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Abstract

This thesis looks at the potential impact that European integration may have on certain aspects of national political contestation. It begins from the idea that, because European integration has begun to affect areas that once belonged to the *domaine réservé* of the domestic arena of politics, national systems of representation should be affected by integration in the mean time. Some studies have looked at this with a focus on national elections as the epitome of the representative connection between citizens and the political elite.

Like this work, the thesis focuses on this element of political contestation in national politics in relation to European unification. Based on the literature in this area of political science, it constructs a theoretical model that connects the issue of European integration to the attractiveness of political parties as options for vote choice. By doing this, it deviates from the more common approach to this topic by focusing on utility formation within the framework of a two step rational choice model and stops short of looking at the actual choice made by individuals in elections.

Necessary conditions under which European integration would potentially affect this part of national politics are derived and then, all but one, tested for empirically. It is found that all necessary conditions hold. Four hypotheses are set up which stipulate that political parties can capitalise on the issue of European integration, that this potential has increased over time, that extreme parties benefit more from this issue than others and that the issue has more effect if individuals are opposed to European Unification.

The results from the empirical analysis are mixed. Evidence is found in support of the first two hypotheses, the third can neither be rejected nor embraced and for the fourth no evidence is found at all. In sum, the thesis finds that the conditions for the issue of European integration to make its way into political contestation at the national level in respect to the relationship between citizens and their representatives are present. In addition to this, not only do the conditions for this exist, but one can already find evidence of the traces of this phenomenon.

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1 Introduction

Once a country joins the European Union (EU), national politics - in theory - becomes more than just national politics. A national government produced through national elections then also becomes the instance which represents the interests of its people in the European Council; still the most powerful legislative organ in the European Union despite the increasing importance of the European Parliament.

With the deepening and widening of the Union, the domestic¹ policy areas that are affected by the legislation of the EU are on the increase and even the old *domaine réservé* of social policy is no longer immune to the influences of the EU in individual states [Leibfried, 2005]. There are no European parties that all European citizens can vote or not vote for in Europe wide elections, nor is there a European government that can be held accountable in such elections at the end of a term. Because of this and in light of the growing importance of EU politics for what happens at the national level, one would expect issues that are now dealt with at the European level to play an ever growing role at the national level. Seeing that the connection that the citizens of member states have with the supra-national level of European Union politics is via their governments, one can expect this growing role of the European Union at the national level not to restrict itself to the impact the EU has on national policies, but precisely because of this, that the European level will find its way into political contestation at the national level all the way to the polls.

This thesis, therefore, sets out to investigate whether the relationship between citizens and their national representatives, who are also their voice at the European level, is now subject to a newer dimension of European integration. The connection between citizens and the political elite of a country manifests itself in elections. But elections are not events that are only relevant on the days that the polls open every other year, but instead are the culmination of continued political contestation in the times in between.

¹The terms domestic and national are used interchangeably throughout this thesis. The same holds for the terms issue and dimension.

During this time, political parties will attempt to garner the favour of citizens, that come election day they may increase their chances in the outcome. This thesis will pay particular attention to the way that European integration as a potential issue dimension, affects the way that individuals evaluate political parties. By shifting the focus thus, it deviates slightly from the more common approach in the literature on this topic.

1.1 The Research Questions

The broad question that this thesis asks and tries to answer, is whether political parties can capitalise on the issue of European integration and what this looks like. More specifically, can parties profit, that is gain greater favour among a significant amount of citizens with the position they take on European integration? In other words, can or do some parties profit more than others or do perhaps some even lose support due to the position they take on EU integration? Are pro- and anti-EU integration positions of equal significance? Are the effects of EU integration positions different across parties that occupy different places in the left/right spectrum? Do extreme parties stand to gain more than mainstream parties? If such phenomena can be observed, have they changed over time?

The literature reviewed in section 2 looks at the effects or potential effects that individual preferences and party positions on European integration have on the electoral decision. This thesis will stop short of looking at electoral outcomes and will instead concentrate on the influence that positions on European integration could have on the attractiveness of political parties to citizens.

It has been a while since the idea was forwarded that European integration may become a new issue dimension on which political parties will have to compete as well in the national setting. This idea is best known as the *sleeping giant* hypothesis [van der Eijk and Franklin, 2001]. The inventors of this term as well as other researchers (see for e.g. de Vries [2007]) present the idea that most notably smaller parties, particularly those that can be found at the extremities of the left/right spectrum, will be able to profit from

the manifestation of individual positions on European integration. This will be a particular focus of the thesis and encompassed in the second research question. A further related question (the third research question), which takes up a suggestion made by Tillman [2004], in a slightly adapted form, is whether pro- and anti-EU positions influence preferences about parties in about the same order of magnitude. In sum, this thesis deals with the following questions:

1. **Can national political parties capitalise on the issue of European integration?**
2. **Has the importance of the issue of EU integration for the attractiveness of political parties to citizens changed (increased) over time?**
3. **Do extreme political parties profit more from their positions on European integration than more mainstream parties?**
4. **Do anti-EU positions have a greater effect on the attractiveness of political parties than pro-EU positions?**

The first question is of a rather general nature. It wishes to establish whether some, any or all political parties can profit (or perhaps also lose) on the position they take regarding European integration. The second question of whether this situation has changed over time, wishes to establish whether the disappearance of what became known as the 'permissive consensus' has led to an impact of European integration issues in the national party scene of member states from the perspective of the citizen in the sense of the individual demands on political parties. The third research question asks whether parties that lie at the extremities of the left/right dimension - termed extreme parties in this thesis - stand to gain more from the European integration dimension than more moderate parties. It has been suggested that moderate parties do not offer much choice on the European integration dimension (this is looked at and discussed in greater detail in section 5.4) than extreme parties. Should European integration be an issue of relevance for citizens and

should the choices offered by more extreme parties deviate significantly from these, European integration positions of parties would be a factor that would play a role in the way parties are viewed by individual persons. The last research question is related to the third. Parties in government are parties that have been and are involved in the process of European integration and will therefore rarely be viewed as anti-integrationist (for a related discussion and implications, see Manow and Döring [2007]). Citizens that view European integration as disadvantageous to themselves or their country as a whole, may accord more importance to anti-EU integration positions held by parties than individuals who do not hold such positions. The latter's preferences are on average at least better looked after by moderate parties and thus, the left/right dimension could be assumed to play a greater role for those deciding between parties that occupy a similar pro- or at least not anti-integrationist position on the European integration dimension.

1.2 Outline of the Thesis

The thesis begins in chapter 2 with a review of the literature that has been produced in the of political science into which the research questions of this thesis fall. This is followed by a discussion of relevant theory from political science in chapter 3. This discussion involves elements of representation theory pertaining particularly to the European Union and spatial models of voting. Special attention is paid to the idea of political space and more specifically that of a European political space, the electoral market and its actors and the concepts of rationality and utility. The fourth chapter then presents the theoretical framework of the thesis based on the preceding literature review and theoretical discussion. The framework is a rational choice one and the assumptions made about the actors and structures involved are described. The chapter also identifies and describes five necessary conditions under which it is assumed that the issue of European integration may impact voting behaviour in national elections. However, the model outlined in chapter 4 is not a voting model, but as will be explained, aims to to set up a framework in which the utility that individuals accord to political parties

can be understood.

Chapter 5 is the longest chapter in this thesis and has a number of objectives. It first describes the data that will be used in the empirical sections and presents the case selection. It then operationalises the research questions and turns them into testable hypotheses. The dependent variable is described in greater detail as it differs from that of vote choice which is most often used in the literature reviewed. Three different statistical models are then set up to which the data is then later applied. At least half of the chapter is dedicated to an empirical analysis of the necessary conditions that were identified for the theoretical framework. This includes conditions on political parties and the electorate with regard to preferences and positions on issue dimensions, as well as identifying the dimensionality of the European political space.

The four hypotheses that are set up in an attempt to answer the research questions are subjected to empirical analyses in chapter 6 with the use of the statistical models from the prior section. Chapter 7 summarises and concludes the thesis.

2 Literature Review

The literature looking at the effects of European integration on electoral dynamics at the national level is no longer entirely novel. The focus of scholars studying in this area, varies from effects on the party landscape, the connection between elections to the European parliament and national parliament to more specifically voting behaviour in national elections on its own. The focus of this thesis is on the last of these issues and thus, this is where the focus of the literature review presented in this chapter will lie. Nevertheless, the literature looking at the first two of the three questions will also be touched upon insofar as it helps to give an overview of the state of affairs in this area of research.

The majority of studies in this area has concentrated on elections to the European Parliament surrounding particularly the 'second order' phenomenon [Reif and Schmitt, 1980]. Such studies have dealt with the observation that in European parliamentary elections turnout tends to be lower and that government and big parties lose whereas small and extreme parties win votes in comparison to national election outcomes [Schmitt, 2005, der Eijk and Franklin, 1991, van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996a]. The literature looking at the effects of European integration on party systems has, in general, found very little evidence for any kind of impact (see for example Mair [2000]). The literature on the effect of European integration on the dynamics in national elections has to date received the least attention. Nevertheless, in the last decade, some literature addressing such questions has emerged. It presents and finds evidence for what has received the term *EU issue voting hypothesis* [Gabel, 2000, Tillman, 2004, de Vries, 2007, Tillman, 2009]. This hypothesis posits that the preferences over European integration influence vote decisions in national elections.

Common to most of the literature trying to identify the existence or non-existence of some kind of effect of European integration on vote choice, is the identification of conditions under which this can potentially be the case. The point of departure for most of this literature is the 'sleeping giant' hypothesis first presented by van der Eijk and Franklin in 2001. The authors

define the 'sleeping giant' hypothesis as as a situation where,"[...] despite its apparent irrelevance for political behavior, [pro-anti EU orientation] constitutes something of a "sleeping giant" that has the potential, if awakened, to impel voters to political behavior that (because of its orthogonality with left-right orientations) undercuts the bases for contemporary party mobilization in many, if not most, European polities. ".

One of the most cited papers in this line of argument is that by de Vries [2007] in which she investigates the hypothesis forwarded by van der Eijk and Franklin. For this, she first defines the term rather commonly used in the literature afterwards of *EU issue voting* as "the process in which attitudes towards European integration translate into national vote choice." She argues that EU issue voting is conditional on the following two factors:

1. the "degree of issue salience among voters" *and*
2. the "extent of partisan conflict over Europe".

The second condition is important because the 'giant' will awaken if there is opportunity for individuals to express their preferences on EU-integration.

Tillman [2004], writing prior to the 2007 de Vries article, presents four conditions that in no way contradict but add to those of de Vries listed above. These would be that:

1. citizens must be able to form preferences about European integration that are independent of the more 'traditional' preferences,
2. party leadership must formulate or have positions on the issue,
3. sufficient variation in the preferences on the issue for both parties and voters must be present and
4. the issue needs to be salient.

Nicolet [2007] takes the study of the impact of the European dimension a level deeper and defines three conditions under which the theory would predict it to take place. Her analysis takes place for individual parties and not countries. She outlines one condition at the individual level, one at the partisan level and a third at the state level:

1. individual: EU preferences are conditional on voter sophistication
2. partisan: the effect of European integration is stronger for parties that do not occupy middle ground on the EU dimension
3. extent of political contestation over European integration will have an effect.

The first two points are not really conditions as those we have shown from other literature. The crux of these two points lies more in the hypothesis that Nicolet [2007] has behind them, which is that there is much more variance in voter preferences and the effect over parties of European integration than one usually assumes. She finds that much of the variance in these two can be explained by voter sophistication and the place occupied by a party on the EU integration dimension respectively. The third condition we also find in de Vries [2007], but interestingly the two come to opposing conclusions. Nicolet, unlike de Vries, finds no significant results for the extent of partisan contestation over issues of European integration.

The results that can be found in the literature pertaining to EU issue voting are mixed. [Tillman, 2004], for example, finds EU issue voting in all the cases he looks at, whereas [de Vries, 2007, Tillman, 2009] find effects in some countries but not in others in larger samples. Nevertheless, the results, in general, present evidence that the 'sleeping giant' has begun to awaken. One notable exception to this is an article by Nicolet [2007]. She found that, contrary to what the 'sleeping giant' hypothesis would lead one to expect, that in the countries she studied there was a decrease in the effect of the European integration dimension over time.

All the work reviewed here, makes use of spatial models of voting; more precisely some form of the proximity model of voting (see section 3.2.2). Vote choice is used as the dependent variable and ,thus, some form of multinomial or conditional logit regression models are applied for the empirical analysis. The data is taken either from individual country election surveys or the European Election Study. This thesis will also apply a proximity model, but deviates from the reviewed literature in the choice of dependent variable and choice of statistical method used.

Another point that keeps on reappearing in the literature and will prove of importance for what follows, is the idea that some political parties have an interest in avoiding the development of a new dimension in the form of European integration and, therefore, attempt to integrate it into the left/right dimension (see for example [Hix and Lord, 1997]). Other parties, on the other hand, may have an interest in doing exactly the opposite [de Vries, 2007]. These are thought to be smaller parties or extreme parties with regard to the left/right dimension. Increased Euroscepticism [Netjes, 2004], may lead such political parties to try to open a new dimension for contestation. This is exactly in line with the 'sleeping giant' hypothesis.

de Vries [2008] notes that little is known about whether political parties gain or lose on the European integration dimension. Studies have tended to look at the effects on vote choice in a country in total and not at political parties individually. There is reason to believe that there will be considerable differences across political parties within countries. In this study of Danish, German, Dutch and British parties, de Vries finds much variance regarding the extent of issue voting across parties. The extent to which parties affected is a function of opposition status, degree of EU issue salience for a party and the level of extremism it exhibits on the EU issue dimension. She further finds, that EU issue voting does not depend on left/right extremism, but rather on extreme positions taken on the European integration dimension.

2.1 Lessons from the literature

In the final section of this chapter, we summarise some of the results found in the literature that will guide the rest of this thesis.

This very brief review of some of the literature that has been produced trying to answer questions on the potential effect of European integration on voting behaviour in national elections shows that there are some general conclusions starting to emerge, but that the results do not always point in the same direction. But it can be said, that on average, evidence can be found to support the hypothesis the European integration impacts the domestic political contestation in some form or another and this becomes visible in

numerous countries in national parliamentary elections.

Attention was paid in the literature review to the conditions under which European issue voting is thought to take place by different authors. Because these conditions will play an important role in the thesis, they are briefly summarised here again.

- Citizens must exhibit 'real' preferences on the European integration dimension.
- The European integration issue dimension must be salient for citizens.
- The European integration issue dimension must largely independent of the more traditional left/right issue dimension.
- Parties must exhibit discernible positions on the European integration dimension.
- There must be variance over the positions of parties and citizens on the European integration dimension.

These topics will be dealt with in greater detail in section 4.3 and analysed empirically in section 5.4 of the ensuing chapters. This is preceded by a general theoretical discussion in the following chapter and incorporated into the theoretical model of the thesis in chapter 4.

3 Theoretical Discussion

The literature reviewed in section 2, as well as the research questions of this thesis, fit into a number of broader discussions in political science. Of particular relevance are the debates surrounding voting behaviour and representation. Each of these draw on further debates in the discipline. In this section, a cursory view is thrown on representation in democratic systems and models of voting behaviour, and elements of the concepts of rationality and utility are discussed in preparation for the presentation in section 4 of the theoretical model to be applied in this thesis. Nothing of what follows bears the claim to an exhaustive review as only topics that are deemed as important and relevant for the thesis are discussed.

3.1 Representation

This section serves to look at why it can be interesting in the first place to pose and answer the questions of this thesis. In essence, this section takes a closer look at the issue of democratic representation in the European Union, something that is mostly deemed as wanting in one sense or another. Thus, we take a little closer look at the channels of representation that exist in the system of the European Union and what, more specifically, it is that subjects this system to be described in conjunction with terms such as 'democratic deficit' and 'legitimacy crisis'. This is then discussed under the lenses of the research questions in section 4.

The European Union may have a parliament that is directly elected by the citizens of the member states, but aside from a few, its functions are not the usual ones of a parliament in a democratic state; particularly it is a lot less powerful and does not take on a central position in the entire system. In parliamentary democracies, governments are elected by the members of the national parliaments. Although, the European parliament is required to agree to the choice of commissioners, the Commission can in no way be equated with a national government. The locus of decision making power remains with the European Council or the Council of Ministers, which are composed of heads of state and government or relevant ministers. These are

in turn not accountable to the European parliament, but to their respective national parliaments (see for e.g. van der Eijk and Franklin [1996b]).

The statement by Dinan [1994] quoted in Thomassen and Schmitt [1997] that “[i]f the European Community was a state and it applied to join the EU, it might be turned down on the grounds that it was not a democracy” would incite a vigorous nod of agreement on the part of some, a smile on the part of others or even a shrug of indifference from yet others. But there are two points implicitly contained in this statement that are of relevance here. First, the system of the European Union, as we have already ascertained in the previous paragraph and however one may position oneself normatively to this, is not comparable to the concept of democracy as we are used to it from the democratic nation state. Second, it makes reference to what is commonly termed, and which we have also already mentioned earlier, the ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union.


Which channels of representation and accountability are then present in the institutional framework of the European Union? According to Norris [1997], those available to the national electorates of member states can be divided into *direct* and *indirect* channels. The former refers to elections to the European parliament and the latter to votes cast in national elections. In light of the research questions, we are naturally more interested in the *indirect* channel of national parliamentary elections and, therefore, concentrate on this here.

On the one hand, the national parliaments elected in national elections choose the government which represents the country in the European Council and Council of Ministers and appoints commissioners. Should the electorate be dissatisfied with how they are being represented at the European level by their respective governments, they can express this in the next national election [Norris, 1997]². In this way, as she notes, the European Union functions more like an international organisation when it comes to holding national governments accountable for their actions in the European Union.

²Norris [1997] also notes that this mechanism of retrospective voting is rather problematic as Council decisions are made behind closed doors and little information is available to the public about how national representatives acted. This makes it rather difficult for citizens to make informed decisions in this regard.

The channels of representation in the European Union are displayed diagrammatically in figure 1. The arrows marked with N refer to the channels that are available in the national context and those labeled E to those that are specifically European. The latter category contains, existing since 1979, only the European parliamentary elections and has been the subject of much research in the mean time; particularly surrounding the debate on 'second order' elections [Reif and Schmitt, 1980]. The former, the indirect national channel, would theoretically - were it to be used - still be the most powerful one under the current institutional framework. It is this channel that the research questions of this thesis address.

Figure 1: Electoral access to European decision-making



Source: adapted from Mair [2000]

The concept of a 'democratic deficit' appears often in the literature about the European Union and is no longer something that is used only by members of this subdiscipline. Yet, as de Vries et al. [2010] note, the concept entails numerous ideas for which the attempt has been made by some to stylise it into the following five points:

1. European integration has made executives more powerful as compared to the legislative,
2. the European Parliament has a weak position compared to the Commission and Council,

3. European Parliament elections are 'second order',
4. there exists an elite/citizen gap (decision making at the European level is elite driven and too distant from the average citizen) and
5. many EU policies are not supported by the majority.

If one puts together what has been written on this topic over the years, one finds that it is mostly posited that the relationship between the European level of politics and policy and the citizens of member states can be summarised by three phases. Initially, a situation where European issues were more technical than anything else, that became known as the 'permissive consensus', existed that lasted from the creation of the European Union to the late 1980's or early 1990's. Tillman [2004] summarises this by three characteristics:

1. The public is uninformed and disinterested,
2. integration is elite driven and
3. there is no "EU issue public".

This phase was followed by what is termed the 'democratic deficit' outlined above, where citizens began to take on more interest and position themselves to the process of European integration. This became markedly visible around the time of the Maastricht Treaty. Studies have argued and found that the public does have (rational) preferences about the European Union and that these are systematic [Carruba, 2001]. Carruba [2001] finds that there are two opposing explanations that have been forwarded for this. In the first, which he terms *policy mood*, the public has rational preferences on issues in the sense that it becomes interested and makes an effort to inform itself when policies lie outside of what they feel to be an "acceptable" zone. This theory implies that policy makers or parties will wish to remain within this zone (determined by their constituents) and will then adjust their positions accordingly. In the second, *cue taking*, it is assumed that the public adopts as their own positions the positions that the parties they support

take on an issue. The two theories both imply the same correlation between public preferences and party positions, but opposite directions in terms of the mechanism.

The final, or current phase, that is to be found in the literature – a stronger idea than the 'democratic deficit' – is a 'legitimacy crisis'. For many, this became apparent at about the time of the French and Dutch no in the referenda to the Constitutional Treaty. The results of these referenda and the results of opinion polls in countries where they did not take place, is most often taken to be evidence that citizens in the member states are increasingly dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the Union [Schmidt, 2006]³.

European integration hence, fits into the broader phenomena of 'transnationalisation' and 'globalisation', but is yet substantially different and unique - in the mean time rarely analysed in an international relations framework⁴. According to de Vries et al. [2010], Robert Dahl [1994] proposes that the concept of democracy, the way it is applied to modern democracies of the nation state, cannot simply be transferred to something like the European Union. He thinks it can be compared to the transformation from the city state where democracy was direct to the nation state where we experience representative democracy. de Vries et al. [2010] further note, that Beetham and Lord [1998] propose an alternative in the form of *dual legitimisation* where two channels of legitimisation, one with directly elected representatives (EP) and one with a process at the national level via national political leaders, exist simultaneously.

The research questions of this thesis deal with the interaction between national political parties and the electorate in member states of the Eu-

³At this point I must say that I disagree with this conclusion with regards to the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in France. Having had the opportunity to experience the public debate around the treaty first hand whilst studying in that year in Paris, I tend to agree with those who claim that this referendum had at least as many domestic as European elements to it. In my view, the most fitting description I came across was given in a personal conversation by Laura Lund Olsen when she referred to the referendum as 'Raffarindum' in reference to the then French prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who incidentally also lost his job after the outcome of the referendum.

⁴This is exemplified by the fact that many studies of European integration in the mean time fit into a comparative politics framework and not at all into an international relations one.

ropean Union. Thus, we pay only attention to the first arrow labeled N in diagram 1, which basically stands for national parliamentary elections. The reason why we do this is because of the consequences elections have for the representation at the European level. Because electoral outcomes determine the composition of national parliaments, which in turn determine the governments which are the representatives of their respective country in the European Council and Council of Ministers and nominate commissioners, the electoral decision potentially gains another dimension. This further dimension has the prospective to change some of the dynamics of political contestation in member states. This idea of another dimension developing is further discussed in section 3.2.1 below.

3.2 Voting behaviour - spatial models

The models used in the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, were spatial models of politics. The approach used in this thesis also applies this logic of space and, therefore, the meaning of such models is briefly discussed in this section. We begin by defining space and looking at its applicability to explaining voting behaviour. Two concepts, central to such models, rationality and utility, are then discussed in greater detail. The section that then follows takes a closer look at the particular case of the European political space.

3.2.1 The idea of political space

When we talk about politics, we often, at least implicitly, use the idea of space. This “we” does not only refer to those dedicating a part of their lives to the study of politics, as ideas such as left and right or conservative and liberal are concepts that are also commonly used by the political layman to put order into and position themselves and others in the complex world of politics. According to Hinich and Munger [1997], the idea of ordering political positions along a continuum of left and right goes back to the first French parliament established after the French Revolution of 1789, but the idea of political contestation taking place within a space goes all the way

back to Aristoteles. These concepts are so familiar to us that they appear to be real, but it is not even necessary to observe that the same terms do not entail identical content across political systems to know that they are not real in the sense that they can be observed like an apple that has fallen from a tree, but are instead inherently constructs that help us to order and summarise that which we can observe.

The concept of space, as it is used in political science, was originally taken and adapted from economics. Policy space summarises the idea that issues can be viewed as a dimension in the form of a set of positions that are ordered; i.e for example, the 'traditional' left/right dimension allows one say that one position is more or less left than another. A policy space then consists of one or more policy dimensions [Hinich and Munger, 1997]. Spatial models of voting, thus, assume that there exists such a policy space with one or more dimensions on each of which actors can be positioned and compared to one another in terms of this position.

In this approach, elections are viewed much as a market with a demand and a supply side. On the supply side we generally find political parties and on the demand side the citizens as voters. Both are acting in the same space and are trying to reach some kind of optimum with their behaviour. To bring structure into this market model, some kind of assumptions need to be made about the rationality of the actors, which is the characteristic in such models that makes them want to optimise in a given situation. Further assumptions are made about what is being optimised, usually maximised, and this most often is described with the term of utility. How these two concepts are formulated in a model can have far reaching consequences for the expected outcomes of the model and its predictive power, which is why both of these are treated separately sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. But first, we talk more about this electoral market. Section 3.3 then discusses the particular case of the European political space.

3.2.2 The electoral market

The supply side of the electoral market in democratic systems is composed of the positions that political parties, of which there must be more than one, offer as a choice for citizens in elections. Political parties are thus, very central actors in modern representative democracies. According to Müller and Strom [1999], the objectives of political parties can be divided into (1) *office seeking* where they try to maximise “control over political office”, (2) *policy seeking* where they wish to maximise their “impact on public policy” and (3) *vote seeking*.

Müller and Strom [1999] emphasise that these three goals attributed to political parties cannot necessarily be maximised simultaneously as they may involve tradeoffs between one another. Furthermore, they note that vote seeking need not be equated to vote maximisation. Positions parties present on issues on the political market will be determined, to a large extent, by the weighing between the three goals in an attempt to achieve an optimal result under given conditions.

On the demand side, we find the voter who is confronted with the options on offer by different political parties. The voter, like political parties, is assumed to have preferences on the different dimensions of the political space and is, according to this position, capable of ranking the desirability of potential outcomes. How or according to what criteria will this voter choose? Spatial theories of voting behaviour offer three alternative explanations for the behaviour that can be observed for the electorate in democracies [Merrill and Grofman, 1999]:

1. party identification
2. proximity to the party positions on offer
3. the direction in which policy is affected by choices made

The first model, party identification, comes from one of the first larger research projects on voting behaviour and is also known as the *Michigan model*. In this model, individuals, mainly through socialisation, come to

identify with a particular party and this is the most important, if not only, predictor for vote choice in elections. The second, the *proximity model*, comes from Anthony Down's famous and much cited work, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, and still remains to this day the most commonly used approach, albeit in different variants. In this model, each voter has an *ideal point* on each issue dimension and will choose the party situated closest to this position. The third of these three models, the *directional model*, posits that individuals will vote for the party that would shift the status quo closer to their most preferred situation (see Merrill and Grofman [1999] for a slightly more detailed summary of these three models).

Because most of the studies reviewed use the proximity model of voting and because it will be applied in this thesis as well, we concentrate on this one. "In general, the *Downsian proximity model* (the traditional spatial model) specifies that *utility* – i.e., a voter's quantitative evaluation of a candidate – is a declining function of policy distance from voter to candidate. Thus, a voter's utility is greatest for a candidate holding identical positions with the voter on all issues and drops off as the candidate's spatial position recedes from that of the voter. The voter is assumed to prefer candidates for whom he has a higher utility. [Merrill and Grofman, 1999, pgs. 20-21]"

The proximity and directional voting model have in common that they make certain assumptions about the rationality of the voter and also political parties, as well as incorporate some kind of concept of utility. These two issues will be discussed in the next two sections. However, before we proceed to this discussion, we take a moment to focus on the spatial electoral models that are most commonly used and were also used in the studies reviewed for this thesis.

The electoral models applied in the reviewed research were models of vote choice. In such models, the dependent variable is the actual vote choice made by individuals in a particular election and these variables are therefore discrete. Such models are based on rational choice models which originally stem from economics. Individuals are presented with different alternatives to each of which they attribute some characteristics. Over these alternatives, individuals define preference relations by which they rank these. This ranking

is then often transformed into some type of utility function that serves to describe this preference ranking.

3.2.3 Rationality

Such models entail some kind of assumption pertaining to the type of rationality the actors in the model are thought to exhibit. Rationality in this context refers to the preferences of individuals [Schofield, 2008] and their actions relative to these preferences [Spohn, 2002]. The idea of rationality has been discussed and reviewed so much since its initial conception in about the eighteenth century, that it could even be viewed as a research field in its own right. There is obviously no way that this small section can do justice to this debate. There exists a myriad of different theories behind the term of rationality, alone in economics. We shall not dwell on these here (see Blume and Easley [2008] for an overview). Instead, we restrict ourselves to individual rationality as the voting models try to explain individual behaviour and discuss two different ideas of rationality prevalent in the social and behavioural⁵ sciences.

“The term “rational” denotes behaviour that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation. Simon [1985, pg.294]” Simon, to whom the concept of *bounded rationality* is usually attributed, discerns between two ideas of rationality to which we alluded to in the introductory paragraph of this section. The first, *substantive rationality*, refers to a situation in which solely the objectives of and the restrictions on an individual are considered. The individual is rational if the outcome optimises her situation, but no consideration is taken of the other characteristics of this individual. In other words, the action can be judged as rational if the individual, under given specifications of objectives and constraints, chooses the ‘objectively’ best outcome.

Even though this concept of rationality provides for very neat theoretical models, it has been the object of much criticism for a long time. The main problem that has been found with it has been empirical. Humans in the real

⁵The term behavioural used here, as it is in the social sciences, is not the same as when in it is used in psychology in the form of behaviouralism (see Simon [1985]).

world just do not appear to function according to this idea of rationality. The most famous objection has been that it is continuously found that individuals behave differently when a problem is framed in alternative ways. In particular, in situations involving risk it has been found that people's actions depend on whether they see the potential outcomes as gains or losses [Quattrone and Tversky, 1988].

The second idea of rationality Simon [1985] terms *procedural* or *bounded* rationality. In his own words, “[t]o derive the procedurally or boundedly rational choice in a situation, we must know the choosing organism’s goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw inferences from the information it possesses. We need know nothing about the objective situation in which the organism finds itself, except insofar as the situation influences the subjective representation. [Simon, 1985, pg.295]”

3.2.4 Utility

The concept of utility plays a central role in voting models, much like in any rational choice model. However, different concepts of utility exist across disciplines and different models use different types of measures for utility. Further, there are some issues with regards to the relationship between utility and choice in voting models in particular. As the different applications of these in models have weighty consequences, they merit a more detailed, even if not comprehensive, treatment. The discussion of these is presented in this section. The different concepts and measures of utility will be presented very briefly, but quite a bit more time will be spent on the relationship between utility and choice as this will be important for the formulation of the theoretical framework of this thesis, particular with regards to the choice of the dependent variable.

Different concepts of utility

Something that is rarely discussed and that took me a long time to find out, is that different academic traditions apply different concepts of util-

ity. Familiarity with only one of the concepts can lead to great confusion when confronted with the term as it is applied in another field. Merely in a footnote, van der Eijk et al. [2006], explain that one needs to differentiate between the concept as it is used in economics and its usage in psychology, consumer studies and electoral research.

In the economic tradition, particularly in game theory, the idea of “expected utility” is most commonly applied. Expected utility pays attention to uncertainty and risk that may be present in a given situation. An individual multiplies the utility she would enjoy from something if it would certainly occur with an objective or, most often, subjective probability to derive the expected utility of an outcome. The individual then maximises over the expected utility to choose the available action that would lead to the highest possible expected utility.

Seeing that electoral research often applies game theoretic concepts, it can then be particularly confusing if the idea of utility that is being used is not explicitly defined and left to the reader to infer. Unfortunately this is often the case. Also, because elections most certainly present situations with uncertainty, it is all the more confusing that this concept is not applied.

According to van der Eijk et al. [2006], in the traditions “individual choice theory” taken from psychology, utility and choice options are one and the same. The utility of different choice options integrate strategic and probabilistic considerations. In electoral studies political parties are viewed as providing some kind of utility to individuals.

Different measures of utility

Utility has to be measured in order for one to be able to work with it. For this, one needs to differentiate between *cardinal* and *ordinal* utilities. Ordinal utility is solely a ranking of different options. In other words, ordinal utilities only measure if one option is better than another. The cardinal utilities approach goes further than this, in that it also provides information on *how much* better one option is than another. That is to say, that for cardinal utility a difference of say 5 units between two alternatives is greater than

a difference of 2 units; this is not so for ordinal utility. I have seen the claim made in some literature that cardinal utility exists when utility can be displayed with a utility function of metric quality (e.g.: van der Eijk et al. [2006]). This assertion is incorrect as alternative options compared with ordinal utility can be and are usually mapped into the real numbers. The difference between the two utility functions stemming from ordinal and cardinal utility is their posterior interpretation.

It is for good reason that economics has largely divorced itself from any use of cardinal utility. Ordinal utility is applied whereby the utility function is used in optimisation problem subject to numerous constraints, from which individual demand is derived. Individual demand is then aggregated across individuals, but one never aggregates or compares the utility that individuals accord to something. The claim that there is little justification for comparing the magnitude of utility difference for an individual and more particularly across individuals lies at the base of the choice for ordinal utility.

Nevertheless, there are also arguments for cardinal utilities in certain contexts. Allais [1991] argues that despite the fact that “a complete theory of general economic equilibrium and maximum efficiency” is possible without cardinal utility, that this concept is absolutely indispensable for certain research questions in economics and elsewhere and that it is possible to construct such measures with the right survey questions (see also Camacho [1979] and Camacho [1980] for a discussion). Voting models, particular their empirical application, need a cardinal concept of utility for them to make sense. In the absence of this concept, it would not be possible to run statistical analyses with utilities as dependent or independent variables.

Utility and choice

In the preceding discussions of different voting models and utility, a connection between utility and choice was made. This connection is very central to rational choice models, because generally such models assume that individuals are trying to optimise (maximise) their utility by the choices they make. The connection between the two concepts is what explains individual and,

as result, collective behaviour.

Naturally, voting models of the kind that we have discussed, make precisely such a connection between utility and choice. However, there are some claims made in rational models of voting that I have difficulty with. It is claimed that individuals vote for parties that will provide them the highest level of utility. This does indeed make sense, but the problem in proximity models is that the utility of a political party for an individual is equated to the inverse of the distance between the most preferred policy position of an individual and that of a party. This is in principle problematic, but even more so if one is confronted with a multi-dimensional political space. If we take a two dimensional policy space, where parties and individuals have positions on both of the two dimensions, we need to look at the total distance between an individual's and a party's position. Yet, it does not appear strange to claim that one of the two dimensions may be more important to an individual than the other, in which case the interpretation of this distance in two dimensional space becomes rather difficult.

It would make more sense to view the policy distance between individuals and parties on different dimensions as part of that which explains the utility individuals accord to a party. One can easily come up with numerous other factors that may influence the utility individuals accord to political parties; the personality or good looks of individual party candidates or the level of competence one accords to a party in relation to another are just a few examples that could affect the utility attached to a party (see also Burden [1997]).

Proximity models have, despite this, fared rather well in explaining voting behaviour and this is probably because the proximity concept does capture one of the most important determinants of party utility. However, from a theoretical perspective they do appear a little more clumsy than from an empirical one. As van der Eijk et al. [2006, pg. 426] put it, voting models tend to fail to “explicitly distinguish between choice on the one hand, and the attractiveness of parties and candidates as options for choice.”

The explanations for choice presented do appear plausible when looking at two-party systems of democracy such as the United States or Great

Britain. Most models, were indeed designed to explain voting behaviour in elections in the former of these two countries. In such situations utility and choice may be compounded in such a manner without fear of detrimental consequences. In the case where the choice to be made is really only one between two options the outcome of an election can be presented as an expected utility. This no longer holds in the case of multi-party democracies with numerous smaller parties, as individuals vote for parties where they have good reason to assume that despite them succeeding in securing some seats in parliament will not make it into the next cabinet. The question then arises why people vote for such parties or to formulate it more starkly why multi-party democracies exist at all. This is relevant as the majority of countries in Europe are multi-party democracies.

The next question that comes up is why people vote at all, regardless of for which party or whether this be in a two or multi-party system. In fact, some game theoretical models of voting conclude that it is irrational to vote. As a mere example, we look at the expected weight of the individual votes for the Austrian parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2008. In the former year 6.107.892 individuals were eligible to vote and in the latter 6.333.109⁶. We calculate the weights for each individual should each eligible voter make the trip to the urns with $\frac{1}{\text{eligiblevoters}}$, which yields 0,000000164 and 0,000000158 for the years 2006 and 2008 respectively. With Austria being a rather small country with a current population of about 8,4 million⁷, the weight of each individual vote will be larger than in many other countries with larger populations. Nevertheless, the voter turnout in Austria was slightly over 78% in both years⁸.

These very small numbers for the expected weight of an individual vote do not give one the idea that one should expect turnout in such large

⁶Source: Bundesministerium für Inneres http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/nationalrat/start.aspx, accessed 18.12.2011. These figures include Austrian citizens living outside of Austria that are eligible to vote.

⁷Source: Statistik Austria http://www.statistik.at/web_de/presse/055278, accessed 18.12.2011. This figure includes individuals living in Austria without Austrian citizenship.

⁸Source: Bundesministerium für Inneres http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen/nationalrat/start.aspx, accessed 18.12.2011.

numbers, yet this is what one sees. This is at least as much a problem of the directional model of voting as of the proximity model, if not even more so. The directional model directly integrates the assumption that citizens vote with the idea that their vote can or may actually influence the direction that policy will take relative to the status quo. Therefore, there must be something else that motivates people to go to the urns (for example, duty, see: Blais [2000]).

To a certain extent, the choice of the dependent variable used in this thesis avoids this problem (see section 5.3.1), because we are not trying to explain actual vote choice. However, it does not avoid this problem entirely as the dependent variable measures the attractiveness of political parties as an option for vote choice and thus does imply to a certain extent that one expects that individuals do on average seriously consider voting in elections at some point in time or another.

From the preceding discussion, we see that the manner in which the concept of utility is applied in voting models, at least in my view, is not entirely unproblematic. Most of the problems arise in the situation where vote choice is used as the dependent variable and then at the same time making no distinction between attractiveness of options for choice and the actual choice. If one views decision problems as a two step process, where in a first instance individuals rank options (this is portrayed in the utility function) and in the second, they make decisions based on this, one must distinguish between the two. In short, the manner in which most voting models are applied collapses the two steps into one.

3.3 The European Political Space

This section takes a closer look at the nature of the European political space. The idea of a political space, in general, was already discussed and defined in section 3.2.1. Political scientists studying voting behaviour or, more generally, political contestation using this idea of political space, have asked how best to describe the political space in which actors act; in other words, whether domestic politics is best described along the one-dimensional

left/right space or is two or even more dimensional and this is just as relevant for the case of Europe in the context that we are looking at it here. The discussions around this could even be summarised by the question of whether there is actually such a thing as European political space.

The discussion in this section and analyses in later chapters are constrained by the requirements of the research questions. Analysing the nature of political spaces can lead one to the study of the substantive content of the individual dimensions of spaces across political systems (see for example Piurko et al. [forthcoming]) or a lengthy discussion of what the relevant areas of political contestations are. Despite these issues being immensely interesting, the ensuing discussion limits itself to the question of whether domestic left/right and European integration dimensions span a one or two dimensional space.

As the European Union member states are nation states that are all democratic, and most of them have been for quite some time, it can be assumed that the classic left-right dimension existed before their accession to the European Union or its predecessors. The question of whether there is such a thing as a European political space then implies the question of whether European integration is an issue that can be subsumed into this 'old' dimension or brings with it a further political dimension that is, at least to some extent, independent of it.

Part of the discussion on the 'permissive consensus' that was thought to exist in the European Union for a while, has been the idea that citizens exhibit no real or systematic preferences on the issue of integration [Gabel and Andersen, 2002]. The 'democratic deficit' came to be, also – though not only –, because citizens began to exhibit exactly such preferences. Because manifest preferences began to develop on the part of citizens, the dimension of European integration came into existence where it had not been before, namely in domestic political contestation, at least in a nascent form. This is exactly what we were making reference to in section 3.1, when we said that the structure of the European polity contains the potential for another dimension of contestation. However, the institutional mechanism alone is insufficient. As we outlined, this dimension must also be perceived on the

part of citizens: in such a way that they have manifest preferences on the issues it contains in order for us to be able to speak of a European political space. We take another look at this in the section outlining the theoretical framework of this thesis and then test for this empirically in section 5.4.3.

4 Theoretical Framework of the Thesis

This section presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. To this end, it draws on section 4 and the literature reviewed in section 2 as well as further literature.

4.1 Approach to Representation

As Thomassen and Schmitt [1997] rightly state “(t)he so-called democratic deficit is a meaningless phrase as long as one does not specify what one’s normative views on the European Union are. (pg.166)” However, the approach of this thesis is such that it is not required to take a normative position on this and this shall also not be done. As we are looking at the way in which, if at all, preferences on European integration affect the attitude of individuals towards individual political parties, it is not required that a position is taken on whether this should be the case or not. In order to answer the research questions it is also not necessary to take a position on whether the institutional mechanisms that were in place at the points in time under inspection are good or bad or whether or not they should be modified and if, how.

At the basis of this framework is the previously discussed paths of representation in the European Union. The thesis, and thus this framework, only pays attention to the national level of representation. That is to say, only national elections are looked at in relation to the European integration issue dimension.

As the data being used (see section 5.1) contains only three years between 1999 and 2009, we are forced to disregard the transition from the ‘permissive consensus’ to the ‘democratic crisis’ and can only look at potential changes to the ‘legitimacy crisis’ after the failed referenda to the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands. Thus, we can only try to see if we can find evidence of any change in the importance of attitudes on European integration at this point in time and not any earlier.

4.2 Electoral supply and demand

Like the majority of the work that has been made in this area of political science, the literature reviewed and the theory discussed in the previous section, the theoretical framework of this thesis is one that follows the rational choice perspective. Thus, the idea of an electoral market, with a supply and demand side of that which is put on offer by political parties and demanded by the electorate in a common political space, forms the basis of the theoretical frame. The assumptions made with respect to these two sets of actors is discussed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, and the two sides of this market are connected within a proximity model in section 4.2.3.

4.2.1 Supply: political parties

Political parties, as the "vehicles of political representation [Müller and Strom, 1999]", are the central actor on the supply side. The focus of the thesis is, however, more on the demand side of the voters and therefore, some strongly simplifying assumptions are made about this set of actors. This is done for analytic purposes, in order to keep the model parsimonious and should not have an effect on the outcomes of the empirical analysis.

First, it is assumed that political parties are unitary actors. This implies that political parties can be viewed as one actor that has preferences, positions and is capable of making decisions. How these positions and preferences or decisions are arrived at will not be our concern. One stark example suffices to show that this is a very simplifying assumption. The French Socialist Party was divided on diametrically opposed during the campaign surrounding the European constitutional treaty to such an extent that many commentators thought a scission to be an entirely possible scenario. Yet, such extreme cases are not the norm and trying to include the internal politics of political parties into the model used in this thesis would make everything wildly complicated and that unnecessarily so.

The second assumption made about political parties is that they are trying to optimise vote gain. Following again, Müller and Strom [1999] optimising vote gain need not necessarily be equated to vote maximisation as this

can conflict with other objectives political parties may have. But as votes are a prerequisite for some other objectives, this assumption will be central to the model in that we assume that parties position themselves along different dimensions in the political space with the attempt to attract as one of the main motivations for a particular choice of position.

4.2.2 Demand: Voters

On the other side of the electoral market we find the electorate. About these, we must also make some simplifying assumptions.

Voters are assumed to be boundedly rational individuals. This implies that we do not assume that individuals are perfectly informed and that they thus do not necessarily hold the views that an 'objective' expert would have.

No assumptions are made as to how voters come by their positions on the different dimensions as this has no effective bearing on the analysis. In other words, whether voters follow their preferred political parties (*cue taking* or whether they come to their positions via experience and the information they collect on an issue (*policy mood*) is left as an open question.

4.2.3 Connecting demand and supply: proximity

The demand and supply side discussed in the previous section are seen to come together most particularly on the day(s) of an election. Naturally, the positions on both sides of political parties and individuals will be constructed during the times between elections and there are numerous ways and directions in which this can take place, but this is not the concern of the research questions in this thesis. Thus, these mechanisms, however they may function, are not at all considered and the positions on the dimensions of the political space are taken for granted.

In section 3.2.2, three spatial models were presented of how this connection between the demand and supply side may take place. These were the 1) *party identification*, 2) *proximity* and 3) *directional* models. Here, the second of the three, the *proximity* model will be used. The first model would be of little use for the theoretical questions. It could, of course, be said that

party identification could change over time and that this could be influenced by issues surrounding European unification, but this would go beyond what we are trying to do here and also does not fit the theory behind this model too well. It then remains to argue the choice between the second and third options.

The first reason for choosing the proximity model is that it has been shown to work well empirically, albeit not always justified empirically in the context of voting models. Secondly, much of the literature reviewed uses this approach and as these studies serve as a point of reference for analysing the results in section 6 it makes more sense to use the same model. Third, despite the theory behind the two models being quite different, there is little evidence that the two models lead to significantly different results [Lewis and King, 1999].

4.2.4 Connecting demand and supply: attractiveness for choice

It must be emphasised again that, unlike the studies that were reviewed which tried to explain the impact of European integration on *vote choice*, that which will be explained in this thesis is *attractiveness of political parties as options for vote choice*.

4.2.5 Location of the electoral market: European political space


In section 3.3, the idea of a European political space was discussed. This European political space potentially entails two dimensions; the domestic left/right dimension and the European integration dimension. On the one hand, the dimensionality of this space, which is termed the European political space in line with [Marks and Steenbergen, 2002], will determine the methods that are applicable to the research question or may even render the research question entirely obsolete with the methods proposed for use in this thesis⁹. On the other hand, despite the emerging discussions in the literature that

⁹I am grateful for a comment made in the *Diplomanden/Dissertanten Konversationsforum* of Prof. Wolfgang C. Müller at the University of Vienna, which made me realise that one must differentiate between a question not being answerable by certain methods and a question being irrelevant in its entirety.

domestic political contestation may not best be captured by the left/right dimension alone [Thomassen, forthcoming 2012], I will restrict myself only to positions on the left/right scale with regards to the domestic dimension.

We therefore posit, that there exists a European political space which is either one or two dimensional. In the case where it is one dimensional, the left/right dimension captures all issues of relevance for political contestation and in the case where it is two dimensional there is another dimension, the European integration dimension, that captures an independent set of issues pertaining to the European Union. Whatever the nature of this space is, we assume that all citizens and all political parties act in this space, which means there exists only one space which is the same for all actors involved on both the demand and supply sides. We investigate the nature of the political space in section 5.4.3.

Figure 2: Two stage model of electoral choice



Source: reproduced from van der Eijk et al. [2006]

4.3 Defining the necessary conditions

In the previous sections certain conditions kept on appearing that were termed as requirements for EU issue voting to take place. We will term these necessary conditions. First, we define the concept of a necessary condition

and then summarise and discuss the necessary conditions for EU issue voting that we derived from the literature review and the theoretical discussions.

Definition: *Necessary Condition.*

"A (...) circumstance in whose absence the event in question cannot occur."

Clark [2008]

In other words, a necessary condition is something that is required to be present in order for an event to occur. Should this condition be absent the event or effect cannot occur, but it will not necessarily always occur in the presence of a necessary condition. Figure 3 visualises this concept. A condition that *always* causes an effect to occur is usually termed a sufficient condition. *None* of the necessary conditions we derived is also a sufficient condition, which implies that on the one hand their presence is required for, but on the other does not necessarily entail that EU issue voting will occur as a consequence.

Demand Side. Citizens as potential voters together with their policy preferences constitute the demand side of the electoral market. We have already specified the assumptions we make with regards to the electorate as actors. Following the literature reviewed, we require that individual citizens actually have 'real' or 'manifest' preferences on European integration. It goes without saying that if individuals were to have no preferences on this dimension we could not expect that any decisions they make on the electoral market will be influenced by this.

As a further necessary condition on the demand side, we require that citizens not only hold 'real' preferences, but also that these vary across them. Would all individuals occupy approximately the same position on this dimension, to speak of political contestation would not be meaningful.

For the left/right dimension we simply assume that these two conditions hold and take this for granted without looking further at it. This has the

analytic advantage that the left/right dimension can act as a point of reference for later empirical analyses. This is precisely what we will do when we test for this necessary condition later.

Supply Side. The supply side is composed of the positions of political parties on the relevant issue dimensions. We also list two necessary conditions on political parties. The first two are analogous to the those of citizens on the demand side. Firstly, we need political parties to have positions on the European integration dimension and secondly, that there is some kind of variance across parties with respect to these positions. One of the problems that was found by numerous authors (for example van der Eijk et al. [2006]) in reference to the 'democratic deficit' of the European Union was that political parties do not offer much choice on this dimension. European integration can obviously have no effect in national elections if political parties do not offer different options for choice to the electorate.


Once again, we assume that these conditions hold for political parties on the left/right dimension and use this dimension as a reference point to draw conclusions about the European integration dimension later.

European Political Space. In the discussion of the European political space in sections 3.3 and 4.2.5, we argued that for the questions posed in this thesis, a European political space must exist and that, furthermore, this space should be two-dimensional. In other words, we need to have two dimensions, one being the domestic left/right dimension and the other the European integration dimension *and* it should not be the case that the two dimensions can subsumed into one, but that they are to a certain extent independent of one another.

Salience. Salience of an issue, here, simply refers to the importance of an issue. If an issue is salient, it means that it is considered important to those for whom it is salient. As a last necessary condition, we require the that the European integration integration be salient for the electorate. An effect of European integration on the probability of an individual to vote for

a political party can only be expected if citizens think the issue sufficiently important, even if they have manifest preferences in this regard, for them to care about the position of a party on the issue.

Figure 3: Necessary Condition



Source: reconstructed from Clark [2008]

Table 1 summarises the necessary conditions. All necessary conditions listed in this table are subjected to a-priori tests in section 5.4, with the exception of the requirement for salience of the issue of European integration. Salience of the European integration issue will be treated as a theoretical assumption, particularly because it is difficult to test empirically with the data being used in this thesis.

In essence, the theoretical model requires all necessary conditions to hold in order for the dependent variable to be potentially affected by the distance between the position an individual holds on the EU integration dimension and the position of a party.

Table 1: Necessary Conditions for EU issue voting

Necessary Conditions:	
Supply side:	
1a.	citizens have manifest preferences about European integration
1b.	preferences about European integration vary across citizens
Demand side:	
2a.	political parties have positions on the issue of European integration
2b.	positions on the issue of European integration must vary across political parties
Political space:	
3.	left/right and European integration dimensions are independent for citizens
Salience:	
4.	European integration is a salient issue for citizens

4.4 Rationality, utility and choice

Rationality. In section 3.2.3 two concepts of rationality, *substantive* and *procedural* or *bounded* rationality were briefly discussed. In this thesis, we assume that the actors, both political parties and citizens as potential voters, are boundedly rational. This implies that these actors inform themselves in a cost effective manner on those issues they deem as important, but are not fully informed on all elements of a topic. As will be discussed in section 5.3.3, this is the basis for certain choices made with regards to the data to answer the research questions. The research questions are formulated in such a way that it makes more sense to view the situation from the perspective of citizens instead of the perspective of analysts. General public opinion does on occasion, perhaps even often, deviate from expert opinion. Hence, we apply data from mass surveys. This, however, does not require one to assume that the opinion of the masses is irrational. Indeed, if we were to do this, a model vested in a rational choice approach as it is applied here would fall apart in

its entirety. The assumption of bounded rationality, which is unrelated to the idea of irrationality, nicely fits our situation.

Utility and choice. The theoretical framework of the thesis stays in line with the assumptions made about utility in electoral models. Thus, it is assumed that political parties provide voters with utility. It is the potential impact of the European integration issue dimension on this utility that we are trying to look for.

In section 3.2.4 we spent much time on discussing the connection between utility and choice. It is with this connection that the thesis deviates from usual voting models that have been applied in the literature. Figure 2 depicts the two stage model of electoral choice for an individual that lies at the base of the theoretical model we are going to apply. We assume that in a first stage the electoral utility of a political party is determined by a number of factors and that, in a second step, some choice rule determines that actual choice then made in an election. We further assume that the electoral utilities of parties are an important factor in determining the vote choices of the electorate, but not the only. In the previous chapter, I objected to the way in which utility and choice are linked in the majority of voting models, but made no real attempt to offer an alternative. Because this thesis only tries to understand the electoral utility of political parties and not vote choice, such a theoretical alternative is not required for the thesis. In other words, we try only to contribute to the understanding of the first of the two steps in this electoral choice model.

By necessity, we assume that the utility attached to political parties is cardinal. This means that, on the one hand, the utility provided by a party to one individual can be compared to the utility that this party provides to another individual. In other words, we can say that the utility of one party is higher for one person than for another. In doing this, we can aggregate utilities across individuals and study what impacts on or explains changes in utility for political parties. The statistical models we will apply in the empirical analysis would make little sense were we not to use cardinal utilities.

4.5 Summary of the theoretical framework

The final section of this section briefly summarises the main points of the theoretical framework to be applied in this thesis.

- The model applied is a rational choice model of political contestation treated as an electoral market.
- At the basis of the model is a two-step electoral decision model, of which only the first step is integrated into the model.
- The electoral market consists of the supply side of issue positions on offer by political parties and the demand side of the voters who have most preferred positions on the same issues.
- Political contestation takes place within a political space that is the same for all actors.
- Political parties are assumed to be unitary actors that attempt to optimise vote gain.
- Voters and political parties are boundedly rational.
- Measures of cardinal utility are applied.
- Proximity on issue dimensions is claimed to be an important explanatory factor for the utility political parties present for individuals.
- Five necessary conditions pertaining to the demand and supply sides of the electoral market and the European political space must hold in order for EU issue voting to be able to take place.

5 Data and Method

This chapter outlines the model and methods that will be used in the empirical analysis in section 6. However, as some empirical questions need to be resolved before the statistical methods can be fully determined, this chapter also includes some prior empirical analyses. These prior empirical analyses pertain to the necessary conditions for the model that were derived in section 4.3. These results from this will then determine, in part, the choice of the statistical methods.

The chapter begins with a description of the data that will be used both in the preliminary empirical analyses and the empirical testing of the theoretical model later in section 6 and the details of the case selection. Section 5.3 operationalises the research questions, which entails a more detailed description of and choice motivation of the dependent variable, the derivation of the hypotheses from the research questions and an illustration of the statistical models that will be applied to test the hypotheses. This is followed by empirical tests of the necessary conditions.

5.1 Data

As the main source of data, this thesis will be using the European Election Study (EES)¹⁰ data [EES, 2009]. The EES has been conducted since 1979 in the member states of the European Union in the years of European Parliamentary (EP) elections. The study made with representative questionnaires in each country, is an attempt to gauge the perceptions and preferences of citizens about issues of the European Union as well as attitudes on the domestic level, but also includes an analysis of party manifestos in the framework of the Euromanifestos project. The data from the Euromanifesto project will not be used; solely the EES surveys will be applied.

There are obvious shortcomings that come hand in hand with using this

¹⁰I am very grateful to Guido Tiemann and his team at the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in Vienna for allowing me to use a more finely formatted version of the EES data set constructed for the FWF Project “Political Behaviour and Political Preferences in the European Political Space”.

data for the research questions. The respondents are replying to the questionnaire at a point in time that, with the exception of Luxembourg, does generally not coincide with the electoral campaigns for national parliamentary elections and the research questions do make reference to national elections. This can then produce a response bias. This problem is circumvented by the choice of the dependent variable which is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter (see section 5.3.1). However, the data set has a number of advantages as well. Firstly, the questions across countries are the same. Secondly, the data that is available is already available without the requirement of recoding different value levels.

Although the focus of the surveys is on EP elections, the questionnaires includes not only questions on the positioning of individuals and their perceptions of party positions on scales on the left/right and European integration dimensions, but also some sociodemographic questions that lend themselves well as control variables in the analyses. Three survey waves, those of the years 1999, 2004 and 2009 will be used.

5.2 Case selection

Twelve of the fifteen EU15 countries will be included in the analysis. Belgium, Italy and Sweden are excluded from the analysis. Belgium presents itself as a complicated case because of the deep divisions between Flanders and Wallonia, where the language and cultural differences also translate themselves into the political party landscape with different political parties operating in the two different areas. Some authors treat Belgium as two cases, however, I choose not to do this in this thesis as the case of the (also constitutionally) bilingual capital Brussels is not resolved by this method. The divides that cut across Belgium are not mirrored in Brussels, and the inhabitants Brussels make up about 10 percent of the Belgian population. Italy is excluded because of its unstable political party landscape. Italy is characterised by a much larger than average number of political parties and these parties tend not to be marked by stability over time. Sweden is left out of the analyses due to some data anomalies that are present for this country in

the EES surveys. These issues would have to be resolved for it to make sense to include Sweden.

The twelve newer member states of the European Union are excluded for two reasons. Firstly, the accession of these countries being relatively recent, the newer member states do not present good cases for looking at changes over time. Secondly, I am in possession of an insufficient amount of knowledge about these countries to make their inclusion in my analyses legitimate.

Thus, the empirical analysis will include all EU15 countries with the exceptions of Belgium, Italy and Sweden. In total this makes thirteen cases that will be analysed, whereby a case is defined here as a country across a particular time span. Thus, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Great Britain, Austria and Finland will be looked at. The EES surveys only began to ask placement questions on a European integration scale in the survey of 1999. As a result, we are restricted to three surveys, namely those from 1999, 2004 and 2009. For each country, to be able to answer the research questions, analyses will be run for each political party in a country and for the country as a whole separately for the survey years.

5.3 Operationalising the Research Questions

This section operationalises the research questions outlined in the introduction and relates them to the theoretical framework constructed in section 4. In a first instance, the choice of the dependent variable, the propensity to vote (PTV) is discussed. Second, testable hypotheses for the four research questions are designed. Third, these hypotheses are discussed in greater detail and translated into statistical models to which the EES data will be applied.

5.3.1 The dependent variable

Throughout, it was emphasised that the dependent variable used for the model in this thesis shall not be vote choice. Instead of vote choice, the propensity to vote (PTV) for a particular political party is the variable that

is to be explained. This subsection serves to present the reasons behind this choice.

The idea of the PTV, particularly as a dependent variable for voting models, was first proposed by van der Eijk et al. [2006]. The PTV is included in the EES surveys and is a respondent's answer to the following question that is asked in the EES survey for all political parties in a particular country:

We have a number of parties in [country] each of which would like to get your vote. How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties? Please specify your views on a 10-point-scale where 1 means "not at all probable" and 10 means "very probable". If you think of [Party x]: what mark out of ten best describes how probable it is that you will ever vote for [Party x]?

The PTV is presented by van der Eijk et al. [2006] as a direct measure of electoral utility. Unlike the most commonly used dependent variable for spatial electoral models of *vote choice*, the PTV measures how *attractive parties are for vote choice*. Although the two concepts are strongly related, they are fundamentally different. Choice is the outcome of an action, whereas the attractiveness of parties measures something that is more closely related to a preference ranking that will then be used with the application of a choice rule to make a choice.

There are three main, more technical, advantages to using the PTV instead of vote choice or vote intent as the dependent variable. Firstly, it is easier to capture information with regard to small parties that do not receive many votes in national elections. If few people voted for or intend to vote for a particular party, also few of these individuals will be included in a survey. This puts one in the situation of a small n problem and one is prevented from really studying the effects pertaining to these parties van der Eijk et al. [2006]. With too few relevant respondents, research questions 2 and 3 could probably not be studied well with the methods used in this thesis. These two questions make reference to extremist parties on the left/right and EU integration dimensions and in many cases this will involve small parties.

Secondly, it will be possible to include non-voters that respondent in the surveys in the analyses. Looking at vote choice requires that an individual actually voted or intends to vote in the next election. It has been found that not all too many non-voters in one election are constant non-voters [Braud, 2004]. As numerous individuals that did not vote in the last or do not intend to vote in the next national election, are still potential voters in future elections, the information included in their responses may be relevant and, therefore, there is no reason not to include them. Furthermore, there is a tendency for surveys to be plagued by a so called 'vote overreporting' problem, whereby the number of people who report having voted in an election when responding to questions in a mass survey lies significantly above the actually observed turnout levels. Selb and Munzert [2011] site two different causes for this overreporting bias. First, voters that actually did vote in an election may be overrepresented due to disproportionate self-selection of such individuals, which may on average be more politically interested than the average non-voter. Braud [2004], however, notes that non-voters can also include individuals that are politically interested, but feel that none of the options presented to them can incite them to vote. Including such individuals in the study can be interesting as the research questions refer to the potential advantages that political parties can get from EU integration issue positions and such individuals could become voters in future elections. In sum, voters and politically interested non-voters may be more willing to participate in an electoral studies survey. This leads to a selection bias.

The second cause the authors identify is misreporting. This occurs when non-voters report to have voted or their intent to vote in an election, presumably due to ideas of social desirability or other ideas held by an individual. This leads to a misclassification bias. Using the PTV measure as the dependent variable means that this particular misclassification bias, a problem inherent to the large majority of mass surveys [Selb and Munzert, 2011], can be entirely avoided. However, the selection bias cannot, nor can any other misclassification biases regarding the PTV or any other used variables be avoided.

A third advantage of the choice of the PTV as the dependent variable

presents itself in the fact that normal OLS can be used in the statistical analyses and thus complex conditional logit and multinomial logit methods can be avoided. Most of the literature applying vote choice models make use of such methods and they are rather complicated and not without their problems [McFadden, 1974].

5.3.2 Hypotheses

In what follows, testable hypotheses relating to the four research questions are stated.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *European integration impacts on the attractiveness of political parties for citizens.*

The issue of European integration affects the way in which individuals view parties. That is to say, that how much an individual likes a party can be and is affected in some cases by the position a party takes on the issue of European integration. The corresponding null hypothesis states that the issue of European integration does not affect the preferences individuals have over parties at all. Thus, in order to be able to reject the null hypothesis we require solely a single case of one party at one point in time where it can be shown that European integration preferences of individuals in relation to the position of this party has an effect on its popularity. An outcome where H1 can be thought to hold for only one case would not be very interesting or informative, but in light of the results in the literature reviewed in section 2 and the preceding theoretical discussion that an effect will be found for a larger number of parties.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *The importance of the European integration issue for the attractiveness of parties for citizens has increased over time.*

As was discussed in the introductory chapter to this thesis as well as in section 2, there is much evidence at least since the early nineties the permissive consensus with regards to European integration had largely been eroded and citizens had begun to view European integration much

more as an issue that was of relevance to themselves and more generally as factor in domestic political contestation. Thus, it can be assumed that how political parties, as primordial actors in the democratic system, are viewed by citizens will be increasingly affected over time by the positions parties and individuals take on European integration.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): *Extreme parties profit more from the European integration issue than moderate parties.*

Whether parties are considered as extreme or moderate is determined by their positions on the left/right scale. Both parties situated at the left and right extremities of this spectrum are regarded as extreme. Following de Vries [2007], extreme parties are defined as those whose position lies one standard deviation more or less away from the party average on the left/right scale (see section 5.3.3). Extreme parties also tend to be smaller parties than moderate parties and, as discussed in earlier sections, will have more interest in a new political dimension. As Mair [2000] notes, some extreme parties that also tend to be anti-integrationist do manage to garner a significant amount of the votes in national elections where he mentions the Austrian Freedom Party, the French National Front and the Swedish Left Party. Thus, a smaller average vote share for extremist parties does not render these irrelevant.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): *Anti-integration positions have a greater impact on individual preferences over parties than pro-integration positions.*

The political parties in European national governments tend not occupy anti-integrationist positions and are also the political parties most directly involved in the European integration process. As a result, in most cases they will not be seen as having an anti-integrationist position by the general public. Individuals that see European integration as largely undesirable will place greater importance on the issue when looking at political parties than those that see European integration in a more positive light.

5.3.3 The statistical model and variable choice

All hypotheses are tested according to some form of the following equation¹¹:

$$PTV_{jt} = \beta_{j,0t} + \beta_{j,1t}d(lr_j) + \beta_{j,2t}d(eu_j) + \beta_{j,3t-j,(k-1)t}X + u_{jt} \quad (1)$$

where PTV_{jt} is the propensity to vote for party j in year t ($t \in \{1999, 2004, 2009\}$), $d(lr_j)$ is the absolute distance between the positions of individuals lr_{it} and the position of party j as seen on average by survey respondents on the left/right scale. Analogously, $d(eu_j)$ is the absolute value of the distance between the positions of individuals lr_{it} and the position of party j as seen on average by survey respondents on the European integration scale. That is $d(lr_j) = (lr_{it} - \overline{lr_{jt}})$, where $\overline{lr_{jt}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n lr_{j,it}$ and $lr_{j,it}$, the position accorded to party j by individual i and $d(eu_j) = |eu_{it} - \overline{eu_{jt}}|$, where $\overline{eu_{jt}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n eu_{j,it}$ and $eu_{j,it}$, the position accorded to party j by individual i . The matrix X contains $k - 3$ control variables.

The control variables include gender and self-placement into a social class. It would be desirable to include further control variables such as retrospective and prospective economic evaluation or political sophistication. However, the variables included as controls are subject to their availability in the data set. To maintain the comparability of the results across different surveys, the regressions run should look the same, in the sense that the variables included are the same. Economic evaluation questions have unfortunately only been included since the 2004 survey and knowledge questions that would allow one to construct a political sophistication index only since 2009 (for a discussion of the importance of voter sophistication for mass elections see: Palfrey and Poole [1987]). This is a pity, as regressions run in the years where these variables were available showed that they do have a significant effect.

Further, it should be noted, particularly later for the interpretation of the results, that the scaling of the both the left/right and European integration scales were changed for the 2009 survey. In the prior years these ran between

¹¹The index i refers to individual respondents and j to political parties.

1 and 10, whereas in the 2009 survey between 0 and 10.

The results for hypothesis 1 and 2, as well as a part of those for hypothesis 4, are produced with the following regression equation:

$$PTV_{jt} = \beta_{j,0t} + \beta_{j,1t}d(lr_j) + \beta_{j,2t}d(eu_j) + \beta_{j,3t}anti_j + \beta_{j,4t-j,(k-1)t}X + u_{jt} \quad (2)$$

In equation 2 the variable $anti_j$ is a dummy variable that indicates if an individual was categorised as for or against European integration. The details to the construction of this variable can be found in the discussion of the statistical models for hypothesis 4 below. In what follows, the method that will be used to test the four hypotheses will be outlined in greater detail.

Hypothesis 1

European integration impacts on the attractiveness of political parties for citizens.

The first hypothesis postulates that cases (at least one) can be found where the issue of European integration significantly affects the average popularity of a political party. That is to say, that there exists at least one case where $\beta_{j,2t}$ has a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. Although the rejection of null hypothesis requires only one such case, it is expected that the cases will be more numerous. This hypothesis, however, says nothing about the sign of $\beta_{j,2t}$. In general, though, the signs for both $\beta_{j,1t}$ and $\beta_{j,2t}$ are expected to be negative as a party is assumed to drop in the favour of an individual the further it is from her position. This hypothesis is tested by running the regression displayed in equation 2 individually for each political party in a country in a particular survey year.

Hypothesis 2

The importance of the European integration issue for the attractiveness of parties for citizens has increased over time.

For this hypothesis to stand the test, there are three options. The first is that, there exist two time points t and $t + 1$, where $\beta_{j,2t+1} < \beta_{j,2t}$. The

direction of the inequality sign follows from the expectation that $\beta_{j,2t}$ and $\beta_{j,1t}$ will be negative. The second case would be where $\beta_{j,2t}$ becomes statistically significant where it was not at the time point prior to this. The last option would be that $\beta_{j,2t}$ gains in magnitude in absolute terms in relation to the coefficient for the left/right distance variable $\beta_{j,1t}$. This hypothesis is, by necessity, limited to cases where a party existed at both points in time that are being compared. The same regression results as for the first hypothesis are used for this one. The resulting β coefficients from equation 1 are simply compared over time.

Hypothesis 3

Extreme parties profit more from the European integration issue than moderate parties.

This hypothesis first requires a concrete definition for extreme left, extreme right and moderate parties. In line with de Vries [2007], we define left extremist parties as those parties whose position on the left/right dimension lies at least one standard deviation below the average position of all parties in a country, extreme right parties whose position lies at least one standard deviation above the national average and moderate parties as all others that do not fall into either of these categories:

- extreme left parties as parties for which $\overline{lr_{jt}} < \overline{lr_{ct}} - sd(\overline{lr_{ct}})$,
- extreme right parties as parties for which $\overline{lr_{jt}} > \overline{lr_{ct}} + sd(\overline{lr_{ct}})$ and
- moderate parties where $\overline{lr_{ct}} - sd(\overline{lr_{ct}}) \leq \overline{lr_{jt}} \leq \overline{lr_{ct}} + sd(\overline{lr_{ct}})$.

where $\overline{lr_{ct}}$ is the average party position in country c at time t and $sd(\overline{lr_{ct}})$ the standard deviation from this mean for country c at time t .

There are two possible ways one could approach this question. First, one could use the regression results obtained from the use of equation 1. One could then compare the outcomes for political parties that were categorised as extreme and those that were not. We would then expect that on average

$\beta_{e,2t} < \beta_{m,2t}$, where e is the subscript for an extreme party and m the subscript for a moderate one. Again, the direction of the inequality sign is due to the coefficients being expected to be negative.

A second way to approach this would be to run an alternative regression, where instead of treating each political party as a separate case, all political parties are included in a case for a particular survey year together with an interaction variable between a left/right extreme party dummy variable and the European integration distance variable. This model would have the following structure:

$$PTV_{cjt} = \beta_{c,0t} + \beta_{c,1t}d(lr_j) + \beta_{c,2t}d(eu_j) + \beta_{ce_t}int_ext_j + \beta_{j,3t-j,(k-1)t}X + u_{ct} \quad (3)$$

The variable int_ext_j is the interactive variable obtained by multiplying $d(eu_j)$ with the dummy $ext_lr_j \in \{0, 1\}$. ext_lr_j takes on the value of one for extreme parties on the left/right scale and zero otherwise. The interactive variable int_ext_j then takes on the value of zero in total for moderate political parties.

What kind of information does the coefficient β_{ce_t} provide us with? To see this more clearly we rewrite int_ext_j as $d(eu_j) * ext_lr_j$ and find the partial derivative for equation 3 with respect to $d(eu_j)$ (see Griffiths et al. [1993] and Wooldridge [2006]):

$$\frac{\partial(PTV_{cjt})}{\partial(d(eu_j))} = \beta_{c,2t} + \beta_{ce_t}ext_lr_j \quad (4)$$

From this we can see that β_{ce_t} will disappear for moderate parties and remains for parties that are extreme. Thus, β_{ce_t} should tell us any “extra” effect that the distance variable $d(eu_j)$ has on the dependent variable for individuals on average. In other words, we seek to find out if an individual on average places different value on the European integration dimension when confronted with an extreme party as opposed to a moderate one.

A regression of this form divides the sample into two subsamples, where the slope of the regression will be different for the two subsets. The for-

mulation of the hypothesis would lead us to expect that β_{ce_t} will also be negative. The closer that an extreme political party is in its position to that of an individual, the more we would expect it to rise in the favour of that individual. Should it be that the attractiveness of extreme political parties is more affected by the European integration dimension than moderate parties, as is proposed by the hypothesis, then this coefficient should show itself to be statistically significant. If the coefficient is not statistically significant and negative, the evaluation of a political party in relation to the European integration dimension does not decrease with increased distance between the position of the party and individual.

Hypothesis 4

Anti-integration positions have a greater impact on individual preferences over parties than pro-integration positions.

The manner in which this hypothesis was formulated, again two possible ways to approach it exist. We use two different regression analyses to look at this research question. Firstly, the regressions run with the application of equation 2 contains the variable $anti_j$ which categorises individuals according to their self-placement on the European integration scale. This variable is a dummy variable of the following structure:

- $anti_j = 1$ if $eu_i < 4.5$ for the years 1999 and 2004
- $anti_j = 1$ if $eu_i < 5$ for the year 2009
- $anti_j = 0$ otherwise

The variable has to be constructed differently for the year 2009 due to the change in the scaling of the variable in the questionnaire. This variable is included in equation 2. There is no particular expectation attached to the coefficient $\beta_{j,3_t}$ for this variable with regards to its sign. Recall that the regressions run with this equation are run separately for individual political parties. As $\beta_{j,3_t}$ is the coefficient for a dummy variable, we are splitting the sample into two subsamples contained in the same regression, one with those

that appreciate European integration and one with those that do not. In other words, we have two different intercepts for the two subsamples. First, $\beta_{j,0_t}$ on its own for those that were categorised as being at least not anti-integrationist and $\beta_{j,0_t} + \beta_{j,3_t}$ for those that were. It would make sense to assume that in the regression results for political parties that are themselves anti-integrationist that the total intercept will be larger for the subset of anti-integrationist individuals. Put differently, for such parties $\beta_{j,3_t}$ should be positive and for political parties that are more pro-integrationist negative. This is what we expect to find.

However, the procedure described above will only help us to answer the question of whether being pro- or anti-integrationist has any effect on the assessment individuals make of different political parties. What we will not be able to establish with this form of analysis is whether the European integration dimension, or the distance of political parties positions from individual positions will have any effect on the average evaluation of political parties by individuals. In other words, whether greater weight is given to the European integration dimension by those that are not too much in favour of European integration. In order to test this part of the hypothesis, we run a regression that is of a similar structure to the one run for hypothesis 3 described in equation 3:

$$PTV_{cjt} = \beta_{c,0_t} + \beta_{c,1_t}d(lr_j) + \beta_{c,2_t}d(eu_j) + \beta_{c,at}int_anti_j + \beta_{j,3_t-j,(k-1)_t}X + u_{c_t} \quad (5)$$

The sole difference between this equation and equation 3, is the interaction variable int_anti_j attached to the coefficient $\beta_{c,at}$, where $int_anti_j = d(eu_j)*anti_j$. Again, to facilitate the understanding of the results, we display the partial derivative of equation 5 with respect to $d(eu_j)$:

$$\frac{\partial(PTV_{cjt})}{\partial(d(eu_j))} = \beta_{c,2_t} + \beta_{c,at}int_anti_j \quad (6)$$

There are some important points that need to be made about the differences of this equation to those of equations 2 and 3. Firstly, the regressions

run according to equation 2 are run for political parties individually, whereas as those from equation 5, like those from equation 3, are run for entire countries in time period. Secondly, the interaction variable int_anti_j in equation 5 varies across all individuals in the sample because each individual receives a value for $anti_j$, whereas the interaction variable int_ext_j in equation 3 containing the variable ext_lr_j , which varies across political parties and *not* individuals, makes reference to political parties.

5.4 Testing for the necessary conditions

In section 4.3 we identified a number of necessary conditions under which it is possible that European integration affects the preference structure of individuals across political parties. On the demand side of the citizens it was said that citizens must 1) have manifest preferences about European integration and that 2) these preferences must vary across individuals. On the supply side of the political parties we similarly required that 1) political parties must have positions on the issue of European integration and 2) that there must be variance across parties in terms of these positions so that citizens are presented with a choice. A more general requirement was the existence of a two dimensional European political space. This section uses the EES data¹² to ascertain whether the necessary conditions for the research questions are in fact present.

5.4.1 Demand side

On the 'demand side' we first required voters to have 'real' attitudes or preferences not only on the left/right dimension, but also on the EU integration dimension (de Vries [2007]; van der Eijk and Franklin [2001]). We measure this by looking first, at the percent of responses to this question in the three EES surveys in comparison to the responses on the left/right dimension. If the majority of individuals is capable of placing themselves on the EU inte-

¹²It must be noted that the sample that we are using for these and the analyses in section 6 is reduced to those individuals that responded to the questions for self-placement on both the EU integration and left/right dimensions.

gration scale and if this number is not significantly less than those who are able to do so on the left/right scale, we will conclude that the preferences on European integration are 'real' or manifest. Non-response to self-placement is displayed in table 2. On average the non-response rates are rather low for both dimensions with some exceptions. Spain in the year 2004 and Finland, France and Luxembourg in 1999 stand out. But, even these comparatively large non-response rates, lie far below one half. Importantly, the rates for the European integration dimension are very similar in magnitude to those on the left/right scale, sometimes even smaller. From this we can permit ourselves to conclude that individuals have real or manifest preferences with regards to European integration.

Table 2: Non-response to self-placement on EU integration and left/right dimensions in %

	1999		2004		2009	
Country	EU	l/r	EU	l/r	EU	l/r
Austria	2.99	12.38	1.39	4.75	2.00	6.3
Germany	1.3	5.2	5.54	10.23	1.0	3.98
Denmark	5.39	6.79	5.69	6.53	0.7	1.7
Spain	7.9	16.8	31.87	20.12	4.4	4.0
Finland	15.77	14.77	4.11	5.22	1.2	3.6
France	12.06	20.1	0.43	1.92	3.9	8.5
Great Britain	6.55	10.85	4.67	12.80	2.5	9.2
Greece	7.80	9.2	2.2	4.8	2.9	9.2
Ireland	2.98	10.54	2.34	7.54	1.5	8.39
Luxembourg	11.3	16.28	1.72	5.39	2.4	6.09
Netherlands	3.5	8.39	7.76	8.95	1.39	3.48
Portugal	14.0	22.40	13.90	11.1	17.1	8.8

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009.

Secondly, we required that these preferences exhibit a certain amount of variance in order for them to have a potential impact on the way in which individuals judge parties. For this, we look at the standard deviations in responses to the self-positioning of individuals on the EU integration and left/right scales. The results are displayed in table 3, which tables the median

of the EU integration and left/right self-placements together with standard deviations (the measure we are mainly interested in) in brackets below for all countries in the sample for the years 1999, 2004 and 2009 of the three EES surveys.

Two things stand out in table 3. Firstly, for most countries in the table the median for EU integration has dropped over the time period looked at. We recall that the EU integration dimensions runs between 1 and 10, with 1 meaning that 'EU integration has gone too far' and 10 that EU integration should be pushed further. That is, in the 2009 survey it runs between 0 and 10. The middle value for the first two surveys is therefore 4.5 and 5 for the 2009 survey. Taking this into account, we see that the median has dropped more on average than appears at first glance from the 2004 to the 2009 survey. The average values for the EU integration dimension dropping over time then means that on average individuals in numerous countries wished to see EU integration being pushed further in 1999 than they did in the 2009 survey. This is most marked in Great Britain, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal, but also quite visible in Austria, Germany and Ireland. This downward trend is not so visible in the Netherlands or Denmark, where they appear to go into the opposite direction. Comparatively, albeit not entirely, the mean self-placements on the left/right dimension have been more stable during the time between 1999 and 2009.

Regarding the variance (standard deviation) of the two dimensions across individuals in a country in a year, it is interesting that in all but two cases (Denmark in 2009, the Netherlands in 1999), the variance was larger on the EU integration dimension than variance on the left/right dimension. In many cases it was a lot larger. To make this easier to see, table 4 portrays the results from a ratio calculated for this. This ratio is constructed by dividing the the standard deviations on the European integration scale by that of the left/right scale. A value above one indicates that there is more variance on the European integration than on the left/right dimension. This indicates that there are indeed varying views taken by individuals on this dimension, which political parties could potentially use to gain favour among certain individuals provided that the issue is important enough to individuals.

Table 3: Mean and standard deviations for EU integration and left/right self placement

	1999		2004		2009	
Country	EU	l/r	EU	l/r	EU	l/r
Austria	5.22 (2.69)	5.14 (1.89)	4.6 (2.74)	4.85 (1.92)	4.32 (3.14)	4.92 (2.18)
Germany	6.42 (2.54)	5.06 (2.07)	5.45 (2.76)	5.07 (2.0)	5.24 (2.98)	5.22 (2.26)
Denmark	5.18 (2.74)	5.69 (2.22)	5.31 (2.53)	5.88 (2.3)	5.36 (2.62)	5.16 (2.74)
Spain	6.57 (2.84)	4.94 (2.65)	6.31 (2.24)	4.17 (2.09)	6.43 (2.83)	4.78 (2.75)
Finland	4.47 (2.61)	5.98 (2.33)	4.45 (2.38)	5.98 (2.24)	4.37 (2.55)	6.0 (2.28)
France	6.41 (2.64)	4.72 (2.22)	5.62 (2.74)	4.75 (2.69)	4.77 (3.35)	4.88 (2.58)
Great Britain	4.74 (2.69)	5.1 (2.1)	4.14 (2.82)	5.31 (2.19)	3.74 (2.84)	5.39 (2.4)
Greece	7.12 (3.05)	5.79 (2.1)	6.6 (3.2)	6.04 (2.82)	5.39 (3.45)	4.95 (2.76)
Ireland	5.41 (2.57)	5.67 (2.07)	5.26 (2.5)	5.7 (2.3)	5.31 (2.67)	5.43 (2.46)
Luxembourg	6.57 (2.54)	5.49 (2.0)	5.14 (2.48)	5.5 (1.8)	4.88 (2.99)	5.36 (2.16)
Netherlands	6.47 (2.22)	5.34 (2.22)	5.18 (2.46)	5.05 (2.37)	5.55 (2.62)	5.05 (2.47)
Portugal	6.54 (3.49)	5.37 (1.86)	6.08 (2.93)	5.66 (2.81)	5.08 (3.12)	5.13 (2.5)

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009. Table contains mean with the standard deviations in brackets below.

Table 4: Ratio of citizen dispersion on the EU integration and left/right dimensions

Country	1999	2004	2009
Austria	1.42	1.43	1.44
Germany	1.22	1.38	1.32
Denmark	1.23	1.1	0.95
Spain	1.07	1.07	1.03
Finland	1.12	1.06	1.12
France	1.2	1.02	1.3
Great Britain	1.28	1.29	1.18
Greece	1.45	1.13	1.25
Ireland	1.24	1.07	1.09
Luxembourg	1.27	1.38	1.38
Netherlands	1.0	1.04	1.06
Portugal	1.88	1.04	1.25

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009.

Further, we required that these preferences on EU integration are salient. This we do not test directly with the data. Instead, we rely on the conclusions of Franklin and Wlezien [1997], that the salience of the European project has significantly increased over time. The salience of European integration is not directly incorporated into the statistical model. To test the hypotheses outlined in section 5.3.2, we calculate separate regressions by party, year and country (see section 5.3.3 for a discussion on this). The only way we are then able to ascertain the salience of the European integration issue is if we find that this dimension has an effect on our dependent variable. Any conclusions about salience are then merely inferred from the results in section 6.

5.4.2 Supply side

The *sleeping giant* hypothesis states that the 'giant can awaken' if voters have an outlet for their preferences regarding European integration at the polls. In other words, that which is on offer by political parties on what was termed the supply side must present different options for the electorate to decide between. To test whether this is indeed the case or not, we take a

look at the variance (we use the standard deviation as a measure for this) in party positions on European integration and we also compare this, as for the demand side, with variance on the left/right dimension. Again we use the three EES surveys for this. It could be argued that it would be preferable to use expert surveys for party positions as these would yield estimates that are more 'objective' or 'correct'. I choose not to do this because I deem it more appropriate to use the positions of political parties as it is perceived by individuals on average rather than expert opinions as there is reason to assume that they may sometimes deviate somewhat from one another. The reason why I hold this position is that it is often enough observable that views are held by the general public that no 'expert' in the relevant field would support. An excellent example of this is the idea that is held by many in numerous member states of the Eurozone, that the Euro has made life more expensive. No economist in her right mind would make such a claim. The average placement of political parties will be the measure used for party positions. Another argument for this choice is that voters are placing themselves on the same metric as they are placing the political parties. This means that the interpretation they give to a scale will be the same for themselves and political parties [Blais and Bodet, 2006, Golder and Stramski, 2010]. Further, the theoretical model assumes that individuals are boundedly rational. Therefore, "we must characterize the political situation, not as it appears "objectively" to the analyst, but as it appears subjectively to the actors. [Simon, 1985, pg. 298]" Some authors use the party placements of the most educated in the sample, whereas others use the mean across the whole sample. But Powell [2009] finds that there is no real difference in the results and thus we also use the average of the entire sample for a particular party in a particular year.

Table 5 displays the mean, range (max-min) and standard deviations for the average placements of political parties by country and year. The range was not calculated for the individual self-placements in table 3 as the responses are discrete and filled the entire available range as it suffices for two persons to locate themselves at one of the extremities for this to be the case. As average placements are being looked at in table 5 and there are few parties

as compared to individuals in the sample, the range will have a meaning. Although the range and the standard deviation will be very strongly related, the standard deviation is nevertheless given as the information contained in this measure is not entirely the same as the range. The standard deviation gives a measure for the variance about the mean, whereas the range indicates the distance between extremities.

There are a number of surprising results contained in table 5. The first thing, which does not appear as a surprise as it was expected, is that the range and standard deviations for the EU integration dimension are systematically, with only three exceptions (Germany and Denmark 1999 and Ireland 2009), smaller than for the left/right dimension. However, a little more surprisingly, there is not much of a systematic pattern to be discerned for the range and standard deviations over time. The magnitude of the differences differs across countries, where for countries such as Finland and France they are rather large and for others, such as particularly Great Britain, they are so small that they can be seen as negligible.

I had expected that, in general, there would be an increase in range and variance over time, but the results do not allow for such a conclusion at all. In fact there is no systematic pattern discernible over time¹³. In Finland and France the range and standard deviations increased quite a bit over time; in Austria and Luxembourg a little less. In Germany, Denmark and Portugal the perceived range and standard deviations actually decreased in the time period being looked at. In the rest of the countries in the sample, Spain, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands, the changes in these two measures did not take on one particular direction across the three points in time. These results appear to throw open more questions than they answer.

¹³It is important to note at this point that it does not make too much sense to view these figures over time as a 'trend'. Although they may be indicative of one, and we do in a superficial manner treat them a little as such, the measures are only given for three years for each country with a time lapse of four years in between. Certain issues make it to the fore at different points in time and they will be reflected in the data used here. Should a domestic issue be much debated in the media at the point in time of a survey, the partisan conflict over this issue will probably be viewed as great and thus the conflict on the left right dimension. Should such an issue be one concerning European integration, the converse will most probably hold.

Table 5: Mean, range and standard deviations for EU integration and left/right party positions

		1999		2004		2009	
Country		EU	l/r	EU	l/r	EU	l/r
Austria	mean	4.71	4.69	4.41	4.15	4.24	4.67
	range	2.61	3.67	3.02	5.58	4.26	5.97
	sd	0.87	1.23	1.22	2.02	1.63	1.92
Germany	mean	4.59	4.55	4.56	4.84	5.22	4.5
	range	4.32	4.19	3.71	4.73	2.56	5.64
	sd	1.55	1.54	1.22	1.7	0.95	1.92
Denmark	mean	4.2	4.7	4.28	4.64	5.04	5.41
	range	5.48	4.96	4.39	4.81	3.6	5.16
	sd	1.95	1.7	1.87	1.95	1.18	1.81
Spain	mean	4.68	4.19	5.34	4.04	4.09	4.11
	range	3.21	5.6	1.07	6.02	3.45	5.98
	sd	1.13	1.83	0.36	1.94	1.13	1.6
Finland	mean	4.84	4.0	4.84	5.02	5.23	5.47
	range	0.7	5.0	3.42	5.71	4.66	6.44
	sd	0.25	1.42	1.09	1.6	1.36	1.78
France	mean	4.98	5.0	3.73	4.37	4.38	4.24
	range	2.22	7.19	3.2	5.62	4.08	7.19
	sd	0.67	2.47	1.13	1.98	1.22	2.43
Great Britain	mean	3.93	4.12	4.04	4.55	3.91	4.7
	range	2.74	2.87	2.07	2.09	3.0	3.17
	sd	0.83	0.92	0.67	0.81	1.02	1.0
Greece	mean	5.09	4.61	4.51	4.59	4.8	5.07
	range	3.6	6.16	4.54	5.43	4.3	5.77
	sd	1.15	1.93	1.75	2.14	1.49	2.18
Ireland	mean	4.79	4.34	4.7	4.56	4.42	4.61
	range	2.71	3.37	2.0	3.0	3.35	3.15
	sd	0.8	1.18	0.66	1.3	1.24	1.05
Luxembourg	mean	5.02	4.02	4.57	4.18	4.42	4.42
	range	2.4	4.98	2.68	4.86	4.39	5.55
	sd	0.96	1.54	1.04	1.7	1.71	1.8
Netherlands	mean	4.62	4.95	4.82	5.0	5.0	5.35
	range	3.73	3.95	2.4	4.97	3.7	4.7
	sd	1.09	1.3	0.83	1.87	1.2	1.56
Portugal	mean	5.14	4.15	4.25	4.38	4.84	4.6
	range	3.72	6.81	2.87	4.37	2.55	5.93
	sd	1.52	2.66	1.14	1.75	0.98	2.54

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009.

Nevertheless, we can see that there are not so many cases in the sample where the standard deviations and range of the EU integration dimension are extremely small as compared to that of the left/right dimension. The smallest standard deviation can be found in Spain in 2004 with 0.36 and Finland in 1999 (Finland joined the European Union four years before this date) with 0.25. But in general the values are larger and we conclude that in most years in most countries there were options on offer, that although they varied less than on the left/right dimension, did present individuals with different choices with regards to the EU integration dimension. The theoretical discussion would suggest that the effects in the cases for which the choice on offer was very limited, we will not be able to find much effect of the EU integration dimension on the dependent variable. We will pay particular attention to such cases from table 5 in our analyses in section 6.

To get a better overview of partisan conflict on the two dimensions, we further tabulate a ratio measure proposed by de Vries [2007] which is measured by $\frac{sd(\overline{eu_{ct}})}{sd(\overline{lr_{ct}})}$, where $sd(\overline{eu_{ct}})$ is defined as the standard deviation from country mean of party positions on the EU integration dimension ($sd(\overline{lr_{ct}})$ was defined analogously earlier in the text).

Table 6 does not contain new information, but summarises the standard deviations of party positions for the EU integration and left/right dimensions from table 5. We read the ratios in this table as the relative partisan conflict of the two dimensions. A ratio smaller than 1 indicates that respondents view partisan conflict to be greater on the left/right dimension and conversely a ratio greater than 1 indicates a perception of greater partisan conflict on the EU integration dimension on the part of respondents.

Particularly Germany and Denmark appear to have had a significant decrease in party conflict over time, where domestic issues have had an upswing in importance.

These results are similar to those of Catherine de Vries de Vries [2007] for the four countries she looked at (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom), although not the same. She uses national election surveys and not the EES (this also means that the years she used are different across the countries she looks at) for her study and we would expect the results to

Table 6: Ratio of party dispersion on the EU integration and left/right dimensions

Country	1999	2004	2009
Austria	0.67	0.6	0.85
Germany	1.0	0.7	0.49
Denmark	1.15	0.96	0.65
Spain	0.62	0.19	0.71
Finland	0.18	0.68	0.76
France	0.27	0.57	0.5
Great Britain	0.9	0.83	1.02
Greece	0.6	0.82	0.68
Ireland	0.68	0.51	1.18
Luxembourg	0.62	0.61	0.95
Netherlands	0.84	0.44	0.77
Portugal	0.57	0.64	0.38

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009.

be a little different, which they are indeed. It is encouraging nevertheless, that the patterns visible in her results and those displayed here are similar in the sense that they exhibit similar patterns in relation to one another.

5.4.3 Political space

The idea of modeling political contestation as taking place within a political space was discussed in section 4. This part of the thesis serves to establish, based on the data used (described in section 5.1), whether the European political space is best viewed as a one or two dimensional space, or more precisely whether the left/right and European integration dimensions span a one or two dimensional space. As was argued before, this is of particular interest to us for the research questions of this thesis, because the research questions in conjunction with the methods and data proposed for answering them make only sense if the European political space can be viewed as two dimensional.

Should the left/right dimension capture the EU integration dimension entirely, there is no reason to assume that a spatial model could in any way

distinguish the effects of European integration from the effects of domestic issues as it were. Thus, the political science literature applying spatial models abounds with the use of terms such as space, dimensions, orthogonality, linear independence and correlation when describing the nature of a political space. In essence, these terms are borrowed from linear algebra, and despite them often being used synonymously in the literature, are by no means equivalent in the mathematical sense, albeit strongly related. Because of the importance of these mathematical ideas, one of the following sections is dedicated in large part to a discussion of this part of linear algebra¹⁴ and uses this area of mathematics to derive a model of the dimensions of political spaces.

The Approaches. Benoit and Laver [2011] forward ex-ante and ex-post approaches as a criterion for distinguishing the approaches used in studies looking at the dimensionality of political spaces. The approach taken to determining the political space within which the research question is posed is an ex-post approach in the sense that it asks what story the data tells. To be sure, a number of ex-ante assumptions are made when framing the analysis. Firstly, based on the discussion in 3.3, it is assumed that political preferences are structured in such a way that they can be subsumed in constructs such as the left/right dimension. Secondly, it is assumed that preferences about the European Union need not necessarily be captured equally well by the left/right dimension as domestic issue preferences are. Further, I am making the obvious assumption that I shall explicitly state nonetheless, that the data can tell the story relevant for my research questions. In other words, it is assumed that when people respond to the relevant questions in a questionnaire, these individuals associate very similar ideas and structures within one political system for the particular concepts. That is to say, one person's left and right is assumed to be very similar to the left and right of her neighbour.

¹⁴It should be noted here that because dimensions such as left and right are bounded (i.e. run for example between 0 and 10), the claim to be dealing with linear algebra is actually not correct. Bounded vector spaces leave the realm of linear algebra and need to be treated as topological spaces. However, as in this chapter we are only interested in the dimensions of this space regardless of its bounds, it is still meaningful to apply linear algebra and this also makes the task at hand significantly easier.

Lastly, the model and methods developed in this section to determine the dimensionality of the European political space are based on the assumption that the relationship between the domestic left/right and EU dimensions is linear. This is certainly not a trivial assumption in light of the famous inverted U-curve that manifests itself in expert survey data on the positions of parties on the two dimensions. This will be further discussed later.

The European Political Space as a Special Case. Marks and Steenbergen [2002] identify four possibilities for the relationship between the left/right and European integration dimensions, three of which are relevant here. The three types of relationship potentially existing between these two dimensions that can be distinguished within a comparative politics framework (the fourth possibility they forward is connected to an international relations framework) can be termed as:

1. orthogonal
2. oblique
3. fused in a single dimension

Both options 2. and 3. posit a linear relationship between the two dimensions. The relationship inherent to option 3 is a strong one, as here the positions of political actors on both dimensions can be subsumed into one. This would mean that the position on one of the two dimensions would be a perfect predictor for the other. This kind of relationship between policy positions in the European political space is associated with Tsebelis and Garrett [2000]. Should we find evidence for option 3., we would be forced to conclude that, according to the data used, the European political space is uni-dimensional and we would be done.

Option 1. - orthogonality between the dimensions - implies that there is no relationship at all between the two dimensions. In other words, knowing the position of a political actor on the left/right dimension gives us no information about their position on the European integration dimension and

vice versa. This model of the dimensions of the European political space is associated with Hix and Lord.

The second option - an oblique relationship - posits a relationship between the two dimensions that differs from that of option 3 in that an actor's position on the one dimension does provide information on her position on the other, but is not a perfect predictor in that the positions cannot be subsumed on one dimension. This model is associated with Hooghe and Marks.


An orthogonal or oblique relationship between the two dimensions implies a two dimensional political space, whereas the ability to fuse the two into a single dimension obviously implies a one dimensional space. If option three had to hold for the data the question asked in this thesis of the kind of influence that preferences about European integration on the part of the electorate has in national elections would be obsolete. If one's preferences about domestic politics and European integration have a one to one relationship as is suggested by this model, there is no possibility for someone to find any kind of motivation in their vote choice in a party's position on the European dimension.

This is no longer the case if the relationship between the two variable is not of this kind. In the case of a two dimensional European political space, the possibility that someone finds some part of their motivation for their vote choice in a party's position on the European integration dimensions does exist. Of course this does not immediately follow simply from the political space being two dimensional and it is precisely this which this thesis aims to investigate, provided that sufficient evidence is found to model the political space as two dimensional.

As was already suggested earlier, it is not enough to simply determine which dimensions the political space has, but also what kind of relationship exists between the dimensions. Possibility 3. has already been sufficiently discussed, but for the two dimensional case the possible relationships are described by options 1. and 2. If the relationship between the two variables is orthogonal, the research question can be tested with some form of ordinary regression analysis.

In the following we will construct a mathematical model of political space and then apply this model to the data to determine which of the three potential cases outlined above we are faced with.

Figure 4: Graphical illustration of the three possible scenarios of the relationship between the two dimensions



Source: own construction

A Mathematical Model of Political Space. If we take the policy positions of n persons within a political system on some scale, the data we collect can be viewed as a vector in $\mathbb{R}^n$. This vector on its own spans a line in $\mathbb{R}^n$. In other words, it spans a one dimensional space; that is, simply a line that is equivalent to $\mathbb{R}$. If we add another such vector in $\mathbb{R}^n$, the two vectors may be linearly independent in which case they span the plane $\mathbb{R}^2$ or linearly dependent in which case they span $\mathbb{R}$. We now define D_i as the vector of citizen positions on the domestic left/right scale and E_i as their preference vector on the European integration dimension for country i , with

$$E_c = (e_{1c}, e_{2c}, \dots, e_{nc})'$$

$$D_c = (d_{1c}, d_{2c}, \dots, d_{nc})',$$

where e_{ic} and d_{ic} are the positions of individual i in country c in the European integration and domestic left/right dimensions respectively. Figure 4 shows what such vectors could look like for the different scenarios of orthogonal, oblique or fused dimensions outlined earlier in section.

In the discussions of the papers reviewed about dimensionality, the terms

orthogonality, linear independence and correlation occur very often. The introduction promised a discussion of these terms and this will be presented here. Two vectors span a two dimensional space or $\mathbb{R}^2$ if they are linearly independent. This would occur for the cases in the diagram termed orthogonal and oblique. The two vectors are not linearly independent, that is linearly dependent, in the third case where together they span only one dimension. We concentrate on the two cases of linear independent vectors and call to mind the discussion from before, where we saw that in the case of orthogonal vectors the position on one vector provides no information about a position on the other and that in the case of oblique vectors some information about one of the two dimensions is contained in the other, but not all. My initial reaction was to calculate the correlation between the two vectors to distinguish between the two cases (and also the third) as other authors have done. However, it turns out that this is not an optimal strategy.


Rodgers et al. [1984] show that the relationship between linearly independent, orthogonal and uncorrelated vectors can be displayed as in figure 5. So for the cases of linear independence, it is possible for a correlation coefficient to equal zero, also when the vectors are not orthogonal and this we do not want, as we wish to have a measure that can distinguish between the two cases. (See also Gibbons [1968] for a brief discussion on zero correlation and independence of variable.)

Based on this discussion, I present another measure to look at the relationship between two vectors. This measure, which I shall term the *CS*-measure in this text, is most commonly known as the cosine of similarity or uncentred correlation coefficient. It uses the fact that the angle between two vectors can be described as their cosine. We define the *CS*-measure for a country c as follows:

$$CS_c = \cos(\alpha) = \frac{(D_c)'(E_c)}{||D_c|| ||E_c||} \quad (7)$$

where $||\cdot||$ is the Euclidean norm of a vector and α the angle between two vectors. The reader will recognise the similarity to the correlation coefficient. The *CS*-measure has a very similar structure, however, unlike the correlation

Figure 5: The relationship between linearly independent, orthogonal, and uncorrelated variables



Source: reconstructed from Rodgers et al. [1984]

coefficient it makes use of the raw vectors instead of the centred vectors. Using figure 4, it is easy to see that if two vectors are orthogonal they have an angle of 90° between them and we know that $\cos(90^\circ) = 0$. So, if two vectors span a two dimensional space and are furthermore orthogonal, the *CS*-measure is zero. On the other extreme, when the two vectors lie on the same line in that they span a one dimensional space, the angle between them is 0° and the *CS*-measure is then equal to one or minus 1. In the remaining cases, it will hold that two vectors are linearly independent and as such span a two dimensional space, where $CS \in (-1, 0) \cup (0, 1)$. This is summarised in table 7.

Thus, the *CS*-measure provides a “nice” normalised measure of the relationship between two vectors in the sense that the interpretation is familiar from the correlation coefficient. However, the two measures measure different things: whereas the *CS*-measure looks at the relationship between two vectors in a space, the correlation coefficient, being the normalised covariance of two data vectors, measures whether the data ‘moves’ together or not

(and how much) in their deviations from the mean. Presenting the difference between the two measures as such, it becomes more intuitive why we can come across some of the situations that are described in figure 5.

Table 7: Interpretation of the Cosine of Similarity

CS	Interpretation
$\in \{-1, 1\}$	two dimensions span one dimensional space
$= 0$	two dimensions span two dimensional space and are orthogonal
$\in (-1, 0) \cup (0, 1)$	two dimensions span two dimensional space and are oblique

Data from the EES 1999, 2004 and 2009 for twelve member states (see 5.2 for details to the case selection) for individual positioning on the left/right and EU dimensions is used to calculate the cosine of similarity for the data sets that will be used in the empirical analysis in section 6. These results are presented in table 8.

Table 8: Cosine of Similarity: left/right and EU integration dimensions

	Cosine of Similarity		
Country	1999	2004	2009
Austria	0.78	0.76	0.69
Germany	0.84	0.77	0.77
Denmark	0.82	0.82	0.77
Spain	0.73	0.64	0.75
Finland	0.72	0.82	0.80
France	0.72	0.77	0.68
Great Britain	0.74	0.69	0.66
Greece	0.75	0.79	0.70
Ireland	0.79	0.82	0.80
Luxembourg	0.82	0.82	0.78
Netherlands	0.82	0.78	0.78
Portugal	0.73	0.74	0.70

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009

Taking a look at the table 8, one can observe that the *CS*-measure for all countries in all three time periods under inspection is relatively large,

ranging from 0.66 to 0.84. These measures correspond to angles between 48.7° and 32.9° ¹⁵ between the two vectors. Evidently, we find ourselves in the situation of case 2., where the relationship between the two dimensions is, as it has been termed in the literature, oblique¹⁶. The *CS*-measures we can observe, tell us that the two dimensions, left/right and EU integration, from two vectors that are linearly independent of one another and span a two dimensional space, but that they are not orthogonal.

The correlation coefficients were also calculated for the same cases as the *CS*-measure and are presented in table 9. The correlation coefficient is often used in the literature to answer the question of the relationship between two political dimensions for which we used the *CS*-measure instead. A correlation coefficient near 0 is often taken as indicating orthogonality between two political dimensions. The correlation coefficients in table 9 are strikingly small, albeit sometimes statistically significantly different from zero sometimes not. However, from table 8 of the *CS*-measures we know that the two vectors of the two different political dimensions cannot be viewed as orthogonal. What information then, does the correlation coefficient give us?

Firstly, we conclude that the correlation coefficients do not provide us with a measure for orthogonality or linear dependence, although this coefficient is often used to do exactly this. Secondly, because the correlation coefficient measures whether two sets of data move together in the same direction or in opposed directions in deviation from their mean, we can read two things off the results in table 9. On the one hand, as we already noted, the correlation coefficients in this table are rather small, which lets us know that the two dimensions we are looking at do not covary much. In other words, the knowledge of an individual's position on one dimension has little predictive power over the position of this individual on the second dimension. On the other hand, we can observe that there are both positive and nega-

¹⁵The *CS*-measures in the table do not give any information as to whether the angle is positive or negative, but simply which of the three cases we find ourselves in.

¹⁶The choice of the term "oblique" for this relationship is rather unfortunate, as oblique angles are those that lie between (not including) 90° and 180° and the angles we are looking at here are in most cases acute. Nevertheless, the term "oblique" shall be used in this thesis to describe the relationship between two political dimensions in the case when they are neither orthogonal nor span the same line.

tive correlation coefficients to be found, both of which are common and thus neither can be viewed as an anomaly. It is also interesting to see that the sign changes in some cases in the same country in different years. We will, however, not try to explain characteristics of the correlation coefficients in this text and simply content ourselves with the information that individual positions on the two dimensions do not covary much. This result is coherent with those of linear independence we received from the *CS*-measures that were calculated.

The question of linearity. The entire discussion up until now has implicitly been based on the assumption that the potential relationship that may exist between the two dimensions under review, can be described as a linear one. It was already briefly mentioned that this is not a trivial assumption and can easily be called into question. Taking a look at a scatter plot of the Chapel Hill expert survey data on party positions on these two dimensions, a striking inverted U-shaped curve becomes immediately apparent. The first question that then needs to be asked is whether this type of relationship is reproduced at the level of individual citizens. The descriptive analysis of the EES data for the countries that were looked at for the year 2004 does not seem to indicate this and a linear relationship does appear plausible. The immediate question that follows is, of course, why there should be such a difference between the party and citizen levels, but this shall not be treated here.

Instead, we take a look more closely at three countries, Austria, Germany and France¹⁷ in an exemplary fashion to show that there is no evidence to suggest that the linearity assumption is incorrect. Because the variables in the data set for individual positions on the two dimensions are discrete, a scatter plot provides no information about their relationship. To circumvent this problem, I have tabulated (table 10) the mean together with the standard deviation and median positions on the European integration scale for each possible position on the left/right scale for the countries in the subsample.

Further, I plotted a smoothed density function in figure 5.4.3, together

¹⁷The choice of these three countries is more or less arbitrary

Table 9: Correlation between left/right and EU integration dimension by country and year

	Correlation Coefficient		
Country	1999	2004	2009
Austria	-0.1474 (0.0021)	-0.1431 (0.0000)	-0.1159 (0.0004)
Germany	0.0157 (0.6303)	-0.0930 (0.0356)	-0.0707 (0.0286)
Denmark	0.1709 (0.0000)	0.0033 (0.9093)	-0.1042 (0.0011)
Spain	0.0115 (0.7488)	-0.0484 (0.1950)	-0.0866 (0.0084)
Finland	-0.0028 (0.9567)	0.1517 (0.0000)	0.0529 (0.1025)
France	-0.1111 (0.0023)	-0.0156 (0.5636)	-0.0724 (0.0303)
Great Britain	-0.1139 (0.0010)	-0.1692 (0.0000)	-0.1688 (0.0000)
Greece	0.0226 (0.6423)	0.0817 (0.0782)	0.0003 (0.9924)
Ireland	0.0081 (0.8657)	0.0607 (0.0480)	0.0777 (0.0192)
Luxembourg	0.0124 (0.8488)	-0.0853 (0.0026)	0.0228 (0.4870)
Netherlands	-0.0768 (0.0214)	-0.0153 (0.5708)	-0.0896 (0.0054)
Portugal	0.0535 (0.3210)	0.0632 (0.0751)	0.0577 (0.1078)


Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009, p value in brackets below correlation coefficient

Table 10: Mean and Median EU integration positions for L/R positions:
Austria, France, Germany 2004

	L/R	Median	Mean	Std
Austria	1	5	5,39	3,28
	2	5	5,68	2,84
	3	5	5,39	2,53
	4	5	4,75	2,31
	5	4	4,41	2,76
	6	4	4,29	2,63
	7	5	4,53	2,56
	8	3	3,36	2,36
	9	5	4,78	3,63
	10	5	4,35	3,21
Germany	1	5	5,43	3,85
	2	5	5,60	2,85
	3	6,5	6,04	2,55
	4	7	6,50	2,44
	5	5	5,14	2,84
	6	6	5,46	2,53
	7	5	5,16	2,66
	8	5	5,32	2,72
	9	4,5	4,00	1,93
	10	5	5,33	3,53
France	1	5	5,55	3,24
	2	6	6,00	2,65
	3	6	5,97	2,59
	4	6	6,13	2,52
	5	5	5,29	2,67
	6	5	5,68	2,25
	7	6	6,11	2,46
	8	5	5,42	2,51
	9	6	6,37	2,38
	10	5	5,36	2,93

Source: own calculation from EES 2004

Figure 6: Smoothed densities and normal approximation of EU integration positions for each L/R position for France 2004



Source: own calculation from EES 2004

with the normal approximation for France, the choice of France being arbitrary. Unlike the measures and graph above, this illustration also provides a sense of the distribution of the positions on the European integration scale for each possible position on the left/right scale.

There is no indication in figure 5.4.3, that would give us a good reason to assume that the relationship between the two dimensions is non-linear. Despite the distributions varying across the L/R positions, they are not more similar at the extremities of the left/right scale, than at the centre. Hence there seems to be no reason not to apply the *CS*-measure as well as the correlation coefficient which are based on the linearity assumption.

5.4.4 Concluding remarks to the necessary conditions

In the previous subsections, we showed that the necessary conditions about the supply and demand sides and the political space of our model hold. As was mentioned in section 4.3, we do not test the necessary condition for salience of the issue of European integration, because the data and approach I am applying makes this difficult. Instead, on the one hand we rely on the convincing conclusions of Franklin and Wlezien [1997] that since the 1980's the salience of this issue has been on the increase on the other hand simply on the results from the empirical analysis in section 6. The theoretical model stipulates that all necessary conditions have to hold in order for EU issue voting to take place. We now know that the first of these hold for the data we are using. What, then, does the necessary condition of issue salience imply for the research questions and the corresponding hypotheses? This will be briefly outlined here. For the ensuing discussion we call to mind that necessary conditions need not inevitably lead to a related effect and that salience is such a necessary, but not sufficient condition.

The first hypothesis states that *European integration impacts on the attractiveness of political parties for citizens*. The implication of the existence of issue salience for this hypothesis is simple and does not require much discussion. It merely implies that we may see that the issue of European integration has an effect on the dependent variable.

Positive results for the second hypothesis, that *the importance of the European integration issue for the attractiveness of parties for citizens has increased over time*, could imply that, that if issue salience is present, that issue salience has increased over time. Due to the study mentioned above by Franklin and Wlezien [1997] we have reason to believe that this is the case. However an increase in the salience of EU integration need not necessarily be the only cause for this.

The second hypothesis can also hold if the salience of the European issue remains the same over two periods. On the one hand, this could be because the relative importance of this issue as compared to issues that can be subsumed on the left/right dimension increases; in other words, the salience of

the left/right issue dimension decreases. On the other hand, it can be because the positions on the European integration dimension of either political parties or individuals changes in such a way that the distance between an individual and a party increases on average whilst the average distance of on the left/right dimension remains constant. An increase in distance on the European integration dimension can then potentially render a party less attractive to individuals (recall that the estimates are conducted separately for individual political parties). We will not be able to discern between these two potential causes in the empirical analysis.

For the third hypothesis, that *extreme parties profit more from the European integration issue than moderate parties* we argued that moderate parties will have more incentive to try to integrate potentially new issues into old cleavage structures, that is the left/right dimension, whereas extreme parties that tend to be smaller will have an interest in trying to create new cleavages. Because of this, extreme parties will emphasise the new issue more than moderate parties either to make an issue more salient in order to attract voters for whom the issue is already salient.

Lastly, the fourth hypothesis states that *anti-integration positions have a greater impact on the attractiveness of parties than pro-integration positions*. This idea is directly related to the idea of issue salience in that it assumes that the issue is more salient for those that are opposed to European integration as they are unhappy with the status quo.

6 Empirical Results and Discussion

In this section, we finally present some of the results that were produced to test the hypotheses. As was already emphasised earlier, due to limits on space, not all regressions are run for all cases¹⁸.

Two types of regressions were set up in section 5.3.3 with the propensity to vote as the dependent variable (PTV). The first type is described by equation 2 in that section and is constructed to be run separately for each political party in a country at a given point in time. The explanatory variables are the absolute distance between a political party and an individual on the left/right and European integration dimensions (the latter being the main variable of interest), a dummy variable describing whether an individual is anti-integrationist or not and further control variables.

The second type of regression are ones calculated for an entire country at a given point in time, whereby all political parties are included at the same time. For this type, we differentiated again between two. The first described by equation 3, introduces an interaction term for extreme parties and the second, described by equation 5, replaces the interaction term by another regarding anti-integrationist stances towards the European project.

For the second type of model, regressions are run for all countries and the full results can be found in Appendix B. For the model of the first kind, where a separate regression is run for individual political parties, only a small selection of cases is calculated. These cases include all Austrian political parties, with the exception of the Austrian Communist Party as well as ten further political parties. The last ten cases were chosen from a randomly constructed list of political parties and includes five moderate and five extreme parties. The list of the party abbreviations and their full names for this sample can be found in table 57 in Appendix C.

Both types of model are used in the discussion of each of the four hypotheses. In what follows the results are put together and discussed. In the discussion of the results for each individual hypothesis, we will see that not

¹⁸There are cases where there are no results for particular years. These are cases where there was a data problem that could not be resolved.

all of the three models do equally well.

Table 11 summarises the results for the beta coefficients for both the left/right and European integration distance variable of the first type of regression; i.e., individual political party regressions for the reduced sample.

Table 11: Left/Right and EU integration results

	1999		2004		2009	
	l/R	EU	l/R	EU	l/R	EU
	Austria					
SPO	-0.58***	-0.15	-0.7***	-0.07	-0.62***	-0.2***
OVP	-0.41***	0.1	-0.69***	-0.08	-0.56***	-0.19***
GRU	-0.67***	-0.22**	-0.45***	-0.2***	-0.62***	-0.2***
FPO	-0.77***	-0.1	-0.31***	-0.11***	-0.47***	-0.17***
LIF	-0.337***	-0.313***	—	—	—	—
BZO	—	—	—	—	-0.43***	-0.1**
	Finland					
VAS	-0.48***	0.00121	-0.67***	-0.105	-0.67***	0.0242
	France					
PCF	-0.452***	-0.0307	-0.375***	0.0563	-0.570***	0.000553
	Denmark					
KF	-0.502***	-0.186*	-0.786***	-0.0273	-0.816***	-0.0715
	Netherlands					
LPF	—	—	-0.292***	-0.0408	—	—
CDA	-0.604***	0.0746	-0.906***	-0.163	-0.553***	-0.269**
	Greece					
KKE	-0.539***	0.0611	-0.410***	0.114	-0.440***	-0.131*
PASOK	-0.389***	-0.133	-0.549***	-0.0333	-0.409***	-0.0834

	Luxembourg					
DP	-0.259	0.0540	–	–	-0.330***	-0.135
	Germany					
CDU	-0.726***	0.116	–	–	-0.888***	-0.148
	Portugal					
PSD	-1.238***	0.191	-0.820***	0.0981	-0.928***	0.159

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009

6.1 H1: Impact EU integration – general

The first hypothesis states that

European integration impacts on the attractiveness of political parties for citizens.

This hypothesis, being the simplest of the four, does not have to stand any hard test and as expected it passes. We first look at table 11. We see that, apart from one case, the coefficient for the distance variable on the left/right dimension is statistically significant and negative for all parties looked at in the different survey years. The coefficient for the distance between a party and an individual with regard to the European integration dimension is not significant in all cases, but for a large number. The sign is negative on most of these coefficients, and in the cases where it is not, the result is not statistically significant.

In sum we can say that this hypothesis stands the test in this model and the results follow our intuition. The second type of model with its two subtypes also potentially contains information on this hypothesis and has the advantage that it was calculated for all countries in the sample. Looking at the tables in the appendix dealing with these two regressions, we see immediately that the results are no longer so neat. The sign of the coefficients for the distance variable on the European integration dimension is not always negative as we would have expected, and this is also often the case when the result is statistically significant.

There are a few countries that “behave well” for both models. For Greece, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark the coefficients are both negative and statistically significant in all years. In the cases of some countries, such as Luxembourg, Ireland, Finland and Spain those coefficients that are statistically significant in both models are at least negative. Strange results are visible in the model that contains an interaction term for extreme parties. In this model for countries such as Austria, Germany and France the coefficient is positive and yet at the same time statistically significant. This is, to say the least, unexpected and quite odd.

6.2 H2: Impact EU integration – over time

The second hypothesis posits that

The importance of the European integration issue for the attractiveness of parties for citizens has increased over time.

We begin again by looking at the results in table 11. For the Austrian political parties, we find that for the Greens (GRU), the Freedom Party (FPO), the Liberal Forum (LIF) and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO) the coefficients for the European integration variable are statistically significant and negative in all the years (the latter two existed only in one of the years of the surveys). The magnitude of the coefficient in absolute terms remained more or less constant for the Greens, but rose slightly for the FPO between the survey years of 2004 and 2009. For the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPO) and the Austrian People’s Party (OVP) the coefficients are significant in the last survey year, 2009. For the case of Austria, we can say that this hypothesis holds as we saw both a change in the magnitude of the effect of the European integration dimension and the coefficients becoming statistically significant where they were not before.

In table 11 we find three more cases where we can observe a change over time. The first, for the Conservatives (KF) in Denmark, the effect of European integration was significant in the first survey year, but no longer in the later two surveys. For the Christian Democrats (CDA) in the Netherlands

and the Greek Communist Party (KKE) the coefficients are insignificant for the first two survey years, but then become significant in 2009.

We turn next to the models run across countries. For the model containing the interaction variable with anti-integration positions the coefficients for the European integration distance variable is always negative. For Austria, Finland, Great Britain, Ireland, Greece and Luxembourg an upward trend in absolute terms over time is discernible. However, for countries such as Germany and Portugal the trend goes in the opposite direction and for Denmark, the Netherlands and France no trend is visible at all. Such changes could be attributed to the level of salience that the issue of European integration has at that point in time relative to other issues. But we have no way to test for this directly in the models. Regarding the statistical significance of these coefficients in the country analysis, we find cases where they become statistically significant at some point, lose statistical significance or are significant all the time. Thus, there is only evidence for an increase in importance of this issues in terms of statistical significance in a small number of countries; namely Austria, Finland and Greece. Looking at the country regressions with the extreme party interactive variable, we no longer get a coherent picture. The coefficients for the European integration distance variable fluctuates between positive and negative in different years and different countries without any pattern being deducible. Even if one could find a pattern, positive coefficients make little sense.

In total, the regressions run for the subsample of political parties and the first of the two country models provide some evidence that the importance of the European integration issue has increased over time in some countries and for some political parties. However, in the country analysis we also found that in some countries the importance of this issue may have changed over time, but not necessarily increased. We attributed this to changes in salience of the issue relative to other issues. A more detailed cross country analysis would be required to follow up on the causes for this variance in results. The second country model, however, provided us with no useful information.

6.3 H3: Extreme parties

The third hypothesis states that

extreme parties profit more from the European integration issue than moderate parties.

To specifically test for this we introduced an interaction variable β_{ect} , which is constructed with the distance variable on the European integration dimension and a dummy variable for extreme parties, where extreme parties receive the value of 1 and moderate parties a value of 0. A party is viewed as extreme if it lies at least one standard deviation from the mean position of political parties in that country on the left/right dimension (see section 5.3.3 for details on the construction of this variable). These regressions can obviously no longer be run individually for political parties as this variable will not vary for a party in a given survey year. The results are summarised in table 12. The Detailed regression results for each country can be found in Appendix B.

Table 12: Results extreme parties

	Interaction coefficient for extreme parties		
Country	1999	2004	2009
Austria	0.127**	-0.667***	-0.472***
Germany	-0.638***	-0.300***	0.0508
Denmark	-0.0553**	-0.189***	0.0502
Spain	0.478***	0.401***	0.278***
Finland	0.217***	0.249***	0.279***
France	-0.333***	-0.411***	-0.307***
Great Britain	-0.0822*	-0.124***	0.155***
Greece	0.232***	0.315***	0.0363
Ireland	0.0704	0.0609	0.121***
Luxembourg	0.170**	—	0.165***
Netherlands	0.0862***	0.366***	0.0261
Portugal	-0.450***	-0.0675*	0.0377

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009

We said that the regression coefficients for the interaction variable are expected to be statistically significant, if on average the European integration dimension counts more for parties that were found to be extreme on the left right dimension. Further, we said that we expect these to be negative. We imagine that this would be the case, because the interaction variable consists of the dummy variable with the categorisation of a political party as extreme or not and the individual distance between political parties and individuals on the European integration dimension.

Taking a look at the results summarised in table 12, we see that these are rather mixed. Most of the coefficients are statistically significant, even highly so. However, only the small majority of them displays the negative sign that we expected. France is, in fact, the only of the countries in the sample where the results are exactly what we would expect. For this country, in all the survey years the coefficients are negative and statistically significant.

In Spain and Finland, the results go in the entirely opposite direction. The coefficients are statistically significant, but positive. In light of our expectations and argument, this result is rather odd. There appears no immediate intuitive explanation as to why an extreme political party should be rewarded for having a position further away from that of an individual on the European integration scale.

In some countries the results are more encouraging than these. In Germany and Denmark, for example, the coefficients are negative and statistically significant in 1999 and 2004. In 2009 they become positive, but also lose their statistical significance. This could be interpreted as the European integration dimension no longer being important when evaluating political parties. However, the results for Greece go in entirely the opposite direction. The results for Great Britain are similar, but the coefficient becomes positive in 2009 without losing its statistical significance. The coefficients are statistically significant for the first two survey years and then no longer in 2009. Yet, they are positive. With such mixed results, it is difficult if not impossible, to make any general conclusions about whether extreme parties benefit more on average from the European integration dimension or not.

This model gave us trouble already for the first two hypotheses. The most

plausible conclusion is a methodological not substantive one. It appears that this model is simply 'bad'. The reasons for this would merit further analysis.

We now look at the model that runs individual regressions for each political party, the results of which are summarised in table 11. We have no way to integrate the concept of extreme parties directly into this model. Instead, we look at the results in table 11 in light of the categorisation of the parties as extreme or moderate. Whether the respective parties are extreme or moderate is shown in table 13.

Table 13: Extreme and Moderate Parties

Abbreviation	Extreme/Moderate
Austria	
GRU	ext
SPO	mod
FPO	ext
LIF	mod
OVP	mod
BZO	ext
Finland	
VAS	ext
France	
PCF	ext
Denmark	
KF	ext
Netherlands	
LPF	ext
CDA	mod

Abbreviation	Extreme/Moderate
Greece	
KKE	ext
PASOK	mod
Luxembourg	
DP	mod
Germany	
CDU	mod
Portugal	
PSD	mod

In Austria, the two moderate parties, SPO and OVP, only show statistically significant effects for the European integration dimension in the 2009 survey, whereas for the right extreme party, FPÖ, and the left extreme party, GRÜ, the coefficients are already statistically significant in earlier surveys. In addition to this, the effect size for the latter two parties is on average larger than for the two moderate parties. As we already discussed earlier, there are only two political parties in the rest of the subsample for which the relevant coefficient is statistically significant. These would be the Dutch CDA and the Greek KKE in 2009. This is not much evidence for the hypothesis, but it also does not give us any indication that we should have to refute it.

6.4 H4: Anti-integration positions

Anti-integration positions have a greater impact on individual preferences over parties than pro-integration positions.

To test whether anti-integration positions have a greater impact on individual attitudes to parties with regards to the European integration dimension than more pro-integration positions, we proposed two different methods to investigate this question. The first, was to include a dummy variable for anti-integrationist positions in the regressions run for individual parties. The second was to run a separate regression for every country, including all

political parties, with an interaction variable that captures this idea. The interaction variable consists of a dummy variable that categorised individuals as pro- or anti-integrationist.

Table 14 summarises the results for the regressions with the anti-integrationist interaction variable. The results for this are even more odd, than those for hypothesis 3, because in this case they are systematically counter-intuitive. *All* statistically significant coefficients for the interaction term are positive and the statistically significant coefficients are numerous. This would imply that individuals that are opposed to further European integration reward political parties for being further away from their most preferred position on the European integration dimension.

Because a measure for being pro- or anti-integrationist can be attributed to each individual respondent in a survey, we were able to integrate this variable into the model that looks at political parties individually. The coefficients for this variable from these regressions are to be found in table 15.

Table 14: Results anti-integration

	Interaction coefficient for anti-integration position		
Country	1999	2004	2009
Austria	-0.0444	0.114***	0.203***
Germany	0.249***	-0.0301	-0.0606
Denmark	0.122***	0.189***	0.124***
Spain	0.228***	0.203***	0.181***
Finland	-0.0202	0.106***	0.0459
France	0.128***	0.0414	0.185***
Great Britain	0.192***	0.0512	0.146***
Greece	0.100**	0.166***	0.0664**
Ireland	0.142***	-0.00634	0.129***
Luxembourg	0.162**	—	0.375***
Netherlands	0.270***	0.0635**	0.135***
Portugal	0.0796	0.134***	-0.0225

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009

Table 15: Anti-integration coefficient results

	1999	2004	2009
Austria			
SPO	-0.0106	-0.569*	-1.604***
OVP	-0.709	0.336	0.191
GRU	-1.351***	-1.708***	-1.604***
FPO	1.258***	0.463*	1.485***
LIF	-0.811**	—	—
BZO	—	—	0.733**
Finland			
VAS	-0.0612	-0.202	-0.0228
France			
PCF	0.0371	-0.200	0.104
Denmark			
KF	-0.365	-0.238	-0.0651
Netherlands			
LPF	—	0.548***	—
CDA	-0.553	-0.124	0.184
Greece			
KKE	1.053*	0.800	-0.0705
PASOK	0.120	-0.675	-0.229
Luxembourg			
DP	0.712	—	0.280

	1999	2004	2009
	Germany		
CDU	-0.145	–	-0.0923
	Portugal		
PSD	-1.142	-0.783*	-0.467

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: own calculation from EES 1999, 2004 and 2009

These results look a lot more as we would expect them too, although not for every case. For the Austrian Green and Socialist parties and the Portuguese PSD we find statistically significant results that are negative. However, we find other cases such as the Austrian FPO, the Dutch LPF and the Greek KKE, where the coefficient is significant but positive. Generally, most of the coefficients are not significant.

I think it would not be justified to say that evidence was found to support the claim of the hypothesis. Although, there are single cases which support the idea set up by the hypothesis, there are others that contradict it just as much. In particular, these results that contradict it are counter-intuitive and one would first have to explain why such cases occur before one comes up with any stronger conclusions than the one we just made.

6.5 Concluding remarks

The preceding discussion presented mixed results for the hypotheses we tested. The first, a simple hypothesis, that EU integration can affect the evaluation of political parties by individuals was easily shown to hold. The second hypothesis added a time element to the first in that it stated that such observed effects should increase over time. For this we found some evidence, but the trends did not always exhibit the same patterns. The formulation of this hypothesis, or even research question, should probably be rephrased to include the concept of salience. The salience of issues need to be seen relative to one another and not in absolute terms. The fluctuations we saw in the analysis for the second hypothesis were probably reflections of changes in the salience of the European integration issue relative to others. Testing for the third hypothesis about the effect of European integration for extreme parties on the left/right scale being stronger than for moderate parties, proved to be more difficult than for the first two. We concluded that with the evidence we produced with the models, that the hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor rejected. For the last hypothesis dealing with the effects of anti-integrationist positions of individuals in relation to the European integration dimension we found no evidence as the results were of such a nature that they contradicted one another.

Three different models were used to test the four hypotheses set up for the research questions of the thesis. We divided these into two types, where the first ran regressions for individual political parties and the second, containing two of the models, ran regressions for an entire country at one point in time. For the first of the two types only a small subset of the sample was used. We found that this model produced results that we expected. The results produced by the other two models varied a lot more across countries and time periods and some of the results were entirely counter-intuitive. Can we, on the basis of this, make any conclusions about the models? Only very tentatively, seeing that the subsample used for the first model was rather small. However, it does appear, in light of the results, that this model is to be preferred above the other two that ran regressions over entire countries.

Between the latter two, the model which integrated the dummy variable pertaining to whether an individual was classed as pro- or ant-integrationist delivered more intuitive results than the model that integrated an interaction variable with extreme parties. There was an important difference between the two latter models in that the interaction terms in the one were attached to individuals, whereas in the second they were attached to political parties. It is conceivable that this could make a difference for the validity of the results. Furthermore, when comparing these two models to the first type of model that looked at parties individually, one can raise the question of whether grouping the actors (political parties) together as we did in the second type of model, leads one to lose some information which leads to the distortion of results. In essence, by running one regression for a country the results can tell us only what to expect on average across parties and individual information is lost. Whether this considerations will lead anywhere is left as an open question for future research.

7 Conclusion

The thesis set out to explore whether the issue of European integration affects political contestation at the national level in a context where national governments represent their country in the supranational institution of the European Union. Because policies at the national level are more and more, both directly and indirectly, affected by European integration, one can expect that it will also have an impact on the relationship between the electorate in member states and their national representatives which they choose in national elections.

The literature reviewed for the thesis mostly looks at this potential phenomenon within the framework of spatial voting models. This thesis deviates from this approach in that it sets up a two step electoral choice model which explicitly differentiates between the attractiveness of choice options and actual choice. The question then asked by the research questions is if and how much the attractiveness or utility that individuals attach to political parties is affected by their own preferences and the positions of political parties on the issue of European integration. As a measure for the utility, the propensity to vote [van der Eijk et al., 2006] for a party is used and applied as the dependent variable in the analyses.

The theoretical framework set up for the analyses, is a rational choice framework. Political contestation is viewed as taking place within a space composed of issue dimensions in which political parties and voters interact. Much attention is paid to the conditions under which one may expect the European issue dimension to affect the relationship between the representatives and the represented in the member states of the European Union. Six conditions were required, five of which were subjected to empirical test. According to these necessary conditions, citizens must have manifest preferences and political parties positions on the issue of European integration and both of these must exhibit sufficient variance. This was tested for with data, as all empirical analyses in this thesis, from the European Election surveys. It was found that individuals do indeed have real preferences on and political parties positions regarding European integration. These were

found to vary not much less, in the case of citizens even more, than positions on the traditional left/right scale. A further necessary condition, on which much time was spent in this thesis, is that the European political space be two dimensional composed of the independent left/right and European integration dimensions. It was shown that the European political space can be viewed as a two dimensional space. The last necessary condition, the salience of European integration dimension, was theoretically required but not tested for empirically. The results in the empirical section emphasised the probable import of this condition.

Two different types of model were used to test the four hypotheses constructed. The first type of model investigated political parties individually in countries for the different survey years. The second type of model were aggregate models over countries. We constructed two types of aggregate models, one with an interaction variable using a dummy for extreme political parties and one with an interaction term splitting the sample into individuals with pro- and anti-integrationist attitudes. The results produced by the individual party and country pro-/anti-integrationist models for the issue distance variables (left/right and European integration) produced more or less what was expected. The results produced by the different models diverged when it came to the questions of whether the European integration dimension made a greater difference for the evaluation of political parties when taking account of whether political parties are extreme or not on the left/right issue dimension and whether individuals are pro- or anti-integrationist. We found that the results from the first model (here we only ran regressions for a subsample due to space constraints) fitted our intuition better than the results produced by the second. From this we concluded that the first type of model is a better model than the second. The question of why this may be the case, we did not answer. Instead we leave it as an open methodological question. This question is quite relevant, because the second type of model is the type of model that has been applied in the majority of the studies that were conducted in this area of political science. As the first type of model treating political parties separately fares better on all accounts and most of the literature that was reviewed for the thesis applies aggregate country model, it is

suggested that a closer look at the effects of different types of models would have value.

The results obtained in the empirical analysis of the research questions presented mixed results. The first question of whether national political parties can potentially capitalise on the European integration dimension was answered in the positive. This does not imply that every political party can gain votes from a position on this issue dimension, but that the potential does exist and that some parties already gain in favour among citizens because of it. The second research question asking if the effects of integration has changed, more specifically increased over time, was supported by some evidence. But it was concluded that there is no systematic pattern present that shows a continuous increase in the importance of the EU integration issue over time. Instead much variance was found across countries and time and the hypothesis was set up that the factor of issue salience not directly integrated into the models, may account for much of the observed variance.

The third research question wished to establish whether political parties that can be categorised as extreme with regards to their position on the left/right issue dimension would profit more from the issue of European integration than moderate parties. For this we found neither evidence to support or refute this idea. The final research question, pursuing the question of whether individuals that are anti-integrationist place greater importance on the European integration dimension led to a dead end. The results of the analysis were conflicting and unsystematic. For this question we could provide no answer at all and found no indication of a possible answer. Therefore, this question, still being interesting, should probably be approached differently to the way in which it was done in this thesis.

In sum, the thesis found that the conditions for issue of European integration to make its way into the political contestation at the national level in respect to the relationship between citizens and their representatives are present. In addition to this, not only do the conditions for this exist, but one can already see this phenomenon in action. In other words, the question is no longer whether the sleeping giant is awake, he is, but rather how big he is.

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Appendix A Regression results per political party per country and year

This appendix lists all detailed regression results that are presented in summarised form in the empirical section of the main text. Table 16 gives the descriptions of the variables in the regressions that follow in this appendix.

Note: Social class self-placements are dummy variables and the not included variable for working class acts as the base category.

Table 16: Variable Description

Variable	Description
d_lr_ij	absolute value of distance between party and individual on left/right scale
d_eu_ij	absolute value of distance between party and individual on European integration scale
anti_i	dummy for individual anti-integration position
ees_socclass_lower_middle	self-placement: lower middle class
ees_socclass_middle	self-placement: middle class
ees_socclass_upper	self-placement: upper class
ees_socclass_upper_middle	self-placement: upper middle class
ees_sex	gender
_cons	constant

In the following, the regression outputs for each political party included in the analysis per country and survey year are displayed. Each table contains the results for an individual party for 1999, 2004 and 2009. The titles of the table contain the party abbreviations and their English full names can be found in Appendix C. The dependent variable is not given in the tables to save space, but is in each case the propensity to vote (PTV).

Appendix A.1 Austria

Table 17: Regression results Austria: SPO

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	0.0102	-0.350***	-0.686***
d_eu_ij	-0.208	0.0860	-0.126
anti_i	-0.0106	-0.569*	-1.604***
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-1.511*	-1.517***	1.449***
ees_soclass_middle	-1.097**	-1.195***	1.243***
ees_soclass_upper	-3.301*	-2.178*	0.706
ees_soclass_upper_middle	-1.679**	-1.720***	1.449***
ees_sex	0.0533	-0.161	0.666**
_cons	7.041***	7.665***	5.146***
<i>N</i>	417	915	886

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 18: Regression results Austria: OVP

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.256*	-0.777***	-0.565***
d_eu_ij	0.0431	-0.243**	-0.329***
anti_i	-0.709	0.336	0.191
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.637	0.677	0.712
ees_soclass_middle	0.277	0.609*	0.971**
ees_soclass_upper	3.055*	1.402	1.654
ees_soclass_upper_middle	0.756	1.158**	1.657***
ees_sex	0.255	0.0402	-0.301
_cons	5.189***	6.313***	6.821***
<i>N</i>	416	914	883

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 19: Regression results Austria: GRU

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.568***	-0.427***	-0.686***
d_eu_ij	0.218*	0.129	-0.126
anti_i	-1.351***	-1.708***	-1.604***
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.821	1.080**	1.449***
ees_soclass_middle	1.240**	1.414***	1.243***
ees_soclass_upper	2.346	0.864	0.706
ees_soclass_upper_middle	1.606**	1.667***	1.449***
ees_sex	1.066***	0.348	0.666**
_cons	3.848***	4.749***	5.146***
<i>N</i>	411	915	886

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 20: Regression results Austria: FPO

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.686***	-0.346***	-0.495***
d_eu_ij	-0.0156	-0.0458	0.0212
anti_i	1.258***	0.463*	1.485***
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-0.343	-0.187	-0.959*
ees_soclass_middle	-0.549	-0.353	-1.209***
ees_soclass_upper	-1.535	0.243	0.108
ees_soclass_upper_middle	-0.464	-0.430	-1.478***
ees_sex	-0.636*	-0.254	-0.0410
_cons	5.783***	3.707***	4.101***
<i>N</i>	414	915	885

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 21: Regression results Austria: LIF

	1999
d_lr_ij	-0.302**
d_eu_ij	-0.00531
anti_i	-0.811**
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.700
ees_soclass_middle	0.812*
ees_soclass_upper	1.219
ees_soclass_upper_middle	1.643***
ees_sex	0.289
_cons	2.672***
<i>N</i>	411

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 22: Regression results Austria: BZO

	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.434***
d_eu_ij	-0.0763
anti_i	0.733**
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-0.490
ees_soclass_middle	-0.547*
ees_soclass_upper	0.0858
ees_soclass_upper_middle	-0.779*
ees_sex	-0.249
_cons	3.355***
<i>N</i>	886

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix A.2 10 randomly selected cases

Table 23: Regression results Finland: VAS

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.480***	-0.673***	-0.672***
d_eu_ij	0.00121	-0.105	0.0242
anti_i	-0.0612	-0.202	-0.0228
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-0.241	-0.521	-0.963***
ees_soclass_middle	-0.820*	-0.707**	-1.293***
ees_soclass_upper	-2.262	-1.388	-0.0448
ees_soclass_upper_middle	-1.147*	-0.744*	-1.245***
ees_sex	-0.266	0.123	-0.0226
_cons	5.852***	6.490***	6.386***
<i>N</i>	318	784	922

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 24: Regression results France: PCF

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.452***	-0.375***	-0.570***
d_eu_ij	-0.0307	0.0563	0.000553
anti_i	0.0371	-0.200	0.104
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-0.957*	-0.681**	-1.015***
ees_soclass_middle	-0.269	-0.906***	-0.808***
ees_soclass_upper	-0.473	-1.316***	-1.482**
ees_soclass_upper_middle	-0.709*	-1.340***	-1.506***
ees_sex	0.0923	0.278*	0.0818
_cons	4.668***	4.323***	4.616***
<i>N</i>	627	1364	847

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 25: Regression results Denmark: KF

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.502***	-0.786***	-0.816***
d_eu_ij	-0.186*	-0.0273	-0.0715
anti_i	-0.365	-0.238	-0.0651
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-0.183	0.732*	0.560
ees_soclass_middle	0.751**	1.226***	0.893**
ees_soclass_upper	0.688	1.532*	1.117
ees_soclass_upper_middle	1.253***	1.994***	1.448***
ees_sex	-0.392*	-0.417*	-0.400*
_cons	4.872***	5.296***	5.414***
<i>N</i>	867	1126	969

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 26: Regression results Netherlands: LPF

	2004
d_lr_ij	-0.292***
d_eu_ij	-0.0408
anti_i	0.548***
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-0.292
ees_soclass_middle	-0.207
ees_soclass_upper	-0.395
ees_soclass_upper_middle	-0.256
ees_sex	-0.125
_cons	3.348***
<i>N</i>	1206

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 27: Regression results Greece: KKE

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.539***	-0.410***	-0.440***
d_eu_ij	0.0611	0.114	-0.131*
anti_i	1.053*	0.800	-0.0705
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-0.228	-0.985*	-0.902*
ees_soclass_middle	-0.820*	-0.366	-1.041***
ees_soclass_upper	-1.924	-1.184	-0.717
ees_soclass_upper_middle	-1.746***	-1.142*	-1.492***
ees_sex	0.157	0.263	0.300
_cons	5.381***	4.304***	5.406***
<i>N</i>	404	445	897

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 28: Regression results Luxembourg: DP

	1999	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.259	-0.330***
d_eu_ij	0.0540	-0.135
anti_i	0.712	0.280
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.794	0.0140
ees_soclass_middle	1.317*	0.797*
ees_soclass_upper	3.843*	1.469*
ees_soclass_upper_middle	1.757*	1.212***
ees_sex	0.0175	0.186
_cons	3.738***	4.387***
<i>N</i>	213	852

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 29: Regression results Netherlands: CDA

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.604***	-0.906***	-0.553***
d_eu_ij	0.0746	-0.163	-0.269**
anti_i	-0.553	-0.124	0.184
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.470	0.120	1.270**
ees_soclass_middle	0.366	0.638*	0.693*
ees_soclass_upper	-0.697	0.147	-0.00507
ees_soclass_upper_middle	-0.377	0.293	0.959**
ees_sex	0.235	0.0547	-0.0314
_cons	5.868***	6.447***	6.112***
<i>N</i>	868	1257	927

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 30: Regression results Germany: CDU

	1999	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.726***	-0.888***
d_eu_ij	0.116	-0.148
anti_i	-0.145	-0.0923
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.0382	0.196
ees_soclass_middle	0.734**	0.639*
ees_soclass_upper	1.561	1.605
ees_soclass_upper_middle	1.233***	1.191**
ees_sex	-0.339	0.173
_cons	7.231***	7.377***
<i>N</i>	925	924

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 31: Regression results Greece: PASOK

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.389***	-0.549***	-0.409***
d_eu_ij	-0.133	-0.0333	-0.0834
anti_i	0.120	-0.675	-0.229
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-0.310	0.299	0.656
ees_soclass_middle	-0.712	0.0262	-0.302
ees_soclass_upper	-3.353	1.703	-1.130
ees_soclass_upper_middle	0.0906	0.612	-0.986
ees_sex	0.0954	1.143***	-0.136
_cons	6.531***	5.896***	5.689***
<i>N</i>	405	447	895

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 32: Regression results Portugal: PSD

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-1.238***	-0.820***	-0.928***
d_eu_ij	0.191	0.0981	0.159
anti_i	-1.142	-0.783*	-0.467
ees_soclass_lower_middle	-0.0845	0.594	0.272
ees_soclass_middle	-0.154	0.541	0.536
ees_soclass_upper	3.700	2.188	-2.326
ees_soclass_upper_middle	1.232	0.807	1.856***
ees_sex	0.121	-0.0900	-0.134
_cons	7.502***	6.994***	6.889***
<i>N</i>	343	761	742

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B Regression results for country regressions

Appendix B.1 Austria

Table 33: Regression results Austria: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.390***	-0.515***	-0.489***
d_eu_ij	-0.0912*	0.216***	0.00609
int_ext	0.127**	-0.667***	-0.472***
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.0963	0.126	0.114
ees_soclass_middle	0.137	0.299*	-0.0840
ees_soclass_upper	0.485	0.788	0.348
ees_soclass_upper_middle	0.405	0.429*	-0.0482
ees_sex	0.183	-0.0763	-0.116
_cons	4.437***	5.001***	5.058***
<i>N</i>	2462	4544	6173

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 34: Regression results Austria: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.369***	-0.676***	-0.582***
d_eu_ij	-0.0216	-0.110***	-0.311***
int_anti	-0.0444	0.114***	0.203***
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.0979	0.0797	0.0970
ees_soclass_middle	0.133	0.209	-0.0951
ees_soclass_upper	0.467	0.721	0.382
ees_soclass_upper_middle	0.386	0.270	-0.0615
ees_sex	0.188	-0.0536	-0.119
_cons	4.387***	5.468***	5.324***
<i>N</i>	2462	4544	6173

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.2 Germany

Table 35: Regression results Germany: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.395***	-0.368***	-0.727***
d_eu_ij	0.187***	0.00479	-0.178***
int_ext	-0.638***	-0.300***	0.0508
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.250*	0.470*	0.0362
ees_socclass_middle	0.338***	0.191	0.186
ees_socclass_upper	0.403	0.811	0.869*
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.518***	0.237	0.425*
ees_sex	0.0463	0.288**	0.0424
_cons	4.498***	4.272***	6.072***
<i>N</i>	5552	2465	4620

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 36: Regression results Germany: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.442***	-0.419***	-0.720***
d_eu_ij	-0.352***	-0.216***	-0.116***
int_anti	0.249***	-0.0301	-0.0606
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.212	0.447*	0.0134
ees_socclass_middle	0.303**	0.146	0.166
ees_socclass_upper	0.318	0.936	0.875*
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.539***	0.201	0.394*
ees_sex	0.0192	0.305**	0.0481
_cons	5.151***	4.508***	6.039***
<i>N</i>	5552	2465	4620

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.3 Denmark

Table 37: Regression results Denmark: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.287***	-0.752***	-0.647***
d_eu_ij	-0.188***	-0.111***	-0.228***
int_ext	-0.0553**	-0.189***	0.0502
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.140	0.101	0.493**
ees_socclass_middle	0.185*	0.135	-0.0136
ees_socclass_upper	0.0912	0.240	0.224
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.0355	0.196	-0.0602
ees_sex	0.0630	-0.138	-0.0980
_cons	4.450***	6.564***	5.472***
<i>N</i>	10371	6772	7734

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 38: Regression results Denmark: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.287***	-0.766***	-0.640***
d_eu_ij	-0.277***	-0.366***	-0.259***
int_anti	0.122***	0.189***	0.124***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.183	0.172	0.510**
ees_socclass_middle	0.225**	0.218*	0.0246
ees_socclass_upper	0.149	0.265	0.311
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.133	0.320**	0.000302
ees_sex	0.0490	-0.146*	-0.109
_cons	4.435***	6.635***	5.448***
<i>N</i>	10371	6772	7734

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.4 Spain

Table 39: Regression results Spain: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.325***	-0.665***	-0.284***
d_eu_ij	-0.298***	-0.0634	-0.304***
int_ext	0.478***	0.401***	0.278***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	-0.165	0.222	-0.313**
ees_socclass_middle	-0.0439	0.220	-0.173*
ees_socclass_upper	0.173	1.319	0.0925
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.0294	0.636*	-0.462***
ees_sex	0.135	0.117	-0.146*
_cons	4.406***	4.599***	3.825***
<i>N</i>	4399	3928	8505

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 40: Regression results Spain: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.255***	-0.586***	-0.241***
d_eu_ij	-0.223***	-0.00179	-0.253***
int_anti	0.228***	0.203***	0.181***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	-0.151	0.234	-0.336**
ees_socclass_middle	-0.0326	0.197	-0.174*
ees_socclass_upper	0.442	1.109	0.107
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.0381	0.633*	-0.412**
ees_sex	0.0417	0.126	-0.162*
_cons	4.363***	4.472***	3.727***
<i>N</i>	4399	3928	8505

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.5 Finland

Table 41: Regression results Finland: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.463***	-0.544***	-0.602***
d_eu_ij	-0.0982*	-0.173***	-0.213***
int_ext	0.217***	0.249***	0.279***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	-0.0893	-0.00492	0.0984
ees_socclass_middle	-0.263	0.136	-0.0518
ees_socclass_upper	-0.383	0.148	-0.198
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.169	0.421***	-0.00791
ees_sex	0.0176	0.275***	0.197**
_cons	5.559***	5.085***	5.472***
<i>N</i>	2523	6257	7392

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 42: Regression results Finland: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.435***	-0.497***	-0.547***
d_eu_ij	-0.0285	-0.182***	-0.172***
int_anti	-0.0202	0.106***	0.0459
ees_socclass_lower_middle	-0.0842	0.0271	0.123
ees_socclass_middle	-0.266	0.177	-0.0260
ees_socclass_upper	-0.391	0.262	-0.262
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.148	0.470***	0.0162
ees_sex	0.0233	0.259***	0.194*
_cons	5.488***	4.983***	5.338***
<i>N</i>	2523	6257	7392

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.6 France

Table 43: Regression results France: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.558***	-0.557***	-0.624***
d_eu_ij	0.0529*	0.114***	0.107***
int_ext	-0.333***	-0.411***	-0.307***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	-0.352*	-0.105	-0.399**
ees_socclass_middle	-0.0293	-0.0160	-0.278*
ees_socclass_upper	-0.0853	-0.0825	-0.668**
ees_socclass_upper_middle	-0.359**	-0.0489	-0.550***
ees_sex	0.259***	-0.0188	0.208**
_cons	5.431***	5.709***	5.481***
<i>N</i>	5578	8183	5832

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 44: Regression results France: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.587***	-0.597***	-0.681***
d_eu_ij	-0.146***	-0.183***	-0.162***
int_anti	0.128***	0.0414	0.185***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	-0.293	-0.147	-0.413**
ees_socclass_middle	0.00533	-0.0528	-0.266*
ees_socclass_upper	0.00934	-0.0999	-0.604*
ees_socclass_upper_middle	-0.319**	-0.102	-0.524***
ees_sex	0.242***	-0.0355	0.200*
_cons	5.596***	5.998***	5.656***
<i>N</i>	5578	8183	5832

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.7 Great Britain

Table 45: Regression results Great Britain: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.176***	-0.243***	-0.220***
d_eu_ij	-0.0539*	-0.149***	-0.204***
int_ext	-0.0822*	-0.124***	0.155***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	-0.157	0.104	0.00492
ees_socclass_middle	0.0579	0.144	0.0295
o.ees_socclass_upper	0	-0.723	6.537***
ees_socclass_upper_middle	-0.0541	0.401	0.203
ees_sex	0.0848	0.142	0.296***
_cons	4.014***	5.227***	3.632***
<i>N</i>	5173	4757	6717

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 46: Regression results Great Britain: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.198***	-0.248***	-0.223***
d_eu_ij	-0.131***	-0.226***	-0.245***
int_anti	0.192***	0.0512	0.146***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	-0.150	0.105	0.0322
ees_socclass_middle	0.103	0.144	0.0625
o.ees_socclass_upper	0	-0.712	7.200***
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.0688	0.390	0.160
ees_sex	0.120	0.142	0.294***
_cons	3.956***	5.211***	3.618***
<i>N</i>	5173	4757	6717

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.8 Greece

Table 47: Regression results Greece: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.488***	-0.556***	-0.569***
d_eu_ij	-0.195***	-0.297***	-0.0784**
int_ext	0.232***	0.315***	0.0363
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.245	-0.227	-0.126
ees_socclass_middle	-0.169	0.0359	-0.170
ees_socclass_upper	-0.216	-0.218	-0.195
ees_socclass_upper_middle	-0.155	0.0977	-0.394*
ees_sex	0.154	0.238	0.122
_cons	5.250***	5.914***	4.947***
<i>N</i>	2830	2227	5377

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 48: Regression results Greece: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.454***	-0.508***	-0.561***
d_eu_ij	-0.0893*	-0.162***	-0.0865***
int_anti	0.100**	0.166***	0.0664**
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.224	-0.239	-0.146
ees_socclass_middle	-0.156	0.0813	-0.191
ees_socclass_upper	-0.0995	-0.273	-0.210
ees_socclass_upper_middle	-0.103	0.193	-0.426*
ees_sex	0.130	0.221	0.126
_cons	5.084***	5.602***	4.946***
<i>N</i>	2830	2227	5377

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.9 Ireland

Table 49: Regression results Ireland: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.332***	-0.390***	-0.187***
d_eu_ij	-0.101*	-0.0370	-0.306***
int_ext	0.0704	0.0609	0.121***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.262	0.0768	-0.253
ees_socclass_middle	0.246	0.175	-0.147
ees_socclass_upper	-0.612	0.202	-0.931
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.451*	0.198	-0.275
ees_sex	0.572***	0.0596	0.175
_cons	4.766***	4.942***	4.876***
<i>N</i>	2840	5735	5111

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 50: Regression results Ireland: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.321***	-0.386***	-0.173***
d_eu_ij	-0.141**	-0.00133	-0.303***
int_anti	0.142***	-0.00634	0.129***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.299	0.0789	-0.245
ees_socclass_middle	0.274*	0.177	-0.136
ees_socclass_upper	-0.735	0.204	-1.016
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.541*	0.199	-0.303
ees_sex	0.545***	0.0604	0.156
_cons	4.782***	4.929***	4.858***
<i>N</i>	2840	5735	5111

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.10 Luxembourg

Table 51: Regression results Luxembourg: extreme parties

	1999	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.342***	-0.503***
d_eu_ij	-0.129*	-0.263***
int_ext	0.170**	0.165***
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.595	0.0511
ees_soclass_middle	0.175	0.128
ees_soclass_upper	1.205	-0.159
ees_soclass_upper_middle	0.214	0.163
ees_sex	0.135	0.329***
_cons	4.353***	4.888***
<i>N</i>	1475	6781

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 52: Regression results Luxembourg: anti-EU position

	1999	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.303***	-0.411***
d_eu_ij	-0.135**	-0.348***
int_anti	0.162**	0.375***
ees_soclass_lower_middle	0.572	0.0165
ees_soclass_middle	0.193	0.0570
ees_soclass_upper	1.209	0.0917
ees_soclass_upper_middle	0.273	0.199
ees_sex	0.110	0.369***
_cons	4.310***	4.687***
<i>N</i>	1475	6781

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.11 Netherlands

Table 53: Regression results Netherlands: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.343***	-0.649***	-0.461***
d_eu_ij	-0.446***	-0.235***	-0.281***
int_ext	0.0862***	0.366***	0.0261
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.300*	0.0323	-0.270
ees_socclass_middle	0.0761	0.0823	-0.376***
ees_socclass_upper	-0.0552	-0.0311	-0.363
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.161	0.0199	-0.357**
ees_sex	-0.0896	0.0794	0.0651
_cons	5.241***	5.537***	5.735***
<i>N</i>	8613	11203	9261

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 54: Regression results Netherlands: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.342***	-0.621***	-0.460***
d_eu_ij	-0.449***	-0.156***	-0.339***
int_anti	0.270***	0.0635**	0.135***
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.293*	0.0448	-0.238
ees_socclass_middle	0.101	0.103	-0.323**
ees_socclass_upper	-0.0173	0.0144	-0.245
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.201	0.0752	-0.233*
ees_sex	-0.114	0.0616	0.0568
_cons	5.221***	5.479***	5.715***
<i>N</i>	8613	11203	9261

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix B.12 Portugal

Table 55: Regression results Portugal: extreme parties

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.624***	-0.413***	-0.641***
d_eu_ij	0.170***	-0.00546	-0.0694
int_ext	-0.450***	-0.0675*	0.0377
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.343	-0.0272	-0.320*
ees_socclass_middle	0.592**	-0.111	-0.164
ees_socclass_upper	1.622	1.266*	-0.364
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.576	-0.0652	-0.105
ees_sex	0.0120	0.143	-0.0112
_cons	5.508***	5.122***	5.857***
<i>N</i>	1679	4510	3702

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 56: Regression results Portugal: anti-EU position

	1999	2004	2009
d_lr_ij	-0.797***	-0.421***	-0.638***
d_eu_ij	-0.206***	-0.0747**	-0.0268
int_anti	0.0796	0.134***	-0.0225
ees_socclass_lower_middle	0.309	-0.0163	-0.321*
ees_socclass_middle	0.508**	-0.0547	-0.170
ees_socclass_upper	1.796*	1.414*	-0.347
ees_socclass_upper_middle	0.492	-0.00442	-0.116
ees_sex	0.0883	0.123	-0.00849
_cons	6.244***	5.103***	5.842***
<i>N</i>	1679	4510	3702

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix C Political Party Abbreviations

In order to keep everything in a manageable framework and size, in the tables presented in the text and appendix ??, abbreviations for party names instead of the full names of parties. The following table lists the full names of parties in English next to their abbreviations as used elsewhere in the text. The order in which parties appear in the table have no meaning.

Table 57: Party name abbreviations and full name

ABBREVIATION	FULL NAME
Austria	
GRU	The Greens – The Green Alternative
SPO	Social Democratic Party of Austria
FPO	Freedom Party of Austria
LIF	Lieberal Forum
OVP	Austrian People’s Party
BZO	Alliance for the future of Austria
Finland	
VAS	Left Alliance
France	
PCF	French Communist Party
Denmark	
KF	Conservatives
Netherlands	
LPF	Fortuyn List
CDA	Christian Democrats
Greece	

ABBREVIATION	FULL NAME
KKE	Communist Party Greece
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Luxembourg	
DP	Democratic Party
Germany	
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
Portugal	
PSD	Social Democratic Party

Appendix D Abstract: German

Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit den Auswirkungen die europäische Integration auf gewisse Elemente des politischen Wettbewerbs auf der nationalen Ebene haben könnte. Die europäische Integration berührt inzwischen politische Bereiche die einst als *domaine réservé* der Nationalstaaten galten. Als Ausgangspunkt wird auf die Idee zurückgegriffen, dass nun nationale Systeme der demokratischen Repräsentation von Europa betroffen werden sollten. Es gibt Studien die sich mit solchen Fragen beschäftigen haben, wobei diese den Fokus auf nationale Parlamentswahlen als Ausdruck der repräsentativen Verknüpfung zwischen Bürgern und der politischen Elite gelegt haben.

Wie diese Arbeiten beschäftigt sich die Diplomarbeit mit diesem Aspekt des politischen Wettbewerbs in Bezug auf die europäische Vereinigung. Basierend auf der Literatur in diesem Bereich der Politikwissenschaft, wird ein theoretisches Modell konstruiert das europäische Integration mit der Attraktivität politischer Parteien als Wahlmöglichkeit verbindet. Mit diesem Modell weicht die Diplomarbeit vom geläufigeren Zugang zum Thema etwas ab indem sie den Fokus auf die Bildung von Nutzen im Rahmen eines zweistufigem rational choice' Modells verschiebt. Die zweite Stufe der tatsächlich getroffenen Wahl wird nicht behandelt.

Notwendige Bedingungen unter denen die europäische Integration potentiell diesen Bereich der nationalen Politik beeinflussen könnte werden hergeleitet und empirisch überprüft. Es wird gezeigt, dass alle notwendigen Bedingungen gelten. Vier Hypothesen werden aufgestellt die behaupten, dass politische Parteien vom Thema der europäischen Integration profitieren können, dass sich solche Effekte über die Zeit verstärkt haben, dass extreme Parteien mehr als andere davon profitieren können und dass bei Individuen die sich eher als Gegner der europäischen Vereinigung bekennen dieses Thema eine größere Rolle spielt.

Die empirische Analyse kommt auf gemischte Ergebnisse. Die erste und zweite Hypothese werden belegt, die dritte kann weder verworfen noch angenommen werden und für die vierte werden keine Hinweise gefunden. Die Diplo-

marbeit zeigt, dass die Bedingungen, unter denen das Thema der europäischen Integration mglicherweise ihren Platz im politischen Wettbewerb auf nationaler Ebene einnehmen kann, gegeben sind. Zudem wird gezeigt, dass diese Bedingungen nicht nur existieren, sondern dass die Europäische Union sich merklich auf die Beziehung zwischen Bürgern und politischer Elite auswirkt.

Curriculum Vitae

Sarah Thandi Dippenaar

Personal Information

Name	Sarah Thandi Dippenaar
Date of Birth	22.01.1983
Nationality	Austrian

Education

Since 2005	University of Vienna - Economics (Diplomstudium) - Political Science (Diplomstudium) - Mathematics (Bachelor)
Since 2009	
2004 - 2005	Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po Paris) - Completed with the "Diplôme du Programme Internationale"
2001 - 2004	University of Innsbruck - Economics (Diplomstudium) - Political Science (Diplomstudium)
1996 - 2000	Grosvenor Girls' High School, Durban, South Africa - High School Diploma (Matric) - Matric prizes: Dux (leading academic), English, history, biology and oratory (2000)

Work Experience

WS 2011/12	University of Vienna - Tutor for 'Linear Models', Department of Statistics and Operations Research
Since 2011	Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Research assistant (Forschungsbeihilfe), Department for Political Science
Since 2010	University of Vienna - Research assistant (Forschungsbeihilfe), Department for Methods in the Social Sciences
2008 - 2010	Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) - Scholarship position (Stipendiatin), Department of Economics and Finance
2009	Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa - Participation in a research project to establish comparable service delivery data in four southern African countries
2008	Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa - Participation in a research project on service delivery rates in South Africa

2005	Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa - Participation in a research project on water and sanitation delivery in South Africa and the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2005
2004	Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa - Participation in the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2004
2004	University of Innsbruck - Tutor for Sociology for Economics / Business Economics
Publications	Daniel, J., R. Southall and S. Dippenaar (2006). Issues of Democracy and Governance. In: Pillay, Roberts and Rule (Eds.) <u>South African Social Attitudes: Changing Times, Diverse Voices</u> . Cape Town: HSRC Press
Languages	- English (mother tongue) - German (mother tongue) - French (fluent / DALF) - Afrikaans (intermediate)

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