially interdisciplinary.
- *Discourse is marked by power-relations*: CDA studies both power in discourse and power over discourse (see van Dijk).
- *Society and culture are (dialectically) related to discourse*: discourse constitutes society and culture and is being constituted by them (see *discourse as social practice*).
- *Language use may be ideological*: since ideologies are ways of representing and constructing society and reproduce unequal relations of

[8] According to Habermas, a critical science needs to be self-reflective, meaning that it should reflect the interests on which it is based; moreover, it must take into account the "historical contexts of interactions" (Titscher et al. 2000: 144).

power, it is necessary to investigate texts in order to determine whether a particular type of discursive event[9] does ideological work.

- *Discourse is historical* and can only be understood within its given context. Hence, utterances can only be meaningful if we take into consideration that they occur in a specific situation that is embedded in a certain culture and ideology.
- *The link between text and society is not direct:* the socio-psychological model of text comprehension implies that said link is only mediated, which relates to questions like 'How do listeners/readers make sense of what they are hearing/reading and how do they relate it to their own beliefs, knowledge and ideologies?'
- *Discourse analysis is said to be interpretative and explanatory:* a critical reading of text requires a systematic methodology and questions the relationship between text and its social conditions, ideologies and power relations. Critical reading also demands that context is investigated properly, keeping in mind that the ways in which text can be understood and interpreted differ. This is were critical readings are claimed to be different from uncritical readings, for interpretations are dynamic and open to change.
- *Discourse is a form of social action:* CDA as a scientific discipline is committed to social aspects. Critical linguists claim to make their intentions clear and explicit, unlike researchers committed to other disciplines.

CDA works with the assumption that discourse - language in spoken and written form - is "a form of social practice" (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258), which implies a two-way relationship between a discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s), and social structure(s) that frame it. Being influenced by social factors, discursive events may thus have ideological effects in so far as they can help shape (unequal) power relations between men and women, ethnic or cultural minorities, social classes, etc. Consequently, discourse may try to pass off a mere assumption about an aspect of social life as common sense (e.g. racist, sexist, etc.). The ways in which language is

[9] Refers to any instance of language use that is analysed as text, discursive or social practice (Fairclough 1995: 135).

used, as well as its underlying power relations, may often be unclear to people, which is why researchers of CDA have made it their aim to

> unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion or exclusion in language use. (Wodak et al. 1999: 8)

Unlike other types of discourse or conversation analysis, CDA prides itself on the fact that it does not try to pretend to take on an objective or neutral stance. Moreover, it is faced with the task of making visible the connection between linguistic means, forms and structures and actual linguistic practice (ibid.: 9).

## 3.2 Approaches to CDA

As we have seen, there are different methodological approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis, with the ones that I think will aid the understanding of media discourse and the analysis thereof. The methodologies developed by Fairclough and van Dijk were chosen for the simple reason that both have dealt with media and news discourse in the past and have managed to create a framework that they believe is applicable to the analysis of media. In the following, some of their major ideas and concepts will be outlined and examined in more detail.

### *3.2.1 Fairclough*

Fairclough (2007: 2-3), for instance, attends to terminology like ‘text’ and ‘discourse’ before going into detail about (critical) discourse analysis, with ‘texts’ essentially referring to any kind of written or printed texts (e.g. shopping lists, newspaper articles), as well as transcripts of spoken interaction (e.g. interviews, TV programmes) produced in a discursive event. ‘Discourse’, on the other hand, is based on the idea of language being an integral part of social life, meaning that research should take into account that interconnectedness (see *discourse as form of social practice*). Text analysis is a crucial part of discourse analysis, but discourse analysis is not solely concerned with the analysis of texts. Also, linguistic analysis is not merely occupied with text but also involves what Fairclough (1995a: 135) termed “interdiscursivity”, which implies that a text is made up of different discourses and genres. What might be of interest, especially with the analysis of newspapers coming up, is the definition

of genre which describes the "use of language associated with a particular social activity" (ibid. 135), that is producing articles for newspapers for instance.

Where the specific theoretical background is concerned, Fairclough's methodology is based on Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), commonly associated with Michael Halliday. Other than the Chomskyan tradition, SFL is strongly influenced by the relationship between language and aspects of social life, with linguistic analysis being primarily oriented towards a text's social character. This, Fairclough (2007: 5) claims, is a valuable resource for CDA, adding that some of the major contributions[10] to critical discourse analysis have in fact developed out of SFL (cf. Fowler et al. 1979; Hodge & Kress 1988; 1993; Kress & Van Leeuwen 2001). What is more, he calls for a transdisciplinary approach to text analysis involving perspectives on language and discourse located within social research and theory, as the different views of CDA and SFL do not exactly coincide with each other. The type of text analysis Fairclough (2007: 6ff) promotes is a form of qualitative social analysis that can be applied to rather small samples of material, as opposed to larger bodies of text (e.g. corpora). Naturally, the extent to which a text can be analysed differs, depending on the number of features that are looked at. This type of analysis, he suggests, can easily be combined with corpus analysis providing the quantitative element, which is exactly what I intend to do in chapter 4, for a number of reasons that I will mention later on. Working with concordance programs enables the researcher to identify keywords in a corpus text, although this method is only of limited value and needs, ideally, be complemented with more detailed qualitative textual analysis, he argues.

One of the themes that Fairclough (2007: 8) centres his analysis on is the social effect of texts, for instance. Texts can have causal effects that may influence the way in which we perceive the world and may, as a result, affect our beliefs, attitudes and values. Moreover, texts can have ideological effects which are, as was already established, of central concern to CDA.

> Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, dominance and exploitation. (ibid.: 9)

For the purpose of analysis, Fairclough (1995a: 133ff; 1998: 144ff) proposes a three-dimensional framework for breaking down discursive events which considers:

[10] Cf. Fowler et al. (1979),

- ☑ *text* itself (spoken or written)
- ☑ *discursive practice* (includes production, distribution, consumption and interpretation of text)
- ☑ *social practice* - framing text and discursive practice

At the *textual level*, content and form are looked at, assuming that both elements are inseparably linked since contents are realised in particular forms and vice versa. *Discursive practice* links texts to social practice and, in addition, considers the production as well as the interpretation of said text. Text production supposedly leaves so-called cues in a text with interpretation, in turn, being based on textual elements. Therefore, the analysis of discursive practice not only includes an explanation of how participants produce and interpret texts, but also relates to the matter of interdiscursivity which was defined earlier. Essentially, the term denotes that texts are not believed to be linguistically homogenous, but may indeed display different stylistic and semantic features (cf. Maingueneau 1987; Kress & Threadgold 1988 referred to in Titscher et al. 2000: 150). This intertextual and interdiscursive analysis is said to be more strongly interpretative than other approaches to linguistic analysis, which is an issue that is prone to critique (see section 3.4). Finally, the analysis of the third dimension – *social practice* – involves different aspects of social organisation (e.g. situation, institutional context, or social context) and asks questions regarding power and ideology (cf. Titscher et al. 2000: 151).

Approaching texts with the assumption in mind that they are a part of social life involves analysis that is not only concerned with the text as such, but also with the processes of meaning-making. Usually, there are three elements attributed to the meaning-making process: the text itself, as well as its production (involving producers, authors, speakers, writers, etc.) and reception (involving interpretation, interpreters, readers, listeners, etc.). Most importantly, however, one needs to understand the interplay between all three elements and implied aspects like intention, values, position and identity of the author, as well as the knowledge, values and position of the receivers. The problem with interpretative work is that it is not only a matter of understanding long instances of text, but also that it requires the understanding of what its producers/writers meant, the latter of which is problematic in terms of ascription of attentions. The bottom line is that any kind of interpretation entails

evaluative, judgemental or explanatory processes and that some texts receive more attention than others based on whether they are quite transparent or not (Fairclough 2007: 10-11).

With special regard to political discourse in the media, a highly interesting topic considering the focus on the fundamentally political issue of Scottish independence, Fairclough (1998: 148) reasons that there are several key players involved. Apart from professional politicians who act as agents in mediatised politics, journalists assume a political role as well. Other important protagonists are experts of all sorts, including academic political scientists, political analysts (featured in the analysis in chapter 4), and pundits, to name but a few. All of these agents may potentially be involved in the struggle over hegemony[11] in the media. However, the agents mentioned need to be distinguished according to their social class, gender, cultural background and, most importantly, political background. Politicians, for example, belong to different political parties with different stances and goals, an aspect that is of crucial importance when it comes to ascribing certain values to parties being positioned at opposite ends of the spectrum (see independence debates).

### *3.2.2 van Dijk*

Van Dijk (1993: 253) devotes himself to CDA in a similar way and refers to it as "the toughest challenge in the discipline", attending to questions like 'What is Critical Discourse Analysis and how does one actually go about doing 'critical' analysis?' In an introductory paragraph on the topic, he provides the following explanation:

> [CDA] is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. […] critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately to resist social inequality (van Dijk 2001: 352)

Like Fairclough, he advocates that it demands a multidisciplinary approach in order to account for complex relationships between text, social cognition, power, society and culture. As far as he is concerned, CDA research is motivated by pressing social issues that need solving, which is done best through discourse analysis, he argues.

[11] Implies control by one country or organisation over others within a particular group (see Oxford Advanced Learner's Compass 2005).

Central to this endeavour seems to be the analysis of relationships between dominance and discourse, with dominance being defined as “the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups [resulting] in social inequality” (van Dijk 1993: 249-250). One of the trademarks of researchers in the field of CDA should be that they take on an explicit socio-political stance and declare their point of view, aims and principles. In the end, their work is said to be political and “[their] hope, if occasionally illusory, is change through critical understanding” (ibid. 252). As far as discourse and its role in the reproduction of dominance and inequality are concerned, the power aspect needs to be looked at more closely. Power involves the control of one group (or its individual members) over (those of) another, meaning that a powerful group may indeed be able to influence people’s opinions. Unlike more direct ways of wielding influence,

> ‘modern’ and often more effective power is mostly cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation, among other strategic ways to *change the mind of others in one’s own interest*. (ibid.: 254)

Van Dijk claims that this is where ‘critical’ discourse analysis comes in, analysing how the minds of others are essentially managed by text and talk. For dominance is not always exercised in a blunt and overtly manipulative manner, more subtle and routine forms of text and talk, appearing ostensibly natural and acceptable, should be taken into account as well. Nevertheless, he concedes that ‘critical’ discourse analysis is not straightforward at all and does not always paint a clear picture of ‘villains’ and ‘victims’ (ibid.: 255), categories that are clearly exaggerated when it comes to opposing parties debating political issues.

Given that power and dominance are usually assumed to be organised and institutionalised, a certain type of hierarchy of power is implied. Those who are a part of decision-making processes thus have a certain amount of control over the enactment of power. A related aspect illustrated by van Dijk (1993) is the question of how (much) access to discourse is provided and in how far it renders the ones having access more powerful. People like journalists, for instance, may have a more or less active (or passive) access to communicative events, speaking to a rather passive audience (i.e. readers). The more they can actively control or influence the properties involved (e.g. discourse genres, participants, audience, scope, text characteristics, etc.), the more powerful elites, institutions or social groups are. Similarly, lack of

controlled or active access to discourse is equated with lack of power, which is true for most of the 'ordinary' people in everyday life. Just like dominance and power may be institutionalised to increase their effectiveness, access to discourse may be organised to increase its impact.

> [Given] the crucial role of the media, powerful social actors and institutions have organized their media access by press officers, press releases, press releases, PR departments, and so on[12]. (van Dijk 1993: 256)

In a nutshell, the degree of (control over) access to discourse determines the dominance and power of certain groups. As was already established, however, more modern power has a cognitive dimension to it and assumes a certain degree of mind management, exerting influence on attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, knowledge, norms and values. In the end, handling the modes of access "is geared towards this access to the public mind" (van Dijk 1993: 257), which is termed 'social cognition' in van Dijk's framework. As for the discursive reproduction of dominance, there are claimed to be two dimensions, namely production and reception. This means that, on the one hand, one needs to distinguish between "the enactment, expression or legitimation of dominance in the (production of the) various structures of text and talk" (ibid.: 259); on the other hand, one needs to consider the consequences, functions and results these structures might have on the recipients' minds.

Having outlined some of van Dijk's thoughts on the central issue of dominance and power, we can move on to more practical issues, especially concerning the analysis of media. Focussing on the press and opinion articles in particular, yet still adhering to the framework of CDA, van Dijk (1995; 1998) examines the complex linkage between ideology and opinions and how they are articulated in discourse. For that purpose, the terms 'ideology' and 'opinion' need to be kept apart, observing how and by what discourse structures these notions might be expressed. The difficulty with ideology is that it is described as "one of the most elusive notions in the social sciences" (van Dijk 1998: 23), which is why the theoretical debate surrounding it will not be dealt with in greater depth. Van Dijk's aim to set aside the problematic nature of the term and try to develop yet vague notions of ideology will be adopted for the purpose of this analysis. Essentially, his approach includes the components of 'social function', asking why people use ideologies in the first place, 'cognitive structures',

[12] Cf. Gans (1979) and Tuchman (1978) for more information on the matter.

questioning the outward appearance (i.e. expression) of ideologies and how they monitor social practices, as well as the element of 'discursive expression and reproduction', looking at how ideologies are expressed and reproduced.

On the one hand, ideologies "involve beliefs or mental representations" (van Dijk 1998: 21) and hence account for the *cognitive* perspective of this approach to media. As such, it involves beliefs, ideas, judgements, thoughts and values, meaning that ideologies are essentially belief systems (van Dijk 1995: 244). On the other hand, ideologies are usually not personal, but account for social, institutional or political aspects of life. Ever since Marx and Engels, ideologies have been tied to sociological or socio-economic terms, relating to group interests or conflicts (e.g. class, gender, race, etc.) and thus to dominance and social power. Moreover, ideologies are also sociocognitive, implying that they are essentially shared by the members of social groups. Most importantly, ideologies must not be confused with 'truth' or 'falsity', but merely function as framework for interpretation to take place. Last but not least, ideologies may have various degrees of complexity, meaning that they may not be fully developed belief systems yet, and may have variable manifestations depending on context. Variation may be due to several factors, including the fact that people frequently identify with more than just one group and may thus hold several, sometimes contradictory, ideologies or values (cf. van Dijk 1995: 244-246).

When it comes to the question asking what ideologies do actually look like, a definite answer cannot be provided and speculations ensue, in spite of the fact that there is a vast amount of literature on the topic. One of the assumptions relates to how group ideologies are represented and how 'self', 'others', 'us' and 'them' are depicted. Often these representations involve a certain amount of polarisation (we=good, they=bad), especially when it comes to conflicting interests, as is the case with the independence debate.

> Such basic propositions of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation may influence the myriad of opinions and attitudes We have about Them […]. (van Dijk 1998: 25)

While this statement is interesting in the sense that it offers an appealing explanation for the ways in which people may be influenced by what they read, one has to question whether positive self-depiction and negative other-presentation are actually detectable in text. The proposed aim of this thesis is to discover elements that can be

classified as representing (Scottish) national identity and one of the ways in which it is suspected to be done is the display of features characteristic of Scottishness. I argue that Scotland's (nationalist) political endeavours to declare independence are central to the understanding of what it means to be Scottish. As was shown in the previous chapter dealing with the abstract notions of Scottishness and national identity, Scots have long been trying to separate from their dominant English neighbour in order to establish a government free from restrictions imposed by Westminster administration. Some even go as far as saying that being Scottish means not being English, a notion that is consistent with the desire to leave the (political and economical) Union.

Coming back to the functions of ideology, its basic (cognitive) function is to organise group attitudes and values, assuming that they "reflect the basic criteria that constitute the social identity and define the interests of a group" (van Dijk 1998: 25). Ideologies may therefore be represented in terms of:

- *Identity/membership* (who belongs and who does not?) – This is particularly true for racist, ethnocentric or nationalist ideologies, which is the most important category for my own analysis, investigating how national identity is expressed in discourse.
- *Tasks/activities* (what do we typically do? what is the role of our group?) – Journalists, for instance, are represented as writing news, while professors are usually involved in teaching or doing research.
- *Goals* (what are our aims?) – being closely related to tasks/activities, group actions are commonly performed with respect to one or more overall goals.
- *Norms/values* - the tasks and goals are contingent upon group-specific ideological criteria (i.e. norms and values).
- *Position* (where do we stand? what are our relations to other groups?) – This category is perhaps the most important since it defines allies and enemies, friends and foes, opponents and proponents, as well as intergroup competition and conflict (see independence debate).
- *Resources* (what do we have?) – This category, naturally, defines the access to resources group members may have. As an example, journalists would want to protect their privileged access to information, whereas

professors would want to guarantee their continued access to knowledge. Scottish politicians and citizens may accordingly define themselves as underprivileged when it comes to restricted political power.

These categories as defined by van Dijk (1995: 249-250) are traditionally referred to as representing a group's interests, but might not necessarily reflect reality but rather constitute self-serving ideological constructions and a group's self-image. For the very reason that these schemata are ideological, a group's self- or other-representation may, of course, be biased when observed from the viewpoint of others, including the analyst's position as well. When it comes to journalists as a group, for instance, the ideological categories as listed before would feature information as to their licensing, their speciality (what do they typically write?), their goals (inform?), their values and norms (truth, reliability?), their position with respect to readers or authorities, and their access to group resources (e.g. information). Ideologies are commonly described as "social representations of the mind" (van Dijk 1998: 26) since they are socially shared, but are nevertheless considered to be quite abstract and general. What is more, different individuals may have acquired variable versions of these representations during socialisation, which leads to individual variation regarding ideological systems.

As for the expression of said ideologies, they may either be uttered in a direct manner by unambiguously stating an opinion like 'women are less competent than men' in male chauvinist ideology, or be expressed in a more indirect way. Most of opinion discourse, however, is said to be more specific and expresses not only group opinions but also personal opinions and knowledge about events, people or situations. These personal and rather specific opinions originate from socially shared attitudes or opinions represented in so-called mental models. These models are essentially responsible for representing people's everyday experiences and, unlike social representations, are personal, subjective and dependent on context. As was established earlier, ideologies are responsible for the organisation of group attitudes, which in turn may be used for developing personal opinions as represented in mental models. For pragmatic reasons, people usually say less than they know or think which is why only a fraction of information will commonly be expressed in talk or text. The same goes for opinions that might be withheld because they are not appropriate for others to hear. As a consequence, text is really just the tip of the iceberg when it

comes to what is represented in these mental models. Opinions, which can be defined as “evaluative beliefs” (van Dijk 1998: 29), imply value or judgement about something or someone (good, bad, pretty, ugly, etc.). Considering that evaluative beliefs may also easily pass for factual beliefs, that is general and socially accepted criteria, caution should be exercised when trying to distinguish the two. Often ideologies or opinions are claimed to represent the ‘truth’, which does not make them factual, however.

The type of analysis that is typically applied when it comes to how ideologies or opinions may be expressed in discourse pertains to *lexical items* (lexicalisation). In order to voice judgement or to make an evaluative statement, words are chosen that express values or norms in a particular context. Referring to people as ‘terrorists’ instead of ‘freedom-fighters’, for example, is deemed an ideological decision and not merely an innocuous categorisation. The same can be said about the term ‘nationalists’, I believe, which implies a certain set of characteristics and attitudes. In addition to that, ideologies may be shown in more complex ways as well, for example in arguments, graphical arrangements, headlines, semantic structures, story structures, and so on (cf. van Dijk 1995: 258-259).

For the main part, however, van Dijk (1995; 1998) examines semantic structures of discourse, assuming that they are fundamentally responsible for the content of ideologically permeated expressions to be formed. Thus, the assumption is that concepts are usually not solely expressed in lexical form but combine into so-called *propositions* which are expressed in clauses and sentences. Words like ‘terrorist’ or ‘nationalist’ do not mean much if the meaning of the sentence is obscured or the context on the whole does not make any sense. Propositions are typically analysed with respect to main predicates and different arguments with specific semantic roles (e.g. agent: terrorists, patient: hostages). Propositions may then be modified by another predicate (e.g. desperate, terrified). Choosing one (harmless) word over another (strong) word already suggests a specific opinion on the part of the writer. What is more, it plays a significant role whether the active or passive role is in fact assigned to the agent or the patient, questioning who is responsible for inflicting or suffering pain. Accordingly, if one group is repeatedly described as being actively responsible for some kind of (perceived) negative action – let us take for example the

SNP's wish to leave the Union – it may well be assumed that this adds to the negative portrayal of said group.

Based on this general assumption, a strategy for the expression of shared group attitudes and ideologies is arrived at. Said strategy involves the polarisation of groups and typically features a positive in-group description, as opposed to a negative out-group description, is referred to as the "ideological square" (van Dijk 1998: 33) and contains the following (abstract) evaluative structure:

1. emphasise 'our' good properties/actions
2. emphasise 'their' bad properties/actions
3. mitigate 'our' bad properties/actions
4. mitigate 'their' good properties/actions

These moves, typically featured in the "overall strategy of ideological self-interest" (ibid. 33), appear in most social actions and conflicts (e.g. racist, sexist, etc. discourse) and

> may be expressed in the choice of lexical items that imply positive or negative evaluations, as well as in the structure of whole propositions and their categories [(active or passive)]. (ibid. 33)

Words like 'our' may thus refer to the in-group and its friends or allies, whereas 'their' may in fact refer to the out-group and its friends or allies. With respect to the people directly (political figures) and indirectly (the citizens of the UK) engaged in the discussion surrounding Scottish independence, a categorisation or polarisation of the groups (i.e. citizens) involved is only logical to occur, I argue. Opinions may, however, not always be explicitly expressed in propositions but may be semantically implied instead, which is said to be another well-known feature of discourse semantics. *Implications* can be reconstructed by the receivers of the message based on shared knowledge, including knowledge about the knowledge of the speaker or writer. Implications may play an important ideological role, providing that the meanings implied by propositions are inferred from attitudes and ideologies. Further, propositions may be implied because they are assumed to be known or presupposed. They may be placed strategically in order to embed propositions which may not even be true, which is also true for propositions containing opinions (cf. van Dijk 1995: 258-268; 1998: 32-35).

### 3.3 Criticism

Literature on the topic suggests that CDA has received enormous attention over the years and that a "network of exchanges" (Seidlhofer 2003: 125) has been built, allowing scholars of CDA and their critics to engage in discussions that have so far been conducted in a quite constructive spirit. Hammersley (1997), for instance, dedicates some thoughts to the meaning of 'critical' and asks what it actually means to add the word to the term 'discourse analysis'. Apart from the fact that there are hardly any areas of social research left that have not assumed a critical stance at one point in the past, he asserts, CDA is different in so far as it does not only "adopt a critical stance towards research products but also towards the social phenomena it studies" (ibid.: 240). Arguing that there are possibly three philosophical traditions[13] upon which he assumes CDA to have been built, he maintains that the term 'critical' has become "little more than a rallying cry demanding that researchers consider 'whose side they are on'" (Hammersley 1997: 244). Above all, he draws attention to what he calls the most damaging feature of CDA: the excessive ambition to offer a great deal more than other existing kinds of discourse analysis, namely to provide an understanding of the processes of discourse and of society as a whole. This overambitious endeavour, he claims, tends to undermine sound research, which makes CDA practices anything but unproblematic.

> Overambition […] encourages the presentation of what can only be speculations as if they were well-grounded knowledge. In all forms of research there is considerable pressure to produce newsworthy findings [which] can lead to researchers over-interpreting their data. (Hammersley 1997: 245)

A similar issue is addressed by Toolan (2006: 87) who suspects that "there would be fewer people provoked to say terrible things about CDA" if the analysts at work did not try to earn praise "for being the first to 'really see and address' the workings of power in discourse". While being largely in favour of the approach, he admits that CDA needs to be more critical of some of the distinctions it makes, for example between description and interpretative explanation. Further, he acknowledges the fact that the rise of popularity has also brought some resistance and criticism, which appears to be quite extensive in part. By claiming that CDA aims at uncovering social

[13] Marxism and Frankfurt School critical theory, decisionism and Habermas' universal pragmatics (Hammersley 1997: 240ff).

inequality (see quote by van Dijk in section 3.2.2), the implied presupposition is that everyone else has so far failed to emphasise or even failed to realise that social inequality is established by discourse. Commenting also on the role of CDA in news analysis, Toolan mentions Fairclough's book *Media Discourse* (1995b) in which he apparently makes the quite compelling point that

> media news items typically involve a complex and subjective weaving together of the voices of those deemed relevant to a story, in which veiled sympathy (and concomitant antipathy) towards particular parties can be found even where a framework of neutrality is projected. (Fairclough 1995b referred to in Toolan 2006: 91)

If we take, for instance, a newspaper article reporting on the independence debate, several opinions and stances will be represented, some in favour of and some against a particular matter at hand. Naturally, the journalists, bloggers or political correspondents commenting on certain events will hold opinions of their own, let alone the assumed political stance of the newspaper they are writing for, which can be assumed to result in a choice of words or content that will portray the issue from a certain point of view. Regardless of the fact that news reporting should, to a degree, be neutral and rather objective in nature, one cannot help but think that attitudes and views will inevitably affect the writing of a news story. In this respect, much of Fairclough's work seems to be concerned with the ways of "projecting and attributing the words and opinions of cited participants" (Toolan 2006: 91).

Returning once more to the elements of CDA that appear to attract criticism the most, Toolan names the unclear focus that the approaches seem to exhibit. At this point, CDA has become so diverse that a certain fragmentation in terms of methodology has already happened, he argues. As far as this diversity is concerned, Toolan appreciates the fact that some have called for a standardisation of assumptions, methods, questions and parameters that would, in his mind, strengthen and clarify the method and render it more accessible for people to learn and teach. At first glance, CDA seems to represent a unity, a unified approach; on closer inspection, however, it appears to be only "a loose alliance" (Toolan 2006: 100). Critical discourse analysis as an idea makes sense, he claims, but in order to make more of a difference, some methods and definitions still need to be refined and made more distinct.

As opposed to those who appear to offer constructive criticism, Jones (2007) is rather harsh when it comes to reviewing CDA practices, claiming that there is no such thing as Critical Discourse Analysis. He maintains that the method aimed at unveiling political and ideological language "is misguided and inevitably leads to a distorted view of the role of communication in society […]". According to him,

> CDA practitioners have come up with a very peculiar picture of the workings of contemporary society and the role and power of discourse within it. (Jones 2007: 338)

Aiming at Fairclough's approach to CDA in particular, he questions whether the means chosen for analysis are actually compatible with the aim of uncovering the ideological functions and effects that discourse may have. As for the judgement of assumed truth or falsity in discourse, Jones (2007: 365) feels entitled to say that CDA as such has no authority to claim whether language is ideological or not. After all, it is Fairclough (1995a: 18) himself who acknowledges as much by stating that "discourse analysis cannot *per se* judge the truth or well-groundedness of a proposition". Still, he goes on arguing that CDA can indeed help us decide whether a particular piece of discourse does ideological work or not. Altogether, Jones considers the linguistic methods applied by CDA entirely unsuitable for discourse and political discourse in particular. While he concedes that there are a few interesting ideas and concepts presented in the work of Fairclough and others and that there is "enormous scope for concrete, critical analysis […] of the politics and ideologies of parties" (Jones 2007: 366), he returns to the statement that

> [there] simply is no such thing as a 'critical discourse analysis' of the ideology or politics of a text separate from, or over and above, an ideological or political interpretation and analysis of it, whatever methodological paraphernalia or terminology we try to dress this interpretation up in. (ibid.: 367)

Widdowson, on the other hand, essentially supports the cause advertised by CDA, which is to demonstrate how "discourse analysis can contribute to a critical awareness of the ways in which language is used [and] abused […]" (Widdowson 2004: ix), although he is deemed one of the most persistent critics of CDA and its practices (cf. Jones 2007: 338; Toolan 2006: 84). Despite his fundamentally positive stance towards CDA, he claims to have serious reservations about the ways in which analysts in the field go about doing their work. Among other things, he addresses the difficulty of interpreting text that is studied in isolation from co-text and context and

concludes that what can be found in CDA are, in fact, “critical discourse *interpretations*” (Widdowson 2004: 103). Following Hodge and Kress in their discussion of how CDA

> [assigns] pragmatic significance […] to a fragment of language sampled from a text, […] cut off from its co-textual and contextual connections (Widdowson 2004: 102),

Widdowson questions the motivation behind the selection of a particular piece of text. The answer is immediately provided, stating that CDA is said to have a rather explicit socio-political pretext which is, according to Widdowson, responsible for the choice of and focus on certain textual features. As a result, a large amount of text is left unanalysed and unaccounted for, due to this kind of “interpretative partiality” (ibid.: 103) and the fact that recipients of a text are “pretextually positioned to derive discourses from them which suit their purpose” (Widdowson 2004: 103). This will be taken as a word of warning since, essentially, the analysis in chapter 4 is all but an extensive portrayal of how newspaper texts presumably depict national identity and nationalist ideologies. Since one of the aims of this investigation is to reveal apparent weaknesses in both terminology and methodology, chapter 4 is meant to test whether any of the claims made by CDA and the scholars researching national identity and nationalism can be validated by analysis. The interpretations arrived at by CDA scholars may satisfy and convince people holding the same pretextual assumptions, but can indeed not be verified by analytical work, I fear.

Another valid point made by Widdowson (2004: 104) refers to the plausible fact that people will bring with them certain pretextual presuppositions when reading newspapers of a particular kind. *The Sun*, for example, is known for appealing to a populist nationalistic sentiment and employs directness rather than subtlety. Journalists make no secret of their attitude towards a particular issue which will instantly be apparent to readers. Readers knowing what is to be expected will accordingly adjust their attention and will not go looking for additional meaning hidden in the text. Adding that “it is surely the purpose of critical analysis to go beyond what the style of an article *seems* to indicate” (Widdowson 2004: 104), one should nevertheless be careful in ascribing attitudes or meaning to a text that might not be instantly apparent to the common reader.

Going into detail about the procedures followed by CDA researchers, Widdowson (2004: 128) continues to discuss the lack of thorough and systematic analysis that is necessary when dealing with text. Critical discourse analysis, however, seems to rely on specific textual features only when doing interpretative work. Depending on context and co-text, features that are said to be neglected by CDA analysts, texts evoke different kinds of interpretation, which poses a problem to those claiming to have found the true meaning underlying a text. Having extensively outlined the differences between text and discourse, Widdowson (2004: 169) states that "interpretation is a matter of deriving a discourse from a text [which] inevitably brings context and pretext into play" and thus renders the relation between text analysis and discourse interpretation such a problematic one. With regard to this particular matter, he essentially raises an objection to the claim that

> CDA interpretations have a privileged status, a unique validity even, because they are based on the analysis of textual facts. (Widdowson 2004: 169)

He adds that as long as discourse analysis is confused with text analysis, critical discourse analysis is fundamentally a misnomer, relying to a great extent on interpretations that are contingent upon "particular contextual and pretextual factors" (ibid.: 169).

With regard to including corpus linguistics into the analysis of texts, Michael Stubbs (2001), responding to Widdowson (2000) who warns against the application of corpus-based descriptions in the interpretation of text, disagrees and adds that, since interpretations are subjective, they must be related to "findings which are objective, insofar as they have been discovered by replicable methods in publicly accessible data" (Stubbs 2001: 150). Relating this to critical discourse analysis and the assumption that language use is related to ideologies, he recommends keeping apart public data and private interpretations. According to Widdowson (2000: 7-8), corpus linguistics deals only with the textually attested, which he claims is only a partial account of real language and can therefore by no means count as being representative. Here, Stubbs agrees and proceeds with the argument that while the methods of corpus linguistics might not be designed to highlight unique instances of language, they do offer an insight into what frequently and typically occurs. Moreover,

he believes that corpus studies could indeed “remedy weaknesses in CDA methodology” (Stubbs 1994 & 1996 referred to in Seidlhofer 2003: 164).

> Since concordances make repetitions visible, this can lead to an emphasis on the repetitive and routine nature of language use, possibly at the cost of striking individual occurrences […]. (Stubbs 2001: 152)

Despite the fact that repetitions of a particular word or phrase might be indicative of a certain pattern, “[frequency] is not necessarily the same as interpretative significance” (Stubbs 2001: 153), meaning that the occurrence of an instance of language may be significant for the simple reason that it is rare. As far as the allegations made by CDA are concerned, individual utterances “cannot tackle claims about the ideological implications of textual patterns” (ibid.: 157). Supposedly, a single newspaper article may seem indeed unimportant in the greater scheme of things, as Stubbs puts it. Nevertheless, if descriptions of one kind are frequently and repeatedly used in the reports relating to a particular event (e.g. independence debates), they might come across as the natural way of talking about things, in turn influencing the ways in which we think about events or people related to them. Although plausible, Stubbs questions in how far frequency does affect interpretation and whether repeated instances of collocations across a corpus show that certain meanings are widely shared and not merely idiosyncratic or personal. All things considered, Stubbs much like Widdowson, appears to be generally “sympathetic to the aims of CDA, but critical of its methods” (Stubbs 2001: 170).

## 4. Newspaper articles: an analysis

As we have learned, national identity appears to be closely linked with nationalism and its set goal to create an independent nation-state; however, definitions of both terms are hardly definite and unambiguous, which makes it two difficult concepts to grasp. Despite the fact that numerous scholars have engaged in research trying to unravel the conundrum of (Scottish) national identity and nationalism, there appears to be some agreement over how these ideas are linked and that they do in fact influence each other. One of the problems that stand out is the supposed link between political actions and national identity, which was shown to be a critical point and cannot easily be argued for or against.

Given that most of the studies concentrating on the press in Scotland and England are of comparative nature (e.g. Law 2001, Rosie et al. 2004, Rosie et al. 2006), I will attempt to do the same by comparing some of the national editions published in both countries. Other than Billig who did a survey of newspapers published on an 'ordinary day', I chose to concentrate on the debate concerning Scottish independence, an issue that will be voted on in the 2014 referendum. For that purpose, newspaper articles that were published in the course of the year 2012 on their respective homepages will be examined carefully, with the aim to discover parallels and differences in the coverage of a heatedly debated topic concerning the whole of the UK. The editions under consideration are the Scottish newspapers *The Herald* and *The Scotsman*, as well as the London-based newspapers *The Guardian* and *The Independent*. With independence being a highly sensitive topic for all the parties involved, one could expect to find emotive language present in the reporting of events pertaining to the independence debate. Hence, a tentative assumption is made as to the possible occurrence of certain expressions that might distinguish articles published in the Scottish press, as opposed to articles published in the English press. Based on what was covered so far on the concepts of nation, nationalism and national identity, the analysis is concerned with the apparent and perhaps not so apparent differences in portraying the nation and their representatives (e.g. politicians) in the news. Also, for the main question posed at the beginning needs to be addressed, extra attention is paid to how a sense of national identity is constructed in the extracts under scrutiny.

## 4.1 Media discourse – language in the news

As outlined in chapter 3, there are different approaches and analytical frameworks for media discourse, which is a given considering that the field of media studies is very multidisciplinary. Most notably, the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘text’ are subject to disagreement, but since there are many different disciplines at work here, there are just as many different ideas of what these terms mean. While in some areas the focus is on discourse in relation to its social contexts, discourse in linguistics is more concerned with the use of language. As far as media discourse is concerned, CDA is among the leading approaches when it comes to researching this area (Bell & Garrett 1998: 2, 6), which is one of the reasons why two of the many approaches promoted by CDA were provided as examples earlier (see sections on Fairclough and van Dijk).

Among other things, one of the objectives pursued by CDA includes the disclosure of ideological language use in texts of different kinds. Since this paper features an analysis of newspaper articles, questions arise as to the language used by those responsible for possibly producing ideologies in the first place (e.g. politicians, political elites) as well as those reproducing them (e.g. journalists, editors). Roger Fowler, one of the pioneers in the field of analysing media discourse within a critical linguistics framework (cf. Bell & Garrett 1998: 5), draws attention to that exact notion, viewing the content of newspapers as ideas, but also as beliefs, values, attitudes, theories, propositions and, most importantly, ideology. His main concern is the fact that language cannot possibly be neutral although professional ethics common to all the news media, press, radio and television requires that the language used is meant to be unbiased, non-distorting and unambiguous. Beginning with the selection of events that are to be reported, a set of criteria influencing said choice is already at work, followed by the process of transformation that encodes news for the specific type of publication (television, print, etc.). Both processes of selection as well as transformation are said to be guided by reference to ideas and beliefs (Fowler 1991: 1-2), which is not difficult to imagine since all of us adhere to (different) frameworks governing our perception and understanding of the world around us.

Similar to the selection process of events to be reported is the selection of certain linguistic features that represent said events or the people participating in them. To be more specific, people and groups are organised into certain categories and values placed on them. Whether consciously done or not, newspaper writers put things into

context, choose certain words and descriptive features that provide the reader with an image. The image that is created may suggest a certain attitude assumed by the producer of the text or even exhibit prejudiced thinking (Fowler 1991: 110), all of which is done by the simple use of language which

> assists in the formation and reproduction of the schematic categories in terms of which a society represents itself: by providing labelling expressions which solidify concepts of 'groups', by assigning different semantic roles to the members of different groups […]. (Fowler 1991: 120)

At the end of the day, since news is always reported from a certain angle it can well be described as being biased, which can be said about any kind of representational discourse though. Also, it is no secret that different newspapers report differently in terms of both content and presentation, which in turn presents the reader with a multitude of perspectives and points of view that need to be deciphered (Fowler 1991: 10-11). It would be wrong to assume, however, that newspapers choose events and "consciously wrap them in value-laden language" (ibid.: 41) which the reader passively absorbs and may have a hard time digesting. On the contrary, the reader is very much assumed to be actively and creatively engaged in the meaning-making process, with perception and understanding involving the active employment of mental schemes and processing strategies. This process of making sense of the world around us can be ascribed to said schemata which account for unconscious knowledge that is shared within a group of people. That is to say that even if we read a text for the very first time, we draw upon prior knowledge to project on the data at hand (cf. Fowler 1991: 43ff).

### *4.1.1 Discursive (re-)production of ideologies and identities*

As was stated in chapter 2, nationalism is commonly associated with the desire to establish a sovereign nation-state. Given the current developments in Scottish politics and the aspirations of the SNP, Scotland's nationalist party, to achieve independence and break away from the UK, a nationalist ideology seems to be on top of the political agenda. Also, since nationalism can be described as the outcome of political mobilisation of national identity, a closer look at political discourse appears to be an appropriate way of attempting to reveal underlying (ideological) meaning that is supposedly mediated by newspaper reporting.

For the purpose of the forthcoming evaluation of the set of newspapers, van Dijk's framework for analysis will be followed. As was elaborated on in chapter 3, he strongly focuses on the dynamic between power and discourse. Here, political elites were named as the group of people involved in decision-making processes and as having a certain amount of control over the enactment of power. Such being the case, they are assumed to be capable of influencing other people's (e.g. voters, supporters) minds and opinions that serve their own purpose. As far as journalists are concerned, the ones in charge of (re-)producing what is said and done by the key players involved in the independence debate, they are claimed to have more or less active access to communicative events, speaking to a rather passive audience. With regard to the dominance and power aspect, journalists could thus be deemed as having a certain degree of (control over) access to discourse. Since 'modern' power is often considered to be mediated cognitively, managing people's minds and exerting influence on attitudes, beliefs and ideologies is supposed to be done via persuasion, dissimulation and manipulation, which is not always easily recognisable.

In terms of how ideologies and opinions are articulated in discourse, van Dijk assumes that their actual expression in text relates to how 'self' and 'others' are portrayed, involving a certain amount of polarisation (good vs. bad). As quoted in chapter 3, the function of ideology is to organise group attitudes and values, assuming that they reflect some of the criteria that represent one's social identity and the basic interests and attitudes of a group. With that said, the qualitative part of the analysis is merely concerned with three of the categories that are assumed to bear ideological meaning. First, identity and membership are looked at, evaluating the extent to which group belonging is expressed. This could be done by speaking of a group of people in an including manner and referring to an in-group (Scots) as opposed to an out-group (the English), for instance. Second, a group's goals can be considered in more detail, questioning what their aims are. In the Scottish case, the aim to establish an independent nation-state is quite straightforward and considered the driving force behind political actions. Third, an evaluation of a group's position and its relation towards other groups is looked at, which is relevant in terms of claiming a Scottish over a British national identity. These categories traditionally represent a group's interest and are responsible for constituting a group's self-image. Admittedly, self- and other-presentation is prone to bias, which includes the person

reporting an event as well as the analyst's point of view. This is also what Fowler (1991) suggests, adding that one needs to be careful when being presented with a certain image of how things appear to be or are claimed to be. There are certain groups or people that readers can be expected to affiliate with more easily which, naturally, plays in the hands of those reporting and portraying a certain event and the ones participating in them. The question now is in how far journalists can be assumed to exploit that situation by purposely charging language and maybe even imposing an ideology on the piece of writing they produce, feeding it to an allegedly passive readership.

Apart from inspecting the word-level of an utterance of longer instances of text, ideologies may also be expressed in the shape of propositions, which was also discussed in the section on van Dijk in chapter 3. Propositions are commonly analysed with respect to noun phrases, which means that choosing one harmless modifier over a strong one may already indicate judgment or evaluation. Referring to the SNP as 'desperate', for example, may suggest a certain attitude on the part of the person commenting on it. With respect to these propositions, a strategy called 'the ideological square' was established by van Dijk which essentially involves positive in-group description as opposed to negative out-group description, with the effect of polarising groups. This polarisation is, for example, achieved by emphasising the good properties and actions of the Scottish political party, while emphasising the bad properties and actions of the opposing side.

In addition to how (nationalist) ideologies are expressed by those cited and referred to in an article (e.g. politicians), special attention will be paid to the journalist's assumed point of view when reporting on a particular matter (e.g. deciding on how the referendum questions should be phrased). Thus, not only the direct quotes in an article are subjected to critical scrutiny, but also the presumed role of those reproducing a communicative event (e.g. journalists and editors). What is more, one needs to distinguish whether ideologies are voiced directly or indirectly, which reminds of Billig's claim that nationalism is expressed in an implicit manner by making use of deictic words such as 'we', 'them', etc. On top of that, one needs to keep in mind that some ideologies are rather easy to spot, while others are more difficult to detect (cf. Ott & Mack 2010). Political parties, for instance, are claimed to possess highly visible political ideologies that govern their policies, which should

considerably facilitate the analysis of newspaper articles dealing with politically infused topics.

### *4.1.2 Means and forms of realisation*

Typically, lexical items are looked at when investigating ideology, an aspect that will be treated by the corpus analysis in section 4.3. With respect to lexis, Wodak et al. (1999: 35), in their well-known work on CDA that promotes the so-called discourse-historical approach, provide a list of linguistic means "involved in the discursive construction of national identity", as they call it. Since their study strongly relies on the analysis of lexical units and syntactic devices that are responsible for the construction of difference, sameness, continuity, unification, unity and the like, they name a few important ones:

1. *personal reference* – personal pronouns (I, you, he, she, it, we, they); quantifiers/determiners; anthroponymic terms (relating to names of human beings);
2. *spatial reference* – adverbs of place (here, there, etc.); spatial reference through persons; toponyms/geonyms (e.g. Scotland, Britain, Holyrood, Westminster);
3. *temporal reference* – adverbs of time (now, then, etc.); temporal prepositions (e.g. in May of 2011, in the year 1999, etc.);

On top of listing what are essentially instances of deictic language (cf. Fowler 1991), the use of deictic 'we' is discussed which, according to Wodak et al. (1999), can be deemed a linguistic means of indicating sameness. As for me, a quote that perfectly captures the essence of what deictic 'we' is assumed to achieve in (media) discourse reads as follows:

> A speaker has at his/her disposal a whole range of […] options with which to present the interests and affairs of 'we-groups' in the public sphere. In a speech during an election campaign, for example, a speaker can unite himself and his audience into a single 'community sharing a common destiny' by letting fall into oblivion all differences of origin, confession, class and lifestyle with a simple 'we' […].(Volmert 1989: 123 qtd. in Wodak et al. 1999: 45)

While the quote above is appealing to the effect that it tries to provide an answer to a highly controversial aspect (see 'deictic we'), a few problems arise. Just as much as

politicians might intend to represent the interests of a group supporting or opposing a certain idea (e.g. independence), journalists writing for newspapers might do the same by strategically placing words like ‘we’, in order to indicate shared interests, affiliation, belonging or ‘sameness’, as Wodak et al. describe it. Where Petersoo (2007) is concerned, having identified three types of deictic ‘we’ in newspaper discourse, ‘we’ is all but trying to encompass the notion of Scottishness. Given the disagreement over the meaning and function of deictic ‘we’, there can hardly be any valid points made and arguments formed, whether for or against it.

Deixis in a more general sense, a subject that was thoroughly discussed in the part on ‘banal nationalism’, it is said to provide “important cues to the oral mode” (Fowler 1991: 64). Stemming from the Greek word for ‘pointing’, deixis is a semantic device that “[links] a text with the time and place of communication and […] [‘orients‘] speaker and addressee in relation to the content of the discourse” (ibid.: 63). These little words, as defined by Billig (in chapter 2) and listed above, “denote where, when and who forms the deictic centre of the nation”, or so Law (2001: 301) claims. Apart from creating a shared verbal universe, deixis sets the context and predicts a case of speaker-listener unanimity. What is more, nations are assumed to make use of repetition, meaning that the more frequent words are used, the more stability national identity gains.

As far as detecting deixis via corpus analysis is concerned, evidence in the shape of numbers is indeed able to give some indication of frequency. Nevertheless, I cannot see how any direct significance can be inferred from said number, for a thorough qualitative analysis would be needed in order for any statements regarding representativeness to be made. In the end, numbers alone do not seem to provide an answer for questions pertaining to validity.

### 4.2 ‘Indigenous’ Scottish vs. ‘Anglo-centric’ newspapers

Allegedly, newspapers are capable of mediating a sense of national identity to their readers, which different sources claim to be true. However, the question is whose identity is actually addressed and where the newspapers are located, produced and edited. As a consequence, one needs to be careful pinpointing the origin of a news-story, the journalists and editors behind it, and, most importantly, the audience that

newspapers are presumably aimed at. With regard to these problems, some researchers[14] have given a lot of thought to the meaning of a 'British' national press, questioning whether Anderson and Billig have both overestimated "the congruence, relevance and obviousness of state, society and national boundaries" (MacInnes et al. 2007: 185), adding that the relationship between national identity and mass media has largely been under-theorised and has yet to be empirically proved. Regardless of the fact that, empirically-speaking, a 'British national press' is difficult to define, some authors have certainly taken some liberties. Take for instance Billig's day survey (outlined in chapter 2) which basically claims to be 'British', while in fact only English editions are covered, neglecting the crucial distinction between territories (Wales, Scotland, England). Given this ambivalence and the ease with which researchers repeatedly seem to facilitate things for themselves in terms of categories and definitions, distinguishing between individual newspapers seems appropriate.

The distinction between 'indigenous' Scottish and 'Anglo-centric' newspapers is made for the simple reason that mass newspapers are assumed to take on so-called "unambiguous 'pivot points' at spatial, temporal, political and cultural deictic centres […]" (Law 2001: 303). Thus, Scottish national newspapers "provide constant reminders of a self-identical Scottish deictic centre", whereas Anglo-centric broadsheets "banally assume a British deictic centre, placing Scottish markers firmly on the outside" (ibid.: 304). Therefore, Scottish newspapers can be expected to operate from a deictic centre that is different from those of non-Scottish ones. According to Billig and Anderson, newspapers are central to the reproduction of a national culture and national identities, offering news from and about the 'homeland' (Scotland vs. England). The presumption that newspapers are intrinsically 'national' is based upon three elements. First, the title makes explicit the national location of a newspaper (e.g. *Le Monde*, *El País*, *The Times*); second, titles assume to have a national audience (e.g. French, Spanish, British) and third, their news agenda and presentation is taking place on a national level (cf. MacInnes et al. 2007: 188).

In many cases, newspapers make sure to indicate their national status on the front page, for readers to be immediately spotted. Especially mastheads, which are described as the "most obvious, therefore least observed, aspect of daily newspapers" (Law 2001: 306), seem to be showcasing nationality, which turned out

[14] Rosie et al. (2004), Kiely et al. (2006), Rosie et al. (2006), MacInnes et al. (2007)

to be particularly true for the Scottish editions. As can be seen in figure 1 below, *The Scotsman* masthead does not only feature the national symbol (a thistle), but also does the name of the newspaper suggest an intended readership (i.e. Scotsmen).


***Fig. 1 The Scotsman masthead***


***Fig. 2 The Herald masthead***

*The Herald* masthead (figure 2), in comparison, does not immediately conjure up an image that indicates 'Scottishness'. Once enlarged, however, the logo (figure 3) placed in-between words reveals the newspaper's city of origin (Glasgow) and features "an iconic masculine image of manual print technology" (Law 2001: 307). Formerly called *The Glasgow Herald*, *The Herald* would merely convey an unidentified deictic centre for Scotland which is similar to the use of 'The' in the London-based titles.


***Fig. 3 The Herald logo enlarged***

The London-based editions, by contrast, offer no such explicit reference to nation, as can be seen in figures 4 and 5 below. Both *The Independent* and *The Guardian* do not appear to bear any special meaning that would indicate place or 'deictic centre', as Law (2001) would call it. Altogether, the absence of any explicit 'English' or 'British' flags is a striking feature, since, compared to the English versions, the Scottish newspapers examined here do in fact seem to suggest an explicitly Scottish setting, addressing a specific readership (e.g. Scotsmen and -women). The question

now is, in how far these direct hints can be seen as reinforcing a sense of (Scottish) national identity, a question that needs to be revisited in this chapter.


***Fig. 4 The Independent masthead***


***Fig. 5 The Guardian masthead***

## 4.3 Corpus analysis

The data subjected to analysis consists of 80 newspaper articles (20 per edition) that were collected over the past months and taken from the respective homepages of the Scottish and English newspapers under consideration here, all reporting on some aspect of the independence debate, be it conferences, official debates or statements made by either of the key players involved.

For my own analysis and especially the corpus-driven part, a few studies investigating newspapers served as inspiration. One of the main problems I had to grapple with, for instance, was choosing the words that could be specified as national flags. Imitating Billig's day survey, Rosie et al. (2004) identify rather early on the potential problems in choosing and assigning significance to elements that could be deemed national flags. As was discussed in the subchapter on banal nationalism, Billig straightforwardly appointed deictic expressions like 'we', 'us', etc. as indicating/flagging the nation. Considering that these categories have attracted critical responses on the basis that they wrongfully assume there to be a British press and are responsible for suggesting (British) national identity, carelessly adopting them would mean to tread on thin ice. In the following, therefore, the categories that seemed the most logical to address within a Scottish frame of reference are presented.

| | ‘indigenous’ Scottish | | ‘Anglo-centric’ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **keywords** | ***Herald*** | ***Scotsman*** | ***Guardian*** | ***Independent*** |
| *Scottish* | 72 | 137 | 147 | 128 |
| *Scotland* | **113** | **143** | **181** | **184** |
| *English* | 5 | 2 | 21 | 7 |
| *British* | 10 | 7 | 15 | 6 |
| *‘we’* | 52 | 104 | 77 | 94 |

***Table 1 Frequency of occurences***

Referring once more to the underlying assumption guiding this thesis (i.e. Scottish national identity expressed in newspaper texts), the terms indicating membership of a particular group or nation are: *Scottish*, *English* and *British*. Initially, I thought it would suffice to compare claims of Scottish national identity as opposed to being English. However, as studies examining the dichotomy of dual identities (Scottish-British vs. English-British) have shown, the English tend to use British as well when stating their national identity, which was barely the case with participants in Scotland. Overall, Scots appear to make a clear distinction between these two identities, whereas the English usually do not, which might be an indicator of the Scottish not wanting to be associated with Britain.

In addition to indicating overall frequency, those keywords that are highest in numbers are highlighted in bold print in each of the columns in Table 1. Interestingly, in both the Scottish and the English editions, the term ‘Scotland’ ranks first, with ‘Scottish’ to come a close second. Considering, however, the circumstance that Scottish independence is the focus of interest, it is not surprising that both terms can be found at the top of the list of occurrences, for they can be expected to be used a lot. Looking at the numbers representing the terms ‘English’ and ‘British’, all that remains to be said is that they are relatively low compared to ‘Scottish’, for instance. This can, however, be related to the problematic nature of the term ‘Scottish’, in view of the occasion that the idea concerning independence originated within Scotland and is therefore termed ‘Scottish independence’.

As for the controversy surrounding deictic ‘we’, it seems entirely impossible to ascribe any meaning to it, based on the corpus analysis alone. Despite the fact that concordance lines provide information on its overall frequency of occurrence, one cannot possibly claim whether the instances of ‘we’ indicated above account for the all-inclusive Scottish ‘we’, the all-inclusive British ‘we’, or in fact the ‘we’ used to signify the newspaper (cf. Petersoo). Therefore, ascribing to ‘we’ the significance of representing ‘the’ nation (be it Scotland or England or Britain even) is simply not possible. Even within its immediate context, assumptions as to the role of ‘we’ prove difficult and remain inconclusive at best, as will be seen in the examination of newspaper extracts below.

The same appears to be true for collocations, for they do not provide any convincing information on the context in which the words listed above occur. The term ‘Scottish’, evidently, collocates with ‘independence’, which only reinforces the suspicion mentioned earlier, namely that the issue of independence is marked as ‘Scottish’ and thus happens to co-occur with ‘independence’. One only has to take a look at the articles taken from *The Scotsman*, where fifteen out of twenty titles read ‘Scottish independence’ before stating what the article is actually about.

Although one does not seem to be able to infer any useful data from the corpus study included in this thesis, I believe it is important to show that so-called textual evidence can be quite misleading. At first glance, the numbers provided in Table 1 suggest a certain pattern, namely that the term Scotland is used the most in all of the editions under consideration. As far as looking at Scottish national identity is concerned, having ‘Scotland’ frequently mentioned does not necessarily point to the fact that any kind of national identity (e.g. Scottish national identity) wants to be reinforced. The explanation that sounds more reasonable, and is partly justified by a close examination of newspaper extracts, is the fact that Scotland is the setting for discussions surrounding independence to take place. Here, the key players involved in the decision-making process regarding the UK’s, and particularly Scotland’s, future make frequent references to Scotland as a country and to Scotland as a place where change is soon to come.

## 4.4 Discussion of findings

In order to remind the reader of the questions and assumptions guiding this investigation of newspaper articles, the key aspects will be summarised here. Given that ideological language may not only be used by the individuals referred to or quoted in articles, but also by the people doing the actual writing, it is interesting to observe who is actually responsible for the construction of (nationalist) ideologies. More specifically, one needs to ask how journalists can be assumed to play into the dynamic of (re-)producing ideologies, considering that they are responsible for passing on to the audience what was said and done by others. Last but not least, a point of interest is the discovery of textual evidence that might be indicative of suggesting a sense of national identity, especially since the corpus analysis alone cannot be taken as a reliable and conclusive source.

So as to provide a clear structure of analysis, the discussion of the findings will be executed as follows: Apart from attempting to detect ideological language (cue: categories representing ideologies; 'ideological square') and indicators for national identity being discursively constructed by the means of deictic language (cf. 'homeland-making deixis', deictic centre) and flags indicating the nation and its citizens (Scotland/Scottish/Scots vs. England/English – Britain/Britsh), two aspects will be paid particular attention to. First, since the journalist's role needs to be taken into consideration, particular attention will be paid to the ways in which events are reported (cue: (re-)production of ideological concepts). Also, a special focus will be on opinion articles for they usually reveal more easily recognisable instances of ideologies (cue: evaluative/judgmental language).

To begin with, a number of articles that evidently exhibit a number of references to nation/national identity are considered in more depth. The first instance is taken from an editorial published in *The Guardian* (15 October 2012) treating the "Do we live as one nation or two?" debate ("Scottish independence: the other One Nation debate"). With reference to signing off on the agreement securing that the referendum is held in 2014, it is claimed that

> [in] Edinburgh on Monday the question was not the division between the two nations of the rich and the poor, but the **division between Scotland** and the **United Kingdom**.

Here, Scotland is positioned outside of the United Kingdom, which could be equalled with creating an out-group (Scotland) that is no longer allowed to claim its place within the UK (in-group), irrespective of the fact that the outcome of the referendum is anything but predictable. The most striking piece of evidence, however, is the circumstance that the author decides to write that "the terms of **combat** for the future of **Britain** have now been set". Apart from using a war metaphor (engaging in 'combat') and thus making it sound more dramatic than it maybe needs to be, Britain is the point of reference from which assumptions about the nation's future are made. As will be seen in most of the other instances quoted below, the deictic centre that is usually assumed when commenting on the decision that is likely to leave a lasting impact on the whole of the UK, is Scotland. Incidentally, the following extract shows exactly that and makes Scotland the deictic centre where decisions are being made, still referring to the Scottish people as 'they'. In addition, the Scottish (people) are clearly marked as 'other' and as being situated outside the assumed in-group (UK). By emphasising that the SNP pursues nationalist goals, which anyone residing in the UK is probably well-aware of, the author might hint at the possible threat ensuing from their (nationalistically motivated) aim to split from the UK.

> There is no doubt that **the Scottish people** voted for this process to begin. By handing the **Scottish Nationalists** a majority of seats at Holyrood last year, **they** put the future of the union unequivocally in the arena.

The author continues by relating the current event to developments in both Canada and Spain where similar "separatist feeling[s]" have been expressed, claiming that London, in comparison to Madrid and Ottawa, has remained quite calm.

> The UK government **deserves credit** for this approach. It is the democratic path. But it may look like **reckless overconfidence** if Scotland votes yes. **Don't underestimate** this moment.

Although the author seems to approve of the course of action taken by the Westminster government, he expresses concern (Don't underestimate this moment.) and asserts that staying too relaxed may come across as reckless behaviour, considering that Scotland has not yet lost the referendum. Looking at how the author chooses to represent Scotland as opposed to the UK, the author makes a statement as to the side he appears to be favouring, I argue.

As a contrast, the author of the article published in *The Independent* (“David Cameron tells Alex Salmond to ‘stop dithering’”) seems to be convinced that the Prime Minister launched “a **passionate** defence of the Union”, when referring to a speech/statement made sometime in May. Here, Cameron is quoted saying: “Let’s be clear about what **we** stand for – and what **we** won’t put up with”. “Let’s give **the Scottish people** the chance to make a clear choice about their future,” Cameron states and thereby clearly establishes group belonging and membership that the Scottish people are consciously excluded from (‘we’ vs. ‘the Scottish people’).

The author continues narrating the event by suggesting that Cameron “**hit out at** Mr Salmond and his Scottish National Party administration’s plans for a referendum”, who stated that “Scotland is better off in Britain”. Similarly, she reports that the Prime Minister “**criticised** […] a Nationalist backbencher at Holyrood who had compared the Union to an abusive relationship”. Interestingly, both sides are described as being actively engaged in calling each other out on their respective failures and do not hesitate to respond to accusations made against them (“It’s not an abusive relationship, it’s a Union”, Cameron says). Although the author uses rather strong expressions to describe the verbal exchanges made (hit out at, criticise), she does not seem to favour one side over the other, which only becomes evident towards the very end of the article where she reports that an SNP MSP “**hit back at** the Prime Minister”. Portraying the event in such a light might leave the impression on the reader that debates are getting heated, which the author does not bother to cover up, it seems.

Other than obtrusively interfering in the news story, the example featured in *The Scotsman* (“Scottish independence: Nothing ‘more important’ to me than keeping UK together, Cameron says”) illustrates how the author manages to be more subtle when reporting about an event. In this case, it appears that the author lets Cameron do most of the ‘talking’, which is already indicated by the title (‘Cameron says’) and perhaps a hint at the fact that he/she does not feel like commenting on what was uttered by the Prime Minister. Although the author seemingly refrains from adding a sense of additional judgment or evaluation to the story, one could read into the fact that Cameron’s (negatively connotated) words are left unchallenged. By indicating that Cameron claimed “Scottish independence would **damage** the rest of the UK”, one cannot be sure whether this is in fact the author’s interpretation of what Cameron

said or supposedly implied or whether this is the rephrased version of an actual quote. In any case, the following verbatim quote at least makes Cameron's point of view unmistakably clear:

> It is very important that, of course, we believe there would be **bad consequences** if Scotland left the UK but the first point is that there would be **bad consequences** for the rest of us.

Although it is not obvious whether the author supports or in fact opposes the statements made by Cameron, which, as we have learned in the introductory part to chapter 4, should be a given in any objective newspaper report, his/her choice of quotes could already be interpreted as exhibiting a set of beliefs and attitudes that guides the author's actions.

An article giving voice to two opposing sides at the same time (Scottish Labour vs. Scottish Nationalists) aptly demonstrates how the actions of the opposing party are deemed negative in nature. Margaret Curran, a Labour spokeswoman asserts:

> In less than two years, the SNP want to break up the UK but they **haven't done the slightest bit of homework** to find out what this will mean for people in Scotland. Their policies are based entirely on **assertion** and **fantasy**. ("Scottish independence: SNP has failed to open any talks with UK government bodies on independence")

Essentially belittling the SNP's strategy in pursuit of independence and referring to their policies as arising from fantasy and being based on allegations alone, the party rejecting nationalist ideas picks its opponent to pieces. The SNP, on the other hand, quick to respond to the "attack", issued a statement saying that "[this] is a **ridiculous** intervention […], but **sadly** in line with her party's thinking on Scotland". Both these instances illustrate that this polarisation of groups is one case among many and that these examples feature into the overall 'strategy of ideological self-interest', as was pointed out by van Dijk in section 3.2.2. Aside from the fact that within Scottish borders two of the major parties do not seem to be on the same page as far as independence is concerned, the author of the article seems to be of the opinion that the SNP "has **failed**" (see title), which does not reflect a statement made by SNP opponents but appears to be the author's evaluation of the situation.

As far as comparing individual newspapers is concerned, articles reporting on the same event are put in juxtaposition in order for differences in reporting to become more apparent. Still, it would be wrong to assume that Scottish newspapers have similar styles of reporting about an issue, just as it would be premature to judge English newspapers of inherently exhibiting an anti-Scottish attitude in their coverage of events. The two articles covering Alex Salmond's announcement that the Yes campaign, supporting independence, will start its work in May, features an astonishing amount of the same key points. As far as structure is concerned, both *The Scotsman* and *The Guardian* adhere to the sequence of events predetermined by Salmond's speech. With the date for the launch of the Yes campaign set,

> [the] SNP leader promised an independence campaign with a '**positive approach'** that he said would 'contrast very markedly with our **opponents**, who are united only in their **negativity**'. (*The Scotsman* "Scottish independence: Alex Salmond says his push for a Yes vote will begin this May")

This part of the speech, which appears in both of the articles under consideration, clearly features Salmond's point of view. By emphasising the positive attributes of their own group (positive approach) and implying that the opponents are defined by negativity, a boundary between self-praise and negative other-depiction is drawn. Although the article mainly consists of direct quotes, there are some instances of reporting that allow the reader to catch a glimpse of the author's alleged intentions, involving moves that polarise groups.

> […] Mr Salmond was **accused** of attempting to deliver a "loaded" referendum question to boost support for an independent Scotland after he claimed pro-independence would be the "Yes" campaign in the referendum.
>
> […]
>
> Labour MSP Patricia Ferguson also **attacked** Mr Salmond's announcement yesterday, as she claimed "there is no agreement on the wording of the question", after the SNP published its preferred option of "Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?"

By stating that the ones opposing the suggested wording of the referendum question 'accused' and 'attacked' Salmond, the opponents' actions are immediately rendered negative by employing verbs that can be perceived as being rather negatively connotated. Throughout the article, the author manages to remain in the background by predominantly using rather neutral reporting verbs like 'said', followed by a direct

quote. In these instances, however, one could suspect the author siding with Salmond on this matter, for a negative evaluation of his actions could have been provided just as well. Instead, Salmond's opponents are portrayed as those committing a perceived negative act (to accuse, to attack), assigning to the leader of the SNP a passive role, which is important to distinguish when looking who does the actual inflicting and who 'suffers' from the actions of others.

In contrast, the author of the article published in *The Guardian* ("Salmond: Scottish independence campaign will begin in May"), refrains from taking up a position that could endanger his neutrality when it comes to reporting the speech made by Salmond. Although both articles have Salmond's name in the title, making clear that he is the one doing most of the 'talking', the author writing for *The Guardian* manages to practice restraint which becomes evident in the way the information is transported to the reader. This example predominantly features direct quotes from Salmond's speech, with hardly any instances of rephrasing visible that could potentially provide the reader with an indication of the author's personal or supposed ideologically permeated stance. In the extracts below, the reporting verb 'said' is frequently used which does not readily suggest any affiliation with either of the political parties, but aims at neutrally reproducing what was said in the course of the speech, letting Salmond advertise his cause and speak for himself.

> The first minister, who won an unprecedented majority in the Scottish parliament last year, **said** […]
>
> In an interview with the BBC's Sunday Politics programme, Salmond **said** […]
>
> Salmond **said**: 'The people who seem to argue for a no seem to be in no fit position to argue their case. They don't even know what their case is.'
>
> He **said** the SNP would be promoting a new 'sterling area' which would involve a fiscal stability pact, meaning limits on borrowing.
>
> He **told** the programme: 'Your fiscal room for manoeuvre is limited in the modern world anyway.'
>
> A monetary union between the UK and Scotland would operate well because the two economies were already closely matched, Salmond **said**, […]

The second set of examples to be looked at was taken from the articles covering the not too recent signing of the 'Edinburgh Agreement', making the independence referendum in 2014 official. In this first extract, *The Herald* (on 16 October 2012) offers a take on a 'historic event' involving political leaders Alex Salmond and David Cameron.

> […] it was a day of **dramatic** significance. Looking around the room, a who's who of political correspondents from north and south of the Border, the importance of the occasion was clear, as was its symbolic significance **outwith** the UK. ("Day of drama as leading protagonists almost prove convincing")

In the extract above, the author might have consciously chosen to indicate a sense of Scottishness herself by including the phrase marked in bold print (outwith), a phrase that, according to the dictionary, is primarily used in Scottish English. Apart from that, the author is not quite able to hide a somehow mocking tone by assigning to the day in question a 'dramatic' significance. Even the title suggests that the take on the latest meeting between Salmond and Cameron should not be taken too seriously – "Day of drama as leading protagonists almost prove convincing". Implying that the encounter between the two statesmen resembled more of a drama or a show, she continues by saying:

> When a tanned David Cameron stepped lightly up the steps of St Andrews House in Edinburgh to be greeted by Alex Salmond, **emerging** on to the front portico like a powerful laird **graciously welcoming** a guest, they both affected an air of conviviality and good cheer that was almost convincing.

Apart from implying a sense of Scottishness on Salmond's part (laird), the author suggests that both leading men put on a show that failed to be entirely convincing. One the one hand, the author assigns to Salmond an elevated status (he emerged) and implies that he had to condescend when (graciously) greeting his opponent. The aim for both to "present an image of statesmanlike gravitas" might probably have worked "if the brief handshake hadn't been lent an **air of farce** at the last moment by a member of the public loudly booing from behind the security cordon", she says. At this point, the author's position becomes quite evident, I believe, which is party determined by her choice of words used to described both of the politicians. At another level, the choice of quotes included only reinforces the sense of mockery that

the whole article is marked by. When commenting on Salmond's appearance that day, for example, the author claims that

> [it] was almost as if he had been urged to avoid any air of **smugness** – which, it turned out, he had. 'Don't look triumphalist, it says here,' he quipped, referring to his press team's briefing, adding that of course he always listens to his advisers. 'You've failed,' someone hollered.

By characterising Salmond as being smug, which, in the case of the author wanting to remain neutral, could have easily been circumscribed as 'showing triumph', directly relating it to the subsequent quote, the author portrays the leader in a light that highlights his bad properties rather than his good ones.

Comparing these extracts to the coverage in *The Scotsman* ("Scottish independence: Handshakes and smiles all round…now it's game on"), it immediately becomes apparent that there are more direct quotes used that allow for Salmond's opinion to be heard. Still, there is plenty of room for the author's attitude to be 'heard', which becomes quite apparent early on:

> The **magnitude** of events was **difficult to avoid** yesterday, as the world's media descended on Edinburgh for the visit of Prime Minister David Cameron.

Similar to the style of reporting in the article published in *The Herald* above, one cannot possibly miss the ambiguity of meaning imposed on some of the phrases used here. Like in the other article, there is talk of a 'magnitude' of events (cf. dramatic significance) that one was apparently not able to 'avoid', implying that the author might have wanted to do exactly that. Addressing Salmond's demeanour, there is a sense of anti-SNP vibe detectable:

> Just in case there was any doubt about the sense of occasion the SNP leader attached to events, **he wasn't slow to crank up the hyperbole**. 'It paves the way for the most important decision that our country, Scotland, has made in several hundred years,' Mr Salmond said.
>
> […]
>
> The **sense of destiny** was perhaps lost on the Scottish public outside the Scottish Government's St Andrew's House headquarters. Barely a dozen or so **bothered** to stop on the other side of police cordons to catch a glimpse of historic events taking place across the way.

Suggesting that Salmond may be exaggerating (cranking up the hyperbole) when referring to the referendum as indicator for the most important decision made in the last three hundred years, the author continues by exaggerating himself, ascribing to

the event a ‘sense of destiny’. What is more, the author indicates that not only has he an opinion of the events unfolding before everybody’s eyes, but also that no-one seemed to really care (barely a dozen ‘bothered’ to stop). Finishing his account by listing a number of derogatory terms (in bold print below) to describe the (verbal) exchanges in the months leading up to the signing of a formal agreement, the author makes clear what he thinks about the developments that have dominated UK politics.

> [After] more than a year of **spats**, **brinkmanship** and **prevarication** about who was in charge of this referendum, a deal has been reached.
>
> […]
>
> The deal signed was always going to be a formality yesterday, and it left Scotland’s First Minister free to do what he does so well – **playing the gallery.**

As the comparison between these two newspapers published in Scotland has shown, there are evident similarities in the portrayal of the people and events visible. Contrary to expectations, both the *The Herald* and *The Scotsman* exhibit a number of features that speak very much against Scottish politics and its current leader. Both reveal a sense of ridicule and mockery when talking about Alex Salmond as their political leader (e.g. he plays the gallery), which shapes the articles from start to finish. So, as far as including or omitting certain aspects is concerned, the journalist’s choice of words/phrases/quotes might hint at a certain attitude or belief system shaping his/her perception and understanding of things.

The last comparison to be made is between two reports covering Alex Salmond’s opening speech at the SNP conference in Perth, which was released in both *The Herald* (on 19 October 2012) and *The Independent* (on 18 October 2012). Although the gathering was overshadowed by recent poll figures showing that the support for independence is continually dropping, Salmond “**vowed** to ‘end the nonsense’ of Scotland being part of the UK” in what the author calls “a **rousing** opening speech to the SNP conference in Perth” (*The Herald* “Salmond vows to ‘end the nonsense’ of UK rule”). Apart from the obvious fact that Salmond believes the union to be a flawed construct, placing Scotland at a constant disadvantage, the author seems to be positively affected by what he refers to as ‘rousing opening speech’.

> [Mr Salmond] said: ‘**We** are now closer to **our goal of Scottish independence** than not just in the 80-year history of the SNP but in the last 300 years. That’s what awaits the people of Scotland in two year’s time’.

> […]
>
> In a **fierce attack** on Scottish Labour, he said leader Johann Lamont's move to review the fairness and affordability of popular Scottish Government giveaways, including free prescriptions and free university tuition, would increase support for independence.

This instance of talking about Scotland's future nicely illustrates the means by which Salmond attempts to speak to and for the Scottish people, expressing both group belonging and group goals. Once again referring to 'our' goal of Scottish independence, he makes it obvious that the whole of Scotland is affected by the referendum held in 2014. In the second part of the extract above, however, the author gets involved by terming Salmond's address to his opponent Johann Lamont a 'fierce attack', expressing not merely a neutral point of view but judgment.

The article printed in *The Independent* ("Alex Salmond tells SNP conference 'the nonsense ends in 2014'") presents the event in a similar way and gives Alex Salmond a voice to let his opinions be heard:

> In economic terms, if **we** stay within the **Westminster straightjacket** **we** can be ingenious, **we** can be clever, **we** can develop new schemes - but **we** are still within that straightjacket.
>
> […]
>
> The only way to **defend** the social fabric of Scotland - to consolidate the gains from devolution, to make sure we can **advance** the social welfare of Scotland - is through **Scottish independence**.

In this example, too, the First Minister is sufficiently quoted in order for the reader to get an impression of the nature of the message communicated by Salmond. Making use of the pronoun 'we' a lot, Salmond probably positions himself within a Scottish framework of reference, hinting at the fact that, economically speaking, the London-based government has nothing but restraining powers over Scotland (i.e. Westminster straightjacket). In the second part, Salmond asserts that Scotland needs defending (from the opposing group) and that the only way to strengthen the benefit devolution has brought is to deliver independence, the main goal that the SNP can be associated with.

Moving past the quotes at the beginning of the article, which reproduces much of the same information as the previous one, the author seems to get more of a voice as the article progresses. Discussing how Scotland should remain anti-nuclear and

further reject NATO-membership, the author seemingly represents some of Salmond's personal opinions and stances towards the issue, although Salmond's 'voice' is no longer directly perceptible. Without knowing the exact wording of the original statement, the reader must put faith in the objectivity of the journalist when it comes to being provided with information second-hand. The following examples are therefore meant to illustrate how the author reproduces information:

> **Mr Salmond will address** this issue more fully in his main conference speech when he will use the referendum deal to galvanise activists and send them out around Scotland on a two-year campaign of persuasion and canvassing.
>
> […]
>
> But **Mr Salmond also knows** he has to use the conference to sort out the last remaining policy blip which he believes, if left unchanged, could undermine his attempts to portray his party as a sensible, moderate and responsible political group.
>
> […]
>
> Aware that this policy has been seen by many in Scotland as left-wing, idealistic and impractical, **Mr Salmond has decided** to change it.

At first glance, there does not seem to be any kind of judgment or opinion visible that would jeopardise the author's neutrality, since he is merely restating the issues that Salmond appears to have addressed in his speech at the conference, or so the reader is made to believe.

Last but not least, a number of self-evident opinion articles, as well as articles marked by rather strong views, are examined in more detail. Other than expressing ideologies in text, which is mostly done via more indirect ways, opinions are much easier to spot for they usually convey evaluative beliefs and/or judgment in a quite explicit manner. With this in mind, caution must be exercised since opinions, much like ideologies, are often claimed to represent the truth.

The first example is a speech written by Alex Salmond himself ("Voting yes will create a new Scotland") that was published in *The Guardian* on 16 October 2012, exhibiting textual features that can instantly be recognised as conveying beliefs.

> The Edinburgh agreement signed on Monday is a watershed moment in **Scotland's** home rule journey. Paving the way for the most important decision **our country** will make in 300 years, the agreement ensures that **we** have a referendum designed and delivered by the **Scottish** parliament.

Here, decisions concerning the 'future' are suggested to rest with the people of Scotland (decision 'our' country will make), on top of clearly assuming a Scottish deictic centre. Of course, the leader of Scotland's Nationalist Party can be expected to operate from an entirely Scottish point of view, which is further cemented by the quotes below.

> My aim now, as it always has been, is to deliver a **better** and **fairer** society for the **people of Scotland**. It happens that independence is the way to do this. The Scottish government has an **ambitious vision** for **Scotland** as a **prosperous** and **successful** European country reflecting **Scottish values** of fairness and opportunity, promoting equality and social cohesion.

In my mind, there is no doubt as to the suggested membership (i.e. being one of the Scottish people) and construction of a Scottish in-group, suggesting that Scotland has failed to receive fair treatment for he promises to deliver a better and fairer society. Aside from repeatedly referring to the people as well as the values of Scotland, he elaborates on the goals (Scotland as a prosperous and successful country) and ambitions he and the Scottish government have: "Independence will allow **us** to create an exciting new **Scotland**". On the whole, the extracts provided here are representative of the overall tone of the article for Salmond continues to speak of "the **people of Scotland**" and how they need to "emerge as a **united** nation" in 2014, sharing a belief in "**our** potential […] and in a hopeful view of **our** […] future".

Returning to articles that are conventionally written by journalists, I will first attend to an opinion piece that was published in the middle of January 2012 (*The Scotsman* "Scottish independence: Steps to the fateful vote"), reporting on the "tactical moves […] apparent on both sides of the Border as a referendum on independence crystalises [sic] into reality". Taking the view that, in politics, acting is usually better than reacting, the author claims that "Alex Salmond has **dominated** the discussion about an independence referendum", but has apparently proven to be rather reserved as of late.

> This uncharacteristic reticence came to an abrupt end this week. But why did **the master of all he surveys** not want to talk about the subject we must suppose is closest to his heart?

Given that this example is taken from an article clearly exhibiting personal opinions and beliefs, it is not surprising that the author would dare insinuate Alex Salmond to behave in a king-like manner, which is not very flattering and borders on the derogatory, I argue. The article continues in a similar fashion, describing Alex Salmond as "**uber-confident**" and repeatedly referring to him by his first name only.

> Even the **ebullient Alex** understood that was not supposed to happen, and he didn't plan on it.
>
> […]
>
> Given the legal position, UK ministers hold a strong hand to influence [the referendum's] terms and timing; but sitting across the table from a **wily operator like Alex**, will play their cards carefully.

Although one might not immediately feel that his article is meant to ridicule or insult the SNP's leader, one cannot help but detect a somehow mocking tone. In spite of the fact that a large proportion of readers can probably be trusted to question what they are presented with, put straightforwardly or not, the suspected undertone may as well go largely unnoticed by a majority of readers but may still creep into people's unconscious and influence their preconceived idea of people or events.

In another example, the author writing for *The Guardian* ("Independence could revitalise Scotland – and England too") makes no secret of his rather positive attitude towards independence and highlights the aspects that people on both sides of the border could benefit from.

> A **powerful**, **plausible**, non-partisan **case** can be made for why independence would be a power for good for Scotland and the rest of the UK.
>
> […]
>
> What have we to be scared of? Independence **promises** a nation less "Scotland the Brave" and more "Scotland the confident".
>
> […]
>
> […] Scottish independence […] is a **powerful**, **positive story**, and the only people who should feel threatened are the **narrow elites** who gain so much from the status quo. A post-British politics would allow for a very different kind of Britain and Britishness to arise. That's why large elements of Scottish society and opinion are **galvanised** and **enthused** by this historic possibility.

In addition to speaking very highly of independence, the author suggests that Britain as a whole could profit from the developments pertaining to independence and that a new kind of Britishness may arise from change like that. Also, it is not surprising that Scots respond rather positively (they are galvanised and enthused) by an opportunity that would mark a historic event for the whole of the UK, adding that only narrow-minded people (i.e. elites) feel threatened by change that is very likely to occur but that could prove to have some positive effects nevertheless.

Other than the previous author who paints a picture that is positively appealing, the author of the following article (*The Independent* "Leading article: The starting gun is fired in defence of the union") clearly emphasises David Cameron's flaws and poor decision-making skills, before concluding that he has learned a few lessons over the past few months. Referring to Cameron's speech made in Scotland in February,

> [the] Prime Minister certainly had plenty of **ground to make up**. He was largely silent on the question of Scottish independence until last month, leaving Scotland's **tenacious First Minister** to **dominate** for the first 18 months of the Coalition Government.
>
> […]
>
> Given Scotland's long-standing antipathy to the Conservatives, a **badly judged** lecture in Edinburgh risked not only confirming Scots' worst fears about **English interference** but also **undermining** the defence of the union.
>
> […]
>
> Mr Cameron's record in government is **far from perfect**, with a **disquieting** tendency towards **ill-considered**, even **erratic**, decision-making. But after 18 months in Coalition, he has, at least, had plenty of practice at striking a nuanced tone. Judging by yesterday's speech, he **has learned the lesson well**.

The focus is on how Cameron has failed to actively engage in the discussions surrounding independence, presenting Alex Salmond as having (persistently) dominated the debates so far. By highlighting that Cameron's bad judgement has given Scots every reason to be suspicious of their neighbours and has even strengthened a feeling of interference on the part of the English, some of the author's sympathy can be said to lie with the Scottish side. In spite of assigning to the Prime Minister and his actions a series of undesirable qualities (disquieting, ill-considered, erratic), the author concludes that, at least, Cameron seems to have learned his lesson for his recent performance in Scotland was deemed "carefully calibrated" and

“deserves some credit”. Closing with the statement that “**we** share Mr Cameron’s hope that the Scottish people will conclude in favour of the union”, he makes his (newspaper’s?) position clear by emphasising “the tangible **benefits** of standing together”, thereby clearly exhibiting a pro-union stance.

Another article from *The Guardian* entitled “The **phoney** war over Scottish independence goes on” already suggests a certain mindset on part of the author. Stating that “we now know the great and good want to keep Westminster goodwill,” he laments that “**we** are none the wiser”, in this case referring to the entirety of voters who are being left in the dark when it comes to developments in the referendum process, it seems.

> If deciding on the question/s can wait (and it can) more Scots will regard this referendum as their gig – not Alex Salmond's – and want the whole lengthy **navel-gazing exercise** to offer more than a simplistic yes/no choice on the two least popular constitutional options.

Referring to the lengthy discussions concerning the nature of the referendum question(s) as ‘navel-gazing exercise’, the author adds a sense of disapproval to his writing, claiming that Scots will expect much more when it comes to the constitutional change that possibly awaits them. He continues like this by asserting that

> [the] natural **anarchy** of new ideas unleashed by the referendum process in Scotland has **provoked** a deep-seated need to "restore order" among politicians, parties, academics and commentators who prefer dusting down old ideas to rolling with new ones.

By being anything but subtle, the reader gets an unambiguous image of the author’s opinion on the matter, which is clearly marked by his using words like ‘anarchy’ and by accusing the referendum debates of provoking people to act on a deep-seated need to ‘fix’ things that are apparently out of order.

Opening with the statement that “[everyone] in the UK should be allowed to have their say on Scottish independence”, the author of this article published in *The Guardian* on 20 May leaves no doubt as to his opinion on the current developments regarding independence, which becomes painfully obvious in one of the first paragraphs:

> I **dislike** nationalist politics and hope the Scots give a resounding no to the question of seceding from the union. That vote will be **fraught with difficulty**. Who will be the electorate? […] Who has the right to rule on the question of statehood?

Continuing to argue that countries are there to evolve and are fundamentally subject to "the process we call history", the author claims that Scottish nationalists apparently like to think that the past three centuries of being part of the union is the aberration and that "the thousand years of Scottish statehood are the norm".

> If only **they** would stop worrying about nationhood and try to construct the useful shopping bag – into which all manner of different-shaped objects can be placed – that we call a country.

He carries on talking about the nationalists and their goals, presenting to the reader a nice example of how to construct the 'other' in text. By creating an out-group referred to as 'they', the author distances himself from the perceived negative properties embodied by the current political leaders of Scotland.

Other than offering rather harsh criticism like the author above, the one responsible for the production of the next article (published on 25 May 2012) manages to achieve a balance in his expression of attitude and opinion. In the light of launching the Yes campaign supporting independence, he takes a moment to reflect on the debates and conflicts that may arise, considering that the No campaign is about to be initiated soon too.

> There will be opponents of independence who console themselves with the thought that the Yes campaign risks peaking too soon. That might be **too relaxed a view**. Mr Salmond has been consistently **underestimated** by his opponents, especially those in England. He is not only an **accomplished** political speaker, but also one of the **shrewdest** operators in the business. If anyone can **win over** doubters among his fellow countrymen, it is he. (*The Independent* "Leading article: Scottish voters must hear the best case for both sides")

As can be seen by the modifiers in bold print ('accomplished' political speaker, 'shrewdest' operators), the author of the article assigns rather positive than negative properties to the leader of the SNP, Alex Salmond. Speaking not only about the No campaign, in favour of maintaining the union, he claims that Salmond's opponents located in England have made the mistake of underrating the First Minister's role in the 'fight' for independence and that they have, in fact, been too relaxed. While speaking very highly of Salmond and his ability to win over sceptics, further down in the article the author states that although "[the] arguments of the Yes campaign have to be taken on directly",

> **exaggerated claims** for the value of North Sea oil could be parried by some home truths about the **hubris**, once upon a time, of the Royal Bank of Scotland.

Here, the author lists some factors that might undermine the strengths of the SNP and its role in the struggle for independence. Apart from the fact that the importance of North Sea oil as a controversial subject in the whole debate might be overrated, the Scottish banking system does not get very positive reviews either. Despite the seemingly inconsistent support for both sides, it remains interesting how bluntly opinions are expressed, painting a clear picture of how the parties involved in the debate are regarded.

Strongly resembling the previous article in terms of representing characters, an opinion article written by Steve Richards starts off with the introductory remark: "Were Scotland's First Minister to win the referendum on independence, it would be a devastating blow to the PM's authority" (*The Independent* "Steve Richards: The stakes are unbearably high for Salmond and Cameron"). He goes on by saying that

> David Cameron faces a **deeply dangerous** sleeping issue, one that will awake and spring into **wildly unpredictable life** shortly before the next general election. It is already wide awake in Scotland.

In addition to implying that England's Prime Minister might be well-advised to watch out for events to develop much faster than anticipated, the author predicts humiliation to hit either of the leading men, depending on how the independence referendum turns out.

> For Scotland's First Minister, Alex Salmond, the stakes could not be higher. The vote will be the climax of his **astonishing career**. But what if he loses it?
>
> […]
>
> One senior SNP figure […] suggested it would not damage Salmond greatly if he lost. He would hold another referendum in a few years' time. **I do not believe this interpretation is correct.**

On top of admitting that Alex Salmond has indeed had a career that can be applauded, the author does not hesitate to speak his/her mind when it comes to evaluating statements made by political figures, as can be seen in the second part of the extract above. Essentially, he doubts that Salmond would recover from a failed referendum, asserting that

> for Salmond, defeat would be a devastating blow, a **fatal undermining** of his authority at a time when his leadership seems already more fragile than it did a short time ago.
>
> […]
>
> But what if Salmond were to win? Think about the **devastating blow** to David Cameron's authority. Such an outcome is by no means impossible.

Again, one cannot clearly make out any preferences when it comes to the author's portrayal of the opposing parties. While believing that failure would mean even greater harm to Alex Salmond in the long run (i.e. a **fatal** undermining of his authority), odds are not exactly in Cameron's favour for sure either (i.e. **devastating** blow to his authority).

By directly comparing the evaluations above to the next sample, a commentary on the current state of the opposing camps in the independence debate published in *The Scotsman*, one can identify a view that is distinctly different from the examples above. Commenting on the habit of involving each other in political debates, the author especially addresses the nature of 'warfare' pursued by the Nationalist Party, saying that

> [the] SNP sometimes gives the impression that independence is a **magic cure-all** that will abolish poverty, unemployment, disease and want. Of course it will not do that but it is hard to find a nationalist spokesman who will admit that. (*The Scotsman* "Leaders: Extended scope of debate is to be welcomed")

Unlike making no secret of the opinions held on a particular subject (i.e. using modifiers that elicit negative/positive associations), the author of this opinion piece is a little more subtle in his/her expression of opinion. However, it appears as if the SNP's quest for independence is ridiculed, by referring to it as the universal remedy for all of the problems befalling Scotland. So, as far as emphasising a group's good properties or actions go (cf. 'ideological square'), the SNP sure is not the one profiting from it, which is interesting considering that the article was published in a Scottish newspaper.

In similar fashion, the author of the article quoted below (published on 18 October 2012) does not hide the fact that he thinks low of the SNP and its politics, declaring that "[deceit] is a way of life for the Nationalists, who refuse to explain the consequences of a split from the UK" (*The Scotsman* "Michael Kelly: SNP looks

unlikely to play fair over referendum"). As if that were not enough, he goes on offending the ones responsible for even voting for the SNP in the first place:

> An **unthinking electorate** has been **naive** enough to believe that it could vote SNP in anger, in protest, in disgust, ignoring the fact that if it did it would lead to this inevitable conclusion – one that few voting Nationalist wanted, or even considered.

Referring of course to the assumed fact that voting for the SNP in the 2011 Holyrood election was done out of mere protest, said electorate is seemingly blamed for having acted out of spite and now having to face the consequences, that is a political party having "**failed** to deliver an example of how Scotland would grow faster alone". Relating this depiction once more to the 'ideological square', solidarity among Scots does not seem to count for much as, again, Scots and their leading political party compare unfavourably to the pro-union end of the spectrum. Adding that his greatest worry is that "on the basis of the SNP's record, this campaign will **not be conducted fairly**, **nor** the arguments **genuinely explored**", leaves little to the reader's imagination of what the SNP's (negatively portrayed) actions might do to Scotland.

On the brink of declaring the chosen set of opinion articles in the Scottish editions of assuming a surprisingly anti-SNP and therefore anti-SNP-goals stance, the next two commentaries in the collection of articles brings about a change of mind. The example taken from *The Scotsman* (published on 19 October 2012), treating the ongoing intra-party debate of whether an independent Scotland should join the NATO, features the line: "good old fashioned punch-up at the SNP conference" ("Tom Peterkin: The SNP leadership is experienced in boxing clever, but now there's the prospect of a real sparring match"). Despite the line quoted at the very beginning of the commentary and contrary to expectations regarding a discrediting move on part of the author, the SNP's strategies are for once approved of, or so it seems. Claiming that "no blood has ever been spilt in the pursuit of the Scottish Nationalist cause", "a **formidable** party machine" has been able to "[subdue] dissent – save perhaps a bit of grumbling from the sidelines". Emphasising the SNP's skill of having skilfully resolved most of the tension existing between so-called fundamentalists and gradualists within the Nationalist Party and their differing views concerning independence,

> [the] iron grip has been fostered by **strong** leadership and a **realistic** recognition throughout the party that presenting a united front is

> important to show that the SNP is **capable** of governing when the prize of an independence referendum is so close.

Clearly, the SNP is assigned a number of 'good' properties, naming a strong leadership that has the capability of properly organising the people depending on them. The author of the opinion article published in *The Scotsman* ("Andrew Wilson: It is now up to the SNP to explain how independence will work") expresses trust in the SNP's leadership abilities in a similar manner. Also, he does not hesitate to establish a sense of affiliation with Scotland and its people by saying that

> **our** leaders are close to agreement on the process by which **we** can decide on the next step in **our** 'journey without end' as a country.
>
> […]
>
> **Our** priority is, and always should be, **our** happiness and success as a society. **Our** challenge to **our** leaders must be to deliver the politics and government most likely to help **us** make it so.

By making extensive use of the personal pronoun 'our' (but also 'we' and 'us'), the author clearly marks Scotland as the nation he considers himself to be a part of, enunciating not only belonging but also affinity (happiness, success). Referring to the fact that both sides (pro-independence and pro-union) need to demonstrate, rather sooner than later, how their preferred constitutional choice is going to work out for everybody involved, he says that

> [much] work is required, and quickly, to set the terms of the choice **we** are making, and the hard questions must be answered fairly so that **we** can vote on principle for a choice **we** can touch rather than just imagine.

From this quote, it is not entirely clear whether 'we' is meant to refer to 'we, the voters', 'we' as in everybody affected by a possible constitutional change (the people in the whole of the UK), or in fact 'we, the Scottish people' – in view of the fact that this article was published in a Scottish newspaper. In spite of speaking very favourably of the SNP and its politics, the author seems to be quite at peace with British politics as well, claiming that it is

> [to] the **great credit** of the British political system […] that the people who live in Scotland can self-determine. We should not lose sight of how important that is, and just as the civic nature of nationalism in Scotland is a **blessing**, so is the civil and democratic nature by which a legitimate conclusion will be reached.

In my opinion, the author indirectly reveals which nation he considers himself to be a part of, by explicitly referring to Scottish (civic) nationalism as a blessing, for an author writing for an English newspaper can hardly be expected to express approval in such an overt manner, I argue. In case there is any doubt left as to the author's affiliation, the following statement makes abundantly clear where the author is located and which deictic centre he assumes.

> The depth of relationship [between Scotland and the rest of Britain] should never be in doubt, irrespective of whether or not people **here** opt to assume maximum control over the policy choices they face.

In this extract, 'here' is probably meant to refer to Scotland since there is talk of voting for maximum control, which only the Scottish are allowed to decide on in the 2014 referendum. Maintaining a rather positive stance towards both parties involved in the decision-making process concerning independence, the author concludes his commentary by saying:

> I am in no doubt that, whatever **our choice**, the governments in Edinburgh and London will work, in the end, to ensure the closest kin of any countries in the world remain here in **our islands**. We have been through too much together for too long for that to ever change.

Although he refers to the vote determining independence as 'our choice', he makes a quite including gesture by subsuming the whole of the UK under terms like kinship and by referring to 'our islands', which obviously does not only include the Scottish population but pertains to everybody inhabiting the British islands.

Summarising the findings as illustrated in the previous section, one can state that there does not seem to be a clear link between the newspaper that the article appears in and the affiliation to either Scottish or English politics. In fact, the Scottish newspapers under consideration here serve as examples of how anti-SNP and therefore anti-nationalist stances often prevail. In spite of the assumption that Scottish nationalism has supposedly ceased to be anti-English in nature, the English are still frequently portrayed as 'other', in comparison to which claims for Scottish national identity are being made. As for political actors being prone to express a nation-centric view, I argue that both Salmond and Cameron can be said to refer to their respective nations with preference and like to emphasise their people's strengths and aspirations, binding people into a community of others who allegedly

share the same aspirations and hopes for the future; however, the same is often true for journalists taking up a position that can be deemed sympathetic to one's 'homeland'. Having said that, there are a number of instances where the author writing for an English newspaper, for example, declares support for Scottish politics and their aim to split from the UK. Nevertheless, the ones holding the opinion that Scotland is better off remaining in the union dominate the discourse concerning Scottish independence.

Generally speaking, the assumption that language (in the news) is meant to be unbiased, non-distorting and unambiguous cannot be confirmed, I feel. On numerous occasions, journalists do not appear to keep an emotionally reasonable distance that would ensure that the news story be presented in a way that does not convey judgement or bias. In fact, most of the opinion pieces exhibit a distinct amount of ideological language which, given that opinions are expressed rather bluntly, is hardly surprising. Also, considering the journalist's role in the production of newspaper material that involves making choices on both the content and the word level, one cannot expect the reader to be left unaffected. Although in some cases, ideologies may not be as easily detectable for the authors are quite clever in their portrayal of events and people, the language they use (choice of words and descriptive features) inevitably affects readers' preconceived ideas and their understanding of the world around them.

I agree that, with critical discourse analysis being criticised for being largely interpretative, there cannot be any solid arguments made as to the nature of language. While some authors, as was shown in some of the examples, straightforwardly express their point of view, other instances of language use are more ambiguous and cannot randomly be deemed ideological. Without a close examination of the newspapers' political and ideological stance, the analyst is left making tentative assumptions as to the authors' alleged intention(s).

## 5. Conclusion

One of the main aims of this paper was to exemplify how claims pertaining to (Scottish) national identity are realised in newspaper texts. I started out by explaining what national identity entails and by naming the criteria that determine people's understanding of belonging to a given nation and then further dealt with the role of (Scottish) nationalism as an ideological concept. Van Dijk's analytical framework, following the basic principles of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), provided the point of reference that allowed for an analysis of the newspaper articles to take place. Dealing with inherently tricky notions like power, dominance and ideologies, van Dijk's approach proved to be the point of entry for the attempt to uncover ideological language as mediated by political figures and journalists alike, on both a quantitative and qualitative level.

Given that the concepts and analytical method under consideration here are anything but homogenous or straightforward, much less universally agreed upon, a number of issues need to be reported. First of all, a few problems pertaining to the corpus part need to be addressed. The initial idea was to include a list of numbers indicating the frequency with which certain terms occur, hoping it would relieve the pressure resting on the qualitative analysis and would, at the same time, provide a platform for interpretations to ensue. Despite the fact that concordances give some indication of the repetitive nature of language and may therefore suggest a certain pattern, it is not sufficient to infer any kind of significance or, in fact, concrete evidence from it (cf. Stubbs), which I had a difficult time experiencing.

This does not only relate to working with a corpus, however, but affects the analysis of text in general. As Widdowson maintains, people bring certain pretextual presuppositions to a text that impacts the ways in which meaning is derived from them. This leaves the analyst of texts (=me) in an awkward predicament for the same applies here. Already having particular questions in mind, one can assume the analyst to be guided by a number of pretextual presuppositions affecting the focus on certain textual features. As for me, I will not deny having been (mis)led by certain assumptions, questions and expectations that must have inevitably affected the choice of texts to be examined. Naturally, this kind of interpretative partiality, as

Widdowson convincingly argues, leaves a large amount of text unaccounted for which must thus be true for the samples provided above, too. Indeed, the analysis provided in chapter 4 is anything but conclusive but rather illustrates the difficulties in making any definite statements as to the occurrence of allegedly ideological language.

Reminding ourselves what the criticism directed at CDA and its methodologies is all about, the problem of relying too much on interpretation and less on empirical facts seems to be one of the core issues dealt with here. Having been accused of ambitiously over-interpreting their data, CDA scholars have, according to some, no authority to claim whether language is ideological or not. Media discourse presents a particularly complex field of investigation, it seems, for neutrality is the point of reference but language always ends up expressing some kind of bias or attitude. As was established in the introductory part of chapter 4, beginning with the process of selection, the journalist has to make choices that automatically reflect a set of ideas and beliefs. Being now presented with the difficult task of trying to entangle several opinions and stances expressed in newspaper texts, some ideologies are easy to spot, while others are more difficult to identify. As the treatment of newspaper articles has shown, embedding politically or ideologically motivated instances of language into texts is not only reserved for the political elites, but applies to journalists and editors all the same. So, taking into consideration the inherently elusive concept of ideologies and the fact that the people involved in their production and reproduction are guided by a set of criteria determining their perception and understanding of the world, aiming at discovering ideological language appears to be an undertaking that is impaired by a number of complicating factors.

On the whole, I believe this paper has managed to demonstrate the complexities involved in trying to base a sound analysis on sometimes rather abstract notions and concepts. Admittedly, this has led to recognition of the fact that the one doing research is not always able to produce significant or conclusive results that are able to hold their own. That being the case, I conclude with the tentative statement that ideological language is indeed there to be found and that it is the task of the researcher to identity and derive meaning from it.

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## Illustrations

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## Abstract (Deutsch)

Als Ausgangspunkt für diese Arbeit diente die höchst umstrittene Annahme, dass Zeitungsdiskurs vermag, ein Gefühl von nationaler Identität und Zugehörigkeit hervorzurufen, beziehungsweise dieses aufrecht zu erhalten. Mit Schottland als Schauplatz liegt der Fokus auf einer Nation, die vor einer möglichen Abspaltung vom Rest Großbritanniens steht, mit dem Ziel einen unabhängigen Nationalstaat zu errichten. Als integraler Bestandteil der Nationalitätenfrage wird Nationalismus als politisches Phänomen näher betrachtet und in einen schottischen Kontext übertragen. Des Weiteren werden bekannte sowie kontroverse Theorien und Konzepte vorgestellt (siehe ‚banal nationalism'), die die bisher ungeklärte und wenig erforschte Verbindung zwischen (Druck-)Medien und nationaler Identität behandeln.

Der Theorieteil dieser Arbeit bietet einen allgemeinen Überblick über das Forschungsgebiet der Kritischen Diskursanalyse, in dem ein besonderes Augenmerk auf die Zusammenhänge zwischen Sprache und Macht, sowie die Offenlegung von Ideologien gerichtet ist. Obwohl sich die Kritische Diskursanalyse und ihr Vorhaben zunehmender Beliebtheit erfreuen, stellen Kritiker die Aussagekraft und Wirksamkeit der angewandten Theorien und Methoden in Frage, allen voran die Tatsache, dass Analysearbeit zum großen Teil auf Interpretation beruht.

Basierend auf der Methode von van Dijk, einer der vielen Vertreter auf dem Gebiet der Kritischen Diskursanalyse, beschäftigt sich Kapitel 4 mit einer quantitativen wie qualitativen Untersuchung zweier schottischer (*The Scotsman*, *The Herald*) und zweier englischer (*The Guardian*, *The Independent*) Zeitungen, welche die laufenden Diskussionen betreffend die Unabhängigkeitsfrage thematisieren. Im Sinne der Kritischen Diskursanalyse zielt der Analyseteil darauf ab, Textnachweise zu erbringen, welche als typisch für ideologisches Sprachverhalten gedeutet werden können. Die Untersuchung lässt erkennen, dass sich ideologisch motivierter Sprachgebrauch nicht nur auf politischen Diskurs beschränkt, sondern auch auf Journalisten zutrifft, welche für die Übermittlung der Nachrichten an den Leser verantwortlich sind und dementsprechenden Einfluss ausüben können.

## CURRICULUM VITAE

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