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**„10 years after the beginning of the construction of
the Separation Barrier: Transformation of Access
and Movement in Greater Tulkarm“**

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List of Acronyms

CP	Checkpoint
DCO	District Coordination Office
EAPPI	Ecumenical Accompany programs in Palestine and Israel
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GNI	Gross National Income
HWE	House and Water Enviroment
ICA	Israeli Civil Administration
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF	Israeli Defence Force
IHL	International humanitarian law
IVGC	Fourth Geneva Convention
JWC	Joint Water Committee
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
UNOCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
oPt	Occupied Palestinian Territory
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PWA	Palestinian Water Authority

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1. Introduction

Tulkarm, as one of sixteen Governorates in the West Bank, is not in the focus of the media or research, when it comes to the Middle-East conflict or the daily life in the oPt. Tulkarm, with social problems in the refugee camps and a relatively high unemployment rate is located at the periphery of the West Bank (UNEP 2003:17). On this account and because I was able to work in Tulkarm as a human rights observer I want to focus the research for my diploma thesis on this area. The main component of my thesis will be analyses of various difficulties, which have arisen in the Tulkarm Governorate since the construction of the Separation Barrier, with the combination of quantitative and qualitative research.

The interest and the importance of the research lie also in a broader view of the current geopolitical situation in the world. Because of the specific development of history and the geopolitical importance of the Middle East is this conflict one of the most internationalized conflicts in the 20th century (Tocci 2005:4). It is also famous for its long lasting peace process, which can be defined as “[...] *a sustained effort to negotiate a lasting solution to a protracted conflict between states and/or nonstate groups*” (Boaz Atzili 2008:185f quoted by Pearlman 2009:80). In 2000 at Camp David the final deadlock of the peace process was reached, because Ehud Barak and Yassir Arafat could not agree on the final negotiations. The status of the city of Jerusalem and the “right to return” were the central controversial issues. The visit of Ariel Sharon at the Temple Mount triggered the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which led to numerous suicide attacks in public places in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa and other Israeli towns. The Government of Israel responded with blockades in the oPt, concerted killings of military leaders of the Hamas and Fatah and the construction of the Separation Barrier. The Barrier emerged as effective concerning the number of suicide attacks (Schmiedinger 2006:246f). The peace negotiations only started again after the death of Arafat and a new shift in the process seemed to appear last September. The demand and the desire for an independent Palestinian state which had appeared prior to the request of the UN

Security Council on 23 September 2011 in New York became stronger and stronger. Obama's "Speech to the Nation" and Netanyahu's response to it, does not seem to increase the hope for an early resolution of the conflict. The situation of the peace process has not improved since September 2011; the conditions agreed upon in the Oslo Accords are still valid and have an influence on the current daily life of people living in the West Bank. The West Bank in general was divided into three zones - Area A, B, and C- in the Oslo Interim Agreement in 1995. The security, authority, administrative arrangements, land administration and civilian affairs were divided between the Israeli Government and the PA. Around 227 separate areas are located in Area A or B, and both are surrounded by Area C. Approximately 60 percent of the West Bank is Area C, where the Israeli Government, implemented by the Israeli military force, is responsible for the full control over this area. The most important key infrastructure of the West Bank lies in Area C and in addition, it is the only Area, which has contiguous geographical zones. The planned gradual transfer of the control in Area C to the PA has not been accomplished yet (NRC 2010:20). This process led to a complicated system, where different laws apply in various places in the Governorate of Tulkarm. On this account it is absolutely necessary to look into the history of the peace process as well as well as into the question which law is applicable in the West Bank. Furthermore, the economic transformation and the specific architecture of the Israeli settlements, including the ongoing water issue cannot be ignored in answering my research questions.

1. 1. Research Questions

The overall aim of this thesis is to look into and critically appraise the transformation of movement and access of land and employment in Greater Tulkarm, which is influenced by a variety of factors such as the Separation Barrier, agricultural gates, roadblocks etc. and analyze the current situation of residents of Tulkarm living in it.

In particular I will try to identify the numbers of pass overs and difficulties with the permission system at the Deir Al-Ghusun Gate to access agricultural land in the Seam Zone. Another focus will be a number of villages as Nazlat Isa, which has been divided by the Separation Barrier since 2003 and the village of Shufa, which is close to Avre Havez settlement and was not able to use the main road to Tulkarm, due to a roadblock. The research questions focus on this aim and are as follows:

How did the construction of the Separation Barrier influence the access and movement of people in the Tulkarm Governorate?

1.2. Research Hypotheses

In my thesis I focus on answering the following hypotheses:

- *The number of border crossings of farmers, women and children at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate has tended to decrease since 2007.*
- *Since 2005 people have had to pass less obstacles within the Governorate of Tulkarm to lead their daily life.*
- *The so called “normalization” process is one key factor, that the permission system at agricultural gates is widely accepted; it also has a huge negative impact on the income of the farmers.*

- *The construction of the Separation Barrier had a great negative socio-economic impact on certain villages as Jubara or Nazlat Isa. In Nazlat Isa it led to a shift as one of the economic centers of the Governorate to the town of Tulkarm.*

1.3. Structure and content of the thesis

The changes in geography and infrastructure in Tulkarm are closely tied to the history of the Middle East conflict. The aim is to get a better understanding how geographic and political forces (for instance by implementing special legal systems) affect the economic development and the ‘daily life’ of people to have access and ability of movement around Tulkarm. In the second section I will present the methodology that will be used in the thesis. The geographic dimension and the political/institutional dimension are both essential and linked to each other and will be discussed in the third section of the thesis. The question of the impact of culture on economic growth, as well as the impact of terrorist attacks on the economy are contrary issues which are being widely discussed at the moment, due to the visit and speech of Romney in Jerusalem in July. Therefore I will use different theories as a framework to tempt it in my analysis. Different aspects and approaches of center, periphery and inner periphery will be discussed, as well as the influence of culture on economic growth, the impact of terrorism on income and the international division of labor.

An integral part will be the literature work in my thesis. At the beginning of the fourth section I will focus on the history and development of the Peace Process in the conflict, starting from the Six Days War 1967. In the following I will, however, focus on the Oslo Accords I (1993) and II (1995) and the development thereafter to the present status. A huge part of the literature work will be the fifth section „Law applicable in the West Bank”. International Law and International Humanitarian Law will also be represented. Therefore I will also focus on the Area C and specific problems like Demolition, Settlements, Building Permits, and Stop Work Permits etc. The economic situation of the oPt is pictured in the sixth section, to get a better view on the whole standing. Moreover the water issue and the specific architecture of settlements in the West Bank are an integral part to answer my research questions, because these themes

are linked to the issues of movement and access of people and land and will be presented in the seventh section. Expert interviews will be incorporated in the whole thesis, but mainly in section 8: Restriction of Movement and Access in the Tulkarm Governorate. The linear regression will be used as a case study in section 8.2.2. Deir Al-Ghusun Gate - Analysis of the collected data 2007-2011. Questionnaires will be incorporated in the whole section 8.

1.4. State of the Art

The Middle East conflict is a widely reviewed topic that is not just analyzed in various media, but also in many studies with different emphasis. The historical analysis, especially around the year of 1948, is partially very controversial; see New Historians vs. traditional Israeli historians (see Pappe 2007, Segev 2005). Also, there are many studies that broach the issue of the Middle East conflict itself (see Shlaim 2000, Wright 2008, Zerdal, Eldar 2009, Pollak 2000). The impact of the occupation of the West Bank is picked out as a central theme by numerous international and national organizations. The transformation of the living conditions of the Palestinians and the influence on the daily life since the construction of the Separation Barrier is primarily analyzed by UNOCHA and ICRC (see UNOCHA, ICRC). One of the most disputed issues around the Middle East conflict is the international law. Huge amount of publications are focusing on this issue. I will use mostly primary resources, e.g. the Conventions themselves (cf. Geneva Conventions etc.). The international law also contains the International humanitarian Law (IHL). The main sources of IHL are the Hague Convention IV (Regulations) 1907, the four Geneva Conventions 1949 (I-IV GC), two Additional Protocols 1977 (I-II AP) and the Customary International Law. The core of the IHL is the four Geneva Conventions 1949. IHL also referred to as the laws of war/of armed conflict is a collection of laws whose fundamental purpose is to alleviate human suffering in any kind of armed conflicts (Diakonia 2011) In order to explain the Customary International Law I have to use secondary sources and explanatory notes (see Diakonia 2011).

An important theme in my thesis will be the specific architecture in the West Bank. Rafi Weizman published a number of books and papers, which I will use to explain the specific infrastructure of the settlement Avre Havez around Tulkarm. Rotbard points out in the preface of “A Civilian Occupation“, that *“the work of Israeli architects is at the very core of the political issues: There is nothing innocent about regarding architecture as an autonomous process. Since the shaping of the physical reality takes place on different scales, such as the political, the urban and the architectural, architecture is no less ‘political’ than ‘urban’”* (Rafi, Weizman 2003:15). He raises the question of the role of politics within architecture and the role of architecture within politics (Rafi, Weizman 2003:16).

On the other hand the governorate of Tulkarm is located on the outskirts of the West Bank and the political contention. The research in this area refers to a large extent to environmental problems and various illnesses, including asthma and cancer (see Qasem 2001, UNEP 2003, etc.).

The water situation in the Middle East is given a lot of attention in general. Many escalating environmental threats like *“[...] problems of scarcity of water resources and land, rapid population growth, long-lasting refugee situation, climate change, desertification and land degradation”* [...] exist in the oPt (UNEP 2003:6). On this account most analyses include the whole West Bank or pick out a few case studies, instead of focusing on Tulkarm as a region.

Furthermore, there is an emphasis on the behavior of children and teenagers in schools in current Palestinian university research (see An-Najar University Journals <http://scholar.najah.edu/journals/humanities>). UNOCHA analyzed the impact of the Separation Barrier in the Tulkarm Area in several publications. Furthermore, they have published a lot of case studies concerning certain villages in the Seam Zone and villages with agriculture land (see UNOCHA 2007, 2010).

However, my specific research question places the focus on the city of Tulkarm, and the

villages of Deir Al-Ghusun, Shufa etc., which was not analyzed to an extent. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics has an extensive data collection, though. Although there are numerous accounting records of border crossings and the permission system of the individual gates and checkpoints, there has not yet been made a linear regression for the Deir Al-Ghusun gate between the years 2007-2011.

This is due to the lack of resources within the international and national organization. EAPPI is the only organization in the West Bank since 2007 that has an ordered collection of data on a daily/weekly basis for this CP (see www.eappi.org). While the general data were always used by UNOCHA and ICRC, however, due to the high number of gates and checkpoints, no analysis has been made for this individual location in Tulkarm in more detail over years.

2. Methodological Approach

The field of research is limited to the Tulkarm Governorate, with special focus on the city of Tulkarm, the village of Jubara, Nazlat Isa, Shufa and Deir Al- Ghusun. Due to my work as a human rights observer with EAPPI in Tulkarm, I am able to use the data collection of all monitored checkpoints and agricultural gates in the governorate. Furthermore I conducted expert interviews and use a questionnaire to get information about movement and access of people, living in the Governorate of Tulkarm.

2.1. Linear Regression - Deir Al- Ghusun Gate

The aim is to prove the decrease of pass overs of famers from the area of Attil and Deir Al-Ghusun since the fall of 2007. The analysis is based on the assumption that the number of commuters on the Deir Al-Ghusun gate corresponds to the number of those who have permission for that gate. I will consider seasonal fluctuations, like the olive harvest, and major weather conditions, mainly in winter time. The analysis of the Deir al-Ghusun Gates was selected because - apart from an annual summer break of about four weeks and once missing value in February - a record since 2007, weekly data is present. This is due to the fact that this gate is easy to achieve, from the town of Tulkarm and has the best opening times compared to the northern gate as Quaffin or Zeita etc.

Therefore with the help of a simple linear regression, the number of farmers, women and children, who passed the agricultural Gate Deir Al-Ghusun between October 2007 and October 2011, will be analyzed. The analysis is based on actual records of the EAPPI, which were carried out by the team based in Tulkarm on different weekdays. EAPPI is a program in Israel and Palestine under the auspices of the World Council of Churches. It has set itself the goal to accompany Palestinians and Israelis in their non-violent use to end the occupation. It supports a just peace based on international law and relevant United Nations resolutions. One of the main principles of EAPPI is the

fundamental impartiality, but it seeks to clear violations of human rights and compliance with international humanitarian law (see www.eappi.org).

A problem in the collection of the material is that the data were not always recorded on the same day. For my calculations I used - if any - one value per calendar week, in many cases this was a Wednesday. I always go back to my analysis based on the assumption that the number of commuters on the Deir Al-Ghusun gate corresponds to the number of those who have "permission" for that gate. The Deir Al-Ghusun gate opens momentarily 3 times a week and is open for 45 minutes in the morning at 06:00 till 06:45 am.

I put the number of border crossings for each of the categories overall, men, women and children in the dependency of the time. In principle, the regression analysis is considered as "*the relationship between two or more metric scaled features*" (Benesch 2008:115). A distinction is made between the dependent variable Y, which is in this case, the number of border crossings, and the independent variable X, which represents the time in calendar weeks. The number of border crossings thus depends on the size effect term (Benesch 2008: 115). Other factors, such as the number of allocated permits by the DCO were not observed in this case. The attempt to apply the time-series analysis in order to clean up the trend for seasonal fluctuations, failed because no statistically seasonal fluctuation was detected. This is probably related with the recurrent missing values for individual months. In addition to simple linear regression, the data were also compared monthly and for the overall categories, men, women and children with the help of radar charts to illustrate the anticipated seasonal fluctuations graphically. The data was not always available during the month of February and June, July and August. Therefore the arithmetic mean of the month before and the following month was used. This data construction enhances the distortion of the results due to the missing values.

2.2. Questionnaires- Movement and Access in Tulkarm

In addition to the time series analysis I distributed 180 questionnaires in Arabic language in Tulkarm City, Shufa, Nazlat Isa, Shweika, Deir Al-Ghusun and Atill about movement and access possibilities of people. I received 160 questionnaires back and was able to use 153 of them due to failures. The focus of the questions is on duration and obstacles in connection with going to work, or school and spending one's free time. The questionnaires were translated in Austria into English. The questionnaire and the data matrix are attached in the end of the document. The purpose of the questionnaires is to show the length of time and possibilities to fulfill daily needs and duties in the Tulkarm region. The analysis will not be representative. First of all the access to consult women that hold a job in rural areas in Tulkarm is limited. Just 30 out of 153 questionnaires were filled out by women. The age range varies from 13 till 70 years old. 3,4% of the people are between 13 - and 19 years old, 20,9% of the people are in their 20s; 17,6% are in their 30s; 18,3% are in their 40s; 23,5% are in their 50s; 7,8% are in their 60s; 1,3% are in their 70s and 7,2% didn't fill in their age. The primary exclusion of younger people is due to the fact, that they are not involved in the working process. The general access to all people in the selected areas is circumscribed and the period of time of the research was also narrowed. Some categories couldn't be used for the analysis due to the small numbers. This has to be taken into consideration.

The field of profession of the polled people is diversified. The category 'driver' is the highest one with 18 people working in this area, followed by the category 'trader' with 13 people, 'farmer' with 10 people. 3 people considered themselves as completely unemployed. 5 people are working for international organizations and 4 people are employed by governmental institutions. 114 people are married and the average number of family members are 6, 6 and the median is 6¹.

¹ Personal status: 22 people = not married, 1 person = widowed 16 people = no answer;/ average number of family members: n=150, 3 people = no answer

2.3. Expert interviews

To get a better understanding and insight into the situation in Tulkarm, I decided to hold expert interviews with 12 people, which are used mainly in section 8 to give a better understanding of the complicated situation of the research field. Experts have a high insight and a specific knowledge. Meusel and Nagler define an expert as a “[...] *person who has privileged access to information about groups of persons or decision processes*” (Audenhove 2007:6). In my research field most persons are not involved in decision processes, but were able to give me a deeper insight into different groups and processes. Experts are not neutral and part of the social debate and the interview setting influences the obtained information. Furthermore are the effects on interaction very high. Systemizing expert interviews are used for information, which is not accessible otherwise, and allow the interviewee to answer extensively (Audenhove 2007:6ff) Basis for the evaluation work are transcribed interviews, with a first round of evaluation process. This process will include the selection of keywords from the questions (guided by theory) and inductive terminology which can be seen as new thematic aspects, arising from the interviewees (see Witzel 1996). Then the development of case-specific main topics and systematic contrasting through case comparison will follow (see Witzel 2000:8 et al.). The interviews will be used to gain a deeper insight into the different topics throughout this thesis. A weakness of my interviews is that the interviewees are apart from two people, Palestinians, who are living in Tulkarm Governorate. A broader approach, including the various Israeli as well as Palestinian perspectives, would have been preferable. Due to the limited time and research field this approach could not be conducted. Some interviews were held with the help of translator. Most people will not be named in this thesis. I assure however, that the names of the interview partners could be given to the academic institutions of Vienna University under strict data protection clauses upon request.

The following general questions were used as a general guideline within the interviews. The interviewed people come from a different background and different villages within the Palestinian society. Therefore the questions were held very open and are seen as general point of reference. The interview with Yehuda Shaul focused on a different issue, mainly how the Israeli society deals with the organization “Breaking the Silence” and will be implemented in my thesis in the general analysis. It is important to mention that the questions were not just processed through the general guideline, because this would not have been useful for the complexity of the issue. Instead I took my personal background and experience into consideration. The following issues were the focus in my interviews:

What are the main obstacles in Tulkarm City/villages today? What was the situation before the second intifada like? What was the situation during the second intifada like? What was the situation after the second Intifada like? What was the economic center in Tulkarm Area before the second Intifada? How has the economic situation changed since 2002? How did the Separation Barrier influence the social and cultural situation? How has the movement of people changed since the construction of the Separation Barrier? How has the infrastructure changed since 2002? Who are the main actors in the change? What is the role of the PA? What is the role of the Israeli Government? Has the access to resources changed? If yes, how? How has the daily life of people changed since 2002? Do the people have a chance to change their living space? If yes, how? Who are the strong social actors in the Tulkarm region? What is the role of international Organizations? What is the role of local Organizations? What is the role of Israeli Organizations? Are there any networks, which try to influence the political landscape in Tulkarm?

3. Theoretical Approach

The following section shows the theoretical inputs which are important for the different aspects of this thesis and will be discussed closer through the different sections in this thesis. Characteristics of peripheral areas play an important role since Tulkarm lies in the periphery of the West Bank and (Israel), not just in geographical terms. Therefore, aspects of the development of regions in the periphery are central factors, when it comes to the transformation and the development of Greater Tulkarm in the last decade. Different concepts of “inner colony” and later on “inner periphery” are possible frameworks to draw a picture of the current situation in the Governorate of Tulkarm. As pointed out in his essay in 2008, Raphael Reuveny even calls the State of Israel the last colonialist in the oPt since 1967. Averages of 3,272 people have been passing into Israel with a work permit through the Tayba (Ephraim) checkpoint in Tulkarm² (EAPPI 2012c:6). Therefore some aspects of the theory of the international division of labor have to be addressed in this thesis. Terrorism tied with economic growth is an issue, when it comes to the Palestinian – Israeli conflict, especially when we discuss the transformation of access and movement due to the construction of the Separation Barrier in Greater Tulkarm. The economic freedom in a region related to growth and culture is a factor which is being widely discussed in Israel and oPt at the moment.

² between 4:00–7:00 am on Sundays and Thursdays

3.1. Characteristics of peripheral areas

“The mutual dependence of center and periphery has reached a level of highest complexity. Structural divestitures seem more difficult than ever. A functionalization of spaces brought about by characteristics attributed to them necessitates a hierarchy of spatial organization. What “spatial structure” is the current spatial planning and regional policy now faced with?”
(Heintel 1999:1, translation of the author)³.

The terms of center-periphery in the 20th Century were largely affected by representatives of the World System theory, including Immanuel Wallerstein and Johann Galtung. The World System theory, as a multidisciplinary and macro-scale approach is “[...] a knowledge movement elaborated since the 1970s and is a critique of dominant modes of analysis in the nineteenth-century social sciences” (Wallerstein 2004:1). Three aspects are quite important. First the basic units of a social analysis are not nation-states but world-systems. Second “[n]either nomothetic nor idiographic epistemologies permit useful analyses of social reality;” and third “[...] [t]he existing disciplinary boundaries within the social sciences no longer make any intellectual sense” (Wallerstein 2004:1). Wallerstein defines a world-system (with a hyphen) as opposed to a simple world system.

“[...] but a system that is a world and which can be, most often has been, located in an area less than the entire globe. World-systems analysis argues that the units of social reality within which we operate, whose rules constrain us, are for the most part such world-systems (other than the now extinct, small minisystems that once existed on the earth). World-system analysis argues that there have been thus far only two varieties of world-systems: world-economies and world empires. A world-empire (examples, the Roman Empire, Han China) is large bureaucratic structures with a single political center and an axial division of labor, but multiple cultures. A world-economy is a large axial division of labor with multiple political centers and multiple cultures. In English, the hyphen is essential to indicate these concepts. “World system” without a hyphen suggests that there has been only one world-system in the history of the world”. (Wallerstein 2004:13).

³ Original Quote: „Die wechselseitigen Abhängigkeiten von Zentren und Peripherien haben einen Grad höchster Komplexität erreicht. Strukturelle Entflechtungen scheinen schwieriger denn je. Eine Funktionalisierung von Räumen durch die ihnen zugesprochenen bestimmten Eigenschaften bedingt eine Hierarchisierung räumlicher Organisation. Mit welcher „Raumstruktur“ ist nun die gegenwärtige Raumordnung und Regionalpolitik konfrontiert?“ (Heintel 1999:1).

One of the first theoreticians, who developed a center-periphery model, was Raúl Prebisch in the 50s. Regions 1 are the centers, or developed countries and regions 2, which are known as peripherals are developing countries. Industrial countries produce mainly manufactured goods whereas developing countries exploit raw materials. He believes that in developing countries, the income elasticity of demand for industrial goods is relatively high (the coefficient of elasticity is greater than 1), while in developed countries the demand for food and raw materials is not income elastic (Schätzl 1996:182). The term center-periphery was also used by neoclassical approaches apart from the World System theory. Common to both is that the center and periphery are considered a necessary component in a capitalist development. In general centers and peripheries are tied to each other and have a relationship in our traditional way of thinking. It usually depends on the context how components and complex parts are put into the general framework of center-periphery. Peripheries can be characterized by the following characteristics to get a better understanding of the broad variety of usage: Basically, there is a hierarchical structure between centers and peripherals that can manifest at different kind of levels. A possibility to structure and differentiate center and periphery is through a procedural perspective. For the collection of contradictory developments a number of indicators are drawn from different fields like income disparities, the number of Internet connections, unemployment, health care, etc. The activity density in centers is higher than in the periphery with regard to mobility, phone calls, etc. The factor of speed plays an essential role in enabling development or hindering it and is becoming a factor of regional development, for instance delayed developments in segments of the labor market, health care, communications and economic integration in national networks. Innovations, flexibility (especially of the labor market) are factors, which have to be included. At the economic level the outflow of profits from the periphery to the center is a key component to analyze. In the political sphere, dependencies, decision-making structures and the distribution of power is analyzed, where the periphery must often follow the decisions of the center. In the socio-cultural field the center is predominant and tries to transfer its conduct and cultural values to the center. The residents of the periphery are thus caught

between their own identity based culture and the “culture of the center”. Different reaction can occur, which can lead to apathy, resignation and traditionalism. Ultimately, the term peripheral is a banal geographical dimension, insofar as the distance and geography of regions are markings as peripherals. The importance of this aspect tends to decrease since the world seems to get smaller due to new technologies and opportunities to travel. The dependencies described above are expressed in the reality of daily life for residents of peripheries and their economic situation. Consequently, the peripheral status of various regions can be read in statistics. However, a problem of perception in the analysis of the relationship between center-periphery is evident, due to the complexity of the single segments and side issues which are not incorporated properly into the analysis (Heintel 1999:1ff, Novy 2007b:70ff).

"The various forms of integration or exclusion of spatial units in a flexible hierarchy of the global economy bring a modified ratio of the 'center' and 'periphery'- both at global, national and regional level. The concentric space structure of industrial cities is increasingly superimposed by a fragmented usage pattern which is both characterized by a concentration- and deconsolidation process and leads to differently sized centers and peripheries. The figuration of center and periphery has to be rethought and presented today" (Prigge et al. 1996, 131 quoted by Heintel 1999:3).⁴

A crucial factor at this point is the incorporation in the world market. Furthermore, center and peripheral structures have always been linked to a hierarchy of organizational structures. Hierarchy appears as something essential or simple needed to be able to develop large organizations (Heintel 1999:4ff). Faßmann points out that centers and peripheries can have a hierarchy within, as well as peripheral regions have their own local centers. A ranking order of different centers and peripheries emerges. Hence the definition of a center or a periphery has to be seen as relative and not absolute (Faßmann 1990:6). The internal hierarchy of the West Bank, as it is also found in other peripheries,

⁴ Original Quote: „Die unterschiedlichen Formen der Integration beziehungsweise Exklusion von Raumeinheiten in die flexible Hierarchie der Globalökonomie bewirken ein verändertes Verhältnis von ‚Zentrum‘ und ‚Peripherie‘ – sowohl auf globaler wie auf nationaler und regionaler Ebene. Die konzentrische Raumstruktur der industriellen Metropolen wird zunehmend von einem fragmentierten Nutzungsmuster überlagert, das gleichermaßen durch Konzentrations- wie Dekonzentrationsprozesse gekennzeichnet ist und zu unterschiedlich dimensionierten Zentren und Peripherien führt. Die Figuration von Zentrum und Peripherie muss heute neu gedacht und dargestellt werden“ IN: Prigge, Walter et. al. (1996) Globalisierung und Regionalisierung; Zur Auflösung Frankfurts in die Region. IN: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 21. Jg., No. 2, pp. 129-138.

becomes easier to understand in this case. Heintel (1999:4) also addresses the problematic issue around borders, because regions, which are located close to borders, often get indicated as classical peripheral regions. Territorial disparities tend to appear in border regions, which can also be found in the Governorate of Tulkarm, which borders the Separation Barrier and the State of Israel.

3.1.1. “Inner Colonies” and “Inner Peripheries”

The “newer” concept of “inner peripheries” stems from the context of the debate over the differentiation between center and periphery. Nolte (2001) uses the term in the context of the regional differentiation in Europe and gives a number of examples, how the concept was used in Europe over time. Michael Hechter (1975) for instance denominated the Celtic region of Britain as an inner periphery. The central element of the historic picture was developed in the process of the creation of the center and therefore the peripheral characteristic of this region was not descended. With this analysis Hechter transferred the critique of the dependence theories on the liberal development politics, to the internal structures of the western European national states (Nolte 2001:7). Even the representatives of the dependence theories argued, that underdevelopment had to be developed first, because the backwardness was constructed by the success of capitalism (Frank, André Gunder 1969 quoted by Nolte 2001:7).

In the 1980s a broad range of regional movements arose, which were divided within. A part of these regional movements were using the arguments of the inwards turned critique of the dependence theorists and developed the concept of “inner colonialism”. Another part of the regional movements combined the claim of regional autonomy with the reduction of the large administration in the center to develop regional authorities. The response of the old political elite to the emerging regional movements was the institutionalization of the policy field “regional policy”. Today the national state is still important in Europe, but the European Union, which also uses the policy field “regional policy”, is acting

above the level of the national state on the layer of regions. On that account questions concerning the inner colonialism, new nations, political heteronomy by the center etc. were an important issue of the political and historical debate in the whole postwar period, but especially in the 60s. Nolte raised the question, why there was a need with the already existing research and interpretation approaches like “inner colonialism” etc. to add the new concept of inner peripheries. On the one hand objections to the old concepts emerged, because the analogy of the concept of internal colonialism to real colonialism is historically quite impossible. Colonies in the Western European sense had a separate legal status from the mother country. Most inhabitants of an “inner colony” had the same rights as the center, though (Nolte 2001:7ff).

“The concept being used in a neo-Marxist sense (as in the debate over the relationship between colonies and the development of capitalism on a global level) made an accurate interpretation of the “unequal exchange” (i.e. the instrument of exploitation) between the centers and the inner colonies in terms of economic history highly problematic. It cannot be proved by a mere description of the roles in the inter-regional division of labor because there are also profits from the sole export of raw materials – the question therefore, remains how the share of surplus value or extra profits from the relationships between the center and the inner periphery can be determined” (Nolte 2001:10, translation of the author⁵).

Then again research focusing on the economic history usually does not approach more than a few years, often in the context of industrialization. The advantage of using the concept of periphery or “inner periphery” is that there is a possibility to combine different fields of research and that it is open to all fields of human activities e.g. religion, international and interregional division of labor, functions of the military etc. The concept of “inner peripheries” offers the possibility to define the relationship between the centers and “inner peripheries” as well as subsystems and the roles of different actors. “Inner peripheries” can be defined as regions, where the conditions are organized, so that people in other regions benefit from it. To get a clearer picture certain fields should be dwelled upon. The field of politics is easier to demonstrate, as for

⁵ Original Quote: „Wurde das Konzept im neomarxistischen Sinn gebraucht, ergab sich auch hier (wie in der Debatte über das Verhältnis von Kolonien und Entstehung des Kapitalismus auf globaler Ebene) das Problem, den “ungleichen Tausch” (also das Instrument der Ausbeutung) zwischen den Zentren und den inneren Kolonien wirtschaftshistorisch präzise zu fassen. Eine bloße Darstellung der Rollen in der interregionalen Arbeitsteilung leistet diesen Nachweis noch nicht, da auch am Export von Rohstoffen verdient werden kann - die Frage bleibt, wie der Anteil der Mehrwertes bzw. von Extraprofiten aus den Beziehungen zwischen Zentrum und innere Peripherie bestimmt werden kann.“(Nolte 2001:10).

instance, heteronomy over persons from other regions, which is defined as the center, uneven tax collection or refund etc. The field of religion, as for instance institutional religious leadership in the center, or the field of regional identity as well as social structures can be more difficult to illustrate (Nolte 2001:13ff).

Nolte (2001:28) points out that the concept of “inner peripheries” has its limits, especially when the society, of which the periphery is a part of, is as a whole defined through state borders. Borders do not only separate one State from another, but run within countries or cities, and they separate the people linked with the new networks and the short comers residents of a city or a state (Löw et al. 2008:73). This becomes quite difficult to achieve, when it comes to the oPt. There are clear borders for the Governorate of Tulkarm in the West Bank. State borders as for the state of “Palestine” do not exist, and therefore only the ceasefire line of 1948 could be used for the analysis. In addition the Israeli settlements need to be included, when it comes to the determination of possible state borders. Regional economics on the other hand are a sub-discipline in economics that deal with regions, which are understood as rooms, which are not nations and need no fixed state border (Novy 2007a:227). The concept of center-periphery is still useful, when it comes to the Governorate of Tulkarm. A great potential for conflict lies in the emergence of new spatial hierarchies.

On the other hand Reuveny (2008) still uses a colonial framework to place the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a historical comparative setting. He argues that the conflict has too often been analyzed as unique in his nature. He doesn't give much attention to several important factors in the conflict as Jerusalem, refugees, economic relations, water and territorial swaps in his analysis. Reuveny states, that according to the historical pattern East Jerusalem will be the capital city of Palestine and the “decolonization” will lead to peace (Reuveny 2008:326ff).

“Facing the prospect of an endless conflict, Israel will probably decide eventually to decolonize and leave the Territories, as essentially all colonial rulers have left their colonies, evacuating most if not all of the settlements it has built there since 1967. The Palestinians will then establish their own independent state. Whether this outcome happens sooner rather than later will depend primarily on the timing and intensity of the next Palestinian uprising should the colonial status quo continue and on the position of the United States”. [...] But history is not simply a random process. It can also provide us with valuable

guidance about the likely future. Israel will probably decide to decolonize, consigning its unfortunate status as the last colonialist into a well-deserved final resting place in the annals of history” (Reuveny 2008:359).

3.2. The Newer International Division of Labor and the Informal Labor Sector

The 21st century is not only characterized by a large number of movements of skilled workers but also a huge number of unskilled workers, not just across countries but even across continents. Due to the structural changes of the world economy companies had to reorganize their whole production on a worldwide scale with the help of the relocation of the production to new industrial places, as well as with the help of rationalization mostly in industrial countries (Fröbel et al.1981). Even more so, a big amount of skilled intensive jobs is outsourced from developed to developing countries and skilled workers move from developing to developed countries. These two developments are linked to each other, as the globalization process leads to a reconfiguration of the international and national division of labor. Two parts lie behind the theory of the New Division of Labor. The global division of labour separated the global labor force into a periphery and center (or core) and focused on highly sophisticated production tasks. Jobs got lost in the center, because the production was relocated into the periphery. Transnational corporations gained in importance (Hutchinson 2004:3ff). Fröbel et al. (1981) defined this as a crisis for the industrial countries and also a way to export-oriented manufactures in developing countries. Governments are not able to turn away the unemployment rate in the developed countries. Relocation would not stop, if political instability arose in certain developing countries. Hutchinson (2004:5) criticized Fröbel et al, because they have overseen some aspects in their analysis, for instance the independent development of the Asian Tigers. He claims that he overestimated the importance of cheap labour, generalized the low-skill nature of outsourcing and made an incomplete comprehension of the implication of the new technological process.

The term informal sector was marked during the 1970s, when development theoreticians had to admit that the worldwide establishment of the formal sector was not successful. The pattern of the developed industrial countries, which were adapted after the models of the modernization theorist, was not applicable. The International Labor Organisation used the term “informal” for an expression of backwardness and lack of modernization. Development programs were the cure for the problem, especially for the dependency theorists. The old dependence on the West and the gap could only be broken up by enforcing this development. The neoliberal approach was completely different. They placed the conventional development theories at the top and propagated informalisation as a way of development (Komlosy 2007:210). Not the informal sector should be formalized, but government structures as well as arrangements that were considered bureaucratic and corrupt, should be degraded (De Soto 1992 quoted by Komlosy 2007:210). All the interpretations lack on the fact, that the informal sector cannot be isolated, and has to be put in combination with other working relationships. The informal sector actually has a broad variety in developing countries, for instance migratory labor, part time jobs, subcontracting, work on the streets, different services like street acrobatics, food stalls, etc. (Komlosy 2007:211). A high number of Palestinians from the region of Tulkarm are working in the agricultural and construction field in Israel. Their number has decreased since the 2nd Intifada and workers from other countries have replaced the Palestinians.

3.3. Terrorism and the impact on income

Blomberg et al. (2011:383ff) are raising the question what effects terrorist attacks have on society or especially on trust levels and if the changes in trust lead to an effect on income. He defines trust as the “[...] *general feeling of how trustworthy a given person feels other strangers are [...]*” and it is actually difficult to measure (Blomberg et al. 2011:384). They merged the World Value Survey with ITERATE and Penn World Table to create a micro-level database. The average annual values 1990-2007 for Israel, which were used in this article are: Income (average across individuals and over time) 21,711; Trust (pooled average) 23 percent; Terrorism: 1, 00; Age: 42, 2; Education: 32 percent; Children: 0.00; Unemployment: 10 percent⁶. Israel is placed in the lower middle part in trust level⁷. The figures for the oPt were not included in the research. They found out that generally speaking war and terrorism have a negative impact on income. The impact of trust “[...] *is positive and statistically significant in explaining income. [...] [They] do not, however, see a drastic change in the economic significance when including [...]*” the impact of trust, “[...] *but the increase in magnitude of the impact of terrorism [...]*” (Blomberg et al. 2011:396). Furthermore a large number of articles have focused on the effects of economy growth related to terrorism since 9/11. For example Gaibulloev et al claimed in 2009, that every terrorist attack causes a 1,5 percent decline in “[...] *annual growth as a good measure of generalized trust [...]*” per one million people (Blomberg et al. 2011:384f). In literature terrorist attacks are often linked to economic damages on different levels. The effect on tourism, investment composition, savings and consumption behavior, defense and the security industry are just a number of channels of economic growth which can be influenced by attacks.

⁶ High income levels strongly correspond to high trust levels

⁷ Trust level highest/lowest: Peru 8 percent, Zimbabwe 12 percent, Sweden 66 percent, Finland 58 percent

“Terrorism strikes at the foundation of the distinctive, Western form of civilization – namely, our unprecedented ability to trust one another [...] Terrorism’s random acts of destruction, because they are targeted at nobody in particular, make everybody feel unsafe. Consequently, they make us apprehensive, wary – distrustful. Every Arab- looking passenger on your flight sets off personal alarm bells. So did every piece of mail from a stranger during the anthrax attacks. [...] Terrorism thus leverages its acts of physical destruction into large contagions of economic and social disruption (Lindsey 2002).

The feeling of being safe is closely tied to the concept of trust. Safety as a social construct is a term which has a number of varieties and cannot be defined in an objective way. A social construct, because it focuses more on designedly assumed social certainties than on adamant social conditions. Official conditions, e.g. the statistics over the number of terror attacks or the number of victims do not influence the public perception of safety to a large extent. Social certainties such as for instance reliability, security of status, protection of danger etc. are closely tied to the societal attribution of meaning and are essential for the individual and the collective sense of security. Scientifically, there is no exact definition of the term security. Security is often used for the instrumentalisation of political power (Six 2007:6ff).

Another Index, which is also related to the feeling of trust in general, is the Happy Planet Index, because it also includes the factor of experienced well-being, which is measured by the question ‘Ladder of Life’ from the Gallup World Poll. The Happy Planet Index shows how countries produce a long, sustainable and happy life for their inhabitants. Unfortunately, no data is available for the oPt. Israel ranks 15 off 151 analyzed countries and has a score of 55.2. *“Israel’s HPI score reflects high life expectancy and high levels of experienced well-being, but is brought down by a very high ecological footprint [...]. The overall index scores rank countries based on their efficiency, how many long and happy lives each produces per unit of environmental output”* (Happy Planet Index 2012)⁸. The three components life expectancy, experienced well-being and Ecological

⁸ Other statistics: GDP per capita (\$PPP): 28,573 (around 0.6 the USA's), Population: 7.6 million (#91 of 151), Land area (square km): 21.6 thousand (#135 of 151) , Population density (people per square km): 352 (#16 of 151), Governance Ranking (WGI): #41, Experienced well-being 7.4, Ranked #10 of 151, Life expectancy 81.6, Ranked #7 of 151, Ecological Footprint, 4.0, Ranked #103 of 151

Footprint are measured and put into a traffic-light score. Green stands for good performance, amber for middling and red for a bad performance. The Index does not measure human rights abuses within a country, which is quite essential when it comes to minority rights within a nation. Nevertheless, the Index gives a good overview of sustainable well-being (Happy Planet Index 2012)⁹.

3.4. Economic freedom and culture and growth

Economic freedom is also a factor which influences the possibility of growth:

“[S]ince the time of Adam Smith, if not before, economists and economic historians have argued that the freedom to choose and supply resources, competition in business, trade with others and secure property rights are central ingredients for economic progress” (De Haan et al. 2000:3 quoted by Williamson et al. 2010:314).

Culture on the other hand is not widely discussed when it comes to economic growth literature or defined as a constant. Therefore, the inclusion of the culture is a relatively new development in theoretical and empirical studies. Williamson et al. (2010:313ff) analyzes how economic freedom and culture impact economic growth. This issue has been discussed very critically this summer in Israel and the international media in the wake of the visit and statement of the Republican US presidential candidate Romney in Jerusalem (see chapter 6). The definition of culture has four central categories, which are trust, respect, individual self-determination, and obedience. Self-determination is central, in terms of the daily economic success and behavior of Palestinians, because it is a measure which defines “the amount of control a person feels to have in their individual choices”. The impact of culture on economic growth is seen as substitutable or complementary in theoretical research. In their article Williamson et al. (2010:313) describe economic freedom, culture and growth and state that “[...] economic freedom is more important than culture for growth outcomes, suggesting substitutability between the two” and “[...] culture is important for

⁹ “These scores are combined to an expanded six-color traffic light for the overall HPI score, where, to achieve bright green – the best of the six colors, a country would have to perform well on all three individual components” (Happy Planet Index 2012).

growth when economic freedom is absent, diminishing in significance once economic freedom is established". Nevertheless economic institutions such as private property or rule of law are essential for the development of a region or economic growth. North (1990:3) defines Institutions as "*[...] the rules of game in a society, or more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction*". Formal and informal institutions are necessary for economic growth. Formal institutions can be seen as codified structures as well as written rules. Informal institutions on the other hand include norms, culture, which is influenced by social customs, and values. The lack of some formal institutions is still in existence.

"It is also evident from the analysis presented in this article that Islamic culture is not a development blockade; on the contrary. Membership in the Islamic Conference has – ceteris paribus – a very positive effect on political democracy, on life expectancy, and on our indicators of the Kyoto process and the eco-social market economy. Far from being a "religion of the Middle Ages" Islam has an important message for the 21st Century. It is to be hoped that socially progressive forces in the MENA countries will achieve a better monetary distribution of incomes and a better gender distribution of work in the societies concerned in the future" (Tausch 2005:103).

Yuchtman, on the other hand, who analyzed the political attitudes in the Muslim world with an empirical analysis in two stages, demonstrated that religion emerges much more as a shape of attitudes in the Muslim world than in the West. He claims that Islam is at the moment not very encouraging of liberal-supportive ideas. Yuchtman suggests that democratic ideas have to receive legitimation on the basis of Koran and Islamic traditions and "*[...] as long as the influence of religion continues to be pervasive in the Muslim world, the adoption of liberal values in this world will depend upon a liberal transformation within Islam*" (Yuchtman 2010:32).

3.5. Definitions

In this section I will give definitions of some important terms that will be used throughout the thesis.

3.5.1. Occupied Territory

The term “Occupied Territory” or short oPt (Occupied Palestinian Territory) is used on a frequent basis in this thesis. Therefore I will use the definition of EDA for this important term:

„An occupied territory is one that is actually placed under the authority of a foreign armed force even if the occupation meets with no armed resistance. International humanitarian law applies in all such situations regardless of whether or not the occupation is lawful. It governs the rights of the local population and the obligations of an occupying force. The latter is responsible for ensuring public order and security while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force. Furthermore, the occupying force must ensure that the local population has access to food and medical care“(EDA 2009:32).

3.5.2. Separation Barrier

The term of Separation Barrier for the Israeli West Bank Barrier will be used throughout the thesis. A number of different definitions in English are used for the Barrier depending on the political or ideological background. *“The Barrier consists of concrete walls, fences, ditches, razor wire, groomed sand paths, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, and a buffer zone”* (UNOCHA 2012b:1). A lot of Palestinians call the barrier “Apartheid Wall” or simply “The Wall”. On the other hand the Israeli government often describes it as a “security fence” or “anti-terrorist fence”. The ICJ uses in his advisory opinion of 2003 the following term: *“The construction of the wall being built by Israel [...]”* (ICJ 2004). The term “wall” will not be accurate in the Tulkarm Area, because some parts of the Separation Barrier consist of a fence. Therefore, the term of Separation Barrier is the most suitable one without taking a political side.

4. Israel-Palestinian Peace Process

“A peace process is a sustained effort to negotiate a lasting solution to a protracted conflict between states and/or nonstate groups” (Boaz Atzili 2008:185f quoted by Pearlman 2009:80).

The role of a Palestinian state for the population is closely tied to the concept of a nation state or associated with a national identity. *“Although undoubtedly, Palestinian identity involves unique and specific elements, it can be fully understood only in the context of sequence of other histories, a sequence of other narratives”* (Khalidi 2009:9). Identity is to some extent the relationship between the self and the other. This definition of the relationship of the self and the other is quite characteristic of many peoples in the Middle East and certainly also in other countries in the world. Palestinians, however, have never achieved a form of national independence in their area. Therefore it was not possible for them to create their own space, where they were in full control and complete confidence. The lack of sovereignty denied the Palestinians full control over various state mechanisms traditionally used to build a national identity, such as education, museums, archeology, postmarks, coins, etc. (Khalidi 2009:9ff).

In a global view point the question of the conflict of Israel and Palestine has always *“[...] maintained a uniquely divisive character”* (Bamyeh 2003:668). Bamyeh (2003:669) identifies widespread ignorance as the reason for this state of affairs, *“[the] perceived moral ambiguity of the question of Palestine”*- Israelis as well as Palestinians have legitimate national and historical claims, which produce ideological cleavages; the influence of the media; and *“[...]a widespread style of ethical judgment typified by a ‘zero-sum’ logic` [...]”*. Bamyeh (2003:670) addresses an important point, which is highly sensitive: As soon as someone shows sympathy for the Palestinian cause, this *“[....] must in some way come at the expense of sympathy for Jewish suffering in modern history”*. *“The Holocaust is a defining factor in Jewish and Israeli identity”*, to quote Arno Tausch (2012:4) *“[...] and Arab research and opinion, after so many decades, must start to confront its legacy and significance”*. Because of this reason it is important that a clear distinction is made between the critics of the Israeli Occupation in the oPt and critics of the State of Israel itself. As Avraham Burg (2012) states in the Neue Zürcher Newspaper: *“Jedem Israeli sollte seit langem klar sein, dass alles*

innerhalb der Grünen Linie zum demokratischen und rechtmäßigen Israel gehört. Und alles ausserhalb dieser Linie ist etwas anderes: undemokratisch und unrechtmässig. Nicht unser". Bamyeh (2003:670) raises important questions, which need to be worked on in Israel/Palestine as well as outside of the conflict region:

"How do we establish both complexity and clarity in our ethical judgment? How do we forge radical outlines with human concerns? How do we overcome the dead-end of nationalist politics? How do we end the horrors attendant to politicized religion and politicize mythology?"

4.1. The emergence of the conflict

"In Israel, the conflict emerged as an identity-based conflict, as the Zionist endeavor to construct a Jewish state in the Holy Land was resisted by the predominantly Arab and Muslim worlds, including the local Palestinian population (both Muslim and Christian) living under the British mandate" (Tocci 2005:2).

The declaration of the state of Israel in 1948 led to a number of unresolved issues between the state of Israel and the Palestinian people, like e.g. borders, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the city of Jerusalem, mutual recognition, security, water rights and freedom of movement. The "right of return" of the Palestinian people is a key issue which has complicated all peace negotiations since then. Even more so, the unresolved issue of the Palestinian refugees after 1948 gave the Arab states an excuse for their refusal of the recognition of the state of Israel. The refugee problem is linked to the problem of repatriation and restitution (of them), which is rather complicated due to the fact that the Israeli Government took over 94 percent of the abandoned Palestinian property. The decline in population numbers of Palestinians and a high rate of immigration by (European) Jews to Israel in the first four years after the declaration of the state led to doubling the population of the Israeli state (Gelvin 2005:165ff).

Wright, an American foreign affairs analyst, explains the tactics and goals of Palestinian politics since the so-called Nakba of 1948 as a four stage path. Palestinians were ruled by other Arabs for a generation. The first shift of power started in the mid-1960s, because the traditional leaders lost their power to a movement, which was more modern and secular. A disordered leadership also emerged in the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, which focused on local affairs and the Palestinians in the region developed diverse and

independent institutions to get by themselves (Wright 2008:30f). The Six-Day War began on June 5, 1967 and represents a point of inflection in the history of the State of Israel, its neighbors and the Palestinian people (PRIME 2006:84). It made it possible for “religious Zionism” to rise up as an idea: The war was seen as the beginning of redemption and many religious/orthodox/whatever Israelis believed that salvation was at hand (Shlaim 2000:549). The Six-Day War and the subsequent occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip added the distinctive territorial aspect and the question of the Israeli settlements to the conflict. This issue has been central in the negotiations since the Oslo Accords. After the war, UN Security Council Resolution 242 was passed as general regulations for a peace agreement, which were restated in resolution 338 after the Yom Kippur War 1974. The resolution 242, was (is) based on two principles:

“Evacuation of Israeli forces from territories occupied as part of the last dispute; “Cancellation of any claim or state of warfare and respect and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every country of the region” (Braverman, N. G. 1981 quoted by PRIME 2006:80).

The interpretation of the Resolution is still not solved between the different groups of the conflict, because “[...] *[a]ccording to the Israeli version, the wording there is ‘withdrawal from territories’ but according to the Palestinian version, it is ‘withdrawal from the territories’*” (PRIME 2006:80).

The second stage or shift of power within Palestinian politics was after the invasion of Israel in Lebanon in 1982 (Wright 2008:30). *“It was the biggest defeat for the Palestinians since 1948. Almost three decades after Fatah’s creation and almost two decades after the PLO was founded, the exiled Palestinian leadership had achieved virtually nothing”* (Wright 2008:32). The PLO lost its role as a regional player and was expelled from Lebanon to Tunisia (Pearlman 2009:96). The creation of an internal power vacuum in Palestinian politics led to the rise of an alternative leadership inside the oPt. The rising unemployment rate, poverty and high birth rates combined with the tensions with Israel led to the first intifada, which marked the shift of power from outside forces to the home grown Palestinian leadership that developed inside the oPt. *“The intifada [...] produced two phenomena. It introduced political Islam as a mobilizing force. It also produced a new young guard of nationalists who posed a challenge to the dominance of the PLO’s old guard in exile”* (Shikaki quoted by Wright

2008:32). Palestinians inside the oPt and outside of the territories, or even the PLO elite moved into two different directions. On the one hand, due to the close ties with Israel, which a lot of Palestinians experienced inside the oPt, they accepted the right to exist of the state of Israel and a two-state solution. On the other (hand), the Palestinians outside of the territories, who are mainly refugees, wanted the return of all of the Israeli territory. Arafat had no other choice in 1988 than to recognize Israel's right to exist and to renounce terrorism.

The intifada lasted until the peace talks in Madrid (Wright 2008:33ff). In 1991 the Madrid Conference was an effort of Spain, the US and the USSR to start a peace process in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Because of Israeli demands, the PLO was not allowed to attend the Conference. Instead, a delegation of the oPt represented the Palestinian people (Pearlman 2009:97).

4.2. Oslo I (1993)

From an international point of view, when the Labour Party won the general election in 1992 they were under the impression that there was not much difference in foreign policy thinking between Likud and Labour. The Arab-Israeli conflict was handled as an interstate conflict and there was broad support for the denial of the right of self-determination of Palestinians. Rabin, as the first Israeli born prime minister, was very much focused on Israel's security connected with a general suspicion of the Arabs. He didn't want to negotiate with all groups simultaneously, as it was agreed in the Conference of Madrid. "One peace at a time" was a hallmark in his worldview (Shlaim 2000:503f). *"The idea behind this approach was to break up the united Arab front, to negotiate with each party separately, and to pay the lowest possible price in terms of territory for each bilateral agreement"* (Shlaim 2000:504). Then again Simon Peres was appointed by Rabin as foreign minister. Rabin thought, Peres was a perfect choice to represent Israel in a multilateral forum after the Madrid conference. In his view the security aspect was not just a military concern, but also comprised economical, psychological and political elements. He was an official supporter of the interim agreement, and even believed in the idea of the full handover of the West Bank and Gaza to the Palestinians (Shlaim 2000:504f).

In the early 1990s Arafat gained more power due to the killings of his contenders Khalil al-Wazir and Saleh Khalaf. The gap between the PLO as an institution and Arafat as its 'guru' blurred more and more over time (Pearlman 2009:96, Sayigh 1997:30f). *"His jealous grip on power prevented rational planning, minimized learning from experience, and impeded coordination of resource"* (Sayigh 1997:31). He returned from exile in 1994 to the Muqata, and autocratically ruled the new Palestinian Authority for the next decade as the Palestine Liberation Organization had done before. Fatah, at the center of the patronage system in the oPt, was at this time in charge of all branches of government, as well as the private sector, security positions and monopolies on moneymaking imports (Wright 2008:26ff). Notwithstanding his important role, Arafat's leading role was challenged for several internal reasons. As mentioned above one threat for Arafat was the generation of nationalist activists and the delegation at the Madrid

Conference. The secret talks in Oslo brought a way to assure his sole authority and indicated a measure of foreign recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The ambition for peace and the struggle for complete hegemony over the Palestinian struggle were interwoven by the PLO (Pearlman 2009:96ff). Arafat “[...] *inherited structures created by others [...]*”, during the Intifada or while assuming the leadership of the PLO in 1969, “[...] *which he then fragmented and duplicated to an astonishing degree, reshaping their form and function to his purpose*” (Sayigh 1997:31).

The difference between all the peace negotiations before and the Oslo negotiations is, “[...] *the Oslo format brought together Israelis and Palestinians in face-to-face negotiations for the first time*” (Gelvin 2005:228). The purpose was to be a base for ultimate negotiations and relations including the “final status issues” between the two parties. Initially, almost 60 percent of Israelis agreed with the Oslo Accords because of their weariness of the intifada and the general optimism of the post-Cold War world. The expanding settlements and the oPt proved to be more of a strain in the course of time and the Gulf War demonstrated the overestimation of the defensive value of the territories. A small number of Israeli citizens followed a perception of a “post-Zionist” state, which would put Israel into a better position on the global market and promote peace in the region. Rabin, of the Labour Party, was also elected in 1992, by virtue of a large part of the people being able to see the new circumstances of this period. On the other hand, the PLO saw a bleak image of the future: There were constant challenges from in and outside and they had little control of the popular intifada (Gelvin 2005:230f). Furthermore “*the disintegration of the Soviet Union had eliminated the PLO’s most important diplomatic patron, and Arafat’s diplomatic bungling did little to endear him to Moscow [...]*” (Gelvin 2005:31). A high number of Russian Jews immigrated to Israel. The settlement expansions in the occupied territories constituted the housing for these people. The new immigrants replaced Palestinian workers and, even more degrading for the PLO, the Arab Gulf states put an end to the financial aid they had sent to the Palestinians before (Gelvin 2005:31f).

Oslo I includes two separate protocols, two letters of recognition between the PLO and the Government of Israel, and the Declaration of Principle on Interim Self-Government Arrangement of 1993 between Israel and Palestinians. The letters of recognition from the Israeli side did not include the recognition of the right of a state for the Palestinians. *“Furthermore, by recognizing Israel, Palestinians conceded that close to 80 percent of historic Palestine- the territory within the pre-1967 boundaries of Israel-would forever remain off the bargaining table”* (Gelvin 2005:233). This led to frustration among the opponents of the Oslo Agreement and to resentments towards new territorial concessions in further peace negotiations (Gelvin 2005:233). The Accords launched the Palestinian Authority (PA) and created a small new pre –state. Its power was limited to policing and municipal services in small parts of the West Bank and Gaza (Wright 2008:34). As a whole the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements was bound by a strict timetable, mainly for the purpose of negotiations. Unfortunately the Declaration didn’t constitute a proper treaty.

In 1994, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed, including more specific details about the Palestinian autonomy. Within two months after the agreement, the Israeli military was supposed to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho with a processing time of two months until completion. Arafat and Rabin faced heavy criticism by a strong opposition, consisting of hardliners from both sides. The Gaza –Jericho Agreement was seen as the end of the Greater Israel and the beachhead for an independent Palestinian state. The withdrawal of the military was distracted, as a consequence of the attack of the extremist settler Dr. Goldstein in Hebron in 1994 (Shlaim 2000:524).

Binyamin Netanyahu, at this time the leader of the Likud, was already strongly opposed to the Accords and predicted a revocation as soon as Likud would come into power again. Within Palestinian society the accord led too fierce opposition, from organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) or the Hawatmeh within the PLO. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad opposed the idea of an agreement with the state of Israel in general (Shlaim 2000:516ff). Prominent Palestinians like Farouk Kaddoumi, Mahmoud Darwish and Edward Said opposed the

accords, either because of their content or Arafat's autocratic style (Shlaim 2000:522). The accord had important consequences for the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, as the Arab League had originally been established to support the struggle for an independent state of Palestine. There was no reason for the Arab League anymore to reject the status of the Israeli state, because even the PLO recognized Israel. The behavior changed completely in the Middle East (Shlaim 2000:520).

The promise that the Declaration of Principle would set in motion a series of actions to achieve a set result, in other words to end the Israeli authority over the Palestinians in the oPt, was not adhered to. Important pillars or issues within the negotiation process, such as the right of return, refugees, the borders of the Palestinian entity, Jewish settlements or the status of Jerusalem, hadn't been addressed to avoid the failure of the accord (Shlaim 2000:516f). *"Both sides took a calculated risk, realizing that a great deal would depend on how the experiment in Palestinian self-government worked out in practice"* (Shlaim 2000:517).

4.3. Oslo II (1995)

The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, better known as Oslo II, was a follow-up to Oslo I, included a number of key aspects of the conflict and incorporated and superseded various agreements. It was signed by Rabin and Arafat in the presence of Egyptian president Mubarak, US president Bill Clinton and King Hussein of Jordan. *“It provided for elections to a Palestinian council, the transfer of legislative authority to this council, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Palestinian centers of population, and the division of the West Bank [...]”* (Shlaim 2000:527f). The Interim Agreement was also the basis for further peace talks and treaties such as the Hebron Protocol, the Wye River Memorandum and the Road Map for Peace. Both sides were disappointed with the outcome of the negotiations and the resulting Interim Agreement. With 61 votes in favor and 59 votes against Oslo II the Knesset ratified the Accords (Shlaim 2000:528f).

4.3.1. Division of the West Bank after the Oslo Interim Agreement

The 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement divided the West Bank into three zones: Area A, Area B, and Area C. The security, authority, administrative arrangements, land administration and civilian affairs were divided between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority. The status of East Jerusalem was not defined in this agreement. It should have been an issue in the final status agreement. Around 227 separate areas are Area A or B, and both are surrounded by Area C (NRC 2010:20). *„The majority of the Palestinians have been deeply distressed by the division, and they hold out hope that Palestinian nationalism will, in the end, reunite both territories under one flag“* (Schanzer 2008:153).

4.3.1.1. Area A

Approximately 17, 2% of the West Bank area is Area A. This includes all major Palestinian cities or population centers, where the PA has the full jurisdiction over security and civilian affairs, planning and land administration (NRC 2010:20).

4.3.1.2. Area B

Around 22, 8% of the West Bank is Area B, where security is controlled by the IDF and the PA together. Civilian affairs, land administration and planning are in the responsibility of the PA (NRC 2010:20). *“In reality, security is, for the most part, controlled exclusively by the Israeli military forces” (NRC 2010:20).*

4.3.1.3. Area C

Approximately 60% of the West Bank is Area C, where the Israeli Government has the full responsibility and authority over the area, with their policies implemented by the Israeli military. An estimated 70% of Area C is appropriated for Israeli settlements or for the Israeli military. This, however, includes nature reserves and a ‘buffer zone’ around the Separation Barrier. The most important key infrastructure of the West Bank lies in Area C and in addition to it, it is the only Area, which has contiguous geographical zones (NRC 2010:20). The final peace agreement within five years, agreed to at the Oslo Accords negotiations has not been reached. The planned gradual transfer of the control in Area C to the PA has not been accomplished yet (NRC 2010:20). In fact, the Israeli military is still in control of Area C. Approximately 150,000 Palestinian people are living in Area C and around 271 Palestinian communities have their build – up area with more than 50 percent of their land in this area (UNOCHA 2010a:1).

4.3.2. Final status negotiations

The final status negotiations were planned to start in May 1996. Unfortunately Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated before by a religious extremist at the largest peace demonstration since 1993 (Shlaim 2000:547). Yigal Amir, the murderer, was a follower of the set of beliefs, that “[...] *[t]he Yewish people, the chosen people, are the rightful owner of the promised land, the Land of Israel. The Palestinians are aliens in this land and, like all other Arabs, a sworn enemy*” (Shlaim 2000:549). Shimon Peres became prime minister and minister of defense. The rise of Netanyahu in 1996 led to a shift in the Oslo process to a work-to-rule approach; and a break with the Labor’s approach. Rabin’s followers also lost the election in 1996 as a result of the Hamas suicide bombers, because the attacks indicated a failure of Rabin’s policies of engagement (Shlaim 2000: 564ff).

Today unfortunately we have to admit that the Oslo Accords “[...] *failed to lead to peace*” (Waage 2008:54). Seen from a Palestinian viewpoint the fragmentation of the West Bank, the disconnectedness of Gaza and the West Bank, and the steep increase of Israeli settlement activity are one side of the effects on the Palestinians of the Oslo Accords (Pearlman 2009:98). The construction of the Separation Barrier, and a “draconian closure regime”, as Waage (2008:54) calls it, are the others. During the six-year period after Oslo, Palestinian extremists killed more Israelis in attacks than the six-year period before. By putting power in the hands of Arafat and the PLO/Fatah, the Oslo Accords threatened the existence of Islamist groups in Palestinian society. To them the Accords were intolerable as a whole, due to the fact that large parts of what they perceive to be ‘historical Palestine’ were ceded to the state of Israel. The attacks served also as an instrument to ensure a new role within the new Palestinian political mindset of power system (Pearlman 2009:99f).

4.4. Camp David Summit (2000)

Under pressure of US President Clinton, Arafat came to Camp David in July 2000, which was nicknamed as the Jerusalem summit by the former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami (Sher 2006:61). Before the negotiations the parties approved a complete gag order during the whole summit, because the participants should be able to get the chance to speak as open as possible. All sensitive and open questions were discussed (Hadi 2001:49f). At that meeting, Barak offered great concessions at the meetings; he even had described himself previously as unimaginable and was often not recognized by the international media to its real extent later on: A deal for a permanent status, which could have been the basis for an independent Palestinian state, which would have included around 90 percent of the West Bank in the end. The withdrawal from the most settlements as well as the connection highway for the West Bank and Gaza was added in the Israeli concessions for peace. He also included parts of the expanded city limits of Jerusalem in his offer and a comprehensive solution for the long lasting refugee problem. Israel should express the regret of suffering of the refugees, take some refugees to Israel and contribute to the financial compensation. The majority of the refugees would have been rehabilitated in their home countries or would have been resettled in the future Palestinian state. A maximum of 100,000 refugees would have been able to return to the state of Israel. The Palestinian would have to give up the full right of return instead (Heller 2001:36ff, Sher 2006:61ff).

“Israelis correctly argued that a return of four million people would fundamentally alter the demographics of Israel, jeopardizing Israel's Jewish character and its existence – an understandable desire of the State in view of the terrible Jewish sufferings over the years since the destruction of the Temple in the year 70 - as a whole. A much larger number of Jewish refugees had fled or were expelled from Arab countries since 1948, and were never compensated” (Tausch 2012:5).

Worth mentioning is also the high amount of compensation for property lost which would have been installed for the Palestinian refugees. The city of Jerusalem was another key element of the negotiations. As Gilead Sher (2006:61) stated in his book *“The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations”*: *“Jerusalem, for example, is clearly not a Palestinian issue, but an issue that focuses the entire attention of the Muslim and Arab*

world”. Before the negotiation started Barak pointed out the little negotiation space concerning the status of Jerusalem.

“We want to allow them free access to the Temple Mount and special status on the Mount. We also need a wider definition of Jerusalem that includes territory that belongs to us and them. In this enlarged area, the capital of Israel will be established. It will be the biggest and strongest Jerusalem ever, with the largest Jewish majority. The Arab capital will be in Al-Quds. Certain areas will be subject to special arrangement, although still under Israeli sovereignty. [...] We have to look for solutions, rather than being dogmatic” (Sher 2006:67).

These concessions went too far for some of Barak's partners in the "Peace Coalition". In the summer of 2000 the Shas, the National Religious Party and the immigrant party Yisrael Be'Aliyah left the coalition and this resulted in the loss of the parliamentary majority from Barak. For the Palestinian negotiation members the concessions were not enough though (Heller 2001 36ff). Arafat responded on a statement from the secretary of state, when she told him during the Camp David negotiations, that he will have a state: *“I already have a state. [...] If Barak does not want to recognize this now, I do not care if it is recognized even in twenty years. Our situation is like the one in South Africa, the whole world supports me”* (Sher 2006:67).

Nigel Parry (2002) criticized the media coverage during the Camp David negotiations. He claims that many politicians and journalist only reproduced the Israeli perspective of being generous in the negotiations and failed to give a clear picture of the Palestinian perspective.

“To conclude, the actual amount of land in Israel’s offer was far from “generous” in Palestinian eyes, its implementation would have compounded the current problems with freedom of movement, and it also did not meet the minimum requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions or international legal precepts concerning the disposition of territories occupied during war”. (Parry 2002).

Some people involved in the peace negotiations also thought, that Camp David was too early.

“Both Palestinians and Israelis need a peace for the generations, not a peace of short-term conveniences. What we learned at Camp David is that the kind of real peace both sides need will require a little more time, a little more effort and a little more pain. But we continue to believe that it is worth the time, effort, and yes, even the pain”(Erekat 2000).

Clinton and Barak wanted to push the negotiations, also because the legislative period of their elected position came to an end. The peace efforts failed in Camp David to lead to results and this paved the way to the third power shift within the Palestinian politics. Arafat constrained the terms, which Ehud Barak, as the Israeli Prime Minister,

proposed. The Negotiations Affairs Department of the PLO (2000) stated after the failing of the Camp David negotiations:

“Palestinians entered the peace process on the understanding that (1) it would deliver concrete improvements to their lives during the interim period, (2) that the interim period would be relatively short in duration - i.e., five years, and (3) that a permanent agreement would implement United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. But the peace process delivered none of these things. Instead, Palestinians suffered more burdensome restrictions on their movement and a serious decline in their economic situation. [...] In sum, Palestinians simply did not experience any “progress” in terms of their daily lives. [...] However, what decisively undermined Palestinian support for the peace process was the way Israel presented its proposal. Prior to entering into the first negotiations on permanent status issues, Prime Minister Barak publicly and repeatedly threatened Palestinians that his “offer” would be Israel’s best and final offer and if not accepted, Israel would seriously consider “unilateral separation” (a euphemism for imposing a settlement rather than negotiating one). Palestinians felt that they had been betrayed by Israel who had committed itself at the beginning of the Oslo process to ending its occupation of Palestinian lands in accordance with UN Resolutions 242 and 338”.

Robert Malley (2001), who wrote “Fictions about the failure of Camp David” stated that there was no “[...] lack of foresight or vision on the part of Ehud Barak. He had uncommon political courage as well. But the measure of Israel’s concessions ought not be how far it has moved from its own starting point; it must be how far it has moved toward a fair solution. [...] The Palestinians did not meet their historic responsibilities at the summit either. I suspect they will long regret their failure to respond to President Clinton -- at Camp David and later on -- with more forthcoming and comprehensive ideas of their own”.

The failure of the negotiations was the beginning of the eruption of the second intifada, which was more sophisticated and a bloody wheel of violence. Suicide bombings targeted Israeli civilians in cafes, hotels, shopping malls and bus stations. On the other hand, Israel reacted harshly against the Palestinian street fighters and governmental sites. A big part of the Palestinian territory was reoccupied. Another big obstacle for the resumption of peace talks was the beginning of the construction of the Separation Barrier in 2002. The disintegration process of the PA started, because there was no possibility to travel from the Gaza strip to the headquarters of the lawmakers in Ramallah in the West Bank (Wright 2008:35ff). Already in 2002 led the Intifada to a setback in economic activity in Israel, especially in the tourism sector. The economic activities in the oPt were almost disrupted completely and the unemployment rate rose over 40 percent. Asseburg called it even mass poverty, because at least one third of the population lived below the poverty line. The legitimacy of the PA within the Palestinian population declined since the outbreak of the Intifada. More than 85 percent of the Palestinians wanted to continue with the Intifada in 2002, and around 70 percent accepted the use of military or violent methods. Only 40 percent believed in a two state

solution. On the other hand more than 70 percent of the Israelis in the survey found that the reoccupation of Area A would be an appropriate instrument to defeat the Intifada. Only 40 percent believed in the possibility of a peaceful solution. The conflict on both sites was more seen as a struggle for existence than a conflict over the occupation of the oPt in 1967 (Assenburg 2002:141ff).

4.5. Road Map for Peace

The Road Map for Peace, which was launched in July 2002 and handed over in April 2003 by the Quartet (the US, the UN, the EU and Russia), adumbrates the general principles for a resolution to the conflict in the Middle East. The call for an independent Palestinian state and for a new Prime Minister was included in the Road Map. The Quartet called for the end of the violence and terror attacks and an acceptance by both parties of the goal that the Road Map would lead to: a negotiated settlement. The institution building and the normalization of the daily life of the Palestinians was also a core element of the road map (BBC 2003).

“The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah - endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit - calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks” (The Quartet quoted by BBC 2003).

The initiative was called off, because Arafat was not willing to give up or did not end the ongoing outrage against the state and the civilians of Israel. Daily life in the oPt became more difficult, due to the high rate of unemployment and lawlessness (Wright 2008:36f).

On the other hand Anwar Darkazally (2003) pointed out, that “[...] ‘*The Road Map is the only game in town*’ is a popular phrase at the moment, and although both Palestinians and Israelis are saying it, only the Palestinians are playing it”. Israel brought out 14 reservations and conditions to obviate the substantive provisions of the Road Map for peace and therefore only agreed to some of the steps which were outlined

in the document. According to Darkazally Israel didn't accept to the final steps to a independent Palestinian state: *"In this peace process it seems that Sharon is keener on negotiating the process than the peace. Each of the reservations entitles the Israeli government to selectively fulfill the aspects of the Road Map it likes, when and if it chooses to"* (Darkazally 2003).

Furthermore the fragmentation of the Fatah was increasing and *"[...] [a]s order broke down, Hamas increasingly filled the political space. During this third shift in power, the Islamic party moved from the margins to the mainstream"* (Wright 2008:37). Hamas, an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, established an immense network during the 1990s and opened up schools, hospitals, organizations, as a parallel civil society. At this time Hamas got the chance to deliver basic needs to the civilians, because the PA failed to fulfill their functions. Hamas opposed the peace process in general, boycotted the PA and didn't run in the 1996 parliamentary and 2005 presidential elections (Wright 2008:37ff). A survey held in the oPt in 2004 showed that 87 percent of the Palestinians thought that Arafat's government was corrupt (Wright 2008:26). Therefore Arafat's death, *"[...] symbolized the gradual – and ongoing – passage of the old guard of leaders who emerged between the 1960s and the 1980s and then hung on to power for decades. That early generation of leaders may have started out with popular ideology or nationalist zeal, but they all ended up corrupt, ineffective, or autocratic- and often all three"* (Wright 2008:28). Mahmoud Abbas, who took over the position of Arafat tried to integrate Hamas into the process of Palestinian institution building, because he was not able to maintain order in the oPt or even negotiate with Israel without an understanding with ²his islamist challengers" (Wright 2008:45).

During the Beirut Summer in 2002 there was another attempt for peace negotiations from Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which was called Arab Peace Initiative. The difference between the Road Map for Peace is that it called for the borders before 1967. During the Riyadh Summer in 2007 the agreement was renewed once again.

4.6. 2006 presidential and legislative elections in the oPt

January 25 of 2006 was an important day for the Arab world and a chancy experiment for the Middle East. Palestinians rejected the status quo in a peaceful and democratic election, which was the most exhaustively monitored election ever held in the region (Wright 2008:19ff). Before the election, Hamas discussed within the organization, if the “politicization” of Hamas was desired, or if they wanted to retain their mission of being a resistance organization (Brown 2007:5). Hamas won 44 percent of the votes and 56 percent of the seats in the legislature. A mistake of the party of Fatah was that they were running with too many candidates (Wright 2008: 48). Regardless of how peaceful the election won by Hamas had been, parts of the world didn’t accept the movement to govern the PA and imposed severe sanctions (Brown 2007:2). A large amount of donor money or foreign aid was frozen and Israel retained around 55 million dollars per month in Palestinian tax revenue. This revenue was essential to pay governmental employees including teachers, police and utility workers. This led to an immediate crisis within Hamas and a political vacuum (Wright 2008:57). Brown (2007:1) explains that the responsibility for the chaos after the election within Palestinian society lay with Fatah, as much if not more than with Hamas. He also blames America for deepening the chaos:

“Assistant Secretary of State David Welch did admit that the GDP in the West Bank and Gaza has dropped 40 percent in the past seven years, over 60 percent of Palestinian households live below the poverty line, meaning they survive on less than \$2.40 per day, and 50 percent of Palestinians rely on food assistance to feed their families” (Brown 2007:1).

The International Crisis Group (2007:31) described the efforts of pushing away Hamas as counterproductive, because they even gained sustainable support in the year after the election from Islamist groups. Even the Palestinians decried the international boycott as an unfair measure; they still recognized the ineffective response of Hamas (Brown 2007:5). In reaction to the elections, Fatah chose to become the opposition in the Palestinian political system and prevented the formation of a national unity government. Initially it seemed that Fatah would peacefully hand over power to Hamas, but this progress changed over time, as the defeated organization. Mahmoud Abbas tried to immediately put the party back into power using different methods at a political level. At the top of attacks against each other’s leadership, Hamas and Fatah forces began

violent attacks in Gaza (Brown 2007:6). Abbas hired Haniyya as prime minister and formed an emergency government in the West Bank without Hamas participation (Wright 2010:62). Abbas was mainly supported by the Arab League, the European Union and the US. Hamas, on the other hand rejected the government set up by Abbas as illegitimate, and did not give up their control over Gaza (Brown 2007:6ff). *“In eighteen months, the two largest Palestinian parties had destroyed the euphoria of the Arabs’ most democratic election ever, anywhere”* (Wright 2010:63). No party has reached a political monopoly in the two territories: *“[...]Fatah had gained politically in Gaza as life deteriorated under Hamas rule, while Hamas had made gains in the West Bank because Fatah still refused to clean up its act”* (Wright 2010:63). As the International Crisis Group (2007:2) recommended after the Saudi-mediated Mecca Agreement: *“Without a Hamas-Fatah power-sharing agreement and as long as the Islamists feel marginalized, unable to govern and in an existential struggle for survival, there can be no sustainable diplomacy.”* The Operation Cast Lead in Gaza by the IDF took place in the winter of 2008/2009 and let too many civilian casualties on both sites.

4.7. Application for UN membership 2011

Despite positive assessments of the developments in the past few years, some experts remain critical of a possible application by the Palestinians for full UN membership. The International Crisis Group (2011) for example, considered the Palestinian efforts to join the UN a show of collective mismanagement. *"Palestinian leaders, in a mix of ignorance, internal divisions and brinkmanship, oversold what they could achieve at the world body and are now scrambling to avoid further loss of domestic credibility"* (Crisis Group 2011). On the other hand the EU has always stressed its principles, and its strategic objectives in the Middle East conflict around two inter-related pillars (see Tocci 2005:3ff): *"The first pillar has been the need to respect the collective rights of the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples. [...] The second pillar of EU goals has been the importance of respecting human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law"* (Tocci 2005:5). Of course, self-interest is the main reason for the positions and behaviors of the important players in the international community.

PA Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (2011) himself, however, in his speech on the 23th September in front of the UN General Assembly stressed the fact, that the Palestinians in various Reports from the UN, World Bank, Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, IMF and AHLC have been positively commented on, giving them reason to expect a positive reaction to a UN membership bid. The right of self-determination as a matter of course to him was very important in his speech. An application for the "state non-member with observer status" was not an option for him (see Abbas 2011). The criteria for being considered a real state are important, however, *" [...] for disseminating and imposing uniform 'national' criteria of identity"* (Khalidi 2009:10). The PA has become in natural control of some these aspects. However, many of these are also still under Israeli control. Of course this is closely related to the concept of self-determination, which Abbas addressed in his speech before the UN General Assembly. The city of Jerusalem plays a central role in the process of nation building, because the city has always been the geographical, spiritual, administrative and political center of the oPt (Khalidi 2009:13). The individual elements of a so-called "Palestinian identity" have throughout

history shifted of course, with some points being added and others losing their importance with the passage of time (Khalidi 2009: 18f).

Seen from a Palestinian viewpoint Israel dramatized the impact of the Palestinian bid for UN membership and tried by different methods, such as withholding tax money from the Palestinian Authority, to stop the Palestinians from submitting their request. Basically, the UN request was supported by the Palestinians. According to a survey by Near East Consulting, which was held on September 18th 2011, it came to a backlash a week before the application to the UN. In principle 84 percent of respondents supported the application. 87 percent believed that the United States would react negatively to the request and even 90 percent believed that Israel would change the terms and conditions to some agreements between the two parties to the Palestinians in the West Bank. " *In general, 57 percent of the respondents expect that recognition of a Palestinian state will succeed, while 43 percent think that the Palestinian quest for recognition by the United Nations will fail*" (Maannews 2011). Prior to application, there was speculation whether Abbas may not apply for full membership in the UN after all. However, he confirmed his intentions with the following words: "*I call upon Mr. Secretary-General to expedite transmittal of our request to the Security Council, and I call upon the distinguished members of the Security Council to vote in favor of our full membership. I also call upon the States that did not recognize the State of Palestine as yet to do so*" (Abbas 2011). A reaction connecting the uprisings in neighboring countries of the oPt or explicitly in the West Bank was barely noticeable among the population. The protest actions on the 21th of September could not mobilize masses within the West Bank. The Palestinian "Non-Violent" tactics in demonstrations, however, led to irritation with the Israeli military in general.

"The power of non-violent protest and civil disobedience is undeniable, and the more and more the Palestinians adopt these tactics, the more they want to leave Israel no choice but to end its effective control over the West Bank or risk total isolation " (Nismann 2011).

Iceland was the first Western European country, which acknowledged on the 29th of November 2009 Palestine as an independent state within the limits in 1967. The vote was symbolically held at the UN Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (Der Standard 2011). Currently, 132 of the 193 UN-recognized countries acknowledge the Palestinian state.

4.8. Present Status

The International Crisis Group (2012:1) rises at the beginning of their new report concerning the Middle East Peace Process the question, if anybody still believes in the Middle East Peace Process? According to the International Crisis Group (2012) is the peace process dead, for a number of reasons, but there are hardly workable alternatives. The promoted idea of a two-state solution is even buried by the people, which promoted it the most (see Hackl 2012). Seen from a Israeli viewpoint the status quo is suitable for the Palestinian elite, as they enjoy relatively high comfort in their daily life in the West Bank and another reason for maintaining the peace process is “[...] *the conviction that halting it risks creating a vacuum that would be filled with despair and chaos*” (Crisis Group 2012:1). For a glimpse the application for the UN membership seemed to be a shift in strategy, but this possible alternative way lost his strength after the refusal of the international support for statehood at the General Assembly. Abbas refused to engage in negotiation with Israel; unless they would freeze the expansion of the settlements and the reconciliation agreement with Hamas didn’t have the hoped outcome either. The fear of a cut off in US aid and the tax clearance revenue in case of a positive development at the UN statehood process is equally frightening to the PA, as the possible negative consequences of a joint government with the Hamas. The rupture of the PA could also lead to financial problems for the public employees and retaliatory actions from Israel (Crisisgroup 2012:1f). The need to find alternatives to the classical peace negotiations and a two state solution are absolutely necessary. “*What should be explored is a novel approach to a negotiated two-state solution that seeks to heighten incentives for reaching a deal and disincentives for sticking with the status quo, while offering a different type of third-party mediation*” (Crisisgroup 2012:2). The Crisisgroup points out four untended areas which should be addressed for a future alternative path: New issues, new constituencies, new Palestinian strategy and a new international architecture. The withdrawal of state of Israel from the oPt as a sufficient basis for Peace negotiations is no longer valid. The demand for the right of return of the Palestinian refugees will be realistically not more than symbolic numbers (see Hackl

2012). Furthermore the peace process has to leave its narrow path and move on to an inclusive approach with more actors. A new Palestinian strategy is badly needed and the international bodies need to address the major changes in the Middle East (Crisisgroup 2012:2). All actors involved in the process for peace need to find a sustained social contract. Otherwise this could avenge the long term. The primarily important is a process of reconciliation concerning history and identity. What a well-founded European perspective, oriented towards peace between the state of Israel with a Jewish character and its neighbors could maintain is that on the one hand the absence of an official Israeli recognition of the so called 'Nakba' is not contributing to a long lasting peace and on the other hand the absent recognition of the entire painful trajectory of Jewish history ever since the year 70 and the Jewish character of the state of Israel is also not helping to progress the peace process. The author of this thesis would argue that the central "catastrophe" in the Palestinian-Arab national memory must be balanced with the national historiography of the Israeli state (following Hackl 2012).

“Whatever steps ultimately are taken, it has become plain almost twenty years after this peace process was launched that none of the parties – neither those immediately implicated nor those purportedly working on a solution – is honest about its own convictions. It is time to acknowledge what has not worked – and to look for something different” (Crisisgroup 2012:37).

5. Law applying in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Today the legal system in the West Bank is a very complicated system, because a number of different laws apply in different areas in the West Bank. International Law and International Humanitarian Law plays an important role in this area, since there is a conflict between the state of Israel and the Palestinians. The Israeli civil law is applicable for the settlers living in the West Bank and on the other side Martial Law is important for the Palestinians (NRC 2010:20f).

“[...] Israeli military law is applied to Palestinians, except in East Jerusalem, which was officially annexed to Israel. As a result, two separate legal systems and sets of rights are applied by the same authority in the same area, depending on the national origin of the persons, discriminating against Palestinians” (UNOCHA 2012:2).

Military Order No. 2 of 1967 issued by the Israeli Military Commander appointed martial law following the occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. The Military Order *“[...] provided for the abolition of any law in force in the oPt at the time where such laws conflict with any military orders issued by the occupying power. Israel annexed East Jerusalem and accordingly applies Israeli civil law in that area”* (NRC 2010:20). According to the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (2009:3) *“[t]his strategy ended with the confiscation of more than 2910 km² (51%) of the West Bank geographic area as to "state property" lands”*. The knowledge of the different legal systems, especially concerning housing, land and property, applying in this area becomes particularly important, when difficulties like house demolitions occur. The question of obtaining a building permit for Palestinians is as important as the Legal Response to Stop Work Orders, Demolition Orders or Land Seizure Orders.

5.1. International Law

„International law is a combination of rules and customs governing the relations between states in different fields, such as the law of the sea, space law, trade law, territorial boundaries of states, and diplomatic relations“(Diakonia 2011). The ambition is to protect and amplify the well-being of people and it is a basis for peace and stability throughout the world. Globalization led to more intensive and complex relations between the different countries and nations. The consent of states is the foundation pillar of international law. A State is obligated to fulfill just those rules of international law, which it has agreed on before, because of the principle of the “Sovereignty of States“. However the prohibition of genocide for example is “*ius cogens*“. This means that the peremptory norms of the international law apply to all States without any exception (EDA 2009:37f). The sources for the international law as the International Court of Justice shall apply, states in its Statute Article 38: international conventions; international custom; the general principles of law; “[...] *subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law*“ (ICJ 1946).

Customary international law implies that States adapt certain behavior in persuasion that they enforce an obligation. Two components are really important for the development of the customary law: “[...] *the systematic recurrence of the same pattern of behavior by States, and the conviction of these States that they are acting in conformity with a rule of international law (and not on the basis of ethics or civility)*“ (EDA 2009:35).

Treaties, which may also be called conventions, pacts, memorandum of understanding, statutes or protocols, are agreements between sovereign states or between one or more States and an International Organization (see Diakonia 2011). States have to sign and ratify them to become legally binding. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relation, as a successful example of such treaties, has almost universal acceptance. The success is partial thought, because the law making by multilateral treaties has demerits and is also

burdensome and interminable. There are several stages of the difficult law making process. The arduousness is that one single state can undermine the effectiveness of a treaty, because a treaty is only binding those states, which also have given explicit consent. A state can ratify a treaty, but still use a reservation to it (Schreuer 2000: 4f). *“A reservation is a unilateral statement by a state whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect on certain provisions of a treaty in their application to that particular state”* (Schreuer 2000:5). Furthermore difficulties arise through the interpretation and application through different language versions of the treaties. *“Thereby the multilateral law-making treaty is thus far from being considered as an effective instrument of international legislation”* (Schreuer 2000:5). Generally the different sources of international law often correlate with each other (Schreuer 2000:19).

5.1.1. International Humanitarian Law

The international law also contains the International humanitarian Law, also called IHL. The main sources of IHL are the Hague Convention IV (Regulations) 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 (I-IV GC), two Additional Protocols 1977 (I-II AP) and the Customary International Law. The core of the IHL is the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949.

“The law of occupation is codified in articles 42 to 56 of the Hague Regulations annexed to the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War” (HPCR 2004b:3).

In 1951 Israel ratified the Geneva Convention. Therefore the Fourth Geneva Convention is de jure applicable to the oPt for a lot of opinion maker. The controversial discussion about the application will be illustrated in the next chapter (see Diakonia2011). *“[...] IHL also referred to as the laws of war/of armed conflict is a collection of rules whose fundamental purpose to alleviate human suffering in armed conflicts”* (Diakonia 2011) Within the IHL you apart between the combatants, who are in fact involved in the fighting and who are not. The aim is to guard the persons from harm, when they are no longer engaged in the conflict. Additionally the means and methods of warfare get limited. It

“[...] applies to armed conflicts, whether they are international or internal armed conflicts. IHL does not apply in internal disturbances or tensions. Internal disturbances are riots, demonstrations, and isolated, sporadic acts of violence, that take place inside a territory of a state” (Diakonia 2011).

The ICC Statute and the Additional Protocol I was not signed by the government of Israel and is therefore not applicable to the oPt. *“Certain provisions might be applicable as customary international law”* (HPCR 2004:4).

Due to the fact that IHL regulations also imply occupations, and the sources of IHL, consists a legal obligation by the state practice, *“[t]his policy brief addresses both the application of the law of occupation and the law on the conduct of hostilities as it relates to Israeli incursions and Palestinian attacks”* (IHLRI 2008). The basic principles of the laws of occupation, or the law itself is one of the oldest and most developed sectors of the IHL and holds a practical definition of occupation. Within the IHL the legality or illegality of the invasion is beside the point (HPCR 2004a:2f).

The three Primary Principles of International Humanitarian Law are distinction, proportionality and military necessity, which provide basic guidance. There must be made a difference between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives, which must be the intended target of the party. Civilian lives have to be secured. Therefore attacks are not allowed if the loss is not in relation to the direct military advantage. The accomplishment of the military purpose for the action is only supported till the use of basic or necessary military force (see IHLRI 2009).

“Other fundamental IHL principles include the duty to take precautions to spare the civilian population before and during an attack; the prohibition against infliction of unnecessary suffering or destruction, or of superfluous injury; and the prohibition against engaging in indiscriminate attacks” (IHLRI 2009).

The differences between IHL and Human rights are that the Human rights are applicable in war and peace and some rights can be limited for retaining the public order. Nevertheless the fundamental human rights cannot be restricted. On the other hand some 'humanitarian benefits' can be straightened in the IHL, if there is a real military necessity (Diakonia 2011).

5.1.2. IHL and International Human Rights Law in the OPT

For more than 30 years an intensive discussion has been going on within the international community concerning the applicability of the Geneva Conventions 1949 to the oPt by Israel. Israel doesn't stand alone when it comes to the objection to the applicability de jure of the Fourth Geneva Convention to occupied territories, because they are often afraid that the acceptance will have a negative aftermath for the occupying powers which would include more than protection of the occupied population as it is regulated now in the law. Israel's argument goes back to the time before 1967 before the occupation of the territories. Gaza and the West Bank were occupied by Egypt and Jordan. Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention would not apply to the oPt (HPCR 2004b:2ff). Israel claims, *that*

“the first two paragraphs of common Article 2 [...] must be read separately [...] with the result that the Geneva Conventions apply under paragraph 1 to armed conflicts in general, with the exception of situations of occupation. Under paragraph 2, the Conventions also apply to situations of occupation, but only when the territory occupied is that of another High Contracting Party” (HPCR 2004b:3).

As a result the Israeli interpretation opposed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the oPt, because the oPt were not part of a High Contracting Party before 1967, because Israel never accepted the sovereignty of Gaza and the West Bank by Egypt and Jordan (Benvenisti 1993:108ff). On this account the two territories are seen by the “missing sovereign” argument of Israel as a status sui generis (HPCR 2004b:4f). Benvenisti (1993:110) referred to Israel's argument relating to the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention *“[...] compared with the only implicit rejection of the Hague Regulations' applicability and [...] the recognition of the Hague Regulations by the Israeli Supreme Court [...]”* as curious. The Hague Regulations are accepted as customary international law by the Government of Israel. This is due to the fact that the Hague Regulations assure governmental interests overall where the Fourth Geneva Convention addresses the interest of individuals (Benvenisti 1993:108ff). Overall *“[...] Israel argues that there are no legitimate sovereigns to whom it could return the territory”* and in reference to the Fourth Geneva Convention is not considering themselves as an Occupying Power, but still apply the “humanitarian provisions” parts

of the Convention (HPCR 2004b:4). The Position of the Supreme Court of Israel is not so clear as the Government regarding the sui generis status of the West Bank and Gaza argues that the government is tied by the customary “Laws of War” (which refers to the Hague Regulations), because Israel is still in control of the oPt. A lot of international organizations and countries are opposing Israel’s opinion and the ICJ decided in 2004 that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the oPt and they point out the Right of Self-Determination of the Palestinian People as Recognized by the United Nations (HPCR 2004b:4ff).

The implication of the IHL in the oPt got affected by the installment of the Oslo Agreements for a number of reasons and is argued in a variety of ways. Watson argues that the Accords

“[...]have formal attributes of binding instruments; they are styled ‘agreements’ and ‘protocols’; they are structured like treaties, and they contain mandatory rather than permissive language. [...] It appears, then, that the Oslo Accords are legally binding international agreements” (Watson 2000:101).

The PA was established and has to be seen as an administrative authority and the West Bank was divided into three areas with different administration competence. Another relevant factor is the mutual recognition of the two sides. The application of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulation in the different areas is an issue of international debate (HPCR 2004b:9). The Oslo Accords and the following transfer of authority to the PA in Area A and B *“[...] may have reduced, but did not extinguish, the scope of Israel’s obligations under the laws of occupation”* (HPCR 2004b:10).

The second Intifada also led to discussions about the implications of the IHL in the oPt, no matter if the IHL was applicable in Area A and B, which were under PA control during the Oslo Process. Out of this reason the IDF’s so called “incursions” in Area A and B trigger the application of IHL (HPCR 2004b:10).

Concerning the international human rights, Israel also states that they are not applicable in the oPt. The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the construction of a wall in the oPt, as well as the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural think, that the international human rights

actually do apply. The Supreme Court of Israel has indeed applied international human rights in various cases in the oPt. This may vary though, depending on the extent of Israel's effective control over the areas in the oPt. Due to the treaty reporting system of the UN, the PA can't be held responsible for human rights violations, because it is limited to state parties. On this account there is a need for a framework for the accountability of human rights violations in the oPt (HPCR 2007: 2ff). IHL and international human rights are often compared and interact with each other. The Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research states that in case of the coexistence of IHL and IHRL in the oPt, there is a need for building a framework by scholars:

“In situations where IHRL provides greater detail to fill gaps in IHL, or where one body of law influences the application of the other, practitioners may push forward and strengthen the legal methodologies illustrated here to create a more meaningful and robust system of legal protection and enforcement for civilians living in occupied territory” (HPCR 2007:13).

5.2. Application of IHL to specific policies in Israel and the oPt

In the following section I want to focus on specific issues, which are currently under critical discussion as settlements and settlers and the Separation Barrier.

5.2.1. Settlements and Settlers

After 1967 Israeli settlements got established which are seen as illegal by International Organizations. *“Settlements [...], are areas within the oPt inhabited by civilians of Israeli nationality. This includes those that have been authorized by the Government of Israel (the majority), and those not so authorized (the minority)”* (HPCR 2009:2). In 2010 more than 310, 000 settlers were living in the West Bank (see CIA 2012). The relationship between the government of Israel and the people living in the oPt, also refugees and stateless people is regulated by the law of occupation. Article 42 to 56 of The Hague Regulations and the Articles 27 to 34 and 47 to 135 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention and specific provisions are particularly important for the law of occupation. According to Paragraph 6 of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, migration of Israeli citizens is allowed, but Israel is not allowed to contribute to this migration process in any sense. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations does not regulate the issue specifically, but is important in the context of the basic demographic structure in the oPt. Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention regulates the prohibition of demolition of private property (not including military necessity) (HPCR 2009:2f).

According to UNOCHA (2012:2) settlements are illegal under international law and this decision has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice, the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the United Nations Security Council. The government of Israel argues, that the Settlements in the oPt are legal in using a different interpretation of Article 49. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted:

“The provisions of the Geneva Convention regarding forced population transfer to occupied sovereign territory cannot be viewed as prohibiting the voluntary return of individuals to the towns and villages from which they, or their ancestors, had been ousted [...]. It should be emphasized that the movement of individuals to the territory is entirely voluntary [...]” (HPCR 2009:5).

Therefore they distinguish between voluntary migration of individuals into the oPt and their contribution, even this interpretation is criticized by various organizations and states. The security argument was used by the Israeli Government in the 1970s to justify the construction of settlements on private land, especially in the Jordan Valley. The Israeli High Court of Justice justified these actions under Article 52 of the Hague Regulations. The payment of compensation for the land and the military need is thought necessary. 1979 was the first time that the Israeli High Court of Justice declared a settlement illegal, due to the missing military needs. Afterwards state land was used to construct new settlements, and for this purpose a lot of land was declared as state land by the Israeli government. This led to a number of problems concerning the land ownership till today (HPCR 2009:5ff). Around 40 percent of the land, on which settlements have been built in the West Bank, is owned privately by Palestinians and around 3,400 buildings are constructed in the settlements that are also in private property of Palestinians. Just a small number of the settlement land was actually purchased by the Jewish Community and more than 50 percent of the settlement land has been declared as “state land” (Peace Now 2006:4). *”‘Survey lands’ are areas whose ownership has yet to be determined and on which development is not legal, yet 5,7 % of settlement territory is ‘survey land’ and 2,5 % of the ‘settlement blocs’ are on ‘survey lands’ “ (Peace Now 2006:4).*

5.2.2. The Separation Barrier

Approximately, the length of the total Separation Barrier by the end of 2011 is 708 km. *“When completed, some 85%, of the route will run inside the West Bank, rather than along the Green Line, isolating some 9.4% of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem”* (UNOCHA 2012:1). Around 15, 000 Palestinians are estimated to enter Israel daily illegally without a working permit (UNOCHA 2012a:1). The construction of the Separation Barrier got approved by the Israeli Government of 2002. The aim of the construction of the Barrier was to prevent a number of suicide bombings by Palestinians in Israel. In 2011 around 62 percent of the Separation Barrier was completed and around 80 percent of it is located inside the West Bank and not on the Green Line (UNOCHA 2011a:1). Checkpoint and agricultural gates are included in the Separation Barrier to allow Palestinian People to cross into Israel or to be able to access their land in the Seam Zone. By the expansion of the settlements in the West Bank, more Palestinian towns got isolated as enclaves. The number of checkpoints, "flying checkpoints", roadblocks, earth mounds, road gates, etc., limits the movement of the Palestinian population. In March 2010, UNOCHA counted a total of 505 obstacles within the West Bank. Compared to the last years the number has plummeted though. The freedom of movement within the cities has improved in the recent years. Access to Jerusalem, however, remains very limited (UNOCHA 2010a:4f).

To appraise the legal situation of the Separation Barrier within the IHL it is necessary to distinguish between the route of the Barrier built on the Green Line and the route built within the West Bank. First of all it is important to mention that it is absolutely allowed to build a Separation Barrier on internationally recognized borders under international law. The construction of the Separation Barrier is related to laws which apply to the Government of Israel as the occupier. For example, Article 46 of the Hague Laws regulates the confiscation of private property or Article 23 of The Hague Regulations and Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions is related to the destruction and seizure of property. This will be discussed closer at the end of this chapter. Particularly important to mention in this context are Articles 55 and 56 of the Fourth Geneva

Convention though, since they are related to the access to food and medical care for the people living in the oPt (HPCR 2004:4ff).

The Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research exemplified five tests which address the concept of military necessity concerning the Separation Barrier and IHL in the oPt. Article 52 of the Hague Regulations implies the legal concept of military necessity. *“The concept of military necessity acknowledges that even under the laws of war, winning the war or battle is a legitimate consideration, though it must be put alongside other considerations of IHL”* (Diakonia 2011). Therefore this concept constitutes an exception considering the IHL, but the armed forces still do not have complete freedom. The first test asks if the measures violate an absolute prohibition contained in IHL. Torture is always forbidden and can't be justified by military necessity. The second test is about the question whether the occupying power will face an actual state of necessity. Furthermore, they raise the question if the measures taken are a sufficient and effective response to the existing threat. The fourth test raises the question if a military advantage gained by the measure outweighs the damage done to the population. The last tests deals with the right measures, after reviewing all interests by the proper authority. The failure of one of the cumulative tests disables the use of military necessity by the government of Israel as a legal justification. The Government of Israel argues that the construction of the Separation Barrier is in accordance with the customary IHL, because the construction is dictated by military necessity and the situation in the oPt since the Intifada is an armed conflict. The government assumes that suicide attacks created a state of necessity. This assumption goes back to the opinion of the Israeli High Court that the military necessity also includes the security of the state itself. For this reason the construction of the Separation Barrier is a legitimate answer to the threat of suicide attacks. Moreover, the construction is defined as a multi stage project and the government of Israel has given the Palestinian people opportunities to address the harm and the right to appeal to the High Court of Israel. They also define the Separation Barrier as a temporary security measure and for this reason can't be seen as a permanent change in the status of the oPt and the harm, which is caused is proportionate and lawful under the IHL. The definition of an armed conflict led to the denial of the applicability of the ICCPR and the ICESCR in the oPt by the Government

of Israel. This assumption includes the opinion that international human rights are not relevant in the case of an armed conflict, because they only protect in time of peace their own citizen (only IHL applies) (HPCR 2004:6ff).

Just a few days before the ICJ published its advisory opinion on the construction of the Separation Barrier the Israel High Court of Justice announced its view in *Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel*. The Court stated that the IDF had to reroute the wall due to negative consequences for the Palestinians and invalidated orders for the construction of parts of the Separation Barrier. The Court also worked on the question, whether the route of the Separation Barrier was accepted under the aspect of military necessity, proportionality between the Separation Barrier (means) and the security of Israel (ends). The Court decided the proportion between the means and ends was reasonable, but certain sections of the Separation Barrier would violate the third part of the test (balance between security and harm to the Palestinian population (Watson 2005:19ff).

On the other hand there are a number of arguments against the construction of the Separation Barrier, which according to the ICRC and the ICR is illegal. In its advisory opinion on the construction of the Separation Barrier in the oPt in 2004, which is nonbinding, the ICR states the following:

“The Court has reached the conclusion that the construction of the wall by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is contrary to international law [...]. Illegal actions and unilateral decisions have been taken on all sides, whereas, in the Court's view, this tragic situation can be brought to an end only through implementation in good faith of all relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)” (ICJ 2004:200f).

Moreover, a number of international organizations do not see the Intifada more than a civil disturbance than as an armed conflict under IHL. The construction of the Separation Barrier is not valid by the concept of military necessity, because it fails a number of tests, which were mentioned above, as *“[...] imposing a disproportionate hardship on the Palestinian population”* (HPCR 2004:11). Moreover the Separation Barrier is not seen as a non-permanent structure. The discussion, whether the situation is an armed conflict or not is not important, because the West Bank seen as an occupied territory remains under the law of occupation. Therefore the concept of military

necessity is only applicable within the law of occupation. Furthermore the negative effects on the daily life of Palestinians are criticized, as well as the protection of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank through the construction of the Separation Barrier. There is one single argument, which both sides agree on, that the Government of Israel has a right to defend itself against suicide bombers by erecting a separation structure on the internationally recognized borders of Israel (HPRC 2004:11ff).

5.3. Housing, Land and Property in Area C

The different powers, the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, and the Israelis, ruling the region in the 19th and 20th centuries, influenced the legal and administrative system in the West Bank. During the Ottomans just a small part of the land was formally registered. The British began with the process of registering the land to special owners and the Jordanians continued with this process, within the framework called “land settlement” (NRC 2010:23) *“Since 1967, Israel has made use of Ottoman legislation dating back to the middle of the 19th century in order to declare land to be ‘State Land’. According to that law, all lands are considered ‘State Land’ unless proven otherwise”* (Peace Now 2006:8).

If for instance a Palestinian wants to formally register a private property, he has to cultivate the land at least for ten years. When the not registered land is cultivated and paid taxes for, this person will be considered as the owner of the land. It can become ‘State Land’, or in another sense, property of the Ottoman State, if the land is not cultivated for three successive years. The state of Israel stopped the registration process, which the other powers before implied, due to the injunction No. 291/1968, announced by the military governor in the oPt. The official purpose was to assure the owners of the land. Unfortunately a huge area of agricultural land was left unregistered and was declared as ‘State Land’ later on. Due to the occupation in 1967, a lot of Palestinians changed their principal source of income from farming in the West Bank to work in Israel (Peace Now 2006:8f). *“This situation paved the way for the ‘Custodian of Government Property in the Area of Judea and Samaria’, to declare large parts of the uncultivated land as ‘state land’, utilizing the Ottoman law”* (Peace Now 2006:8). “Jewish land” and “survey land” are other categories of land in the West Bank established by the Israeli Government. Survey land is an expression for Palestinian land, whose ownership is controversial and the title of the land is demanded by the state of Israel. Even the development of this land is not allowed by both sides, has the construction of the settlements continued (Peace Now 2006:12). In conclusion the Civil Administration of the Israeli Government divides the land of the West Bank into four

categories: State land; private Palestinian land, survey land and Jewish land. Privately owned Palestinian land is

“[l]and that was registered and recognized as private property before 1986, at a time, when the process of land registration was still open and available to Palestinians, or cultivated land which is recognized by Israel as private land according to the Ottoman law” (Peace Now 2006: 9).

The Civil Administration is responsible now for all security and civil matter in Area C and the Military Commander is in charge of the Civil Administration, concerning land registration, land confiscation and allocation, general administration, planning and land requisition. The ICA runs nine joint Israeli-Palestinian District Coordination Offices (DCOs), of which one is located in Tulkarm.

Land registration is particularly important to the Palestinian people, because it states the proof of ownership of the highest order. According to the Civil Administration this state proved ownership land doesn't have to be cultivated as opposed to the unregistered land. The Ottoman *kushans* is as well accepted as prove of ownership. A lot of people in the West Bank do not have *kushans*, and even if they possess one, it is still difficult to ascertain the borders of the privately owned land. At Bel El at the Land Registry Office the “first time registration of real estate” takes place, which means a long and elaborate process. To register the land you need to prove the legal ownership as well as cultivation and possession. A number of documents have to be submitted and the costs for all the expenses including the lawyer have to be covered by the applicant. In terms of a rejection there is a chance to appeal at the Military Appeals Committee, which can take several years. For these reasons this land registration process is not a realistic and affordable way for Palestinians to prove their ownership of land. Instead settlers or Israeli settlements use this registration process quite frequently, if they purchase land from Palestinian owners (NRC 2012:23, Btselem 2010:45f). The Israeli Military Government in the West Bank has used a variety of methods to obtain land in the oPt as requisition orders, expropriation of “absentees” land, closed zones and declaration of state land (NRC 2010:23f). In the following sections I will illustrate some important and lively debated issues and possible legal responses for Palestinian people like land seizure, building permits, stop work and demolition orders, as well as demolition itself.

5.3.1. Land seizure

Land seizure orders are orders, which are supposed to last only a short while. The ownership of the land stays with the original owner, but the military holds the control of the land for a certain period of time. At the end the control of the lands returns back to the original owner or the seizure order has to be renewed (Peace Now 2006:9, NRC 2010:49). Two Articles, one in the Hague Regulations and one in the Fourth Geneva Convention are particularly important when it comes to the issue of land seizure. Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations states, that it is forbidden “[...] *to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war*” (ICRC 2005a). Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states

“destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations” (ICHR 2005b).

The seizure of Palestinian land is justified by the Government of Israel with military necessity. The Supreme Court of Israel added that seizures are allowed under IHL for the military purposes, as long as compensation is paid for the owner of the land (Watson 2005:20).

It is important to remember, that a central part for the State to get private land in the West Bank is the “seizure for military purposes. A high number of settlements, established before 1979, were built on seized land. The Elon More case in 1979 changed this practice officially (Peace Now 2006:9). “[...] *The State was forced to cease using ‘seizure for military purposes’ as a means of taking over privately-owned Palestinian land for the construction of settlements*” (Peace Now 2006:10). 32 percent of the land of the settlements after the year 1979 is still private Palestinian land, but mainly without seizure orders (Peace Now 2006:20). To install the bypass road system after the Oslo Accords, the seizure injunctions for military purposes was used again and additionally seizure orders have been issued for secure zones around the settlements and

the Separation Barrier. The construction of the settlements still continues on privately Palestinian land or on established settlements without any legal basis (Peace Now 2006:11).

To be able to challenge a seizure order as a Palestinian owner, applicants have to submit an objection to the DCO itself or the Legal Advisory Bureau at Bel El, usually within seven days by the owner itself, the village council or a affected person. The proof of ownership is needs, as well as the taxation deed (when the land is not registered), an inheritance deed, a survey map for the location of the land, a copy of the ID and a copy of the seizure order (NRC 2010:49f).

5.3.2. Building Permits in Area C

Construction and planning in the West Bank was regulated by the Jordanian Planning Law No. 76 of 1966, which intended a permit for almost every construction. This law was modified by the Israeli military order in 1971. For the Palestinian people, living in the West Bank, it is nearly beyond the bounds of possibility to get a building permit in Area C. The planned construction is often not consistent with the existing plans in Area C, which are Special Partial Outline Plans from the ICA and the Regional Outline Plans from the time of the British Mandatory period (UNOCHA 2009d:5ff).

This building permit is thought necessary to be able to build new homes, new water supplies, schools or any type of permanent structure on a legal basis (NRC 2010:63). In 44 percent of the West Bank or approximately 70 percent of Area C building it is not allowed for Palestinians, as it is restricted mostly for Israeli settlements or the Israeli military and was declared as state land and closed areas for training, nature reserves, military basis and a buffer zone around the Separation Barrier. Other restrictions aggravate obtaining a building permit in the remaining 30 percent of Area C (around 18 percent of the West Bank). That means in order to build legally as a Palestinian, it is necessary to build on the only one percent of Area C, which is approved by the ICA. Most of this available land is already built up area. This leads to the problem, that there

is often no other possibility for Palestinians, living in Area C than building their new houses illegally and this leads to the risk of a demolition order for their constructions (UNOCHA 2009d:1ff). On the other hand the PA also lacks the capacity and the ability in building an efficient system of land registration as well as the use of the technology of remote sensing and geographic information tools (ARIC 2005:5). The Palestinian communities are not involved in the planning and zoning process, which goes back to the military order in 1971 (UNOCHA 2009d:11).

At best the application for a building permit should be submitted before the construction work of the new permanent building, but it is also possible to obtain a building permit after the start of the construction work, or even upon receipt of a stop work order from the ICA. In the Tulkarm Governorate the application for the building permit has to be submitted to the organization and planning offices under Civil Administration of Tulkarm and will be allocated to the Planning and Licensing Subcommittee in the ICA. The application fee is about 400 NIS and the applicant needs to submit a number of documents like the proof of ownership or taxation deed, inheritance deed, survey map for the location, a copy of the ID, a copy of the received order (in case of a stop working order), a photograph of the construction and a letter from the village council and an acceptance declaration from all heirs is helpful. The reasons for the rejection of a building permit are numerous as the construction is situated in a closed military zone or in a prohibited area. It can be delivery of false information, continuing construction after the receipt of a stop work order or if the construction doesn't follow the original plan etc. If Palestinians decide to build a new permanent construction without obtaining a building permit from the Civil Administration, they risk to receive a stop work order or demolition order, which will be discussed in the next section (Btselem 2010:48ff, NRC 2010:31ff).

5.3.3. Stop work and demolition orders in Area C

If a construction is built without permission in Area C, it is possible that people receive a stop work order as a first step from the Inspection Subcommittee at Bet El issued by an inspector of the Inspection Unit. This stop work order forbids any further construction on the building and the owner is supposed to attend a hearing at Bet El. The next step after the stop work order is the demolition order, in case the objection to the stop work order was not successful or no objection was submitted. The first step, when receiving a stop work order, should be to apply for a building permit, usually within 14 days (see above). After the rejection of the building permit the applicant should appeal against the rejection. In most cases the appeal will be rejected again. For this reason the Palestinian applicant has another few options to prevent a demolition of the construction. The first possible change is to plea for mercy with included humanitarian grounds. Another option is a petition to the Israeli High Court of Justice or a plan for a change of the land from agricultural to residential use (NRC 2010:39ff). Unfortunately the number of demolitions in East Jerusalem and the West Bank are rising, which will be discussed more closely in the next section.

5.3.4. Demolition

According to the Israeli military order in 2007 concerning the Buildings Planning Law (Amendment No. 19) (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1585), “[...] *[b]uilding without a permit is also a criminal offence under Israeli military orders, punishable by a fine or prison sentence, though this appears not to be enforced currently*” (UNOCHA 2009d:13). In 2011 almost 1,100 Palestinians were displaced due to demolitions and 622 structures (222 homes, 170 animal shelters, two classrooms, two mosques) and 46 rainwater cisterns and pools were destroyed. For the demolition of structures this is a rise of 80 percent to 2010. Vulnerable farming and herding communities in Area C are affected at the most (90 percent) (UNOCHA 2012c:1f). Displacement and demolitions have serious humanitarian consequences for the Palestinian families and the high risk communities are often the ones, which live under the poverty line. The current situation in Area C causes challenges to humanitarian assistance; the area has even been identified as a priority in the international humanitarian community. It is challenging to set up and run projects like the construction of schools, medical clinics or water infrastructure (UNOCHA 2009d:12ff). The World Bank even claims, that the ICA “[...] *is seen by donors as a major constraint*” and the missing coordination between the many donors leads to fragmented presented projects. A fieldworker confirmed the difficult situation in an interview with the World Bank: “[i]n Tulkarm, the water connection was damaged, the Civil Administration would not give approval to repair it. Water had to be trucked in [...]” (World Bank 2009:54).

UNOCHA (2009:16ff) is concerned about the impact of the planning practice of the ICA in Area C on Palestinian communities, which also influences the Palestinian people living in Area A and B, because of the rise of the population and the resulting need for construction space. The organization suggests a gradual transfer of the Area C to the Palestinians, as it was agreed upon in the Oslo Accords.

6. The Palestinian economy in the West Bank

after the second Intifada

From a certain Palestinian viewpoint, the dynamics within the Palestinian politics at the moment actually assists the arguments and strategies of the Israeli Government. Important aspects in the West Bank such as restriction of violence, "good governance" and democratization are still not solved. Criticism of the Palestinian Authority comes from an increasing part of the population. *"Segments of the population resented the leadership for having failed to deliver peace, democracy and better standards of living"* (Tocci 2005:8). The widespread corruption, inefficiency and authoritarianism of the PA are always in the crossfire of criticism. Especially in the last weeks a number of public transport strikes were held all over the West Bank due to the rising costs of living including fuels (see Maannews 2012a)

The second intifada starting in September 2000 had huge negative consequences on the economic situation in the oPt, which is closely tied to the Israeli economy, including huge economic disparities. In 2005 the GNI per capita in Israel was around eighteen times higher than in the West Bank and Gaza (World Bank 2009:4). The slowdown of the Israeli economy caused also a slowdown in the oPt. Both sides suffered a drop in the tourism sector. The bad economic situation of Israel leads to redundancies of Palestinian workers employed in Israeli industry, agriculture and services. One of the main reasons for the economic decline in the oPt has been the Israeli policy of closures and curfews. The movement of vehicles and also people were strictly limited by a lot of closures at checkpoints and roadblocks. This also affected the movement of goods between Israel and the Occupied Territories (UNEP 2003:17f).

The labor market in the West Bank is functioning under occupation. There is controlled boarder passage to the neighboring country of Jordan and a long boarder to Israel,

where the mobility of goods and persons is comparatively not difficult. East Jerusalem has a full access to the Israeli labor market and is therefore almost part of the Israeli economy. In general, the Palestinian labor market is also closely tied to Israel. A high unemployment rate in the West Bank is therefore negatively associated with the employment rate in Israel (Shabaneh 2006:5). The international division of labor also plays a role in Israel/West Bank. A huge number of Palestinian workers got replaced with other nationalities during the second Intifada. A lot of cheap foreign workers, mainly from Asia are employed in the construction and agriculture sector in Israel. On the other hand a lot of Israelis are not satisfied with their job situation and their salary in comparison with their living situation and spending for daily needs.

During the years of 2001-2004 the unemployment rate was very high in the oPt, with an average of 31, 2 percent in 2002. Another problem is the huge wage gap between jobs in Israel and domestic jobs in the West Bank. The taxation system is not well- functioning and the market in general is less developed. „*The Palestinian labour market is considerably less developed and less organized, formal and informal sectors are not well defined*“ (Shabaneh 2006:5).




Table 1: ILO (2012): Laborsta International Labour Database: Unemployment Rate Israel/oPT

6.1. Fayyad's two- year program: "Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing a State,"

In response to internal and external pressure a process of reforms was set in motion in 2002, which had the goal of "good governance" and strengthening democracy. Even the death of Arafat created space to transform the Palestinian policy. At the beginning of Abbas' presidential term, the success was felt significantly at diverse fronts (Tocci 2005:8ff). The political transformation had a huge impact on the economic situation in the oPt. Since the election victory of Hamas in 2006, they have become an important political force, especially in Gaza. The struggle for Gaza in June 2007 ended the coalition government between Fatah and Hamas and a bisection of Palestinian territories followed. *"The majority of the Palestinians have been deeply distressed by the division, and they hold out hope that Palestinian nationalism will, in the end, reunite both territories under one flag"* (Schanzer 2008:153). In June 2007, Abbas appointed Salam Fayyad as the new prime minister, and replaced Ismail Haniyya. Despite the lack of democratic legitimacy through an election process, you can certainly speak of a sort of "Fayyadism" in the West Bank.

The two-year program "Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing a State," was declared in August 2009 under his government, which includes the following national objectives: Ending the occupation; Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state; protection of refugees and their rights; ensuring the release of prisoners; ensuring human development; economic independence and national prosperity; promoting national unity; equality and social justice for all citizens; foundations of good governance; protection and safety and building positive regional and international relations "(Palestinian National Authority:2009). The two-year program therefore focuses on the possibilities of building a state taking into consideration the occupation. For example, the planning of an airport in Area C refers to the Declaration of Independence 1988. Fayyad argued that the Oslo Accords have no clear line with regard to the political rights and the specific rules of statehood (Journal of Palestine Studies, 2009: 59). This point is clearly contradicted by the Israeli side because any unilateral

declaration of a Palestinian state, "[...] would contravene the principle of a negotiated solution between Israel and its Arab neighbors, as enshrined in the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 [...]" (MESI 2009). The efforts in Area C in particular, e.g. planning an airport in the Jordan Valley under Israeli civil and security administration legitimate Fayyad, as a reason of the not clearly defined guidelines in the Oslo Accords and the Israeli violations of international law (Journal of Palestine Studies 200:68 f). To this line of argument must be added that "[...] a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood would also free Israel from the restrictions and obligations it accepted under the Oslo agreements, with all that implies, and would further complicate the Middle East peace process "(MESI 2009). Moreover the Israeli argument of the "defensible borders" plays an important role in the structure building in Area C, as the Jordan Valley takes a large part of it (see UNOCHA 2011a). The planned economic progress will be influenced very strongly by the Israeli occupation. Building structures, especially in Area A and B, is a risk, because the effective management can only be enforced in these zones. Dr. Mohammad Mustafa, CEO of the PIF is of the opinion that the reason for the restraint positive economic development is the Israeli occupation in the West Bank. However, the economic growth in the West Bank may also arise from foreign donors, as mentioned above. Mustafa mainly sees the structure of the education sector as an important future market and argues for an independent construction of the tourism sector. He is also clearly against import substitution, because first the structure of domestic markets has to be built up (Journal of Palestine Studies 2010:42 ff). Although Mustafa basically argues for Fayyad's two-year plan. *"What we need, in addition to the government's plan to build institutions and to modernize and rationalize expenditures, is a program to launch the process of sustainable growth as speedily as possible"* (Journal of Palestine Studies 2010:47). In his opinion institution building alone is not enough, but must be supplemented with a process of sustainable growth. Therefore Mustafa and Fayyad are clearly against Netanyahu's Economic plan and his proposal of "economic peace" (Ahren 2008). An agreement within the policy framework is needed. This should turn into a sovereign Palestinian state and lead to a complete control of checkpoints, borders and economy. This line of argument is traceable in the view of the numerous checkpoints, agriculture gates, flying checkpoints and settlements. A combination of

Fayyad's plan of institution building, simultaneous focus on economic development and combating corruption seems to make sense. Seen from a Palestinian perspective, as Khalidi states:

"Moreover, the past decades of Israeli-Palestinian economic relations have shown that no Palestinian economic development strategy can be effective as long as the Israeli occupation policy of asymmetric containment is not dismantled through ending occupation and achieving sovereignty and national rights" (Khalidi, Samour 2011:17).

The World Bank report that was published in April 2011, certainly speaks of a positive development over the past two years in the West Bank. In the opinion of the World Bank the economic growth in the West Bank is also accredited by the international donors. There was also a determination of the reduction in the unemployment rate (World Bank 2011:7 ff). International organizations repeatedly addressed the potential of the private sector: *"Sustainable growth will require the unleashing of the private sector's potential, including its ability to trade"* (World Bank 2011:7). In recent years, improvements in the West Bank, however, have been clearly visible. A construction boom in urban areas was developed, car shows were performed, international hotels and trendy restaurants were built. These are all signs of a vibrant economy (Khalidi, Samour 2011:8 ff).

"The statehood plan, as well as the 2008 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) incorporates it, faithfully reflect the economic policy agenda set forth in the so-called 'post-Washington Consensus' (PWC) orthodoxy advanced by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), since the 1990s" (Khalidi, Samour 2011:9).

Despite all, these efforts inside the West Bank couldn't obtain to reach a sovereign state within the 1967 borders. Therefore Fayyad's estimation with respect to the two-year plan and its time compliance was not adhered to, despite enormous improvements in the West Bank. His words in 2009 appear empty in relation to the current situation: *"If a plan is not tied to a timetable, it will simply be wishful thinking"* (Journal of Palestine Studies 2009:60).

From a whole different perspective and according to Barry Rubin (2012d:30ff), director of the GLORIA Center, is the peace process also dead. There is no window of opportunity at the moment and in the foreseeable future for any successful peace

negotiations. He blames the economic situation in the West Bank mainly on the performance of the PA, as they used the received aid money as a “[...] *political pay-off to buy patronage*” (Rubin 2012a:2). In his point of view Israeli actions against Palestinian economy like roadblocks or checkpoints are a direct response to violent confrontation and terrorism. The PA is not able to provide jobs for a big part of the population and to build good institutions. According to Rubin Fayyad is totally powerless in political terms. “*From a cynical Western leadership standpoint it can be said that at least the funding keeps things relatively quiet in the face of lots of other troublesome issues in the region*” (Rubin 2012a:2). Rubin’s reaction to Romney’s statement concerning the gap between Israeli and Palestinian economic success, was quite different from other negative media reactions. Romney, who visited Jerusalem for the US presidential election campaign in July, stated “*As I come here and I look out over this city and consider the accomplishments of the people of this nation, I recognize the power of at least culture and a few other things*”.

Moreover, Romney added, “*As you come here and you see the [gross domestic product] per capita, for instance, in Israel, which is about \$21,000, and compare that with the GDP per capita just across the areas managed by the Palestinian Authority, which is more like \$10,000 per capita, you notice such a dramatically stark difference in economic vitality*” (Sherwood 2012).

The numbers given by Romney are not valid according to the World Bank, because Israel's per-capita GDP was about \$31,000 in 2011, while the West Bank's and Gaza's was around \$1,500 (following Sherwood 2012). Romney was criticized of being racist and not including the occupation of the oPt in his statement. In response to the criticism of Romney Ruben (2012b:4) stated, thereby basically blaming the PA: “*The main problem is not Israel, or capitalism, or a racial group meanly oppressing someone else, but on bad and undemocratic governance along with demagogic leaders encouraging their followers to adopt behavior not conducive with progress and prosperity*”. Rubin (2012c:2ff) sees the problem within the Palestinian economy in the leadership’s refusal to make peace with Israel, the unequal status of women within the oPT, corruption and incompetence of the PA. He claims that the Palestinian economy is advancing under occupation, especially when compared to other non-oil rich countries in the region.

The concept of trust and feeling safe, usually in terms of terrorism attacks and the influence on income was found in a few interviews on the Palestinian site. They argued that the absence of trust or feeling safe concerning the future leads to a different behavior in money spending.

“In my point of view before the second Intifada is the same after the 2. Intifada [...]. It becomes a little bit better the economic situation, but still people believe it is temporary. [...] anytime it can be closed, anytime everything can be stopped, personally for individuals or for the whole city, for the whole community, the same in the villages, [...]they can work now, because they should collect money, they are in hurry, to feel in hurry, because nothing in the future is guaranteed. That is the situation, nothing guaranteed in the future” (Interview 5).

6.2. The economic situation and infrastructure in the Governorate of Tulkarm

The number of registered live births in 2011 in Tulkarm Governorate conducted a total of 4,221 births (still birth 7) and the number of registered deaths was a total of 561, with approximately around 168,973 inhabitants in total (PHIC 2011:30ff). Three hospitals (163 hospital beds in total) are located in the Governorate of Tulkarm, 144 schools, 50 kindergartens. The unemployment rate in 2010 was approximately 13,7 percent with a participation rate of labor force (aged 15 years and above) of 43,2 percent. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2011:62) 10,9 percent of the population in Tulkarm was considered as poor in 2010. The number of licensed vehicles was 11, 257 in 2009. The values of import are rising in the Governorate compared to recent years and reached around 152, 6 million US\$ in 2009 (Export fall compared to recent years, 8, 4 million US\$ in 2009). In 2009 there was a deficit in the trade balance of 144.2 million US\$ (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2009:98).

Generally speaking the economy in Tulkarm lies on two shoulders, the industry and agriculture (Interview 1). As Abdul Karim Dalba points out:

“[...]it depends usually on agriculture and workers... and ah it is not an industrial zone for people .the main problem is the unemployment and [...]the expenses of planting let’s say, which is not enough for people to living and also this is the main economic situation, and also because it is cut near by the green line and near by the sea, so it is supposed to be like an rab tourist city or at least passing treading through to the world but it becomes like far away or cut from the sea from the air... the transportation to Israel and also cut from the economic from the south or in the capital. So the main problems of Tulkarm people is unemployment, and there is no things, you can see it, there are no hotels in Tulkarm, there is no big restaurants, any things that people can love it, even. People who lives in Tulkarm maybe they are obliged to live here now, but the main problem is people like to immigrate, even inside Palestine or to other countries. That’s what the situation becomes here in Tulkarm. And the villages around is the same, [...] agriculture, the wall issues, the chemical factory, [...]the west side is the main source for agriculture and for being free, for feeling free, and they seem it was not enough reason. So the depend more on other cites, in Nablus, in Hebron in other places for their goods to come here. So there is no big business in Tulkarm, there are just branches for big businesses” (Interview 5).

Stone-cutting facilities, building material factories, two olive mills, garages, one slaughterhouse, and five gas stations are the main industrial income. Complementary are tile and ready-made cement factories, food processing facilities, several chemical workshops and a petrochemical plant owned by Israel. The area of lands is around 246

square kilometers with a number of agricultural holdings of 8,147 (during the agricultural year of 2009/2010). The fertile soil and the practical climate contribute to the rain-fed farming and irrigated agriculture. Cauliflower, corn and Bush Okra are cultivated on privately-owned land and there are a number of small-scale farms with goats, sheep and chickens (HWE 2008:13, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2009:98). Tulkarm has 2 semi-professional soccer teams; Thaqafi Tulkarm and MarkezShabab Tulkarm, which play a role in the free time activities of the people. The theme park “Megaland”, located in Tulkarm, is the biggest one in the West Bank. A lot of people from all over the West Bank are coming to Tulkarm to go to the swimming pools or the Megaland. The town of Tulkarm doesn’t benefit from these attractions, though.

“[...] It doesn’t affect Tulkarm city. I see it, that people who come to the Megaland or the swimming pools, they just come for this place and leave. They don’t show up in the city [...]”. “The city is not an attractive city.[...] Before 2002 most of the people come to Tulkarm [...], especially the 48ers [...], it was easy. [...] But now it is difficult, people are not willing to go. [...] Even when they allowed Palestinians from 48 to come to Tulkarm, through Eynab [...]. People from Tayba, after the opened Nablus, they preferred to go to Nablus, not to Tulkarm.[...] They were not coming passing Tulkarm. [...] Now it is a little bit better [...] but all the traders have also branches in other cities, because they feel unsecure in Tulkarm.[...] People just like to leave. No real big public projects happened in the Municipality [...]. The development of Tulkarm is very slowly.[...]There is no plan for a new hospital, or a new building for al Quds Open University, even there was a plan in 1995.[...] Everything is going very slowly, the business and the government, [...] They can’t guarantee Tulkarm as a city the development, because of the wall. People loose even the trust in peace, and it will be over. Even the future of this terminal, it would be the main entrance for the West Bank, nothing is guaranteed” (Interview 5).

According to the interviewees the corruption of the PA, the fact that there are no upcoming elections in Tulkarm, and the smuggling of Israeli goods, support the process that the planned projects for the town are actually not getting implemented (Interview 4,5,2). Unemployment is named as the most difficult factor for the development of Tulkarm by almost all of my interviewees.

“[...] Tulkarm Area is very close to Israel; and since 1967[...], most of Palestinians used to go to Israel. I think the Israeli Authority encouraged the Palestinian in that time to go to Israel [...] to make their economical life better and that of Israel. After establishing the wall, they cut of all the roads, which led to Israel and there is no way for any Palestinian to go to Israel. After 2005 the Israeli Authority allowed the Palestinian worker to start working. Now around 4,000-4,500 persons are allowed to go to Israel. I think, in the past, before the wall, there is around 20,000 Palestinian working inside Israel, male and females [...] from Tulkarm area. I think this is the major problem, the employment. There are no changes for all workers to [...] find work. [...]This is reflection the social and the economical life. [...] And now you find a lot of people, who are just sitting in the café, smoking [...] (Interview 4).

According to some interviewees the economic situation has also changed the social life in Tulkarm or the situation of women within the families:

"[...] The women situation changed. Sometimes I feel the changing make also a conflict in the same family. [...] The people here, are not used, to this changing, or let's say the husband or the men. They don't accept, that the women have power. But this is reality, because also the women get their power, not just of those women organization, but of the economic situation. [...] The women can work anything, let's say, the minimum they can clean houses. They gain money. [...] For instance today, a woman, came to our office, and cleaned the office. So I asked her, what is your husband doing? She said, he is sitting at home. I said: Why? Is he sick? She said: No! He wants to work in Israel and he can't. He stopped working and searching for work and is staying at home. And I am working. So who will control the house? So it is not like before, that women will always say yes, yes and the men control everything. This is the economic power. So for me, the Palestinian women have the change to have a work, even the educated or the uneducated women. They have a power now, it is better than before. I mean there is no equality, but it is better than before [...]" (Interview 6).

7. Architecture, Infrastructure and Water Resources

in the West Bank

Many escalating environmental threats like „ *[...] problems of scarcity of water resources and land, rapid population growth, long-lasting refugee situation, climate change, desertification and land degradation*“*[...]* exist in the oPt (UNEP 2003:6). These problems are linked with several reasons. Seen from an Palestinian perspective the specific architecture of Israeli settlements as well as the general water situation in the region contribute to a certain extent to some issues. In this section I give an overview over the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and the Palestinian population centers in the West Bank with the focus on Tulkarm Governorate, the town of Tulkarm and the villages around. The water and environmental situation in the West Bank and in Tulkarm will be illustrated as well as the influence of the Israeli industrial zone in the region of Tulkarm.

7.1. Israeli Settlements

71 of the 150 Israeli settlements and over 85% of the total population of settlers live on the 'Israeli' side of the Separation Barrier (UNOCHA 2012b:1). Most settlements are connected to each other and to Israel. Along three strips, Eastern Strip; Mountain Strip and Western Hill Strip; the Israeli settlements were established with a very elaborate network of roads. *"This network cuts across the areas that were handed over to Palestinian control, creating territorial islands of Areas A, which are under full Palestinian control, and Areas B, whose civil affairs are under Palestinian control"* (Btselem 2010:12).

At large settlements can be defined by their boundaries, functions and factors, which determine the land of the settlements and include the possibilities of Palestinians to reach their parts of the land: *"[...] build up areas; open areas that have been developed; areas fenced in by a partial or complete perimeter fence, perimeter lighting; ring roads that were built around the settlements"* (Peace Now 2006:13). In this connection architecture and its influence and impact on the landscape of the Israeli Settlements is particularly interesting and should not be omitted when we talk about the influence of settlements on the peace process or the daily life of the Palestinians in the West Bank. Rotbard points out in the preface to „A Civilian Occupation“, that *„the work of Israeli architects is at the very core of the political issues: There is nothing innocent about regarding architecture as an autonomous process. Since the shaping of the physical reality takes place on different scales, such as the political, the urban and the architectural, architecture is no less 'political' than 'urban'“* (Rafi, Weizman 2003:15). He raises the question of the role of politics within architecture and the role of architecture within politics (Rafi, Weizman 2003:16).

From the perspective of Weizmann settlement expansions are problematic due to various reasons. First of all they harm the Arab- Jewish relationship, because they block or influence a future territorial exchange in a peace agreement. Furthermore, it deepens the discrimination against the Bedouins in the south. They often got expelled from their land to move into planned towns. The main argument used in this debate was that the provision for modern service cannot be provided in too small settlement units. The state of Israel actually provides now modern service in new Jewish settlements which are far smaller than the Bedouin villages (Weizmann 2003:33f). *"Clearly, their alienation from*

the state will deepen, damaging Arab-Jewish relations even further” (Weizmann 2003:34). The overall security of Israel stands at risk, because the new settlements are a heavy security burden. Deepening social disparities are another problematic aspect in the expanding settlement plans. The so-called “settlement mentality” is named as a factor to contributing to the national goals. In reality the new settlements often become a place for poverty, alienation and unemployment in the periphery of Israel and are contributing to the increase of the social gap between center and periphery or in other words between more affluent(usually Ashkenazi) and deprived groups(usually Mizrahi). The huge amount of public waste such as water, roads, electricity, housing etc. which is also caused by the construction of new settlements, demand excessive investment (Weizmann 2003:34ff). Since 1976 150 settlements have been established in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) as well as approximately 100 outposts, which are erected by settlers with the official authorization of the Government of Israel. UNOCHA (2012c:1, Zertal et al. 2007) estimates a settler population of around 500,000 and “[...] *its rate of growth during the past decade stood at a yearly average of 5.3% (excluding East Jerusalem), compared to 1.8% by the Israeli population as-a-whole*”. The total area controlled by Israeli settlements was 42, 8 percent of the West Bank in 2010, which is around 2,399,824 dunums (Btselem 2010:11).

Avnei Hefetz, the settlement, which is the closest to Tulkarm and borders the village of Shufa. The settlement and the Palestinian village of Shufa, with special focus on the roadblock between the main street into these two villages and to the town of Tulkarm will be discussed closer in section eight.

7.2. Palestinian population centers

Palestinian population centers such as Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron, Bethlehem or Tulkarm are located in Area A and are therefore as mentioned before under civil and security administration of the PA. The fast growing Palestinian population lives mostly in urban areas. These population centers are divided into separate areas and therefore not connected with each other. This obstacle was quite significant during the second intifada, because the transportation and connection between these centers was limited. Access to basic services like education, health or even water supply was difficult. The situation has improved in the last few years, and obstacles like roadblocks and checkpoints have been removed, but the period between the years 2010 and 2011 showed no evidential improvements in terms of movement restrictions. The period between July 2010 and June 2011 was characterized by the absence of significant changes in the system of movement restrictions implemented by the Israeli authorities within the West Bank territory to address security concerns. 522 obstacles, e.g. checkpoints and roadblocks etc. were documented by UNOCHA, with an increase of four percent in 2010.

“[N]ine of the ten governorates main cities have one or more of their historical entrances currently blocked, resulting in traffic congestion and frequent delays through those entrances that are open. Access to the main traffic arteries leading from the villages to the cities also continues to be limited to select junctions” (UNOCHA 2011f).

As a result traffic between urban areas and the villages around has to be rerouted to lower-quality roads. The Israeli settlements play an important role in terms of this restriction of movement, due to the protection of settlements or expansion of settlements as well as the improvement of the connection between the settlements and Israel. Main Palestinian traffic on the roads 60, 90, 443 etc. has been limited due to the administrative restrictions, *“[...]transforming these roads into rapid ‘corridors’ used by Israeli citizens to commute between the settlements and Israel, and, in some cases, between various areas within Israel via the West Bank” (UNOCHA 2011f).*

7.3. Tulkarm Governorate

In the 3rd millennium BC Tulkarm is supposed to have been settled by the Canaanites (Semplici 2009:3, Tulkarm Municipality 2011). In the 13th century a village called Tulkarm was founded as a waqf (religious trust) by the Mamluksto support al-Jawhariyya Madrasa which was administrated by elite families of Tulkarm.

“This created a situation where administrative and taxation powers were held by local elites over a long span of time, unlike the normal case in the Ottoman Empire where these functions were held by outsiders for relatively short periods of time” (Al-Salim 2011:65).

Even the great majority of the population was Sunni Muslim during the Ottoman periods, the village of Tulkarm was under control of the Zaydan family during the late Mamluk and early Ottoman periods, which was of Kurdish origin. Later on Tulkarm was registered as part of the property of the Ottoman Sultan in 1596 by the *Defterler-iMufasssal* of Sham Sharief Vilayet. During this time around 968 people lived in Tulkarm in around 176 families. That made it the village with the largest population in this district. Tulkarm was attacked a number of times during the following centuries by nomadic raiders and later on by the French (1799) and Egyptians. Farid al- Salim (2011:78) describes Tulkarm as a waqf village in his historical socio-economic features as a

“[...] prosperous and self-governing village, with dense agricultural settlement and a level of agricultural productivity strikingly greater than elsewhere during the period of decline, which had frequently been extended to include to the whole of Ottoman Palestine and the Middle East”.

During the reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century Tulkarm was also subjected to central rule. The consequences were that the important local leaders lost their hold. In 1886 the municipality of Tulkarm was established (Al-Salim 2011:65ff). A major rail junction from Egypt and southern Palestine to Haifa and Akka in the northwest, Jerusalem, Nablus and Ramallah to the south, Lebanon to the north, and Syria and Jordan to the east was established and was running till 1948. Tulkarm was an important center of traffic and traveling during this time. During the First World War the municipality of Tulkarm was used as a military base by the Turkish army and was captured by the British in 1918. Later on during the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 it was under control of Iraq and became a part of Jordan. In 1995 it came under the control of

the PA during the Oslo process (Semplici al. 2009:3). After the second Intifada in 2005 Tulkarm was given into PA hands and ended the Israeli military administration.

Today Tulkarm lies in the western part in the north of the West Bank and it borders the Governorates of Jenin, Nablus and Qalqīliya and the state of Israel on the western side. Therefore it is just around 15 kilometers east of Netanya, Israel and around 15 kilometers west of Nablus. Around 14,000 dunums are urban developed area today (Semplici 2009:3). The commercial importance of the Governorate is mainly due to the surrounding farmlands as well as its central location between the Nablus Mountains and plains (HWE 2008:12). The farmers mainly produce olives, melons, citrus fruits, potatoes, wheat, sesame, olive oil, tomatoes, peanuts, eggplant, chili pepper, green beans etc... Tulkarm Governorate is one of sixteen Governorates in the West Bank. Generally these Governorates are sub-divided into 89 municipalities in the West Bank (UNEP 2003:17). The Tulkarm Governorate has an estimated population of 168, 973 and around 33, 6 percent of it are refugees (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011:98). Around 41 percent are living in rural areas of Tulkarm. 33 villages are located in the Tulkarm Governorate. The villages around Tulkarm are mostly located in area B, e.g. Deir Al Ghusun and 'Attil, though a few villages are located in area A, e.g. 'Anabta. The mountain area around the town of Tulkarm, parts of Far'un village are located in Area C (Tulkarm Municipality 2011, UNOCHA 2009b:36).

The Separation Barrier in the Governorate of Tulkarm is around 40 kilometers long and 78 % of the Barrier is constructed within the West Bank. The land is fertile, and farming takes a fundamental part of the economic and social life of the area (UNOCHA 2009b:36). A huge part of the agricultural land is situated in the Seam Zone, which can only be accessed through permissions since 2003. The access to the Seam Zone is regulated through an "Agriculture Gate". The permit is issued for a special gate, person and duration of time (UNOCHA 2009b:4f). There are also one village Jubara and several individual houses in the Seam Zone. Movement restrictions and the Separation Barrier influenced the economy of the Tulkarm area. Exports from the West Bank were restricted, many consumers could no longer reach Tulkarm, and therefore poverty began to grow. An important source of income for the people in Tulkarm is PA salaries, apart from agriculture and commerce. When the international community withheld funds

from the Hamas-led government in March 2006, the situation became very difficult for people dependent on government salaries. Furthermore the Geshuri factory and other pollutants have a negative impact on environment and health. A lot of difficulties in Tulkarm Governorate, such as the collapse of the economy due to the construction of the Separation Barrier, high dependence on PA salaries, high unemployment rate, expansion of settlements, army incursions, permit problems to access agricultural land etc., can also be seen in a lot of other places in the West Bank.

7.3.1. The Town of Tulkarm



Figure 1: Town of Tulkarm¹⁰

The City of Tulkarm has about 80,900 inhabitants including the people living in the two refugee camps with 85,332 males and 83,641 females and is situated in Area A (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011). The majority of the inhabitants are Muslims, just two families still belong to Christianity due to emigration into other cities in the oPt or to foreign countries (Interview 12). Tulkarm has two universities, al Khodori and Al-Quds Open University, as well as two campuses of the An-Najah National University, which is mainly located in Nablus. Furthermore there are four high schools located in the town, Al'adawiyya and Jamal Abd-Al-Naser (for girls) and Alfadeleyya and Ihsan Samarah (for boys). 11, 1% of the polled people in the questionnaire just completed primary school. 40, 5 % of the people completed secondary school. Even 44, 5 % were able to attend university¹¹. The biggest hospital in town is Thabit Thabit Hospital, which most of the people, who filled out the questionnaire, are going to.

Tulkarm camp and Nur Shams camp are the two refugee camps in Tulkarm under PA control. Tulkarm camp, which is the second largest refugee camp in the West Bank with

¹⁰ Wikimapia (2012): Town of Tulkarm <http://wikimapia.org/#lat=32.3073457&lon=35.0638908&z=14&l=0&m=s> [20.08.2012]

¹¹ 3,9 % = no answer

approximately 18.0000 refugees on 0.18 square kilometers, was established in 1950. The refugees were mainly from villages or cities in the region of Haifa, Jaffa or Kissaria. Today the camp is connected to public water as well as electricity but lacks sewage infrastructure. Five schools are located in the camp, but still more than a third of the refugees in the camp are unemployed. UNRWA runs a health center and a women's programme center.



Figure 2, Figure 3: Tulkarm Refugee Camp¹²

Nur Shams refugee camp has around 9.000 inhabitants (around 1760 families) and was established in 1952 on 0.23 square kilometers and is located around 3 kilometers east of the town of Tulkarm. Most parts of the main street from the town of Tulkarm to the Nur Shams camp lie in Area C. The people, living in the camp, are originally mainly from villages around Haifa. Before the establishment of the camp in Tulkarm, they lived in tents near Janzour (Jenin valley) until a devastating snowstorm. They also have a connection to public water and electricity. It has been under PA control since 1998 after the Wye River Memorandum. Two schools are located in the camp, as well as a health center, rehabilitation center and a women's programme center etc. Around 220 people from the camp are working in the public sector. The unemployment is also high due to the lack of connection to the Israeli labor market (see UNRWA 2012, Zeitan 2007).

¹² Zangl (2011):Tulkarm Refugee Camp. September 2011



Figure 4: IDF “flying CP” in town of Tulkarm¹³

7.4. Water situation in the West Bank

Around 20 ground water basins, based on hydrogeological factors, are available in the whole Middle East. The most important aquifers are the Mountain Aquifer (western and eastern), Coastal Aquifer, and the Azraq Aquifer (Watercare 2004:25). In Quaternary sand and gravel in the Coastal Plain are the most productive Aquifer (Exact 1998:10). The Mountain Aquifer is the main source for drinking water in the West Bank (HWE 2008:4). More than 50 % of the total water consumption in the Middle East comes from ground water from springs and wells. The largest water user is agriculture, followed by municipal and industrial use (Exact 1998:3).

Israel established Mekorot, a national water carrier, before 1967, which transported water from the already existing sources to the agricultural, municipal and industrial customers. The situation changed after the war, a water supply network for settlements linked with the Mekorot network has been established and wells developed. Two aquifers lie under the oPt, which are the Mountain Aquifer and the Coastal Aquifer. Israel took the main control of the water resources in the West Bank and Palestinian water rights were annulated. Today Israel’s fresh water per capita availability is about

¹³ Zangl (2011): IDF “flying CP” in town of Tulkarm. July 2011

for times as high as in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel was able to establish an efficient water infrastructure by contrast with the oPt (World Bank 2009:4). Today there are different water resources available for the Palestinians in the West Bank. Groundwater, springs and harvest rainwater are the main sources. The River Jordan, which cannot be used for the people in the West Bank, is a water resource used by Jordan and Israel (UNEP 2003:14f). The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Appendix 1, Article 40, Principle 1 states the following: *“Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water sources”* (UNEP 2003: 14). The calculated domestic consumption rate for Palestinians was rated 28.6 mcm/year and for the PA around 70-80 mcm/year of water in the interim period. Nowadays this leads to difficulties, because these rates were identified in 1995 and were not adapted to today’s needs. During the Oslo Accords the Palestinians requested 450 mcm/year of water, but the issue was not resolved as it was one of the five major issues in the Final Status negotiations (HWE 2008:31ff). The population growth and the limited water resources prove that water or its economic utilization can be seen as a very important key policy. *“The projected demand [...] would result in Municipal and Industrial demand almost quadrupling from 133 million Mcm/cr today [2000] to 472 Mcm/yr in the same period”* (Palestinian National Water Plan 2000:4 quoted in UNEP 2003:181). The situation in Area C is even more severe, because planning restrictions and required permits for all water constructions complicate the sustainable development of a Palestinian water sector:

“Using the powers of the 1967 Military Order [...], Israel monitors and intervenes to control all water related activities in Area C. There has also been use of military control in Area C to enforce Israeli authority over water resource. [...] Even rainwater harvesting cisterns have been destroyed by the IDF” (World Bank 2009:54).

Regardless of this fact, the PWA was not able to arrange an integrated water management system within the governance framework. The PA institutional weakness is contributing to the severe situation as well as the JWC, which is actually not working as a joint water resource governance institution. Combined with the power of the ICA and the physical M&A restrictions, *“[...] the shortfalls in aid effectiveness have*

reduced the development of water resources and services for Palestinian people below levels expected at the time of Oslo” (World Bank 2009:14).

Nowadays Palestinian people have access to the Mountain Aquifer of approximately one fifth of the whole and the water withdrawals per capita have even decreased in the last ten years (World Bank 2009:5). Water level declines and changes in flow direction in the aquifer occurred due to heavy pumping in some areas of the region. In a few cases this led to a contamination of the aquifer, because saline water was induced from the sea into the aquifer. Moreover, the quality of the ground water gets affected by the industrial, municipal and agricultural sectors, especially in the recharge zone (Exact 1998:13). The Wash Cluster stated in their monthly situation report in June 2012 that the overall water scarcity in the West Bank is “better” than in 2011, but further assessment is needed to focus on the remote, unconnected villages (EWASH 2012:4).

The Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources Middle–East Peace Process propounded several imaginary ideas to solve the water problem in the region. They state that “[...] *the imaginary ideas of today form the basis for tomorrow’s technological development*” (Watercare 2004:114). One idea is the “Peace pipe”, where water gets imported from Turkey by means of a pipeline through all countries in the region. Another imaginary idea is to use giant tankers or huge plastic containers with water from Turkey or icebergs from Antarctica. With the help of desalination plants the seawater could be turned into fresh water. A Seas canal could use the hydroelectric energy that is produced for desalinization (Watercare 2004:114).

7.4.1. Water situation in the Tulkarm Governorate

Tulkarm is in the recharge area on the northwestern strip of the Mountain Aquifer and is affected by heavy pollution from its municipality, other Palestinian regions, Israeli settlements as well as the Israeli Industrial Zone. The two main water resources are ground water and surface water, since springs do not exist in the municipality of Tulkarm (26 wells). A number of wadis, e.g. Wadi Abu Nar, Wadi Ammar, Wadi Hawwatut, Wadi AlSham, Wadi Masseen, Wadi Al Teen, and Wadi Zeimar stream through the governorate, which lead to the Mediterranean Sea. Wadi Zeimar, which flows within the municipality of Tulkarm, contains raw domestic and industrial wastewater during the summer from the areas of Nablus, Anabta, Tulkarm and Israeli settlements (HWE 2008: 4ff, Arij 1996:2ff). Furthermore the untreated wastewater flow into Wadi Al Zeemer left heavy damages.

The water consumption is around 85 Liters per day per person and the municipality usually uses

“[...] the water municipal well no. 1 with production capacity of 180 m³ / hour, well no. 2 with production capacity of 100 m³/hour, well no. 3 with production capacity of 65 m³/hour and Shwekeh well with production capacity of 110 m³/hour and they are 90 meters deep”. (PWE 2004:17).

During summer time a few agricultural wells are used in addition for the demanding need of water due to the weather and the higher production in agriculture. The sewage system is around 60 kilometers long, very old and covers only 70 percent of the town in 2004 (PWE 2004:17). Tulkarm is vulnerable in terms of pollution, also because the groundwater is very close to the land surface and *“[...] some of the most abundant water extractions from the Mountain Aquifer occur in this area”* (HWE 2008:12). The ground water is under pressure in Tulkarm due to several reasons. Insufficient sewage infrastructure, the inadequate funding for waste and sewage as well as improper disposal of waste is causing the current stressed situation. Moreover public education in terms of environmental issues is not well established within the public school sector or in the civil society. To complete the vicious circle, institutional problems are still superabound, due to the lack of enforcement (HWE 2008:14).




Figure 5: Risk Map of Tulkarm¹⁴

Al Khatib (2003:199ff) and other researchers of the Birzeit University conducted a study for the year 1999 about quantitative and qualitative determinants of drinking water in the Tulkarm Governorate, as well as the effect of water pollution on the health of people. They used 500 drinking water samples collected from the Public Health Department/Ministry of Health and were examined for free chlorine residual concentration, total coliforms and fecal coliforms. The dispersal of water-related diseases is higher in regions with contaminated and nonchlorinated drinking water. Many of the examined samples were not acceptable according to WHO standards (Al Khatib, et al. 2003:1999).

“60.6% of the samples have concentrations of free chlorine residual less than 0.2 ppm, which is the minimum concentration, recommended by WHO. Out of these samples, 34% and 9.2% were contaminated with total coliforms and fecal coliforms respectively” (Al-Khatib, et al. 2003:199ff).

Just 39 percent of the drinking water in the Governorate of Tulkarm is acceptable within the standard limits, and a few chlorinating pumps emerged as faulty or not correctly operated. Not only was the contamination of groundwater and springs a serious problem in Tulkarm, but also the pollution of rain-fed cisterns in villages as Attil, Baqa Alsharkia, and Nazlat Isa. Despite existing chlorinating pumps in Attil the water contamination from wastewater was distressing. Nazlat Isa had the same problems as

¹⁴ HWE (2008:8): Risk Map of Tulkarm

Attil, because all samples were severely contaminated. The contamination of water, especially in drinking water can lead to several health problems. In 1999 approximately 5,924 cases of gastrointestinal (GI) and worm infection were detected in Tulkarm. The infections can also result from many other factors like low quality of housing, malnutrition or bad sanitation, “[...] was the total number of GI infections and worm infections [sic!] in the studied communities [...] about 4,208 cases. Those represent 71% of the cases in the Tulkarm [sic!] district“(Al Khatib, et al. 2003: 203). The exact infection rate for GI and worm infections in Tulkarm district could not be identified for 2011, due to the lack of exact figures. PHIC (2011) published a report for the year 2011, where the numbers of different worm infections can be checked up. In 2012 Lina Mahmmoud Ali Hamarshi (2012:81f) identified that the highest nitrate concentrations can be found in wells and springs in Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarm and Nablus area and the cesspits are the main sources for pollution in groundwater wells in Tulkarm Governorate. Nevertheless, the situation has improved in the last ten years, but still needs to be an issue of focus of the municipality, the PA and the population itself. For example at the Anabta well no. 3 a new well pump (60m³/hr) was installed in 2007, including a booster pump with accessories and a balancing tank of 200m³ (World Bank 2009:125).

The conceivable solutions for the threat to the ground water by pollution will be discussed in the next section of this paper.

7.5. Israeli Industrial Zone in Tulkarm and environmental problems in the region

The environment of the oPt and its natural resources are under huge pressure, especially after the division of the West Bank during the Oslo Accords. An increase in traffic, unclean fuels, an increase in stone-cutting and quarry factories, superannuated processing in the industry and a deficit of environmental regulations are just a few factors which contribute to the worsening of the air pollution in the Governorate Tulkarm. Growing cities concatenate with the rising need of energy and the pollution from the liquid and solid waste of the settlements, industrial zone, factories and Palestinian population centers makes the situation more severe (Qasem 2001:22f).

During the 1980s the Israeli Government moved several industries close to residential areas in Tulkarm (Qasem 2001:25). In addition to this, Israeli factories, which were constructed within the West Bank at the west side of the town Tulkarm, stress the environment, as well as water resources, agriculture and human beings.

“The factories continue to spread and dispose internationally forbidden toxic effluents [...], which causes cancer, asthma, and pneumonia due to inhalation of contaminated air or digestion of crops planted around the factories, as proven in various medical tests” (Arij 2011:26).

Qasem (2001:24) points out, that the industries in Tulkarm Governorate, except stone-cutting factories, are not enough developed to play an important role in the deterioration of the air qualities in the district. However, from a Palestinian viewpoint, the location of the Tulkarm district close to Israel and its industrial areas and villages, determine the problem of air pollution.

One industrial factory is always in the center of discussion when it comes to the environmental pollution in Tulkarm. In 1987 the Geshuri factory was moved from Kafr Saba, located inside the state of Israel, which manufactures fertilizers, acids and pesticides (Lamour 2005:3).



Figure 6, Figure 7: Zangl (2011): Fayyaz farm with Geshury Factory and Separation Barrier in the background¹⁵

Lamour, who wrote a report about environmental issues in Tulkarm Municipality in the year 2005, reported three key issues around environmental problems in Tulkarm. The effects on the health of the local people are one of the main problems in the town, especially in vulnerable age groups. Residents of Tulkarm claim, that noxious fumes are carried with the wind into local housing areas thereby causing adverse health problems. The effect of effluent on local land use is in particular the decay of trees close to the Geshuri factory and a slow grow rate of the trees. Furthermore, approximately 2, 5 dunums¹⁶ of the nearby land were not usable anymore for cultivation due to effluent including Sulfamic Acid in 1991. Lamour explained that the situation clearly improved in 2005 and the land around the factory was cultivated with extensive green housing. It is not clear though, if this land is the same as mentioned above. The confiscation of agricultural land is a result of the construction of the factories, e.g. the Geshuri factory and others in the West Bank. Mr. Shahr Hamdan Haweli's land was confiscated because of the construction of Dixon Gas (Lamour 2005:4ff, Qumsieh 2000). The local economy has been dependent on this land and the profits were reduced by approximately 22 percent in 1997 as around 144,100 square meters or 17 percent of Tulkarm agricultural land was affected by pollution. According to Lamour this information is obsolete though, because of the missing accurate data. For this reason the

¹⁵ Zangl (2011): Fayyaz farm with Geshury Factory and Separation Barrier in the background. August 2011

¹⁶ 1 dunam is around 1000 sq. meters

problems with the Geshuri factory must be seen in the context of the other environmental problems in the Tulkarm region. There is also a need for further evidence of the hazard for public health coming from the Geshuri factory (Lamour 2005:3ff).

A number of people (Qasem 2001:22, Isaac 2000:2, Safieh 2012) also claim that there is illegal transfer of toxic waste from Israel to two dumping sites in Tulkarm. According to Qasem (2001:22) one dumping site is supposed to be on the south eastern border of the Tulkarm Municipality, in Area C, with citrus trees, irrigated vegetable crops, and including two groundwater wells. In the vicinity of the residential area of A`zoun Municipality there is the location of the second dumping site. It is located just 50 meters from the drinking groundwater well of the borough.

The two municipal waste sites for the residents of the governorate are situated in Anabta and one outside the town of Tulkarm close to Jubara. Due to the rise in population numbers and the lack of implementation of waste treatment techniques solid waste remains largely untreated and unsorted, which leads to health risks for the local people and a threat to groundwater resources (Lamour 2005:6ff).

According to a number of interviewed people environmental issues are not the first priority for the municipality, when it comes to Tulkarm. In the end the politically tense situation and the socio-economic situation make their contribution to the decision of priorities (HWE 2008:29). Nevertheless, Lamour recommends a clear environmental plan for the Tulkarm region as well as the treatment and disposal of municipal sewage. Approximately 80 percent of the people in the town of Tulkarm and 90 percent of the people in the refugee camps are connected to the sewer system. For the villages around Tulkarm there are no clear numbers available, however “[...] *all of the sewer water from Anabta and surrounding villages drains directly to the Wadi Zaimer (e.g. Nur Shams Camp*” (Lamour 2005:15). Hence environmental priorities need to be developed with local and regional targets. Lamour recommends focusing on Wadi Zaimer, the dumpsites, a public awareness education Programme, water quality and the identification and elimination of pollution sources (Lamour 2005:20ff). In 2008 HWE published guidelines for Palestinian municipalities, focusing on Tulkarm Governorate. The key recommendations for Tulkarm from HWE are based on short, medium and

long term solutions, e.g. improving infrastructure, solid waste collection and sewage treatment. *“Increasing the municipality's institutional capacity to conduct inspections and monitoring of infrastructure and of businesses and its capacity to enforce against environmental violations [...]”* is important; as well as local financing for upgrading the water system and the development of a strategic plant against groundwater pollution (HWE 2008:3). HWE recommends the principles of the Integrated Water Resources Management and promotes a holistic approach and GIS (HWE 2008:3ff).

8. Restriction of Movement and Access

in the Governorate of Tulkarm

Article 12(1) of the *ICCPR* states that, “[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence” (OHCHR 2007). The restriction of movement in the Tulkarm region is mainly influenced by the Separation Barrier. This is of particular concern because this restriction affects the Palestinian communities in various ways. In my conducted analysis 19, 6 percent of the people, must pass through an obstacle on the way to work. People, living in the town of Tulkarm most often filled in that they have to pass any kind of obstacle on the way to work¹⁷. The average travel time to work and from work for people which were polled is 30-60 minutes. Just 34 people answered that they have a full time job. Most people walk to their work or use public transport as bus service or taxi.

The impact on the economy and the increase in unemployment and poverty leads to a struggle on a daily basis for the Palestinian community. According to the ICRC (2011), the income of Mohammad Tawiq of Far’un Village dropped by 75 percent, due to the construction of the Separation Barrier. Restrictions on access for farmers to their lands in the Seam Zone have severely harmed the farming sector in the Tulkarm Area. Permits are always required. This leads to intensive bureaucratic involvement for the farmers. Since May 2011 a decrease in the approved permits by the Civil Administration has been seen on a large scale in the northern part of the Tulkarm Area (Interview 4). According to the secretary of the Qaffin village council Omar Ajoleh, just 40 out of 300 requests in the last 4 months were approved (EAPPI 2011b). Additionally, this permit system creates a situation of constant uncertainty for Palestinian farmers regarding their ability to carry out every day work. Abdul Karim Dalba (Interview 5), a freelance

¹⁷ 16, 3 percent of the 153 people didn’t fill in an answer. Places of residents/Number of people, who have to pass an obstacle: Sweika:1; Attil:3; Shufa:5; Tulkarm:9; Nazlat Isa:3; Deir Al-Ghusun:1; Beit Lit:1; Tubas:1; No Answer of place of residence:7

journalist and activist in the Tulkarm Area states:

“The whole system of the wall around Tulkarm, and also the system of checkpoints and roadblocks, which are sometimes easy to pass or in using alternatives, did not change the idea or the feeling we are still in a prison. The rules of permissions, no matter if it is easy to pass or not, aren't changing the system of control. The impression that you see open gates and can be closed at any time is a feeling what makes it difficult for people to live”.

The Separation Barrier in the Governorate of Tulkarm is around 40 kilometers long and approximately 22 percent of it is built on the Green Line (UNOCHA 2009b:36). Talal Dweikat, Governor of Tulkarm stated that “[...] about 40,000 dunums from Tulkarm Area was isolated to the west side of the wall” (Interview 1). The first phase of the construction of the Separation Barrier was completed in July 2003 and had a total length of 157 km in the northern districts of the West Bank. Five *de facto* enclaves were created in Tulkarm Governorate, where four communities with around 11,749 residents were living. The villages in the first enclave are Baqa ash Sharqiyya, Nazlat Isa and Nazlat Abu Nar. Khirbet Jubara, in the second enclave, is located on the west side of the Separation Barrier. 26 agricultural gates were planned along the stretch of the first phase of the Separation Barrier. In October 2003 only four gates were installed in Tulkarm and Qualqillia districts (HDIP 2004:31ff). 78 percent of the Barrier lie within the West Bank and there is one community of the name of Khirbet Jubara and two families of Ar Ras located inside the Seam Zone. The re-routing process of the Separation Barrier will return the people from the Seam Zone to the Palestinian side of the Barrier. Moreover, one family from Shweika is also living in the closest area but the gate usually opens all the time (UNOCHA 2009b:36).

The impact of the construction of the Separation Barrier on access to health care services in Tulkarm region is discussed by the report of the Health Development, Information and Policy Institute (HDIP) in 2004. The HDIP (2004:24) claim that in the first phase of the construction around 14, 680 dunums of land were confiscated, 102,320 olive trees uprooted, 36 groundwater wells and 200 cisterns confiscated (HDIP 2004:11ff). One interviewed persons points out, that there is just one part of the society in Tulkarm, who are suffered from the construction of the Separation Barrier:

“[...] Israel always uses security issue. They even they can talk about peace, security is a high issue for Israel. For the Palestinians I should be honest with you. For the people, who lost their land, they suffered. But let's say like myself, I didn't lose some land [...] so not me, but some people for example, I will not feel really with those Palestinians. [...]. Most people from suffering from the wall, are the people living close to the wall or who lost their land. For example let's go to Ramallah. Do you think Ramallah is similar to Tulkarm? [...] Of course not,[...] Ramallah is small and [...] full of clubs, full of international presents, [...] full of different ideologies.[...]. So for me, the people, who lost land or going to the field or Israel, are the only one, who are affected by the wall. You will feel the difference between A. and someone who opens a clothes shop in Tulkarm. He was never affected by this. The second Intifada is really different from the first Intifada. [...]The Palestinian were more united. But now, not at all!” (Interview 6).

88 people out of 153 polled people wrote that the construction of the Separation Barrier influenced/influences their personal life. 28 people stated that there is no influence from the Separation Barrier on their personal life. 37 people didn't answer this question. It was an open question. Therefore the people were able to write about different aspects and I put the answers into different categories. 35 people mentioned that the Separation Barrier influenced their possibility to work in Israel negatively and 20 people wrote about the negative influence on their work in the West Bank. 15 people mentioned the exclusion from the possibility to swim in the sea. Other aspects people wrote about in the questionnaire are: the possibility to pray in Jerusalem; visiting family and friends in Israel, limited access to the Seam Zone and agricultural land, freedom of movement, freedom, psychological problems, problems to get a permission, changing of free time activities, imprisonment during the second intifada etc.

8.1. Checkpoints

Without actually drawing a line, Palestinian and Israeli Oslo peace negotiators designed one of the most complicated creations of the occupation, which were called “passages” (Weizman 2008:151). Annex I, Article X, called “passages” of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement states:

“a. [...] These arrangements aim at creating a mechanism that facilitates the entry and exit of people and goods, reflecting the new reality created by the Declaration of Principles, while providing full security for both sides. [...]d. The two sides are determined to do their utmost to maintain the dignity of persons passing through the border crossings. To this end, the mechanism created will rely heavily on brief and modern procedures” (PLO, The Government of Israel 1994).

These “passages” had a significant importance for the developing self-determination of the Palestinians and the security needs of the Israelis. The specific architecture of the CPs serves as a figure for the new power relationships, which were developed during the whole Oslo Process. The security logic behind the CPs is that the room of the CP is safer, when as few Palestinians as possible actually are in there. The system of control points is so omnipresent that it controls the daily life of the Palestinians under occupation in every aspect. Palestinians are used to control points in their daily life. The term “normalization” is often used in this context in the oPt (Weizman 2008:151ff, Segal et al 2003). 98 CPs were operating in February 2012 in the West Bank, whereof 41 are leading into Israel (Btselem 2012b).

8.1.1. The workers' Checkpoint Taybe/Irtah -Sha'ar Efrayim

The CP is located south of Tulkarm on the Green Line and north of the route 557. Taybe Checkpoint opens daily around 4 am for Palestinians with workers permit only. The CP also operates as a transit point for commercial goods by a back-to-back method and is operated by a civilian manpower company. GROUP4SECURICOR (G4S), respectively their Israeli subsidiary, G4S Israel (Hashmira) are providing the CP with the security systems including luggage scanning machines and full body scanners (Machsom Watch 2012, Who Profits 2012)¹⁸.




Figure 8, Figure 9: Taybe CP at night¹⁹

The CP doesn't have an extra queue for women. The women are led through by opening a small door on the side, at the opening of the checkpoint. Later on (around 5 minutes after the opening) they have to queue with the men in the same line, which can be quite stressful for the women due to cultural circumstances. Around 50 to 100 women are passing this CP every morning. The checkpoint is monitored by EAPPI around two times a week and by Machsom Watch on an irregular basis. Organizations which monitor the Checkpoint are not able to pass through or interact with the responsible

18 "G4S Israel is one of the major security systems providers to the Israeli government, including the Ministry of defense building ("Hakiria") in Tel Aviv. It also provides security systems to the Israeli armored corps base of Nachshonim, which was donated by the US army in accordance with the Wye River Memorandum. The company operates security patrol units which secure oceanic facilities, vehicles and transport routes, buildings and equipment of the security and finance industries. These units, as the company states, are manned by 'warriors who graduated elite combat units in the Israeli army'" (Who Profits 2012)

19 Zangl (2011): Taybe CP at night. August 2011

people working inside the Checkpoint. In August an average of 3,272²⁰ Palestinian workers passed the Taybe CP between 4:00 -7:00 am (Sunday, Thursday) to get to their work in Israel. The busiest day is Sunday morning, because a lot of workers are staying in Israel for the working week and are just returning back to their homes in the West Bank for the weekends. 3900 people passing through the CP was the highest number recorded by EAPPI (2012a, 2012c) in August. Around 300 people were waiting in a queue by the opening hour of the CP on a regular basis, but could enter the CP shortly after 4 am.

“The number of people entering the CP per minute was on average 18.2 for the whole morning, but while dealing with the rush between 4:00-5:00 am a flow rate of over 30 people per minute was frequently achieved. Another queue started forming from 6 am onwards for people with a permit for 7:00 am” (EAPPI 2012c:4).

A protest against the “mistreatment by Israeli soldiers” at the CP was held in the beginning of October by hundreds of Palestinian. There is a demand for earlier opening hours due to constant overcrowdings at the CP (Maannews 2012c).

²⁰ 3,482 people in July

8.1.2. The Case of Jubara- a village in the Seam Zone


Jubara, 5 kilometers south of Tulkarm, is a village located in the 'Seam Zone' with around 52 families or 350 people living in it. The settlement of Sal' it, with a population of approximately 400 residents, and the Green Line are close to the small village (Seifert et al. 2009:61ff).

UNOCHA predicted in 2011 that around 25,000 Palestinians (plus the majority of the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem) will have their residents in the closed area, when the construction of the Separation Barrier is completely finished. Now approximately 6500 people are living in the Seam Zone (UNOCHA 2011a:3).

Isolated lands in a district seam zone like Jubara are facing difficulties on a daily basis. In general Palestinians over the age of 16 living in the 'Seam Zone', the closed area between the Green Line and the Separation Barrier, need a permanent resident permit to stay in their own houses (also overnight) The registration process in 2004 of the residential permit in Jubara led to problems, because only people, who were staying in the village on a particular day, were able to receive such a permit. The residents were not given notice in advance and therefore some people were just given a visitor permit and had to stay outside the village during the night. One woman of the village was not given a residential permit for four years, although she had been living in the village her whole life and her house was in Jubara (Seifert et al 2009:61).

People living in the 'Seam Zone' usually have limited access to health, education and social services. Social Networks are difficult to keep up for relatives and friends living in the West Bank (UNOCHA 2009b:4) due to the restriction of access permissions to the 'Seam Zone.' One family of Jubarah got a visit from a relative living in Germany. Although they had organized a huge meal for the visitor he was not allowed to pass the CP. The food had to be taken to the village of Ar Ras (Seifert et al 2009:62).

In general the residents of Jubarah are able to enter or leave the village through a CP,



which is open for 24 hours. “On 4 March [2009], the Israeli authorities removed the Ar Ras / Kafriat checkpoint, including all related infrastructure. The checkpoint controlled all traffic to and from seven villages in the southern Tulkarm district (approximately 12,000 people) to Tulkarm city” (UNOCHA 2009a:1). According to Gordon et al. (2009:61) it was only allowed to bring small quantity of goods into the village and it was closely inspected by the soldiers at the CP. The ²¹consequences were a rundown of the

local economy and especially chicken farming suffered extremely due to the fact that the import of feed and fertilizers was not allowed. Even worse the poultry flock has been reduced from 120,000 to 20,000 due to the denial of access of a veterinarian. According to Foad Jubarah, a farmer from Jubarah 7,000 chickens have died in the past few months of an unknown disease, representing a year loss of USD100,000.00, although he has been trying to bring a veterinarian into Jubarah to check it, but applications were denied 5 times by the DCO (UNOCHA 2009b:37, EAPPI 2011).

The situation for the school children has improved in the last few years due to the construction of a school within the village. Medical service is available in the town of Tulkarm, even though UNRWA provides a mobile medical clinic once a month in Jubara itself (Seifert et al 2009:62f).

The Separation Barrier is being rerouted to the west this year as a result of an Israeli HCJ decision. The village will be located within the West Bank in the future. “Some 522[587] dunums would be confiscated as part of the realignment of the Wall but 90 percent of the villagers` land would be returned to the villagers of Jubarah” (Seifert et

²¹ UNOCHA (2011): Tulkarm Closure Map.

al 2009:62). This means a great improvement for the daily life of the residents of Jubarah and the local economy. The agricultural land will be taken from fifty families of the village of Far'un (UNOCHA 2011a:5).

Farmers, whose agricultural land is located in the 'Seam Zone', also face difficulties to reach their land for cultivation. Especially the farmers in the northern part of the West Bank have needed permission or a visitor permit to be able to reach and cultivate their land since October 2003. The Access to the 'Seam Zone' is regulated through an 'Agriculture Gate'. The permit is issued for a special gate, person and duration of time (UNOCHA 2009b:4f). *"Restricted allocation of these visitor permits and the limited number and opening times of the Barrier gates have severely curtailed agricultural practice and undermined rural livelihoods"* (UNOCHA 2009b:4). A typical example of the difficulties which arise in this closed zone is the following case: four fires in 2008 were reported to the fire brigade which were not allowed to pass into the Seam Zone. On that account 500 dunums of olive trees were destroyed (UNOCHA 2009b:37).

8.1.3. Nazlat Isa



Figure 11, Figure 12: Nazlat Isa- Separation Barrier²²

Nazlat Isa, now a quiet village far up north (around 17 kilometers from the town of Tulkarm) in the Governorate of Tulkarm has changed a lot since the construction of the Separation Barrier. The Barrier runs on the Green Line, which is not illegal, but separated a lot of families from each other. To be able to visit each other the families have to take a detour via Tulkarm (around 40 kilometers), although they only live around 50 meters from each other. The demolition of more than 300 shops conducted by the IDF in preparation of the construction of the Separation Barrier caused a huge impact to the economic situation of the inhabitants of Nazlat Isa. Nazlat Isa was a vibrant place before the construction of the Separation Barrier. Due to the shop closings a big economic center in the Governorate moved away and Nazlat Isa lies now lies in the peripheral outskirts of Tulkarm. The Barrier also isolated around 500 dunums of the land (Interview 12).

The Separation Barrier also completely isolated 6 houses, whose entrance is organized by a checkpoint. The checkpoint in the south of Nazlat Isa opens on a daily basis from 06.00-24.00. Around 84 people are passing this checkpoint on a regular routine. 14 of them are school children, who are crossing the checkpoint two times a day (UNOCHA 2009a:37). Health care is provided in two local governmental clinics in Nazlat Isa,

²² Zangl (2011): Nazlat Isa- Separation Barrier separating a Palestinian House. August 2011

which open weekly from 08:00 until 14:30 and a third level clinic in Baqa Ash-Sharqiyeh (HDIP 2004:59).

8.2. Agricultural Gates

The Separation Barrier features three capacious incursions into the West Bank. On these grounds a huge amount of tracts of agricultural land is isolated. The communities of Akkaba, Qaffin, Deir al Ghusun, Far `un, Ar Ras, Kafr Sur, Kafr Jammal and Kafr Zibad are especially confronted with the disconnection to their agricultural land. In Qaffin approximately 12,000 olive trees are located in the closed area and in Far`un *“[...] hundreds of dunums of citrus & guava have died due to lack of access. Only 149 out of the population of 3,100 have permits as of May 2009”* (UNOCHA 2009a:37).

There are a total of nine agricultural gates in the district of Tulkarm to access the farming land. One of them is seasonal and four are seasonal/weekly agricultural gates. Four out of nine Gates open on a daily basis (UNOCHA 2009a:36). In total there are 80 agricultural gates leading into the Seam Zone where the agricultural areas are separated by the Separation Barrier, but the majority of these agricultural gates only open for a six week period in fall during the olive harvest season. They are not open all day (usually 2-3 times a day) and the opening time is restricted mostly to 45 minutes (UNOCHA 2012b:1f). *“During the 2011 olive harvest, about 42% of applications submitted for permits to access areas behind the Barrier were rejected citing ‘security reasons’ or lack of ‘connection to the land”* (UNOCHA 2012b:1). UNOCHA also claims that the numerous fires which are annihilating trees and crops in the Seam Zone are a recurring problem. The cause of these fires is mainly the unchecked undergrowth (UNOCHA 2009a:36).

8.2.1. The system of permissions

To be able to reach the agricultural land in the Seam Zone it is necessary to obtain a permit from the ICO. The security standards have to be fulfilled to apply or renew this permit. Farmers must be able to prove a valid ownership or present a land taxation document which shows a connection to their land. In reality a huge part of the permissions are rejected due to the failing proof of the connection to the land and the strict permit and gate regime. According to UNOCHA around 150 communities in the West Bank suffer from the negative consequences and their agricultural livelihood is gravely undermined.

Farmers who were able to get a permit were forced to shift from labor-intensive to rainfed and low-value crops or even stop cultivation completely due to the limited opening of the agricultural gates (UNOCHA 2012b:1f). Meanwhile, these permissions are only valid for a few months for a few family members. The valid duration of the permission has decreased in many cases from 6 months to 1-2 months. Even more problematic are the opening hours of the gate, which can be reduced any time. In the last year, especially since April 2001, there have been more complaints about the denial of permissions from farmers with their crops in the Seam Zone (Btselem 2012c:46f, EAPPI 2011a).

“The Civil Administration reported that in 2010 it issued 30,985 permits to enable Palestinians to enter the seam zone. Some 70 percent of permit requests were granted. Of the permits that were issued, 61 percent were for short periods of up to three months. Since 2007, the Civil Administration has imposed a quota – it does not grant more than 70 percent of the requests for a permit, regardless of the number of requests submitted” (Btselem 2012c:46).

Another obstacle for the farmers is that the gate opens 2 or 3 times a day. When they have to for instance water the plants for an hour, they have to stay inside the Seam Zone until the Agricultural Gate opens again in the evening and are not able to obtain work at home or inside the West Bank.

“For example you have a land [...], it will be no nice to go to your land through the gate, the soldier check you, check your donkey, stay in line like the animals, waiting until the soldiers come and open the gate. No one wants to do this [...] These is my land, I wanna go there anytime. Maybe I am free today, and I wanna go there and it with my family there. This situation is really difficult for the farmers [...]” (Interview 7).




Table 2: Rate of Approvals of Permit Application ²³

²³ UNOCHA (2012b:2): The humanitarian impact of the Barrier. Factsheet July
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_barrier_factsheet_july_2012_english.pdf [02.08.2012]

8.2.2. Deir Al-Ghusun Gate - Analysis of the collected data 2007-2011

Deir Al – Ghusun is located about 8 km north of Tulkarm city with about 11,000 inhabitants. Thus, Deir Al-Ghusun is one of the most populated centers in Tulkarm governorate. More than 60% of residents are dependent on agricultural income. According to the World Food Programme at least 400 persons of Deir Al-Ghusun are totally dependent on international aid and up to 150 families are dependent on payments from UNRWA (see LRC 2007). The total area of Deir Al Ghusun was 27000 dunums, 51% of it was annexed in 1948. The remaining 13 000 dunums were divided as follows:

"2868 dunums are built up zone, 2000 dunums are cultivated flatland with vegetables in greenhouses, 300 dunums are destroyed under the path of the Segregation Wall, 2400 dunums are separated behind the Wall; 5432 dunums are cultivated with olive and almond trees "(LRC 2007).

The research question for the case study at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate is the following: Is a tendency to decrease in the number of farmers / farm women and children that pass through the gate Deir Al-Ghusun ascertained?




Figure 13: Tulkarm Closure Map²⁴

²⁴ UNOCHA (2011b): The CLOSURE MAP Tulkarm

The objective is to determine whether a trend can be observed with regard to the number of border crossers. I put the number of border crossings for each of the categories overall, ‘men’, ‘women’ and ‘children’ in the dependency of the time period. The regression analysis considers the relationship between two or more metric scaled features (Benesch 2008:115). A distinction is made between the dependent variable Y, which in my case, is the number of border crossings, and the independent variable X, which represents the time in calendar weeks. Therefore the number of border crossings depends on the cause variable “time” (Benes 2008:115). Other factors, such as the number of issued permits from the DCO will not be observed in this case.

In the following line graph the regression line was drawn for all categories (total, men, women and children). First, it shows that especially men pass the Deir Al-Ghusun gate, thus more men are working on the fields. And each case shows that there is a clear trend towards the reduction of border crossings.




Table 3: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Total

The average number of daily border crossings decreased from about 66 to about 40 people, for all groups (category total), which means a reduction by more than a third.




Table 4: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Men

The average number of men, who crossed the Deir Al-Ghusun gate on a daily basis decreased from around 58 to around 35 people, representing a decrease of more than a third.




Table 5: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Women

According to the regression line, the number of average daily border crossings of women at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate decreased from about six to about two people. This corresponds to a reduction by two thirds.




Table 6: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Children

The average number of children who passed the Deir Al-Ghusun gate on a daily basis decreased in accordance to statistical calculation of approximately three children to 1 child, and therefore declined by two thirds.

One reason for the general decline of the border crossings is the denial of the permission request. *"Some 40% of applications for 'visitor permits' to access olive groves behind the Barrier, submitted by Palestinians on the eve of the 2010 harvest season, were rejected"*(UNOCHA 2011e:1). Out of safety reasons or because of the impossibility to prove the ownership according to Israeli requirements, it often comes to denials of applications in the Seam Zone (UNOCHA 2011f:2). Another reason for the decrease in border crossings is the decline in applications in general: *"Many Palestinians are discouraged from applying for permits as they have been refused in the past, and others refuse to apply as a matter of principle"*(UNOCHA 2011f:2).

However, the coefficient of determination (R^2) also shows that the regression line only reflects the curve to a very limited extent. Thus, the regression line for the category total only explains about 5.5% of the shape of the curve. For the category men it can be explained by around 8%, because the number of border crossings as a total is more balanced over the period of time than in the category women and children. That means, it has proportionally less steep peaks. Therefore, the coefficient of determination is also lower for the category women and children: The regression line for the category women can only be explained by 4.4% of the scattering of data points and for the category of children only 1.4%.

One reason for the sometimes large variations from the regression line is seasonal fluctuations: even though it was not possible to prove it via time series analysis, it becomes evident by the maxima of the individual years that most border crossings were in the years 2007 to 2011 in the months of October and November.

Maxima of the border crossings - Total				
2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
103 (October)	185 (October)	71 (October)	111 (October)	130 (October)

Maxima of the border crossing- Men				
2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
89 (Oct./Nov)	119 (October)	61 (October)	78 (October)	107 (October)

Maxima of border crossings - Children				
2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
4 (November)	33 (October)	8 (October)	17 (October)	3 (October)

Maxima of border crossings - Women				
2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
14 (October)	33 (October)	11 (October)	25 (October)	17 (October)

Table 7: Maximas of border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate

The increased border crossings in the months of October and November can also be well understood in the radar charts with monthly averages. It also very clearly shows how much the category men is dominated by the cross-border workers in total: They pass the Deir Al-Ghusun gate more often over the year than women and children, and have therefore - as mentioned above - proportionally less steep peaks .




Table 8: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Total




Table 9: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Men




Table 10: Border Crossings Deir Al-Ghusun Gate Women

In the period from late September to mid-November more permissions are issued by the DCO, because the olive harvest takes place at that time. As many as 44 of the 66 Agricultural Gates open only during the harvest season. Thus, an increase in border crossings at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate is observed during this time period (UNOCHA 2011f). Both the line charts and the radar charts, as the tables with the maximum values, show that the number of border crossings - from 2009 rapidly declined, especially during the olive harvest, but in the year of 2010 the peaks increased during the olive

harvest and showed higher values in the category Men (and thus also in the category overall) over the year.

According to UNOCHA (2009c:1), the Israeli authority has implemented different measures to improve the free movement of Palestinians between the Palestinian urban centers in the West Bank from May to October 2009. However, during the same period there was no significant improvement in access to agricultural land in the Seam Zone ascertainable. Instead it is evident: *"Attorney to the HCJ indicated that the number of permits issued to Palestinians farmers to access the 'Seam Zone' in the northern West Bank between 2006 and mid-2009 has sharply decreased"* (UNOCHA 2010b:18). Our data from the Deir Al-Ghusun gate confirms this. It was made even more difficult for the Palestinian farmers: In early January 2009 there was a change in the licensing system. From this point on a "visitors permit" was often necessary for entering the agricultural land. *"Prior to that, farmers were only required to register with the Israeli authorities and show their IDs at the relevant gate (also known as the 'prior coordination' system)"* (UNOCHA 2010b:18). A key factor for the decrease in border crossings were also the additional requirements of the permission system (UNOCHA 2010b:18). The extreme drop in applicants for permissions (70% at some gates) can partly be explained by the poor harvest in succession of cold and rainy weather in 2009 (see Data Matrix).

In March 2010, there were incidents with Israeli soldiers at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate. A dispute emerged between the farmers and the soldiers after the farmers were asked to undress. The farmers accused the soldiers of a more restrictive treatment at the gate: *"Farmers who must pass through the agricultural gates near the Jubarah [sic!] checkpoint south of Tulkarm, as well as farmers working West Bank lands beyond the wall in the Qalqiliya district have reported an increase in restrictions and checks. At two gates, farmers said Israeli forces had installed metal detectors"* (Maannews 2010).

In the data series more minima and maxima are included and can be explained with the weather and with holidays (Ramadan: about 31 July to 31 August - exact date varies). The bad weather explains the following weeks: CW 44 (2009) - only 7 border crossings because of the cold and rainy weather, CW 8 (2010) - only three border crossings due to storm (see Data Matrix 2010), CW 8 (2011): 18 border crossing due to heavy rain.

My unambiguous answer to the question whether there is a determined tendency of decrease in the number of men, women and children who pass through the gate Deir Al-Ghusun is yes.

The regression line shows that the average number of cross-border commuters per day has decreased among men by more than one third, and among women and children by two thirds. In this context, the male domination at the gate and its distribution over the year is well and much more balanced than that of women and children. The peaks of the last two groups are proportionally significantly higher. Thus, the significance of the percentage decline for the group of men is also higher than for the group of women or children.

Even if they were not detected by the time series analysis, seasonal fluctuations can be seen graphically and by means of the annual maxima. This is one reason why many of the values deviate from the regression line. Because of the olive harvest (September-November) strong peaks are visible especially among the groups of women and children.

In order to calculate the seasonal fluctuations, but above all to get an overall, less distorted result, it is important that EAPPI or similar organizations will document all border crossings on a regular and uninterrupted basis. For data analysis, it would also be helpful if this unified data collection would be made consistent and structured. In principle, it would also be desirable if the north gates, e.g. the Quaffin gate, stood more under observation since the opening hours are problematic and difficulties at the border crossings arise (EAPPI 2011b). The practical implementation is thought to be extremely difficult based on factors like distance, time and personnel resources.

8.3. Roadblocks

The number of roadblocks in the West Bank has decreased since the second Intifada. But still “[...] 522 roadblocks and checkpoints obstruct Palestinian movement in the West Bank, compared to 503 in July 2010” (UNOCHA 2011:1). Roadblocks are used to control, limit or block the traffic along a certain road. A lot of roadblocks in the West Bank are located close to main streets of Israeli settlements. Another way to block the access to certain roads used in the West Bank by the Israeli military is earth mounds.

8.3.1. Shufa and Avnei Hefetz



Figure 14: Roadblock Shufa²⁵

Shufa, a Palestinian Village close to Tulkarm city, was separated into two parts, Lower and Upper Shufa, with a roadblock on the main street. Shufa has around 1250 inhabitants, with a lot of people working in Israel before the second Intifada (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011, Interview 11). People from Upper Shufa were not able to use their main road to Tulkarm city for years, because of a roadblock on the junction to Tulkarm and Netanya, Israel. This street was only used by an Israeli military base and the inhabitants of the Israeli settlement of Avnei Hefetz, with around 1500 inhabitants, mostly born in Israel or “olim” from France (see Amana 2012). The settlement was established in 1990 by Hesder Yeshiva students from Karnei Shomron. The settlement today has four neighborhoods in the community:

25 Zangl (2011): Roadblock Shufa, View from Tulkarm site. September 2011

1. *“Neve Hefetz – urban style housing in apartment buildings*
2. *Avnei Shoham – rural style, single-family dwelling houses*
3. *Mitzpe Hefetz – built onto the hillside with a mountain view*
4. *Avnei Chen – the newest neighborhood, still in its growing stages”* (Amana 2012).

Many people living in the settlement have to commute to towns like Netanya, Kfar Saba or Hadera to work in fields like law, computer science, finance, education etc. There is a girl and a boy elementary school (till grade 8) located in Avnei Hefetz. The infrastructure in the community is well developed. A community center, a library, post office, grocery store, dental clinic, gym, a Beit Midrash, six synagogues etc. are located within the settlement²⁶ (see Avnei Hefetz 2011, Amana 2012).

The roadblock was a huge obstacle in terms of freedom of movement for the people living in Upper Shufa. A minibus was operating between Upper Shufa and the roadblock and the roadblock and the town of Tulkarm. People were not able to use their own transportation to go to Tulkarm and needed a lot of extra time to be able to go to work or school or buy basic products.

“It costs a lot of money and time. Students are losing a lot of time for walking. This influences the students of being consequent. [...] The farmers also, they don’t have access to their fields, for example me. I used to go to my field by car. Not it is impossible for me to go there. I have to walk for 3 or 4 kilometers in the morning to get to my field. [...] Imaging working in your field for 5 or 6 hours and coming back in the afternoon by foot. [...] and sometime you have the whole things to carry [...] on your shoulders [...]. This is because the settlers have closed the road leading to your farm. The road was ours; we build it [...]. ”Then, because of the expansion of the settlement, the confiscated the road. Now it is in the middle of the settlement. At first they told us, it is ok, we can pass through. After some time, they told us, it is not good for our security, you can’t pass anymore” (Interview 11).

The relationship between the residents of Shufa and Avnei Hefetz is better than in a lot of other areas in the West Bank. However, there is still a certain level of mistrust between the people. Both sites argue that the land belongs to their side. A resident of Avnei Hefetz takes up an argument often used by Israeli settlers:

“[...] Again, if we are talking about the land, and we spoke about the Palestinian people. There was not such a thing as Palestinian people. They came from Jordan, they came from Syria, they came from Lebanon, from Egypt, from all around the place”. [...] But again [...], I came here, because I truly believe, that this is, what my god gave me. This is a promised land. This is land, what is always ours [...]. We have an [...] agreement with god [...]. I am ..years old, [...] I am not a fanatic, I am not crazy guy. I

²⁶ house of interpretation, house of learning

am a normal guy [...]. I go to pubs,[...] listen to music ACDC, I go out, speak with people [...], read books. I am not a fanatical settler from Samaria and no one is here and again we are looking for peace. [...] We are speaking about 10000s of years this land belongs to us [...]" (Interview 10).

During the month of Ramadan in 2011 the Israeli Authority removed the roadblock at the main entrance to Shufa. According to the residents of Shufa the roadblock was put back after the end of Ramadan. During this spring the roadblock was removed permanently. Therefore the residents of Shufa are now able to use the main road to Tulkarm without using a long detour. Military controls still occur on a sporadic basis. The removal of the roadblock means a huge improvement of the freedom of movement and access of the people there.

9. Summary and Conclusion

The restrictions of movement in the West Bank were slightly reduced by the Israeli Military in 2011. A number of the main obstacles like CPs had already been removed in 2009 (for the main roads between Palestinian cities) (Btselem 2012c:56). The freedom of movement is still heavily restricted in significant areas for the Government of Israel, e.g. the Jordan Valley, East Jerusalem, the Seam Zone, the city of Hebron etc. “[...] *Palestinians are still unable to move about the West Bank freely, and Israel continues to view the Palestinians’ free movement as a privilege it may grant or deny at its discretion*” (Btselem 2012c:56). But overall the obstacles within the Governorate of Tulkarm have been reduced since the second Intifada. Samir S. describes the situation as follows:

“We are separated from other families. For us to go to Hebron it is a dream. I know, Hebron is in the South and we are in the North. [...] Of course, in one country, in any normal state, you can go from the South to the North. [...] But in our case it is difficult, because how many CPs I will face, first of all [...] Anab, Zatar, Atar etc. [...]. These are 4 Cps before I reach Hebron. This is the main, let’s say permanent Cps. Could anybody guess if there are there any flying Cps? So maybe it will reach 6 or 7. So I said, ok, why should I go to Hebron? Instead to spend 2 or 3 hours from Tulkarm, I spend 5. So when I return back, maybe I should sleep in Hebron. It happened with me. So I decided I will not go. So it affects our social life [...]. Also for the families who are separated behind the wall as Nazlat Isa for instance. [...] Their social life with their neighbors, with their friends is cut off. They just can contact each other by talking from the roof [...]” (Interview 6).

She also points out the different situation in the center of the West Bank as compared to that in Ramallah and Tulkarm:

“People in Ramallah, it’s different to feel. [...] Sometimes, people, who are living in Ramallah, they don’t feel the occupation. When they return back to Tulkarm, [...]. I mean, there is a woman, working in Ramallah, living in Ramallah, she can live her life in Ramallah, [...] going hanging out, have friends. But when she leaves Ramallah, start to pass the first checkpoint Antara, she can feel the occupation, [...] the settlements around. So yes, of course the wall influenced the social life of the families” (Interview 6).

With reference to a criminal case (463/09) in March 2009 Judge Nehama Netzer of the Kiryat Gat Magistrate’s Court wrote: *“It is time the State of Israel realizes that no punishment, regardless of its severity, will cause Palestinian Authority residents to stop seeing Israel as their first, if not main, source of work and livelihood”* (Machsom Watch

2010:20). This statement shows the significance of Israel for the people in Tulkarm as a working place. The salary in Israel is much higher. A lot of the people polled in the questionnaire complained about the impact of the Separation Barrier in terms of freedom of movement, visiting families and friends, swimming in the sea, but mainly of the reduced working opportunities in Israel. The PA is still unable to eliminate corruption and to build up a sustainable working environment for Palestinians. Nazlat Isa and Jubara, examples used in this thesis, clearly show the negative impact of the Separation Barrier in economic and cultural terms. Tulkarm lies in the periphery of the oPt due to its geographic and economic situation. Talal Dweikat points out the strength of the Tulkarm area for the future of the oPt as follows:

“Most of the rich and the business people were abroad, [...] we will work on that, because it would be a good investment for Palestinian people to come back to improve the situation [...]. I think Tulkarm Area is very important for a Palestinian State...[...]We are rich in land, we are rich in water, we are rich in educated people. All this figures are important for a future Palestinian state [...]” (Interview 1).

The analysis for the Deir Al-Ghusun gate showed that one reason for the decline in border crossings is due to the fact that more applications for permissions are being rejected and the numbers of applications are also decreasing. A decline in numbers for the year 2009 has been monitored. The stricter permission system as well as the bad harvest influenced the number in a negative way. My hypothesis that the number of border crossings of farmers, women and children at the Deir Al-Ghusun gate has tended to decrease since 2007 has proved to be right. The hypothesis that the so called “normalization” process is one key factor that the permission system at agricultural gates is widely accepted and that it also has a huge negative impact on the income of the farmers could not be proved in this thesis.

However, the term “normalization” was used on a frequent basis by the interviewees and seems to play a significant role in accepting the general situation of the occupation. The farmers complained about the permission system, but did not see an opportunity to be able to change the situation on a sustainable basis (Interview 9). Yehuda Shaul from Breaking the Silence pointed out an important aspect of the phenomenon of “normalization” when asked if the actual concrete wall or the fence make a difference in

the way the soldiers see the occupation when they go to work in the West Bank:

“I don’t think so. [...] I think, what really really impacts the way soldier think and see things, is the fact that the security situation is calm. And, the fact they don’t have political perspective on things, so they actually see the status quo as something that was there ever and is going to be forever. [...] And that is different than like you know, when I go to Hebron now and I see people like leftwing soldier who serve their; and it is difficult for them to understand what’s the problem. But in my time it was very easy to see what the problem was. And it that sense, I think more soldiers came out from Cast Lead with bad feeling of their behavior than from a regular tour [...] of Hebron. So it’s like Normalization? Yeah, that’s what impacts. It is only the peaks. When your normal life is shaped, that you start to asked question sand thinks seem to start wrong. I think in the long run Cast Lead would be like what Operation Defensive Shield was for my generation. The peak of 2002 for my generation was, the one thing that was to understand was, we are not the victims, and I think for this generation of soldiers it is Cast Lead. Slowly slowly you see it. I am not saying you see it in terms of 80 percent of the military thinks this way, I am saying it is 5 percent of the military thinks this way, that would be their turning point [...]. When things change slowly slowly, it doesn’t seem like they are changing, you need this [...], down the cliff, to reunderstand, that something is different, something is moving, we are in a different reality. What I thought till now needs to be rethought” (Interview 3).

But the environmental challenges arising in the Tulkarm Governorate tied to the political tense situation and the socio-economic situation also present opportunities for joint projects like an olive mill or waste disposal in the municipality of Tulkarm and in Emek Hefer in Israel. Both sites are affected by the consequences of the waste problem as the Mountain Aquifer is a trans-boundary resource.

Consequently, cooperation could not only help to solve the environmental issues in a more sustainable way, but could also contribute to a better cross-border understanding between the Palestinians and the Israelis. A “Pro-Aquifer” project in Tulkarm and in Umm el Fahem, supported joint training and study tours to create common knowledge concerning sewage treatment, GIS and a network. The creation of awareness and new jobs in the field of environment are just other positive aspects of the joint projects (HRE 2008:29).

Seen from a Palestinian view the Israeli Government still uses both the threat scenario as well as the constant emphasis on the threatening anti-Semitism to secure the almost unconditional support of the USA and the countries of Europe. *“Dabei wird nicht bedacht, dass Israels Regierungspolitik an sich, auch ohne Bezug zum Judentum, Anstoß erregen kann”* (Maier 2011:15).

Seen from an Israeli perspective the PA seems to be totally overwhelmed by the current situation in the West Bank. The idea of using History as a tool to learn for the future - for a long- lasting peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, needs to be taken up by both sides, the citizens of Israel as well as the Palestinian people.

The effects of the ceasefire which ended the “Operation Pillar of Defense” and the upgrade to a non-member observer state at the UN will bring new developments in the deadlocked peace process.

“If you think you are too small to make a difference, try sleeping in a closed room with a mosquito”
(Old African Proverb)

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Appendix

Data matrix Deir Al-Ghusun

T = Total
M = Men
W = Women
C = Children
CW = Calender week

Date	CW	year	T	M	W	C
31.10.07	44	2007	103	89	14	0
07.11.07	45	2007	95	89	6	0
27.11.07	48	2007	87	77	6	4
05.12.07	49	2007	60	55	5	0
11.12.07	50	2007	79	70	7	2
23.12.07	51	2007	59	51	7	1
27.12.07	52	2007	55	52	3	0
04.01.08	1	2008	35	31	2	2
09.01.08	2	2008	73	69	4	0
16.01.08	3	2008	71	67	4	0
06.02.01	6	2008	63	60	3	0
12.02.08	7	2008	60	56	4	0
05.03.08	10	2008	70	65	5	0
12.03.08	11	2008	67	61	6	0
20.03.08	12	2008	69	56	13	0
26.03.08	13	2008	77	69	7	1
02.04.08	14	2008	59	52	7	0
14.04.08	16	2008	62	56	6	0
30.04.08	18	2008	55	49	6	0
12.05.08	20	2008	43	35	7	1
19.05.08	21	2008	46	42	4	0
26.05.08	22	2008	48	45	3	0
04.06.08	23	2008	44	40	3	1
18.06.08	25	2008	46	41	5	0
02.07.08	27	2008	64	54	9	1
08.07.08	28	2008	65	56	7	2
14.07.08	29	2008	75	63	7	5
26.09.08	37	2008	58	56	0	2
13.09.08	38	2008	67	67	0	0
20.09.08	39	2008	54	54	0	0
27.09.08	40	2008	92	80	11	2
04.10.08	41	2008	149	104	32	13
11.10.08	42	2008	151	107	23	21
17.10.08	43	2008	185	119	33	33
25.10.08	44	2008	126	108	17	1

29.10.08	45	2008	140	104	16	20
01.11.08	46	2008	98	84	8	6
08.11.08	47	2008	77	60	4	13
22.11.08	49	2008	80	69	10	1
06.12.08	50	2008	60	56	1	3
13.12.08	52	2008	57	54	2	1
27.12.08	1	2009	34	31	2	1
03.01.09	2	2009	34	33	0	1
11.01.09	3	2009	42	37	4	1
24.01.09	4	2009	28	26	1	1
14.03.09	11	2009	33	31	1	2
21.03.08	12	2009	33	31	1	1
28.03.09	14	2009	56	55	0	1
11.04.09	15	2009	33	31	1	1
18.04.09	16	2009	42	37	2	3
25.04.09	17	2009	37	35	1	1
02.05.09	18	2009	26	26	0	0
09.05.09	19	2009	45	44	1	0
16.05.09	20	2009	34	3	1	0
30.05.09	22	2009	52	44	6	2
06.06.09	23	2009	61	53	6	2
11.06.09	24	2009	47	47	0	0
20.06.09	25	2009	55	50	4	1
25.06.09	26	2009	43	42	0	1
22.08.09	34	2009	20	18	0	2
29.08.09	35	2009	36	33	1	2
05.09.09	36	2009	19	19	0	0
12.09.09	37	2009	34	34	0	0
19.09.09	38	2009	16	16	0	0
03.10.09	40	2009	71	52	11	8
10.10.09	41	2009	70	61	1	8
17.10.09	42	2009	47	40	2	5
24.10.09	43	2009	60	52	5	3
31.10.09	44	2009	7	7	0	0
07.11.09	45	2009	57	51	3	3
14.11.09	46	2009	41	34	3	4
19.11.09	47	2009	52	52	0	0
26.11.09	48	2009	17	17	0	0
05.12.09	49	2009	39	38	0	1
26.12.09	52	2009	27	27	0	0
02.01.10	53	2010	23	23	0	0
09.01.10	1	2010	18	18	0	0
23.01.10	3	2010	29	25	4	0
30.01.10	4	2010	17	17	0	0
06.02.10	5	2010	12	11	0	1
13.02.10	6	2010	34	31	2	1
27.02.10	8	2010	3	3	0	0
06.03.10	9	2010	27	24	0	3
13.03.10	10	2010	27	25	2	0
20.03.10	11	2010	28	26	2	0

03.04.10	13	2010	26	26	0	0
10.04.10	14	2010	27	24	3	0
18.04.10	15	2010	17	15	1	1
22.04.10	16	2010	29	26	3	0
29.04.10	17	2010	23	20	3	0
15.05.10	19	2010	19	16	1	2
29.05.10	21	2010	23	23	0	0
05.06.10	22	2010	20	20	0	0
14.08.10	32	2010	29	27	0	2
21.08.10	33	2010	23	22	0	1
27.08.10	34	2010	24	21	1	2
08.09.10	36	2010	18	17	0	1
13.09.10	37	2010	29	29	0	0
09.10.10	40	2010	111	71	23	17
16.10.10	41	2010	111	78	25	8
30.10.10	43	2010	95	78	15	2
06.11.10	44	2010	84	69	9	6
13.11.10	45	2010	79	70	2	7
20.11.10	46	2010	48	48	0	0
27.11.10	47	2010	75	68	2	5
04.12.10	48	2010	69	66	3	0
11.12.10	49	2010	36	25	1	0
15.12.10	50	2010	69	66	3	0
22.12.10	51	2010	61	56	5	0
31.12.10	52	2010	62	59	1	2
11.01.11	2	2011	35	35	0	0
22.01.11	3	2011	60	57	3	3
02.02.11	5	2011	47	46	1	0
08.02.11	6	2011	24	24	0	0
16.02.11	7	2011	33	33	0	0
26.02.11	8	2011	18	16	2	0
07.03.11	10	2011	46	45	1	0
16.03.11	11	2011	49	46	3	0
23.03.11	12	2011	31	31	0	0
28.03.11	13	2011	28	26	2	0
13.04.11	15	2011	43	41	2	0
19.04.11	16	2011	47	45	2	0
24.04.11	17	2011	43	41	2	0
03.05.11	18	2011	37	36	1	0
10.05.11	19	2011	34	32	2	0
12.07.11	28	2011	39	36	2	1
20.07.11	29	2011	41	39	2	0
02.08.11	31	2011	42	42	0	0
10.08.11	32	2011	43	40	1	2
24.08.11	34	2011	38	37	1	0
19.09.11	38	2011	52	50	2	0
08.10.11	40	2011	89	80	9	0
15.10.11	41	2011	104	84	17	3
22.10.11	42	2011	130			
29.10.11	43	2011	125	107	16	2

For the calendar week 42 2011 there is only total data available and not breakdown between men, women and children

Data calendar week: category total

	CW	Total	Month	Average/Month	n=135
2007	44	103	10	103,00	
	45	95	11		
	48	87	11	91,00	
	49	60	12		
	50	79	12		
	51	59	12		
	52	55	12	63,25	
2008	1	35	1		
	2	73	1		
	3	71	1	59,67	
	6	63	2		
	7	60	2	61,50	
	10	70	3		
	11	67	3		
	12	69	3		
	13	77	3	70,75	
	14	59	4		
	16	62	4		
	18	55	4	58,67	
	20	43	5		
	21	46	5		
	22	48	5	45,67	
	23	44	6		
	25	46	6	45,00	
	27	64	7		
	28	65	7		
	29	75	7	68,00	
	37	58	9		
	38	67	9		
	39	54	9	59,67	
	40	92	10		
	41	149	10		
	42	151	10		
	43	185	10		
	44	126	10	140,60	
	45	140	11		
	46	98	11		
	47	77	11	105,00	
	49	80	12		
	50	60	12		
	52	57	12	65,67	
2009	1	34	1		
	2	34	1		
	3	42	1		
	4	28	1	34,50	
	11	33	3		

2010	12	33	3	
	14	56	3	40,67
	15	33	4	
	16	42	4	
	17	37	4	37,33
	18	26	5	
	19	45	5	
	20	34	5	
	22	52	5	35,00
	23	61	6	
	24	47	6	
	25	55	6	
	26	43	6	51,50
	34	20	8	
	35	36	8	27,50
	36	19	9	
	37	34	9	
	38	16	9	23,00
	40	71	10	
	41	70	10	
	42	47	10	
	43	60	10	
	44	7	10	51,00
	45	57	11	
	46	41	11	
	47	52	11	
	48	17	11	41,75
	49	39	12	
	52	27	12	33,00
	53	23	1	
	1	18	1	
	3	29	1	
	4	17	1	21,75
	5	12	2	
	6	34	2	
	8	3	2	16,33
	9	27	3	
	10	27	3	
	11	28	3	27,33
	13	26	4	
	14	27	4	
	15	17	4	
	16	29	4	
	17	23	4	40,67
	19	19	5	
	21	23	5	21,00
	22	20	6	20,00
	32	29	8	
	33	23	8	
	34	24	8	25,33

2011	36	18	9	
	37	29	9	23,50
	40	111	10	
	41	111	10	
	43	95	10	105,67
	44	84	11	
	45	79	11	
	46	48	11	
	47	75	11	71,50
	48	69	12	
	49	36	12	
	50	69	12	
	51	61	12	
	52	62	12	59,40
	2	35	1	
	3	60	1	47,50
	5	47	2	
	6	24	2	
	7	33	2	
	8	18	2	30,50
	10	46	3	
	11	49	3	
	12	31	3	
	13	28	3	39,25
	15	43	4	
	16	47	4	
	17	43	4	44,33
	18	37	5	
	19	34	5	35,50
	28	39	7	
	29	41	7	40,00
	31	42	8	
	32	43	8	
	34	38	8	41,00
	38	52	9	52,00
	40	89	10	
	41	104	10	
	42	130	10	
	43	125	10	112,00

Note.: For CW 6 2008 were two different data available

Data calender week: category men

	CW	Men	Month	Average/Month	n=134
2007	44	89	10	89,00	
	45	89	11		
	48	77	11	83,00	
	49	55	12		
	50	70	12		

2008	51	51	12	
	52	52	12	57,00
	1	31	1	
	2	69	1	
	3	67	1	55,67
	6	60	2	
	7	56	2	58,00
	10	65	3	
	11	61	3	
	12	56	3	
	13	69	3	62,75
	14	52	4	
	16	56	4	
	18	49	4	52,33
	20	35	5	
	21	42	5	
	22	45	5	40,67
	23	40	6	
	25	41	6	40,50
	27	54	7	
	28	56	7	
	29	63	7	57,67
	37	56	9	
	38	67	9	
	39	54	9	59,00
	40	80	10	
	41	104	10	
	42	107	10	
	43	119	10	
	44	108	10	103,60
	45	104	11	
	46	84	11	
	47	60	11	82,67
	49	69	12	
	50	56	12	
	52	54	12	59,67
2009	1	31	1	
	2	33	1	
	3	37	1	
	4	26	1	31,75
	11	31	3	
	12	31	3	
	14	55	3	39,00
	15	31	4	
	16	37	4	
	17	35	4	34,30
	18	26	5	
	19	44	5	
	20	3	5	
	22	44	5	29,25

2010	23	53	6	
	24	47	6	
	25	50	6	
	26	42	6	48,00
	34	18	8	
	35	33	8	25,50
	36	19	9	
	37	34	9	
	38	16	9	23,00
	40	52	10	
	41	61	10	
	42	40	10	
	43	52	10	
	44	7	10	42,40
	45	51	11	
	46	34	11	
	47	52	11	
	48	17	11	38,50
	49	38	12	
	52	27	12	32,50
	53	23	1	
	1	18	1	
	3	25	1	
	4	17	1	20,75
	5	11	2	
	6	31	2	
	8	3	2	15,00
	9	24	3	
	10	25	3	
	11	26	3	25,00
	13	26	4	
	14	24	4	
	15	15	4	
	16	26	4	
	17	20	4	22,20
	19	16	5	
	21	23	5	19,50
	22	20	6	20,00
	32	27	8	
	33	22	8	
	34	21	8	23,33
	36	17	9	
	37	29	9	23,00
	40	71	10	
	41	78	10	
	43	78	10	75,67
	44	69	11	
	45	70	11	
	46	48	11	
	47	68	11	63,75

2011	48	66	12	
	49	25	12	
	50	66	12	
	51	56	12	
	52	59	12	54,40
	2	35	1	
	3	57	1	46,00
	5	46	2	
	6	24	2	
	7	33	2	
	8	16	2	29,75
	10	45	3	
	11	46	3	
	12	31	3	
	13	26	3	37,00
	15	41	4	
	16	45	4	
	17	41	4	42,33
	18	36	5	
	19	32	5	34,00
	28	36	7	
	29	39	7	37,50
	31	42	8	
	32	40	8	
	34	37	8	39,76
	38	50	9	50,00
	40	80	10	
	41	84	10	
	43	107	10	90,33

Data calender week: categorie women

	CW	Women	Month	Average/Month	n=134
2007	44	14	10	14,00	
	45	6	11		
	48	6	11	6,00	
	49	5	12		
	50	7	12		
	51	7	12		
	52	3	12	5,50	
2008	1	2	1		
	2	4	1		
	3	4	1	3,33	
	6	3	2		
	7	4	2	3,50	
	10	5	3		
	11	6	3		
	12	13	3		

2009	13	7	3	7,75
	14	7	4	
	16	6	4	
	18	6	4	6,33
	20	7	5	
	21	4	5	
	22	3	5	4,67
	23	3	6	
	25	5	6	4,00
	27	9	7	
	28	7	7	
	29	7	7	7,67
	37	0	9	
	38	0	9	
	39	0	9	0,00
	40	11	10	
	41	32	10	
	42	23	10	
	43	33	10	
	44	17	10	23,20
	45	16	11	
	46	8	11	
	47	4	11	9,33
	49	10	12	
	50	1	12	
	52	2	12	4,33
	1	2	1	
	2	0	1	
	3	4	1	
	4	1	1	1,75
	11	1	3	
	12	1	3	
	14	0	3	0,67
	15	1	4	
	16	2	4	
	17	1	4	1,33
	18	0	5	
	19	1	5	
	20	1	5	
	22	6	5	0,67
	23	6	6	
	24	0	6	
	25	4	6	
	26	0	6	2,50
	34	0	8	
	35	1	8	0,50
	36	0	9	
	37	0	9	
	38	0	9	0,00
	40	11	10	

2010	41	1	10	
	42	2	10	
	43	5	10	
	44	0	10	3,80
	45	3	11	
	46	3	11	
	47	0	11	
	48	0	11	9,33
	49	0	12	
	52	0	12	4,33
	53	0	1	
	1	0	1	
	3	4	1	
	4	0	1	1,00
	5	0	2	
	6	2	2	
	8	0	2	0,67
	9	0	3	
	10	2	3	
	11	2	3	1,33
	13	0	4	
	14	3	4	
	15	1	4	
	16	3	4	
	17	3	4	2,00
	19	1	5	
	21	0	5	0,50
	22	0	6	0,00
	32	0	8	
	33	0	8	
	34	1	8	0,33
	36	0	9	
	37	0	9	0,00
	40	23	10	
	41	25	10	
	43	15	10	20,33
	44	9	11	
	45	2	11	
	46	0	11	
	47	2	11	3,25
	48	3	12	
	49	1	12	
	50	3	12	
	51	5	12	
	52	1	12	2,60
2011	2	0	1	
	3	3	1	1,50
	5	1	2	
	6	0	2	
	7	0	2	

8	2	2	0,75
10	1	3	
11	3	3	
12	0	3	
13	2	3	1,33
15	2	4	
16	2	4	
17	2	4	2,00
18	1	5	
19	2	5	1,50
28	2	7	
29	2	7	2,00
31	0	8	
32	1	8	
34	1	8	0,67
38	2	9	2,00
40	9	10	
41	17	10	
43	16	10	14,00

Data calender week: categorie children

	CW	Children	Month	Average/Month	n=134
2007	44	0	10	0,00	
	45	0	11		
	48	4	11	2,00	
	49	0	12		
	50	2	12		
	51	1	12		
	52	0	12	0,75	
2008	1	2	1		
	2	0	1		
	3	0	1	0,67	
	6	0	2		
	7	0	2	0,00	
	10	0	3		
	11	0	3		
	12	0	3		
	13	1	3	0,25	
	14	0	4		
	16	0	4		
	18	0	4	0,00	
	20	1	5		
	21	0	5		
	22	0	5	0,33	
	23	1	6		
	25	0	6	0,50	

2009	27	1	7	
	28	2	7	
	29	5	7	2,67
	37	2	9	
	38	0	9	
	39	0	9	0,67
	40	2	10	
	41	13	10	
	42	21	10	
	43	33	10	
	44	1	10	23,33
	45	20	11	
	46	6	11	
	47	13	11	13,00
	49	1	12	
	50	3	12	
	52	1	12	1,67
	1	1	1	
	2	1	1	
	3	1	1	
	4	1	1	1,00
	11	2	3	
	12	1	3	
	14	1	3	1,33
	15	1	4	
	16	3	4	
	17	1	4	1,67
	18	0	5	
	19	0	5	
	20	0	5	
	22	2	5	0,25
	23	2	6	
	24	0	6	
	25	1	6	
	26	1	6	1,00
	34	2	8	
	35	2	8	2,00
	36	0	9	
	37	0	9	
	38	0	9	0,00
	40	8	10	
	41	8	10	
	42	5	10	
	43	3	10	
	44	0	10	4,80
	45	3	11	
	46	4	11	
	47	0	11	
	48	0	11	1,75
	49	1	12	

2010	52	0	12	0,50
	53	0	1	
	1	0	1	
	3	0	1	
	4	0	1	0,00
	5	1	2	
	6	1	2	
	8	0	2	0,67
	9	3	3	
	10	0	3	
	11	0	3	1,00
	13	0	4	
	14	0	4	
	15	1	4	
	16	0	4	
	17	0	4	0,20
	19	2	5	
	21	0	5	1,00
	22	0	6	0,00
	32	2	8	
	33	1	8	
	34	2	8	1,67
	36	1	9	
	37	0	9	0,50
	40	17	10	
	41	8	10	
	43	2	10	10,67
	44	6	11	
	45	7	11	
	46	0	11	
	47	5	11	4,50
	48	0	12	
	49	0	12	
	50	0	12	
	51	0	12	
	52	2	12	0,40
2011	2	0	1	
	3	3	1	1,50
	5	0	2	
	6	0	2	
	7	0	2	
	8	0	2	0,00
	10	0	3	
	11	0	3	
	12	0	3	
	13	0	3	0,00
	15	0	4	
	16	0	4	
	17	0	4	0,00
	18	0	5	

19	0	5	0,00
28	1	7	
29	0	7	0,50
31	0	8	
32	2	8	
34	0	8	0,67
38	0	9	0,00
40	0	10	
41	3	10	
43	2	10	1,67

Average month tabular form

Border crossings Total Deir al Ghusun (2007-2011)					
Month	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
January		59,67	34,50	21,75	47,50
February		61,50	37,59	16,33	30,50
March		70,75	40,67	27,33	39,25
April		58,67	37,33	40,67	44,33
May		45,67	35,00	21,00	35,50
June		45,00	51,50	20,00	37,75
July		68,00	39,50	22,66	40,00
August		63,84	27,50	25,33	41,00
September		59,67	23,00	23,50	52,00
October	103,00	140,60	51,00	105,67	112,00
November	91,00	105,00	41,75	71,50	
December	63,25	65,67	33,00	59,40	

CW 42 2011 data deleted due to missing individual data for the categories M, W,C

08/08 arithmetic average from 07/08 and 09/08

02/09 arithmetic average from 01/09 and 03/09

07/09 arithmetic average from 06/09 and 08/09

07/10 arithmetic average from 06/10 and 08/10

06/11 arithmetic average from 05/11 and 07/11

Border crossings Men Deir al Ghusun (2007-2011)					
Month	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
January		55,67	31,75	20,75	46,00
February		58,00	35,38	15,00	29,75
March		62,75	39,00	25,00	37,00
April		52,33	34,30	22,20	42,33
May		40,66	29,25	19,50	34,00
June		40,50	48,00	20,00	35,75
July		57,67	36,75	21,66	37,50
August		58,34	25,50	23,33	39,67
September		59,00	23,00	23,00	50,00
October	89,00	103,60	42,40	75,67	90,33
November	83,00	82,67	38,50	63,75	

December	57,00	59,67	32,50	54,40	
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CW 42 2011 data deleted due to missing individual data for the categories M, W,C

08/08 arithmetic average from 07/08 und 09/08

02/09 arithmetic average from 01/09 und 03/09

07/09 arithmetic average from 06/09 und 08/11

07/10 arithmetic average from 06/10 und 08/10

06/11 arithmetic average from 05/11 und 07/11

Border Crossings Women Deir al Ghusun (2007-2011)					
Month	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
January		3,33	1,75	1,00	1,50
February		3,50	1,21	0,67	0,75
March		7,75	0,67	1,33	1,33
April		6,33	1,33	2,00	2,00
May		4,67	0,67	0,50	1,50
June		4,00	2,50	0,00	1,75
July		7,67	1,50	0,17	2,00
August		3,83	0,50	0,33	0,67
September		0,00	0,00	0,00	2,00
October	14,00	23,20	3,80	20,33	14,00
November	6,00	9,33	9,33	3,25	
December	5,50	4,33	4,33	2,60	

CW 42 2011 data deleted due to missing individual data for the categories M, W,C

08/08 arithmetic average from 07/08 and 09/08

02/09 arithmetic average from 01/09 and 03/09

07/09 arithmetic average from 06/09 and 08/09

06/11 arithmetic average from 05/11 and 07/11

Border Crossings Children Deir al Ghusun (2007-2011)					
Month	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
January		0,67	1,00	0,00	1,50
February		0,00	1,17	0,67	0,00
March		0,25	1,33	1,00	0,00
April		0,00	1,67	0,20	0,00
May		0,33	0,25	1,00	0,00
June		0,50	1,00	0,00	0,25
July		2,67	1,50	0,83	0,50
August		1,67	2,00	1,67	0,67
September		0,67	0,00	0,50	0,00
October	0,00	23,33	4,80	10,67	1,67

November	2,00	13,00	1,75	4,50	
December	0,75	1,67	0,50	0,40	

CW 42 2011 data deleted due to missing individual data for the categories M, W,C

08/08 arithmetic average from 07/08 and 09/08

02/09 arithmetic average from 01/09 and 03/09

07/09 arithmetic average from 06/09 and 08/09

07/10 arithmetic average from 06/10 and 08/10

06/11 arithmetic average from 05/11 and 07/11

تعبئة الطلب الموجود يساعد الطالبة بيتينا من التماسا في دراستها للحصول على درجة الماجستير. والهدف من المعلومات هو معرفة الفرق بين ماضي الشباب وحاضرهم ضمن التعبيرات الحادثة منذ بناء الجدار الفاصل

1. العمر
 2. الجنس
انثى ذكر
 3. مكان الولادة
 4. منذ متى وانت تسكن في
شويكة عتيل شوفة طولكرم
 5. كم عدد الافراد الذين يعيشون في بيتك?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 أكثر
 6. كم عدد الاولاد عندك?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 أكثر
 7. اذا كنت تدرس بالجامعة او لديك اولاد يدرسون؟ كم التكلفة اليومية للذهاب الى الجامعة؟
 8. هل انت متزوج؟
 9. اذا كانت الاجابة نعم في أي سنة تزوجت؟
- التعليم**
10. ما هو تحصيلك العلمي?
المرحلة الابتدائية المرحلة الثانوية خريج جامعي
 11. ما هو مجالك المهني؟
 12. الى أي مدرسة/جامعة تذهب؟ في أي سنة انهيت الدراسة؟
- العمل**
13. كم عدد الافراد في اسرتك لديهم دخل شهري?
0 1 2 3 4 5 أكثر
 14. كم هو الراتب الشهري للعائلة؟
 15. هل تعمل
دوام كامل دوام جزئي دوام متقطع لا شيء عمل خاص
 16. اذا كانت الاجابة نعم فما هو مجالك المهني?
الضفة الغربية اسرائيل منطقة التماس
 17. كم من الوقت يستغرق وصولك الى العمل?
10 دقائق 30-10 دقيقة 60-30 دقيقة 2-1 ساعة 3-2 ساعة 4-3 ساعة 6-4 ساعة ساعات أكثر من ذلك
 18. كم من الوقت يستغرق رجوعك من العمل?
10 دقائق 30-10 دقيقة 60-30 دقيقة 2-1 ساعة 3-2 ساعة 4-3 ساعة 6-4 ساعة ساعات أكثر من ذلك
 19. هل تعود من العمل كل مساء؟
نعم لا
 20. في أي وقت تخرج للعمل صباحا?
2 صباحا 3 صباحا 4 صباحا 5 صباحا 6 صباحا 7 صباحا 8 صباحا 9 صباحا 10 صباحا بعد ذلك

21. أهو طريق مغلق (أو بوابة عسكرية) للذهاب إلى عملك؟ هل تمر أو تقطع أي حاجز نعم لا
إذا كانت الإجابة نعم، أين؟
بوابة عتيل بوابة دير الغصون حاجز الطليبة طريق شوفة المغلقة أماكن أخرى
22. كيف تذهب للعمل؟
مشياً سيارات السرفيس سيارات الإجرة (تاكسي) سيارتك الخاصة التراكثور مع العربة شراطة
هوائية الحصان الحمار
23. إذا كنت تستخدم وسائل النقل العام، كم يكلفك الذهاب إلى العمل؟
10 شواقل 20 إلى 30 شيقل 30 إلى 40 شيقل 40 إلى 50 شيقل أكثر من ذلك لا يكلفني شيء
24. إذا كنت تستخدم وسائل النقل العامة، كم من الوقت يستغرق وصولك إلى مجمع الكراجات؟
5 دقائق من 5 إلى 10 دقائق من 10 إلى 20 دقيقة من 20 إلى 30 دقيقة أكثر من ذلك
25. هل الجدار الفاصل له أي تأثير على عملك؟ نعم لا
وضح أو اشرح إذا كانت الإجابة نعم أو لا؟
26. هل قمت بتغيير مجالك المهني بسبب تأثير الانتفاضة الثانية وبناء الجدار العازل؟ نعم لا
إذا كانت الإجابة نعم...كيف؟

التسوق

27. أين تذهب للتسوق؟
شويكة شوفة عزية شوفة مدينة طولكرم في مناطق أخرى
28. كم من الوقت يستغرق منك الذهاب إلى التسوق؟
5 دقائق من 5 إلى 10 دقائق من 10 إلى 20 دقيقة من 20 إلى 30 دقيقة أكثر من ذلك
29. هل تمر أو تقطع أي طريق مغلق أو أية بوابة أو أي حاجز عسكري نعم لا
30. هل يمكنك الذهاب للتسوق بسيارتك الخاصة؟ نعم لا

المسحة

31. أين يسكن طبيبك؟
32. كم من الوقت يستغرق منك الوصول إلى الطبيب؟
5 دقائق من 5 إلى 10 دقائق من 10 إلى 20 دقيقة من 20 إلى 30 دقيقة أكثر من ذلك
33. أين أقرب مستشفى من مكان سكنك؟
34. كم من الوقت يستغرق منك الوصول إلى المستشفى؟
5 دقائق من 5 إلى 10 دقائق من 10 إلى 20 دقيقة من 20 إلى 30 دقيقة أكثر من ذلك

الحياة الاجتماعية والثقافية

36. ماذا تعمل في أوقات الفراغ؟

37. أين تقضي أوقات فراغك؟

نعم لا

38. هل تذهب الى المطاعم؟

اذا كانت الاجابة نعم, اين تذهب؟

كم من المرات ؟

39. هل تمر او تقطع أي بوابات او أي طرق مغلق او أية حواجز عسكرية للوصول الى المطعم؟ نعم لا

40. هل انت قادر على عمل شئ معين قبل الانتفاضة الثانية والآن وبعد الانتفاضة انت لا يمكنك عمل نفس الشئ

اذا كانت الاجابة نعم, هل يمكن التوضيح كيف؟

Part 1/ Page1/ Questionnaire Data Matrix

Nr	Age	Gender	Place of birth	Year of residents	Place of residents	Members of Family	Members of Household	Spending on transportation for the family in NIS/daily	Family status	Year of marriage	Education
1	28	1	0		0	7	0				1
2	53	1	0/3		0	6	9	10	1	1983	1
3	26	1	3		3	10	0		1		2
4	40	1			3	5	3		1	1998	2
5	20	1	0		0	8	4	0	0	1995	1
6	52	1	3		3	5	3	10	1	1989	1
7	23	0	3		3	10	0				2
8	55	1			3	11	5	20	1		
9	48	1			1	8	8		1	1983	0
10	47	1				8	8	3		1986	0
11	28	1				9	0				
12	52	1		1996	3	5	5		1		2
13	42	1	3		0	7	5	70	1	1989	1
14	53	1	0		0	9	5	120	1	1985	2
15	50	1			3	6	4		1	1999	2
16	55	1	0		0	4	4	20	1	1980	1
17	44	1			3	7	5	60	1	1997	1
18	52	0			0	8	6	30	1	1989	1
19	45	1		1967	0	6	4		1	1996	1
20	57	1	3		3	5	3		1	1980	0
21		0			3	2	0	0	0		2
22	33	0	6		3	6	4		1	1998	2
23	32	0				7	8	30	0		1
24	29	1				4	2		1	2006	1
25	30	1				3	0		1		1
26	37	1				7	5		1	1996	1
27	47	1				6	4	70	1	1990	2
28	37	1				5	4	0	1	2001	1
29	59	1				5	3	0	1	1962	2
30	19	0							0		2

31	53	1				5	5	40	1	1987	1
32	52	1				6	4	0	1	1990	1
33	33	1				7	5	15	1	1998	1
34	45	1				8	6	30	1	1990	0
35	23	1				4	5	0	0		2
36	23	1				11	0	25	0		2
37	13	0				9		0			0
38	32	1				6	2		1	2008	2
39	45	1				6	4		1	1994	2
40		0				10	6	40	1	1985	1
41	50	1				10	8	20	1	1986	1
42	20	1				10		60	0		2
43	58	1				5	5	100	1	1982	1
44	27	0				3	1		1	2009	2
45	51	1				6	4		1	1991	1
46	23	1				5	0	50	0		2
47	53	1	3		3	5	3		1	1972	2
48	47	1			3	5	3	35	1	1990	1
49	23	1	3		1	10	0	38	0		2
50		0			3	10	0	30	0		2
51	25	0	3		0	6	0	0	1	2011	2
52	31	0	8		1	4	3	0	1		2
53	28	1	5		11	5	3		1	2006	2
54	56	0	7		3	5	3	34	0		2
55	25	1	5		12	5	0	35	0		2
56	50	1	6		3	7	0	100		1979	1
57	34	1	3		3	0	9	1	1		2
58	40	1	7		10	6	4		1	2000	2
59	52	1	2		2	7	5		1	1994	1
60	43	1	9		10	7	4		1	1998	2
61	39	1	3		2	7	4	15	1	1979	1
62		1	2		2	4	2	40		1970	
63	44	0	1		1	12	10	70	1	1990	2
64		1			3	2	0		1	2011	2
65	23	1			3	8		5			2
66	39	1	6		6	6	3		1	2005	1

67	35	1	1		1	6	3		1	2006	1
68	28	1			1	14	4		1	2003	0
69	36	1	1		1	>14	5	0	1	1997	2
70	29	1	1		1	2			1	2011	0
71	38	1				2			1	1999	1
72	46	1	0,1		1	14	4		1	2000	1
73	37	1	2		2	7	4	20	1	1990	1
74	58	1	3		2	13	3	90			0
75		1	3		3	4	4	0	1	1999	2
76	17	0	3		2	4	4		0		0
77	60	1	6		6	9			1	1962	0
78	25	1			1	10	1		1	2007	1
79	49	1			0	7	2	50		1983	1
80	68	0	4		4	6	2		2		2
81	59	1	4		4	6	4	25	1	1979	2
82	68	1	4		4	6	4		1	1971	1
83	23	1	3		0	4	2	20	1	2004	1
84	46	1	4		4	6	4	50	1	1990	2
85	52	1	0		0	6	4	40	1	1989	1
86	55	1			1	3	0		1	84	2
87		1			3	5	3		1	2001	1
88	34	1			3	5	3		1	2005	2
89	31	1	5		5	4	2	0	0		0
90		1			3	4	2		1	2007	2
91		1			10	3	1		1	2009	2
92		0			10	5	3	x	1	2005	2
93	55	1	3		0	5	3		1	1977	2
94	45	0	3		3	7	5		1	1991	2
95	31	1	0		0	7	5		1	2007	2
96	20	1	13		0	4	3		1	1971	1
97	62	1	3		4	6	9				2
98	45	1			1	6			1	1990	2
99	50	1	?			14	12	100	1	1985	1
100	33	1	3		0	5	3		1	2005	2
101	40	0			10	3	0		0		2
102	46	1			0	5	1	1	1	1995	2

103	53	1	14		0	1	2	70	1	1996	1
104	20	1	1		1	1	2		1	199?	
105	25	0	0		0	5	3		1	2005	1
106	46	1	3	1980	3	5	3	80	1	1992	2
107	19	1	3		1	0	0		0		2
108	22	0	6		6	0	0				2
109	50	1			3	8		60	1	1982	0
110	45	1	0		1	10	8	100	1	1996	0
111	23	0			1	9	7	0	1	2007	1
112	26	0	0		0	3	1		1	1999	1
113	32	0	7		3	6	4		1	2000	2
114	33	0	3		3	4	2		1	1999	2
115	52	1	4		4	8	6	50	1	1984	0
116	39	1	3		3	6	4	0	1	2003	1
117	62	1	3		3	10	4	30	1	1976	2
118	45	1	3		3	10	4		1	1994	2
119	48	0	3		3	3	0		0		2
120	60	1	2		2	8	6	20	1	1975	1
121		1	3		2	9					0
122	60	1	3		3	7	5	20	1	1976	1
123	50	1	3		3	10	5		1	1990	2
124	20	1	3		3		0		0		1
125	43	1	3		3	7	5	5	1	1992	2
126	43	1			3	8	5				1
127	20	1	3		3	7			0		1
128	19	1	7	2011	3	6	0		0		1
129	52	1			3	8	3				1
130	53	1	0		0	8	2	80	1	1985	2
131	56	1	6		6	5	1	30	1	1974	0
132	50	1	6		6	6		50	1	1990	1
133	38	1	3		3	8	8	40	1	1990	1
134	35	1			1	4	3		1	2001	2
135	70	1	0		0	12	3	20	1	1975	1
136	48	1	3		3	12	3	20	1	1988	1
137	28	1	3		0	8	4	10	1	1991	1

138	61	1	4		4	9	5	100	1	1972	2
139	29	1	8		0	>14	9		1	2004	1
140	46	1		1980	15	4	2	o	1	1990	1
141	31	1	3		3	4	2		1	2007	2
142	58	1	4		4	7	7	30	1	1979	1
143	69	1	0		0	8	3	0	1	1969	1
144	26	0	0		0	6	4	0	1	2000	1
145	54	1	0		0	7	5	25	1	1987	2
146	61	1	4		4	7	5	0	1	1976	1
147	36	1	3		0	6	4	0	1	2000	2
148	70	1	3		3		4	30	1	1970	2
149	31	0			0	2	4		1		1
150	54	1				9	6	20	1	1979	0
151	61	0	4		4	10	8				
152	22	1			3	8			0		2
153	62	0			1	8	3		0		

Part 2/Page 1/Questionnaire Data Matrix

Place of graduation	Date of graduation	Members of family with Income	Monthly salary for family	Field of profession	Place of Work	Travel time to work	Travel time from work	Return to home daily	Time
		3	15	2	0	2	2	1	4
			1000		0			1	5
	2006	0		3	0	0	0	1	7
			2000	2	0	0	0	1	5
		2	2500						
	1989	1	300	16	0	0	0	1	6
	2011	2	2000	11	0	1	1	1	9
			1500	26	0	0	0	1	6
		1	1600	23					
		1	2000	27				1	5
	2002	2	1800	28		0	0	1	6
		2	5000	20	0	0	0	1	5
School of Shweika	1987	1	5000	24	0	0	0	1	5
	1985	1	2000	1	2	1	2	0	3
	1990	2	2000	16	0	0	0	1	5
	1974	1	2000	2	0	1	1	1	3

	1986	0	2500		2	2	2	1	3
Literature School	1988	0				3	3	0	5
		1	2000	3	0			1	6
	1971	3	900	3	0	0		1	8
	2003	2	3000	15	0	0	0	1	6
	1991	2	1000	11	0	0	0	1	7
		0	1500	19	0		4	1	2
	1998			2	0	0	0	1	5
School of Shweika		3	2000	2	0	1	0	1	6
	1991	0	2600	16	0	3	0	0	0
		1	4000	15	0	2	3	1	7
School of Shuhan	1993	0	2800		1	6	4	0	2
	1982	0	3000	3	0	0	0		7
		1	1700			0	0	0	6
	1972	0	1500	1	2	2	3	1	2
		0	1500	1	2	1		1	3
		0	1800	23	0	1	1	1	4
			2200	1	2	4	4	1	2
		1	2000						
	2011	1	2500	6	1	6	5	1	1
		1	2000						
	2006		2300	8	0	1	1	0	5
	1991	1	2500	29	0	1	1	1	5
	1982	0	2000	1	0	2	2	1	4
	1978	1	3000	6	0	3	4	1	1
Arabic American University Jenin		3	3000			2	2	1	4
	1969	1	3000	5					
		1	not stable	8	0	0	0	0	6
		0	2000	25	0	0	0	1	1
	1979	2	3500	9	0	0	0	1	7
Louisiana/US	1982	3	3000	8	0	0	0	1	7
		1	2500		2	2	3	1	3
University of Najjar	2011	2	2300		1	6	5	0	1
Nablus	2011	1	2700						
Technical Palestinian University	2009	2	2500	21	0	1	1	1	6
Al Quds University	2010	2	0		0	1	1	0	5
Technical University Tulkarm	2006	0	3200	8	0	1	1	1	5
Najar University		2	5000	2	0	1	2	1	5
Najar University		3	5000	21	0	3	3	1	4
	1975	4	2500	20	2	2	3	0	2
Najar University		1	2500			1	1	1	5
Jamurk	1994	2	5800	8	2	1	1	1	5
		0	1000	7	1	4	4	1	1
		0	2800		2	1	2	1	4

Al Quds University		1		7	2	2	2	1	4
		1	2500		0	1	2	1	3
	2005	1	2500						
Al Quds University	2012	0	3000	5	0	0	0	1	6
Khadoury	2010	1	2000	7	0	1	0	1	5
	1990	0	2000	1	0/2	2	2	1	2
				28	0	1	1	1	4
	1996	0	2100	16		1	1	0	6
	2001	none	2400			1	1	0	5
		0			0	2	2	1	3
		0	1500		0	0	0	1	2
		0		1	0	2	3	1	3
	1993	1	2000		0	3	3	1	2
	1970	1	2000	2	0		1	1	0
University of Bethlehem		2	6000		0	0	0	1	5
Shufa School		1	3500	0					
	1959	1		1	0	1	7	1	5
	1981	0		2	0	0	0	0	5
		3			2	1	1	1	5
Beirut University	1975	2	1000	3	0	6	6		7
	1962	5	11700	9	0	0	0	1	6
		2	2500	2	0	0	0	1	5
	1985	1	2000	9	0	0	0	1	6
	1985	1	1800		0	0	0	1	5
	1979	1	3300	8	0	0	0	1	5
	1996	1	2000	13	0	2	2	1	6
Al Quds University	2008	1	4000	8	0	1	1	1	5
		3	1000		1	1	1	1	4
Kafr Sur	2004	2	5000	8	0	1	1	1	5
Kafr Sur	2001	1	2000		0	1	2	1	4
	1998		3000	8	0	0	0	1	5
	1975	1	2000	2	0	0	0	1	3
	1984	2	4800	9	0	1	1	1	6
	1998	0	1500-2000	2	0	1	1	1	5
					0	0	0	1	5
		3	6000		0	0	0	1	4
Kalil Institut		0	1500			0	0	1	4
	1981	2	8000	13	0	1	1	1	7
	1998	1	2000-2500			1	1	1	5
Al Quds University		1	1600	9	0	2	0		5
		1	1000-1500	9	0	0	0	1	6
	1985	3	1000	19	0	0	0	1	5
					0	1	1	1	3
Shweika School		1	2000						

	1987	0	2500	3	0	0	0	1	4
Al Quds University		0				0			
Khadoury	2010	1	1600	20	0	2	2	1	5
	1975	3	4000	3	0	2	2	1	2
	1976	1	2000-2500	2	0	0	0	1	5
	2005	0	2000		0				
	1985	0	2200	19	0	1	1	1	4
Bizeit University	2000	2	9000	15	0	0	0	1	6
An Najar University	2000	2	10000	15	0	0	0	1	5
	1979	1	2000	12	0	0	0	1	6
Shweika School	1986	1	3000		2	2	2	1	3
	1972	2	6000	3	0	0	0	1	5
		1	5000	3	0/1/2			1	5
	1982	0	700	3	0	0	0	1	6
		1	2500		0	2	2	1	4
Fatalila School			2000						
	1975	2	2600	3	0	1	1	1	7
		2	4500	15	0	3	3	1	5
Bizeit University		2	4500						
	1989	2	4000-4500	9	0	0	0	1	6
	1984	1	2000-2500	3	0	1	1	1	4
		1	1000		0	1	1	1	7
		1	5000		0	0	1	1	7
		1		21	0	2	2	1	5
	1980	1	2000	2	0	0	0	1	5
	1970	0	1000-1500	2	0	1	1	1	4
	1960	0	2000	0	0	0	1	u	5
	1971		1900	2	0	0	0	1	5
University of Jerusalem Abu Dies		0	3000	21	0	1	1	1	5
	1972	2	2000-4000						
	1981	0	6						
	1990	0	1500		0	0	7	1	5
	1976	2	1500	30		0	0	1	5
Shweika School	2001	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	5
	1982	1	3000-4000	3	0	0	0	1	6
	2003	1	2000		0	0	0	0	6
		2	10000	1	0	0	0	1	3
		2	2500	0	0	0	0	1	
	2000	1	2000						
	1981	1	2000	2	0	0	0	1	3
	1971	2	1000-1200	1	0	7	7	1	9
	1997	4	4500	2	0	0	0	1	5
				17	3	0	0	1	6
		3			0	2	1	1	5

	1969	2	2000		0	0	0	1	5
					0	0	0	1	1
	2008	4			0	0	0	1	1
		2			0	0	0	0	1

Nr	Obstacles on the way to work	Location of obstacle	Means of transport	Cost for public transport	Travel time to station	Impact of obstacle on work	Kind of impact	Influence of the Separation Barrier on the profession	Influence
1	0		1	3	0	1	4	0	
2			1						
3	0		3			0		0	
4	0								
5	0			0	0	0		0	
6	0			5		0		0	
7	0		2	0	1	0		0	
8	0		0			1		0	
9			1			1		0	
10			1			1	4	1	4
11	0	4	0	5	0	1		1	0
12	0		3			0		1	11
13	0		3	0	1	1	11	11	17
14	0		3	5		1	11	1	17
15	0		3			0	0	0	
16	0		3			1		1	
17									4
18				1		4		1	
19	1	4	4			1	4	1	0
20	0		0			1	8	0	
21									
22	0		0	5		0		0	
23				0					
24	0		3	5	4	1	4	1	17
25	0		2		1	1		1	
26	1		1	4	2	0			
27	1	4	1	2	3	1		0	
28	0		0,2	4	4	1	7	0	
29	0		0	5		0		0	
30	0		1	0	0			0	
31	1	0/1	0,4			1		1	
32	1	0	4						
33	0		0	5		1		0	
34	1	0	8	2	3	1		0	
35	0								
36	0		0,1	4	1	1	4,12	0	
37	1	3							

38	0		1	0	0	0		0	
39	0		2	1		0		0	
40	1	3	0,1	2	3	1	8	1	17
41	0	3	0,2	1	1	1	16	1	17
42	0			0	1	0		0	
43									
44	0		3	0	1	1	11		
45	0		0			0	0	0	
46	0		1	0	0	0		0	
47	0		3	0	0	0		1	17
48	1	1	0	5		1	4,14	1	17
49	0			0,1	4	4	1	1	0
50									
51	0	2	0	2	0	2		0	
52		0	3	2		1	7,12	1	17
53	1	4	1	0	0	0		1	17
54	0		1	0	3	0	0	0	
55	1	4	1,2	2	2	0	0	0	
56	1	1	9			1	11	1	7
57	1	4	2	1	0	0		0	
58	0		2	0		1	8	0	
59	1	2	2	3	3	1	8		1
60	0		2	1	2				
61	1	3	1	2	2			1	
62	1	3	2	2	3	1		1	
63									
64	0		0				0	1	12
65	1	4	1	4	4			1	11
66	1	0	4			1	7		
67	0		0			1	4	1	16
68	0		3	5	1	0		1	17
69	0		2	0	0	0	0	1	4
70	0		4			1	6	1	6
71	0		1	0	0	1	4	1	6
72	1	0	4			1	7		
73	1	3	4	3		1		1	4
74	0	3,4	1	3	3	1		1	4
75	0		3			1	12	0	
76	0								
77	0		2	0	3	0		0	
78	1	0	0	5		1	4	0	
79	0		3	5		1	4	1	
80	1	4	7	5		1	6	0	1
81	1	4	3	5	1	1	6,8	1	
82	0		0	5		0		0	
83	0		3	5		1		1	11
84	0		0			0		0	
85	0		3	5		1		1	
86	0		0			0		0	
87	1	2	2	0	4	1		1	

88	0		1	0	0	0		0	
89	0		1	1	0	0		0	
90	1	4	2	1	2	1		0	
91		4	2	0	2	1	6,1	0	
92	0		2	1	1	1		0	
93	0		2	5		1	4,12	1	17
94	0		1,2	0		1	11	0	
95	0		1			1	4	1	17
96	0		3	0	2	1		1	
97	0		2			1		1	
98	0		0	5	1	0		0	
99		4	3			1	4,11	0	
100				0	3	1			
101		4	1			1	7		
102	0		3			1	11	1	17,4
103	0	4	0	5	1	0		0	
104	0		0			1		1	
105									
106	0		2	0	0	0		0	
107	0		2	0	2				
108	0		1	0	2	0			0
109	1	1	2	3	2	1	11	0	
110	1	3	0	5	0	1	7	1	4
111	0					0		0	
112	0		0	5	0	1	11	0	
113	0		3			0		0	
114	0		3			0		1	7,17
115	0		0			0		1	4
116		4	8	5	3	1		1	11
117	0		0	5	0	1		1	12
118		4	3			1		1	12
119	0		3			1	11	1	11,17
120	1	3	8			1	11	1	6,11
121									
122	0		0			1		1	17
123	1	4	1	1	1	1	11	1	17
124									
125	0		1,2	0	1	1	11	1	17
126	1	2	0			1	6	1	6,17
127									
128	0			1					
129			1	1	2	1	7	1	
130	0		3			0		0	
131	0		1	1	3	1	4	1	17
132	0		1	5		1	12	1	4,17
133	0		2		1	1		1	17
134	0		1	0	1	0		1	17
135	0								
136	0		3	0	1			1	
137	0		1	1	3	1		0	

138	0		0	5	3	1		0	
139	0		1	5	1	1		1	
140	0		0						
141	0		3			0		0	
142	1	4	0	5	4	1		1	17
143	0					0		0	
144									
145	0		0			1		1	
146	0	4	0			1	6	3	
147			3	4		1	11	0	
148	0			3		0		1	11
149	0		2	0	1	1		1	
150	0		2	5	0	0		0	
151									
152	0		0	5		0			
153	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	

Part 2/ Page 2/ Questionnaire Data Matrix

Place of shopping	Travel time	Obstacles	Transportation with car	Place of health care	Travel time	Nearest Hospital	Travel Time	Free time activities	Place of free time activities
3	0	0	1	3	0	3	0	3	2
3	3		1	3	1	3	1	0	0
3	1	0	1		1	1	1	11,12	0,1,3
3	4	0	1	3	2	3	2	4	0
3	1	0	1	3	0	3	0	3,5	0,9,13
3	0	0	1	3	0	3	0	0	
3	2	0	0	3	2	3	2	4	1
3		0		3	1		1		
				6	2	1	3	4	0
3	1	0	1	3	2	3	2	0	0,2
			0	3	3	3	1	4	9
3	3	0	1	3	1		1	20	0
3	1	0	1		4	15	2	6	
0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	4	0
3	2	0	1	3	2	15	2	2,5	15
3	1	0	1	3	2	3	2	7	0
0,3	2	0	1	3	2	15	2	0,14	0
0,3	2	0	1	3	2	3	2	6	2
3	1	0	0	3	1	1	1	6	6
3	0	0	0	3	2	15	0	5	0
3	0	0	1	3	0	3	0	0,2	
3	2	0	1		0	3	1	6	

0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	6	6
3	2	0	1		2		2		
3	3	0	0		2	3	3	2	14
3	4	0	1	2	1	1	4	3,2	9
3	0	0	0	3	0		1	7	0
3	4	0	0			3	2	4	0
3	4	0		6	2	3	3	4	0
3	3	0				3	3		
3	2	0	0	3	2	3	2	6	0
	3	1	0	1	2	3	3	6	
3	2	0		3	3	3	2	8	
3	1	0	1	3	1	1	1	5,9	9
3	3	1	1	3	3	3	3	4	
3	1	0	0	3	1	3	1	0,2	0
3	4	1	0			3	3		20
3	3	1	1	3	3	3	3	14	14
3	4	1	1	3	4	3		4	0
3	1	0	1	3	2	1	2	16	0,9
3	1	0		1	1	3	1	4	0
3	0	1	1	3	1	3	1	0,2	1,5
3	0	0	1	3	1	3	1	14	1
3	1	0	0	3	1	3	1	3,5	0,9
3	4	0	1		1	3	0	0, 1,2, 18,	2
3	3	0	0	6	0	3	3	18,2	0,2
3	3	0	1	1	1	1	1	7,12	0,9,20
3	1	0	1	3	0	3	0	5	0
3	1	0	0	0	1	3	2	5, 7, 18	0
3	3	1	1	3	3	1	3	0	0
3	3	1	0	11	0	3	3	1	0
3	3	0	1	3	3	3	3	18	0
4	1	0	1	5	0	9	2	5	0,2
6	2		2	3	2,3	3	4	20	
3	3	0	1	3	3		3	4	0
3		1	1		1	3	3	14	0,2,14
	4	1	0	10	1	3	4	2	14
3	4	1	1		3	3			
3	3	1	1	3	4	3	3	0, 14	0
3	3	1	1	2	1	3	3	14	14
3	2		0	1	1	1	1	20	0,15
3	1	0	1	3	2		2	8	0
3	1	1		3	1	3	1	0	
3	4	1	1	6	2	3	3	20	0.5
there is no domain for shopping, no money				3	2	15	2	4	3
3	3	0	1	1	2	3	3	4	9
3	4	0	1	3	4	1	4		0,7
3	3	0	1	1	2	3	2	3	0
3	2	0	0		0	3	2	18	0
	3	0	0	1	1	15	3	3	3
3	4	1	0	3	4	15	4		0
	3								

	3	0	0	3	2	3	31	4	4
3	3	1	0	3	3	3	3		
3	3	1		8	1	3	3	2, 18	0
				1	3	15	3	4	12
3	3	0	1	3		3	2	4	0
4	1	0	1	5	1	3	3	4	0
3,4	4	1	1	3	3	3	3	0,14	20
3	3	0	1		0	3	3	0,14	0
3	2	0	1	0	1	3	0	3,12	2
3	3	0	1	3	3	3	3	5	0
3	3	0	1	3	2	3	1		0
3	2	0	1	3	2		2	14,18	0,14
3,4	4	1	0,1	3	3	15	3,4		
3	1	0	1	3	1	3	1	5	0
	4	0	0	5	1	5	1	6	6
3	2	1	1		1		3	14	1,2
3		1	1	3	4	3	4	8	0
3	3	0	1	10	2	3	3	1	0
3	2	1	2	3	0	3	0	6	0
3	2	0	1	3	2	3	2	0	0
3	1	0	1	3	2	3	2	6	6
4	4	0	1		2		2		0
3	3	0	1	0	2	3	3	4	9
3	2	0		0	2	3	1	8	0
3	3	1	1	3	2	3	2	0,14	0,1, 14
3	2		1	3	3	3	1	4	0
3	2	1	1	3	3	3	3	18	0
3	1	0	1	3	3	3	2	4	0
3	1	0	0	3	1	3	1	7	19
3	3	0		3	1	3	3		
4	1	0	1	3	1	3	1	1	0
3	0	0	1	3	0	3	0	14	1,2
3	2	1	1	0	2		2	18	0
4	3	0	2	6	1	3	3	18	0
3	3	1	1	3	2	3	2	14	14
3	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	6	20
3	3	0	0	1	2	3	1	14	7
3	1	0	0	3	1	3	1	1,18,8	0,1
3	1	0	1	3	0	1	1	20	0,15
4	4	0	1		1	3	2	17, 8, 20	0,15
3	3	0	1	4	1	3	3	4	0
3	2	0	1	0	1	1	2	0	0
3	0	0	0		0	1	0	17,18,20	2,9
3,4	3	1	1		1	1	1	20	0,1,2
3	1	0	1		1	3	1	2	5,2
3	4	1	0	3	3		4	1	1,2
3	3	1	1	3	3	3	3		
3	1	0	2		2	3	2	1	0
3	2	0	2		2	3	2	2, 14	2
								4	2

3	1	0	1	3	1		1	9,1	9
3	2	0	1	3	2	3	2		
3	4	0	1	3	1	3	2	18	0,15
3,4	0	0	0	3	1		1	5	0
3	3	0	0	3	3	3	3	4	0
3	1	0	1		1	3	1	4	9
3	3	0	1	3	3	3	3	6	6
3	0	0	1	3	0	3	0	4	0
3	0	0	1	3	0	3	1	6	0
3	2	0	1		1	3	2	18	0
3	2	0	1	3	2	3	2	0	0
3	2	0	1	3	1	3	2	18	2
0	2	0	1	3	2	3	1		
3	3	0	1	4	2	3	3		
3	1	0	1		1	3	1	12	12
3		0	1	3	2	3	2	0,14	0,2
3	4	0	1	3	1	1	1	17,9	17,9
3	3	1	1	3	3	3	3	0,19	0
0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	3	0	3	0	7	0
3	1	0	1	3	1	3	1	10	0
3	3	1	1	3,4	1,3	3	3	14	0,2
0	2	0	1	3	0	3	0	10	0
3	3	0	0	3	2	3	2	8	0
0	0	0	1		1		2		
3	0	0	0		0	3	0	4	0
3	3	0	1		1		0		
3	0	0	1		0		0		

Nr	Visit of restaurants	Place	Number of visits	Obstacles on the way to the restaurant	Influence of the Separation Barrier
1	1		1/week	0	2,9,10
2					
3	1	KFC, Abu Hable, Mansbakir, Abu Nedat Humus,	3/week	0	
4	0				
5	0			0	2
6	0			0	0
7	1	neighboring restaurants	1/month	0	3
8	0			0	
9					11
10	0				11

11	1			0	
12	0				11
13	0				4
14	0			0	4
15	1	two public restaurants, and gardens such as waha or tel arabia	3/month	0	10
16	0			0	11
17	0			0	4
18		fast food	1/month	0	8
19	0			0	4,7,11
20	1		1/month	0	
21	0			0	2
22	0			0	0
23	1	Abu Hawha	1/month	0	5
24	1	3	1/month	0	2,1
25	0			0	
26	1			0	
27	1	3		0	0
28	0			0	4
29				0	0
30	0				
31	0				4
32					1
33	0			0	13,14
34	0				5,1
35	0			0	
36	0			0	0
37	0			1	0
38	0			0	0
39	0				0
40	0				2,3,4
41	0				3,4,5,6
42	1			0	2
43	0			0	4
44	1	there is no special place, sheifa sultan	2/month	0	14
45	0			0	4
46	1			0	7,9
47	1			0	5,9,10,12
48	0			0	11,12
49	0				0
50	1	3	1/week	0	0
51	1	3	1-2/week	0	0
52	1			0	0
53	1	5	1/month	1	0
54	0			0	0
55	1	5	2-3 /week	0	0
56	0			0	4,7,12

57	0			0	0
58	1		5/year	1	
59	0				4
60	0			1	3,5,6
61	0				
62	0				
63	0				
64	1	3	3/week	0	0
65	0				0
66	1	3	2/week	1	6,12
67					4
68	1	3	1/month	0	4
69	0			0	4
70	0				4
71	0			0	6,11
72	0				11
73	0			1	2
74	1	3,5	1/month	0	4
75	1	3	2/week	0	
76	0				
77	0				
78	0				6
79	0				
80	1			0	4,5
81	0			0	11
82	0			0	5
83	0	3	1/year	0	2,4
84	0			1	4,9
85	0			0	4
86	1			0	6
87	0			0	
88	0			0	4
89	0			0	
90	0			0	4
91	0			0	
92	0			0	0
93	0				4,5,9
94	0			0	2,5,7,11,
95	0			0	4
96	1			0	4
97	0			0	
98	0				2,3,5
99	0			0	
100	0			0	
101	0			0	7
102	0			0	4
103	0			0	
104	1			0	9,12
105	1			0	
106	1			0	13

107	1				3,9,10,11
108	0			0	0
109	0			0	0
110	0			0	13
111	0			0	0
112	0				12
113	0				8
114	0			0	8
115	0				5
116	0				8
117	0			1	4,8
118	0			0	11
119	0			0	11
120	0			0	9,1
121					
122	0			0	11
123	1	small restaurants, fast food	1/week	0	4
124	1		daily	1	11
125	0			0	11
126	0			0	4
127	0			0	0
128	1			0	4
129	0				0
130	0			0	
131	0			0	4
132	0		seldom	0	0
133	0			0	2,4
134	0			0	
135	0			0	
136	0			0	8,11
137	0			0	
138	0			0	
139	1	abu hable		0	
140	0				11
141	1			0	2,9
142	0	Tulkarm cafe	sometimes	0	,5,8,14
143	0			0	0
144	0			0	2,9,12
145				0	2,4,5
146	0			0	11
147	0			0	2,4,11,
148	1			0	
149	0			0	
150	0			0	0
151					
152				0	0
153	0			0	

Abstract

This thesis aims to analyze the transformation of movement and access to land and employment in Greater Tulkarm in the West Bank, which is influenced by a variety of factors such as the Separation Barrier, agricultural gates, roadblocks etc.; and the current situation of residents of Tulkarm living in it. Overall the obstacles within the Governorate of Tulkarm have been reduced since the second intifada. Nazlat Isa and Jubara, examples used in this thesis, clearly show the negative impact of the Separation Barrier in economic and cultural terms. Tulkarm is in the recharge area on the northwestern strip of the Mountain Aquifer and is affected by heavy pollution from its municipality, other Palestinian regions, Israeli settlements and the Israeli Industrial Zone in Tulkarm.

Before the actual development in the Tulkarm Governorate is shown, a part of the introduction illustrates the development and the complexity of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Particular attention is given to the Oslo Accords and the developments to date. The legal situation in the West Bank is displayed with a focus on international law and IHL. Specific points of conflict, such as house demolitions, permits, etc., which arise especially in Area C of the West Bank are discussed in detail.

In particular the numbers of pass overs and difficulties with the permission system at the Deir Al-Ghusun Gate to access agricultural land in the Seam Zone is analyzed with the help of a linear regression. The regression line shows that the average number of cross-border commuters per day has decreased among men by more than one third and among women and children by two thirds. The expert interviews and the questionnaires give an insight of the current situation in Tulkarm. The reduced working opportunities in Israel are named on a frequent basis as the main consequence of the Separation Barrier in the questionnaires, followed by reduced contact with family and friends and access to the sea.

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Transformation von Bewegung und dem Zugang zu landwirtschaftlichen Flächen und Beschäftigungsverhältnissen im Großraum Tulkarm in der Westbank. Dies wird von einer Vielzahl von Faktoren wie der Sperranlage, landwirtschaftliche Tore, Straßensperren etc. beeinflusst. Es wird somit auch die aktuelle Situation der Bewohner von Tulkarm analysiert. Insgesamt sind die Hindernisse wie Straßensperren usw. im Gouvernement Tulkarm seit der zweiten Intifada reduziert worden. In den Dörfern Nazlat Isa und Jubara, die als Beispiele in dieser Arbeit verwendet werden, zeigen sich deutlich die negativen Auswirkungen der Sperrmauer in wirtschaftlicher und kultureller Hinsicht. Tulkarm liegt in der Grundwasseranreicherungsfläche im nordwestlichen Streifen des Bergaquifer und ist von starken Verschmutzungen seitens der eigenen Gemeinde, anderen palästinensischen Gebieten, israelischen Siedlungen sowie von israelischen Industrieansiedlungen betroffen. Bevor konkret die Entwicklung im Gouvernement Tulkarm aufgezeigt wird, verdeutlicht ein Einführungsteil den Ablauf und die Komplexität des Friedensprozess zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern. Besonderes Augenmerk liegt dabei auf dem Osloer Abkommen und den Entwicklungen bis heute. Die rechtliche Situation in der West Bank wird beleuchtet mit dem Fokus auf Völkerrecht und Humanitären Völkerrecht. Spezifische Konfliktpunkte, wie Hauszerstörungen, Genehmigungen usw., die vor allem in der Zone C der West Bank eine Rolle spielen, werden eingehend behandelt.

Insbesondere die Zahl der Grenzübertritte zu den landwirtschaftlichen Flächen in die „Seam Zone“ und Schwierigkeiten mit dem Genehmigungen am Landwirtschaftstor Deir Al-Ghusun, wird mit Hilfe einer linearen Regression analysiert. Die Regressionsgerade zeigt, dass die durchschnittliche Zahl der GrenzgängerInnen pro Tag bei Männern um mehr als ein Drittel und bei Frauen und Kindern um zwei Drittel zurückgegangen ist. Die Experteninterviews und die Fragebögen geben einen Einblick in die aktuelle Situation in Tulkarm. Die reduzierten Arbeitsmöglichkeiten in Israel werden am häufigsten als Folge der Sperranlage in den Fragebögen genannt, gefolgt von reduziertem Kontakt mit Familie und Freunden und Zugang zum Meer.

Curriculum Vitae

Name Bettina ZANGL
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Education

12/ 2012 **Master Degree in Development Studies (Magistra)**
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2006-2007 **Fairfield University**
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German: native
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