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“Welfare State Foundations of Immigrant Integration
Policy

An Analysis of Integration Policy Divergence and
Underlying Welfare System Structures”

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Abstract

Based on the data of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) this master thesis aims at analysing the extent to which Western European integration policies diverge with regard to inclusion and exclusion. Furthermore, the analysis shows whether different welfare systems may influence the configuration of integration policy. The main hypothesis suggests that countries with larger welfare programmes pursue inclusive approaches of integration policy in order to promote solidarity and support for redistribution. For scrutinising MIPEX data quantitative methods of comparing average scores and standard deviations and cluster analysis are applied. Via bivariate data analysis these are then being compared with OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) indicators and welfare system typologies. While national integration policies clearly diverge in their inclusiveness and the simple size of welfare programmes does not show a clear correlation, welfare system types may explain the configuration of integration policies: Social-democratic welfare systems tend to have inclusive policies, while Liberal welfare systems tend to have exclusive policies. Conservative and Southern welfare systems are in-between, but show a tendency of becoming inclusive over time. Thus, different objectives of welfare systems might affect integration policy, but the welfare system size might not.

Abstract

Basierend auf den Daten des Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit untersucht, inwiefern westeuropäische Staaten Unterschiede bezüglich der inkludierenden oder exkludierenden Ausrichtung der Policies im Integrationsbereich aufweisen. Anschließend wird versucht die Unterschiede anhand wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Systeme zu erklären. Die zentrale Hypothese lautet, dass Staaten mit umfangreichen Wohlfahrtsleistungen eher eine inkludierende Integrationspolitik verfolgen, da diese Solidarität und Befürwortung von Umverteilung in der Gesellschaft sicherstellen soll. Zur Beschreibung der MIPEX-Daten kommen quantitative Vergleiche der Mittelwerte und Standardabweichungen, ein Zeitvergleich der Daten zu 2007 und 2010, und Clusteranalysen zur Anwendung. Mittels bivariater Datenanalyse werden die Daten anschließend mit Indikatoren der OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) und wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Typologien verglichen. Während sich zeigt, dass nationale Integrationspolitiken im Hinblick auf Inklusion und Exklusion sehr unterschiedlich ausgeprägt sind und der Umfang der Wohlfahrtsleistungen darauf keinen eindeutigen Einfluss hat, können unterschiedliche Wohlfahrtsmodelle die Ausrichtung von Integrationspolitiken klar erklären: So zeigt sich, dass sozial-demokratische Wohlfahrtsstaaten auf Inklusion ausgerichtete Policies aufweisen, während liberale Wohlfahrtsstaaten tendenziell exkludierende Integrationspolitiken verfolgen. Die Integrationspolitiken der konservativen und südlichen Wohlfahrtsstaaten sind nicht eindeutig zuordenbar, zeigen im Zeitverlauf aber eine Tendenz zu Inklusion. Ein möglicher Rückschluss von diesen Ergebnissen ist, dass die unterschiedlichen Zielsetzungen sozialdemokratischer, konservativer und liberaler Wohlfahrtsmodelle eher für die Konfiguration von Integrationspolitiken sind, als deren schlichte Größe.

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I. Introduction

In the last decades debates about the “proper” integration of immigrants received a lot of public and academic attention. Since Western European countries faced various forms of immigration, including labour migration, forced migration, and family reunion from large parts of the world this does not surprise much. As a consequence nation-states had to accept that their societies became multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural. Using the words of Stephen Castles, they had to abandon the myth of being homogenous and monocultural national entities (Castles 2002: 1156). Hence nation-states had to deal with new forms of diversity, fostering immigrant integration in a changing society. In academic literature different approaches of immigration and integration policy are largely described as national idiosyncrasies, reflecting a country’s individual history and political and economic system. Hence, immigrant integration policies were either analysed in single case studies or in studies including a small number of cases allowing for a detailed in-depth analysis (e.g. Green 2001; Guild/Carrera 2009; Joppke/Morawska 2003; Koopmans/Giugni/Passy 2005; Sainsbury 2006; Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006). Until recently, quantitative comparisons including larger numbers of countries were limited at least due to the lack of comparable data. With the introduction of the European Civic Inclusion and Citizenship Index in 2005 and the Immigrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) in 2007 the lack-of-data problem became less significant. The aim of my master thesis is then to challenge the idea of idiosyncratic national integration policies via cross-country quantitative empirical analysis.

Once different configurations of integration policies were described, we can raise questions of how to explain differences and similarities of national models of integration policy. One possible explanation lies in effects of welfare systems and redistribution. There are many contradicting arguments on this relation: First, immigration and diversity are argued to threaten a country’s ability to develop a redistributive welfare state or to undermine public support for redistribution, because they undermine social solidarity (e.g. Alesina/Glaeser 2004). In a similar vein, Koopmans argues that generous welfare states counter immigrant’s integration, because social rights make them less efficient in finding employment (Koopmans 2010). This might be countered by a second line of arguments that inclusive models of integration involving social rights are vital to generous welfare systems because they prevent an ethnic or racial segregation of society (e.g. Banting/Kymlicka 2006; Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006). Third, different welfare systems contain different conceptions of state intervention and social equality. This might entail

different normative conceptions of the state's role in immigrant integration and different objectives of integration (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006; Sainsbury 2006). Furthermore, immigrant integration and welfare system restructuring in Western European countries can be argued as a double dilemma of inclusion and exclusion, involving both socio-economic as well as socio-cultural marginalisation (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006). In this context integration and welfare systems do not necessarily have a causal relationship, but are interdependent issues that need to be dealt with simultaneously. Since Will Kymlicka noted on the issue of causal effects of welfare systems and immigrant integration policy that "there has been much armchair speculation on this question, but remarkably little evidence" some progress has been made (Kymlicka 2002: 367). Still, the results on causal relationships of welfare systems and immigrant integration and integration policy are highly contradicting and thus provide space for further analysis (Alesina/Glaeser 2004; Banting et al. 2006; Fleischmann/Dronkers 2010; Koopmans 2010; Mau/Burkhardt 2009; Morrisens/Sainsbury 2005; Sainsbury 2006). In this context, I suggest to analyse effects of welfare systems on integration policy by comparing indicators on welfare systems with the results of the MIPEX indices. Noteworthy, unlike some of the literature I cited above, I will focus on integration policies only, making no argument on integration outcomes.

1. The research question

My research is basically guided by two questions, which will both be specified and attributed with arguments, but this will follow in the two theoretical chapters of the master thesis:

- To which extent do countries diverge in respect to integration policy and if so, can different types of integration policy be identified?
- Do countries apply different integration policies based on different conceptions of welfare provision?

2. Case selection

In short, the argument that immigrant integration policy can be explained by welfare systems crucially depends on two independent variables: First, there needs to be a considerable number of people immigrating for a country in order to develop specific policies towards integration. Second, the immigration countries need to have a developed

welfare system upon which they can build their integration policies on. To confirm existing theories Seawright and Gerring recommend applying the “most similar” case selection technique (Seawright/Gerring 2008: 298). For this method of case selection cases should be characterised by as many similarities as possible, except for the dependent variable. Of course, there needs to be some variation in the independent variable too in order to explain different outcomes on the dependent variable. Hence, I chose to analyse the EU-15 countries, because they are arguably similar in their experience of immigration and welfare provision. Of course, there is some divergence, but comparatively little with respect to other countries like the US, Canada, or Eastern European countries. EU membership might be a factor of similarity too. Still, in order to achieve a balanced variation of different welfare systems I decided to include Norway and Switzerland to raise the number of representatives of the social democratic and liberal welfare regimes. In sum, 17 countries will be analysed.

3. Methodology and outline of the master thesis

In the second chapter, I will provide an introduction on the meaning of integration and describe different philosophies and analytic concepts of immigrant integration, based on a review of recent literature. In the end of the chapter I will explain the structure of the MIPEX framework, whose results I will analyse eventually. The third chapter then includes a description of national integration policies in the selected countries, followed by a bivariate correlation analysis of the variables of the 2007 and 2011 indices and a cluster analysis based on the 2011 index. Hence, in this chapter I analyse the MIPEX results in a quantitative way. The aim of this chapter is to provide an answer for the first research question, showing that national integration policies resemble another only to a very limited extent.

After describing integration policy variations and answering the first research question, in the fourth chapter I will focus on theories explaining why integration policies and integration outcomes vary. These include the timing of migration, political parties of the right influencing integration policy, the Europeanisation of integration policy and most notably, welfare systems as an explaining factor of integration policy. In the fifth chapter, I will turn to empirical analysis again, conducting bivariate analyses on welfare system indicators (mostly provided by the OECD), welfare regime types, and MIPEX results. The results of the analysis then allow me to answer the second research question of causal

relationships between welfare systems and integration policy. Eventually, I will summarise my findings in chapter six and make some proposals on other possible explanations.

II. Making sense of immigrant integration policy

In this theoretical chapter I will provide a basis for analysing the MIPEX results on integration policy of 17 countries. After some comments on the terminology and meaning of immigrant integration the focus on the chapter turns to different historical and national models of immigrant integration. We will see that the configuration of integration policy depends on notions of national belonging as well as on specific domestic needs, for example needs of labour markets.

1. The terminology of immigrant integration

In the literature on immigrant integration there are many terms being used for “integration”, for example “incorporation”, “inclusion”, “accommodation”, or “assimilation”. While the term “assimilation” requires some special attention – I will refer to that below – the remaining terms are mostly used synonymously. Boswell and Geddes argue that the term “integration” is used most frequently and being deeply contested (Ager/Strang 2008: 167; Boswell/Geddes 2011: 206). Since my analysis tries to capture many different areas of immigrant “integration” the use of this rather broad term appears appropriate. Additionally, for practical reasons I use the same terminology as the authors of the MIPEX-Indices do. In the 2005 report, they referred to “inclusion”, but in the later reports of 2007 and 2011 they used the term “integration” too.

2. What are the objectives of immigrant integration policy?

Analysing immigrant integration necessarily puts up at least two important questions: What is the objective of immigrant integration and how can we measure its achievement? Since the focus of this text is not on actual outcomes or immigrant integration performances, the question how to measure immigrant integration can be left aside. The questions then are: What is the objective of immigrant integration and what can governments do about it?

The objectives of immigrant integration can involve cultural monism, the adoption of the majority's lifestyle, cultural, and religious practices, the sharing of one language, equal rights, and/or equal social opportunities. The focus of integration can further be oriented on the needs of the receiving country or on the needs of the immigrants. For example, integration can mean the customisation of immigrant's to labour market needs alone. Alternatively, integration can include assistance for immigrants to maintain their cultural heritage in the receiving country. Hence there is a variety of different purposes and goals of immigrant integration we need to be aware of.

Additionally, integration can be understood as a process leading to the acquisition of citizenship. Citizenship then may be an endpoint of integration, but it may be located in the middle of an integration process as well. Citizenship commonly refers to a sense of belonging to a community. Different conceptions of this belonging influence access to citizenship to a great extent. If citizenship is, for example, based on ethnicity (*ius sanguinis*), one might seriously question an immigrant's perspective of access, since he or she cannot absorb the ethnicity of the majority population. Of course, citizenship might not be part of immigrant integration at all: Especially if immigrants are not wanted to stay in the "host"-country for the rest of their lives, citizenship can be deliberately excluded from the integration process. However, citizenship and naturalisation are important tools for immigrant integration that can be designed to include or exclude immigrants (see e.g. Guild/Groenendijk/Carrera 2009).

Alastair Ager and Alison Strang provide an insightful framework for identifying and analysing "successful" integration. According to them integration can be split up into ten basic domains:

Core domains of integration

Markers and means	Employment	Housing	Education	Health
Social connection	Social bridges		Social bonds	Social links
Facilitators	Language and cultural knowledge		Safety and stability	
Foundation	Rights and citizenship			

(Ager/Strang 2008: 170)

In a bottom-up fashion, all domains are crucial for integration. Immigrants need rights, usually including citizenship after some time, in order to achieve a notion of belonging to a

community and, of course, to be able to find employment and housing and access public services. Facilitators provide necessary skills for interaction, say being able to communicate with others, foster a feeling of being welcome, and prospects for the future. If an immigrant has some linguistic and cultural knowledge and safety and stability in her or his status and accommodation, he or she is able to build social connections with peers, other groups, and public institutions. This in turn fosters the ability to find suiting employment, education, and housing and promotes health, or if being sick, access to health care. These markers and means can then indicate the successfulness of an integration process. Public policies can affect most of these domains, most notably access to rights, citizenship, and security, to employment, health services, housing, and education. The extent to which a government encourages immigrants to learn about language and culture also affects the integration process. Hence, even if we do not analyse integration outcomes, but policies, the framework of Ager and Strang provides useful insights about areas in which public policy may affect immigrant integration.

3. Assimilation, differential exclusion, and multiculturalism

Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller summarize three main strategies for the integration of immigrants: assimilation, differential exclusion, and multiculturalism (Castles 2002: 1154-7; Castles/Miller 2009: 245-50). In this section I will describe these strategies in detail and show how they might be criticised.

The term assimilation means the full adoption of the social and cultural practices of the majority population by immigrants. Thus the goal of this approach is that immigrants become indistinguishable from the receiving society. It should be accompanied by a shift of loyalty from the country of origin to the host country. Immigrants then adopt the national identity of this country. Typically, assimilation involves easy access to citizenship, the use of birthright citizenship (*ius soli*), strict definitions of anti-discrimination, and a distinction between public and private life that defines cultural and religious diversity as a purely private matter. The example for assimilationist immigrant integration most referred to is France (Castles/Miller 2009: 247; 256-7). In his article on the debate on republicanism and multiculturalism in the French citizenship model Jeremy Jennings gives a good overview of the elements of French integration policy (Jennings 2000). He describes the classical approach to French citizenship as based on a strong political national identity and the principle of *laïcité*:

“National identity is not a biological but a political fact: one is French through the practice of a language, through the learning of a culture, through the wish to participate in an economic and political life” (Schnapper, in: Jennings 2000: 577).

“Raised to the level of a constitutional principle ... [laïcité] postulates the existence of a secular ethic, grounded in science and philosophy, that would not act only as a civil religion and social bond but also as the means of educating the free and tolerant citizens required by the new democratic order” (Jennings 2000: 578).

This implies for immigration policy that on one hand the French state appears very inclusive, since all immigrants can learn the French way of life and respect the secular principles, on the other hand this essentially means that immigrants are not accepted as who they are: They have to adopt French culture and national past to be integrated (ibidem: 580-2). Jennings then summarises French philosophy of integration to four principles:

- accordance to the secular principle: religions are tolerated, but do not receive special support;
- prevention of the constitution of structured communities, immigrants integrate as individuals, not as groups;
- respect for the French law, in return the law respects immigrant’s culture and traditions;
- French nationals and immigrants must be treated equally, hence neither positive nor negative discriminations are permissible (ibidem 583);

An important feature of this approach is the support of one language within a country only. Contrarily to the French example provided above, assimilation can involve affirmative action programmes too. This can be imagined as an instruction how to be a proper citizen. Susan Gordon provides an insightful example on that, referring to the US at the end of the 19th century (Gordon 2007: 372-80). In the United States, however, assimilation is viewed somewhat differently, as an inevitable consequence of immigration and settlement (Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008: 162; Castles 2002: 1155; Reinprecht/Weiss 2011: 24-8). Rogers Brubaker importantly notes that conceptions of assimilation changed over time (Brubaker 2003). According to him, the version I described above refers to an old conception of assimilation. I will refer to the new conception later. Thus, in this sense, assimilation captures the objective of integration as becoming indistinguishable from the native majority population, no matter which policies it entails.

The differential-exclusion-approach typically refers to the treatment of guestworkers in post-war Europe. Not expected to stay longer than a few years, these immigrants were only enabled to participate in public life as far as labour market participation was concerned (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 41; Però/Solomos 2010). From all other spheres of integration, say education, political, social, and cultural participation guestworkers were typically excluded. Hence, this approach clearly differs from the assimilation and multiculturalism approaches in its goal: Immigrants are not seen as a part of the national society and are neither expected to shift their loyalty. Despite the rather temporary character of this approach, differential exclusion was – and is – a long-lasting model of immigrant integration, as Simon Green shows on the case of Germany (Green 2001). Carl-Ulrik Schierup and others argue that this approach can also be applied to the present treatment of undocumented migrant workers, especially in southern Europe (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 41-2). In its pure type, the differential-exclusion-approach involves no political rights, very limited social rights, and separated schooling for immigrant children. In the first place, it only involves affirmative action programmes concerning the teaching of working-skills. Often the differential exclusion approach to immigrant integration coincides with an ethnic notion of citizenship. This means that citizenship is based on descent (*ius sanguinis*) instead of the place of birth (*ius soli*) (Heater 2004: 252-5).

Multicultural integration of immigrants does primarily not refer to the multicultural character of a society say diverse ethnicities living together or diverse religions being practiced. Instead, it abandons “the myth of homogenous and monocultural nation-states” (Castles 2002: 1156): All members of a community should be able to maintain their own cultural heritage and have access to equal opportunities in society at the same time. Hence, multiculturalism is a whole citizenship model (e.g. Bloemraad/Korteweg/Yurdakul 2008; Kymlicka 1995). Immigrants are not expected to waive their cultural and social practices or native languages when planning to settle in a new country. Instead, they can maintain their distinctiveness via group rights and legal exemptions (Kymlicka 1995). According to Keith Banting and others multiculturalism towards immigrants ideally entails

- (a) a public affirmation of multiculturalism,
- (b) an adaption in school curricula,
- (c) sensitivity towards minorities in public media,
- (d) exemptions from dress codes etc.,

- (e) the possibility of dual citizenship,
- (f) funding of ethnic group organisations,
- (g) funding of bilingual education, and
- (h) affirmative action for disadvantaged minorities (Banting et al. 2006: 56-7).

Canada is usually the provided example for countries pursuing this approach. Since multicultural integration policies claim to enable immigrants to participate in society more effectively, a shift of loyalty to the host country is a part of this approach too. The normative difference to assimilation, however, lies in acceptance of diversity as a public matter and of group rights as a way of meeting immigrants' needs.

4. Criticisms to the heterogeneity of immigrant integration models

Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska criticise both the categorisation of integration policy models as well as the view of distinct national models of integration that differ from each other (Joppke/Morawska 2003: 3-8; Joppke 2007): First, the discussion about the terminology of integration, assimilation, or multiculturalism, rather reflects the politicised debate than actual policies. Second, neither do many states differ in their choice of policies that much that one could ascribe them clearly to one model or the other, nor they purely rely on one model of integration policy. Third, states might change their policy models over time. These arguments can be illustrated by the example of Germany:

Post-war Germany experienced three major flows of immigration: war refugees, ethnic Germans, and German Democratic Republic (GDR) citizens that fled or returned to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the years following World War II, Mediterranean (mainly Turkish) guestworkers that were recruited by German companies to make up for labour shortages, and asylum seekers that fled from the war in former Yugoslavia in the 1990ies (Green 2001; Hansen 2003: 90-7; Castles/Miller 2009: 96-103). Since German nationality law was based on *ius sanguinis*, ethnic Germans arriving in the FRG were technically no foreigners and – compared to other immigrant groups – they were not treated as foreigners. Simon Green notes that they were quickly taken seriously by German parties and subject to generous financial provisions to improve their livelihoods (Green 2001: 85). The belonging of these people to the FRG was – at least by government officials – not questioned, because they were ethnic Germans. About 20 years later the (non-) integration of guestworkers had very different objectives: Labour force shortages in the

industry caused the FRG to sign recruitment treaties for foreign workers with many Mediterranean countries, most famously Turkey. These workers should be trained and employed by German companies and return after a few years with their skills back to their countries of origin. Hence, these new immigrants were solely integrated in the labour market without any perspective of long-term residence and full incorporation in German society (the ideal-case of differential exclusion). Due to changes in the guestworkers life-plans and due to the interest of the companies not to train employees in too short circles their residence permits were renewed and large-scale family reunion took place. When the government decided to stop recruitment and impose restrictive eligibility rules on family reunion asylum applications rose to almost 450.000 per year in 1992 due to the war in former Yugoslavia (Green 2001: 93). Thus, Germany experienced an inability to control the numbers of immigrant inflows. In reaction to restrictive German citizenship laws naturalisation rates remained low and many former guestworkers lived in Germany for decades without access to German citizenship. Despite the resulting high numbers of foreign residents - 7.2 million in 1995 (see Castles/Miller 2009: 118) – Germany still claimed to be a non-immigration-country (Green 2001: 83). This entails that the perspective of Germans/citizens and foreigners/guestworkers as two different groups which cannot merge prevailed. As Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove note, public opinion on proper immigrant integration became an important area of party politics already in the 1980ies. Due to the centre-right party government the official position remained one of non-immigration and differential exclusion (Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006: 181-9). Following the SPD-victory in the 1998 Bundestag elections a long debate on the widely perceived policy-failure of the guestworker-system led to a far-reaching reform of German nationality and immigration law in 2000. This reform included the possibility of dual citizenship, the adaptation of *ius soli*, a reform of naturalisation requirements, a reintroduction of labour-recruitment, and a commitment to increase integration efforts (Hansen 2003: 94-7). On that development Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove note:

“Yet, what was “unthinkable” in 1992 has, in large measure, come to pass. The SPD-Green coalition elected in 1998 passed a revised citizenship law that includes provisions for attributing citizenship to children of qualified foreign residence via the principle of *ius soli*” (Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006: 173).

Using the data of the 2011 Multiculturalism Policy Index, by 2000 Germany can be said to have multicultural elements in its integration policy due to the funding of ethnic groups,

some support for bilingual education, and the partial allowing of dual citizenship (Tolley 2011: 43-8). As the results of the MIPEx data analysis will show, German integration policy contains a number of elements contradicting the differential-exclusion approach nowadays. However, Germany adopted various elements of different integration models, intended on inclusion or exclusion, depending on time and circumstances.

5. Historical development of integration policy

Alternatively, one could also argue that different models of immigrant integration rather appear in different historical contexts than in different countries. Due to a limit of space I will refer to European countries only. In the second half of the 19th century, migrants from Ireland and the colonies came to industrialise Britain to work in the industrial sector. Similar to that, Poles migrated to Germany. These workers were mostly segregated from the main population and disadvantaged in the labour market. Usually, there were strict connections between labour contracts and legal residence. In sum, these countries were following the differential-exclusion approach at this time. France states a different example, where migrant from its neighbouring countries were assimilated and granted citizenship especially due to the fact that France needed soldiers for its military (Castles/Miller 2009: 87-90). Contrary to that the US and Australia had a clearly different objective: Since they were countries that mainly consisted of immigrants, the focus was to assimilate all immigrants into a common nation. Exclusionary politics appeared mostly in the decision about whom to grant access: Typically, Europeans were permitted and Asians were not (Castles/Miller 2009: 83-7; Gordon 2007). Of course, slavery constituted an example of exclusion in the US. Multicultural policies only occurred in the Ottoman Empire at this time (Kymlicka 1995). In the interwar period among European countries only France experienced major immigrant inflows. At this time, France relied on some sort of differential exclusion to labour immigrants too, like Germany and Great Britain before (Castles/Miller 2009: 92).

In the postwar period many European countries - most notably Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands - recruited workers to fill labour shortages. This development went hand-in-hand with strong economic growth. The workers mainly immigrated from former colonies and Mediterranean countries. Apart from France, most countries tried to limit immigration to specific labour market needs and discouraged family reunion. Immigrants were not seen as future citizens and were expected

to return to their countries of origin after the fulfilment of their work contracts. Especially in the cases of Great Britain and the Netherlands immigrants from former colonies often held the citizenship of these countries (Castles/Miller 2009: 97-103). Hence, their residence did not depend on a labour contract, as in the remaining countries. Apart from that, the main policy of immigrant treatment was characterised by the differential-exclusion model.

The immigration policy towards guestworkers was marked by an obvious policy failure. As I have shown on the example of Germany above, many guestworkers did not return to their countries of origin. Instead they became permanent settlers and brought their families over. The resulting diversification of society was at least partially ignored (e.g. Germany, Green 2001). Nevertheless, European countries had to accept that they were countries of immigration at some point and thus had to amend their policies towards foreign residents. Between 1970 and 1990 especially Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden started recognising group-based demands by immigrant minorities and thus adapted a multicultural model of integration (Castles/Miller 2009: 247-50; Tolley 2011). As noted above, Germany changed its integration model towards multiculturalism too. France did not include multicultural elements in its integration policy, but the appropriateness of the assimilation model was seriously questioned in public debate (Jennings 2000).

From 2000 on, multiculturalism was blamed of creating segregated societies that did not alter immigrant's chances to participate economically and socially on an equal level compared to non-immigrants (Joppke 2004). Additionally, the appearance of illiberal practices like, for example, forced marriage brought multiculturalism into question. Joppke identifies a movement away from multiculturalism both in the theoretical debate as well as in actual policies especially in those countries that adopted multicultural policies in reaction to growing diversity (ibidem). This perceived failure pushed policy makers to develop new approaches to immigrant integration (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 207; Joppke/Morawska 2003). One concept of integration policy is presented by Rodgers Brubaker's "new assimilation": This concept shifts the focus of integration away from what he calls a holistic approach of assimilation that was driven by the question of "how much" immigrants need to assimilate towards a disaggregated approach that asks in what respect and in reference to which ideal immigrants need to be integrated (Brubaker 2003: 51-3). Among others, he notes that there is a clear emphasis on the socio-economic, linguistic, and political integration of immigrants that replaced to emphasis on cultural

diversity or monism of the multicultural or “old” assimilation model (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 202; Brubaker 2003: 53; Joppke 2004). The concept of post-assimilation and post-multiculturalism integration is mostly referred to as “civic integration” (e.g. Carrera/Wiesbrock 2009; Joppke 2007). Therefore the concept underlying the MIPEX-Index presents a well-developed example. Below I will describe this approach in detail. I am sceptical whether it is appropriate to call this development a “return of assimilation” (cited from Brubaker 2003), since it does not exclude culture and group-based demands per se.

6. Summary

In sum, integration policies vary in respect to different countries, time periods, and forms of migration. The assimilation, differential exclusion, and multicultural models do merely describe reactions of national governments to specific situations than constitute holistic models that can be applied under any circumstance. Cross-national differences of integration policies, however, can show different normative conceptions, but we need to be aware of their relativity in respect to various challenges to nation-states. Policy responses to perceived failures and specific domestic challenges can vary much from what is expected to be the national stereotype model. Returning to the first research question, for the analysis of the country results of the MIPEX indices I do not expect countries do embody clear-cut holistic models of the three integration “philosophies”. Neither can be expected that all integration policies resemble another across countries. Most likely countries face some similar and some specific challenges of policy failure, political constraints, and labour market and social integration to which they might respond different due to different national legacies. Thus integration policies are expected to be highly individual in each country.

III. The MIPEX Index: Areas and dimensions of immigrant integration

1. Integration policy areas

So far I did not discuss the content of immigrant integration policy in detail. Contrarily to the work of Ager and Strang, the discussion of different policy ideals or models does not provide a systematic overview of policy areas affected by immigrant integration. A fairly sophisticated systematisation of integration policy is provided by the MIPEX-index, which is one strong reason why the index is the subject of my analysis. In this chapter, I will give an overview of the components of integration policy using the data of the MIPEX report of 2011. The examples below are compiled by policies from all 31 countries scrutinised by MIPEX.

Labour Market Mobility

The participation of immigrants in the labour market can be promoted or prohibited in various ways. Access can be provided immediately or after waiting periods up to five years. Then, immigrants might have access to all kinds of public and private employment and start businesses under equal conditions as citizens or face restrictions, like being banned from public employment or self-employment. Qualifications from abroad can be fully recognised or not. When trying to amend her or his qualifications an immigrant can either be treated equally to a citizen, or he or she can receive targeted support, like vocational training or study grants. There might be some specific focus on certain groups of immigrants too, like women or immigrant youth. Of course citizens might be favoured in the granting of training and study grants too. Working immigrants can either have the same rights as their colleagues or not. Policy might also vary in the extent immigrants receive information about their rights associated with employment. This concerns rights to social security, legal protections of employment, and political rights to join unions (MIPEX 2011: 12).

Family Reunion

Family Reunion policies vary in their definitions, eligibility conditions, and rights associated. Definitions of families eligible for reunion range from the narrow core family to broad conceptions including partners or spouses, adult children, and dependent parents or grandparents. These definitions also include different age limits for eligible family members. Conditions can include high incomes, stable employment, suitable accommodation, waiting periods, and/or high level language and integration tests for the sponsor and integration and language pre-tests for family members. The application procedures vary in their costs and length. Applications can be rejected because of security threats only or discretionarily. If a family is reunited, family member can have immediate labour market access and equal social rights or remain dependent on the sponsor. A withdrawal of the status might be caused by serious crimes only or by many reasons evaluated discretionarily. As well, the conditions for an autonomous residence permit for family members vary. Some countries actively support families to find work, schools, or social assistance (MIPEx 2011: 14).

Education

In this area of integration policy immigrant children are either discriminated against their peers, treated equally, or being supported actively. In some countries, immigrants do not have a right to full Education. Countries vary in their capacity to assess and accept a pupil's skills learned abroad. When immigrant pupils are being treated equal officially, teachers are often not in contact with the children's parents and language support is poor or absent. Active support can entail language training (mother tongue and public languages), teachers trained to be sensitive towards special needs, and a commitment to cultural diversity. This includes intercultural approaches in the curriculum, textbooks, and hiring of staff. Hence diversity is understood as a potential asset to all pupils (MIPEx 2011: 16).

Political Participation

Immigrants can have equal civil liberties as citizens and have a right to vote and run for offices on the local and regional level after few years. Participation on national elections is not included. Some countries restrict civil liberties in ways that immigrants for example

cannot work as journalists. Immigrants further can be consulted via consultative bodies on the national, regional, and local level with varying significance. These bodies might be run by immigrants and might be state-organised or private, but state-funded. Additionally, the state might inform immigrants about their political rights and provide funding for immigrant organisations and thus support the development of an immigrant civil society. However, most countries refrain from providing immigrants political opportunities (MIPEx 2011: 18).

Long-term Residence

Ideally all immigrants can decide freely to settle in a country at some point and receive a permanent residence permit. Usually holders of certain residence permits are banned from applying permanent residence and waiting periods vary for different categories of immigrants. For example, migrant students can count their time studying in some countries, but not in others. Similar to Family Reunion, conditions can involve high income and employment requirements, language and integration testing, which might be expansive. Duration and costs of the application process vary as well as the discretion decisions are based on and the possibility of an appeal against a rejection. Long-term residents can have equal rights concerning most areas of life than citizens, except political rights. In some cases visiting the home country is only possible for a very short period without losing the right of permanent residence (MIPEx 2011: 18).

Access to Nationality

Access to citizenship is partly a substitute to other areas of integration policy. For example, if an immigrant had immediate access to citizenship and dual citizenship were allowed, issues like voting rights for long-term residents would not matter. Thus a liberalised access to citizenship can make up for restrictions in other areas, and vice versa.

Access to citizenship can be based on *ius soli* or *ius sanguinis*, which might lead to second- or third-generation immigrants without national citizenship. Both ways can be applied automatically or based on an application. Naturalisation requirements involve waiting periods from three to twelve years, varying income levels, fees, having no criminal record, being “a good character”, and language and citizenship testing, which might be expensive.

Decisions might be highly discretionary and without judicial oversight. Some countries accept dual citizenship generally, some accept it only for second-generation immigrants and some do not accept it at all. Once citizenship is granted, most countries have rules that allow them to revoke it but under varying conditions, sometimes even leading to statelessness (MIPEX 2011: 22).

Anti-discrimination

Anti-discrimination policies vary in their definitions of discrimination and application areas. Some countries have a broader conception of discrimination, including more dimensions (e.g. race, nationality, gender) of discrimination than others. These definitions then are applied to all areas of public life or only applied to few, for example, employment and schooling. If brought to court, procedural settings vary in the placement of the burden of proof, the funding of legal aid and interpreters, and in the range and effect of sanctions. There might be public support for victims to enable a trial. NGO's can play important roles in supporting victims before, during, and after the procedure. Equality bodies might assist victims of discrimination and instigate investigations and/or promote equality via positive action. Furthermore, funding and power of these bodies might vary.

2. The scope of MIPEX data

These seven areas capture public policy of immigrant integration in a very broad use of the term, but do not capture all domains identified by Ager and Strang. Often issues like family reunion or access to long-term residence are not included in integration policy, but kept as separate policy fields themselves (e.g. Boswell/Geddes 2011; Freeman 2006). This broad approach allows specifying on effects on a single area later on. For example, we might say that public social expenditure does not correlate with integration policy per se, but with Labour Market Mobility. Of course the areas included in the index are hardly exhaustive. Important issues that are only receive limited attention in the MIPEX areas are housing and health services. Non-citizens might face disadvantages in the access to public housing as well as they can be actively supported to find accommodation. The same counts for access to health services, which might be supported by providing information and interpreters as well as there might be subject to restrictions. However, the framework of the MIPEX index does not provide us with systematised information on these issues.

In a nutshell, we see that integration policy is a cross-issue, being a subject of many policy areas. This explains partially why the policy models described above do not fit under all circumstances. Causes and explanations of integration policy development can hardly explain all areas simultaneously. If integration policy can be explained in reference to one or two of areas only, this still might be a valuable insight.

3. Development and structure of MIPEX

The MIPEX Immigrant Integration Policy Index is managed by the British Council Brussels, the Foreign Policy Centre, and the Migration Policy Group, three think-tanks located in Brussels and London. The index tries to provide comparative data that allows for comparison and monitoring of integration policies of the member states and to identify examples of good practice. In 2011 33 countries are part of the index: the EU-27, Australia, Canada, Norway, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. So far, three index reports were being published (2005, 2007, and 2011). While the first index of 2005 only included five areas, the structure of the index was increasingly expanded, leading to the seven areas of immigrant integration policy described above. Additionally, the methodology was subject to amendments, with the consequence that the data of the 2005 index cannot be compared to the data of the following indices in a quantitative fashion. Here I will only refer to the methodology of the 2011 index.

The normative framework of the index is focused on inclusion, which means that 100% scores indicate maximum inclusion and 0% scores indicate maximum exclusion of immigrants (Geddes et al. 2005: x). The formulations of ideal policy conditions for immigrant inclusion are built on EU legislation, international conventions and NGO proposals (MIPEX 2005: 15). Based on the conclusions of the Tampere European Council in 1999, long-term resident immigrants should benefit from “civic citizenship”, a concept that provides immigrants with a legal status as similar as possible to EU citizenship. According to the 2005 index this includes:

- “Right of residence,
- Protection against expulsion
- Access to employment and self-employment
- Access to family reunification
- Access to education, vocational training and recognition of qualifications.

- Access to social security and social assistance
- Right of association and membership including trade unions
- Right of participation in political life (at least local level).
- Right to vote in European Parliament elections.
- Right of movement for work and study purposes to any state in the EU.” (MIPEX 2005: 4)

These objectives are clearly judged as desirable in the index reports and a lot of effort is put into legitimising this approach (see MIPEX 2005: 1-19). In the following reports a commitment to civic citizenship is not mentioned. Instead, Council of Europe Conventions and EU Directives are argued to be the normative basis for the index framework (MIPEX 2011: 7). However, a change in the normative concept of the index is not evident to me: The main difference is that in the 2005 index the concept is sufficiently explained, while in the 2007 and 2011 index it is used implicitly. For the context of my analysis a judgement about the desirability of civic citizenship for immigrants is not necessary. What matters is that compliance with the objectives is regarded as ideally inclusive hence non-compliance can be regarded as exclusive. Thus, the index can function as a measure for immigrant integration policy inclusiveness. Noteworthy, there is no clear objective of distinguishing between multicultural, differential-exclusionist, and assimilationist integration models. These strategies might shape policies, but are not measured explicitly. Hence, I may only analyse whether countries have different approaches towards civic inclusion or citizenship, but I cannot measure approaches towards multiculturalism or assimilation.

For the 2011 index 148 policy indicators were used to measure immigrant integration policy (see Annex 1 or MIPEX 2011: 211-2 for a full list of indicators). For each indicator values from one to three representing total, halfway, or non-compliance with the normative concept are given based on the judgement of national experts. These scores are then being summarised to the dimensions of the policy areas (see below) and converted into percentages. 100 per cent are indicating total compliance within a dimension. The dimensions are then summarised into policy areas, which in turn can be summarised to get a total score.

MIPEX 2011 country profile structure: policy areas and dimensions

<u>Labour Market Mobility</u>	• Access • Access to general support • Targeted support • Workers' rights
<u>Family Reunion</u>	• Eligibility • Acquisition conditions • Security of status • Rights associated
<u>Education</u>	• Access • Targeting needs • New opportunities • Intercultural education for all
<u>Political Participation</u>	• Electoral rights • Political liberties • Consultative bodies • Implementation policies
<u>Long-term Residence</u>	• Eligibility • Acquisition conditions • Security of status • Associated rights
<u>Access to Nationality</u>	• Eligibility • Acquisition conditions • Security of status • Dual nationality
<u>Anti-discrimination</u>	• Definitions and concepts • Fields of application • Enforcement mechanisms • Equality policies

For the 2007 index the authors used a slightly different conception of Labour Market Mobility and the Education area was not part of the index yet (MIPEx 2007). To allow for a comparison over time, the scores for Labour Market Mobility for 2007 were recalculated using the 2011 index structure. The results are part of the 2011 index (MIPEx 2011: 11-25). The policies analysed in the indices date in October 2004 for the 2005 index, March 2007 for the 2007 index, and May 2010 for the 2011 index (MIPEx 2005: 22; MIPEx 2011: 7).

IV. Analysing MIPEX results 2004-2010: Commonalities and divergence


In this section, I will provide detailed information on MIPEX indicators for the selected countries and eventually answer the first research question: Therefore I will first describe the results for all countries separately, summarising results of the different areas of integration policy explained above. As a second step, I will compare averaged scores of the countries across areas and standard deviations and apply a bivariate data analysis in order to see whether national policies are consistent in their inclusive- or exclusiveness across different areas. Third, two models of cluster analysis will be adapted to analyse to which extent there are groups of countries that apply similar integration models. Finally, I will focus on index score changes to see whether policies are becoming more inclusive or exclusive over time. This methodology in sum allows for arguing to which extent integration policies are similar across countries and whether different types of integration policies exist. Thus, I will answer the first research question eventually.

Unless specifically mentioned, the information presented below is taken from the 2007 and 2011 indices and the tables on foreign born as part of the population and third country nationals (TCN) employment in the annex. The referred scores are all taken from the 2011 index.

1. Country results

Austria

In 2009 15.5 per cent of Austrian population were foreign-born, which is the fourth highest rate among the selected countries. TCNs are more likely to be employed than in most central or northern European countries and unemployment figures indicate that unemployment rates for TCNs in total and compared to nationals are rather low. Austria scores last in the overall performance as well as in Access to Nationality and Political Participation. Long-term Residence can be argued to be the strength of Austrian integration policy being average, with all other areas performing below average compared to the other countries selected. In the time period captured by the three indices Labour Market Mobility tended to become more inclusive, while Access to Nationality and Family Reunion became more exclusive.




Austrian **Labour Market Mobility** policies does not provide equal access to immigrants to the labour market and general support: Depending on their status, foreign workers can be tied to one employer or one sector. Family member are banned from the labour market for a year after arrival. There are specific obstacles to self-employment, training and study grants. If employed, immigrants are secure in their employment status and have full access to the rights employment involves. Eligibility for **Family Reunion** is exclusive due to waiting periods and age limits for spouses. Further, high income, housing, and integration requirements have to be met. Pre-departure measures are currently being debated. If Family Reunion is granted, the status involves fewer rights and is less secure than in many other countries and needs to be renewed after a year. Immigrant pupils have full access to compulsory **Education** and general support. Specific needs are met in the case of funding and provision for quality German language courses. Teaching of mother tongue languages, specific training for teachers, and approaches to intercultural Education for all are subject to discretion of schools and Länder and thus vary, but exist at some level. TCNs have no electoral rights but full political liberties. There is some funding for immigrant organisations, but only with specific conditions. Consultative bodies are not structurally implemented and consulted only on an ad-hoc basis on the regional level. In sum, **Political Participation** as integration policy is almost absent in Austria. Although eligibility was expanded since 2007 temporary workers do usually not have access to **Long-term Residence**. There are many conditions, including health insurance, integration requirements, and economic autonomy, to becoming a long-term resident. Once it is granted, it contains comparatively many rights, but can be withdrawn for a number of unspecific reasons. Most immigrants are eligible for naturalisation after ten years. There are exclusive conditions like tests on Austrian history and politics and high income

requirements plus discretionary decision-making and high fees. Additionally citizenship is a comparatively insecure status in Austria. Dual nationality is allowed only exceptionally. While the performance in definition and enforcement mechanisms for **Anti-discrimination** is about average in Austria, it crucially lacks fields of application, for example schools and housing. There is only limited dialogue and policy of promoting equality (MIPEX 2007: 20-5; 2011: 26-31).

Belgium

Belgium provides policies above average in all areas except Labour Market Mobility and Political Participation. Its non-native population is with 9.1-12.1 per cent of the total population about European average. TCNs are only half as likely to be employed as citizens and face the lowest employment and the highest unemployment rates of the selected countries. Immigrant integration – except citizenship – falls under the competence of the three regions. Thus, a validation of Belgium’s integration policy appears to be difficult (MIPEX 2005; 2007: 26). Integration policy was subject to changes on a number of occasions in recent years. This led to some policies becoming more exclusive, but most policies becoming more inclusive (MIPEX 2007: 27; 2011: 32-3).




It is somewhat unclear whether policy changes or changes in the concept of the index led to serious divergence in the scores of Belgian **Labour Market Mobility** policy: In the 2005 index Belgium scores far above average with security of employment status meeting best-practice. In the 2011 index, Labour Market Mobility states the major weakness of Belgian integration policy, without any reference to policy changes in that area. Using the

2011 data and scores, immigrants do not have access to many careers after arrival, for example permanent public sector jobs. They can profit from general support and some targeted measures. Belgium's complex **Family Reunion** policy is generally inclusive, but becoming more exclusive due to stricter age and housing requirements. If the conditions are met, Family Reunion is usually granted. Noteworthy, family member only have limited access to the labour market. **Education** is an area of particular inclusiveness of Belgian integration policy. Pupils can learn about immigrant languages and culture and targeted support should be available. Still, economically disadvantaged pupils might not receive this support in underperforming schools. In the area of **Political Participation** Belgium scores very low in electoral rights and - scarcely consulted - consultative bodies. To be able to vote in regional elections, one has to be a resident for five years (MIPEX 2011: 34-7). This deficit is being made up for by high scores in implementation policies, representing specific public support and funding for immigrant associations (MIPEX 2007: 29). **Long-term Residence** policy is being exclusive as far as tough eligibility rules are concerned. Despite that the system is very clear to applicants about how long they are allowed to stay, how long the procedure takes etc. Thus there is no discretion in the decision-making by the authority. In sum, Belgian Long-term Residence policy scores highest among the countries of the 2011 index. **Access to Nationality** on the contrary is characterised by a highly discretionary element and per se inclusive eligibility rules and acquisition conditions. Two thirds of the applicants are being rejected without being given a reason or a chance to appeal. Dual citizenship is allowed. **Anti-discrimination** policy was subject to amendments in all dimensions and became to be fairly inclusive. Belgium is ranked fourth among the selected countries in this area (MIPEX 2007: 26-31; 2011: 32-37).

Denmark

In 2009 7.5 per cent of the Danish population were not born in Denmark, which is below the European average. TCNs are about ten per cent less likely to be employed than citizens, but higher unemployment rates lead them to be more likely to receive training in order to find a job (MIPEX 2005: 61-3). In Family Reunion, Access to Nationality, and Anti-discrimination Denmark scores below average, in Political Participation and Education about average, and in Labour Market Mobility and Long-term Residence above

average. Integration policy was subject to various changes between 2007 and 2010, leading to a result indicating slightly more inclusion than 2007.




Labour Market Mobility is characterised by access to all areas of employment for residents and family members, targeted support, but unequal access to resulting social rights than citizens. For example, there is a ten-year waiting period to receive old-age pensions for immigrants. Hence, immigrants can participate, but under unequal circumstances. **Family Reunion** policy is extraordinarily restrictive, scoring second-last after Ireland. Eligibility requirements like the definition of eligible family members, residence requirements, or tests are all about the most restrictive among the selected countries. Additionally, family member can hardly get a residence permit independent from their sponsor. **Education** policy strongly focuses on the inclusion of immigrant pupils, providing extra support and language courses for pupils and special training for teachers. A concept of taking diversity as an asset of education or intercultural education is not part of Danish Education policy. This fact reduces the score to average (MIPEX 2011: 64-6). Immigrants have electoral rights after four years and full political liberties, but are hardly encouraged to participate via immigrant organisations or consultative bodies, which lack public affirmation and funding since a budget cut in 2002. This results in an average score in **Political Participation**. Participation in associations appears crucial for integration into Danish society, with 73 per cent of the population serving in at least one association (MIPEX 2007: 53). To be granted **Long-term Residence** immigrants face many conditions composed to a points system, which is considered to be one of the most restrictive systems in Europe. Eligibility is still considered inclusive, because Long-term Residence can be applied for after four years. To get **Access to Nationality** first generation

immigrants have to wait nine years and meet high language requirements. Additionally, applicants must not have received social benefits for most of their residence period. Dual nationality is accepted only exceptionally and once citizenship is granted, it is averagely secure in its status. **Anti-discrimination** policy lacks nationality as a reason for discrimination in its definition and equality policies. This results in the third lowest score after Switzerland and Austria (MIPEX 2007: 50-5; 2011: 62-7).

Finland

Finland's integration policy has particular strengths in the areas of Political Participation and Anti-discrimination. All other areas are slightly above average, except Long-term Residence, which is just below average. Changes in integration policy in recent years were scarce and lead only to little changes in the MIPEX-scoring. Being a newer country of immigration, the percentage of foreign-born residents rose slightly to 4.4 per cent in 2009, which is the lowest score of the analysed countries. Employment rates of TCNs are 22 per cent below the rates of citizens, which is a comparatively large gap. Finnish unemployment rates for TCNs are the second-highest after Belgium.




Despite the performance above average, Finnish **Labour Market Mobility** policy does only provide limited access to public sector employment for immigrants because of tough language requirements. Additionally, targeted support to improve qualifications, the recognition of skills, and limited access to study grants are weaknesses of the policy. While eligibility rules and acquisition conditions of **Family Reunion** are very inclusive, the security of the status and the rights it involves are rather not: It can be withdrawn on

several reasons and it is very difficult to get a residence permit independent from the sponsor. The **Education** system provides immigrant pupils favourable access to education and targets special needs: Teachers are instructed specifically, Finnish language courses are of high quality, and it is possible to learn the mother tongue. But integration policy does hardly go beyond, for example in making diversity an issue for all pupils. In terms of **Political Participation**, Finland is only outranked by Norway. This entails full political liberties and electoral rights at the local and regional level and far-reaching implementation policies fostering immigrants to participate. Consultative bodies are relevant at national and regional level. **Long-term Residence** comes with equal rights in most areas of society, but is difficult to attain: Temporary worker have no access, students cannot count their time studying, but waiting time during an asylum application counts for application requirements for Long-term Residence. Additionally, the status can be withdrawn on a number of reasons. **Access to Nationality** is available after six years of residence, but the procedure is long and costly and involves high language requirements (MIPEX 2011: 76-9). Dual nationality is available to naturalising immigrants, but not to children born in Finland, which applies ius soli (MIPEX 2007: 66). **Anti-discrimination policy** has a broad definition of discrimination and wide areas of application. Although victims cannot rely on NGO-support, enforcement of sanctions is facilitated by the Ombudsman for Minorities and Discrimination Tribunal. This leads to Finland being ranked fourth in this area (MIPEX 2007: 62-7; 2011: 74-9).

France

France is host to 11.6 per cent of foreign born residents in its population, which is average among the selected countries. Similar to Finland and Germany, employment rates for TCNs are about 20 percent below the rates for citizens. Moreover, TCNs are 2.8 times more likely to be unemployed, which is about average among the selected countries. French integration policy scores below average in most areas, particularly in the area of Education. Access to Nationality and especially Anti-discrimination are strengths of the French approach to immigrant integration. Between 2004 and 2007 integration policy was subject to significant changes, making it more restrictive in terms of Long-term Residence, Family Reunion, and Access to Nationality and more inclusive in the area of Anti-discrimination. Between 2007 and 2010 MIPEX scores do not indicate significant change.




French **Labour Market Mobility** policy involves legal access to fewer careers than any other MIPEX country. Additionally, access to trade unions is denied. Despite this exclusion, France provides targeted support for immigrants to find jobs, but this does not match the recognition of immigrant's skills. Mostly, it is designed to assign immigrants to jobs with manpower shortages. In sum, France has the fourth least favourable Labour Market Mobility policy among the selected countries. **Family Reunion** is subject to a large number of conditions, making it very restrictive, together with Denmark, Austria, and Switzerland. Additionally, the status can be withdrawn due to several reasons and getting an autonomous permit is only possible after three years and subject to further conditions. **Education** as a part of integration policy is subject to some pilot projects. Apart from that, immigrant pupils have access to education, but receive hardly any specific support. Diversity is not a part of French education curriculum. Granting electoral rights to TCNs is under public debate, but not agreed yet. Political liberties are limited, because many media professions are not available to immigrants. Consultative bodies are in place, but not led or elected by TCNs. Implementation policies receive high scores because immigrant organisations are funded equally like other organisations. In sum, **Political Participation** scores halfway to best practice. Eligibility and acquisition conditions for **Long-term Residence** include high income requirements, the fulfilment of an integration contract and health insurance, making it extraordinarily restrictive. Additionally, it is not being renewed automatically and does not involve as many rights as in other European countries. **Access to Nationality** is per se inclusive, including naturalisation after five years, the use of ius soli, and acceptance of dual citizenship. Still, the decision about the application is subject to great discretion and made on the local level, providing divergent practices in different regions. **Anti-discrimination** is a clear strength on French integration policy, including

wide definitions and areas of application. Equality policies and enforcement mechanisms could be improved, but are both above average (MIPEX 2007: 68-73; 2011: 80-5).

Germany

With 12.9 per cent of its population being foreign-born, Germany is slightly above average. There is a gap of about 20 per cent between employment rates for nationals and TCNs, similar to France and Finland. High overall unemployment leads to a comparatively little gap between nationals and TCNs, with TCNs being 2.4 times more unemployed than nationals. MIPEX data reveals some changes in German integration policy, in sum making it more inclusive over time. This concerns Access to Nationality especially. The total score indicates that Germany is performing about average compared to the selected countries, with some areas above and below average.




German **Labour Market Mobility** policy is generally inclusive, granting equal access and rights to most immigrants on the labour market. Targeted support scores high too. There are some issues about Germany not using its immigrants' potential effectively: This entails limited access to study grants, banning from public sector jobs and difficult qualification recognition procedures. An amendment of the latter is on the reform plan of the current government. **Family Reunion** policy appears to be average in all dimensions. Specific elements are language tests that need to be taken abroad prior to reunion and a system of different waiting periods for different family members. With this development, Family Reunion policy became more restrictive since 2007. The federal character of the **Education** system makes it difficult to assess regarding integration policy. Targeting needs

and general access to education varies. Children of undocumented immigrants have a right to education in five Länder only. Pupils do not get recognised all they have learned abroad. Diversity is a matter to all pupils in the German education system and there are campaigns to diversify teaching staff. TCNs have no electoral rights and full political liberties in Germany. **Political Participation** includes strong implementation policies. The role and structure of consultative bodies varies in the Länder. **Long-term Residence** is more difficult to attain in Germany than in no other selected country including high income requirements and language and civil society testing. If Long-term Residence is granted it is more secure and involves more rights than in most other countries. **Access to Nationality** was subject to many reforms since 1999, but becoming easier to attain over time. By 2010, second generation immigrants are entitled to citizenship by birth. First generation immigrant can naturalise at least after eight years. With some exceptions dual nationality is not permitted. Naturalisation requires linguistic and economic integration. After five years, citizenship cannot be withdrawn. In sum, Germany scores slightly above average in this area. Racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination are prohibited in most areas of life, but nationality discrimination only in some. **Anti-discrimination** policy further lacks efficient enforcement mechanisms and equality policies compared to other countries (MIPEx 2007: 74-9; 2011: 86-91).

Greece


Despite being a newer country of immigration, rates of foreign-born residents show a decrease to 8.3 per cent of the population in 2009. This might be explained by Greece being a transit country for immigrants (MIPEx 2011: 92). Similar to other new countries of immigration, employment rates of TCNs are about 10 per cent higher than those of Greek citizens, which is the largest gap among the selected countries. Additionally, TCNs are less likely to be unemployed, which in the case in Greece only. Having a highly exclusive integration policy in the 2005 and 2007 indices, policies became much more inclusive in recent years. The 2011 index rates Greek integration policy below average in all areas, except Access to Nationality, which was subject to reform in 2010.



In Greece, immigrants have only limited access to the labour market because of additional conditions to self-employment and a banning of public sector employment. Legally, TCNs enjoy equal rights and access to general support with few exceptions, but there is no targeted support meeting specific needs at all. Hence **Labour Market Mobility** scores are far below average. **Family Reunion** procedures take a long time and include long waiting periods and high income requirements and exclude adult children and parents. If a family is reunited it is averagely secure in its status. Immigrant pupils have full access to **Education**, but receive little targeted support. There are some policies towards teaching of immigrants' languages and intercultural educations, which result in Greek performance little below average. Immigrants have full political liberties and since 2010 long-term residents have electoral rights on the local level. Consultative bodies are not significant and immigrant civil society receives no funding. Despite the progress, Greece scores far from average in the area of **Political Participation**. After five years immigrants can become long-term residents under restrictive conditions: application fees cost 600€ (900€ before 2010), income requirements are high, and one has to pass a language and integration test. Once granted **Long-term Residence** provides average security and many rights (for example electoral rights). **Access to Nationality** does not make up for the restrictive acquisition conditions of Long-term Residence: Naturalisation in Greece is expensive too (700€, before 2010: 1500€) and based on a language and integration test, but immigrants are eligible after five to seven years. Since 2010, second generation immigrants become dual citizens at birth. Noteworthy, Greek citizenship is a particularly insecure status and can be withdrawn even when leading to statelessness. **Anti-discrimination** policy is halfway to best practice, lacking a prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality (MIPEX 2007: 80-5; 2011: 92-97).

Ireland

Being a newer country of immigration, the share of foreign-born residents increased rapidly in the past ten years, being 17.2 per cent, which is the highest rate after Luxembourg and Switzerland. Employment rates for TCNs are equal to nationals and unemployment rates for TCNs are the second-lowest, after Greece. Except for Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination, which are about average, and Political Participation, which is above average, Ireland receives low scores in the 2011 Index. Comparison with the earlier indices reveal that Irish integration policy is becoming more exclusive over time, except Anti-discrimination.




Temporary workers cannot access new jobs, start their own businesses, or benefit from general support. Some targeted support measures were withdrawn funding in 2008. If regularly employed, immigrants enjoy associated rights. In sum, **Labour Market Mobility** scores lowest among the selected countries. Ireland opted out on the EU directive on **Family Reunion** and limits access to reunion to Irish nationals and EU-citizens only. Family Reunion for TCNs has unclear legal standards, involves high fees, hardly any rights, and no judicial oversight, making it the most exclusive policy among the selected countries. Family members further cannot get an autonomous permit and are banned from regular access to employment. Access to compulsory **Education** and general support is granted to immigrant children. Programmes that meet specific needs or provide language support were mostly cut due to the economic crisis. In 2010 and new program for intercultural education was launched, still, Irish education policy received the lowest

scores in sum. In contrast to the integration areas described above, Ireland provides the most inclusive local electoral rights among all MIPEX countries. Further, immigrants enjoy full political liberties and elaborated implementation policies, including funding and consultation of immigrant organisations. National Councils on Integration are not elected or led by immigrants, which constitutes a weakness in the area of **Political Participation**. **Long-term Residence** is composed of two different statuses in Ireland, permanent residence after eight years and renewable residence contracts for five years after five years. Both are marked by average eligibility rules, high administrative discretion, no judicial oversight and unclear rights involved. **Access to Nationality** is based on inclusive rules containing short residence requirement, dual citizenship, and some application of ius soli. Still, procedures are expensive (up to 950€), long, and discretionary (one must, for example proof ‘good character’) and the provided status is as insecure as only in Greece. Irish **Anti-discrimination** policy has wide fields of application, but rather exclusive definitions. Irish equality and human rights bodies were further subject to large budget cuts which makes their effectiveness questionable (MIPEX 2007: 92-97; 2011: 104-9).

Italy

According to the 2011 index 6.5 per cent of Italy’s population was foreign-born, which is significantly below average. TCNs are only little less likely to be employed than Italian nationals. On unemployment differences there is no data available. Integration policy scores slightly above average in all areas except Education and Political Participation. Data from the indices reveal that integration policy became more inclusive until 2007 and slightly more exclusive from then on especially with respect to the 2009 Security Law.




Labour Market Mobility policy is characterised by equal access, general support, and rights for immigrants. Immigrants face problems getting their skill recognised and receive hardly any targeted support. This might indicate why TCNs are employed below their skill levels or on the illegal labour market. Legally eligibility for **Family Reunion** is inclusive, but disproportional income and accommodation requirements and high procedure costs limit access to Family Reunion. Once it is granted, reunited family are generally secure in their status and have equal rights as their sponsor. Italian **Education** system provides equal access to all immigrants under 18 to education and general support despite a law that prohibits the number of immigrant pupils in a class to 30 per cent. There is some risk being placed on the wrong level. Programmes targeting immigrant pupil's needs are in place, but appear somehow to have a stigmatising effect. New opportunities and intercultural education for all do not receive much support, which makes education policy score below average. **Political Participation** policy does not provide electoral rights for TCNs, but all political liberties except the right to run a company publishing newspapers. Implementation policies are in place. Rome's immigrant consultative bodies are influential an immigrant-organised and becoming a model for other regions. However Political Participation scores are below average due to the absence of electoral rights. Language and integration conditions make **Long-term Residence** policy comparatively difficult to achieve. Therefore a test might be introduced. The status is generally secure and contains equal rights to citizens in many respects, leading to a favourable score for Italy's Long-term Residence policy. TCNs are eligible for naturalisation only after ten years of residence. Conditions are little more demanding than for Long-term Residence. For immigrants born in Italy, ius soli is applied when they are 18 years old and have stayed in Italy without interruption. Before that they are treated as foreigners. Dual citizenship is

permitted. Despite the long waiting period **Access to Nationality** scores are above average in sum. After an EU infringement procedure Italy adopted inclusive **Anti-discrimination** definitions, fields of application, and enforcement mechanisms. Still, equality is not being promoted by public discourse or policy (MIPEX 2007: 98-103; 2011: 110-5).

Luxembourg

In 2009, 36.9 per cent of Luxembourg's population was foreign-born, which is by far the highest rate among the selected countries. TCNs are less likely to be employed than citizens, but the gap is smaller than in its neighbouring countries. While nationals face to lowest unemployment among the selected countries, unemployment rates for TCNs are above average. Hence there is a ratio of nationals being 6.8 times less likely to be unemployed than TCNs. The 2011 index shows an average overall performance with strengths in terms of inclusion in Political Participation and Access to Nationality and weaknesses in Labour Market Mobility and Anti-discrimination. Score changes reveal strong trends towards more inclusion in recent years.




While immigrants generally enjoy equal rights and general support that comes with employment, access to the labour market is particularly exclusive: TCNs are excluded from the public sector, few areas of the private sector, and from self-employment. A reform in 2008 encourages immigrants better to have their skills recognised. With only few targeted programmes to improve immigrant's **Labour Market Mobility**, it scores significantly below average, despite recent amendments. Prior to the transposition of EU law in 2008, Luxembourg did not have **Family Reunion** legislation. It turned out to be

rather inclusive with eligibility after one year, average acquisition conditions and equal opportunities for family member as their sponsor. To get an autonomous permit is rather difficult in Luxembourg. Access to **Education** is provided for all immigrant pupils and a specific introduction programme explains parents the education system and makes sure that pupils are placed on the right level. Moreover, there is intercultural education provided for all. There are some difficulties for immigrants to receive language training and Luxembourg does not diversify its teaching staff. **Political Participation** is a clear strength of Luxembourg's integration policy with high scores on political liberties, implementation policies, and consultative bodies, which were reformed in 2008. Electoral rights do allow immigrants to vote in local elections, but not to run as a candidate. Eligibility for **Long-term Residence** rests on five years of residence, but not all types of permits count: While refugees and students usually can apply, migrant workers cannot. Rights associated and acquisition conditions are above average, but the status can be withdrawn quite easily and rejections do not always include a right for appeal. **Access to Nationality** was subject to reform in 2008 too, bringing both inclusive elements (dual nationality) and exclusive elements (longer waiting period, testing). After seven years of residence immigrants can apply for citizenship under recently restricted conditions that include a free citizenship course and Luxembourgish language testing. The language requirement cannot be met in German or French, although these are official languages. Ius soli is applied to third generation immigrants only. **Anti-discrimination** policy is rather exclusive on all dimensions. Nationality as a reason of discrimination is not part of Luxembourg's Anti-discrimination policy and there are very few commitments to equality. In sum, scores for Anti-discrimination are significantly below average.

Netherlands

In 2009 11.1 per cent of the Dutch population are foreign born, which is average for the selected countries. In the Netherlands employment rates of TCNs are almost 30 per cent lower than those of nationals, which is one of the largest differences. Still, generally low unemployment rates include TCNs, which are less likely to be unemployed than in many other countries. Integration policy scores above average in all areas and proved to be fairly consistent in the three indices, except Family Reunion, which is slightly below average and tends to become more restrictive. However, the overall score did not change between 2007 and 2010.




Dutch inclusive **Labour Market Mobility** policy provides immigrants with equal access and rights in the labour market as natives. Its targeted support programmes specifically support young immigrants and immigrant women in improving skills and finding a job or setting up a business. Among the analysed countries only Sweden and Portugal receive higher scores. Although eligibility and acquisition conditions were more inclusive in 2010 than in 2007 **Family Reunion** remains a weakness of Dutch integration policy. Its pre-departure integration and language test is distinctly difficult and expensive. The status of a family member involves equal access to work, study, and benefits as the sponsor, but can be withdrawn on many grounds. Still, the score is almost average among the selected countries. Dutch **Education** system provides access to compulsory education for immigrant pupils. Its targeting programmes are average in Europe. There is a strong account for intercultural education for all pupils, but the teaching of immigrant cultures and languages does not receive much support. Except from the dimension of consultative bodies, which occur on an ad-hoc basis, the Netherlands receive high scores in all dimensions of **Political Participation**. This represents electoral rights on the local level after five years of legal residence, full political liberties, and state support for immigrant organisations. **Long-term Residence** is not eligible to many categories of temporary migrants and based on high fees (400€), integration and language tests and a steady income. The status can only be withdrawn on few grounds and involves many rights. **Access to Nationality** is available already after five years residence and based on the same test as Long-term Residence. For second generation immigrants ius soli is being applied. Dual nationality is usually allowed and the citizenship status is more secure than in most countries. With regard to **Anti-discrimination** Dutch policy provides broad definitions and a particularly strong enforcement mechanism, but limited fields of application.

Additionally, there is only little commitment to promote equality through information and dialogue, reflected by a lower score on equality policies (MIPEX 2007: 128-33; 2011: 140-5).

Norway

In 2009 10.9 per cent of the population was foreign-born, which is average. TCN employment rates are below those of Norwegian citizens and the gap between is almost 20 per cent. Unemployment for nationals is fairly low and still below average for TCNs. Integration policy scores are above average in all areas except from Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination. In the area of Political Participation Norway receives the highest score of all MIPEX countries. There is some evidence that Norwegian integration policy is becoming more restrictive over time, which results in a marginal decrease of the overall score from 2007 to 2011.




Generally immigrants have equal access to the labour market, training programmes and study grants in Norway, but there is an obstacle of insufficient recognition of skills. Access to general support and rights are per se equal too, but using social assistance can lead to a permit withdrawal for migrant workers or family members. Thus **Labour Market Mobility** policy does not effectively include equal social rights. Since 2010 a sponsor needs an employment history for up to four years to be eligible for **Family Reunion**. Acquisition procedures were restricted too, being average in Europe. After arrival family members can benefit from an introduction and language programme, have equal rights than their sponsor and can get an autonomous contract after three years. Since 2010

unaccompanied minors over 16 have reduced access to secondary or higher **Education**. Apart from that the Norwegian education system scores strong in three sub-categories, especially concerning mother tongue and Norwegian language teaching and intercultural education for all. **Political Participation** policy is particularly inclusive in all dimensions in Norway. Immigrants have full electoral rights, except for the national level, after three years. The national consultative body KIM is in place since 1984 and plays an influential role in Norwegian politics. After three years some immigrants are eligible for **Long-term Residence**, but there are many categories of immigrants that cannot. Acquisition conditions include integration courses but no testing and the application process takes about eleven months. Once Long-term Residence is granted, immigrants are secure in their status and had the most rights associated in the 2007 index. **Access to Nationality** is based on seven years of residence and *ius soli* is not applied for most second generation immigrants. Acquisition conditions are more inclusive than in most countries, but include long language courses. The status is averagely secure. Dual citizenship is only permitted for those who cannot renounce their previous citizenship. Nationality is not explicitly included as a potential ground of discrimination in Norway's conception of **Anti-discrimination**. Additionally, enforcement mechanism could be improved by greater sanctions and legal aid. Norway has a particularly strong approach to equality policies, ranked fourth among the selected countries (MIPEX 2007: 134-8; 2011: 146-51).

Portugal

Portugal scores above average in all areas of integration policy and ranks second, after Sweden, in the overall scores. Although Portugal scored above average already in the 2005 index, policies were further amended up to the 2011 index (MIPEX 2007: 147; 2011: 158-9). Being a newer country of immigration, the share of foreign-born people in the population is fairly low. Similar to Spain and Greece, employment rates of TCNs exceed rates for citizens. Additionally, the unemployment ratio between TCNs and nationals is comparatively small.




Labour Market Mobility received maximum scores in three of four dimensions with targeted support as a comparative weakness. Still, the recognition of qualifications of immigrants was amended in 2007, limiting this weakness. In general terms, Labour Market Mobility is achieving lots of attention in Portuguese policy-making with its 2007-9 National Plan for Immigrant Integration that strongly focuses on labour market integration (MIPEX 2011: 160). Due to the economic crisis income requirements for **Family Reunion** were lowered, making Portugal the most inclusive country concerning Family Reunion. Eligibility is broad and family member have the same rights as their sponsor and can get autonomous contracts after two years (MIPEX 2007: 148). The area of **Education** constitutes a weakness of Portuguese integration policy. While access to education and intercultural education scores are high, Portugal could improve targeting immigrant pupils' needs. For example, teaching of immigrant languages and interaction with parents are issues of possible improvement. **Political Participation** lacks electoral rights for most TCNs (based on reciprocal agreements, see Spain) and a more frequent and systematic cooperation with consultative bodies. The fact that immigrant organisations are publicly funded and incorporated into decision making provides Portugal with a maximum score in implementation policies and political liberties. **Long-term Residence** was an area of amendment in all dimensions since 2007. In sum, Long-term Residence scores are slightly above European average. **Access to Nationality** is most inclusive among all MIPEX-countries in Portugal. This means that residence requirements are short, basic knowledge in Portuguese are required, the status for naturalised citizens is almost as secure as the status for citizens who always had Portuguese citizenship, and dual citizenship is permitted. While enforcement mechanisms and fields of application of **Anti-discrimination** are scoring very high, definitions of Portuguese Anti-discrimination policy lack racial profiling

and equality bodies cannot represent victims under all circumstances. Still, Portugal performs third, behind Sweden and the UK (MIPEX 2007: 146-51; 2011: 158-3).

Spain

Spanish integration policy is characterised by consistently high scores in the areas of Labour Market Mobility, Long-term Residence, and Family Reunion. Although scores were high before, these areas were subject to amendments between 2007 and 2010, which led to even higher scores. In 2009, adult children and spouses granted the right of Family Reunion became entitled to immediate full access to the labour market when arriving. All other areas are characterised by scores below average, in particular Access to Nationality. In these areas there was no recent policy change. Noteworthy, employment rates for TCNs are above the rates for nationals and unemployment rates are comparatively equal, with TCNs being 1.5 times more likely to be unemployed. Although Spain only recently became a country of immigration, immigration rates are the highest in Europe and the quote of foreign born residents is above average (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 24-6; MIPEX 2007: 164).




Spanish **Labour Market Mobility** policy constitutes an ideal case of inclusion except its reluctance of providing targeted support. Apart from that, all legal residents have legally equal opportunities in the labour market than nationals and labour market participation provides them with equal rights. Recognition of qualifications and labour market training are average. After Portugal, Spain is the most favourable European country for **Family Reunion**, with eligibility for adult children and spouses/partners, a very secure status

including labour market access and the possibility of getting an independent residence permit. Procedures are free and short. **Education** constitutes a weakness of Spanish policy with immigrant pupils being able to benefit from general support and language courses. There are only very few approaches to diversify schools, except the provision of mother-tongue language courses for Moroccans and Romanians. **Political Participation** is another weakness with electoral rights being based on reciprocal agreements. Hence, voting rights are granted if the country of origin grants voting rights for Spanish residents vis-a-vis, which is the case for Norway and five Latin American countries. Consultative bodies have powers, but are neither directly elected by immigrants, nor led by them. After five years of residence, immigrants are entitled to **Long-term Residence** permits. Waiting for asylum application decisions or studying time does not fully count, although there are incentives to convince former students to settle. Procedures are short and simple. The status provides many rights and is comparatively secure. **Access to Nationality** is characterised by strict eligibility requests for up to ten years of residence and time-consuming and discretionary procedures. Dual nationality is not allowed for most immigrants and citizenship at birth is only applied after two generations. **Anti-discrimination** policy lacks the inclusion of discrimination based on nationality in its definitions. Equality policies and enforcement mechanisms are below average as well (MIPEX 2007: 164-9; 2011: 182-7).

Sweden

In 2009 there were 14.4 per cent of the population foreign-born, which is about three per cent above average. Swedish employment rates reveal a difference of 30 per cent in TCN and national employment, which is the largest gap with Belgium and the Netherlands. The ratio of TCNs being 2.9 times more likely to be in unemployment is average. Swedish immigrant integration policy scores very high across all areas. Political Participation could be argued as a weakness of Swedish policy, but the scores still are significantly above average. Policy only changed little from 2004 to 2010. The scores from the 2007 and 2011 indices indicate that Swedish integration policy became somewhat more exclusive in the area of Family Reunion. However, Sweden scored first in all indices' overall rankings.




Labour Market Mobility shows maximum scores on all dimensions. This entails full access to employment, workers' rights, and general support for all immigrants with residence permits for at least a year. There are many efficient targeted support programmes that especially focus on teaching Swedish, assessing and improving newcomers' skills. In 2009 legislation on **Family Reunion** became to be more restrictive than in the past with new income and housing requirements. These measures are argued not to restrict Family Reunion, but to create incentives for labour market participation. However, with the other dimensions scoring very high, Sweden has an inclusive Family Reunion policy. Swedish **Education** system includes full access to education, general support and specific programmes for immigrants supporting school entry and language teaching, both mother-tongue and Swedish. There are intercultural curricula and campaigns to diversify teaching staff, but there is some discretion of the municipalities on these issues. In sum, Sweden received the highest scores of all MIPEX-countries. **Political Participation** policy includes full electoral rights on the local and regional level, full political liberties, and support for immigrant organisations. There are no formal consultative bodies on the national level, but on the regional level. This causes Sweden's comparative weakness in the area of Political Participation. **Long-term Residence** is characterised by inclusive eligibility rules and high levels of security and associated rights. Migrant workers, get Long-term Residence permit after four years if they can prove that they were working. Families can get the status of Long-term Residence after two years and refugees immediately. Acquisition conditions score halfway because immigrants may not have left Sweden for a longer period and need to pay a considerable fee when applying for Long-term Residence. After five years immigrants have a right to citizenship and dual nationality. Immigrant children do not have **Access to Nationality** via ius soli, but face

favourable acquisition conditions than first generation immigrants. To naturalise, immigrants do not need to prove language skills. Swedish **Anti-discrimination** policy scores high in all dimensions. Noteworthy, a 2009 reform made Anti-discrimination law simpler and four equality bodies were replaced by a equality ombudsman, which made procedures and monitoring more efficient (MIPEx 2007: 170-5; 2011: 188-193).

Switzerland

In 2009 26.3 per cent of Switzerland's population were foreign-born, which is the second-highest value for the selected countries. For northern and central European countries, Switzerland's employment gap between nationals and TCNs is rather small, similar to Austria and Denmark. Unemployment rates for TCNs of 14.1 per cent are about average, but compared to the rate for nationals (3.1 per cent) fairly high. Integration policy is marked by scores below average in all areas, with Education and Political Participation being close to average and Access to Nationality receiving scores as low as in Austria only. The evaluation of Switzerland's integration policy faces some difficulty due to the federal organisation of the country. In the 2007 index there is an argument that integration policy was subject to restrictions in 2006 in the areas of Long-term Residence and Family Reunion. Despite some reforms the scores from 2007 and 2011 do not indicate any further change.




In Switzerland there is no equal access to the labour market and associated support for immigrants. Many public sector jobs are not available for immigrant and self-employment is possible for long-term residents only. Additionally, there are limitations concerning

access to study grants and social assistance for immigrants. There are some targeted programmes that focus on immigrants' language skills and working skills. In sum, **Labour Market Mobility** scores are significantly below average. **Family Reunion** conditions vary in the Cantons, but include a narrow definition of eligible family members, receiving no social assistance, and appropriate housing and might include high income requirements, integration contracts, and long and expensive procedures. Once a family is reunited, family members have limited access to employment and **Education** and face difficulties in attaining an autonomous contract. All immigrant pupils have access to compulsory schooling and can receive specific training and language courses, including mother-tongue and cultures of origin under better conditions than in many countries. Intercultural education for all is not included in all Canton's education system. TCNs have electoral rights in many Cantons and full political liberties in all. Immigrant organisations can receive public funding, but only under conditions. Consultative bodies are in place on the national and on the Canton level, but are not fully elected by immigrants and lack coherent representation of different nationalities or gender. However, scores for **Political Participation** come close to average. **Long-term Residence** is difficult to achieve and can be withdrawn comparatively easy. Immigrants face waiting periods up to ten years before being eligible and the time studying does not count. Acquisition conditions include a discretionary element when officials determine the "degree of integration" the applicant has achieved. If the status is granted, it is not secure but involves many rights, coming close to those of nationals. Since 2009, there are some limits to the Canton's discretion over judging applications for naturalisation and there is a chance to appeal against negative decisions. Requirements and procedures still include waiting periods of up to twelve years, fees about 1.500€, and language and integration assessment. **Access to Nationality** is not provided on an *ius soli*-basis, but once naturalising, one does not need to renounce the previous citizenship. **Anti-discrimination** scores are the lowest among the selected countries by far. This entails limited definitions that are not applicable under many circumstances, weak enforcement mechanisms and little equality policies (MIPEX 2007: 176-80; 2011: 194-99).

United Kingdom

In 2009 11.3 per cent of the United Kingdom's population was foreign born, which is exactly at average of the selected countries. Similar to Ireland, employment and

unemployment rates of TCNs and nationals are comparatively close. This means that TCNs are almost twice as likely to be unemployed than citizens and employment rates share a gap of less than ten per cent. The performance of the United Kingdom in the 2011 index reveals a unique integration policy: While scores are below average in Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion, Political Participation, and Long-term Residence and slightly above average in Education and Access to Nationality, scores in Anti-discrimination are almost the highest. Further, those areas receiving lower scores experienced a significant shift towards exclusion in recent years, in return, Anti-discrimination was subject to changes making it more inclusive over time.



Immigrants have equal access to employment than citizens, but do not enjoy general support and social security equally. Hence they participate under unequal conditions. Moreover, targeted support programmes that might make up for that are scarce. This results in scores around halfway to best practice in **Labour Market Mobility**. Since 2008, the United Kingdom uses tight regulations on **Family Reunion** to prevent forced marriage. This results in a ban of spouses under the age of 21 to be eligible for Family Reunion. While other conditions are argued to be average for Europe, the family member status involves only limited access to public benefits. **Education** policy promotes intercultural education for all best among the selected countries. This includes the diversification of teachers and an accommodation of different cultural and religious needs. Apart from that all immigrants have access to education and receive targeted some programmes. Language and introduction programmes differ greatly among different schools and municipalities. While electoral rights are limited to EU and commonwealth citizens, all immigrants enjoy basic political liberties. There is governmental support for immigrant organisations, but no

structured consultative body representing immigrants. In sum, **Political Participation** scores are below average. **Long-term Residence** and **Access to Nationality** policies were changed significantly with the 2009 Border, Citizenship and Immigration Act, which entered into force in 2011: The new system involves waiting periods for up to eight years for most immigrants, while students and certain labour migrants are generally excluded. Applying for Long-term Residence or citizenship then leads to a probationary period of three to five years, in which future citizens have to be in employment for a specific period and collect points doing voluntary work for an assessment whether they get granted citizenship. In the meantime they do not have access to public benefits. Long-term Residence then can be an alternative for those whom were granted citizenship. Dual nationality is permitted. This system aims to add value to citizenship. The United Kingdom's **Anti-discrimination** policy provides broad definitions that include many forms of discrimination and are applied in most areas of life. Equality policies were reformed in 2006 and 2010 leading to improved scores in the 2011 index. Enforcement mechanisms are argued to have average effects and should include NGO-work in a more efficient way (MIPEX 2007: 182-87; 2011: 200-5).

2. Are policies consistent? A bivariate data analysis

The policy profiles presented above lead to an impression of high divergence and countries pursuing individual approaches to integration policy. As the following chapters will show, there are some limitations to that observation. Before putting countries into clusters, I want show to which extent performances across areas are consistent in the selected countries. Consistency would indicate that policies in the different areas are equally inclusive or exclusive. For example, if a country had inclusive regulations on naturalisation, it also had inclusive Labour Market Mobility and Family Reunion policies. Hence policy consistency would allow us to make meaningful statements on integration policy inclusive- and exclusiveness in general terms.

Integration policy consistence		
	Average score across policy areas, 2010	Standard deviation
Sweden	83	7
Portugal	79	10
Finland	69	8
Netherlands	68	8
Belgium	67	7
Norway	66	11

Spain	63	17
Italy	60	9
Average	60	10
Luxembourg	59	10
Germany	57	9
United Kingdom	57	10
Denmark	53	12
France	51	10
Greece	49	5
Ireland	49	15
Switzerland	43	7
Austria	42	9

(MIPEX 2011; own calculations)

We can see that there is some tendency that countries with high average scores are more likely to score consistently across areas, or in other words, score high in most areas. Notable exceptions are Switzerland and Greece, which score consistently low. The authors of the MIPEX 2011 index claim that they found strong positive correlations among the scores of different areas (MIPEX 2011: 10). The figures on standard deviation presented above raise some doubt to that claim: If scores did correlate highly, countries would score more consistently, no matter whether they have high or low scores. A bivariate data analysis for the scores of the 2007 and 2011 indices give proof to that doubt.

Correlations of MIPEX policy areas, 2007							
		LMM	FR	PP	LTR	AN	AD
Labour Market Mobility	Pearson Correlation	1	,752**	0,482	,576*	0,478	0,454
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0,001	0,05	0,016	0,052	0,067
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17
Family Reunion	Pearson Correlation	,752**	1	0,292	,568*	,594*	,661**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001		0,256	0,017	0,012	0,004
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17
Political Participation	Pearson Correlation	0,482	0,292	1	0,103	0,353	0,261
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,05	0,256		0,695	0,164	0,311
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17
Long-term Residence	Pearson Correlation	,576*	,568*	0,103	1	0,336	0,449
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,016	0,017	0,695		0,188	0,07
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17
Access to Nationality	Pearson Correlation	0,478	,594*	0,353	0,336	1	,844**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,052	0,012	0,164	0,188		0
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17
Anti-discrimination	Pearson Correlation	0,454	,661**	0,261	0,449	,844**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,067	0,004	0,311	0,07	0	
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations of MIPEX policy areas, 2010								
		LMM	FR	EDU	PP	LTR	AN	AD
Labour Market Mobility	Pearson Correlation	1	,684**	,601*	0,339	,630**	0,27	0,296
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0,002	0,011	0,183	0,007	0,294	0,249
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Family Reunion	Pearson Correlation	,684**	1	,619**	0,297	,631**	,563*	,486*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,002		0,008	0,248	0,007	0,019	0,048
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Education	Pearson Correlation	,601*	,619**	1	0,417	,526*	0,32	0,461
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,011	0,008		0,096	0,03	0,211	0,063
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Political Participation	Pearson Correlation	0,339	0,297	0,417	1	0,152	0,311	0,256
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,183	0,248	0,096		0,561	0,225	0,321
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Long-term Residence	Pearson Correlation	,630**	,631**	,526*	0,152	1	0,196	0,154
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,007	0,007	0,03	0,561		0,45	0,555
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Access to Nationality	Pearson Correlation	0,27	,563*	0,32	0,311	0,196	1	,731**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,294	0,019	0,211	0,225	0,45		0,001
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Anti-discrimination	Pearson Correlation	0,296	,486*	0,461	0,256	0,154	,731**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,249	0,048	0,063	0,321	0,555	0,001	
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Both models show very similar correlation patterns: Correlations among the variables Long-term Residence, Family Reunion, Labour Market Mobility, and - for the 2010 scores - Education are high and significant. The same can be said about the correlation of the variables Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination. Hence there are two groups of variable that correlate internally, but not with respect to other variables. Political Participation appears to be an issue separated from other areas of immigrant integration. Hence, whether a country generally has an inclusive or exclusive approach to integration does not matter for the policy of immigrant Political Participation. However, the countries I have selected do not score entirely consistent. For an explanation of integration policy divergence, we need to acknowledge that some variables of the MIPEX index structure are independent from another. For Political Participation this might entail that we leave it aside when trying to find explanations for integration policy divergence.

As the country profiles might have indicated already there is no clear-cut relation between the labour market participation of TCNs and integration policy. Comparing the data of immigrant and citizen employment and unemployment in 2006 and the index results for 2007 reveals that there are no significant correlations except one: Unemployment of TCNs in countries with inclusive Family Reunion policies tends to be higher than in countries

with exclusive policies. It is important to note that we cannot derive a causal argument from this correlation: There is no evidence of what constitutes the independent and the dependent variable. I suggest interpreting the result of scarce correlations between (un-) employment and integration policy as an indication that there are intervening variables influencing both the employment of TCNs and integration policy.

Correlations of labour market participation data and integration policy, 2006/2007								
		LMM	FR	PP	LTR	AN	AD	Overall
Employment of TCNs	Pearson Correlation	-0,044	-0,153	-0,279	-0,057	-0,346	-0,313	-0,28
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,866	0,559	0,277	0,828	0,174	0,221	0,276
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Employment of citizens	Pearson Correlation	0,408	-0,072	0,312	0,119	-0,039	-0,047	0,149
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,104	0,783	0,223	0,65	0,882	0,857	0,567
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Employment ratio	Pearson Correlation	-0,202	-0,104	-0,401	-0,092	-0,313	-0,271	-0,322
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,436	0,692	0,111	0,726	0,222	0,292	0,207
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Unemployment of TCNs	Pearson Correlation	0,133	0,355	0,244	0,055	0,275	0,3	0,312
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,625	0,178	0,362	0,84	0,302	0,259	0,239
	N	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Unemployment of citizens	Pearson Correlation	0,272	,504*	-0,264	0,093	0,234	0,406	0,272
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,307	0,047	0,322	0,732	0,383	0,119	0,309
	N	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Unemployment ratio	Pearson Correlation	-0,175	-0,124	0,388	-0,081	-0,132	-0,22	-0,067
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,516	0,646	0,138	0,767	0,626	0,413	0,805
	N	16	16	16	16	16	16	16

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

3. Cluster analysis

For the cluster analysis I provide two models using SPSS quick cluster analysis with three and four cluster solutions applied to the seven areas of the 2010 data. The results indicate that most countries have idiosyncratic approaches to immigrant integration policy. In other words, countries within one cluster have only limited commonalities and thus clusters differ from each other only to a limited extent. The standard deviation scores of the four-cluster model are significantly lower than those of the three-cluster model, and it appears to provide more distinctive information on cluster differences. For an analysis of causes underlying different integration policies I hence suggest using the four-cluster model.

3.1. 4-cluster solution

The **first cluster** contains France, Greece, Ireland, and the United Kingdom and is characterised by consistently exclusive Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion and Long-term Residence policies and a slightly inclusive Access to Nationality. The

remaining areas show a high deviation: Education scores are very low except for the United Kingdom and Political Participation scores are low except for Ireland. Anti-discrimination scores are high, but show a large variation.

➔ Inclusive Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination policies and exclusive Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion and Long-term Residence policies.

Countries in the **second cluster** (Belgium, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway) have moderately inclusive policies in all areas and an inclusive policy of Political Participation. They score consistently and above average in the areas of Family Reunion, Education, Long-term Residence, and Access to Nationality. Labour Market Mobility is averagely inclusive in sum, but reveals some deviations in the cases of Belgium and Luxembourg, which have rather exclusive policies. The same can be said for Anti-discrimination, with the exclusive exception of Luxembourg. Political Participation scores are very high in most countries, but Belgium and Italy.

➔ Moderately inclusive policies throughout and most inclusive Political Participation policies.

Countries in the **third cluster** (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Switzerland) often have policies with adverted effects than countries in cluster one. This means that these countries have inclusive labour market policies but exclusive policies of Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination. Family Reunion scores vary very much, including scores of 37 (Denmark) to 85 (Spain). The same can be said about Long-term Residence with the outliers of Spain (78) and Switzerland (41). Education policies are consistent and slightly exclusive. Except for Austria's exclusive policy, Political Participation scores are about average. Access to Nationality is very exclusive, with the exception for Germany that scores averagely.

➔ Restrictive Access to Nationality, but inclusive Labour Market Mobility and large variations.

The **fourth cluster** only contains two countries, Sweden and Portugal. They share highly inclusive policies throughout, with the slight exception of cluster two scoring higher in Political Participation.

➔ Most inclusive policies, except for Political Participation.

4-cluster solution, MIPEX 2011 Index							
	Labour Market Mobility	Family Reunion	Education	Political Participation	Long-term Residence	Access to Nationality	Anti-discrimination
Cluster 1 (mean)	48	47	38	54	44	58	69
standard deviation	5	8	12	13	7	1	13
• France	49	52	29	44	46	59	77
• Greece	50	49	42	40	56	57	50
• Ireland	39	34	25	79	43	58	63
• United Kingdom	55	54	58	53	31	59	86
Cluster 2 (mean)	66	67	56	74	65	60	65
standard deviation	11	3	8	13	6	8	9
• Belgium	53	68	66	59	79	69	79
• Finland	71	70	63	87	58	57	78
• Italy	69	74	41	50	66	63	62
• Luxembourg	48	67	52	78	56	66	48
• Netherlands	85	58	51	79	68	66	68
• Norway	73	68	63	94	61	41	59
Cluster 3 (mean)	69	52	46	55	59	38	43
standard deviation	11	16	3	9	10	9	6
• Austria	56	41	44	33	58	22	40
• Denmark	73	37	51	62	66	33	47
• Germany	77	60	43	64	50	59	48
• Spain	84	85	48	56	78	39	49
• Switzerland	53	40	45	59	41	36	31
Cluster 4 (mean)	97	88	70	73	73	81	86
standard deviation	3	3	7	2	5	1	2
• Portugal	94	91	63	70	69	82	84
• Sweden	100	84	77	75	78	79	88

3.2. 3-cluster solution

Countries in the **first cluster** (Austria, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Switzerland) generally have rather exclusive integration policies, except for Labour Market Mobility, where scores vary, but tend to be rather inclusive. Typically countries in this cluster have the most exclusive policies in Anti-discrimination and Access to Nationality. Additionally, Education policies are consistently exclusive. With the exception of Switzerland Long-term Residence policies are moderate. Family Reunion policies are restrictive, except in Spain, which scores second in this area. In the area of Political Participation countries in cluster one reveal low (Austria and Greece) and almost average (Denmark, Spain, and Switzerland) scores.

- ➔ Countries in the first cluster combine restrictive Anti-discrimination, Education and Access to Nationality policies with moderate Labour Market Mobility and Long-term Residence policies.

The **second cluster** (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, United Kingdom) contains countries with rather restrictive Labour Market Mobility, Long-term Residence and Education policies and inclusive Anti-discrimination and Access to Nationality regulations. Political Participation and Family Reunion policies are about average. Access to Nationality scores are highly consistent and above average. For the other areas there are notable exceptions: Germany and Italy have inclusive labour market regulations, Belgium and Italy have favourable policies towards Family Reunion and Long-term Residence and Ireland and Luxembourg towards Political Participation. The favourable scores on Anti-discrimination of the second cluster do further not include Germany and Luxembourg.

- ➔ Countries in the second cluster have inclusive Anti-discrimination and Access to Nationality policies and exclusive policies towards Labour Market Mobility, Education and Long-term Residence.

The **third cluster** includes countries that have inclusive policies in all areas (Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden). Unlike countries in cluster one or two, these countries tend to score consistent across most areas. For example, Sweden has – compared to countries of cluster one and two – a fairly balanced approach to immigrant integration. The same can be said about Finland, which received lower scores than Sweden, but still has no exclusive policies across all areas. There are only two exceptions: Dutch Family Reunion and Education policies and Norwegian Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination policies are not as inclusive as their other policies.

- ➔ Countries in cluster three have consistently inclusive policies across all areas.

3-cluster solution, MIPEX 2011 Index							
	Labour Market Mobility	Family Reunion	Education	Political Participation	Long-term Residence	Access to Nationality	Anti-discrimination
Cluster 1 (mean)	63	50	46	50	60	37	43
standard deviation	12	14	3	11	9	8	6
• Austria	56	41	44	33	58	22	40
• Denmark	73	37	51	62	66	33	47
• Greece	50	49	42	40	56	57	50
• Spain	84	85	48	56	78	39	49
• Switzerland	53	40	45	59	41	36	31


Cluster 2 (mean)	56	58	45	61	53	62	66
standard deviation	10	10	12	11	12	3	13
• Belgium	53	68	66	59	79	69	79
• France	49	52	29	44	46	59	77
• Germany	77	60	43	64	50	59	48
• Ireland	39	34	25	79	43	58	63
• Italy	69	74	41	50	66	63	62
• Luxembourg	48	67	52	78	56	66	48
• United Kingdom	55	54	58	53	31	59	86
Cluster 3 (mean)	85	74	64	81	67	65	75
standard deviation	10	11	6	7	6	13	9
• Finland	71	70	63	87	58	57	78
• Netherlands	85	58	51	79	68	66	68
• Norway	73	68	63	94	61	41	59
• Portugal	94	91	63	70	69	82	84
• Sweden	100	84	77	75	78	79	88

4. MIPEX score change

As indicated already in the country profiles integration policy was a subject to change in many countries in recent years. Due to the different scoring system of the 2005 index a systematic comparison of the index scores is possible for the 2007 and 2011 indices only. Policy changes prior to 2007 are that are mentioned in the country profiles of the 2007 index show that almost all countries introduced changes in their integration policy. These changes date in 2005 and 2006 and can be summarised as follows:

- Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands introduced almost exclusively tougher regulations on integration issues. This concerns the introduction of a new Aliens Law in Switzerland and changes in Long-term Residence and Family Reunion acquisition conditions in France and the Netherlands. France additionally amended its Anti-discrimination policy, making it more inclusive (MIPEX 2007: 69, 129, 177).
- Luxembourg, Germany, and the United Kingdom did not change their policy significantly, except for Anti-discrimination, for which policy became more inclusive. There are further no implications that Spain changed its policies (MIPEX 2007: 75, 117, 165, 183).

- Austria, Belgium, Ireland, and Norway show changes towards inclusion and exclusion in this period. This concerns less inclusive Family Reunion regulations (except Ireland) and Access to Nationality (except Norway) and more inclusive regulations on Labour Market Mobility (except Belgium) (MIPEX 2007: 21, 26, 93, 135).
- The remaining countries changed their policy towards inclusion only. This concerns Greek and Italian policy towards Long-term Residence. In Denmark, Finland, Portugal, and Norway Family Reunion, Access to Nationality and Political Participation policies became more inclusive (MIPEX 2007: 51, 63, 147, 171).



For the period from 2007 to 2010 we can see that all countries changed their policy in at least one area in a way that led to changes in the index scores, but to a very different extent:

- Greece, Portugal, and Spain changed their policy exclusively towards inclusion leading to significant index changes. Except for a minor change in the area of Long-term Residence, the same can be said about Luxembourg.
- Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland changed policies significantly in both directions.
- Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland changed policies leading to minor score changes only.

- Italy, Norway, and Sweden became little more exclusive. The United Kingdom is the only country that changed its policy significantly towards exclusion, except for amendments in Anti-discrimination policy.
- Anti-discrimination is the only area that received changes towards inclusion only. All other areas show changes in both directions.

5. Conclusion

Clearly, the structure of the indices focuses on integration following a conception of civic inclusion. Hence, the national approaches towards cultural integration, which many multiculturalists argue to be crucial, do not receive much attention. Governing diversity only comes into play in the area of Education. In this area, Sweden, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Portugal, and the UK scored considerably higher than the remaining countries. However, this is clearly to the emphasis of the index structure. Instead, the index draws a clear picture on the complex policies of regulating access to civic, political, and social rights and their inclusive or exclusive effects.

Answering the first research question I showed that national approaches to integration policy provide a highly complex picture. Although different bivariate variable analysis shows that performances correlate highly across some policy areas the case-by-case analysis provided before indicates that national policy models present unique approaches, hence differ surprisingly much. Despite some general policy trends towards improving access to the labour market, liberalising waiting periods for naturalisation, citizenship testing, or imposing restrictions and testing on Long-term Residence or Family Reunion there is no evidence that national integration policy models and their inclusive- or exclusiveness are very similar across countries. Focusing on the policy change between 2007 and 2010 some countries with previously low scores caught up (Greece, Luxembourg) and others with previously high scores fell behind (most notably the United Kingdom). These observations are too scarce to argue that integration policies become harmonised across Europe. Both cluster models show high standard deviation values in many areas, because countries do not often score similarly. However, with all the exceptions mentioned above we can hardly argue that the provided clusters are consistent across all areas. Four observations need to be kept in mind for a further analysis of possible explanations underlying integration policy divergence:

First, if countries do not score consistent across different areas, they often have inclusive Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination policies and exclusive Labour Market Mobility and Long-term Residence policies, or vice versa. This is the case for France, Ireland and the United Kingdom, and adversely for Austria, Spain, and to some degree Switzerland and Denmark.

Second, countries with higher scores across all areas mostly have consistent scores, in other terms they do not score high in one area and low in another. Sweden and Finland provide useful examples for that observation. Countries with low overall scores then tend to perform inconsistently across areas. Notable exceptions for this argument are Greece and Denmark. The table on policy consistency provides average scores and standard deviations of the seven areas of integration policy, underlining this observation.

Third, if there are changes in Anti-discrimination policy, they always lead towards inclusion. There are still countries with low scores in this area (cluster three of the first model), but none of these countries recently changed its Anti-discrimination policy towards more exclusion. However, the clusters are not useless for the integration policy research since they represent commonalities and divergence in some, although not all areas. Hence, turning to possible explanations of integration policy divergence now, we need to keep these clusters in mind.

Fourth, policies of Political Participation do not correlate with other policies of immigrant integration. They neither led to the identification of a country cluster. Hence it might be fruitful to omit this variable when turning to explanations of immigrant integration policy and keep it a separated issue.

V. Explaining divergence and convergence of immigrant integration policy

Apart from the distinction of assimilation, differential exclusion, and multiculturalism there are few theories describing national differences of immigration and integration policies. Boswell and Geddes identify a list of causes that can explain policy development and divergence. First, different national narratives of migration can lead to different policy outcomes. Second, the timing and size of migration flows and settlement might matter. Third, party politics, especially by right-wing parties, is expected to influence integration policy. Fourth, EU membership might be a reason for convergence due to supranational policy-making. Fifth, integration policy might be based on certain welfare and labour market structures (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 201-24). In this chapter, I will give an overview of recent comparative explanations of integration policy divergence. Since it is the goal of my analysis, I will put an emphasis on theories, typologies, and measurement on welfare system divergence before focusing on welfare systems as a cause of integration policy divergence. Of course, immigrant integration is closely linked to immigration policy. Thus some articles I am citing below do not focus exclusively on integration and try to explain immigration policy in broader terms. Most authors focus on a small number of cases/countries and analyse integration policies and their causes in depth. Quantitative comparative analyses – as I am aiming to – are rather scarce.

1. The nature of immigrants determining integration outcomes

Before I turn to explanations that focus on state-level independent variables (e.g. welfare systems, political parties, European Integration) that might explain integration policy divergence, I want to note that integration outcomes can be applied to attributes of immigrants too. Of course this only accounts for integration outcomes and not for integration policies. For example, we might say that religion, the country of origin, or gender determines successful integration. There is some literature proposing that this is the case, focusing on Western European countries (Bisin and others 2011; Dronkers/Vink 2010; Fleischmann/Dronkers 2007; 2010). In this context, successful integration can be measured in citizenship acquisition, or labour market participation. In terms of citizenship acquisition, Dronkers and Vink conclude that immigrants from poor and politically instable countries are less, while immigrants from former colonies are more likely to naturalise (Dronkers/Vink 2010). Second, long residence, having a parent born in the host country,

retirement, and speaking the host country language make naturalisation more likely. Interestingly Dronkers and Vink claim that being a Muslim does not influence the acquisition of citizenship for first-generation immigrants, but for second-generation immigrants it does (ibidem). This sounds rather confusing, but might have a simple cause: Countries with restrictive naturalisation policies towards second-generation immigrants might also oppose religious diversity, making it more difficult for Muslims to naturalise. Employment, education, and gender seem not to have effects on immigrant naturalisation (ibidem). In terms of employment, immigrants from politically unstable, poor, or majority-Muslim countries are more likely to be unemployed (Fleischmann/Dronkers 2010). The same can be said about migrant women and immigrants with strong identity in terms speaking a different language at home than the majority and having a strong attachment to religion (Bisin and others 2011). This mostly applies to first-generation immigrants, while second-generation immigrants are statistically indifferent to natives. Education influences employment less among immigrants than among natives (ibidem). Keeping in mind that immigrant attributes do influence integration outcomes, I now turn to state and society attributes influencing integration policy.

2. Timing of migration and settlement

Among others, Gary P. Freeman notes that policy outcomes and public debate on immigration policy are not necessarily coherent (Freeman 1995; see also Boswell/Geddes 2011: 39-50). He assumes that immigration inflows are generally favoured by elites and employer interest groups and opposed by public opinion, since immigrants constitute potential competitors in the labour market. Hence, the model Freeman applies is one of the political economy of employer – employee negotiations.

Freeman's typology of immigration politics

English-speaking settler societies	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States;
European states with postcolonial and guestworker migrations	Germany, France, Great Britain, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, (Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg);
New countries of immigration	Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece (Finland, Ireland, Norway);

(Freeman 1995: 882; I added the countries in brackets based on information from the MIPEX policy profiles described above)

Freeman identifies three different types of countries of immigration: English-speaking settler societies, European states with postcolonial and guestworker migrations, and new countries of immigration (Freeman 1995). The English-speaking settler societies are characterised by a long history of immigration, a positive folklore of immigration that “provides opportunities for proponents of larger intakes to shape decisions”, little party-competition on the issue of immigration, hence limited public debate despite a rather restrictive public opinion (ibidem: 887-9). European states with postcolonial and guestworker migrations on the contrary were fully developed national states at the time immigration became a mass phenomenon. In the first place, employer-interest groups were not challenged by public debate on the regulation of immigration. Since the guestworker system had the unintended effect that it led to permanent settlement there is a widespread “scepticism about state capacity to master immigration, control borders, and manage migration in the national interest” (ibidem: 890). This legacy caused an implicit understanding of immigration as an issue of domestic political debate, an intensifying multilateral cooperation (especially at the EU level), and empowered parties of the far right to shape politics and policy in a restrictive way. (ibidem: 890-3). The third type, new countries of immigration, are characterised by the absence of administrative experience, “ineffective attempts to organize legal entry, curtail illegal entry, and regularize those already inside the country without authorization”, and pressures from the European Union to Europeanise immigration. At the same time, the need for migrant workers is broadly acknowledged at least in Spain and Portugal. Thus Freeman notes that the picture of the new countries of immigration resembles that of the guestworker-receiving countries at the upheaval of the guestworker system (ibidem: 893-6). Although Freeman’s analysis appears oversimplified there are some valuable insights on different pressures and narratives of immigrant-receiving countries. However, he shows that notions of immigration history and perceived failure of previous policies can be included in a rather formal political economy model of policymaking.

3. National narratives and party politics

Ruud Koopmans and others analyse cross-national differences of the politics and policy of immigration and cultural diversity in France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (Koopmans et al. 2005). In order to understand national differences, their

argument goes, one has to bear in mind “the different conceptions of national identity and their cristallization in nation-specific integration and citizenship policies. These national self-understandings and policies act as institutional and discursive opportunities and constraints” (ibidem: 6). I already mentioned these differences in chapter two. According to Koopmans and others citizenship models can be distinguished best by their approaches towards individual equality and cultural difference. They argue then, built on these national differences, institutional and discursive opportunity structures can explain different ways of handling immigration and diversity. The method applied here is Political Claims Analysis: Claims making is defined “as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of *the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors*” (ibidem: 24, emphasis in original). The authors analyse daily newspapers in these countries.

Their findings point out some essential national differences: First, they state that Great Britain and the Netherlands allow for the most group-based rights towards minorities and cultural diversity. While Germany did move away from its “ethnic cultural monism”, Switzerland and France steadily refuse to respond to group-based cultural demands. These national differences are argued to be more pronounced today than in the past (ibidem: 235). Second, a shift to postnationalism within immigrant group tends to be more visible in countries that do not intend to grant citizenship to immigrants like Germany or Switzerland. If immigrants had easier access to citizenship, they are more likely to use their political opportunities within the boundaries of the (guest-) country: “Failure to grant citizenship to migrants and to provide opportunities for political inclusion actually seem to be factors that lead them to invest their political energies outside of the place where they are settled and live” (ibidem: 239). Third, the argument of multiculturalists that the recognition of group based rights is crucial for successful immigration appears to be overrated in this context as the authors show that France migrants do participate politically despite France’s hostility towards group-based rights. Only in the context of Islam group-based rights appear relevant (ibidem: 240-3). Extreme-right mobilization is also a subject of their research, but they analysed immigration and cultural diversity as a cause of extreme-right mobilization. Hence we gain no insights whether it influences integration policy (ibidem: 180-204).

The observation of Freeman that central parties try not to politicise immigration by entering informal agreements on it might be a cause why party politics was not being analysed in detail as a cause of certain forms of integration policy yet (Freeman 1995; Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006: 171). In a similar way, Virginie Guiraudon suggests that an expansion of immigrant rights – unlike other historically disadvantaged groups – was not caused by mass mobilization and public debates. Instead they were subject to bargaining behind closed doors only (Guiraudon 1998). Boswell and Geddes note that there is some evidence that centre-left parties are more favourable to multicultural approaches than right-wing parties (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 209-10). Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove convincingly show on the examples of Austria and Italy that government presence of right-wing parties lead to restrictive policies of immigrant integration (Triadafilopoulos/Zaslove 2006). The same can be said about the influence of the Green Party in Germany liberalising integration policy (ibidem; Green 2001). When not in government right-wing parties have the ability to influence policy by channelling public discourse (ibidem: 176). Importantly, Guiraudon notes that we need to take “venues” like political opportunities and conjunctures into account, if we want to analyse influence of certain political forces on immigration issues (Guiraudon 1998; 2000). However, the influence of party politics on integration policy constitutes a fairly untouched area of cross-country empirical analysis.

4. Europeanization of immigrant integration

According to Guiraudon the Europeanization of immigration policy is essentially driven by “venue shopping” on the EU level. In this context, EU-level meetings provide opportunities to negotiate solutions to perceived problems with less parliamentary, judicial, or public constraints than at the national level (Guiraudon 2000). Of course EU-level harmonisation can rather explain convergence of integration policy, than its divergence. Taking the Europeanization of immigration policy into account, we need to question domestic party politics as a source of integration policy development: If national politicians can meet their allies in Brussels, with whom they share similar conceptions of their problems, to deliberate on immigrant integration without public scrutiny and debate, then national political parties would not matter. I will show that this would be a clear overestimation of EU influence on immigrant integration.

Prior to the intergovernmental conference of Amsterdam in 1997 migration and integration policy issues were Europeanized mainly outside the EU-framework. In the 1980ies ministries of Justice and Home Affairs began to collaborate in the elaboration of policies concerning security and migration outside public scrutiny. This development is referred to as “intensive transgovernmentalism” and included the coordination of controls within EU countries and managing access to EU-territory as Sandra Lavenex shows on the case of Asylum policy (Lavenex 2001). The Schengen agreement provides an example par excellence for transgovernmentally developed institutions that were later included in the EU aquis (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 58-61). As Kerstin Rosenow notes, the Council of Europe was the primary actor in fostering immigrants’ rights (Rosenow 2009). For example, the 1992 “Convention on the participation of foreigners in public life at the local level (ETS 144)” provides immigrants with a range of political rights that reduce the legal difference between denizens and citizens (ibidem: 135; 140).

What output did EU institutions provide so far for immigrant integration? A detailed description of EU policy on immigrant integration up to date would need lots of space and is not necessary for my work. However, Carrera provides a detailed description of EU policy (Carrera 2009: 61-144). In a nutshell, the Amsterdam Treaty and the following Tampere summit in 1999 set the basis for EU policy making regarding immigrant integration. After the Tampere summit a number of Directives defining anti-discrimination towards TCNs were concluded in 2000. In 2003 the family reunification and long-term-residents Directives led to a fostering of TCN-rights on the EU-level. The Tampere programme was followed by the The Hague programme (2005-9) and the Stockholm programme (2010-4), which again emphasise on immigrant integration policy amendment. In 2007, an EU fund for TCN integration programmes was concluded. Apart from these Directives the EU institutions provide a number of non-binding recommendations, projects, and reports (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 52-3, 210-7; Rosenow 2009: 135-6). Notably, the MIPEX index as a source for benchmarking EU member states’ policies is part of the EU framework too (Carrera 2009: 118-26). We see that as far as binding legislation is concerned, mainly Amsterdam and its succeeding Directives appear relevant. Arne Niemann explains the progress of the Amsterdam Treaty and the decrease of further development in the succeeding intergovernmental conferences by differences in functional pressures for Europeanisation, the role of supranational actors, the socialisation and learning of the negotiating ministers, and domestic countervailing forces (Niemann 2008: 583).

Apart from “venue shopping” as a potential cause for EU immigration and integration policy development a number of factors appear relevant: Most references are made to the point that the discrimination of TCNs is bad for the economic development of the single European market and thus a legitimate EU issue. The Amsterdam Treaty then introduced a legal provision for EU action to fight discrimination against TCNs (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 210-7; Rosenow 2009; Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 50-3). In this sense, EU-fight against discrimination does not exclusively focus on EU citizens only.

Another reason for EU policy-making might be policy failure at the national level: As noted above, integration policy in European countries carries a notion of failure. A relocation of the issue on the EU agenda thus might be a reaction to this perceived failure.

Following functionalist spill-over theory the development of EU-policy on integration issues can be argued as a simple consequence of asylum and immigration policy harmonisation. Rosenow states the argument this way: “It is widely known that Europe is characterised by a multitude of integration schemes ... [which] led to decades of stand-still regarding the harmonisation of integration policies. But the emergence of a common EU immigration and asylum policy changed this blockade” (Rosenow 2009: 137).

She additionally notes that the Commission tried to link the economic argument of anti-discrimination with an argument of social cohesion (ibidem: 151). Immigrant integration is thus not only relevant for a functioning single market, but also for social cohesion or solidarity within the EU. Schierup and others devote attention to this argument, critically highlighting how immigrant integration and anti-discrimination are incorporated into the European Social Model: “On the whole, the primacy of market requirements that permeates EU policy discussion on new labour immigration leaves very little room for the type of ‘civic citizenship’ and rights dimension that, despite its flaws, is still endorsed in policies addressing the situation of the EU’s ‘legally’ and permanently settled TCNs” (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 76). Welfare state restructuring and the ambivalence of temporary labour migration are argued to be contradicting attempts to immigrant integration. However, the point is made that economic needs and social integration and cohesion are interacting variables in the EU framework. It is not the subject of my analysis to argue whether the EU policies on welfare restructuring and immigrant integration are sound or not, hence I will not go into detail.

5. The welfare state

Before describing theories of welfare states as an explaining factor for integration policy I will give an introduction on the development and different models of welfare states, putting an emphasis on different ways to analyse welfare systems in a comparative way. Eventually I will turn to the operationalisation of welfare systems as an independent variable.

5.1. Welfare state theory

According to Xaver Kaufmann welfare states can be described as a specific form of societal organisation that combines democratic institutions and capitalism with a well-developed state-organised social sector that provides benefits to citizens according to legal entitlements based on defined needs (Kaufmann 1989, in: Lessenich 2008: 23). To achieve a definition that is more precise, we would need to define the scope of the social sector, the nature of the entitlements for benefits and the nature of the benefits themselves. This cannot be done without making reference to different types of welfare states and their underlying logics (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi/Palme 1998). Nevertheless a few notes on the intention of welfare programmes need to be made: Welfare systems redistribute goods within society for two reasons (Goudswaard/Caminada 2010: 3-4): First, life-cycle or intrapersonal redistribution should protect people from some risks they face in their lives. This may be sickness, disability, unemployment, or the death of a spouse. Life-cycle-redistribution of course also includes benefits for children and old-age pensions. In this context a welfare system basically functions as an insurance. Second, welfare systems can reduce possibly unfair outcomes of the market distribution of the capitalist economy. This we may call inter-personal redistribution. Since market distribution appears to lead to inequalities that might be unjust and undeserved the welfare system should balance that out. This objective of welfare systems might be based on a simple wish for fairness, but might also be necessary to the sustainment of democracy. As Kaufmann argues, welfare-statism is both a result of and a condition to democracy and societal peace (Kaufmann 2003: 30-5). I will refer to democracy as a driving factor for welfare state development later. The issue of being a condition for democratic government lies in the fostering of societal integration and solidarity through welfare programmes. There is a variety of arguments of how and why welfare programmes promote societal integration: From a Neo-marxist logics-of-capitalism perspective, one might argue that capitalism cannot function

without the bourgeoisie providing some social programmes for the proletariat (O'Connor 1973, in: Esping-Andersen 1998: 25). According to this argument, there is a class conflict within society that can be mitigated and maintained by social programmes at the same time (ibidem: 19-31). Contrary to that argument Kaufmann argues that social programmes and the resulting redistribution are not a matter of conflict but rather a means of belonging to a reciprocal community (Kaufmann 30-31). In a reciprocal community people are not equals in all respects, but fulfilling different societal needs and dependent on another. This notion of solidarity is based on Durkheim's organic solidarity: In contrast to mechanical solidarity people do not have a feeling of belonging together because they are equal-minded or equal-built, but because they live in a functionally differentiating society (Ottmann 2009: 41-6). Hence, solidarity might not only entail equality, but also functional difference. Especially with respect to immigrants potentially threatening social solidarity we need to keep this distinction in mind.

Explanations for welfare state development

There are three major theories explaining welfare state development that are rather complementary than contradicting. Functionalism basically explains welfare statism as a logical consequence of capitalism. Power-resources Theory proposes that welfare states were caused by democratic class struggle. Institutionalism also presumes some form a democratic government as a basis for welfare statism. From this perspective, institutions of political participation and path-dependency determine the development of welfare programmes.

Functionalism

This theory argues that mass industrialisation and capitalist markets led to an erosion of traditional structures of society, which in turn lost its function of welfare provision. Pre-industrial forms of societal reproduction like big families, influential churches or guilds got replaced by modern society's mobility, urbanisation, individualism, secularity, and market dependency (Esping-Andersen 1998: 24). Since capitalist markets do not replace the loss of pre-industrial welfare per se, states need to step in through the provision of public welfare services. From this perspective welfare states are a logical consequence of modernity and industrialism. This can explain the emergence and expansion of public

welfare services, but not their divergence. Wilensky provides an insightful example for that: He argues that sinking birth rates and a subsequently ageing population were caused by industrialism and need to be compensated by expansive welfare services (Wilensky 1975, in: Schmid 1996: 51). According to this argument, more industrialised countries would have a faster ageing population and would then have larger welfare systems. Hence, functionalism may explain the “how much” quality of welfare systems, but not how welfare states are organised or how they redistribute among society (Kaufmann 2003: 27-8). The two other theories essentially focus on these questions.

Institutionalism

The theory of Institutionalism presumes that economy and politics are necessarily interwoven and that capitalist markets need some form of social embedding (Polanyi 1944, in: Esping-Andersen 1998: 26). This comes close to the argument of T. H. Marshall that equality in citizenship necessarily involves social rights (1950). Democratic institutions respond to majority claims of redistribution at some point. The crucial point for Institutionalism is then under which circumstances welfare programmes were first debated and subsequently introduced. This may happen prior to or past industrialisation and democratisation and demands may rest on specific needs of certain groups among society (Manow 2009). As path-dependency theory suggests, introduction points determine the structure of welfare systems in so far as welfare system principles are not likely to change over time (Manow 2009; Pierson 1998). Starke and other’s empirical analysis provides proof for the argument as welfare states tend to converge only slowly (Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008). Institutionalism hence presumes some findings of Functionalism, but focuses primarily on the divergence of welfare systems, or, in other terms, on “how” welfare systems work.

Power-resources Theory

Power-resources Theory presumes similar to Institutionalism that there are groups – often the majority – among society that favour redistribution. Assuming parties reflect a capital – labour cleavage Power-resources Theory suggests that people in favour of redistribution vote in favour of parties representing labour interests, for example social-democrats. The

better these parties are organised and the more votes they get, and in turn government positions they receive, the larger are welfare-systems (Korpi 1998). This is being operationalised in social-democratic parliamentary power and government. The longer social-democratic governments were or are in power, the larger are social budgets in relation to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (ibidem). If not in government, or having shared governmental power social-democrats might further push other parties to introduce social programmes they would not introduce otherwise. Among others, Philip Manow specified Power-resources Theory focusing on class and party coalitions and religious cleavages to explain different welfare regimes (Manow 2008; 2009). Different coalitions and religions then cause different welfare systems, answering the “how” question.

In sum, the arguments of Institutionalism and Power-resources Theory then are that different structures of welfare systems and not solely the size of social budgets were caused by different introduction points, societal cleavages, and party coalitions. In the next chapter I will show how these different regimes look like and how they can be analysed.

Categorising welfare states

There are a number of different typologies explaining or describing different welfare systems with different measures (Arts/Gelissen 2002). Since it is not the focus of this text I will not describe different typologies separately. Instead, I will present different variables underlying welfare state typologies and show that they lead to only slightly diverging results concerning the placement of countries in different welfare types or clusters.

The most famous typology on welfare states is provided by Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds of Welfare” (1990). By analysing pension systems, unemployment, and sickness benefits in 18 countries Esping-Andersen argues that outcomes regarding **decommodification** and **social stratification** lead to three groups of similar countries: The Liberal, Conservative, and Social-democratic welfare types. In this context welfare systems are expected to break or maintain social stratification. Decommodification constitutes a measure for the extent to which people can refrain from “selling” their labour on the market via social benefits in order to maintain their income (Esping-Andersen 1998: 36-43). Decommodification is a matter of social rights, eligibility and the scope of social benefits. In terms of unemployment benefits, for example, a welfare system has a higher decommodifying effect if a person can stay unemployed longer without losing the entitlement to unemployment benefits. Although Esping-Andersen’s methodology received

a lot of reasonable critiques, his ideal types are part of most typologies on welfare systems (Bambra 2006; Arts/Gelissen 2002).

Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme identify five ideal types of welfare states, of which three reflect Esping-Andersen's types closely: the Basic Security (=Liberal), Corporatist (=Conservative), and Encompassing (=Social-democratic) model (Korpi/Palme 1998). At least as far as the 17 selected countries are concerned the types that are not included in the Three Worlds of Welfare are not relevant. This typology rests on the variables of the **basis of entitlement** for benefits, the **benefit level principle**, and on the **governance of benefits**. Entitlements may involve a means test, membership in organisations, labour force participation, previous contributions or citizenship. Benefit level principles may either be minimal, flat rate, or earnings-related. The governance of benefits may be state-controlled or based on employer-employee co-operations (ibidem: 666). Additionally Korpi and Palme show that different types of welfare systems have varying effects on **poverty reduction** and **income redistribution** (ibidem).

In a similar way Giuliano Bonoli tries to place the focus not only on "how much", but also on "how": He argues that social benefits are either focused on income-maintenance and based on social insurances and thus contributions- or income-related (the Bismarckian logic), or focused on poverty reduction and prevention and based on residence and/or need, flat-rate and financed through general taxation (the Beveridgean logic) (Bonoli 1997: 357). For the measurement of this variable Bonoli uses the **share of social expenditure financed through contributions** out of total social expenditure. Combined with a "how much" variable of **social expenditure as a percentage of GDP** he identifies four clusters of welfare systems, of which three represent Esping-Andersen's typology and one representing southern European countries (ibidem: 361).

Alan Siaroff specifically focuses on the situation of women and families in the welfare state, measuring employment and income differences of men and women ("**female work desirability**"), size and eligibility of **benefits for families** (towards the mother, the father, or the head of the family), and the **orientation of the welfare state towards women's needs** (Siaroff 1994). He identifies four groups of countries which he labels according to different religious majorities, which are presumed to cause different family policies within welfare systems. Again, three of these groups reflect Esping-Andersen's typology and one basically represents southern European countries (ibidem).

Country classifications in four typologies

Esping-Andersen (1998: 44)	Liberal	Conservative	Social-democratic	
	Denmark Switzerland United Kingdom	Austria France Germany Italy	Norway Sweden Finland Denmark	
Esping-Andersen, decommodification only, (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 149)	Ireland United Kingdom	Italy France Germany Finland Switzerland	Austria Belgium Netherlands Denmark Norway Sweden	
Korpi/Palme (1998: 675)	Basic Security	Corporatist	Encompassing	
	Denmark Ireland Netherlands Switzerland United Kingdom	Austria Belgium France Germany Italy	Finland Norway Sweden	
Bonoli (1997: 361)	British	Continental	Nordic	Southern
	United Kingdom Ireland	Netherlands France Belgium Germany Luxembourg	Sweden Finland Norway Denmark	Italy Switzerland Spain Greece Portugal
Siaroff 1994 (in: Arts/Gelissen 2002: 149)	Protestant Liberal	Advanced Christian-democratic	Protestant Social-democratic	Late Female Mobilization
	United Kingdom	Austria Belgium France Germany Luxembourg Netherlands	Denmark Finland Norway Sweden	Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Switzerland

(Arts/Gelissen 2002: 149-50)

As the table shows most countries are classified similarly across different typologies. If there is a fourth category, it usually includes those countries that were not part of Esping-Andersen's analysis and thus not included in his classification. Below I will summarise what the authors of the described typologies attribute to their identified types of welfare systems.

The Liberal type

The Liberal or Basic Security type is characterised by benefits for the “deserving poor” that are based on a means-test, in other words, one has to prove the need and deservingness for assistance. The basic logic is that payments to the poor help only those who really need it and reduce poverty among the population without stressing public spending much (Bonoli 1997). Universal or contributions-related benefits are rather scarce in this type. As many authors argue this logic does not reduce poverty and income inequality much, because it favours market-based insurances, has a stigmatising effect and its low benefits do not reduce the market-dependency of the poor (Goudswaard/Caminada 2010; Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi/Palme 1998). Although it partially accounts for the same countries Korpi’s and Palme’s Basic Security model relies on low-level universal flat-rate benefits (ibidem: 666). Liberal and Basic Security welfare states are argued to be residual insofar as market solutions are preferred over state-organised social security. Low decommodification scores do not allow for long periods of absence from the labour market and thus push people to find employment. Market solutions for insurance are further promoted by the absence of state programmes and/or by subsidies for private insurance schemes (Esping-Andersen 1998: 43). Employer – employee co-operations governing social programmes are only of a private nature, for example within one firm, and not required by law. Hence accessing public assistance is not supported, instead it rather constitutes a very last option to labour market participation and reliance on forms of privately organised social security. There is only limited support for families, but women are relatively little disadvantaged in the labour market (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 143). With regard to theories explaining welfare state development Liberal welfare programmes were introduced in countries with majority voting systems, a middle class that did not favour high redistribution within society, and at a time when industrialisation and democratisation took already place in the country (Manow 2009).

The Conservative type

The Conservative, Corporatist, Continental, or Advanced Christian-democratic type is based on social insurances. Hence benefits based on universal principles or means-tests are rather scarce (Korpi/Palme 1998: 666-8). Following a Bismarckian logic, social insurance’s objective is income maintenance for employees who are out of work for

reasons beyond their control: Benefits are earnings-related and an entitlement for benefits depends on the scope of previous contributions. Social benefits are further based on employer-employee co-operation and contributions and to a lower extent on general tax revenues (Bonoli 1997: 357-67). Additionally, benefits are mostly of a financial nature and only scarcely contain services (like childcare, active labour market programmes, etc.) (Jensen 2008; 2010). Since public insurance schemes cover most aspects of welfare, private insurance schemes and subsidies for private social investments play only a marginal role (Esping-Andersen 1998: 44). Using the term of Korpi and Palme, public institutions are “crowding out” private welfare programmes (Korpi/Palme 1998: 664). Differences in the size of private social expenditures and the effects of subsidies and tax breaks on those can be nicely illustrated by the net social expenditure measurement of the OECD (OECD 2009: 44-51). According to these calculations social expenditure figures of Conservative welfare regimes remain rather steady, while those of Social-democratic regimes decrease due to the taxation of social benefits and those of Liberal regimes increase due to private investments (ibidem: 48). Esping-Andersen argues that Conservative welfare regimes focus on the maintenance of status differences with rights based on class and status. This involves considerable decommodification scores, but only little redistributive effects (Esping-Andersen 1998: 44). Siaroff argues that this welfare type provides strong incentives for women not to work, but to stay at home (Siaroff, in: Arts/Gelissen 2002: 143). Among others, Manow and Esping-Andersen see churches influencing Conservative welfare states that perpetuate traditional forms of families and care. This might be called a subsidiary principle of the state only stepping in as a welfare provider if the family cannot help itself (Esping-Andersen 1998: 44). Conservative welfare states typically were a result of coalitions of conservative and social-democratic parties in Christian-catholic dominated countries (Manow 2008; 2009).

The Social-democratic type

The Social-democratic, Encompassing, or Nordic welfare state differs in the objective of welfare provision. Unlike in the Liberal and Conservative type the objective lies in the promotion of equality in the society. Hence welfare benefits are provided at a universal basis of residence and/or citizenship. Independently from class or social status benefits are thus open to all. These benefits are most likely flat-rate and on a comparatively high level. Unlike in Conservative welfare states the governance of benefits obliges to one state-

governed insurance system (Esping-Andersen 1998: 44-5). Unlike in Liberal welfare states the better-off are not excluded from public benefits. While Esping-Andersen does not ascribe earnings-related benefits to this welfare type, Korpi and Palme argue that the Encompassing welfare system combines universal benefits with conditional earnings-related benefits in order to keep the better-off in the public welfare system and hence crowd out private insurance programmes (Korpi/Palme 1998: 669). As Bonoli shows Nordic welfare states have in sum rather low shares of social insurance contributions financing welfare programmes. Instead welfare expenditures are mostly financed through general taxation (Bonoli 1997: 361). However, these welfare states reduce poverty and income inequality to a larger extent than other types and have the highest decommodification scores (Esping-Andersen 1998: 45; Korpi/Palme 1998). High-level benefits and expenditures of course require high employment rates and high taxes. In order to keep the budgets balanced, Social-democratic welfare states need to make sure that employment rates remain high. Hence care for children, elderly, and people in need are directly covered by the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1998: 45-6). This allows for individual independence in finding employment, which relates especially to the labour market performance of women. Siaroff argues that women have a true work – welfare choice, because benefits for families are high and paid to the mother (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 143). The Social-democratic welfare type was typically introduced by coalitions of agrarian and social-democratic parties in countries with protestant influences and a strong urban – rural cleavage when welfare systems were introduced (Manow 2008; 2009).

The Southern type

Criticisms to Esping-Andersen's typology often focus on the omission of distinctive characteristics of southern European welfare states (Arts/Gelissen 2002; Bonoli 1997; Siaroff 1994). Southern European states are argued to lack an explicit social minimum that is guaranteed by the state and relatively limited state intervention in welfare systems (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 144-6). Hence, families and churches are the most important welfare providers in these countries. The residual character of state welfare provision has exceptions: Health care is provided as a citizenship right and pension systems are often very generous. In contrast, care for children and the elderly is often not a part of public welfare (ibidem). Compared with the ideal types of Esping-Andersen's typology Southern welfare systems are mostly similar to Corporatist/Conservative types, especially

concerning their focus on cash-benefits instead of services and their contributions-relatedness (ibidem; Jensen 2008). In the work of Bonoli they differ from Conservative systems only insofar as their social expenditure levels are lower (Bonoli 1997: 361). Focusing on gender differences embedded in the welfare system the Southern type shows similarities to the Conservative type too, but is more extreme in its residual character, not offering alternatives to family based care for children and the elderly and not accounting domestic labour (Arts/Gelissen 2002: 147). In a nutshell, we can summarise the Southern welfare state as an emerging, to some degree still rudimental, Conservative welfare type.

Debates on welfare system categorisation and development

There are many different forms of criticisms to welfare system typologies. They include arguments about the correct placement of countries, methodological misconceptions, or general doubts about the idea of ideal types of welfare states and the commensurability of summarising different national welfare systems into common welfare types (Bambra 2006; Castles/Obinger 2008; Kasza 2002; Schubert/Hegelich/Bazant 2008: 14-9). Another area of academic discourse is whether certain types of welfare states respond to various challenges, most notably financial crises, retrenchment, deregulation, societal changes and globalisation in similar ways (Bonoli 2007; Pierson 1998; Schubert/Hegelich/Bazant 2008; Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008). I think it is necessary to add a few notes on methodological and analytical discourses: Gregory J. Kasza offers a number of arguments why we should not categorise welfare states into ideal types (Kasza 2002). These involve the influence of national legacies, the diversity of policy actor influencing welfare systems, idiosyncratic meanings of certain welfare areas and the singularity of different welfare areas (ibidem). He recommends that for a comparative analysis we should focus on specific elements of welfare systems and not on the welfare system as a whole (ibidem: 284). A reaction to that critique can be to refrain from analysing typologies and use indicators and data on specific welfare programmes and effects instead. Of course there is still an inherent neglect of specific national legacies and idiosyncrasies, but one can avoid some troubles of oversimplifying welfare typologies. Therefore Peter Starke and others provide a suiting example, analysing convergence of welfare states via various indicators and neglecting welfare typologies (Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008).

For a short description of welfare system reactions to challenges of globalisation, financial problems and social and economic development I want to focus on the work of Bonoli

(2007), Pierson (1998) and Starke and others (2008). Paul Pierson argues that challenges to welfare systems are not to be understood as challenges of globalisation. Instead, challenges of slowing productivity growth, an inherent tendency of social expenditure growing faster than the GDP and population ageing are argued to put the welfare state under pressure (Pierson 1998). As a scholar of path-dependency theory he argues that welfare state retrenchment and reform are limited by political constraints of “institutional stickiness” and a “negativity bias” of voter reacting stronger to potential losses than potential gains (ibidem: 552). Hence retrenchment and reform are preferably avoided by policy-makers. This comes close to the analysis of Starke and others, who analyse to what extent and how countries came to converge with respect to their welfare systems (Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008). By analysing various indicators (social expenditure across different areas as percentage of the GDP, cash vs. service expenditure, welfare state financing, decommodification, net replacement rates) over a period from 1980 to 2003 they show that welfare systems did not converge much. Most countries further did not downsize their welfare programmes although there are many arguments that they should. In other words, empirically they cannot determine an “Americanisation” of social policy (ibidem: 994-6). Giuliano Bonoli focuses on deindustrialisation and the tertiarisation of employment, changing family structures, increasing rates of women in the labour market, and the destandardisation of employment, which he summarises as “new social risks” as challenges for welfare systems (Bonoli 2007: 498). He argues that Nordic welfare systems faced these challenges at an earlier stage when their welfare states were not as mature as Continental welfare states now facing these challenges are. Thus he constitutes that especially the large Continental welfare systems need to adapt to new challenges, but, for the reasons presented by Pierson, they are not likely to do so: “...the findings presented ... are not good news for those who are hit by new social risks in continental and southern Europe. These countries have missed a window of opportunity to reorient their welfare states.” (ibidem: 518).

Conclusion

In sum, we see that challenges to welfare systems can be analysed by using typologies and theories of welfare state development I described above, but we do not necessarily need to. Instead, we might also look at indicators to identify change and stability of welfare systems and refrain from typologies. I suggest understanding typologies not as ideal pictures of welfare states, but as indicators of distinctive logics underlying welfare states. Turning to the second research question of the welfare system as an underlying factor, or independent

variable, of immigrant integration policies I suggest using indicators like social expenditure as percentage of the GDP and others and welfare types in a complementary way: Both might tell us something about the relation of welfare systems and integration policy.

5.2. Welfare states and immigrant integration, and vice versa

In this section I will present a number of different, partly contradicting, theories on causal relationships of welfare systems, immigration, and immigrant integration. These involve arguments of immigration and diversity as a threat to welfare systems, the rejection of these arguments, and welfare systems as causal factors for divergent integration policies and outcomes.

Is immigration threatening the welfare state?

Contrary to the literature I cited above, Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser do not try to explain or differentiate integration policy. Instead they use it as an independent variable explaining differences between the welfare systems of Europe and the US. They try to explain why European welfare systems have greater redistributive effects and hence reduce poverty to a greater extent than the US (Alesina/Glaeser 2004: 2). One of their arguments is “that the United States is a much more racially fragmented society than anywhere in Europe” (ibidem: 10): The authors presume that intra-group generosity is greater than generosity towards members of other groups and that ethnicity or race constitute group identification. They assume the US to be much more culturally, ethnically, and racially diverse than European countries, because European countries put a lot of effort in maintaining their homogeneity:

“Moreover, while European governments strove to eradicate ethnic and cultural differences over the past four centuries [...], American governments put much less effort into this task, which would have surely impossible in such a diverse country. As a result, it is much easier to convince a white middle class person in the United States to think that the poor are ‘different’ (read black) than to convince a white middle class person, say, in Sweden” (ibidem).

This argument concerns integration policy so far as managing diversity is an important feature of integration policy. For Alesinas and Glaesers argument, a country that tries to

assimilate immigrants in a way that they waive their cultural and linguistic heritage is very different to a country that implements multicultural policies. The authors go on and argue “that if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to immigration, ethnic divisions will be used to challenge the welfare state” (ibidem: 11). Brian Barry essentially puts the focus not on immigration per se, but on models of integration: He claims that the emphasis on cultural difference of multicultural integration models puts solidarity and willingness for redistribution under pressure (Barry 2001). Hence, both the level of immigration rates and the choice of integration models influence the welfare state.

By analysing racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalisation in the US and Europe Alesina and Glaeser find proof for their argument. Essentially they show that countries with little ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities have a larger share of their GDP spent on welfare expenditures (ibidem: 133-54). Although there is no point made to the impact of immigrant integration policies per se, the implication is obvious: Countries with less societal diversity have bigger (I suppose this equals higher redistribution rates and lower poverty rates) welfare systems. Thus the control of diversity must be a target of immigrant integration.

In a nutshell, the argument provided by Barry, Alesina, and Glaeser “is that a viable welfare state, which commits substantial resources to health care, income transfers, and social services, depends on achieving and maintaining a high level of solidarity among citizens, and that this in turn rests on feelings of commonality among citizens” (Banting/Kymlicka 2006a: 282). Hence ethnic, religious, or cultural diversity and multicultural integration policies endanger the welfare state. Banting and Kymlicka refer to that as the “heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off” and “recognition/redistribution trade-off” (ibidem: 283). The latter can be distinguished in three sub-arguments: First, multiculturalism policies are said to “weaken pro-redistribution coalitions by diverting time, energy, and money from redistribution to recognition” (Banting/Kymlicka 2006b: 10). Second, multiculturalism policies are said to erode solidarity among citizens, because of the emphasis on differences among citizens instead of their commonalities. Banting and Kymlicka call that the “corroding effect” (ibidem: 11). Third, multiculturalism policies “misdiagnose” minority problems by presuming that problems of minorities are rooted in cultural discrimination and not, say, in economic marginalisation or class difference (ibidem: 12-3).

Empirical rejections

One way to measure effects of multiculturalism on solidarity and attitudes towards redistribution is by analysing public opinion via surveys. Christoph Burkhardt and Steffen Mau show that immigration and ethnic diversity have slightly negative effects on public opinion towards redistribution and immigrant inclusion, although this effect might be explained by other factors too (Mau/Burkhardt 2009: 224-6). Markus Crepaz analysed effects of immigrant multiculturalism on public opinion towards redistribution and found a positive relation: People in countries that adapted multicultural integration policies are slightly more favourable towards redistribution (Crepaz 2006). However, there is no reason to believe that public policy is somehow congruent to public opinion. Thus we need to analyse integration policy and its effects on social policy or vice versa. In their analysis of multiculturalism and welfare state change Banting and others reject the argument that multicultural integration policies reduce the redistributive power of welfare states (Banting et al. 2006). They show that changes in government's social expenditures, redistribution and poverty reduction rates do not correspond to the introduction of multicultural integration policies. They neither lead to more, nor to less government social expenditure and redistribution (ibidem: 78-87).

Much of this dispute lies in disagreements on the value and importance of cultural rights. Since it is not my subject of analysis and the MIPLEX index does not measure a cultural dimension of integration these arguments appear not relevant at a first glance. Nevertheless, I suggest these arguments underline the potential threat of immigration and malintegration to social solidarity and welfare systems. Thus, the dispute on multiculturalism and redistribution fosters the claim that immigrant integration especially matters to countries with larger welfare systems.

Welfare systems determining integration policy

Boswell and Geddes argue that immigrant integration policy might be less a cause of immigration and (non)-integration, but a consequence of broader labour market and welfare system processes. In other words, the configuration of integration policy is defined by labour market and welfare state characteristics (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 218-21). Thus different types of welfare organisation might be a source of different integration policies: Social-democratic, conservative, and liberal welfare systems would then be characterised by distinct integration policy configurations. Boswell and Geddes suggest that welfare

systems not only influence integration policy, but also outcomes, for example employment and unemployment rates of TCNs in EU member states (ibidem: 220). This argument is being specified by the research of Schierup and others (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006):

Contrary to Koopmans, who argues that generous welfare systems essentially endanger successful immigrant integration, Schierup and others do not state a clear causal relation of welfare states and immigrant integration in their analysis (Koopmans 2010). Instead, they picture a dual crisis of European countries, wherein immigration and integration are intervening variables, being influenced by welfare systems and influencing them vice versa (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 1-6): Labour market participation and strong welfare services were successful forces promoting equality of people of different classes. Since the 1970ies, ages of economic growth providing strong welfare systems and social inclusion (not necessarily focused on immigrants) are over and leave the countries with new challenges of integration. The absence of this integrative power led to an ethnicised exclusion of (a growing number of) immigrants. At the same time, national identities are being transformed and result in a growing politicisation cultural difference and the emergence of nationalist-populist parties and eventually their inclusion in political decision-making. Immigration and cultural diversity thus became issues of politicisation. Hence, immigrant integration is troubled by a restructuring of welfare and labour market systems and by a changing notion of national belonging:

“[T]he heart of present dilemmas of race, class, and democracy, and the focus of this book, is whether a sustainable policy targeted at equal opportunities can actually succeed without the precondition that some form of broad social compact on citizenship and social welfare is still valid in terms of normative consensus and strong institutions beyond and complementary to the market” (ibidem 18-19).

Schierup and others provide an in-depth analysis of cases representing different welfare system types: the UK, Sweden, Germany, and Italy. They note that they omitted other countries in the belief that “much of what is said about the cases discussed” does apply to them too (ibidem: 19-20). This belief thus provides a good source of arguments for quantitative comparative analysis:

The Liberal case

The United Kingdom combined Social-democratic universalism with liberal thoughts of market orientation. Since Margaret Thatcher in the 1980ies welfare state restructuring according to the “liberal dogma that there is ‘no proper reason for altering the stratification outcomes produced in the marketplace’” that was shared by New Labour led to an Americanisation of welfare provision (Levitas 1998, in: Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 135). According to this dogma, the primacy of market distribution should support “effort, motivation, adeptness, and self-reliance” (Esping-Andersen 1990, in: ibidem). Hence the British welfare system constitutes a residual Liberal type combined with a liberal labour market, with the consequences of high wage differences, a casualization of labour, and economic growth with an increasing demand for low-skilled labour. This development coincided with restrictive policies of migration control and institutional racism despite the focus on stringent anti-discrimination policies and multiculturalism as an integration policy (ibidem: 134-6). Crucially, liberal non-intervention did not only concern the welfare system and labour market, but also the absence of positive-action towards immigrants. Consequently, in a mixture of ethnic and class polarisation, Schierup and others argue that ethnic minorities are the worst-off (ibidem: 136).

The Conservative case

The description of the German case by Schierup and others largely does not differ from the description of German immigration and integration policy in the second chapter. The period of strong economic growth and social stability involved a need of labour support that was responded by the guestworker system and differential exclusion. At the same time the labour market and welfare system was – and is – characterised by strong state intervention and regulation (ibidem: 161). At the time when the ethnic segmentation of German society became recognised as a problem and eventually as a subject of policy change, it was “too late to prevent the entrenchment of new patterns of ethnic and class exclusion” (ibidem: 162). The reform of German integration policy was preceded by a development of higher unemployment and a pressing need for a reform of the unsustainable welfare state. Although integration became certainly more inclusive over time, Schierup and others question Germany’s ability to succeed both in integration and

welfare policy reform and describe the German situation as “paradise gained and paradise lost” (ibidem: 161).

The Southern case

In Italy of the last two decades undocumented workers were necessary to make up for deficits of welfare services especially for domestic care. This need is caused by the residual function of the public welfare system and native women largely participating in the labour market. In turn, clandestine immigrants undermine tax revenues necessary to sustain welfare programmes. The same can be argued for immigrants employed in other low-skill jobs: On one hand, they are crucially important for economic development, but on the other hand, the government lacks revenues due to illegal employment (ibidem: 191-3). As a result, immigrants became scapegoats being blamed for the government’s economic crisis by right-wing parties, which push for a politicisation of immigration and integration. Integration policy resembles to some degree guestworker models of differential exclusion and temporary limitations of immigration. Simultaneously immigrants in Italy have allies in their claim for access to social rights and equality: Influential churches and NGOs traditionally support immigrant’s claims and many employers became that dependent on immigrant labour support that they prefer to support their regularisation, settlement, and integration (ibidem: 193-4).

The Social-democratic case

Swedish Social-democratic universalism is opposed to liberalised labour markets with undocumented labour migration or temporary labour migration. Hence immigrants generally had access to the labour market and to welfare programmes. Integration policy clearly provided access to rights, but immigrants still performed economically unequal to natives. The deregulation of labour markets and welfare provision retrenchment that took place at least to some extent in Sweden too especially concerned immigrants on the lower end of the social ladder, receiving limited wages in low-skill employment and limited welfare benefits (ibidem: 227-8). As a result, immigrants as welfare recipients are at a large scale opposed to welfare system reform. The mal-performance of immigrants in Swedish society was a subject to large debate in the last two decades and led to further

attempts of all-area integration instead of social rights only. In sum, growing fears of social and ethnic fragmentation appear to provide incentives for inclusive integration policies that show some positive results (ibidem: 229-30).

Welfare system effects on integration policy

Taking these countries as representatives of distinct welfare regimes, we might say that liberal states refrain from pursuing strong notions of civic integration policies, but try to manage diversity through elaborate anti-discrimination policies, though not entirely successful. Conservative welfare states initially focused less on managing diversity through civic integration and are now facing troubles of welfare state restructuring and growing social and ethnic fragmentation. The same counts for southern welfare states with some delay. Social democratic welfare states in contrast acknowledged a need for immigrants' civic integration sooner, have elaborate integration programmes and less challenges of social and ethnic fragmentation, but face strong opposition to welfare state restructuring. Stretching the observations of the cases to other cases having similar welfare systems might underestimate national idiosyncrasies of welfare and integration policies. But this we can test in the analysis eventually.

Welfare systems determining integration outcomes

Ann Morrisens and Diane Sainsbury argued in a similar way analysing effects of welfare regimes on immigrants' social rights and de commodification levels (Morrisens/Sainsbury 2005): First, they expect social democratic and conservative welfare states to restrict immigration, but to extend social rights to immigrant residents, while liberal welfare states encourage immigration, but limit access to social benefits. Second, conservative welfare states are further expected to provide worse outcomes for immigrants than social democratic ones, because benefit entitlements are delayed due to the condition of previous contributions. Third, countries with high de commodification rates are expected to provide better outcomes for immigrants than those with lower rates. Outcomes for immigrants are measured in access to social rights, poverty reduction, and household income composition relative to citizens. After an analysis of two cases for each welfare regime (United Kingdom, United States, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and France) the results show first, that there are large disparities of outcomes for migrants and citizens, but different welfare

systems appear to have only a limited effect on this relation (ibidem: 654-5). Interestingly, household income compositions of immigrants and citizens are most similar in France and Germany. The fact that different effects of welfare systems are less clear in regard to immigrants than to citizens is attributed to case selection and the proper classification of the cases in welfare typologies: Morrisens and Sainsbury question whether Denmark constitutes a social democratic welfare state and whether the US and the UK are similar – although liberal – welfare states (ibidem). Furthermore, they argue that different immigration regimes have to be integrated in the analysis (see Sainsbury 2006). The variation of single cases constitutes a striking problem of analysing the effects of welfare systems on immigrant integration, as I will show in my analysis. Noteworthy, the use of diverse indices for measuring welfare system outcomes and integration policy instead of typologies at least avoids the problem of cases not fitting into ideal-type categories. Not keeping immigration regimes in mind unfortunately is a problem inherent in the structure of the MIPEX index: The MIPEX index captures integration in very broad terms, conditions for immigration, hence different immigration regimes – if there actually is such a thing – are integrated in the index through the access-dimensions of Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion, Long-term Residence and Access to Nationality policies. Thus I may only analyse immigration and integration policy to some extent as a combined dependent variable.

6. Hypotheses

Contrary to the research of Banting, Crepaz, and Kymlicka I suggest focusing on welfare systems as a cause of integration policy divergence, and not its feedback. This is mainly due to two reasons: First, path dependency suggests that welfare systems and especially their basic configurations are not likely to change (Pierson 1998; Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008). In contrast, as I have shown above, integration policies are (Joppke/Morawska 2003; Joppke 2007). Second, different welfare regimes might require specific integration policies, especially concerning access to the labour market and social rights (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 218-21; Sainsbury 2006). The counterargument that welfare systems are adapted to a country's approach to immigration appears much less plausible. However, my research interest lies in the explanation of integration policy difference, not in the likely effect of integration policy.

My hypotheses than are that countries with large welfare programmes (hypothesis 1a) and high redistributive effects (hypothesis 1b) need to put a greater emphasis on the inclusion of immigrants to sustain solidarity and trust than countries that have smaller or less redistributive welfare programmes. Countries with smaller welfare programmes or lower redistribution rates might refrain from inclusive policies for a variety of reasons. Most notably the rhetoric of immigration and integration in public debate is dominantly restrictive, hence governments can respond to that by adding tough action to tough talk. Second, they might share the liberal dogma that state regulation – that integration policy is – should be avoided unless absolutely necessary.

With regard to welfare system typologies I derive following hypotheses from the work of Schierup and others (Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006):

Hypothesis 2a: Liberal welfare states try to avoid state regulation and do not need to put great emphasis on social solidarity since welfare programmes and redistribution rates are small. Hence they have less inclusive integration policies.

Hypothesis 2b: Social democratic welfare states have large welfare programmes and high redistribution rates. Their universalism requires the strongest account of social solidarity hence integration policies are inclusive.

Hypothesis 2c: Conservative welfare states were initially less focused on promoting social solidarity with regard to immigrants, because their welfare systems largely rely on contributions. The failure of differential-exclusion towards guestworkers led them to acknowledge the solidarity towards immigrants needs to be promoted hence their integration policies increasingly became more inclusive over time.

Hypothesis 2d: Southern welfare states, being newer countries of immigration too, are expected to act similar than Conservative welfare states, but more extreme, since their integration policies and welfare systems do not have the same long-standing history.

The arguments crucially rest on two presumptions, which do not appear to be questionable to me: First, immigration cannot be controlled in a way that countries actually can avoid immigration for a long period entirely. If zero-immigration was a possible alternative, some countries might prefer that. There are a lot of reasons why this is not the case, say economic needs, population shrinking, or simply a government's inability to control its borders entirely (Boswell/Geddes 2011; Castles/Miller 2009). Second, the retrenchment of

welfare programmes is not desirable for governments. As I have shown in the section on welfare systems, this presumption can be generally supported (Pierson 1998).

VI. Analysis: Welfare system foundations of integration policy

In this chapter I will provide bivariate analyses of welfare system indicators and typologies. First I need to operationalize the hypothesis of large and redistributive welfare systems causing inclusive integration policies in order to analyse the causal relationship via bivariate analysis. As a second step, I will analyse whether welfare system types can explain divergent integration policies and policy change.

1. Indicators

For the bivariate analysis of welfare system indicators and MIPEX results I use following data provided by the OECD (OECD 2011b; 2011c):

1. Total public social expenditure: Sum of all expenditure taken by public institutions for social purposes, including expenditure for the areas of old-age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, family, health, active labour market policies, unemployment, housing, and a residual category of other social expenditure (OECD 2011b: 90);
2. Public pension expenditure (in cash, including the categories pensions and survivors);
3. Public expenditure towards income support to the working age (in cash, not including active labour market policy spending);
4. Public health expenditure;
5. Summarised other expenditure towards public social services (including services to elderly and disabled people, families, housing, active labour market policies etc.; OECD 2011b: 21);

These variables describe the size of public welfare systems compared to the GDP. Thus, the higher the score of the variable, the more integration policies are expected to be inclusive / show high scores in the MIPEX data. Furthermore, we may distinguish between service and in-cash expenditure. While Conservative welfare systems focus rather on in-cash benefits, Social-democratic welfare systems usually provide larger service-oriented benefits (Jensen 2008). Notably health expenditure usually diverge only little in OECD countries (ibidem). Thus I do not expect the health variable to reveal differences of integration policy.

6. Means-tested benefits as percentage of total public social expenditure;
7. Social expenditure taken and at private and voluntary level (expressed as a percentage of GDP);
8. The percentage of private voluntary and mandatory social expenditure in total social expenditure;

These variables describe self-reliance and the residual function of the public welfare system. If large parts of the public welfare system are based on a means-test, self-reliance is greater than in a welfare system based on universalism. According to Korpi and Palme private social expenditures take place to a larger extent in welfare systems with no universal coverage (Korpi/Palme 1998). Thus, I will use private expenditures as a measure of residual public welfare provision and expect them to correlate negatively with MIPEX scores.

9. Recalculated decommodification scores for the year 2002, following the methodology of Esping-Andersen 1990 (Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008);
10. GINI values on income inequality of market incomes;
11. GINI values on disposable incomes (market income - taxes + public transfer benefits);
12. The redistributive effect of public redistribution: $(10. - 11.) / (10.)$;
13. Poverty rates based on gross market incomes, at 50 per cent of the median income (=pre-redistribution);
14. Poverty rates based on disposable incomes, at 50 per cent of the median income (=post-redistribution);
15. Poverty reduction effect: $(13. - 14.) / (13.)$;

These variables describe redistributive effects of public welfare and taxation systems. Redistribution will be measured as the degree to which a person can refrain from “selling” his or her labour power on the market (9.), as a factor changing income inequality (12.), and reducing poverty (15.). Furthermore integration might correspond to the post-redistribution poverty rates and GINI values. The pre-redistribution variables are not necessarily expected to correlate with integration policy, since they do not directly involve the welfare state.

All data of the variables on welfare systems date in two or three years before the MIPEX data they are compared with. Hence MIPEX scores from 2007 are compared to welfare

system data of 2004 or 2005 (variables 6.-8.) and MIPeX scores from 2010 are compared to data from 2007. For redistribution and poverty reduction the OECD refers to the date to the date as “mid-2000” and “late-2000” (OECD 2011c). Thus the delay is about two to three years. The only recent available data on decommodification dates in 2002 and hence has a five-year delay and will be compared to the 2007 MIPeX results only. Including a delaying effect in the analysis is based on two reasons: First, for these years the OECD offers more complete data not based on estimates. Second, since I argue that welfare systems are a causal factor of integration policy development, I need to provide a time lag for the effect to occur. To increase the number of observations I include the 2007 and the 2010 MIPeX data in one bivariate analysis model, having then 34 instead of 17 observations (King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 221-3).

1.1. Welfare system indicators and overall integration policy

Correlations of welfare system indicators and overall integration policy					
		Overall score without EDU	LMM/FR/LTR combined	AN/AD combined	Overall score without EDU and PP
Public social expenditure	Pearson Correlation	0,185	0,299	0,137	0,261
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,295	0,086	0,438	0,137
	N	34	34	34	34
Pension	Pearson Correlation	-0,124	0,081	-0,02	0,041
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,484	0,647	0,913	0,819
	N	34	34	34	34
Income support to the working age	Pearson Correlation	0,165	0,09	-0,012	0,052
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,35	0,612	0,946	0,77
	N	34	34	34	34
Health	Pearson Correlation	0,125	0,06	0,292	0,188
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,481	0,735	0,094	0,286
	N	34	34	34	34
Other services	Pearson Correlation	,363*	0,325	0,192	0,306
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,035	0,06	0,276	0,078
	N	34	34	34	34
Means-tested expenditure	Pearson Correlation	-0,085	-0,316	0,187	-0,104
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,634	0,069	0,291	0,559
	N	34	34	34	34
Voluntary private social expenditure	Pearson Correlation	0,248	0,065	,445**	0,271
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,157	0,717	0,008	0,121
	N	34	34	34	34
Percentage of private spending in total spending	Pearson Correlation	-0,078	-0,193	0,064	-0,089
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,66	0,274	0,718	0,617
	N	34	34	34	34
Decommodification 2002	Pearson Correlation	0,415	0,458	0,042	0,301
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,158	0,116	0,891	0,318
	N	13	13	13	13
GINI before redistribution	Pearson Correlation	0,21	0,192	0,339	0,293
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,265	0,311	0,067	0,116
	N	30	30	30	30
GINI after redistribution	Pearson Correlation	0,085	0,063	0,272	0,18
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,631	0,721	0,12	0,309
	N	34	34	34	34
Redistributive effect: income inequality	Pearson Correlation	0,088	0,098	-0,072	0,02
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,643	0,606	0,707	0,915
	N	30	30	30	30
Poverty before redistribution	Pearson Correlation	0,276	,381*	0,285	,388*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,114	0,026	0,102	0,023
	N	34	34	34	34
Poverty after redistribution	Pearson Correlation	0,016	0,09	0,068	0,092
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,929	0,611	0,701	0,604
	N	34	34	34	34
Redistributive effect: poverty	Pearson Correlation	0,247	0,313	0,193	0,298
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,16	0,071	0,274	0,087
	N	34	34	34	34

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Applying a bivariate analysis to various forms of average scores of the MIPEx indices and welfare system indicators provides surprisingly little evidence for the hypothesis on welfare systems influencing integration policy:

In terms of the size of welfare programmes, only the variable “other services” shows a rather weak but significant correlation with the overall score of integration policy. Thus, countries with little expenditure towards services except health tend to have rather exclusive policies and countries with higher expenditure tend to have rather inclusive policies. Noteworthy there is no significant correlation of overall public expenditure and integration policy.

Contrary to my expectation voluntary private expenditure correlate positively with the combined score of Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination. In other words, in countries with little private expenditure Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination policies are more likely to be exclusive than in countries with larger private social expenditure levels. Apart from that, there are no further significant results of variables indicating residual welfare systems.

The variables representing welfare system effects do not show significant correlations at all. This clearly indicates that we cannot confirm the hypothesis of redistribution influencing integration policy inclusiveness. Interestingly, poverty rates before redistribution correlate significantly and positively with the combined Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion, and Long-term Residence score and with the overall score excluding Political Participation and Education. This indicates that integration policy in these areas tends to be inclusive in countries with high poverty rates before redistribution. Since I did not make an argument on a causal relation of these variables, this result does not answer my research question in any way.

However, integration policy inclusiveness per se – taken as a sum of policies in different areas – can neither be explained via total welfare expenditure, nor via income redistribution.

1.2. Welfare system indicators and integration policy areas

Correlations of welfare system indicators and integration policy areas								
		LMM	FR	EDU	PP	LTR	AN	AD
Public social expenditure	Pearson Correlation	0,248	0,25	0,247	-0,189	0,298	0,048	0,217
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,157	0,154	0,339	0,285	0,087	0,788	0,217
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Pension	Pearson Correlation	-0,051	0,223	-0,212	-,659**	0,032	-0,02	-0,015
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,774	0,205	0,415	0	0,856	0,91	0,933
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Income support to the working age	Pearson Correlation	0,104	-0,053	0,39	,483**	0,231	-0,077	0,058
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,56	0,764	0,122	0,004	0,188	0,665	0,747
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Health	Pearson Correlation	0,002	0,181	-0,012	-0,173	-0,056	0,308	0,243
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,99	0,306	0,964	0,329	0,753	0,077	0,167
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Other services	Pearson Correlation	,453**	0,08	,531*	,381*	0,332	0,077	0,292
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,007	0,652	0,028	0,026	0,055	0,665	0,094
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Means-tested expenditure	Pearson Correlation	-0,169	-0,275	-0,469	0,025	-,432*	0,153	0,201
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,339	0,115	0,057	0,89	0,011	0,387	0,255
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Voluntary private social expenditure	Pearson Correlation	0,094	-0,069	0,21	0,029	0,178	,399*	,443**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,597	0,698	0,418	0,872	0,313	0,019	0,009
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Percentage of private spending in total spending	Pearson Correlation	-0,046	-0,289	0,026	0	-0,18	0,121	-0,005
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,797	0,097	0,922	0,999	0,307	0,496	0,979
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Decommodification 2002	Pearson Correlation	0,546	0,284	-0,251	,619*	0,367	-0,058	0,139
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,053	0,346	0,349	0,024	0,218	0,851	0,651
	N	13	13	16	13	13	13	13
GINI before redistribution	Pearson Correlation	0,021	,478**	-0,253	-0,166	-0,073	,398*	0,237
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,91	0,008	0,327	0,381	0,703	0,03	0,207
	N	30	30	17	30	30	30	30
GINI after redistribution	Pearson Correlation	0,001	0,258	0,147	-0,285	-0,151	0,325	0,186
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,994	0,141	0,588	0,102	0,393	0,061	0,291
	N	34	34	16	34	34	34	34
Redistributive effect: income inequality	Pearson Correlation	0,039	0,051	0,247	0,264	0,194	-0,089	-0,044
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,837	0,787	0,339	0,159	0,305	0,64	0,818
	N	30	30	17	30	30	30	30
Poverty before redistribution	Pearson Correlation	0,222	,455**	0,335	-0,263	0,321	0,193	,352*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,207	0,007	0,189	0,132	0,064	0,274	0,041
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Poverty after redistribution	Pearson Correlation	-0,041	0,252	0,003	-0,261	0,01	0,121	0,006
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,819	0,151	0,99	0,136	0,957	0,495	0,974
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Redistributive effect: poverty	Pearson Correlation	0,25	0,271	0,42	-0,062	0,314	0,092	0,278
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,154	0,121	0,093	0,728	0,071	0,606	0,111
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The bivariate analysis of single MIPEx policy areas and indicators on welfare systems provides similar, although more detailed results: Neither the size of public welfare systems nor their redistributive effect may explain integration policy inclusive- or exclusiveness.

The variables on public spending show a few correlations: First, pension expenditure correlate strongly and significant with Political Participation, but in a negative way. Thus, the higher pension expenditure are, the more likely Political Participation policy is exclusive. Income support to the working age shows an adverse effect, correlating positively and significant with Political Participation. As expected health expenditure does not affect integration policies. Similar to the model shown above, other service expenditure show significant positive correlations with Labour Market Mobility, Education and Political Participation policies. In other words, countries with higher public expenditure towards services tend to have inclusive policies in these areas and vice versa.

Confirming the expectations, means-tested programmes reveal a significant negative correlation with Long-term Residence: Countries in which benefits are often based on means-testing have rather exclusive Long-term Residence policies. As already mentioned before, private social expenditure correlate positively and significant with Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination policies.

Variables on redistribution show only one significant and positive correlation: Countries with decommodifying policies are highly likely to have inclusive Political Participation policies. Additionally, the positive correlation of Labour Market Mobility and decommodification is close to the 0,05 significance threshold. All other correlations are weak and not significant. Again, income inequality and poverty before redistribution appear to influence integration policy in terms of Family Reunion, Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination. These observations do not relate to my hypotheses.

1.3. Conclusion

The hypotheses I tested were: Countries with large welfare programmes and high redistributive effects need to put a greater emphasis on the inclusion of immigrants to sustain solidarity and trust than countries that have smaller or less redistributive welfare programmes. As the analysis showed both hypotheses cannot be confirmed: Neither public social expenditure, nor redistribution has effects on integration policy inclusiveness or exclusiveness. I think that the observation of “other services” expenditure influencing integration policy rather reflects different welfare types and their effects on integration policy. Furthermore, Political Participation can be explained better by welfare system

indicators than most other areas of integration policy. Thus the general hypothesis on integration policy maybe should be replaced by hypotheses specified on different areas of integration policy. However, the fact that the hypothesis cannot be confirmed does not entail that there is no causal relation between welfare systems and integration policy. Instead, it is just evident that the relation is not as clear-cut as expected.

2. Typologies

For an analysis of different welfare system types we first need to classify countries in groups representing regime types. According to the typologies presented above, some countries are difficult to classify. Thus, I will count some countries double, representing two regime types:

For the Liberal or Basic Security type only the **United Kingdom** was classified equally in the four presented typologies. **Ireland** is usually classified as a Liberal welfare system, but has catholic imprints that led Siaroff to classify it as a Late Female Mobilization type (McCashin/O'Shea 2008; Siaroff 1994). I decided to classify Ireland as the Liberal type that it represents according to the work of Bonoli (1997), Esping-Andersen (1990) and Korpi/Palme (1998). Albeit similar, I count **Switzerland** both as a Liberal and as a Southern type, because Siaroff (1994) and Bonoli (1997) classify it as a Southern or Late Female Mobilisation type. In the typology of Bonoli Switzerland is classified as a Southern type because its rather low public social expenditures largely rely on social insurance contributions (Bonoli 1997). **Denmark** is usually considered as a Social-democratic type, but its public welfare benefits are rather focused on providing basic security and poverty reduction and do not crowd out private insurance schemes (Green-Pedersen/Baggesen Klitgaard 2008; Korpi/Palme 1998). Thus I count it as a Liberal and Social-democratic type.

For the Social-democratic or Encompassing type **Sweden** and **Norway** are classified easily. As noted above I also include **Denmark**. There are some doubts about **Finland** being a Social-democratic type, because of its comparatively low decommodification rates and a comparatively large share of contributions-related benefits (Bonoli 1997; Kangas/Saari 2008). Thus I count the borderline case as a Social-democratic and Conservative type. Being hybrid welfare systems I count **Belgium** and the **Netherlands** as both Social-democratic and Conservative types (Cantillon/Marx 2008; van Oorschot 2008).

The typologies referred to above cite **France, Germany and Luxembourg** exclusively as Conservative or Corporatist countries. As noted above, I also include **Finland, Belgium** and the **Netherlands**. **Austria** has some Liberal and Social-democratic elements in its welfare system too and comparatively high decommodification rates, but is described by Esping-Andersen as an ideal type of a Conservative welfare system (Esping-Andersen 1998: 44; Heitzmann/Österle 2008).

Southern welfare types are of course similar to Conservative welfare systems, but treated separately in the analysis, since I expect their integration policies to change more significantly than in “older” welfare and immigration countries. Typologies usually include **Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy**. As noted above, I decided to include **Switzerland** too.

Country classification for bivariate analysis

Liberal	Social-Democratic	Conservative	Southern
Denmark Ireland Switzerland United Kingdom	Belgium Denmark Finland Netherlands Norway Sweden	Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Luxembourg Netherlands	Greece Italy Portugal Spain Switzerland

I include these groups as dummy variables (receiving scores of 0 and 1) into the bivariate analysis of integration policy area scores. For this operationalization it does not matter that some countries are classified double. Again I include the 2007 and 2010 data in a single correlation model. Positive correlation scores indicate that a certain welfare type tends to have inclusive policies and negative correlations indicate exclusive policies. After comparing welfare system types with integration policy scores I want to show that there are strong correlations of welfare system types and TCN employment, suggesting that welfare states are an independent variable explaining both integration policy and integration outcomes, at least as far as labour market participation is concerned.

2.1. Welfare system types and integration policy

Correlations of welfare system types and overall integration policy					
		Overall except EDU	LMM/FR/LTR combined	AN/AD combined	Overall except EDU and PP
Liberal welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-,389*	-,535**	-0,198	-,441**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,023	0,001	0,261	0,009
	N	34	34	34	34
Social-democratic welfare system	Pearson Correlation	,485**	,414*	0,243	,388*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,004	0,015	0,167	0,023
	N	34	34	34	34
Conservative welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-0,065	-0,133	0,009	-0,079
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,715	0,455	0,959	0,657
	N	34	34	34	34
Southern welfare system	Pearson Correlation	0,115	,343*	0,028	0,231
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,518	0,047	0,877	0,188
	N	34	34	34	34
Conservative or Southern welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-0,153	0,012	-0,157	-0,074
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,389	0,948	0,377	0,679
	N	34	34	34	34

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations of welfare system types and integration policy areas								
		LMM	FR	EDU	PP	LTR	AN	AD
Liberal welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-,353*	-,630**	-0,256	0,01	-,410*	-0,156	-0,223
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,041	0	0,321	0,954	0,016	0,38	0,206
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Social-democratic welfare system	Pearson Correlation	,440**	0,202	,637**	,569**	,478**	0,142	0,321
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,009	0,251	0,006	0	0,004	0,423	0,064
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Conservative welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-0,176	-0,078	-0,058	0,009	-0,084	0,001	0,017
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,321	0,659	0,826	0,96	0,638	0,995	0,926
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Southern welfare system	Pearson Correlation	0,197	,429*	-0,09	-,361*	0,27	0,056	-0,003
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,264	0,011	0,73	0,036	0,123	0,755	0,987
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34
Conservative or Southern welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-0,102	0,153	-0,206	-,361*	-0,032	-0,08	-0,219
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,568	0,386	0,427	0,036	0,855	0,653	0,214
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Contrary to the model of welfare system indicators, the bivariate analysis of welfare types shows that there are some strong significant correlations of welfare types and integration policies with the exception of Anti-discrimination and Access to Nationality policies: In these areas I do not find significant correlations in any welfare type, thus these areas cannot be accounted for arguments of welfare systems causing different integration policies:

Liberal welfare systems correlate in a negative way and significantly with all variables of overall integration policy, except for the combined score of Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination. Furthermore, the areas of Labour Market Mobility and Long-term Residence show significant and medium-sized negative correlations and Family Reunion a strong significant negative correlation. Thus we can conclude that Liberal welfare states have exclusive Family Reunion; Labour Market Mobility and Long-term Residence policies and an overall tendency towards exclusion in all areas except Political Participation.

Social-democratic welfare systems show positive correlations in all areas and overall scores, although not significant for Anti-discrimination, Access to Nationality and Family Reunion. While most correlations are moderate, those for Education and Political Participation are fairly strong. In sum, I conclude that Social-democratic welfare systems have inclusive integration policies, being a counterpart to Liberal welfare systems.

As expected **Conservative welfare systems** lie somewhere in-between and thus show no correlations. To identify characteristics of Conservative welfare systems and their integration policy a different method needs to be applied. **Southern welfare systems** show significant and moderately positive correlations with the combined Labour Market Mobility, Long-term Residence, and Family Reunion score, because of the latter. Furthermore Political Participation policy shows a significant moderately negative correlation with Southern and Southern or Conservative welfare systems. In order to reveal more distinctive information on Conservative and Southern welfare systems I suggest measuring the distance to average scores of integration policy variables and MIPEx score change.

Correlations of welfare system types and average integration policy scores									
		LMM	FR	EDU	PP	LTR	AN	AD	Overall except EDU
Liberal welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-,174	,307	-0,024	-,337	,445**	-,012	,244	-,013
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,326	,077	0,926	,051	,008	,946	,165	,940
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34	34
Social-democratic welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-,048	-,092	0,09	,035	-,186	-,007	-,086	,092
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,786	,603	0,73	,846	,293	,970	,628	,603
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34	34
Conservative welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-,062	-,618**	-0,126	,104	-,307	-,252	-,047	-,203
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,727	,000	0,629	,560	,077	,150	,790	,249
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34	34
Southern welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-,002	,307	-0,145	,019	-,106	,172	-,190	,038
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,991	,077	0,578	,916	,550	,330	,283	,829
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34	34
Conservative or Southern welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-,109	-,282	-0,342	,006	-,278	-,067	,013	-,037
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,538	,106	0,179	,972	,112	,707	,941	,834
	N	34	34	17	34	34	34	34	34


** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Looking at distances to average scores of integration policy areas, I expect Conservative and Southern welfare states to show strong negative correlations indicating integration policy scores close to average. The other welfare systems are expected to show positive and low correlation scores. The findings suggest that only with regard to Family Reunion **Conservative welfare systems** have averagely inclusive policies. Furthermore, **Liberal welfare systems** show a moderate and positive significant correlation with Long-term Residence. This indicates that they have either very inclusive or very exclusive policies of Long-term Residence. Based on the tables above we know that Long-term Residence policies in Liberal welfare systems are predominantly exclusive. Surprisingly, all other variables show low and/or insignificant correlations.

2.2. Welfare system types and integration policy change

For an analysis of integration policies changing over the period of 2007 to 2010 with respect to different welfare system types I suggest to look first at the figures of integration policy change I presented in the third chapter:



We can see clearly that Southern and Conservative welfare systems changed their policies mostly towards inclusion, while Social-democratic and Liberal welfare systems do not share this trend. The bivariate analysis presented below shows that there are surprisingly few significant correlations of welfare systems and integration policy change:

Correlations of welfare system types and integration policy change								
		LMM change	FR change	PP change	LTR change	AN change	AD change	Overall score change
Liberal welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-0,106	-0,131	-0,238	-0,467	-0,359	,485*	-0,425
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,687	0,617	0,357	0,059	0,157	0,048	0,089
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Social-democratic welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-0,22	-0,331	-0,359	0,203	-0,185	0,172	-0,115
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,397	0,194	0,157	0,434	0,476	0,508	0,659
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Conservative welfare system	Pearson Correlation	-0,044	0,115	-0,176	0,212	0,164	0,039	0,188
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,867	0,659	0,5	0,415	0,529	0,883	0,471
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Southern welfare system	Pearson Correlation	0,388	0,265	,491*	0,211	0,25	-0,354	0,365
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,124	0,305	0,045	0,415	0,334	0,164	0,149
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Conservative or Southern welfare system	Pearson Correlation	0,247	0,373	0,267	0,43	0,372	-0,37	,500*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,338	0,141	0,301	0,085	0,141	0,144	0,041
	N	17	17	17	17	17	17	17

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The results indicate that **Liberal welfare systems** changed their policies mostly towards exclusion, except for Anti-discrimination, but correlation scores are partly low and only the positive correlation of Anti-discrimination policy is below the 0,05 significance threshold.

For Long-term Residence and overall policy changes correlations are moderate and negative, but slightly above the 0,05 threshold and thus not valid. For **Social-democratic welfare systems** the analysis does not provide noteworthy outcomes. Anyway, my primary interest concerns Conservative and Southern welfare systems. As the correlation scores show the results are far less clear-cut as one might expect: Correlations for **Conservative welfare systems** and integration policy change are far from significant and thus not valid. **Southern welfare systems** show a moderate positive and significant correlation only in the area of Political Participation, whereas all other areas mostly have positive correlations that are not significant. However, these results do not disconfirm the hypothesis of Southern and Conservative welfare systems changing their policies towards inclusion, because they are mostly not significant. Instead, the strong positive and significant correlation of the variable “**Southern or Conservative welfare system**” and overall policy change suggests that exactly this is the case: In general terms, countries that have a Southern or Conservative welfare system are more likely to change their integration policy towards inclusion than Liberal or Social-democratic welfare systems.

2.3. Welfare system types and TCN labour market participation

Correlations of welfare system types and TCN labour market participation					
		Liberal welfare system	Social-democratic welfare system	Conservative welfare system	Southern welfare system
Employment of TCNs	Pearson Correlation	0,346	-0,429	-,703**	,573*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,174	0,086	0,002	0,016
	N	17	17	17	17
Employment of citizens	Pearson Correlation	0,302	0,469	-0,105	-0,461
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,239	0,057	0,688	0,062
	N	17	17	17	17
Employment ratio	Pearson Correlation	0,174	-,612**	-,630**	,766**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,504	0,009	0,007	0
	N	17	17	17	17
Unemployment of TCNs	Pearson Correlation	-0,416	0,404	,636**	-0,414
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,109	0,121	0,008	0,111
	N	16	16	16	16
Unemployment of citizens	Pearson Correlation	-,506*	-0,062	0,13	0,441
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,045	0,818	0,632	0,087
	N	16	16	16	16
Unemployment ratio	Pearson Correlation	-0,05	0,257	0,466	-,596*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,855	0,337	0,069	0,015
	N	16	16	16	16

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The bivariate analysis of labour market participation of TCNs and welfare systems reveals high correlation levels, indicating that distinctive elements of welfare systems are closely related to TCNs employment: While in **Social-democratic and Conservative welfare systems** TCNs are far less likely to be employed than citizens than in Liberal or Southern welfare systems, in the latter they are more likely to be employed, in fact they have higher participation rates than citizens. These correlations are strong and significant. Furthermore, in **Southern welfare systems** TCNs are less likely to be unemployed than citizens compared to other countries. **Liberal welfare systems** lie somewhere in-between, showing no noteworthy results. In comparison with the bivariate analysis of integration policy and labour market participation it appears that welfare systems have a larger impact on TCNs employment than integration policy. I do not want to stretch this observation too far, but I want to notice that employment statistics can provide strong arguments of the importance of welfare systems to immigrant integration (Boswell/Geddes 2011: 218-21).

2.4. Conclusion

Contrarily to the analysis of welfare system indicator the analysis of welfare regimes underlying integration policy development provided results that largely confirm my hypotheses:

For **Liberal welfare regimes** I argued that they have less inclusive integration policies because their welfare programmes are small and less redistributive and they avoid state intervention if possible (hypothesis 2a). The result for overall integration policies confirms the hypothesis, based on exclusive Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion and Long-term Residence policies. While Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination did not provide valid results in the bivariate analysis, which was the case for all welfare types, Political Participation counters this tendency in Liberal welfare systems: In terms of Political Participation Liberal welfare systems tend to have inclusive policies. However, integration policy in sum, including all areas analysed by MIPEX tends to be exclusive in Liberal welfare regimes, hence hypothesis 2a can be confirmed.

Social-democratic welfare regimes were expected to have inclusive integration policies because of their universalism and their large and redistributive welfare programmes (hypothesis 2b). The bivariate analysis showed that integration policies in these countries tend to be generally inclusive, especially concerning Labour Market Mobility, Education, Political Participation, and Long-term Residence. Contrary to the expectation Family

Reunion policies do not contribute to the overall inclusiveness of Social-democratic integration policy, at least not much. This does not change the fact, that there is an overall tendency towards inclusion in Social-democratic welfare systems, thus hypothesis 2b can be confirmed too.

In hypothesis 2c I argued that integration policy of **Conservative welfare regimes** was initially less inclusive or close to average, but becoming more inclusive over time. The bivariate models analysing the correlations of welfare systems and integration policies and welfare systems and integration policy change did not provide many valid results for Conservative welfare systems: In fact, we only know that Family Reunion policies are close to the average of all analysed countries. Furthermore, both Conservative and Southern welfare systems together tended to change their policies within the period of 2007-2010, but this result is rather caused by the Southern welfare systems. All other areas of integration policy, and most importantly the overall scores of Conservative welfare systems' integration policy did not provide valid results in the analysis, thus I believe the hypothesis should be rejected: If there were a tendency towards inclusion over time, the analysis would have provided valid results. Instead, integration policies of Conservative welfare systems appear not to be commensurable.

Hypothesis 2d stated that integration policies of **Southern welfare regimes** are becoming more inclusive over time. The findings suggest that this is the case, but not as clear cut as expected: In terms of Labour Market Mobility, Long-term Residence and especially Family Reunion, Southern welfare systems generally tend to have inclusive policies. The contrary can be said about Political Participation, which tends to be exclusive. Crucially, it is exactly this area in which the policy change model showed a significant result: Political Participation policy is becoming inclusive over time, at least for the period of 2007-2010. In other words, Southern welfare systems were catching up in exactly that area, where they generally had exclusive policies. Furthermore, the combined analysis of Southern and Conservative welfare systems showed a tendency of integration policy towards inclusion. However, with some caution I can confirm hypothesis 2d.

VII. Conclusion

Before summarising my findings I want to remind of the high level of abstraction and generalisation in this work. Already in the MIPEX framework actual policies are evaluated of their inclusive or exclusive effects on immigrant integration. Eventually they are given scores representing inclusiveness and compliance with EU legislation, international conventions and policy recommendations. These scores are then summarised to scores of policy areas, which I analysed eventually. Thus, the findings on integration policy divergence alone are highly generalised. When these are compared to welfare system typologies and indicators, another large issue of generalisation comes into play. As I have noted, the issue of commensurable welfare types itself is subject to a lot of academic disagreement. If these are taken as a measurement of independent variables for explaining the MIPEX results, we sort of multiply the generalising effect inherent in the variables. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to argue that there factually is a causal relationship of welfare systems and integration policy in every single policy. This implies that whatever conclusions I draw, they represent just general tendencies of integration policy configurations and welfare system structures underlying it.

The case-by-case, bivariate and cluster-analysis of integration policy in chapter three revealed that national integration policies are fairly individual in their inclusive and exclusive effects, making it difficult to identify common features of national policy configurations. In short, I suggested that if a country does not have inclusive policies throughout, the areas of Long-term Residence, Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion, and to some extent Education are often similarly inclusive or exclusive. Spain, Austria and Ireland provide good examples for this observation. The same can be said for Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination, with the examples of Switzerland, France and Norway. Political Participation was argued to be a rather independent issue. The cluster analysis models did not provide convincing results hence it is difficult to identify groups of countries with similar policies. In sum, there remains a highly diffuse picture of national differences and commonalities in the area of immigrant integration policy. This confirms the expectation of individual policy approaches towards immigrant integration.

Given the idiosyncratic nature of national integration policies that was suggested in theory and found in the comparative analysis on policy inclusiveness and exclusiveness it is surprising that welfare regime types can explain integration policy considerably well. But first I would like to focus on welfare system indicators again: In the analytical chapter on

welfare system indicators I concluded that both the hypothesis on welfare expenditures and the hypothesis on welfare system redistribution cannot explain integration policy inclusiveness. The variables on public spending and on redistributive effects did not provide significant results, implying that some welfare systems with large spending and redistribution levels have sometimes inclusive and sometimes exclusive integration policies. In the same way, countries with little welfare programmes and small redistributive effects have inclusive or exclusive policies. Interestingly, the variable of Political Participation, which I argued to be rather independent from other areas of integration policy, provided some significant results: Political Participation policy tends to be inclusive in countries with low pension expenditure, high income supports to the working age, high service expenditures except health and high decommodification rates. As already mentioned I did not specify my hypotheses to single areas of integration policy. If I did that, I could conclude that countries with large welfare systems not directed towards the elderly have inclusive policies of Political Participation. Looking at overall integration policy, however, I have to conclude that the size and redistributive effect of welfare systems does not influence integration policy inclusiveness.

Except for the Conservative welfare types, the hypotheses derived from the work of Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen and Stephen Castles (2006) on welfare regimes influencing integration policy were confirmed. In this context the areas of Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination did not play an important role. As already mentioned, the analysed countries are likely to have similar scores on these variables. This means that they are both either low, average or high and not that scores are similar across countries. Although I found some effects of private social expenditures influencing these areas, the welfare regime analysis could not explain Access to Nationality and Anti-discrimination policy inclusiveness. Thus, I suggest that these variables can be left aside for arguments on welfare system effects on integration policy. Despite being rather independent from other integration policy areas, Political Participation policy is distinctly inclusive in Social-democratic welfare systems and exclusive in Southern welfare systems. Thus, against the implication from the bivariate analysis of integration policy consistency, Political Participation policies can be explained well by welfare regime types. As expected, Long-term Residence, Labour Market Mobility, Family Reunion and Education policies have similar welfare system foundations with Liberal welfare regimes having exclusive policies (not significant for Education) and Social-democratic regimes having inclusive policies

(not significant for Family Reunion). Family Reunion is instead most inclusive in Southern welfare regimes.

Finally, I would like to propose three arguments for further analysis on the issue of welfare system structures causing different integration policies:

First, in the analysis of the relation between Family Reunion policies and welfare system indicators I found the surprising result that inequality pre-redistribution and not post-redistribution might explain Family Reunion inclusiveness. For an analysis of welfare system causes of integration policy inclusiveness this result appears useless at the first glance. In chapter two I argued that the MIPEX framework provides a very broad concept of integration, including areas - like Family Reunion - that are not included in other concepts, but treated separately (Boswell/Geddes 2011). If we distinguish between immigration policy and integration/immigrant policy we might very likely subsume Family Reunion under immigration policy (*ibidem*; Freeman 2006: 228). Diane Sainsbury showed in her analysis that immigrants' social rights and thus to some extent integration policy inclusiveness depend on welfare regimes and immigration policy regimes (Sainsbury 2006). Thus we might argue that Family Reunion policies are not extraordinarily inclusive in high-redistributive Social-democratic and well-developed Conservative welfare regimes, because it is not a matter of immigrant integration, but of governing access and thus a matter of immigration policy. Then it would not surprise that countries with high demands for low-skilled workers like Italy or Spain have inclusive Family Reunion policies (see chapter two; Schierup/Hansen/Castles 2006: 163-93). However, for an analysis of immigration and integration policy inclusiveness the MIPEX data lacks information on most areas of immigration policy, like border control or the granting of visas. Thus, if we want to apply a quantitative cross-country empirical analysis on this issue, other data needs to be scrutinised.

Second, why are the results for welfare system indicators and typologies so different? Since I rejected the hypotheses that welfare systems with large expenditure levels and high redistribution rates cause inclusive integration policies the hypotheses on welfare system types lose their relevance: Why, if not for the reasons of welfare system size and redistribution would different welfare regimes have different integration policies? I think that the mismatch of the findings on welfare system indicators and welfare system typologies may have two causes: One argument might be that countries reflecting certain welfare types do not inhibit some characteristics they are expected to: For example, the

ideal-type of a Social-democratic welfare system per se, Sweden, would have high rates of redistribution and low voluntary private social expenditures according to Esping-Andersen (1990) and Korpi/Palme (1998), because its public welfare system crowded out private programmes. In contrast, the OECD data revealed that voluntary private social expenditures are above average of the selected countries in Sweden and the redistributive effect of the public welfare system is only little above average. Hence, it seems that there is a discrepancy of welfare types and welfare system indicators. Looking at GINI pre-redistribution and post-redistribution data we see why Sweden's public welfare system has just average redistributive effects: Its pre-redistribution inequality is fairly low, thus in order to achieve equally low rates of income inequalities post-redistribution the Swedish welfare system does not have to redistribute that much as, for example, Belgium's welfare system. In this context the argued discrepancy of indicators and welfare types diminishes. However, the question whether welfare systems changed over time and thus do not represent the ideal types they did in the 1980ies cannot be answered here. The observation of Swedish redistribution and income equality leads to a second argument: Low income inequality rates indicate that Sweden has the egalitarian society Esping-Andersen (1990; 1998: 45) speaks of despite its only average redistribution rates. Hence, not redistribution and welfare system size might cause different integration policies, but the objective of welfare systems might. In other words, aiming to achieve an egalitarian society, Social-democratic welfare systems have inclusive integration policies, because these policies contribute to achieving this form of society. In Liberal welfare systems state non-intervention and market obedience do not push for inclusive policies. Conservative welfare systems are not opposed to state regulation, but not focused on equality as much as Social-democratic ones. Accordingly, their integration policy would be averagely inclusive. Implications for Southern European countries would be less clear since their welfare systems are less developed. Hence, integration policies would rather have different causes in these countries. The argument of welfare system types' different objectives underlying integration policy was partially included in my analysis, but this issue could of course be analysed in a more detailed fashion.

Third, there is no evident reason why other possible causes of inclusive or exclusive integration policies should not be included in the analysis of welfare systems as a causal factor of integration policy divergence. It can hardly be argued that welfare systems are the only factor underlying integration policy. Furthermore, countries that did not fit well in my analysis, for example Austria, Denmark or France would require a consideration of other

causes. In this context, I suggest that party systems and the role of far-right parties might provide a fruitful explanation of integration policy exclusiveness. A combined analysis of political parties and welfare systems as explanatory variables of integration policy might then provide a more complete picture on foundations of immigrant integration policy.

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IX. Annex

1. MIPEX 2011 indicators

List of MIPEX indicators, (MIPEX 2011: 212-3)	
1. LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY	
1.1 Access	1. Immediate access to employment, 2. Access to private sector, 3. Access to public sector, 4. Immediate access to self-employment, 5. Access to self-employment;
1.2 Access to general support	6. Public employment services, 7. Education and vocational training, 8. Recognition of qualifications;
1.3 Targeted support	9. State facilitates recognition of qualifications, 10. Measures for economic integration of third-country nationals, 11. Measures for economic integration of migrant youth and women, 12. Support to access public employment services;
1.4 Workers' rights	13. Accessing trade unions, 14. Accessing social security, 15. Working conditions, 16. Information policy;
2. FAMILY REUNION	
2.1 Eligibility	17. Time and documents considered, 18. Partners and age limits, 19. Minor children, 20. Dependent relatives, 21. Dependent adult children;
2.2 Conditions for acquisition of status	22. Pre-departure integration conditions, 23. Upon arrival integration conditions, 24. Accommodation, 25. Economic resources, 26. Maximum duration, 27. Costs;
2.3 Security of status	28. Duration of validity, 29. Grounds for rejection, withdrawal, refusal, 30. Personal circumstances considered, 31. Legal protections;
2.4 Rights associated with status	32. Autonomous permit for partners and children, 33. In case of widowhood, divorce, death, violence, 34. For other family members, 35. Access to education and training, 36. Employment and self-employment, 37. Social benefits;
3. EDUCATION	
3.1 Access	38. Accessing pre-primary education, 39. Compulsory education as a legal right, 40. Assessment of prior learning, 41. Support to access secondary education, 42. Accessing vocational training, 43. Accessing higher education,

	44. Advice and guidance;
3.2 Targeting needs	45. Induction programmes, 46. Support in language(s) of instruction, 47. Pupil monitoring, 48. Educational situation of migrant pupils, 49. Teacher training;
3.3 New opportunities	50. Option to learn immigrant languages, 51. Immigrant cultures, 52. Promoting integration and monitoring segregation, 53. Measures to support parents and communities;
3.4 Intercultural education for all	54. Inclusion in school curriculum, 55. State supports information initiatives, 56. Modifying curricula to reflect diversity, 57. Adapting daily life, 58. Bringing migrants into the staff, 59. Teacher training;
4. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	
4.1 Electoral rights	60. Right to vote in national elections, 61. Regional elections, 62. Local elections, 63. Right to stand in local elections;
4.2 Political liberties	64. Right to association, 65. Political parties, 66. Creating media;
4.3 Consultative bodies	67. Consultation at national level, 68. Regional level, 69. Capital city level, 70. Local city level;
4.4 Implementation policies	71. Information policy, 72. Public funding/support for national immigrant bodies, 73. For regional immigrant bodies, 74. At local level in capital city, 75. At local level in city;
5. LONG-TERM RESIDENCE	
5.1 Eligibility	76. Required time of residence and documents considered, 77. Counting time as pupil/student, 78. Periods of prior-absence allowed;
5.2 Conditions for acquisition of status	79. Language and integration conditions, 80. Economic resources, 81. Duration of procedure, 82. Costs;
5.3 Security of status	83. Duration of validity, 84. Renewable permit, 85. Periods of absence, 86. Grounds for rejection, withdrawal or refusal, 87. Personal circumstances considered before expulsion, 88. Expulsion precluded, 89. Legal protections;
5.4 Rights associated with status	90. Residence after retirement, 91. Working and conditions, 92. Social benefits, 93. Recognition of qualifications;
6. ACCESS TO NATIONALITY	
6.1. Eligibility	94. Time of residence for first generation immigrants, 95. Periods of absence,

	96. Partners/spouses of nationals, 97. Birthright citizenship for second generation, 98. For third generation;
6.2 Conditions for acquisition	99. Language, 100. Citizenship/integration, 101. Economic resources, 102. Criminal record, 103. Good character, 104. Maximum duration of procedure, 105. Costs;
6.3 Security of status	106. Additional grounds for refusal, 107. Discretionary powers in refusal, 108. Personal circumstances considered before refusal, 109. Legal protections, 110. Grounds for withdrawal, 111. Time limits for withdrawal, 112. Statelessness;
6.4 Dual nationality	113. Dual nationality for first generation, 114. For second/third generations;
7. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION	
7.1 Definitions and concepts	115. Definition includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, instruction to discriminate, 116. Discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics, 117. Applies to natural and legal persons, 118. Applies to public sector, 119. Legal prohibitions, 120. Freedom of association restricted when impeding equality, 121. Multiple discrimination;
7.2 Fields of application	122. Anti-discrimination law covers employment and vocational training on grounds of race and ethnicity, religion and belief, and nationality, 123. Education, 124. Social protection including social security, 125. Social advantages, 126. Access to and supply of public goods and services, including housing, 127. Including health;
7.3 Enforcement mechanisms	128. Procedures available, 129. Alternative dispute resolution, 130. Grounds, 131. Duration, 132. Burden of proof, 133. Situation testing and statistical data, 134. Victimisation, 135. State assistance, 136. Role of legal entities, 137. Range of legal actions, 138. Sanctions, 139. Discriminatory motivation;
7.4. Equality policies	140. Specialised equality agency established, 141. Assists victims, 142. Acts as a quasi-judicial body, 143. Has legal standing, 144. Can instigate proceedings, lead investigations, enforce findings, 145. State disseminates information and facilitates dialogue, 146. Mechanisms ensure compliance at national level with dedicated

	government units, 147. Public bodies promote equality in functions and contracts, 148. Positive action;
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2. MIPEX scores 2007/2010

MIPEX scores by country, 2007/2010, (MIPEX2011)								
	Labour Market Mobility		Family Reunion		Political Participation		Long-term Residence	
Country	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010
Austria	43,8	56,3	43,3	40,8	32,5	32,5	54,2	58,3
Belgium	52,7	52,7	70,4	68,3	61,0	58,5	64,1	78,7
Denmark	63,8	73,1	36,8	37,0	66,3	61,9	63,9	65,8
Finland	71,0	71,0	69,8	69,8	86,9	86,9	58,5	58,5
France	48,8	48,8	52,8	51,6	43,5	43,5	45,6	45,6
Germany	76,9	76,9	62,1	60,2	64,4	64,4	50,3	50,1
Greece	44,6	49,6	47,1	49,2	25,0	39,6	56,1	56,3
Ireland	42,3	39,2	35,8	33,8	78,8	78,8	42,6	42,6
Italy	69,0	69,0	77,7	73,5	49,8	49,8	69,2	65,6
Luxembourg	44,6	47,7	53,3	66,7	76,0	77,7	56,8	55,8
Netherlands	85,4	85,4	59,3	57,6	79,4	79,4	67,9	67,9
Norway	76,3	73,1	72,1	67,5	93,8	93,8	61,1	61,1
Portugal	80,2	93,8	88,5	90,6	69,0	70,2	55,2	68,5
Spain	79,4	84,4	76,3	84,6	55,8	55,8	71,6	77,5
Sweden	100,0	100,0	88,5	84,4	75,0	75,0	77,7	77,7
Switzerland	52,5	52,5	39,8	39,8	58,1	58,8	41,4	41,4
United Kingdom	55,4	55,4	56,3	53,8	52,5	52,5	74,1	31,5
Minimum	42,3	39,2	35,8	33,8	25,0	32,5	41,4	31,5
Average	63,9	66,4	60,6	60,5	62,8	63,5	59,4	59,0
Maximum	100,0	100,0	88,5	90,6	93,8	93,8	77,7	78,7

MIPEX scores by country, 2007/2010, (MIPEX2011)							
	Access to Nationality		Anti-discrimination		Average (without Education)		Education
Country	2007	2010	2007	2010	2007	2010	2010
Austria	21,6	21,6	40,0	40,0	39,2	42,0	44,4
Belgium	68,6	68,6	69,5	78,7	64,4	68,0	65,7
Denmark	33,1	33,1	41,7	46,5	50,9	53,0	51,4
Finland	54,3	56,8	76,6	78,0	69,5	70,0	63,5
France	59,0	59,0	74,5	77,0	54,0	54,0	28,9
Germany	52,0	59,2	47,9	47,9	58,9	60,0	43,2
Greece	18,3	56,8	49,7	49,7	40,1	50,0	42,2
Ireland	60,0	58,2	54,5	62,8	52,3	53,0	24,6
Italy	64,6	62,9	61,6	61,6	65,3	64,0	40,6
Luxembourg	34,3	66,4	46,5	47,6	51,9	60,0	51,7
Netherlands	65,1	65,6	67,5	67,5	70,8	71,0	50,7
Norway	40,7	40,7	59,4	59,4	67,2	66,0	63,0
Portugal	82,0	82,0	83,8	83,8	76,4	81,0	63,1

Spain	38,6	38,6	48,7	48,7	61,7	65,0	48,1
Sweden	79,3	79,3	87,7	87,7	84,7	84,0	77,4
Switzerland	35,5	35,5	30,6	30,6	43,0	43,0	44,6
United Kingdom	75,2	59,3	81,5	86,1	65,8	56,0	57,7
Minimum	18,3	21,6	30,6	30,6	39,2	42,0	24,6
Average	51,9	55,5	60,1	62,0	59,8	61,2	50,6
Maximum	82,0	82,0	87,7	87,7	84,7	84,0	77,4

3. Foreign-born residents as part of the population

Foreign born as percentage of total population			
	2000	2005	2009
Austria	10.4	14.5	15.5
Belgium	10.3	12.1	9.1*
Denmark	5.8	6.5	7.5
Finland	2.6	3.4	4.4
France	10.1	11.0	11.6
Germany	12.5	12.6	12.9
Greece	10.3***	10.3	8.3*
Ireland	8.7	12.6	17.2
Italy	3.9***	4.2**	6.5*
Luxembourg	33.2	35.0	36.9
Netherlands	10.1	10.6	11.1
Norway	6.8	8.2	10.9
Portugal	5.1	6.3	6.3
Spain	4.9	11.1	14.3
Sweden	11.3	12.5	14.4
Switzerland	21.9	23.8	26.3
United Kingdom	7.9	9.4	11.3
Average (median)	10,1	11,0	11,3

(OECD 2011a; own calculations, *data taken from MIPEX 2011, **data taken from MIPEX 2007, indicates rates of TCNs, ***scores are for 2001)

4. Labour market participation of TCNs

TCN employment and unemployment, second quarter 2006						
	Employment			Unemployment		
Country	TCNs	Citizens	Ratio TCN/citizen	TCNs	Citizens	Ratio TCN/citizen
Austria	59,6	70,8	0,84	11,7	4,2	2,79
Belgium	33,1	61,5	0,54	32,4	7,6	4,26
Denmark	65	77,3	0,84	12,2	3,9	3,13
Finland	48	70,2	0,68	29,2	8,8	3,32
France	42,9	63,8	0,67	23,2	8,3	2,8
Germany	47,9	68,5	0,7	23	9,5	2,42
Greece	70,8	60,6	1,17	7,4	9	0,82
Ireland	58,6	58,9	0,99	8,1	4,1	1,98
Italy	52,9	57,9	0,91	*	*	

Luxembourg	47,3	60,9	0,78	21,1	3,1	6,81
Netherlands	46,6	75	0,62	12,2	3,7	3,3
Norway	56,9	75,5	0,75	13,1	3,8	3,45
Portugal	72,6	68	1,07	10,4	7,6	1,37
Spain	71,9	63,9	1,13	12,2	8,1	1,51
Sweden	46,4	74	0,63	22,9	7,8	2,94
Switzerland	64,3	78,7	0,82	14,1	3,3	4,27
United Kingdom	62,3	71,7	0,87	9,8	5,1	1,92
Minimum score	33,1	57,9	0,54	7,4	3,1	0,82
Average score	55,7	68,1	0,82	16,4	6,1	2,94
Maximum score	72,6	78,7	1,17	32,4	9,5	6,81

(Boswell/Geddes 2011: 219-20; own calculations; *data not available)

5. OECD public expenditure data

Public social expenditure by country and year (OECD 2011b: 41-5)															
	Total public expenditure			Pensions			Income support to the working age			Health			Other services		
Country	2004	2007	2010*	2004	2007	2010*	2004	2007	2010*	2004	2007	2010*	2004	2007	2010*
Austria	27,7	26,4	28,9	12,7	12,3	12,2	6,2	5,3	5,8	6,8	6,8	6,9	2,0	2,1	4,0
Belgium	26,5	26,3	29,4	9,0	8,9	9,1	7,2	7,2	8,0	7,5	7,3	7,4	2,8	3,0	4,9
Denmark	27,7	26,0	30,1	5,3	5,5	5,7	8,8	7,0	8,0	6,1	6,5	6,6	7,6	7,0	9,7
Finland	26,0	24,9	29,1	8,3	8,3	8,8	7,1	6,0	7,2	6,0	6,1	6,2	4,6	4,6	6,9
France	29,0	28,4	31,0	12,2	12,5	13,0	5,3	4,6	5,1	7,7	7,5	7,6	3,9	3,8	5,4
Germany	27,1	25,2	27,3	11,6	10,7	10,5	4,8	4,0	4,1	8,0	7,8	8,1	2,8	2,7	4,6
Greece	19,9	21,3	23,2	11,1	11,9	11,8	2,0	2,0	2,3	5,1	5,9	6,0	1,6	1,6	3,1
Ireland	16,0	16,3	22,8	3,4	3,6	3,7	5,0	5,3	8,1	5,9	5,8	5,9	1,7	1,6	5,2
Italy	24,7	24,9	27,5	13,8	14,1	14,1	2,8	2,8	3,1	6,6	6,6	6,6	1,5	1,4	3,7
Luxembourg	23,9	20,6	23,5	7,3	6,5	6,5	7,0	5,7	6,6	7,3	6,4	6,5	2,2	2,1	4,0
Netherlands	21,1	20,1	22,6	5,0	4,7	4,6	6,5	5,3	6,1	5,8	6,0	6,1	3,9	4,1	5,8
Norway	23,3	20,8	24,0	5,1	4,7	5,1	6,7	5,4	6,1	6,1	5,7	5,8	5,4	5,0	7,1
Portugal	22,4	22,5	26,1	9,9	10,8	11,2	4,2	4,0	4,7	7,0	6,6	6,7	1,3	1,1	3,4
Spain	21,2	21,6	26,7	8,1	8,0	8,5	5,0	5,1	6,6	5,8	6,1	6,2	2,2	2,4	5,3
Sweden	29,5	27,3	28,2	7,7	7,2	7,3	7,0	5,6	5,7	6,7	6,6	6,7	8,1	8,0	8,6
Switzerland	20,2	18,5	19,6	6,8	6,4	6,3	5,0	4,3	4,8	5,9	5,6	5,6	2,5	2,2	3,0
United Kingdom	20,5	20,5	24,4	5,5	5,4	5,4	4,6	4,5	5,5	6,5	6,8	6,9	3,9	3,8	6,5
Minimum	16,0	16,3	19,6	3,4	3,6	3,7	2	2	2,3	5,1	5,6	5,6	1,3	1,1	3
Average	23,9	23,0	26,1	8,4	8,3	8,5	5,6	4,9	5,8	6,5	6,5	6,6	3,4	3,3	5,4
Maximum	29,5	28,4	31,0	13,8	14,1	14,1	8,8	7,2	8,1	8,0	7,8	8,1	8,1	8,0	9,7

*Scores for 2010 are estimates

6. OECD data on means-tested and private social spending

Means-tested and voluntary private spending by country and year (OECD 2009: 27, 29; 2011: 19, 24)						
	Spending on means-tested programmes		Voluntary private social expenditure		Percentage of private spending (voluntary and mandatory) in total social spending	
Country	2005	2007	2005	2007	2005	2007
Austria	3,9	7,1	1,0	1,0	6,5	6,5
Belgium	3,5	5,1	4,5	4,7	14,7	15,3
Denmark	3,7	6,2	2,4	2,3	8,9	9,0
Finland	10,1	5,6	1,1	1,1	4,0	4,1
France	6,4	14,5	2,6	2,6	9,3	9,3
Germany	5,8	13,1	1,9	1,8	10,1	10,2
Greece	6,4	10,3	1,7	1,5	7,6	6,7
Ireland	15,3	26,3	1,3	1,5	7,4	8,5
Italy	2,7	5,0	0,6	0,6	7,6	7,9
Luxembourg	2,0	2,7	0,9	0,7	4,6	4,3
Netherlands	5,2	18,1	7,6	6,3	28,5	25,6
Norway	4,9	6,8	0,8	0,8	8,7	8,8
Portugal	7,6	11,8	1,5	1,5	7,5	7,7
Spain	7,6	12,3	0,5	0,5	2,2	2,2
Sweden	2,1	4,0	2,4	2,5	8,7	9,5
Switzerland	5,2	9,0	1,1	1,1	29,3	30,8
United Kingdom	12,6	24,1	6,3	5,0	25,1	22,0
Minimum	2,0	2,7	0,5	0,5	2,2	2,2
Average	6,2	10,7	2,2	2,1	11,2	11,1
Maximum	15,3	26,3	7,6	6,3	29,3	30,8

7. Welfare system effects: decommodification and redistribution

Welfare system effects: decommodification and redistribution by country and year (OECD 2011c; Starke/Obinger/Castles 2008)							
	Decommodification	GINI before redistribution (1)		GINI after redistribution (2)		Redistributive effect ((1-2)/1)	
Country	2002	mid-2000	late-2000	mid-2000	late-2000	mid-2000	late-2000
Austria	28,8	0,433	0,472	0,265	0,261	0,388	0,447
Belgium	30,9	0,494	0,469	0,271	0,259	0,451	0,448
Denmark	34,9	0,417	0,416	0,232	0,248	0,444	0,404
Finland	30,1	0,483	0,465	0,254	0,259	0,474	0,443
France	27	0,485	0,483	0,288	0,293	0,406	0,393
Germany	30,2	0,499	0,504	0,285	0,295	0,429	0,415
Greece		0,454	0,436	0,321	0,307	0,293	0,296
Ireland	28,9			0,314	0,293		
Italy	26,7	0,557	0,534	0,352	0,337	0,368	0,369

Luxembourg		0,454	0,482	0,258	0,288	0,432	0,402
Netherlands	34,6	0,426	0,426	0,284	0,294	0,333	0,310
Norway	37,3	0,447	0,41	0,276	0,250	0,383	0,390
Portugal		0,542	0,521	0,385	0,353	0,290	0,322
Spain			0,461	0,319	0,317		0,312
Sweden	32,5	0,432	0,426	0,234	0,259	0,458	0,392
Switzerland	21,9		0,409	0,276	0,303		0,259
United Kingdom	24,7	0,445	0,456	0,331	0,345	0,256	0,243
Minimum	21,9	0,417	0,409	0,232	0,248	0,256	0,243
Average	29,9	0,469	0,461	0,291	0,292	0,386	0,365
Maximum	37,3	0,557	0,534	0,385	0,353	0,474	0,448

8. Welfare system effects: poverty reduction

Welfare system effects: poverty reduction (OECD 2011c)						
	Poverty before redistribution, at 50% of median income		Poverty rate after redistribution, at 50% of median income		Reduction effect ((1-2)/1)	
Country	mid-2000	late-2000	mid-2000	late-2000	mid-2000	late-2000
Austria	23,1	28,8	6,6	7,9	0,714	0,726
Belgium	32,7	31,4	8,8	9,4	0,731	0,701
Denmark	23,6	22,1	5,3	6,1	0,775	0,724
Finland	30,5	30,1	6,6	8	0,784	0,734
France	33	32,6	7,2	7,2	0,782	0,779
Germany	32,7	32,5	8,3	8,9	0,746	0,726
Greece	32,5	31,1	12,6	10,8	0,612	0,653
Ireland			13,6	9,1		
Italy	33,8	33,3	11,4	11,4	0,663	0,658
Luxembourg	29,1	26,9	8,1	8,5	0,722	0,684
Netherlands	24,8	24,1	7,8	7,2	0,685	0,701
Norway	25,7	23,8	6,8	7,8	0,735	0,672
Portugal	29	28,4	12,9	12	0,555	0,577
Spain	17,6	27,2	14,1	14	0,199	0,485
Sweden	26,7	26,5	5,3	8,4	0,801	0,683
Switzerland		19,9	8,7	9,3		0,533
United Kingdom	30,9	31,2	10,3	11	0,667	0,647
Minimum	17,6	19,9	5,3	6,1	0,199	0,485
Average	28,4	28,1	9,1	9,2	0,678	0,668
Maximum	33,8	33,3	14,1	14	0,801	0,779



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Education

1993 - 1997	Grammar school Vöcklabruck
1997 - 2005	Secondary school Zaunergasse Salzburg, focus on languages
2005	A-Levels/Matura passed with distinction
2006 - 2009	University of Salzburg: Bachelor degree in Political Science
2008 - 2009	University of Warwick, United Kingdom: ERASMUS scholarship, Political Science
2010 - 03/2012 (expected)	University of Vienna: Master degree in Political Science

Civilian Service

2005 - 2006	Diakonie Flüchtlingsdienst Salzburg: Social assistance and voluntary returns assistance for people in detention
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Work experience

2003, 2004	St. Virgil Salzburg (summer internships): correspondence, enquiries, administration, reception;
08-09/2007	Caritas Salzburg (internship): legal assistance for asylum seekers
10/2007 - 05/2008	Diakonie Flüchtlingsdienst: Social assistance and voluntary returns assistance for people in detention
11/2009 - 1/2010	Asyl in Not (internship): legal advice for asylum seekers and refugees
02/2012 -	International Organization for Migration (IOM) (internship), project CulTrain

Skills and accomplishments

ERASMUS scholarship (one year, Warwick/UK)
University of Salzburg merit scholarship 2006 - 2009
University of Vienna merit scholarship 2010 - 2011
In-depth knowledge on Austrian and European Asylum and Aliens
Law
Languages: English (fluently), Italian (basic), Spanish (basic)
Driving license
MS-Office and SPSS