



universität
wien

Diplomarbeit

Titel der Diplomarbeit

The Historical and Ideological Foundations
of the Rhetoric of Kemalist Women

Verfasserin

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Angestrebter akademischer Grad

Magistra der Philosophie (Mag. phil.)

Wien, 2012

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A-300

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Politikwissenschaften

Betreuerin: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Birgit Sauer

Abstract

Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit den historischen und ideologischen Grundsätzen der Rhetorik der kemalistischen Frauen, welche die sogenannten „republikanischen Proteste“ des Jahres 2007 organisierten und durchführten um gegen die Präsidentschaftskandidaten der gegenwärtigen Regierung aufgrund ihrer kopftuchtragenden Frauen vorzugehen. Diese Proteste wurden von kemalistischen Frauen getragen, deren Identität als ideale republikanische Frau im Zuge des Modernisierungsprojektes der 1920er Jahre von Atatürk und seinen Anhängern konstruiert wurde. Diese Identität mit der dazugehörenden Rhetorik basieren auf Laizismus und Nationalismus wie auch die kemalistische Ideologie selber, welche Staatsgründer und Armee als einzigen Beschützer und Befreier vorsieht. Das Privileg als einziger Repräsentant der türkischen Frau gelten zu dürfen wurde durch die kemalistische Indoktrination bis in die 1990er Jahre nicht in Frage gestellt. Kemalistische Frauen –oder: ideale republikanische Frauen- begannen in dieser Zeit sich gegen den Aufstieg des politischen Islams zu mobilisieren und definierten sich als türkisch und unverschleiert, wodurch ein großer Teil der Gesellschaft ausgeschlossen wurde. Als Kern ihrer Forderungen galt die Ablehnung von verschleierten Frauen an Universitäten, im Parlament und schließlich auch als Ehefrau des Präsidenten. Das Kopftuch wurde als Bedrohung der „republikanischen Werte“ betrachtet. Während der Proteste erklärten sie: „Wir sind hier um die Republik und ihre Werte zu verteidigen“. Eine First Lady mit Kopftuch wäre ein Verstoß gegen den säkularen Staat und seine Prinzipien und sie würden das nicht akzeptieren. Außerdem erklärten sie, dass die gegenwärtige Regierung eine geheime Agenda zur Ersetzung des türkischen Rechtsstaates durch einen islamistischen Gottesstaat verfolge. Darüber hinaus betrieben sie eine Rhetorik, welche Frauen von kopftuchtragenden Frauen entfremdete und eine größere Spaltung in modern/vormodern, Industrie/Rückständigkeit, Kemalismus/ Islam und West und Ost inkludierte. Damit schufen sie zwei unterschiedliche Wertesysteme, von

welchen der Kemalismus als das anzustrebende Ideal galt. Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht die Wurzeln dieser Idealisierung aufzudecken um den abwertenden Blick der kemalistischen Frauen auf die frommen Frauen zu beleuchten.

Abstract

This thesis focuses on the historical and ideological foundations of the rhetoric of Kemalist women, who organized and attended the so-called “Republican Protests” in 2007 against the presidential candidates of the current government; due to their covered wives. The protests were conducted and led by Kemalist woman, whose identity was constructed as the ideal Republican woman within the modernization project in 1920s by Atatürk and his colleagues. This identity and its rhetoric rest upon laicism and nationalism likewise the Kemalist ideology itself, which sees the army and the founders of the state as the protector and the only emancipator. Their privilege as being the only representative of Turkish woman had not challenged due to Kemalist indoctrination until the 1990s. Kemalist women -or ideal republican women- started their mobilization against the rise of Political Islam in 1990s and defined themselves as Turkish and uncovered, which again excluded a big part of society. As the core of their rhetoric, they didn’t want women with headscarf at the universities, in the parliament and finally as the president’s wife. Their headscarf was perceived as a threat against the “Republican Values”. During the “Republican Protests” they declared; “We are here to protect our Republic and its values”. Kemalist women claimed that a First Lady with headscarf would be a violation of the secular state principle and they would not accept that. Moreover they stated that the current government had a secret agenda about replacing the Turkish constitutional state with an Islamist state. Furthermore the rhetoric, which alienates women from women with headscarf, includes a bigger separation, such as modern/pre-modern, industrial/backwardness, Kemalism/Islam and in final case the West and the East. By so doing, their rhetoric creates two different value systems, in which the Kemalist one is considered to be the “ideal”. This thesis tries to track down the roots of this idealization to illuminate the pejorative view of Kemalist women on pious women.

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Preface

This thesis studies the rhetoric of the Kemalist women, which lastly appeared in the “Republican Protests” against the candidacy of the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül for the presidential elections in 2007. The demonstrations were organized by non-governmental organizations and attended predominantly by Kemalist women who interpreted Erdoğan's and Gül's wives' Islamic clothing as the violation of the principle of the secular state. The principle of the secular state in Turkey refers not only to the separation of religion and state, but also to a vast state control over religion through various state institutions. In this political context head covering has a unique meaning and the statist ideology-which claims to be the best interests of the people despite the people- aimed confining religion to the private realm. Covering the hair was prohibited in public offices and educational institutions. The official ideology, which was established by the Kemalists, claimed that it represents and propagates a religious ideology perceived to be hostile to the secular foundations of the republic. Accordingly, covering the head became an act of protest against the state and its dominant ideology. Arat (1999) wrote that the struggle of Kemalist women with the headscarf started in 1990s, and described the case as the transformation of Kemalist women to Kemalist feminists, who were mobilized in response to what they perceived as the Islamist threat. They were afraid that the Islamic Law would delegitimize or replace, the secular legal basis of the republic including the Civil Code. They organized to

defend the secular republican framework. In 2007 they made series of demonstrations, which took place in the big cities and they were the most well-attended ones in the history of the Republic. The demonstrators were carrying flags and Atatürk posters as they claimed they protected and defended “values of the republic”. The Organization Committee of the Protests consisted of seven women, who were members of various Kemalist Thought Organizations and supporters of the CHP (Republican People’s Party) which was built by Atatürk and has never received the majority of the votes except during monoparty period. Although Kemalist women started their political activism in the 1990s, when the pro-Islamist party RP (Welfare Party) became powerful in the political arena, the roots of their ideology are embedded in the early republican years. The contemporary polarization was settled in the nation-building process and its reaction started with 1980s. Its historical roots in the early republican years must be examined to understand the discourse of the Kemalist women at these demonstrations. This thesis aims at conducting research on the protestors through their rhetoric, to clarify who they are, how they are constructed, what they demand, why they see pious women as threat and why they stress on nationalism and laicism as the guarantee of their freedom.

The Method

The method of this research is tracing the historical developments and by conducting a literature review of the scholars. The speeches and the symbols of the demonstrations are taken from various newspapers and websites. Their accountability is supported by the writer of this thesis since she herself witnessed this big event in her home city Istanbul with an attempt to see through the objective glasses of an “academic”.

Plan of the Thesis

This thesis is divided mainly into two chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the ideological background while the second one follows the historical foundations. In the first chapter the

representative cases since the 1990s are introduced to exhibit the strong emphasis on two main principles of Kemalism; laicism and nationalism in the rhetoric. In the same chapter, the parties and the Turkish political actors are manifested too. Also some pictures are put to show the women participants of the protest with their flags and posters. In the second chapter, the modernization project is examined to see the historical roots of the contemporary rhetoric. The thesis ends with a conclusion, which tries to combine the two chapters to clarify the division within the society.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my parents; Bilgi and Metin for the amazing effort they put into being good parents. I would also like to thank my sisters; Sedef and Billur for delicious Turkish coffee and chat sessions. Special thanks to dear Ralph Zlabinger; in and out of this process nobody challenged and simultaneously supported me as he did. My grateful thanks also go to Can Dalyan for his contributions. I am grateful to Eylem C. Çetintaş for being always “there”. I would like to thank Demet Güngör and Müge Erarslan who always encourage me to pursue “my way”. Lilian Bernoulli also deserves a sincere Thank you for her precious friendship. Lastly, I would like to thank all the invisible heroes and heroines in my head. This thesis is dedicated to them.

She always had the feeling that it was
very, very dangerous to live even one day.

(V. Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway)

Introduction

The Ottoman Empire was majorly occupied by the Allies after its defeat in World War I, which was considered as the end of the Empire. A group of young military officers, led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his colleagues, organized a resistance and succeeded. In 1923, they established the modern Republic of Turkey under the presidency of Atatürk. The new Republic constructed itself as laicist, secular, unitarian and constitutional. The parliament with the single party started a series of reforms while they centralized the power, and abolished the opposition. The modernization project was executed by the state elites, who were soldiers and civil movements weren't really allowed. The people were asked to be graceful and loving towards the state and this became the prerequisite to be a 'good' citizen in the long run. The justification of the practises were always based on the victory gained at the Independence War and the emancipators remained ready to accuse anybody of being a traitor as soon as any critic appeared towards the ongoing reforms. They needed loyal citizens and signifiers for the new state. Women of the Republic played the main role in this nation-building process as several scholars pointed out. They were not only mothers, who would raise "modern" citizens but also the members of this society who would have the rights to

attend and protect the public sphere. The Independence War never remained as a military struggle in the official history. Simultaneously it entailed independence, democracy, secularism and freedom for women. Women were asked to defend nationalism, which includes militarism, laicism and feminism to remain 'emancipated'. Kemalism addressed mainly to educated middle and upper-middle class women. Some of these women were already in Ottoman feminist movements and claimed their rights but unfortunately these women were erased from the history due to their civil encourage. In official history; 'Atatürk gave women their rights although no women asked for'. Tekeli (1986) defines it as State Feminism. State feminism is a hegemonic and statist ideology, which shapes the movement according to its own limits. State's role as protector makes women faithful and obedient. These women became the flags of the Kemalist project, which strived for a radical rupture from Ottoman Empire. It started an indoctrinization through the education system. History books, especially those on the history of the revolution and the history of the Republic, which are used in middle and high-school education, say "Women were granted their rights by the Republican Regime without having fought for these rights themselves". As Cakir (2007) articulates correctly 'praising Kemalist reforms, this androcentric discourse designated Atatürk as the sole emancipator of Turkish women'. They ignored the luculent continuation and considered all the things related to Ottoman as backwardness. Kadioğlu (1994) describes this attitude as Kemalist Orientalism. In her words: The Kemalists, in fact, were influenced by what Edward Said calls Orientalism, the manufactured Western image of the Muslim world. This image is epitomized in the secluded, veiled, and hence oppressed women of the Muslim world. The founders desired to transform the social life in Turkey rapidly. The history of politics as well as women in Turkey can not be comprehensible unless this intense modernization project; its actors and opposers are well defined in their historical context. The terminological dichotomy of modernism such as modern/traditional,

progressive/backwardness, secularist/islamist are often used expressions among Turkish society. As a natural consequence of this dichotomy, the society seems divided rather than united and this division can be observed among women groups easily since in both ideologies women are signifiers through their covered or uncovered hair. However this goes far beyond the body politics, due to the women, who are more than signifiers but active actors of the politics. The terms "Kemalists" and "Republican modernists" in this work are used interchangeably to refer to the political elite who initiated a series of reforms to westernize Turkey after the Republic was established in 1923. Mustafa Kemal presided over the country from 1923 to 1938 and led the reforms. The opposition against him was from those who were in favor of keeping the Ottoman, Muslim and traditional elements of the previous regime, but the Kemalists maintained control over these groups. The Islamists, who were in favor of traditional customs and religious practises, were one of the strongest oppositions. They were seen as the internal enemies of the secular state and they were taught how to practise their beliefs by the state elites. Religion was prisoned to the private life and public sphere was filled with "modern" "republican" images. Big cities were adaptive, while the big part of the country remained indifferent to the reforms. Turkish experience with liberal representative democracy began with the 1950 elections, when the ruling elite of the single-party era (1923-1950) devolved power to the opposition. Since then, there have been three military interventions lasting from one to three years, 1960, 1971 and 1980. Despite the interventions, representative democracy with its minimum requirements for regular elections, general suffrage, secret ballot, free competition of political parties and accountability of the elected grew in a unique Muslim context. The Turkish context of democracy was unique because of its predominantly Muslim culture with a strong state tradition (Heper, 1985).

Nevertheless, on the contrary of this homogeneous state idea, the society was divided into center and periphery until the 1980s. "The center" and "the periphery" didn't really meet

with each other except some kind of insurgency or bureaucratic duties in the East. After the 1980s, the periphery started showing up in the center physically and mentally. Intense immigration to the big cities changed the image of the homogenous “republican” identity. The conflict between unveiled enlightened urban and veiled pious peasant evolved into veiled urban and unveiled urban. Veiled urban created a big confusion among Kemalist women, who used to think if one is educated, she wouldn’t cover her hair. This confusion led to a fear which was established in the 1920s against having the Sharia Law again. Due to the fear against Sharia Law, Turkey has a long-lasting tradition in banning political parties when they are not 'appropriate' for the Kemalist order, which can be defined as the secular state surrounded by the Atatürk reforms. The Constitutional Court used to work as the bodyguard of this system and it was strongly supported by the military and the Kemalist groups. All the institutions gave a red alarm when the Islamist party enjoyed the majority of the votes at the elections in 1994. The role of the military in political sphere was the biggest problem that democracy had been facing in Turkey until the AKP government started taking its decisions to diminish the power of the military systematically until some time ago. Almost all political parties with Islamist tendencies have been closed down by the Constitutional Court for violating the Republican principle of secularism. Due to the suppression of the Islamists by the state institutions this part of the society remained out of the center. They were surely elected as representatives, but could never use their own rhetoric. Whenever they dared to do, either the party was closed down or military intervened the politics. Three coups in the last 50 years - in 1960, 1971 and 1980 were carried out by the army and in 1997 it intervened to force Turkey's first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, from power. Secularists and Islamists created two different value systems (consistent cultural values) within the society. The climax of the struggle was the AKP victory in the parliamentary elections. Current prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan and his party AKP have a strong Islamist background and as well as the

majority in the parliament. The prime minister Tayyip Erdogan tried to convince and calm down the Kemalism supporter. However it got even worse when the presidential elections came up in 2007. When it was time for the presidential elections in 2007, the Kemalist population leading by their NGOs wanted to block AKP's candidate by demanding an early election for parliamentary, so that the new parliamentary would elect the new president. They started demonstrations on the streets against the candidate of AKP, who is the current president Abdullah Gül by saying that his wife was covered and that would damage the secular state principle of the constitution. The demonstrations were made in series and they were radically attended by women, who carried state symbols such as flags and Atatürk posters. The main slogan was "Turkey is secular and will remain secular". This paper focuses on the mass demonstrations to explain the nature of the crisis led by women, who name themselves as Kemalist. Their speeches have an authoritarian character hand in hand with militarism/nationalism, in which discriminative laicism is included. To clarify this character, the modernization project, nation-building process and the constructed female "republican" identity should be examined. Under the introduction part, contemporary reactions of the Kemalist women will be mentioned to build a bridge between the ideology in the beginning and the mobilization from the 1990s on. To examine and clarify the undemocratic and nationalistic character of Kemalist women's aggression and fear against their "sisters" with headscarfs is the priority of this thesis. This discriminative feature of Kemalist feminism is the natural consequence of the Kemalist ideology and the problematic modernization project which urged to construct new identities during the new republic was proclaimed. This aggression entangled with fear has its historical roots in the monoparty period, in which the "Values of the Republic" they defend were established.

Chapter I

Case Description

Turam (2008) describes Kemalist woman, regardless of whether she has a religious faith or not, she bases her life, politics, activism and worldview on laicism, a particularly rigid form of secularism in which religion is not only privatized but controlled by the state. Put differently, the controversy is not over whether an individual is religiously observant, but the wider politics of religion and its relation to the state. Kemalist women neglects the individual preferences and she filters state related issues through the principles of Atatürk.

Tekeli (1986) and White (2003) call what Kemalist women support is; ‘state feminism’. State feminism means that they believe in the laicist state as the main safeguard of women’s rights and equality. They also believe that Turkish women owe their ‘equal’ position in society to Atatürk, who pictured them as ideal republican woman. This gratitude is acknowledged as a prerequisite to be a good citizen, nobody can (and willing to) criticize him in any sense. He was and is the symbol of modern and secular life. When the non-Kemalist representations appeared in the public, Kemalist women couldn’t understand their position in the society. Since they were wealthy and educated, why they still wear a headscarf, was unknown to them. Soon, Kemalist women recalled the early republican times and used Atatürk’s rhetoric when he tried to alienate religion in the society to strengthen the new republic towards the Ottoman heritage. His rhetoric was based on the statement of “religion and religious people should be controlled otherwise they could damage the secular system.”

Kemalist women against the public manifestations of Islam, especially the headscarf have been very active in civil society organizations and women’s associations.

Turam (2008) states that their militancy is increasing in tandem with the rising popularity of political Islam. Most importantly, and distinct from other secular actors, Kemalist women

remain pioneer advocates of the military's dominant role in 'protecting' the secular Republic. Their support for army intervention was lucid in the republican protests.

The political scientist Yesim Arat (1996) sets the 1980s as the period of the transformation of Kemalist women into Kemalist feminists against the Islamist challenge and she claims that the Kemalist women see Islamist activism as well as their relationship to the republic, in intensely emotional terms. Kemalist women see Islamists as remainders from the Middle Ages. So they have the right to oppose them which derives from the secular state. They also believe -as the educated elite- they have a task to "enlighten" the reactionary Islamists.

As Arat points out, the Kemalist women's activism basically organized itself after the 1980s as a result of the rise of the pro-Islamic party in the politics. The last and the biggest reaction was the Republican Demonstrations in 2007, which is the motivation of this thesis. Before getting involved with this reaction, the start of the mobilization in the 1990s should be mentioned.

1.Kemalist Women vs. Political Islam

1.1. 1990s

With the rise of the Welfare Party, Kemalist women appeared in the arena to pose an obstacle to their achievements. Kemalist women took women who studied in higher education and yet still wanted to cover their hair as uncomprehensible and not fitting for the standards of modern life. Aysel Ekşi, the first president of the Support for Modern Life Association (ÇYDD) –one of the leading organizations of the Republican Protests- founded in 1991, summarized the purpose of their organization as follows:

For some time now, we have been facing a serious and sneaky reactionary movement in Turkey which hides behind the veil of 'women's freedom to dress as they like' but endeavors

to take our society back to the dark ages [...] we came together, conscious of this threat and based upon the authority given to us by Atatürk's revolutions, in order to preserve Atatürk's legacy, the secular republic and our rights, which are inseparable from them (Arat, 1994).

In this small passage, Ekşi mentions several keywords of Kemalist rhetoric. She talks about "the freedom to dress as one likes" as a potential threat and described it as a sneaky reactionary movement. This dress is part of a wider agenda, and an attempt to take the society back to the dark ages (dark ages refer to Ottoman Empire in the rhetoric). Having described the "enemy" she calls for awareness and wants Kemalist women get together against the "sneaky reactions" to protect the republic. The republic belongs to them, the republic is actually them. Their authority comes from the Atatürk's revolutions, which they don't have to legitimize, because it was the core of the republic and legitimized long before they need to. As at the end she claims Atatürk's legacy should be defended in order to carry on the secular republic and women rights. The rhetoric states that without Atatürk legacy, there wouldn't be a secular state and subsequently there wouldn't be rights for women. So the scope is determined; Protect your republic based upon the Atatürk's revolutions!. These revolutions are more important than any groups and individuals. In fact Atatürk replaced Islam with another kind of religion called Kemalist nationalism.

Yazıcı (2001) also defines the 1990s as marked by the presence of the "Islamic threat" for the secularists and Atatürkist groups. After the Welfare Party's victory in municipal elections in 1994 a number of Atatürkist social organizations, such as Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (The Society for Atatürkist Thought) and Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (The Society to Support Contemporary Life), were established and continued their activism to defend a secularist establishment modeled on "the principles of Atatürk".

In the secularists' view, even more horrifying than the 1994 elections was the ascension of the Welfare Party to the government as one of the coalition partners in 1996. The Welfare Party's governance (which ended in the summer of 1997) was interpreted by the secularist sections as a systematic attempt to undermine the Turkish Republic and to replace it with an Islamic state. Thus, in this period, there was great mobilization by the secularist, Atatürkist groups to defend the Republic against what was seen as a deadly threat (Yazici, 2001). To avoid this dreadful threat Kemalist women manifested their clear collaboration with the military openly via demonstrations. There are two worth-mentioning demonstrations in this period to show the will to subordinate the Islamist position and the Kemalist achievements on that. These two cases, in which Kemalist women went along with the military opened the path to the Republican Protests in 2007.

1.1.1. Women Walk against Sheri'a 15 February 1997

The coalition government was formed between the religious RP and the (DYP) True Path Party led by Tansu Çiller in 1996, in which the RP was the bigger partner. Soon the RP started making provocative gestures and women's groups were particularly agitated. The polarization got sharper as the religious party humiliated the Kemalist symbols and crossed the sentimental borders by promising mosques in the prominent squares of the cities and etc. Kadioğlu (1996) states that the polarization has become so acute that it resembles the late nineteenth century Dreyfus Affair in France.

On 15 February 1997, under the initiative of Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği (Association of Contemporary Legal Professionals), a large rally was organized in defense of secularism and in protest of fundamentalism. The rally was named Women's Walk Against the Shariat (Arat, 1999). According to the Head of the Republican Women Association 50,000 women attended this meeting. This protest made the problem solid and soon after, the military intervention

came up when the ruling coalition was openly challenged by the military representatives of the National Security Council (MGK) in its meeting of the 28 February 1997. After nine hours of deliberations, the declaration of the MGK expressed uneasiness about attempts to harm and ultimately change the secular, Kemalist nationalist and democratic character of the Turkish constitution. Several precautionary measures, demanded by the military branch of the MGK, were submitted to the cabinet. These included demands for the regulation of Koran courses, social and economic activities of various Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats) and a halt to appointments that were seen as aimed towards building an Islamic cadre within the state bureaucracy. The RP leader Necmettin Erbakan tried to resist the military impositions, but could not obtain the necessary political support. Under pressure, he signed the MGK decisions, and the “28 February process” had formally begun. It was subsequently ended with the early elections of April 1999, bringing to power a coalition of parties with a nationalist-secularist-liberal, as opposed to a religious agenda (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007).

1.1.2.Merve Kavakçı Affair 3 May 1999

On 3 May 1999 Merve Kavakçı, deputy of the Islamist Virtue Party caused an uproar by attending the oath ceremony in the parliament wearing a scarf. This was the very first time that a covered women entered the parliamentary with covered hair. As Göçek (1999) describes, even though the assembly dress code only specified for women deputies ‘a suit and modern attire’, the additional use of a headscarf signified for many deputies a politicized religious practise that had no place in the national assembly. The Kemalist women deputies started shouting ‘Turkey is and will remain secular’ and ‘all Merves should go to Iran’ as they were banging on their desks. She left the saloon and didn’t come back to the ceremony. The prominent accusation was made by the president of the republic, Süleyman Demirel, as he called her an “agent provocateur”.

He also added that while it was indeed traditionally acceptable to wear a headscarf in public, the national assembly had its own rules which had to be abided by and which she clearly had not followed. Furthermore, he commented that Kavakçı's headscarf symbolized the movement 'which aimed to turn Turkey into an Iran, Afghanistan or Algeria, and which (for that purpose) murdered one thousand people in Algeria'. The chief public prosecutor interpreted the incident in a similar vein, using Kavakçı's action to start a lawsuit against her party for inciting her to take a stand against the secular principles of the state, and to eliminate, once and for all, all party members who 'were like vampires constantly sucking on the blood of the nation' (Göçek, 1999). There was also popular protest from the media and the Kemalists groups such as hanging Atatürk's pictures on the windows. There were rumours about a coup and an investigation of her personal life. Soon it was discovered that Kavakçı has an American citizenship and yet didn't notify the Turkish state properly. The Turkish state accepts dual citizenship if the applicant notifies the Turkish state before applying for US citizenship. Due to this technicality, she was stripped of her Turkish citizenship. She was a 30 year old US educated engineer and scared the Kemalists of being an agent, who wanted to transform Turkey into Iran and subsequently lost her power.

2. AKP (2002- present)

The restless years of 1990s taught the Kemalist women that they are not the only representatives of the Turkish women and that their authority would be shared soon. However they were still defenders of "their" republic and the daughters of Atatürk. When Cagatay (2009) analyses Turkish politics, she points out this separation by saying that the last decades in Turkey have been marked by a polarization between Secularism and Islamism which disrupts social life. Turkish society has been divided into camps, i.e. Secularists and Islamists, "us" and "others". On one end of this polarization is the rapid increase in the public visibility of religious identities, the ascendance of religious cadres within bureaucratic ranks to high

level positions under the consecutive AKP (Justice and Development Party) governments since 2002, and the conservative and oppressive tendencies of the central and local state institutions adopting an Islamist discourse. On the other end, there is an excessive distrust towards the executive and legislative organs, a fear of political Islam among groups who identify themselves with the Kemalist tradition, and opposition from these groups to the AKP's rising hegemony through a discussion of secularism. Çağatay draws attention to the women's role in that polarization and claims that their movement is a determining factor and has been polarized in this cleavage, which at times has turned into a regime crisis.

AKP (Justice and Development Party) was founded in August 2001 under the leadership of the ex-Istanbul mayor Tayyip Erdoğan, who, at the time, was banned from politics on the grounds of having provoking religious hatred, some years back. The AKP participated in the 2002 elections under Erdoğan's leadership but Erdoğan himself could not get elected to the parliament because of his continuing ban. Only in March 2003, was Erdoğan able to get himself elected after a series of amendments to the existing legislation. He as a very popular political figure after his four months imprisonment became even more popular and beloved. He was the representative of the victims of the Kemalist system.

Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) indicate that the AKP has its roots in the pro-Islamist electoral tradition of the early 1970s. They use the term —pro-Islamist not as a demand for an Islamic state or Shari'a rule, which they can not realize within the regulatory framework of the Turkish party system but more for relying on Islamic motives in their rhetoric and valuing Islam in the private sphere. Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) see AKP as an offspring of the pro-Islamist RP, which had a victory in the municipal elections of 1994 and then in 1995 general election. RP became a major electoral force in Turkish politics and was the stronger partner of the coalition government established after the 1995 election and the political polarization in the country hugely increased. This polarization eventually pushed the country into the

“February 28th” period (Soft Coup) and resulted in the banning of the RP by the Constitutional Court. FP (Virtue Party) was then established to replace RP, but this party was also closed down. The outlawing of FP divided the political Islam. Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) describe this division as the reactions of the secularists, spearheaded by the influential military and also oppositions in the party made a split between old guards who controlled the pro-Islamist parties ever since 1970s and the younger generation led by the ex-Istanbul mayor Tayyip Erdoğan . As Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu articulate Tayyip Erdoğan was the progressive wing of the traditional pro-Islamist party and the founder of the AKP. He used a softer tone to be conservative and he didn't challenge the secular system. However his pro-Islamist past was never forgotten by the secularists and often updated with the help of non-governmental Kemalist organizations and the military forces when he particularly gained the power in the parliament. Walter Posch (2007) says there might be two possible interpretations of the AKP:

a) The AKP acts like any Islamist Party in the world, using democracy as a first stage, in order to get as much power as possible. In the Turkish context this would mean that the AKP would benefit from the reforms imposed on Turkey by the EU in order to curb the power of the Armed Forces;

or on the contrary

b) the AKP is indeed a new type of party, nurturing conservative sentiments when it comes to social matters but combining them with freemarket economics. The AKP's official position goes along these lines: in official statements senior members of the party stress that the AKP is not an Islamic and even less than Islamist party and that the place of religion lies in private worship.

The first position, which is described as ‘the other’, ‘the islamic threat’, ‘internal enemy’ in

the Kemalist ideology, has a long tradition from the early republican times. This position has been the reason of all the Kemalist women movements so far. Second position is majorly supported by the liberals, businessmen/women and new electorates. Although the party seems like the combination of both positions, which has been indeed europeanised as well as having a conservative discourse to their core electorate, Kemalists always suspect it of running a secret agenda defined as transformation of the Turkish Republic into Iran.

The most reactionary group in the society against the AKP and Erdoğan have been the Kemalist women, who perceived the Islamic upsurge as a threat, and organized to counter it. They supported the military as the democracy protector and their emancipator. This emotional link between Kemalist women and the military caused an agitated language within the society. Turam (2008) also points out the polarization between women when she analyzes the AKP government by saying in the early phase of AKP's rule in Turkey (2002–4), the pro-Islamic government of the AKP (Justice and Development party) and various branches of the state collaborated in a series of political and economic reforms. The democratization process has gradually moderated and integrated Islamic actors into the secular Turkish Republic. However, it has also had polarizing effects on social groups. Among many, the polarization of two groups of women, 'pious' and 'secularist', deserves particular attention.

2.1. Republican Protests 2007

The polarization between Kemalist women and the women with headscarves became concrete when the street protests started taking place in 2007 before the presidential elections. These protests were organized and attended predominantly by women and their message to the government was that they defend 'their' secular republic. The warning was that the AKP governance was to abandon "republican gains". The Committee of the Demonstrations called the rallies "People's March for the Republic". They made the first one in Ankara and later, a series of protests were organized under the name of "Republican Protests". The character of

the Republican demonstrations crystallized around the “headscarf issue,” and was escorted by huge Turkish flags carried by the participants. Here is the summary of the protests city by city as they appeared on the news.

2.1.1. Ankara 14 April 2007

The rally came two days before the presidential elections started and was intended to pressure current Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan not to join. On 14 April 2007 BBC News reported that some 300,000 people have demonstrated in Turkey's capital, Ankara, to demand that religion and politics should be kept separate in their country. BBC also conveyed that the protesters carried banners of Kemal Atatürk, the revered founder of the Turkish republic as a secular state. He was accused of having a secret agenda about transformation of the country into Iran. Tens of thousands of people came to near Atatürk's mausoleum. BBC reporter (14 April 2007) conveyed that the area was packed with people, many of them draped in the red-and-white national flag and chanting anti-Islamic slogans. The most repeated slogan was “Turkey is secular and will remain secular forever.” BBC interviewed some of the demonstrators. “I feel a little scared about the developments. I would not like to have an Islamic regime in Turkey,” one demonstrator, who gave her name as Nursel, told the BBC. “I would like to protect the secular system. That's why I am here. Especially as a female, this is very important for me.” (BBC, 2007a).

2.1.2. Istanbul 29 April 2007

Two weeks after the rally in Istanbul, the committee decided to organize another rally, this time in Istanbul. They announced that it was demanded by the society. The current president declared that he would not run for the elections but their candidate was Abdullah Gül, who was the head of the party before he was able to be elected.

As BBC (29 April 2007) reported hundreds of thousands of people rallied in Istanbul of secularism in Turkey, amid a row over a vote for the country's next president. In this rally the

demonstrators still claimed that the ruling party's candidate for the post remained loyal to his Islamic roots. On 27 April 2007 the army posted a statement on its website and accused the government of tolerating radical Islam and vowed to defend secularism. Business leaders also claimed early elections. However Abdullah Gül announced that he would not quit despite the growing critics from opponents and the army. Abdullah Gül accelerated Turkey's European Union accession as foreign minister and was seen as less confrontational than Prime Minister Erdoğan but these facts didn't convince Kemalists or as BBC calls them Secularists due to his wife's headscarf. His wife would be the first First Lady to wear a headscarf, which provoked the Kemalists the most. "Turkey is secular and will remain secular," again shouted the demonstrators from all over the country as they waved flags and pictures of Atatürk. Many sang nationalist songs called for the government's resignation. The rally was an enormous show of force. AKP spokesman Cemil Cicek responded to Friday's unusually forthright army statement, saying any intervention was inconceivable in a democratic state. The military, which led coups in the past, said it was concerned by the party's choice of presidential candidate (Mardell, 2007). Mardell (2007) also claimed that the army statement should be a message to the constitutional court judges to declare the vote invalid and dissolve the parliament.

2.1.3. Manisa 5 May 2007

Tens of thousands of Turks were taken to the streets again to show their support for Turkey's secular system. The protest in the western town of Manisa came a day before a key vote in parliament on the presidency. The ruling AK party tried to have its candidate, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, elected. A court ruled out an earlier vote after an opposition boycott meant there was no valid quorum in parliament. The protest was the third one within that month to be organized by supporters of Turkey's secular constitution.

Earlier protests in Ankara and Istanbul drew more than a million people. An early election aimed at ending the crisis would be held on 22 July. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had said that the constitutional court's ruling was like "firing a bullet at democracy". He further said that he wanted the president to be elected by the people not by parliament. On Saturday, Mr. Gül said he would win easily if that was the case. "Support for me is 70% [among the public]," he said. The opposition accused Mr. Gül of having a hidden Islamist agenda and said that if he became president it would threaten Turkey's secular tradition. He and the prime minister denied the accusations (BBC, 2007b).



Figure I. 14 April 2007 Ankara



Figure II. 14 April 2007, Ankara (near Atatürk's Mausoleum)



Figure III. 29 April 2007, Istanbul (On the Poster of Atatürk: „Sleep well”)



Figure IV. 5 May 2007, Manisa



Figure V. 13 May 2007, Izmir

2.1.4.Izmir 13 May 2007

At least one million Turks have rallied in the city of Izmir to protest against any government plans to undermine Turkish secularism. The major demonstration was the fourth since the ruling AKP nominated Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as its candidate for the country's presidency. Many Turks suspected Mr. Gül of having an Islamic agenda, something he denied before withdrawing his candidacy. Parliamentary elections scheduled for November are now to be held in July. The AKP - which has roots its in political Islam - argued that a general election would only prove that it consist of widespread public support. The government had also backed a constitutional reform package that would allow the president to be directly elected by the people. There were loud calls at the latest rally for opposition parties to unite and weaken the AKP at the polls. Opinion polls showed that the AKP remained the most popular party in Turkey, despite the mass protests. The demonstration in Izmir - Turkey's third-largest city - was the fourth mass gathering in favor of the republic in as many weeks. Buildings and streets in Izmir were covered in flags and portraits of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the republic. Boats flying the flag also joined the demonstration in Izmir's harbor. The main slogan, once again, was that Turkey is secular and will stay secular, a BBC correspondent said. Many of those rallying knew that their main aim was to make a clear statement to the government. "The AK Party will most likely win the elections but they will have to take into account these demonstrations and what people are saying," said Haluk Berk, a doctor and university teacher. "These rallies have been useful in forcing the government to take a step back," protester Neslihan Erkan told the Reuters news agency. "The danger is still not over. These rallies must continue until there is no longer a threat." Many secularists consider the government's efforts to confirm Mr. Gül as president as evidence of a hidden Islamist political agenda. The military, which regards itself as the guardian of Turkey's secularism, had also indicated its opposition to the AK Party's move (BBC, 2007c).

3. The Consequence of the Protests

As the consequence of the protests and the demands from several different actors, the AKP government decided on early parliamentary elections before the presidential elections took place. 2007 parliamentary elections again resulted with the victory of the AKP headed by Erdoğan. Subsequently, Abdullah Gül was elected as the state president. Having received so much power in the legislative and executive branches of the state, AKP started a big cleansing for the military members, who intervened the political life. The slogan “Turkey is and will remain secular” remained as the motto of Kemalists but the secular state is not anymore “guarded” by the military. This military feature of the protests has been discussed. The Kemalist reflex associated with antidemocratic behavior, which relies on the army and the constitutional court rather than the initiative of the society. The following chapter aims at clarifying the historical roots of this Kemalist reflex. The historical roots of Kemalist rhetoric is simultaneously the history of the modernization adventure of Turkey.

Chapter II

Historical Roots of the Rhetoric of Kemalist Woman's at the Republican Protests

The national woman is the mother of her children, comrade to her husband and a pioneer of modern civilized life (Göle, 1991). The national woman was created multi-functional and she was the corner stone of the Kemalist ideology in its expansion either as a mother or a professional. Her role was to be the pioneer of modern civilized life. Her contemporary struggle to define the public sphere primarily as “uncovered” and also “Turkish” as they did in the Republican Protests. Kemalist women claimed that they are the true representative of the nation and the rest of society should follow . This stance of the Kemalist women has deepened the cleavages between women in spite of their claim to represent, modernize and liberate all women. In this conjuncture Kemalist women's earlier role as educators and modernizers was seriously questioned, differences between women became more visible and adopted new dimensions at the same time. The hegemony of Kemalist women within women's activism in Turkey was openly questioned, and the political, social and cultural representation of “Turkish women” became a field of struggle (Çağatay, 2009).

They wanted their position as the true representatives of Turkish women back and the Republican Protests showed that the contemporary Kemalist women's organizations were not anymore only responding to Kemalism's abiding call to women to guard its principles but also they organized to defend their inherited political, socio-economic, and cultural privileges in Turkish society. As Turam argues (2008) as the socio-economic and educational gap between these groups of women decreased in the wake of democratization over the past decade, their different patterns of political engagement and leadership have come to divide them even further. Kemalist women struggled for their autonomous political cause.

Necla Arat and Nur Serter were the prominent actors in the Republican Protests due to their efforts in the organization committee but also their prominent Kemalist rhetoric in general.

Their speeches, which are analyzed below, had strong Kemalist motives, basing on nationalism with militarism and laicism with antidemocratic tendencies. Since their claim is that they are the true representatives of the Republic, it is important to see how they want to construct themselves and the “others”, so that the current polarization will be comprehensible for the reader.

1)Necla Arat

Necla Arat was born in 1940 and studied in the U.S.A.. She is an university professor and one of the founders of the Women Studies department at the University of Istanbul. She works for several of non-governmental organizations for women. During the republican protests, she was a parliamentarian from the opposition party CHP. On April 29, her speech was as follows;

“Beloved children of the secular republic, citizens, young people of all ages,who don’t betray Mustafa Kemal’s escrow. Welcome to the Çağlayan Rally for the Republic. I greet all of you with love and respect on the behalf of the organization committee.”

Arat started her speech from the beginning with defining the sides, which are two; the ones who don’t betray Mustafa Kemal’s state and the ones do. The ones that do betray the escrow were the reason of the protests. Sertter on the behalf of the Organization Committee clearly stayed loyal to the early modernization spirit; the duality of “us” and the “others”.

“As you know, in order to protect our republic we met at Tandoğan. We announced our voice together to the whole world. Today, those who joined the rally in Caglayan,from Istanbul, all over Europe and Anatolia, are here to demonstrate their commitment to the defense of national honor and independence and protect the basic values and principles of the nation state.”

The role of protecting the republic was given to the Kemalists and Atatürk mentioned this task in his statements. As Nükhet Sirman (2002) claims Kemalism is an ‘emotional’ ideology which always deals with honour, values and principles. The state was given human features and the nation was anticipated for an endless struggle to keep them as they were established in the beginning.

“We are here to say no to the global and local master of collaborators, who have dirty plans on our political, economic and cultural independence, we are here to give a great lesson to those who have an agenda on our political, economic and cultural liberty.”

Another remarkable feature of Kemalism is, that its definition without internal and external enemies who are always after ruining the state is not possible. The social engineering relies on the cleansing and finding the enemies within and outside the society. That is the reason, a true citizen must live naturally on alert and ask for “real reasons” not to be on the side of Kemalists.

“ We are here to defend Turkey's secular nature and stop the sneaky practises of those who want to change it step by step, we are here! We are here to show them that nation state and nationalism are alive. We are here to prove those who don't accept the positivism and science in the founding principles of the republic, are wrong.”

Arat sees no problem in showing her admiration for the nation state and pride of being a nationalist. The enemies are always undercover to damage this system but Kemalists are aware of it and won't let it happen. The positivism and science are possessed by the Kemalist state and the ones, who don't support Kemalism, should be also against science in their opinion.

“We are here to show that we don’t believe those who use the democracy as a tool to take its advantage. Those who say political Islam should first occupy the decision mechanisms must see that it’s a dead-end road and those who instrumentalise the religion will ultimately perish.”

The skepticism about the democracy and those who are in favor of it create fear. Non of the liberties should be allowed if there is an any chance to harm the nation state. Indeed Kemalism should be protected but democracy could be sometimes neglected at the cost of Kemalist secular state. Köker (2010) in his book “Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy” claims that Kemalism never sees the pluralist democracy as the achievement at the end. The scope was rather creating a society that ‘acts’ like western.

We are here to announce that our nationalist, secular, anti-imperial alliance keep the national interests and honour on top of everything. We share the same emotions and ideas with millions from all over Turkey.

This is the populist discourse that CHP often uses as an anti-imperialist party. However their policies on non-Kemalists have been extremely imperial or as Kadioğlu (1999) calls it colonial and also oriental. The emotional togetherness is an important paradigm.

We are here to call them to stop their permanent conflict with the republic’s basic institutions and values. We are here to say that we want a government as well as a president, which respects the laws of the Revolution. We are here to warn the opposition parties about the danger that the democracy and the secular regime are into. They need to come together. We are the people! We are the rulers! We are here to tell Mustafa Kemal that we are the owners and the defenders of the principles and we are here to say we protect our republic. I give my regards.”

Arat divides the government and the state institutions, particularly the constitutional court, into two as one side is the potential traitor and on the other side loyal member of the Kemalist system. The “danger” is so close that Arat calls the opposition parties for a coalition, who completely share different worldviews. However, it is just a detail when it is about the nation state and the Atatürk principles. The state which was given by Atatürk should be protected. The rest is a bunch of traitors and leftist dreamers who are not aware of the “danger”. “Are you aware of the danger?” is a well-known motto of the newspaper Cumhuriyet often used against the pro-Islamist society. The polarization was emphasized truly and named as Protectors vs. Betrayers.

2) Nur Serter

Professor Nur Serter was born in 1948 and studied at the Istanbul University. She worked for the Support for Modern Life Association (ÇYDD) and The Atatürkist Thought Association (ADD). She is a parliamentarian at the opposition party CHP. Her speech at the meeting was as follows:

“Welcome, fully independent Turkey lovers, democracy lovers, defenders of the secular republic, and true representatives of Turkey! We are here and we are the Turkish nation. We are the real owners of the secular and democratic republic. We are proud of being Turkish. We won’t let them realize their plan of invading Cankaya. Will you let them? –No.”

Serter starts with the standard sensitivities of the Kemalist ideology such as defending and protecting the country and being the “real” owner of it. She adds, after acknowledging that the state belongs to them, the secret plan of invading presidency (Çankaya) wouldn’t work because they won’t let them.

We are facing a mentality, which calls the General Commander of Turkey an officer. We kneel with respect in front of the Turkish Armed Force, in front of our glorious army. Long live Turkish Army! On April 27, the Turkish Army heard your voice, our voice and protected our voice and democracy. They protected secular republic and the real will of Turkish people. We allow nobody to insult the Turkish army.”

This is the lucid expression of the ideology. Serter talks about the Prime Minister Erdoğan here, who calls the head of the army as an officer of the state. She defined the army as the guarantee of the principles and with her militarist approach; the speech became a inciting for a coup or at least intervention of the military. The justification of the intervention was the need to be protected.

“Stop challenging Ataturk principles and reforms. And also stop challenging with his institutions. Stop abusing religion. Stop working with the imperialism. You can not ignore the people who protect their secular republic. Stop the election immediately. Go for the early elections! Let the people elect. Nationalists, patriots, social democrats get together! All the opposition should come together. Let bring Turkey again under the light of Ataturk! Get together!”

Serter ends her speech as Arat before with a “get together” invitation to the opposing parties. The ideological differences don’t matter. What matters is, that Kemalism shouldn’t be threatened by the Islamist forces that have a secret plan to transform the country to Ottoman times, in which people were pre-modern. The well-known wish of Kemalist women for Turkey is the ability to get back to the “Golden Age” of Atatürk. Through a strong indoctrination, particularly women were made believe that they owe Atatürk and nationalization everything. Here is a sample of daily propaganda of this ideology.

On every school-day in the morning a nearly identical ceremony takes place the length and breadth of Turkey. Children line up in school-yards from the Thracian border with Greece to the steep mountains stacked up against the Iraqi frontier. In the massive concrete sprawl of Istanbul, in whitewashed Mediterranean villages, in the harsh towns of the Anatolian plateau and in hamlets hidden in the forests of the Black Sea coast, the voices of teachers rise above the excited chatter. When silence has been imposed, morning assembly gets under way, usually with the aid of a scratchy amplifier. Though not officially religious, the ceremony which ensues is part of a ritual indoctrination in the ideology of the Turkish republic founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 'I am a Turk! I am honest! I am industrious!' the children shout in proud unison, whatever part their ancestors may have played in Turkey's jumbled mosaic of ethnic groups, religions and migrations. The slogans are various, but the message is the same for the young would-be citizens of modern Turkey. 'O Great Atatürk, I vow that I will march unhesitatingly along the road you opened, towards the goal you showed!' (Pope, 2004)

This morning ceremony told by Pope takes place in front of an Atatürk bust. This vow is part of the school life of children aged between 7 and 12, which is also completed with national hymn on Fridays as the closing of the week. There are other hymns, songs, poems for national celebrations, which create a great atmosphere to be a 'Turk' and defend it 'unhesitatingly' from the very early age. These elements of indoctrination such as ceremonies, official history books, speeches of school teachers and national symbols are the grand protectors of the republic. In these Atatürk and his reforms can not be criticized and should be embraced and protected.

Atatürk's adopted daughter Afet Inan (1981) opposes the authoritarian character of the republic by saying that Atatürk's political philosophy was not dogmatic, but practical and flexible; it was logical and objective and added that the founders of the modern Turkish

Republic were wise enough not to copy any of the doctrinaire revolutions which had emerged in the 19th Century. Afet Inan claimed that these revolutions were based on theories which could not be applied in countries where different conditions prevailed. This argument gave clues about the “uniqueness” of the perceived parliamentary democracy by the Founders. The Turkish Republic mainly stood on Westernization as modernization and struggling with the “other”, whoever resisted the new practices. The “other” of the system was chosen as Ottoman, which was an enormous cultural being relied on different religions and nations. Atatürk’s reorganization and exclusion of those, who didn’t fit the picture, created an authoritarian state with modernization policies.

Two principles; nationalism and secularism were the important paradigms of the new system. Their relation to women can not be comprehensible without the Ottoman heritage. The modernization attempts of Ottoman should be acknowledged to see the unnecessary gratitude addressing the Republic.

1.Denying Ottoman Heritage

The republic was based on the denial of the Ottoman heritage and its contributions to the society. The main claim is that all the reforms for the sake of modernization/westernization were first made efficiently and truly by Turkish Republic and on the contrary Ottoman Sultans were in favor of their Islamist worldview, which kept the society poor and illiterate. In this frame, the sides were established, the Ottoman was the symbol of backwardness and the Turkish Republic was the starter of the reforms, the survivor of the country and the emancipator of women. The women body was the main signifier in this process. Tekeli (1986) argues that giving rights to women was to prove the democratic nature of the Turkish Republic ruled by a single party. However, Turkey was far from being democratic and opposite to its claim it was also a continuation of the Ottoman Empire.

What is modernization?

Göle (2011) describes modernism as ‘awareness’ and ‘ability to make a decision’. She puts modernism in the western zone, where the state and the people have a longer bargaining tradition on rights. Göle says on the contrary of modernism, modernization doesn’t have a liberal character and the actors are mostly state elites. In the case of Turkey they consisted of the military and the bureaucracy. They wanted to ameliorate the country ‘despite of’ the illiterate people.

Hasan Bülent Kahraman (2008) claims both Ottoman and Republican modernizations aimed to find an answer to the question 'How to save the state?'. The reason for the modernization was to ameliorate the holy one: the State. Naturally the amelioration reflected to the society as well and it also became part of the process however the priority of the state never diminished. According to general acceptance of the scholars (Ahmad, 1999; Berkes, 1998; Jayawardena, 1986; Koker, 2010; Zürcher, 2003) the westernization process of Turkish society started with the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century on the contrary of the official history which gave all the share to Atatürk and his party. Çakır (2007) claims that the roots of modernization in Turkey are located in the final period of the Ottoman Empire (1839–1918). She defines both Ottoman and Turkish reformers as French Jacobins; they were centralist, authoritarian, and insistent with regard to realizing the ideals of the Enlightenment.

1.1.The modernization in Ottoman

Selim III

The institutions and the ideological movements transferred to the republic from the late 19th century; however the need of modernization appeared in the beginning of 18th century. The modernization as westernization was described two hundred years before Atatürk. From the 18th century on the Ottoman Empire started to reconsider its position in the world political system. The prestigious years remained as nostalgia due to the Western developments in

economics and military. Tulip Period (1718-1730) was the symbol of new policies and programs which created a rupture from the Ottoman state ethos basing on religion and jihad. Berkes (1998) claims that the elites of this period started getting involved with the European culture and reforms, subsequently the aggression of Ottoman died down. The territorial integrity was threatened by the consequences of the French Revolution. In order to regain power, first reforms were made in the field of military. Sultan Selim was assassinated by Janissaries (Household Troops of Ottoman) when he wanted to carry on with the reforms to ameliorate administration and military forces in 1807. Tulip Period and Sultan Selim III were instrumentalised during the nation-building to show barbarism of religious people who insisted on status quo. However Sultan Selim and his period were also used as a symbol of the unnecessary luxury the sultans used to have.

Mahmut II

Mahmut II was his successor and the performer of the modernization wave he started. Having witnessed Sultan Selim's tragic end, Mahmut II first quashed the Janissaries and then initiated the reforms. The massacre of the Janissaries, known to the reformers as the Vak'a-i Hayriye – the Auspicious Incident- completed the preparatory work which the Sultan had already begun with his campaigns to end provincial autonomy. The valley-lords and notables in the provinces, the Janissaries and dervishes in the capital, all those who restricted the arbitrary power of the Sultan, had been crushed and destroyed. Now no group remained that could challenge the Sultan's will. [...] Between the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 and his death in 1839, Mahmud II embarked on a great program of reforms; in them he laid down the main lines along which later Turkish reformers, in the nineteenth and to some extent even in the twentieth century, were to follow. In each field of reform, the creation of a new order was proceeded by the destruction of an old one (Lewis, 1968). “Naval and military students were sent to France and other European countries for training: 'the first outriders of a great

procession of Turkish students to Europe, who on their return played a role of immense importance to the transformation of their country' (Lewis, 1968). Mahmut II took religion, bureaucracy and army under the state control. As Ilber Ortaylı (2005) claims Murat II built a strong bureaucracy in the empire, which opened a path to the modern state. In 1826 he made a reform in clothing likewise Atatürk, which would be called 'Wardrobe Revolution' in a pejorative sense. His policy was the centralization of the Ottoman Empire. Berkes (1998) says the period beginning with the collapse of the New Order until the 1830s was spent to create a bureaucratic monarchy with totalitarian tendencies, which also fed new Turkish Republic later. The most significant outcome of these changes was the creation of a new bureaucratic class. This class, though loyal to the sultan and the Ottoman dynasty, possessed a higher sense of loyalty to the state which its members no longer saw as being manifested only in the person of the sultan. These new officials, who launched a new programme of reform and reorganization known in Turkish as the Tanzimat, were steeped in Western ideas and looked to Europe as their model and inspiration. Throughout the nineteenth century the men of the Tanzimat, followed by the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks, fought hard to establish European principles (Ahmad, 1999). By the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire was named as "sick man" by Europeans. More modernization or westernization was the solution and Sultan Abdülmecit followed his father Mahmut II by declaring Tanzimat Fermanı (Reorganization) in 1839 on which he guaranteed everybody that taxes would be collected fairly and all should practise religion in full liberty and with equal rights (Zürcher, 2003). Superiority of Europe was accepted with this edict. The reforms made prior to the Tanzimat were conformed with the principles of traditionalism and commitment to Islamic principles. After Tanzimat Europe was taken as a model in renovations. The State concept, bureaucratic organization, army, education, commercial and penal laws and even partly the court organization were changed according to their European samples. As a result, a duality within

the State occurred almost in every area (Acer, 2009). As Acer stated the reforms before Tanzimat Fermanı, were more focused on giving a re-birth to the empire. However Tanzimat Fermanı (Reorganization) as it's meaning reorganized the society and created a duality which is Old and New. The edict's other scope was to avoid the interference of Europe with internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire with the excuse of protecting minorities. There is a consensus among scholars on the fundamental changes with the Tanzimat in the theocratic Sultanate to the starting of a modern state. Berkes points out that Tanzimat was not welcomed especially by the muslim groups due to its non-muslim friendly character, which can be perceived as the resistance against modernization. However the modernization process was organized by the elites and went on without involving the opponents or any of the civilians outside of the frame. The most important contribution of the Tanzimat Edict to the Turkish history is that the first Ottoman intelligentsia raised in this term and that the first important step was taken on the way to realize the constitutional regime (Acer, 2009).

Abdülaziz

In 1861 Abdul Aziz started ruling the empire, who visited London, Paris and Vienna in 1867. He was the first Sultan, who travelled to Europe without political reasons. This incident can also be taken as an evidence of the interest and admiration to the West by the state elites. At the time that European ideas were spreading in the Ottoman Empire, a new literary movement arose which broke from the classical Turkish style and inspired by French writing. They tried to reconcile the Turkish Muslim identity with the pressure for modernization. After studying in France, they came back with ambitious plans. These liberal reformers, known as the 'Young Ottomans' were an organization of Ottoman nationalist intellectuals formed in 1865, influenced by Western thinkers and the French Revolution. In the time of nationalism they developed a concept of Ottomanism in order to hold the population together. In addition to the "Ottomanism" they created a dynastic state that would subordinate Islam to secular

institutions and allow non-Muslim subjects to participate in representative parliamentary institutions. They wanted a state depending on a constitution and a parliamentary. In 1867 they revolted against the Sultan and the absolutism, which ended with their defeat, subsequently the organization was declared forbidden and its members were sent to exile. They carried on the opposition and started the tradition of directing opposition from the outside of the country (Deringil, 1998).

Abdülhamit II

In 1876, Abdulhamit II came to the throne and declared the First Constitutional Rule. Parliament itself sat (in two sessions) until February 13, 1878, when the Sultan used the emergency situation brought about by the war to dissolve it and to prorogue the constitution indefinitely. From then on, Sultan Abdülhamit ruled his country as a true autocrat for thirty years. Bernard Lewis (1968) doesn't agree with the extremely negative image of Abdülhamit's reign, and thinks that there were continuing elements between the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods. Sultan Abdülhamit is an important figure in the republic history as well. He has been often mentioned to emphasize his unjust despotism in order to make republican propaganda. His improvements in the fields of education and communications had never been the topic. In his period the number of Western-type schools and the number of graduates increased and in 1900 the University of Istanbul opened. With the expansion of education for the first time the lower strata of population felt the Western influence. Deringil (1998) states this deeply divergent perspectives on Abdülhamit held by Turkish 'Islamists' and 'Secularists' is but one instance of the 'deep emotional divide [that] exists between these two perspectives. Each camp tends to conceive the other as a representative of a hostile world view, as if they live in separate worlds. Lewis (1968) writes that the second Turkish constitutional regime (1908-1918) lasted longer than the first one, but it too ended in failure, bitterness and disappointment. The dangers and difficulties, at home and abroad, were too great; the

defenders of the constitution were too few, too weak, too inept. Though the constitution remained in force and elections were still held, the regime degenerated into a kind of military oligarchy of the Young Turk leaders, which ended only with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The military oligarchy of the Young Turk leaders influenced the new Turkish Republic.

Young Turk Revolution

As Lewis (1968) states this revolution made by the Young Turks was the last hope to save the state in combination with the liberal promises. “Bu devlet nasıl kurtarılabilir”- “How can this state be saved”, was asked for the last time under the roof of the Ottoman Empire. Lewis (1968) describes the Young Turk Revolution as a patriotic movement of Muslim Turks, mostly soldiers, whose prime objective was to remove a fumbling and incompetent ruler and replace him by a government better able to maintain and defend the Empire against the dangers that threatened it. With the coming of the 1908 Revolution something made itself felt for the first time: the Turkish masses reacted politically rather than religiously. Unnoticed, the Hamidian regime had served to split the religion from the state in the minds not only of the educated but also of the masses. At last, the masses had entered into a stage where there could be a political association existing apart from the state and continuing when government collapsed (Berkes, 1998). Westernization, Islamization and Turkification were the competing bases for the reformation of the major social institutions- state, religion, family, education and economy (Berkes, 1998). The Young Turks movement included the Kemalist group, which would appear after the failure in World War I and organized the Liberation War with a motive of settling the nation-state of the Turks. The Young Turks were separated between these two tendencies, which were liberals, demanding some measure of decentralization and of some autonomous rights for the religious and national minorities; on the one hand, and the nationalists claiming for central authority and Turkish domination on the other hand. The

political instrument of the nationalist Young Turks was the Committee of Union and Progress. This party included different voices but the state oriented authoritarian features were accepted by the all members.

World War I

The empire had shrunk significantly with the loss of Libya to Italy in 1911-1912 and the amputation of the Balkan province in 1912-1913. The empire had become much more homogeneous and the Unionists (nationalists) were forced to rethink their entire ideology and administrative policy. They could not abandon any of the three elements in their ideology - Ottomanism, Islam and nationalism- and any change could only be one of emphasis. Despite the increasing importance of Turks as the most significant numerical group, Islam and not nationalism received the most emphasis; only some intellectuals in the capital took Turkish nationalism seriously (Ahmad, 1999). As Ahmad points out here, nationalism even in the time of disintegration was supported by only limited elites. People were still under the roof of Islam and their cultural identity was depending on it. The turification policies of the Young Turk's party, which was the Committee of Union and Progress was still holding all the opposing ideas altogether. In 1918 the Committee of Union and Progress, aware of its coming defeat, took the first steps to organize a national resistance movement, both in the capital and in the provinces [...] The plan to continue the struggle as a national guerilla from Anatolia was not new in 1918, but dated from 1915 [...] Mustafa Kemal took his final decision to go to Anatolia relatively late, probably around the middle of April, 1919, after he tried for six months to gain an influential position in politics in the capital [...] When Mustafa Kemal was appointed Inspector of the Ninth Army, the intention was that he should restore order in the Eastern Black Sea region. There were no means of banishing him from the capital nor a conscious attempt on the part of the government to start a national resistance movement. The officers were aware of Mustafa Kemal's plans and supported him in their execution

(Zürcher, 1984). On the contrary of the historical fact that Atatürk was in cooperation with the CUP, the official history claims that Atatürk organized the National War secretly and when the Ottoman sultan heard about it, they tried to chase Atatürk to prevent him to save the country.

1.2. Ottoman Women

The modernization period of the Ottoman Empire was also a stage for the debate on women rights since there was an active struggle by Ottoman women on the very topic. There were mainly two sides as on all the topics in the time of duality. Kandiyoti (1991) states women in the Ottoman polity were constituted as an ideological terrain upon which these two opposing viewpoints fought out their conflicts. These two opposing groups soon would appear in the new Republic under the name of Kemalists, who supported the radical changes and Islamists, who were moderate and had a more religious discourse than nationalist. There has been a clear continuity of seeing women as an ideological terrain since both modernization elites wanted to create responsible citizens, who should be educated and enlightened to be the perfect mothers for the modern citizens of the Ottoman Empire/Turkish Republic. In 19th century women started being politically active before the state elites subjected them as the symbol of modernity. Serpil Çakır (2007), who initiated a deep research on Ottoman feminism by examining the magazines and journals they published, stated that ‘to wake up, to see, and to demand’ are three verbs that Ottoman women used to describe their movement. Since the late nineteenth century, along with the processes of change and progress in different areas of the Ottoman world, women brought their demands for rights and freedom to the fore. They began to express themselves in society and created an agenda and awareness regarding their own rights in the public opinion. They created journals and associations in order to discuss their problems and propose solutions. While journals helped to amplify their voices, the associations helped to transform their individual claims into socially organized demands.

Sirman (1988) writes about a particular journal, called *Yerakki*, (*Progress*, a political journal devoting a special page to women), which was published in 1868 and suggested that education would help women to transform them into useful human beings. They also demanded more equality in the public sphere and criticized veiling, segregation and polygamy. The prominent woman essayist Fatma Aliye Hanim wrote a polemical essay said that polygamy was an Arab custom that had been adopted in the course of the centuries. The real rise of the women voices with the support of the state elites was in the Second Constitutional period (1908-1919) ushered in by the Young Turk Revolution. The Committee for Union and Progress came to power after the overthrow of Abdülhamit and declared their reforms for the nationalization project. They announced the period as time for freedom. However, the freedom, they argued, turned out to be only freedom for men; the reformists forgot about women once they obtained state power. Again, however, the liberation of women is used synonymously with progress and is linked closely to education. Emine Saniye, Fatma Aliye's sister, argues in 1910 that progress can only be obtained through the education of women and that it is up to women to undertake women's education (*Terakkiyat-i nisvaniyye'yi kimoen bekleyelim?*). A woman (Ismet Hakki) writing in *Mehasin* (Things Beautiful) in 1909 takes the argument even further by stating that rights can only be obtained by fighting (*Carpismak Intiyari*), and that it would be easier to safeguard rights for which a struggle had been waged (Sirman, 1988). There was a marked drive to increase the number of schools for girls. Trade schools for girls were increased and reformed. Several day and evening courses in cooking, sewing and child care were opened. The first girls' lycée was opened in 1911. Courses for nurses were started in 1913 and the number of scientifically trained nurses and midwives increased. Girls were admitted to secretarial and commercial courses. Women began to be active in exhibitions, ceremonies and philanthropic societies, especially in the Red Crescent Society founded in 1907. They began to appear here and there,

working in family stores and other small businesses. Thousands of women were employed in industry during World War I; these were mainly in the textile factories, and in the tobacco processing plants from which most of the men had been taken into military service. There was a purposeful drive to increase the number of women primary school teachers; special training courses were opened for them (Berkes, 1998).

Thus, various vocational schools, secondary schools, as well as a Women's University were established to train well-to-do urban women as schoolteachers and nurses. A few years later, when the Balkan war and the First World War broke out, these women actively participated in the war effort by raising funds, organizing supplies, tending the wounded and so on. The educational reforms of the Tanzimat did not only create the educated bourgeois woman. Elementary education in the Islamic schools and the widespread apprenticeship system that taught these women basic household skills laid the basis for the creation of a female proletariat (Isin, 1988).

In Istanbul at least, the increased participation of women in work outside the home created problems for Islamic ideals of segregation. In 1916, the Islamic Organization for the Employment of Women was founded with the expressed aim of teaching women to earn their living by working 'honorably'. This organization provided women with room and board and allowed them to live a secluded life by taking upon itself the transportation of the resident women to and from work (Toprak, 1988). To conclude Ottoman women started leaving their houses long before Atatürk "gave" their rights. They were important actors in the time wars but also their intellectual existence went hand in hand with the Ottoman modernization from the mid 19th century. When the new republic counted them as citizens, they deserved this title due to their efforts and not because of a feminist state, which was concerned about them. Their contribution to women was symbolic and not in the context of liberation but rather in the context of national politics. However the legal regulations were ameliorated.

2. New Republic and New Identities

Early Republican reforms (adoption of the Civil Code and abolition of Shari'a law in 1926, women's suffrage in 1934) gave Turkish women civil and political rights as part of the project to modernize the Turkish nation, as the status and roles of women were symbolic of Turkish modernity and progress (Berktaş, 2003; Durakbasa, 2009; Göle, 2011; Jayawardena, 1986; Kadioğlu, 1994; Kandiyoti, 1991; Sirman, 1988; Y. Arat, 1999; Z. Arat, 1999)

Kadioğlu (1994) claims that women had been burdened with the difficult task of defining the boundaries between tradition and modernity since the initiation of modernization projects from above not only by the Ottoman bureaucrats at the turn of the nineteenth century but also in the early republican years. The Kemalist intelligentsia instigated a sharper turn toward modernization with the explicit goal of bringing Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization. The ensuing reforms constituted an onslaught on the existing cultural practices. Kadioğlu uses the term hyperreality for the constructed identities in the monopoly period. Hyperreality is the term used by the Baudrillard, which refers to reality by proxy. According to Kadioğlu the symbols of Kemalism outpaced the real people. The people of the new Republic became the signifiers and defenders of the system. They became hyper real, the symbols replaced the reality. There are several reasons for being the free advocate of the state. The victory of the liberation war was possessed by only one group, which was in favor of fundamental modernization. People felt thankful and followed the founder of the state. State had the legitimacy to use force, if it is necessary. The Republican state itself evolved into what later scholars called a "feminist" state, a male-dominated state that made women's equality in the public sphere a national policy. The new government radically changed laws, encouraged women to unveil, to enter universities and professions, become airplane pilots, and run for parliament—in many cases before other European societies did. However, these state reforms represented only the vision of a single charismatic leader, the founder of the

Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the values and interests of a small group of urban, middleclass citizens. The Republican state determined the characteristics of the ideal woman and set up a monopolistic system to propagate this ideal in a population that held often quite different values and perceptions of ideal women's behavior (White, 2003).

Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the new Turkish state essayed the wholesale reorientation of Turkish society away from the Ottoman–Islamic past towards Western-style modernization. While banning the Ottoman fez and replacing it with the brimmed hat for men, the Kemalist regime urged women to remove their veils, to adopt Western fashions, and to work alongside men for the development of the new nation (Secor, 2010).

Despite the propagation of these nationalist messages, the reach of these reforms was not even, and for the most part changes in women's dress (and lives) have been inconsistently realized across in urban areas by uncovering their heads and benefiting from educational opportunities.

In 1927, women were allowed to work at state-run institutions. New women's colleges were opened in Istanbul and Ankara. In 1928, female teachers' colleges opened in music and physical culture specialties. The Kemalist reforms have actually opened the way for the Turkish woman to speedily penetrate nearly all domains of the Turkish public, political, and economic life. That, however, has been the case for mostly urban residents, particularly the metropolitan area. In the provinces the woman's situation still remained very distant from freedom. Women in Anatolia were not yet aware of these rights awarded to them by the new political system of the country, for they were, first and foremost, illiterate. They knew of only one authority, the authority of man, who exploited them as free labor. First it was the father, then the husband, and then the brother, if the husband died. Generally speaking, in the Turkish Province, the laws of life were stronger than the official laws. Even today, in the actual reality of the Turkish provincial life, there are a lot of cases of polygamy and trade in girls. Perhaps,

for many decades to come the official legislature will not be able to prevail over the traditional approaches (Safarian, 2007). As Safarian points out very well, the effect of modernization was in the cities rather than the whole country. Kemalism dealt mostly with the ideology and its expansion, which delayed restructuring the country and making a “real” change in women’s life.

White (2003) described the new life for women provided by the Republic as follows; she was expected to behave and dress in a way the state defined as a modern. Western manner. Women who felt that their religious beliefs required them to dress modestly and cover their heads, and women who kept to older customs—like sitting on cushions and eating at low trays instead of sitting on chairs at a table—were not accepted into this Republican sisterhood and were alternately reviled as the uncivilized primitive or romanticized as the “noble” peasant. Since poverty and rural origin hindered women from “obeying” the injunction to leave their homes, become educated, and contribute to the Republic’s professional life, social class and urban/rural differences were, from the beginning, implicit in the differentiation of the Republican woman from the “reactionary” woman. The ideal Republican woman was a “citizen woman”, urban and urbane, socially progressive, but also uncomplaining and dutiful at home. Modernity, as defined by the Turkish state, included marriage and children as a national duty for women. Marriage was to be companionate, rather than contractual and segregated, and children were to be raised “scientifically” by mothers educated in the latest childrearing and household techniques from the West. Beyond that, state feminism did not concern itself with what happened behind the closed doors of the home. The welfare and duties of women were discussed almost exclusively as attributes of the national ideal. The Kemalist woman was the product of the Kemalist state rather than an emancipated feminist woman who believes in democracy.

2.1.Kemalist State

The Kemalists were in a minority in the Grand National Assembly when the political struggle started in 1923. However, the leadership of Atatürk and the prestige he enjoyed as the hero of the war of liberation gave the Kemalists a great advantage. He established the Republican People's Party (CHP) and was elected as party's president. Meanwhile, elections were held and Atatürk was elected president. He appointed Fethi Okyar, an old friend and political associate from CUP days, prime minister, replacing Rauf Orbay who was one of the leaders of the conservative opposition. On 3 March 1924, the Grand National Assembly deposed the caliph and banished all the opposition. The ideology of Kemalism was launched when the Third Party Congress adopted the six 'fundamental and unchanging principles' of Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism and Reformism. These principles became the six arrows of the Republican Party, the symbol on the party's emblem. On 5 February 1937 they were incorporated into the constitution so that the amended Article 2 read: The Turkish State is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist and Reformist (Ahmad, 1999). The constitution didn't embrace the whole nation, it rather established as a booklet of a political party. The six principles were very ambiguously defined, which gave the floor to Constitutional Court to move freely on its decisions. Kemalism resided on secularism and nationalism, while the identities were created. The Republic inherited a society of rich and diverse traditions and then added on an enormous social change which introduced new modes of social differentiation and stratification. The Republic, in its attempt to form a new political community based on universal citizenship, had to find viable alternatives for the basis of power and legitimacy to the powerful institutions of the Sultanate and Caliphate. The Anatolian people in the 1920s were an overwhelmingly rural population of illiterate peasants. Hence, Westernizing reforms and a populist discourse involving a good deal of peasantism went hand in hand. The people were to be educated to become free citizens whose primary

loyalty would be directed to the nation-state. The omnipotence of the nation vis a vis the individual citizen was overtly emphasized. Yet in real terms, this was far from being the case (due to the multitude of communities) (Ayata, 1993). As Ayata states the Kemalist claim for the homogeneous Turkish nation with European cultural habits always have been far from being the reality. The reality appeared much more complex than one single society admiring and following the Kemalist reforms. However Kemalism was very influential within the state institutions and limited educated middle class. It followed the strong state tradition of Ottoman Empire, radical secularism as the distance from the Ottoman, Westernization against Islam, state feminism to have the women as the signifier of all this process hand in hand with military to protect the system.

Sirman (1988) argues that linking of women and democracy was also part of the struggle against Islamic forces, a struggle in which images of an essentially democratic and feminist Turkish past were frequently made use of. The most prominent phrase “emancipated but unliberated” by Kandiyoti (1994) was said to define women’s incomplete liberation process. However the state’s campaign for the reforms attracted a lot of women and they enjoyed their rights with enthusiasm. They internalized the reforms and stood on the behalf of the state. The state played the role of the protector. The strong state tradition was a continuity from the Ottoman times as Bozdogan and Kasaba (1997) describe. The newly founded republican state explicitly aimed at severing all ties with the Ottoman past, especially its Muslim institutional and legal framework, the strong state tradition continued to exert its presence during the process of modernization. It was the state elites who decided for the people, at times despite the people and defined the common good as Westernization and executed their decision with quite effective results. With the legitimacy that the strong state tradition gave them, they could resort to authoritarian measures to undertake their Westernizing reforms. They could thus institutionalize the republic, replace the religious legal framework with a secular one that

included the personal status code (and gave women equal rights to men in, for example, inheritance and divorce) and give suffrage to women. Although the strong state with its unitary transcendental concept of the common good could implement its Westernizing reforms, the practice of democracy could not be autocratically experienced. Republican secularism was suspicious of religion and demanded to be closely guarded. The reformist regime had alienated itself from the everyday life of the people. The balance between the individual and society has swung to the side of the Turkish Republic in 1923, priority given to the “common good” as defined by the state elite stifled the claims of the individual (Arat, 1999). In the realm of gender relations, the Kemalist “civilizing project” aimed at ending the seclusion of women by redefining their role in the public realm. In doing so, the project created women of its own image, closely bound with the creation of a national state and Westernized society (Ayata, 1993).

2.2.National and Secular State

In addition to the westernized society feature, the national state was built on the base of some myths from the distant past. As Arat (2000) states the founding fathers of the Republic exhibited creativity in “imagining” the national state by rejecting Islam, the traditional religion of the majority, and seeking to legitimize their project with a reference to the pre-Islamic Turkish past. This period was idealized, if not invented, to legitimize the Western values of secularism, equality and nationalism that the Turkish project of modernity sought to adopt. “They claimed these values already resided in Turkish culture. In the reinvention of the national cultural history women were very important. The Turkish intellectual Ziya Gökalp, who provided the ideological base for Turkish reforms after 1923, argued that women had been considered equal to men among the pre-Islamic Turks in Central Asia, unlike during the Islamic-Ottoman period.

According to Gökalp:

Old Turks were both democratic and feminist... In every business meeting woman and man had to be present together... For any verdict to be obeyed both hakan (male leader) and hatun (female leader) had to sign the decree... Women were not forced to cover up... A man could have only one wife... Women could become a ruler, a commander of a fort, a governor and an ambassador (Arat, 2000). Tekeli (1986) argues that it is true that the women's revolution was a significant part of Kemalism.

Our [feminists'] first question, however, is this: Was this revolution undertaken for women's own rights or was it used in some manner for the other transformation, the transformation Kemalism aimed to accomplish at the level of state. I solemnly believe there was such an instrumentality. Atatürk was a soldier and an excellent strategist. He was a person who could evaluate what women's rights meant in the context of the transformation of the state. He was a Jacobin and he made use of women's rights as much as he could (Tekeli, 1986).

Under the Kemalist Republican regime, opportunities for women's education and professionalism expanded. The new regime replaced the Islamic civil code with a secular code adopted from the Swiss.

Arat (1999) says that this code was a cornerstone in their project to ensure political victory over the Islamist opposition to the Kemalist modernists. Another crucial change was the suffrage to women in 1934. "Many held that suffrage was good for the country and it was Turkish tradition to engage women in state affairs." The active Ottoman women who were in struggle for their rights were never mentioned.

As Çakır (2007) clearly points out these critical transformations in the emancipation of women took place under the strict discretion and monopoly of the Kemalist elites. Women were not allowed to organize themselves on their own or to lobby for their own rights. Even though women had been demanding civil and political rights for themselves since Ottoman

times (without much success), an independent women's movement was not allowed to emerge during the Republican regime.

Yaprak Zihnioğlu's book (2003) on Nezihe Muhittin; a leading feminist at the time, elaborates her initiative for a Women's People's Party in 1923, but was denied permission to open it to prevent her party from competing with the Republican People's Party that the Kemalist elite had simultaneously founded. She was advised instead to form a women's union. This organization, which hosted the Congress of the International Federation of Women, was soon perceived as having too much of an independent voice in the public realm and was subsequently closed in 1935, due to pressures from Ankara (Zihnioğlu, 2003). The Kemalists allocated the whole public realm to the modernizing state and neither autonomous women's organizations nor other similar organizations could be tolerated. "The women, satisfied with the new rights they had been bestowed, acquiesced (Arat, 2000). In Turkey's jealously guarded public space, women were emancipated but only to the degree that the founding fathers saw fit. "This jealousy was successfully transformed to the republican women to check what fits and what doesn't to the "precious" public space.

3. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to make a multi-dimensional research on Kemalist woman to explain her contemporary reactions against pious woman particularly woman with headscarf. Kemalist woman's subordination will for Islam and its symbols were born with the new Republic. After the National Liberation War, Atatürk and his supporters started a series of reforms and woman was appointed for the pioneering role in the westernization process and defending role for afterwards. The founders of the republic led by Atatürk discredited and accused Ottoman Empire of being the reason of failure in the World War I due to its pre-modern remainder features unlike the new republic. They abolished the sultanate and announced the secular state. The westernization equaled to modernization was not only a political project but also a cultural one, which wanted people's active participation such as clothing in european style, attending mix-gendered events and learning new alphabet. The reforms addressed specially to the educated middle class, which already highly urbanized in the last quarter of 19th century. Rest of the country stayed excluded and remained indifferent to the reforms, except some shallow practices such as school ceremonies or national day celebrations. However, the state tried to control their daily life by sending republican teachers, opening nationalist institutions, obligatory five years of education and encouraging women to unveil. No critical approach was allowed and everybody was asked to love the republic and make the others love too. The modernization tried to implement a rapid change in the society rather than democratic practises. The elements of a constitutional parliament was there but the

implementation was overtaken by the state-government-party chain. This chain was naturally pointing Atatürk thought (Kemalism) since until 1950 Turkey was a mono-party state. There were several attempts to build an opposing party, but in most cases they were closed by the Constitutional Court due to their non-Kemalist attitude. The lucid duality in the society as the consequence of authoritarian modernization didn't show its face before 1980s. The phenomenon of emigration started in 1980s and soon after, the excluded 'periphery' found its discourse in Political Islam and demanded its share. According to Kemalist women, losing republican values was the same with the losing their position in the society. They felt threatened and started organizations and fight against the headscarf, which was accepted as the symbol of political Islam. This struggle was first fired in 1990s, subsequently in 1997 a soft coup took place and Kemalists found peace again after the members of the pro-Islamist party were prohibited for some years. The AKP was established by the progressive wing of this prohibited party. The fear reached the peak when it was the winner of the 2002 elections. In 2007 before the presidential elections Kemalist stood up for 'their' republic once again to show their reaction against a First Lady with a headscarf. They were well organized in several big cities and the army was also on their behalf, which gave an anti-democratic feature to these protests from the beginning.

This work claims that the rhetoric of Kemalist woman is and was based on militarist nationalism and authoritarian laicism which is a heritage from the Kemalist modernization project. Subsequently this heritage denied the Ottoman heritage and tried to create a one nation state from a multi-national empire. The dramatic division appeared between the ones who were in favor of Kemalism and the ones who were in favor of mild and slow changes. Ecevit (1970) claimed if one day the Kemalist intelligentsia had to make a choice between the principles of Atatürk and democracy, there were the ones who would choose the principles of Atatürk and believed that the nation wouldn't survive without them. Ecevit's argument

summarizes the rhetoric of the Kemalist Woman. These women think claim their rights wouldn't be protected if the state mechanisms didn't control the Islamists. The rhetoric is state versus society and each power is in struggle with one another for influence over the state (Yazici, 2001). A convergence of intellectual trends in the world and in Turkey over the past two decades have led to a widening debate on various institutions and aspects of "modernity" i.e. the nation state, centralized political structures, cultural uniformity, relations with minority groups and religion. In Turkey, Kemalism, a term often used in a generic sense to refer to a wide range of ideas and institutionalized forms of behaviour, has become a specific reference for critical viewpoints. One major aspect of Kemalism which is vigorously taken up in intellectual debates is its approach to the place of religion in society and its relation with other aspects of social and political life (Ayata, 1993). By systematically excluding Islam, Turkish modernization failed to direct indigenous culture into new channels so as to transform them into modern ones. Instead, with a single minded emphasis upon cultural homogeneity and uniformity, Turkish modernization attempted a total approach in importing and transplanting Western values and institutions. Thus the modernist attempt at civilizing could not successfully accommodate rising social groups and classes and fell short of providing them with new frameworks for social emulation (Göle, 1991).

Arat (1999) thinks Kemalist women have the Kemalist heritage 'which has stood for and legitimized the statist, solidarist understanding of democracy where the ruling elite that rules for the people at times does so despite the people. Secularists declare that the Islamist women are the best victims of an obscurantist ideology and usually the enemy against whom they must organize(Arat, 1999). As the Founders of the Republic they also don't believe an individual preference, their impression about the women with headscarf shaped itself accordingly. The pious women were cheated. They can't choose not to be Kemalist because it is the best way for a modern woman. Women should be grateful to Atatürk for their liberty.

The untouchable distance was noticed when Can Dündar was gathering material for his film as Yazıcı (2001) conveys; he realized that all information relating to Atatürk had been covered, veiled. According to Dündar, it is not all easy to try to reach “the Turks” recent history. Most of the social actors whose cultural productions are refer to in this paper label their work as a brave first step. The forces that are seen as hiding the truths of the past are referred to either as “official history” or as “they”. These forces are left to remain ambiguous and undefined (although frequently blame is assigned to the educational system) and are used to make the claim that the actors' “discovery” of the past is a heroic struggle against these forces.

Likewise Arat (1999), Yazıcı (2001) also thinks that the engagement with the past is very much a phenomenon of the middle class, the urban and the educated. Yazıcı claims that they are engaged vastly with the past (especially the 90s) due to the Islamist movement as a major challenge. Their task of “loving the republic” and the goal of “making the youth love the Republic” turned into a real struggle as they lost the power in the state institutions. The fight for developing love for the Republic has been present at exactly the moment when the “threats to the Republic” have been really felt, which turns it into a hegemonic claim as Cagatay(2009) defines for the Republican Protests. To conclude, this thesis suggests five significant determinations enrolled in the Kemalist women reflex throughout the history.

1) Turkish modernization project chose woman as the symbol to declare its independence from the past regulations (Arat, 1999, Kadioğlu, 1994). Thus modern women were to display their modernity (and modesty) through their physical appearance. Beauty contests, which began to be held by Cumhuriyet (the unofficial spokesperson of the state) in 1929, also revealed the preoccupation with this visibility (Olca, 2009).

2) Due to the desired distance from the Ottoman Empire, the whole heritage of modernization and women movements were ignored and the state elites of new republic acted as if they gave

the rights for granted. The gratitude to Atatürk and the republic became a must to be enlightened woman (Çakır, 2007).

3) Atatürk wanted to replace Islam with Kemalism. This new religion wanted to raise national awareness. In order to be Kemalist, one should be also nationalist as it has been the fairest nation for women because of its egalitarian roots from the distant past. To enter the public sphere several women didn't hesitate to be as it was regulated. Nationalism was perceived as a way to improve their condition (Jayawardena, 1986).

4) Kemalist women were entitled to modernize the rest of the society by educating them. In this frame the most honourable profession is teacher, who would bring the reforms to the corners of the country. Açıkel(2002) mentions the didactic feature of Kemalism, which bases on the social engineering. Kadioğlu (1994) thinks this could be also colonial feminism, which doesn't accept the native but it rather has the transforming scope for the "good".

5) With the rise of Political Islam in 1990s, Kemalist organised due to their awareness of the 'danger'. They didn't perceive it as a democratic development and another pattern of political engagement. In her claim the woman followed a militarist way and polarized the women on both sides.

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02.10.2007, Kendini ülkenin sahibi zannedenlere [Turkish state control, statism and supreme court]

30.10.2007, Bayraklama [The groups on the streets with flags]

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