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*Für meine Eltern, die es mir ermöglicht haben zu studieren und
mich stets bei allem unterstützt haben.*

*Mit besonderem Dank an Can und insbesondere an Thomas für
ihre Unterstützung.*

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ABBREVIATIONS

CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
EIU 2010	Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2010
FSI	Failed State Index
IDV	Individualism Index
IVR	Indulgence versus Restraint Index
LTO	Long Term Orientation Index
MAS	Masculinity vs. Femininity Index
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PDI	Power Distance Index
PFI	Press Freedom Index
SFI	State Fragility Index
TI	Transparency International
UAI	Uncertainty Avoidance Index
UNDEF	The United Nations Democracy Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNROL	United Nations Rule of Law
VAP	VAP Turnout
VT	Voter Turnout
WGI	World Governance Indicators
WGI	The Worldwide Governance Indicators
WVS	World Value Survey

1. Introduction

» It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried. « (Quotations Page 2010) This is probably one of the most famous quotes by Sir Winston Churchill. Its meaning can be interpreted in different ways. Democracy could be, even if it seems not to be the “best type” of government, better than all other types of government human beings have tried so far. Another interpretation could be that all other types of government are so bad that they are simply worse than democracy without democracy necessarily being a “good type of government”. However the interpretation might be the key message is that democracy is a “better” type of government than the other forms which occurred so far. Still there is much criticism about democracy. Despite the critique against democracy it still seems to be worth to analyze this particular form of government because there was an upward trend for democracy as a form of government within the last decades. The number of countries in the world classified as democracies has risen within the last decades especially with the end of the cold war – the rise of democracies with the end of the cold war is called the “The Third Wave of Democracies”. (Keman 2002, p. 42)

Figure 1: Global Trends in Governance 1800-2010



Source: Center for Systemic Peace 2011

The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2010 differs between different governance types: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. It lists that in the year 2010 15.6 % of the 167 countries covered by the index were full democracies, 31.7 % were flawed democracies and the rest being hybrid (19.8 %) or authoritarian (32.9 %) regimes

according to its own categorization – in total 47.3 % of the 167 countries covered by the index are regarded as democratic. (EIU 2010, p. 1)

Table 1: EIU Democracy Index 2010, by regime type

	No. of countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	26	15.6	12.3
Flawed democracies	53	31.7	37.2
Hybrid regimes	33	19.8	14.0
Authoritarian regimes	55	32.9	36.5

Note. "World" population refers to the total population of the 167 countries covered by the index. Since this excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire actual estimated world population in 2010.

Source: EIU 2010, p.1

Together with the increasing popularity of democracy as a form of government not only the question when or how democracies evolve occurs but also the question about the functioning of democracy.

Analyzing the functioning of democracy is a complex task since many different factors could have an influence and democracies differ from each other – there are no two democratic regimes that are exactly alike. However by intuition it seems that some countries are more democratic than others and the goal of this thesis is to elaborate the factors which might have an influence on the functioning or the quality of democracy. The key question is: Which are the factors that influence the functioning of democracies? The term functioning in this context refers to the quality of democracies which will be explained below. The author of this thesis considers the "good functioning" of a democracy in terms of the quality of a democracy. A democracy that functions "better" than others is therefore regarded as one which has a higher democratic quality.

It has to be stated that this undertaking is highly complex and probably cannot be analyzed completely. Certainly there is not a single or mono causal connection to explain why democracy does or seem to function better in some societies than in others. Some factors might not be measurable which makes a comparison of them highly difficult. There also might be factors which have an influence on the functioning or the quality of democracy which can not be identified due to complexity.

The aim of this thesis is not to elaborate factors that support the occurrence of a democracy. The analysis and the comparison are related only to societies which already are democracies.

2. Methodology

This thesis tries to analyze the factors that influence the functioning or the quality of democracy by comparing two democracy indexes with measurable data of possible influence factors. For the analysis, the democracy indexes Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy 2010 (Democracy Ranking 2010) and the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy index 2010 (EIU 2010) will be used.¹ Those two democracy indexes will be considered as indicators for the quality of democracy: The countries which have better ratings (or rankings) on those indexes will be considered as the democracies which function better and have a higher quality of democracy, compared to countries that do have worse ratings (rankings) on those indexes. Different variables will be compared and if possible their influences will be elaborated. While the goal is to find factors that influence the quality of democracy, indicators of those factors will be used for comparison, e.g. the income Gini coefficient is an indicator for the income distribution within a society, which is the factor. After comparing different sets of data and different relationships the author will try to make own conclusions and interpretations.

During the analysis two approaches will be taken, as far as possible: (a) a comparison of the similarities of the "best functioning democracies" or the democracies with the highest quality; (b) a statistical comparison of all democracies with different variables.

(a) As "best functioning democracies" countries will be regarded if they rank within the top 15 ranks of both mainly used democracy indexes (EIU 2010 and Democracy Ranking 2010). Those countries will be named "High Quality Democracies" (HQDs) within this thesis. Those HQDs will be analyzed for similarities they have. This approach is taken to avoid a possible methodological bias.²

During this analysis not all possible factors can be considered, the choice of the variables and indicators is based on a subjective approach of the author.

Even if those two democracy indexes try to be comprehensive, they do not cover all countries in the world. The EIU Democracy Index 2010 (EIU 2010) for instance covers 165 independent states and two territories and does not include "Micro States". The Democracy Ranking 2010 ranks all countries which were categorized as "free" or "partly

¹ The reason for the particular choice of those two democracy indexes is explained in chapter 4.

² This does not mean that other countries, which are not among the categorized HQDs, are not high quality democracies.

free” on the Freedom in the World Survey with a minimum population of 500.000 inhabitants. Due to this method, countries like Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta are not included in the Democracy Ranking 2010 for instance, although they perform very well on the EIU 2010 and also on other indexes.³ The absence countries in one of the two used indexes has the consequence that those countries will not be included in the Group of the HQDs even if they have a top rating on the other index. The fact that those three countries are not included in the Democracy Ranking 2010 does not mean that they do not have high quality of democracy. They probably do and for that reason those three countries will be analyzed separately as well.

The self chosen restrictive condition that the countries should rank among the top 15 of both democracy indexes does indeed lead to an exclusion of some countries from the analysis. On the other hand it is a measure to avoid biases or better said a “biased rating” of countries due to the possible “favoring methodology” of a single index.

(b) A simple statistical analysis between the democracy indexes and the considered variables (possible influencing factors) will be done and the correlations will be computed with statistical software. The data is collected from different sources which will be specified. The related correlations and graphs are computed and created by the author of this thesis. All correlations are available in the appendix.

Due to the absence of a universal definition of democracy and the different methodologies of democracy indexes only those countries will be used for the statistical analysis that are categorized as democratic in both of the mainly used democracy indexes. All countries on the Democracy Ranking 2010 (except a few exceptions with virtual values) are categorized as democratic in that index. The EIU Democracy Index 2010 has four categories: “full democracies”, “flawed democracies”, “hybrid regimes” and “authoritarian regimes”. Only countries among the first two categories (full democracy and flawed democracy) will be regarded as democracies in this index. Some countries are regarded as democratic in only one of both indexes: Turkey for instance is considered to be a democracy in the Democracy Ranking 2010 (rank 66) but is categorized as a hybrid regime in the EIU Democracy Index 2010 (rank 89). In this case Turkey will not be included in the statistical analysis because of the definition of hybrid regimes of the EIU Democracy Index. Consequently, other countries which are categorized as hybrid regimes will not be included

³ All three countries rank among the top 15 of the EIU Democracy Index 2010. Unfortunately not all other compared variables are available for those three countries.

in the statistical analysis. Also countries which are categorized democratic by the EIU Democracy Index 2010 but are not listed on the democracy ranking will not be used for the statistical analysis. Although the statistical analysis of the indexes and the variables will be done separately for each democracy index, only the countries which are regarded as democratic on both of the indexes will be used for the statistical analysis.⁴ The goal of this approach is to avoid biased results due to the methodology of the indexes. Applying this approach the sample size of the countries which are categorized as democracies by both indexes is 67. (EIU 2010; Democracy Ranking 2010)

The comparisons will be followed by an interpretation of the results. It has to be stated, that even if certain relations or correlations between the democracy indexes and some variables are found, it does not imply the direction of the relationship nor the causality. This is a general problem if two variables are compared with each other. Elaborating the relationship usually requires a model or at least an assumption. The possible relationships will be tried to explain in a conceptual approach with the use of existing theory, if possible. The author of this thesis will proceed carefully in the attempt to find the relationships occurring from the data by being aware of the possibility of misinterpretations. The outcome therefore would not be definite relationships of certain factors influencing democracy and open to discussion.

The indexes and the data will mainly cover the year 2009. This is due to the availability of the data for this year. Some indexes include the year 2008 or the year 2010. Unfortunately not all indicators are available for this period, e.g. the income Gini coefficient for the countries ranges between 2000 and 2010. The literacy rate values date between 2005 and 2009 and some of the values are estimated. The indexes and the indicators have been chosen – as long it was possible - to cover the year 2009.

There are different schemes for the interpretation of correlations. Generally speaking, a correlation indicates a linear relation between two variables, except in the case of 0. There can be positive (between 0 and 1) and negative correlations (between 0 and -1) – the higher the absolute value the higher the linear relationship. With regard to the interpretations of

⁴. For instance Albania and Lebanon will not be included in the statistical analysis with the Democracy Ranking 2010 - although they are regarded as democracies by this index- because the EIU Democracy Index categorizes them as a hybrid regime. On contrary Guyana and Lesotho for instance are categorized as “flawed democracies” by the EIU Democracy Index 2010 but are not included in the Democracy Ranking 2010 and consequently will not be used for the statistical analysis. Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta are, as already stated, also not included in the Democracy Ranking 2010 and therefore they are not included in the statistical analysis.

correlations in this thesis, the following categories (levels of correlations) will be used: a value of 0 shows that there is no correlation between two variables. A weak correlation exists if the value is between 0 and 0.5 whereas the author regards a medium strong correlation for results between 0.5 and 0.8. A strong correlation is considered to be between 0.8 and 1, and 1 is considered to be a perfect correlation. The “strength” of the correlation indicates the “strength” of the linear relation between both variables.⁵ (Schlittgen 2003, p. 179)

⁵ The translations was done by the author: keine Korrelation = no correlation, schwache Korrelation = weak correlation, mittlere Korrelation = medium strong correlation, starke Korrelation = strong correlation, perfekte Korrelation = perfect correlation

3. Political System

Democracy is one type of different kinds of political systems. Even though each political system is probably unique in itself, there are main distinctions between them and according to them they are categorized. Political scientists usually distinguish between the following basic systems: authoritarian, democratic and totalitarian. Hybrid forms are also a possibility, meaning that they have elements of more than one system.

a) Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes

» Totalitarianism is tyranny with a rational bureaucracy, a monopoly of the modern technology of communication, and a monopoly of the modern technology of violence. « (Almond 1956, p. 403-404) Gabriel Almond argues that this type of political system has only become possible in modern times because its dependency on modern types of organization and modern technologies of violence and communication. (ibid, p. 403) Juan Linz summarizes characteristics of a totalitarian system with regard of other authors as following: there is a monistic center of power; an exclusive and autonomous ideology with which the ruling leader or party identify and use as a basis for policies or for legitimizing them; the participation of the citizens in political and collective social tasks and their active mobilization are encouraged and rewarded. (Linz 2000, p. 70) There are also different definitions for authoritarian regimes. One of them comes from Juan Linz and the author considers authoritarian regimes as political systems with limited political pluralism, without a guiding ideology, without mobilization, and in which a leader exercises power within formally not clearly defined limits. (Linz 1970, p. 255) According to those definitions the distinctions could be done by the use of an ideology and mobilization.

Other distinctions are possible as well. Paul Sondrol for instance makes a distinction of authoritarianism and totalitarianism by the characteristics of their leaders (dictators). According to him the role conception of the leader in a totalitarian system is the “leader as function” whereas in an authoritarian system it is the “leader as individual”. The ends of power for a totalitarian leader are public and in contrary they are private for the authoritarian leader. He also argues that totalitarianism has an official ideology whereas authoritarianism does not. (Sondrol 1991, p. 599-620)

b) Democracy

The term democracy comes from the Greek word “*dēmokratía*” (“rule of the people”) which is coined from “demos” (people) and “Kratos” (power) and denoted the political systems of some city-states existing in ancient Greece, e.g. Athens. There is no universal accepted definition of the term “democracy”. According to Elgstrom and Hyden democracy is a system of government with the attributes that institutions and procedures exist through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies at national level, there are institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, existence of inclusive suffrage and of the right of participation in the selection of leaders and policies. (Elgstrom and Hyden 2002) Larry Diamond uses the term "democracy" with a reference to Dahl's "polyarchy" or "liberal democracy": »This encompasses not only a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with regular, free, and fair elections and universal suffrage, but organizational and informational pluralism; extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations); effective power for elected officials; and functional autonomy for legislative, executive, and judicial organs of government.« (Diamond 1995, p. 11) Furthermore Larry Diamond and Leonordo Morlino regards the following as a minimum requirement of democracy: » 1) universal, adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of information. « (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) Almond et al define democracy briefly as (...) » a political system in which citizens enjoy a number of basic civil and political rights, and in which their most important political leaders are elected in free and fair elections and accountable under a rule of law." (Almond et al. 2004, p. 27) The UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) breaks democracy down into the following distinctive inter-related components: constitutional design, electoral process, parliamentary process, justice and the rule of law, human right including freedom of expression, civil society participation, existence of political parties, access to information and transparency, accountable executive and public administration, and decentralized administration. (UNDEF 2010) In those definitions democracy is defined as a political system or a form of government.

Democracy sometimes is not only defined as a » (...) political system—a set of normative rules, and legal and political institutions, constituted in accord with those rules. It is an ideal, an aspiration, really, intimately connected to and dependent upon a picture of what it is to be human—of what it is a human should be to be fully human (whatever that might mean).« (Kompridis 2009, p. 31) The dual meaning of democracy, as a political system and as an ideal, makes classification necessary. Diamond and Morlino regard popular sovereignty, political and civil freedom, political equality, and broader standards of good governance as the main goals of an ideal democracy. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) This could be understood that democracy as a political system is one that tries (successfully) to implement the ideal – although the ideal might not be an end that can be finally achieved. It can be argued the closer a political system reaches the ideal the more democratic it is. In this thesis the focus lies on democracy in the meaning of the political system.


Democracy itself can have different forms of its occurrence. As stated before each political system is unique somehow, if certain characteristics are regarded. The same applies for democracies. The most known forms of democracies are: direct democracy, representative democracy, liberal democracy, participatory democracy and consensus democracy – it can be argued that the complexity of the respectively democratic system and its decision making process increases from the first mentioned to the last. Although each democratic system is unique, there are some common similarities which they do share according to the regarded definitions. Considering the above used definitions of democracy a minimalist and a broader definition are possible. The minimalist definition would include free and competitive elections by universal suffrage, more than one party and alternative sources of information. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) A broader definition of democracy, considering the definitions above, would additionally include characteristics as freedom of expression and press, accountability, civil liberties, separation of powers, the rule of law, access to information and transparency, and political pluralism.

Although democracies are seen as a form of majority ruling, minority rights are crucial as well – as Prothro and Grigg argue in their conclusion that majority rule and minority rights are the principles regarded as most essential to democracy. (Prothro and Grigg 1960, p. 282) Certain “checks and balances” are needed for a democracy to function well – the simplest examples would be the separation of powers as well as a functioning political opposition – if the political opposition is repressed and has no rights or duties at all a

democratic system would not function properly since it would mean an absence of control over the government which is in power.

Most of the countries in the world proclaim themselves to be democracies - for some of them (e.g. North Korea) it is obvious that they are not democracies. Apparently there is a difference between “de jure” democracies and “de facto” democracies. Only 4 countries in the world do not proclaim themselves to be democracies: Brunei, Burma, Saudi Arabia and Vatican City. (Nobel Media 2011) Relying only on this information the democracy map of the world would look as in the following graphic

Figure 2: De jure Democracies



Source: <http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Democracy>

Assuming the difference between “de jure” and “de facto” democracies a tool for measurement and distinction is necessary – surely an individual judgment is possible but would not be very precise. Democracy indexes are a possible tool not only for the distinction between “de jure” and “de facto” democracy but also as indication about the “quality of democracy”.

c) Hybrid Regimes

Hybrid regimes are seen as mixed systems which have attributes from both government types democracy and autocracy. (Pickel and Pickel 2006, p. 175) The term itself dates back to Terry Karl and was used by him for national states in Central America (except Costa Rica). (Karl 1995). According to Friedrich Rüb democratic hybrid regimes are characterized by free and fair elections and the rule of law but the separation of powers in hybrid regimes is low and more similar to authoritarian regimes and the comprehensive claim to power due to weakly distinct constitutional legality. (Rüb 2002, p. 109) Autocratic

hybrid regimes on the opposite do not have the minimum of free and fair elections, participation is strongly restricted and competitive elections are restraint. The distinction between democratic and autocratic hybrid regimes is done by fair and free elections. (Pickel and Pickel 2006, p. 175) The EIU 2010 categorizes countries as hybrid regimes that have the following characteristics:

» Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies--in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent. « (EIU 2010, p. 31)

This categorization of hybrid regimes would at least not fulfill Diamond and Morlino's minimum requirements of a democracy, as quoted above – in particular the requirement of free, fair and competitive elections would be violated. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) Furthermore the attributes of this definition are also not in accordance with other above quoted definitions of democracy. Therefore the countries categorized as hybrid regimes, e.g. Turkey, will not be included in the analysis due to the self chosen restriction that countries have to be categorized as democratic in both indexes (EIU 2010 and Democracy Ranking 2010).

d) Level of Analysis

Political systems usually refer to national states and this is the level for the analysis in this thesis. In general different entities could be subject to an analysis as well, e.g. the local level. States are usually considered to be the main actors in international relations and the “legitimate” executors of power. When trying to compare different political systems the main focus still lies on the level of the state. Not that states are the only actors but the aggregated level of a national state is taken for analysis and comparisons. Other possibilities would be to focus on the local level; the supranational or intergovernmental level (such as in the case of the EU); on an international level by analyzing the effects of elections, legitimacy and outcomes internationally; not yet practiced but in theory a global level could be considered if it would exist – some political scientists e.g. Alexander Wendt argue about the inevitability of a world government. (Wendt 2003)

This thesis will nevertheless focus on the state level.⁶ In this sense democracies will be analyzed and compared on a state level. In political science states are considered to be (legal) entities with the basic elements being: the state territory, the state power and the people of the state. States are seen to be sovereign with their “external sovereignty” to the outside world (e.g. other states) and with their “internal sovereignty” meaning the power over legitimate violence over a geographic location and population which is not subject to any other power or state. (Nohlen and Schultze 2010, p. 1016; Nohlen and Grotz 2011, 583-585)

In every political system, regardless if it is a democracy, the two key issues for analysis are power and interest and basic questions which can be asked are: How is the power distributed? Do the actors have legitimacy? In whose interest are actions taken and regulations implemented? To which extend are different interests represented?

⁶ The term state is used in the meaning of sovereign state / a nation / a country.

4. Measuring of the quality of democracy and Democracy Indexes

a) Measuring the quality of democracy

Measuring democracies and their performance is a quite difficult project. Depending on the regarded variables the result can differ. Meanwhile there are different kinds of democracy indexes. They try to rank nations on a scale of “how democratic” they are. All of those indexes have their own forms of measuring and put different weights on different factors.

Ratings about the quality of democracies should be regarded critically. Considering only one of those indexes could lead to biased conclusions, since the methodology behind them is different and could favor certain countries. Still, for the comparison of different countries and their ratings with other variables they seem to be useful. The outcome of such a comparison might deliver some useful information – especially when more than one index is used.

Diamond and Morlino elaborate and refine the concept of the quality of democracy by creating a framework with eight dimensions on which democracies vary in quality: the rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, freedom, equality and responsiveness. Those dimensions could be used to measure the quality of democracy. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21-22) This list might not be complete and surely it can be extended. If those dimensions can be used to measure democracy, as the authors suggest, then the quality of democracy would be the “final outcome” of the degree of those dimensions. In this case the quality of democracy can be regarded as the depending factor on those dimensions which in turn can be seen as the independent variables. The authors differ between the (quality of) results, the (quality of) content and the (quality of) procedure. (ibid, p. 20-23) This approach seems to make sense since democracies for instance require a certain competition - at least two possible choices; this could be a competition of political parties – in order to provide a possibility to choose among different actors or ideas and to elect representatives. If only a single actor or a single group would permanently hold the positions of power and decision making this would certainly not result in a democracy, rather it would be an autocracy. Participation, as another example, seems to be a crucial factor as well, not only as a result for the quality of

a democracy, but also from the perspective of the contents and the procedure. (ibid, p. 22-24) Again, if a single actor or a single group would decide or frame the content of the agenda, govern or take binding decisions the outcome would probably be one-sided and in favor of this actor – dictatorships are the best example for that.

There is also much critique against democracy rankings and indexes. Beetham and Weir for instance argue that “comparative country rankings” cannot be generated because the aggregation of data is omitted by democracy audits. (Beetham and Weir 2000, p. 76) Diamond and Morlino state that » There is no objective way of deriving a single framework of democratic quality, right and true for all societies. « (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p.22) The authors add that their multidimensional framework and the growing number of democracy assessments imply a pluralist notion of democracy quality. (ibid, p. 22) One of the conclusions of Munck and Verkuilen in their analysis of different at that time available democracy indexes is – Democracy Ranking and EIU were not included in this analysis because they did not exist then – » (...) that constructors of democracy indices tend to be quite self-conscious about methodological issues but that even the best indices suffer from important weaknesses. « (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, p. 5) Critiques against democracy indexes might be justified and true, however a comparison needs data. Both of the mainly used democracy indexes (Democracy Ranking 2010 and EIU 2010) do have a comprehensive assessment which is one reason of their choice.

Although some democracy indexes have similarities in the analyzed factors or sometimes even in used methodology this does not mean that they are identical or do deliver the same results. Casper and Tufis show in their analysis by testing three different measures of democracy, that even if those measures correlate with each other they are not interchangeable because they can deliver different results if used in analysis with other variables. (Casper and Tufis 2003, p. 2-9) This means that correlations between democracy indexes do not make them interchangeable. This section will explain briefly some of the present indexes of democracy which tend to focus on different dimensions as well as the reason for the choice of the two mainly used democracy indexes.

b) The Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy 2010

This democracy ranking is based on six individual dimensions: (a) politics 50%, (b) gender equality (socioeconomic and educational) 10%, (c) economy (economic system) 10%, (d)

knowledge (knowledge society and economy, education and research) 10%, (e) health (health status and health system) 10%, (f) environment (environmental sustainability) 10%. It only includes democracies, and as such only countries that are rated as “free” or at least “partly free” by the Freedom House Ranking (except China and Russia). The country sample is also restricted to a population of at least one million and where a certain maximum number of indicators with missing values per dimension were not exceeded. The weight measures in this index follow the logic of Quality of Democracy = Quality of Politics + Quality of Society. According to the authors the conceptual formula for the quality of democracy can be summarized as: Freedom and other characteristics of the political system + performance of the non political dimensions. The country sample is 100 countries. The periods of observation are the years 2008-2009. (Campbell 2008, p. 40-41; Campbell et al 2010, p. 3-7)

c) The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2010

This democracy index (EIU 2010) is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in the following five categories: (1) Electoral process and pluralism; (2) civil liberties; (3) the functioning of government; (4) political participation; (5) and political culture. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indexes. The country sample is 167. This index does not only cover democracies since it rates hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes as well. The years 2009 and 2010 are observed and the index reflects the situation in November 2010. An index only for the year 2009 was not prepared; the previous EIU Index of Democracy 2008 covers the years 2007 and 2008. (EIU 2010, p. 31-32)

d) Polity IV 2009

This index is unique in that it examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions. It differs between autocracies, authority regimes (anocracies) and democracies. The polity scheme consist of six component measures, which record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, political competition and changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. It includes only information on the institutions of the central government. (Center for Systemic Peace 2011) » It does not include consideration of groups and territories that are actively removed from that authority (i.e., separatists or "fragments"; these are considered separate, though not independent, polities) or segments of the population that are not yet

effectively politicized in relation to central state politics. « (ibid) The index reflects the regime characteristics in effect on the end of the year 2009. (ibid)

e) World Audit Democracy Ranking 2010

The World Audit Democracy Ranking » (...) is concerned with the condition of democracy as it relates to 150 nation states – all those with a population of more than a million. « (World Audit 2011) Democracy is defined via the criteria of Human Rights; Political Rights; Free Speech; and the Absence of Corruption. This index uses statistics and reports from different sources such as Freedom House, Transparency International, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. (ibid)

f) Selection of the democracy indexes for the analysis

The choice of the Democracy Ranking 2010 and the EIU 2010 was - besides the reasons of availability of their data and the relatively good reputation they have - in particular the ordinal score both indexes assign on each included country. This is particularly important for the statistical analysis and for computing correlations because using only a ranking is not possible for such an analysis. Besides that both indexes are comprehensive in their approach. The author of this thesis is aware of the fact that there is certain criticism with regard to the legitimacy of democracy indexes as well as the comparison of democracies with each other, as the above quoted authors argue. However, the indexes seem to be comprehensive and suitable for such an analysis – an own “rating” by the author of this thesis about the quality of democracy would definitely not be precise.

Biases in methodology could always be possible: in this case most of the indexes or rankings are based in the so called “western world” and the cultural background of the researches might have had an influence in the analysis. However assuming that the indexes are unbiased they will be used for the analysis. The fact that both indexes correlate with each other – 0.895386 (own calculation) for the 67 of the observed democracies – does not make them interchangeable as some of the result will show.

Polity IV focuses only on institutions and therefore it will not be sufficient for an analysis of the quality of democracy. The World Audit Democracy Ranking has no total ordinal scores assigned to each country but rather a ranking which makes it unusable for the statistical analysis. (Center for Systemic Peace 2011; World Audit 2011)

5. Economic factors

» Therefore, in spite of the significant relationship discovered between the stability of democracy in economically developed countries and the higher probability that those having reached a certain level of economic and social development would be democracies, there is a sufficient number of deviant cases to warrant a separate analysis of types of political systems, social systems, and economic systems. There is no doubt that certain forms of political organization, of legitimation of power, are more likely in certain types of societies and under certain economic conditions than others and that some combinations are highly unlikely. «
(Linz 2000, p. 57)

The argument of this author is in favor for the causality that economical development favoring democracy as a regime. Linz still mentions deviant cases of a sufficient number. (ibid, p. 57) On contrary there are authors which think that capitalism is the necessary condition for democracy. (Berger 1992, p. 9) Max Weber also assumed that a modern democracy can only occur in societies with capitalistic industrialism. (Weber 1906, p. 73) Schlesinger argues that democracy is the political product of technological development and capitalism. He also argues that inventions such as the steam engine and the printing press have been the fundament for a capitalistic development which in turn fostered rationality, individualism and democracy. (Schlesinger 1997, p. 5-7)

The assumption that democracy follows or is a function of the socioeconomic development is part of the “theory of modernization” and some authors argue for this relationship. (Lipset 1994, p. 7; Bukes 2000 p. 12; Sunde 2006, p. 472) According to this theory the more developed an economy and society of a country is the higher is the likelihood of the occurrence of a permanent democracy. (Lauth 2010, p. 190) Several studies show that the level of economic development, usually measured as GDP per capita, is a central variable for the degree of the democratic development in a society.⁷ (Lauth 2010, p. 190) Schumpeter argued for modern democracy being a product of the capitalist process. (Schumpeter 1950, p. 297; Lipset 1994, p. 2) Some authors argue that capitalism is a necessary condition for democracy but not a sufficient condition. (Lipset 1994, p. 2-3; Przeworski 2004, p. 487) Przeworski et al (2000) argue that modernization does not generate democracy but rather that democratic regimes above a certain socioeconomic

level of development consolidate and do not fall back to autocratic regimes. (Lauth 2010, p. 191)

The quoted authors argue for either the relationship of economical development causing democracy or stabilizing or affecting the degree of the democratic development. There are also arguments for the opposite relationship between economical development and democracy. The authors of the EIU 2010 argue for instance that:

»However, the direction of causality between democracy and income is also debatable. The standard modernisation hypothesis that economic development leads to, and/or is a necessary pre-condition for democracy, is no longer universally accepted. Instead, it has been argued that the primary direction of causation runs from democracy to income. « (EIU 2010, p. 16)

However the goal of this thesis is not to determine the factors that lead to democratization but rather the factors that influence the functioning on democracy and hence the factors that well functioning democracies have in common.

5.1. Economic Output and Income

This section the relationship between economical developments as measured by GDP and GNI (PPP) per capita will be analyzed. Both variables are seen as (main) indicators of economic development. A country with high GDP or GNI (PPP) per capita is usually interpreted as high economically developed. (Eurostat 2012; World Bank 2012b)

a) GDP per capita (2011 US \$)

The GDP is still regarded as one of the most important economic key measures. The formula for calculating the GDP is: private consumption + gross investment + government spending + (exports – imports). It measures only the performance of an economy in respect to the output. This indicator can be seen as the sum of all produced or consumed goods in one period, generally one year, multiplied with their monetary end values. GDP per capita is simply the total GDP of one year divided by the population. (World Bank 2011c; World Bank 2011d; World Bank 2012b) This delivers information about the relation of the GDP in regard to the population – since countries with a bigger population tend to have a higher total GDP. Although the GDP is an important economical key figure and is broadly used, its information content is limited: It does not provide any information about the distribution of the wealth or of the income within a society. Still, the higher the GPD per

capita is the higher is the associated level of general wealth within a society. While the GDP per capita is only an absolute measure without considering the price differences and different conditions between countries, the GDP per capita in purchasing power parities (PPP) equalizes the purchasing power of different currencies. The GDP per capita in PPP delivers usually more relevant information for comparisons between countries. Sometimes the GDP per capita is still used for international comparisons. Since in the GNI per capita in PPP is analyzed as well, the analysis for the GDP per capita is done without considering the differences in purchasing power. This will allow analyzing the relationship of the quality of democracy with an absolute economical key measure rather than with a relative indicator.

The World Bank defines the GDP per capita as:

» (...) gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. « (World Bank 2011a)

The data used is taken from the online database of the World Bank - the database includes World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files and it is based on 2011 U.S. dollars. Purchasing power parities (PPP) are not considered in this indicator and therefore it only indicates absolute values. (ibid)

Plotting the GDP per capita and each of the two democracy indexes (EIU 2010 and Democracy Ranking 2010) on a scatter box results in the following two graphs.

Figure 3: GDP p. C. 2009 / Democracy Ranking 2010





Figure 4: GDP p. C. 2009 / EIU 2010



In both graphs there a positive linear relationship is visible. In general the higher the GDP per capita is the higher is the achieved score on the respectively democracy index and vice versa. In deed the respectively correlations occur to be strong: The correlations for 67 observations between the GDP per capita 2009 and the democracy indexes are: 0.875694 with the Democracy Ranking 2010 and 0.860841 with the EIU 2010.⁸ These correlations within democracies and GDP per capita are strong – at least for the year 2009. The stronger correlation of the Democracy Ranking 2010 with GDP per capita could probably be explained by the inclusion of economic factors in the index.⁹ (Campbell 2010) The EIU 2010 report states in contrary that the correlation of all countries in the index and GDP per capita in PPP is just under 0.6. (EIU 2010, p. 16) This lower value can result because of two possible factors: the adjustment of the GDP per capita with PPP lowers the relationship or the correlation with the GDP per capita is simply lower if the so called hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes are added.

Looking at the data of the 12 HQDs and the 6 countries which were among the top 15 of only one of the both democracy indexes (HQDs Group B), it becomes clear that almost all of them have high GDP per capita rates. In fact all HQDs had a GDP per capita above 30.000 USD (in 2011 currency) except New Zealand. Malta is the only country with a GDP per capita below 20.000 USD among the 6 additional regarded countries. Although all HQDs have a high GDP per capita rate, this indicator does not solely explain the differences in the quality of democracy since there are countries such as France, Italy, Japan and Spain with high GDP per capita rates which nevertheless do not make it on the top of the democracy indexes. (compare Table A 1 in Appendix)

⁸ The correlations were calculated by the author of this thesis.

⁹ The index uses economic indicators and weights them as the dimension “economy” with 10 % of the total score. Among those indicators are GDP per capita PPP and GNI per capita PPP as well. (Campbell 2010)

Table 2: GDP per capita 2009 (U.S. Dollars 2011) of HQDs

HQDs

Country	GDP p. C. 2009
Australia	421302
Austria	45555
Canada	39599
Denmark	55933
Finland	44576
Germany	40658
Ireland	49737
Netherlands	48068
New Zealand	29352
Norway	78408
Sweden	43406
Switzerland	63524

HQDs Group B

Country	GDP p. C. 2009
Belgium	43640
Iceland	37972
Luxembourg	106252
Malta	19326
United Kingdom	35163
United States	45744

Own illustration. Source: Worldbank 2011a

b) GNI per capita, PPP (2011 international \$)

The gross national income (GNI) is a similar economical indicator as the GDP. The World Bank defines the GNI as:


» GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad.« (World Bank) PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. Data are in current international dollars. « (World Bank 2011b)

The GNI is calculated as $GNI = \text{private consumption} + \text{gross investment} + \text{government spending} + \text{net income from assets abroad} + \text{gross export of goods and services} - \text{gross import of goods and services} - \text{indirect business taxes}$. This economical indicator reflects the national income of a country over a certain period whereas the GDP reflects the production in country over a certain period. The GNI includes the income received from other countries and the income paid to other countries is subtracted. GNI per capita is the total GNI divided by the number of the inhabitants of one country. The conversion to international dollars (for the year 2011) using purchasing power parities makes this indicator a more relative one instead of an absolute indicator as the above used GDP per

capita. An international dollar is equivalent by purchasing power over GNI to a U.S. dollar in the United States. (World Bank 2011b; World Bank 2011d)


Plotting the GNI per capita PPP and each of the two democracy indexes on a scatter box, results in the two graphs below. (Figures 5 and 6) As previously with the GDP per capita with the GNI per capita PPP there is a positive linear relationship between with both democracy indexes. In general the higher the GNI per capita PPP is the higher is the achieved score on the respectively democracy index and vice versa. The respectively correlations are strong as well: The correlation between the EIU 2010 and GNI per capita PPP 2009 is 0.868112. The correlation between the Democracy Ranking 2010 and GNI per capita PPP 2009 is 0.906896.¹⁰ Again the correlation of the Democracy Ranking 2010 with this economical indicator is stronger than the correlation of the EIU 2010. This again probably results because of the economic factors are in the assessment of this index included. In both cases the correlations are a bit stronger than the correlations of the GDP per capita and both democracy indexes. This could be due to adjustment by PPP which make this indicator a more relative one. As in the case of the GDP per capita the same problem about the direction of causality applies here as well and the relationship is not clear.

Figure 5: GNI p. C. PPP / EIU 2010



Own illustration

Figure 6: GNI p. C. PPP / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration

¹⁰ The correlations were computed with statistical software and are based on 67 observations.

Also with this indicator it becomes clear that almost of the 12 HQDs and the 6 HQD Group B have a high GNI per capita PPP. All HQDs had a GNI per capita PPP above 30.000 in international Dollars (in 2011 currency) except New Zealand. Among the 6 additional regarded countries all have a higher GNI per capita PPP than 20.000 in international dollars.

Again, although all HQDs have a high GNI per capita PPP, this indicator does also not solely explain the differences in the quality of democracy since there are countries such as with high GNI per capita PPP rates which nevertheless do not make it on the top of the democracy indexes, e.g. France, Spain, Italy and Japan. (compare Table A2 in Appendix)

Table 3: GNI per capita 2009 PPP (internat. Dollars 2011) of HQDs

HQDs		HQDs Group B	
Country	GNI p. C. PPP 2009	Country	GNI p. C. PPP 2009
Australia	38380	Belgium	36610
Austria	38400	Iceland	30000
Canada	37280	Luxembourg	59590
Denmark	38360	Malta	23160
Finland	35910	United Kingdom	35640
Germany	36830	United States	45640
Ireland	32970		
Netherlands	39690		
New Zealand	28050		
Norway	55390		
Sweden	37830		
Switzerland	47010		

Own illustration. Source of Data: World Bank 2011b

c) Conclusion

Correlations do not explain the relationship of variables nor do they imply the direction of causalities. However the strong correlations and the fact that high values on those two economic indicators are a similarity all HQDs have makes coincident not likely and a strong relationship exists. In this case the interpretation is difficult; either the economical output or income in democracies is positively influenced by the quality of democracy or the quality of democracy is positively influenced by GDP and GNI (PPP) per capita.

Only the correlations between the democracy indexes and GDP and GNI (PPP) per capita for the year 2009 are not sufficient enough to assume causality in a certain direction. Three

different relationships are possible: (1) (the quality of) democracy influences the economic development (2) economical development influences (the quality of) democracy (3) the relationship is reciprocal. Arguments for the first two cases were provided by the above quoted authors. In the third case democratic development might have had an influence on economic development in previous periods, since high levels of economical development are usually achieved over time through accumulating economic growth. But in the regarded period of 2009 (a longer period could be possible as well) a high level of economic development could have had an influence on the quality of democracy. A possible argument could be as following: The higher the economical output or income of a society is the higher the “wealth” of this society will be and this increases the general possibilities of its citizens. This in turn would allow the citizens more participation in societal activities or politics. Since participation is regarded as a crucial factor for the quality of democracy a possible link between economic output or income and the quality of democracy could be draw. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 22-24) Dennis Müller also provides a possible argument for this relationship:

» One advantage from higher incomes is that citizens may spend less time working and have more time to participate in the democratic process. More importantly, however, economic prosperity provides resources to educate a country's citizenry, which in turn should improve the quality of the collective decisions they make in a democracy. « (Müller 2009, p. 3)

If a relationship from economic development to the quality of democracy does exist then by looking at the data it looks like, that the effects of the GNI per capita PPP would be slightly higher than the GDP per capita. A possible explanation for that would be that the (average) real income and the purchasing power of the citizens, as measured with the GNI per capita in PPP, is more relevant for their opportunities of the citizens than the economical output which is measured with the GDP.

For a more profound analysis of the economical output on democracy probably a time series comparison would be necessary - in this case other variables must be taken in account as well. John F. Helliwell did a time series analysis for the years 1965 to 1985 but for the relationship between democracy and economic growth up to 125 countries using cross-sectional and pooled data over period from 1960 to 1985 and the two-way linkage

between democracy and economic growth was evaluated.¹¹ As a result Helliwell finds robust and positive effects of income on having democratic forms of government whereas the estimated direct effect of democracy on subsequent economic growth is negative but insignificant (Helliwell 1992, p. 3-24):

» Allowing for the possible positive indirect effect of democracy on income, flowing through the positive effect of democracy on education and investment, tends to offset the negative direct effect of democracy on economic growth. The general result of the growth analysis is that it is still not possible to identify any systematic net effects of democracy on subsequent economic growth. « (ibid, p. ii)

The author further concludes about the relationship of income and democracy, that the notion of countries at higher income levels being more likely to have democratic forms of government and adds: »This positive effect does not appear to be the result of reverse causation, as attempts to estimate the reverse effect from democracy to subsequent growth show that his feedback is more likely to be negative than positive. « (ibid, p. 21) The results of Helliwell indicate a relationship from economic growth on the occurrence of democracy. However the relationship between income and democracy found by Helliwell is in support for countries with higher income levels having the democracy as a form of government. (ibid, p. 21-24) The validity of the same relationship for the quality of democracy remains still not verified.

About the (negative) relationship of growth rates and democracies Helliwell notes:

» These results tie in with, and may provide some confirmation of the reasons for, the evidence that countries starting with lower levels of per capita income and productivity have rates of growth that are initially higher but then tend to slow down as the income levels converge. One possible component of this slowdown is that countries adopt democratic forms of government at some stage during their convergence, a form of government characterized by almost all of the richer countries. It is still unclear whether the adoption of a democratic government contributes to convergence by reducing the subsequent growth of the democratizing countries. « (ibid, p. 21)

¹¹ For the measure of democracy Helliwell uses the annually published measures of political rights and civil rights published as described by R.D. Gastil (1990) in: "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and Suggestions" (Helliwell 1992)

In his conclusions the author additionally argues that it is easy to understand that increasing levels of income and education likely will increase the demands of the citizens for many things, including the degree of political and civil freedoms which characterizes democratic systems. Helliwell also notes that there were relatively unstudied indirect linkages between democracy and economic growth flowing through education at the time of his research. (ibid, p. 21-24) Although this argument is about the linkage of increasing education and income on the demand and occurrence of democracy it could possibly be applied to democratic systems as well. Especially the factor of education could be an important factor and will be elaborated in a separate chapter. (see Chapter 7.2.)

Since GDP and GNI are very similar economic indicators, their possible influence on the quality of democracy would be similar as well. Still if one of those two indicators is to be preferred it probably should be the GNI per capita in PPP due to its measure of the average (real) income and due to the adjustment with purchasing power parities which expresses to a greater extent the “real economic” terms for the citizens than the GDP per capita – at least in terms of an average. Both indicators are just average values and therefore they do not deliver any information about the distribution. However an influence of economic output and income on the quality of democracy cannot be verified at this point.

5.2. Income distribution

The term equality can have multiple meanings and therefore refer to many concepts: Equality before the law, equal opportunities, gender equality, racial equality and social equality. Equity is another (normative) concept which is » (...) based on the idea of moral equality, the principle that people should be treated as equals. (...) This is not the same as treating people equally (...) rather, it is the idea that all count in the moral calculus « (Jones 2009, p. 3) The normative concept of equity will however not be elaborated in this chapter. Equality is also one of the dimensions of the quality of democracy of Diamond and Morlino. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) The authors state that democracy presupposes in practice a degree of political equality which is not possible if inequalities in wealth and status become too extreme. (ibid, p. 27) There are also other authors and institutions that recognize the importance of economic equality for the democratic process:

» Democracy prevails when either economic equality or capital mobility are high in a given country. On the one hand, economic equality promotes democracy. As the distribution of

assets and incomes becomes more balanced among individuals, the redistributive impact of democracy diminishes and the probability of a peaceful transition from an authoritarian regime to universal suffrage increases. « (Boix 2003, p. 3)

Carles Boix claims that besides the level of income a country reaches, distribution also determines whether the country democratizes. (Müller 2009, p. 3) In his statement quoted above he identifies two prerequisites for democracy: economic equality or capital mobility. (Müller 2009, p. 3; Boix 2003, p. 3) The United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) points out the importance of equal opportunities:

» To be sure, the other side of the democratic coin is politics, and politics is essentially about power and its distribution. Since the distribution of power and opportunity are to a significant extent economically determined, and vice versa, the overall state of human development in a country, as well as the distribution of resources and the equality of opportunities is an important factor in ensuring due democratic process. « (UNDEF 2010)

Diamond and Morlino also point out, by referring to Dietrich Rueschemeyer's observation, the effects of "inequality": » (...) individuals and groups with better education, more information, and more resources will inevitably have more power to shape public debate and preferences and to determine the choice of leaders and policies. « (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 27) Considering the arguments of the quoted authors, economic equality seems to be an important factor in the democratic process. But what about the quality of democracy: Does economic (in-) equality influence the quality of democracy?

Measuring economic equality is not a simple task: for a full measurement all transfers by the state, taxations and welfare policies must be regarded. One possibility however is to measure the distribution of income by the income Gini coefficient (Gini coefficient). This economic indicator does not measure economic equality fully but it indicates the income distribution of one society for a certain period.¹² The Gini coefficient is defined as: » (...) a measure of income inequality that ranges between 0, indicating perfect equality, and 1, indicating complete inequality. « (UNDP 2003, p.39) The Gini coefficient is limited to its relative nature. Countries with identical Gini coefficient might differ considerably in wealth. Another limitation of this indicator is the use of nominal income instead of purchasing power. The advantages on the other hand are that it measures inequality by means of a ratio analysis which makes it easily interpretable, it is scale independent and it

¹² It has to be stated that the income Gini coefficient just measures the income distribution but not the distribution of wealth. So the validity of this indicator is limited to income.

is population independent. (Ray 1998, p. 188-191) The highest observed Gini coefficients in the data of the UN were in Namibia with 74.30 (0.743) followed by Comoros 64.30 (0.643) and Botswana with 61.00 (0.610) On contrary the lowest observed Gini coefficients were in Azerbaijan with 16.80 (0.168) followed by Denmark with 24.70 (0.270) and Japan with 24.90 (0.249). (UN Statistics Division 2011)


Due to its availability, its scale independence and its easy comparability the income Gini coefficient will be used for analysis: This section will analyze the relationship between income distribution and the quality of democracy. More precise the relationship between the Gini coefficient and the both used democracy indexes. According the arguments of the above quoted authors, and because equality is one of Diamond and Morlino's dimension of the quality of democracy, the Gini coefficient will be considered as the independent variable. The relationship does not necessary need to be from income distribution to (the quality of) democracy because democratic governance on a high level could implement policies to increase the equality of income distribution, for instance through the influence of labor unions and by progressive tax policies or monetary transfers to the poor. However due to the reasons mentioned above the Gini coefficient will be considered as the independent variable in this analysis.

The data for the Gini coefficient is taken from the UN Data online database. (UN Statistics Division 2011) Unfortunately the data is not available for a single year, in this case the year 2009. The data of the Gini coefficient from the UN database is valid for the years 2000-2010 in which the data refers to the most recent year available. (ibid) Furthermore the database provides the values in a percentile scale between 0 (absolute equality) and 100 (absolute inequality). (ibid) The results will not be as specific and significant in comparison to some of the other used variables, since the period of the observations for the Gini coefficient differs from each other as well from the year 2009 which is the analyzed year. The Gini coefficient does change over time but it seems that is usually does not change so quickly and preceding years seem to have similar value.¹³ (Eurofund 2009) The results of the analysis, even if not completely accurate because of the different periods, could in deed provide some information about the relationship to the quality of democracy.

Looking at the graphs of the Gini coefficient (2000-2010) with the respectively democracy index a relationship seems to exist but it is not a strong


¹³ At the table of Eurofund (2009) this can be at least observed for European countries.

Figure 7: EIU 2010 / Gini Coefficient 2000-



Own illustration

Figure 8: Democracy Ranking 2010 / Gini Coefficient 2000-



Own illustration

There seems to a small tendency for countries which achieved high scores on the democracy indexes to have relatively low Gini coefficients and therefore a more equal distribution of income.

A correlation analysis of the Gini coefficient and the two democracy indexes for 66 observations has the following results: The EIU 2010 and the Gini coefficient (2000-2010) have a correlation of -0.446449. The correlation between the Democracy Ranking 2010 and the Gini coefficient is a bit higher and has the value -0.525510.¹⁴ Those correlations are lower than initially expected by the author of this thesis. Even though there seems to be a negative relationship it cannot be considered to be strong. As in the case of GDP and GNI the correlation with the Democracy Ranking is stronger – however this cannot be explained by the economic factors this ranking includes in its assessment because income distribution is not included in the economic dimension. (Campbell 2010)

The HQDs vary in terms of their Gini coefficient but are similar in that they all have Gini coefficients below 36 (0.36), except for New Zealand. The UN database does not list the values of the Gini coefficient for three out of the six countries in HQDs Group B (Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta). Among the three listed countries in the HQDs Group B UK has a

¹⁴ The Gini coefficient values are only available for 66 out of 67 observations. The value for Mauritius was not included in the data of the UN database.

value of 36 (0.36) which would be similar to the HQDs although it is a bit high as the value of Australia and New Zealand.

Table 4: Income Gini coefficient 2000-2010 of HQDs

HQDs		HQDs Group B	
Country	Gini Coefficient 2000 - 2010	Country	Gini Coefficient 2000 - 2010
Australia	35.2	Belgium	33
Austria	29.1	Iceland	N.A.
Canada	32.6	Luxembourg	N.A.
Denmark	24.7	Malta	N.A.
Finland	26.9	United Kingdom	36
Germany	28.3	United States	40.8
Ireland	34.3		
Netherlands	30.9		
New Zealand	36.2		
Norway	25.8		
Sweden	25		
Switzerland	33.7		

Own illustration. Source of Data: UN Statistics Division 2011

The Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and USA) do all have a Gini coefficient above 33 (0.33) meaning in general they tend to have a slightly higher unequal income distribution than the other HQDs. The USA has the highest Gini coefficient of the HQDs including Group B with 40.8 (0.408) which indicates that it has the highest inequality in terms of income distribution. Although the HQDs have relatively low Gini coefficient values not all of them have the “best values” in terms of income equality (lowest values). Japan, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Croatia for instance have a more equal income distribution than some HQDs. (compare Table A3 in Appendix)

Conclusion

The data does not indicate a strong relationship between the income distribution and the quality of democracy. The computed correlations only indicate a weak or medium negative linear relationship. The only indication is that all HQDs including Group B, except USA, have a lower Gini coefficient than the global average (mean) of 40.79 (0.407) and the median of 39.80 (0.398) of all 145 listed countries.¹⁵

¹⁵ The UN database 2011 (HDR) includes income Gini coefficient values for 145 countries. The average (mean) and the median are based on own calculations by the author of this thesis using the data of the UN Database. (UN Statistics Division 2011)

A more equal income distribution does not necessarily indicate a higher quality of democracy or vice versa. The question remains if there is a “threshold” of how unequal the income distribution in a democracy should be for the country to achieve a high quality of democracy. Having an equal income distribution does not necessarily mean to have democracy: Azerbaijan (16.80), Belarus (28.80) Ethiopia (29.80), Bangladesh (31) and Egypt (32.10) for instance had relatively low Gini coefficients, even lower than some of the HQDs, but are not considered to be democracies by both indexes.¹⁶ (UN Statistics Division 2011) This also could indicate that democracies or a high quality of democracy do not necessarily increase the equality of income distribution in a society. On the other hand the Gini coefficient does indicate the distribution within a society but it does not provide any information of respective income levels. All the above listed five countries with low Gini coefficients had low or very low GDP per capita levels in 2009. Also those countries had relatively low GNI per capita PPP values, except Belarus.¹⁷ (World Bank 2011a; World Bank 2011b) This could mean that if the distribution of income matters for (the quality of) democracy, it probably does after reaching certain income levels.

5.3. Influence of Oil

» If we also include a measure of oil wealth (...) the explanatory power of the regression increases sharply to some 60% of the inter-country variation in the democracy index. Although this still leaves almost 40% of the variation unexplained, it illustrates the often-observed strong negative impact on democratic development of a reliance on oil wealth. « (EIU 2010, p. 16)

According to the authors of the EIU 2010 the negative impact of a (reliance) on oil wealth on democratic development is often observed. The above described relationship, of which the explanatory power increases, is about the relationship of GDP per capita PPP and the EIU 2010 – a simple correlation between both variables for all observed countries in the EIU 2010 was 0.6 which, according to the authors, only explained one-third of the variations in democracy between countries by income levels. (ibid, p. 16) The relationship


¹⁶ Azerbaijan, Belarus and Egypt were not considered to be democracies in both indexes. Ethiopia was only considered to be a democracy on the Democracy Ranking 2010 but was on the last rank. Bangladesh was categorized as a Hybrid Regime by the EIU 2010 and was on rank 87 (out of 100) in the Democracy Ranking 2010.

¹⁷ The GNI per capita PPP values were due to the adjustment in purchasing power higher than the GDP per capita values. Belarus had GDP per capita of 5182 USD but a GNI per capita of 12530 internat. Dollars.

between oil and democracy however seems to be partly valid for the development of democracy and does probably not explain the quality of democracy. This section will therefore analyze the possible relationship between oil productions or between oil exports with the quality of democracy. The data for the oil production and oil exports is taken from the online database of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2011).¹⁸


a) Oil production

Figure 9: Total Oil Supply 2009 (1000 Barrels / Day) / EIU 2010 /



Own illustration

Figure 10: Total Oil Supply 2009 (1000 Barrels / Day) / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration

The graphs and regressions of both indexes and the total oil supply in 2009 do not indicate any relationship between oil production and democracy: The overall scores on the EIU 2010 for countries with no oil production at all or with just a small production differ a lot. The computed correlations for 67 observations are 0.132099 with the Democracy Ranking 2010 and 0.162578 with the EIU 2010 and also do not indicate any relationship.

Looking at the data of the HQDs there also does not seem to be a relationship between the quality of democracy and the oil production nor any similarity. Canada and Norway have been the major oil production countries among the HQDs and this did not affect their democracies.

¹⁸ The reason this source was chosen is because the data it provides for the year 2009 which is open accessible.

Among the HQDs Group B the USA was the major oil producing country and in fact it was the country with the third highest oil production in 2009. A general relationship between oil production and democracy seems to be difficult to elaborate: Among the top 50 oil production countries in 2009, 22 countries are categorized as democracies in both indexes with 5 countries being among the HQDs: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany and Norway. (compare Table A5 in Appendix) On the other hand there are only six countries categorized as democracy among the top 20 oil producing countries and only four countries are among the top 10 oil producers.

Table 5: Total Oil Production in 2009 (1000 Barrels per Day) of HQDs

HQDs

Country	Oil Production
Australia	588.25
Austria	25.41
Canada	3294.42
Denmark	262.14
Finland	8.72
Germany	133.04
Ireland	-0.43
Netherlands (+ offshore)	69.05
New Zealand	61.15
Norway	2350.18
Sweden	4.83
Switzerland	3.49

HQDs Group B


Country	Oil Production
Belgium	11.22
Iceland	0
Luxembourg	0
Malta	0
UK (+ offshore)	1501.50
United States	9140.79

Own illustration. Source of Data: EIA 2011

b) Oil Exports


As previously the variables are plotted a two axis scatter box and the resulting graphs do not show a relationship between the export of crude oil and the quality of democracy. The regression line in both graphs has a flat upwards slope which actually would indicate a positive relationship but it doesn't seem to be significant. The respectively computed correlations for 67 observations are insignificant: 0.172552 for the Democracy Ranking 20100.261663 for the EIU 2010. In both cases there does not seem to be a relationship between the export of crude oil and the quality of democracy.

Figure 11: Exports of crude oil (1000 Barrels / Day) / EIU 2010



Own illustration

Figure 12: Exports of crude oil (1000 Barrels / Day) / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration

Table 6: Exports of crude Oil 2009 (1000 Barrels per Day) for HQDs

HQDS	
Exports of Crude Oil including Lease Condensate	(Thousand Barrels Per Day)
Country	
Australia	250.04
Austria	0.00
Canada	1355.36
Denmark	171.14
Finland	0.00
Germany	2.2
Ireland	0
Netherlands	13.14
New Zealand	45.18
Norway	1758.88
Sweden	0
Switzerland	0

HQD Group B	
Exports of Crude Oil including Lease Condensate	(Thousand Barrels Per Day)
Country	
Belgium	0
Iceland	0
Luxembourg	0
Malta	0
United Kingdom	788.92
United States	43.795

Own illustration. Source of Data: EIA 2011

The table of the crude oil export rates (in thousand barrels per day) of the HQDs does also not indicate a similarity – the only conclusion is that the majority (12 out of 18) of the HQDs (including HQDs group B) do not export any crude oil at all or only export small amounts. (EIA 2011)

More interesting is the fact that the number of democracies within the top 50 oil exporters drops to 17 (22 countries were among the top 50 of the oil producing countries).¹⁹ Also there were only four HQDs and two HQDs from Group B among the top 50 of oil exporting countries. Among the top 20 oil exporting there are only five countries categorized as democracies and among the top 10 this number even drops to a single country, which is Norway. (compare Table A5 in Appendix)

c) Conclusion

The conclusion of this analysis is that there is either no relationship between the total oil production or oil exports and the quality of democracy after a country has become democratic, or a relationship cannot be elaborated since most of the HQDs and most of the other democracies do neither produce nor export crude oil.

A relationship in the occurrence of democracy and major oil production or oil exports (dependence on oil wealth) might exist – this probably depends on the time when the oil production started, before becoming democratic or afterwards. It looks like that major oil exporting countries are less likely to be democratic. This relationship of oil exports seems to be more significant compared to the production of oil and indicates a certain validity in the often observation mentioned in the EIU 2010 on the strong negative impact of reliance on oil wealth on democratic development. (EIU 2010, p. 16)

¹⁹ The categorization of democracy follows the same method: A country has to be categorized as democratic on both democracy indexes.

6. Factors of the State and the Political System

6.1. State failure

The state territory, the people of the state (citizens) and the state authority are considered to be the three basic elements by which a (national) state is traditionally defined.²⁰ (Nohlen and Grotz 2011, p. 584) The state authority consists of the monopoly over the legitimate violence within the territory of the state and of the sovereignty to the external world.²¹ (ibid, p. 584; Nohlen and Schultze 2010, p. 1016) The monopoly over the legitimate violence is used by the state for the implementation and enforcement of its decisions. The use of force of a state usually needs certain legitimacy which in modern democracies is both derived and limited by the “sovereignty of the people”.²² (Nohlen and Grotz 2011, p. 584; Nohlen and Schultze 2010, p. 1016) The degree of the monopoly over the legitimate violence in practice differs among states. Some states do have a greater power over their territory and some states do not have the full monopoly on the legitimate use of force, for instance Somalia. Besides the ability to use force states do (should) also have certain tasks to fulfill, e.g. the protection of the citizens and their rights. (Nohlen and Grotz 2011, p. 584) But not all states can fulfill those responsibilities.

Possibly a relationship between the state’s control over the legitimate use of force, its fulfillment of certain tasks and democracy can be drawn – both factors could affect the democratic process in a state, the easiest example would be the connection between the monopoly over legitimate violence on the rule of law: If a state loses its ability to exercise the legitimate use of force than the implementation of the rule of law – since it needs executive power to do so – will suffer as well. Another example concerns the tasks of a state, for instance if a state cannot ensure the sufficient conditions for participation of its citizens.

The above mentioned difficulties state can have in the control of the monopoly over violence or in fulfilling certain tasks is usually expressed as state failure. State failure is a term about the structural deficits in action and performance or capacity of a state. (ibid, p. 598) According to Global Policy states are considered to be „Failed States“ when they can

²⁰ Translated by the author: Staatsterritorium = state territory; Staatsvolk = people of the state; Staatsgewalt = state authority.

²¹ Translated by the author: Gewaltmonopol = monopoly over the legitimate violence; Souveranität nach außen = sovereignty to the external world.

²² Translated by the author: Volkssouveranität = sovereignty of the people.

no longer perform basic functions such as security, governance or education usually because of extreme poverty or fractious violence. In this power vacuum people can fall victim to crime and competing factions. State failure does not only occur because of internal factors. The destabilization of a state can knowingly be fueled by foreign governments. (Global Policy 2012)


This section will analyze the relationship between “state failure” and the quality of democracy. For the analysis in respect to the state’s authority, its monopoly over the use of force and its capacities, for instance to provide public services, the Failed State Index 2010 (FSI) will be used. The Failed State Index 2010 consists of twelve indicators to measure state vulnerability are: Demographic Pressures, Refugees / internally displaced persons, Group Grievance, Human Flight, Uneven Development, Economic Decline, Delegitimization of the State, Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention. In addition the capabilities of 5 core state institutions are assessed, idiosyncratic factors and surprises are identified and the analyzed countries are ranked and placed on a map that shows their risk history. It includes 177 countries. The organization Funds for Peace, which creates this index in collaboration with Foreign Policy, regards a failed state as one which is failing several attributes, such as: loss of physical control of its territory or monopoly on the legitimate use of force; erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services. The Fund for Peace uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) to generate the scores of the index. (The Fund for Peace 2011)

The results are regarded as » (...) snapshots of state vulnerability or risk of violence for one time period each year. « (Foreign Policy 2011) The Failed State Index 2010 covers the period May until December 2009. The total score, on a scale 0-120, is the sum of the 12 indicators. The higher the total score of a country the less stable it is regarded – a country that has an aggregate score between 90 and 120 falls in the “alert zone” and is considered to have a critical status. According to Funds for Peace the CAST methodology has been peer-reviewed in several different fields including experts and independent scholars, government institutions, and private-sector agencies. (The Fund for Peace 2011)

The two axis graphs of FSI 2010 with each democracy index indicate a strong linear negative relationship between state failure and the quality of democracy.


The computed correlations between the FSI 2010 with the Democracy Ranking 2010 for 67 observations are -0.914622 and with the EIU 2010 it is -0.880704. These correlations are strong and verify a strong linear negative relationship between state failure and the quality of democracy.

Figure 13: Failed State Index 2010 / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own Illustration

Figure 14: Failed State Index 2010 / EIU 2010



Own Illustration

Table 7: Failed State Index 2010 Scores of HQDs

HQDs

Country	Failed State Index 2010 Score
Australia	27.30
Austria	27.20
Canada	27.90
Denmark	22.90
Finland	19.30
Germany	35.40
Ireland	22.40
Netherlands	27.90
New Zealand	23.90
Norway	18.70
Sweden	20.90
Switzerland	21.80

HQDs Group B

Country	Failed State Index 2010 Score
Belgium	32.00
Iceland	29.80
Luxembourg	27.30
Malta	48.20
United Kingdom	33.90
United States	35.30

Own Illustration.

Source of Data: The Fund for Peace 2011

A comparison of the HQD shows that all of them including the HQD Group B countries had relatively low values on the FSI 2010 and a ranked among the last (best) 20 – except Malta which ranks on 145 out of 177.

Conclusion

The relationship between “state failure” and the quality of democracy within democracies is strong, at least according to the indexes. States with high levels democratic quality have low low “levels” of “state failure” and vice versa. Some countries among the regarded democracies, which usually have lower scores on the democracy indexes, have high values in the Failed State Index 2010 indicating certain “state failure”. Sri Lanka (96), Colombia (88), Philippines (87), Moldova (84) and Indonesia (83) for instance achieved high scores on the Failed State Index 2010 and were labeled with the category “Warning”. (ibid)

The direction of the relationship is still not exactly clear. Larry Diamond argues » Yet, not any country can become a democracy at any particular moment, and certainly not quickly. Failed states pose among the most difficult challenges for democratization. « (Diamond 2006, p. 114) Diamond further argues that the democratization of non democratic regimes that remain (“tough cases”) is not simple because they lack, among other conditions - e.g. civil society, more developed levels of income per capita, democratic attitudes and values - the more basic conditions of a viable political order. Diamond regards a capable state (“having a state”) as precondition before a country can have a democratic regime: political institutions that exercise authority over the territory; maintaining order through an effective monopoly over the means of violence; extracting and distributing revenue; making and executing policies; producing public goods. (ibid, p. 93-94) However even if a relationship between state failure and democratization does exist, it is not necessarily valid for the quality of democracy. Another interesting and in this case relevant relationship exists between state failure and the rule of law. The FSI 2010 has negative correlations of - 0.849601 with the sum of the factors of the Rule of Law Index 2009 for 25 observations and -0.886573 with the WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 (Score) for 67 observations. Considering the rule of law as a dimension of democratic quality, as Diamond and Morlino do, it is likely that the democratic quality would be negatively influenced by the attributes of state failure. This would especially be the case when a “decrease” in the monopoly on the legitimate use of force occurs which in turn would affect the law enforcement ability of the state. Delegitimization of the state could have a negative effect on vertical accountability; another dimension of democratic quality by Diamond and Morlino.

(Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21-23) A relationship from state failure on the quality of democracy seems likely but cannot be verified within this analysis. High levels of democracy might help or facilitate building a more stable state.²³ Still, this would probably be likely to happen in the medium to long run. Considering a certain period e.g. one year, a sharp decline in state failure would probably lead to a decline in the democratic quality as well but not vice versa.

Another interesting observation is that the FSI 2010 strongly correlates with GDP per capita 2009 and GNI per capita PPP 2009, even among democracies. The computed correlations for 67 observations are -0.852378 with GDP per capita 2009 and -0.884745 with GNI per Capita PPP 2009 and thus they indicate a strong negative relationship. The lower the per capita income or economic output the higher are the values on the FSI, indicating attributes of a state failure. The correlation with the income Gini coefficient (2000-2010) however, is 0.539990 and therefore only medium strong and not as significant as the other two economic indicators.²⁴ A certain positive relationship seems to exist with a tendency that more income unequal societies have higher scores on the FSI 2010. Still this relationship is not strong and not significant. The Failed State Index has uneven development and economic decline among its 12 indicators. In this case the economic indicators could probably be considered the independent variables that have an influence on state failure. (Funds for Peace 2011; World Bank 2011a; World Bank 2011b)

6.2. State fragility

An international agreed definition of state fragility does not seem to exist. In a working paper of the International Department for Development the authors focus their definition of state fragility (fragile states) on the lack of political will to provide services and / or on weak capacity. States are considered to be fragile when their government is unable or unwilling to deliver the core functions to its people. (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, p. 4)

The state fragility index tries to measure how fragile a state is. 163 countries are assessed of which the total population is greater than 500.000. » The Fragility Matrix scores each country on both Effectiveness and Legitimacy in four performance dimensions: Security,

²³ The categorization of “stable” is taken by Funds for Peace ” for countries that have low values on the FSI as the opposite to “critical” for countries with the highest values. (The Fund for Peace 2011)

²⁴ The three correlations were computed by the author of this thesis using the data of the World Bank for 2009 and the Failed State Index 2010.


Political, Economic, and Social, at the end of the year 2009. « (Marshall and Cole 2009a, p. 7) The scores are then combined on eight indicators and rated from 0 (“no fragility”) to 25 (“extreme fragility”).

» A country’s fragility is closely associated with its state capacity to manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and continuing progressive development. « (ibid, p. 7)

This index has some similarities with the Failed State Index but it differs in the used indicators and the meaning of the results. The State Fragility Index focuses on the capacities of the state: The two main analyzed dimensions are legitimacy and effectiveness – these two dimensions are rated in the above listed four dimensions. (Marshall and Cole 2009a, p. 7)


This chapter will briefly analyze the relationship between state fragility and the quality of democracy. The scatter boxes the State Fragility Index 2009 (SFI 2009) and each of both democracy indexes show a negative linear relationship.

Figure 15: State Fragility Index 2009 / EIU



Own illustration

Figure 16: State Fragility Index 2009 / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration

The respectively correlations for the observed democracies (67 observations) indicate a negative linear relationship too: -0.704280 between EIU 2010 and SFI 2009; -0.808204 between Democracy Ranking 2010 and SFI 2009. The correlation between the SFI 2009 and the Democracy Ranking 2010 is considerably higher than with the EIU 2010. While

the correlation the EIU 2010 is medium strong the correlation with the Democracy Ranking 2010 can be considered to be strong.

Also all assessed HQDs and HQD Group B countries achieve the best scores ranging from 0 to 2. (Marshall and Cole 2009a, p. 5-6)

Economic indicators including the GDP per capita are considered within the assessment of the State Fragility Index. An interesting observation is the relationship between the SFI 2009 and two of the previously used economic indicators exists as well: The correlation between the SFI 2009 and GDP per capita 2009 for the 67 observations is -0.607557 and with GNI per capita PPP 2009 (67 observations) the correlation is -0.723339 and remarkably higher. The correlation between the income Gini coefficient and the SFI 2009 (observations) is 0.429234 and therefore positive but not as strong as with the other two economic indicators.²⁵ Those results indicate a certain relationship between state fragility and economical output or income. When all countries, not only democracies are analyzed, the relationship between income and the SFI score is even higher: In the global report 2009 the authors find a high correlation (adjusted R^2) of -0.7596 between the State Fragility Index Score and GDP per capita of all analyzed countries for the year 2004. According to this result there is a negative relationship between income per capita and state fragility as well. It is also pointed out, that almost all net oil-producing countries have fragility scores far greater than would be expected for their level of income - compare figure 17. (Marshall and Cole 2009b, p. 14-15)

The relationship between oil-production and state fragility seem to be higher if all countries are analyzed than the relationship between oil-production and the quality of democracy as previously analyzed only for democracies.


Conclusion

A medium strong to strong relationship does exist between state fragility and the quality of democracy, at least according to the indexes. The direction of the relationship is not clear. The author of this thesis could not find a plausible explanation how the state fragility is related to or influencing the quality of democracy. The relationship seems more difficult than it looked like in the beginning of the analysis. The definition and the methodology

²⁵ All three correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.

used by the State Fragility Index make conclusions on the quality of democracy difficult. However, it is possible that state fragility affects the rule of law negatively which in turn could affect the quality of democracy. The relationship of state fragility and the rule of law is not definite because the latter is not included in the index.

Figure 17: Relationship between GDP per capita and State Fragility Index 2004



Source: Marshall and Cole 2009b, p. 14

6.3. Press Freedom


This chapter will analyze the relationship between freedom of press and the quality of democracy. The Press Freedom Index (PFI) 2009 will be used as an indicator and its relationship to the democracy indexes will be examined for democracies. The PFI measured the violations of press freedom in 175 countries for the stated period. According to Reporters Without Borders the index tries to reflect » (...) the degree of freedom that journalists and news organisations enjoy in each country, and the efforts made by the authorities to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. « (Reporters Without Borders n.d.)

This index is compiled every year by Reporters Without Borders on basis of questionnaires which are completed by journalists and media experts around the world. The index for 2009 reflects press freedom violations between September 2008 and August 2009. (ibid)

The index is based on a questionnaire which assesses the state of press freedom in each country. Included are violations affecting journalists directly and news media as well as the degree of impunity enjoyed by people responsible for the press freedom violations. The level of self-censorship in each country, the media's ability to investigate and criticize, the legal framework for the media and the degree of independence of the public media are also measured. The final score includes assessed financial pressure as well. Abuses by armed militias and other pressure groups are taken into account too. The lower the score a country has on this index – with 0 being the lowest achievable score - the better is the situation of freedom of the press in this country. (ibid)


Plotting the PFI 2009 on a scatter box with the respectively democracy index show a certain negative relationship between both variables. In general the better countries perform on the democracy indexes the better they seem to perform on the PFI (lower score) and vice versa though not all observations fit into this relationship.

Figure 18: Press Freedom Index 2009 / EIU 2010



Own illustration

Figure 19: Press Freedom Index 2009 / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration

The correlations between the PFI 2009 and the democracy indexes for 67 observations are lower than the author of this thesis had expected: -0.584652 with the EIU 2010 and -0.660552 with the Democracy Ranking 2010.²⁶ The results, especially with the Democracy Ranking 2010, indicate a certain positive relationship between press freedom and the

²⁶ The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.

quality of democracy since 0 is the best possible value to achieve in the PFI and the negative correlation is therefore to be interpreted in the opposite direction.

A comparison of the HQDs shows that all the HQDs and HQDs Group B countries had a maximum score of 4,00 on the PFI 2009 with the Scandinavian countries and Ireland ranking on the top of this index with a score of 0. This means that press freedom (according to the PFI 2009) seem to be a similarity HQDs do have. Press freedom itself is still not a sufficient factor that leads to a high quality of democracy and the direction of the relationship between both is not exactly clear. Considering the dimension of freedom by Diamond and Morlino - which includes freedom of expression, thought and information – press freedom can be regarded within this dimension. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 26) This link and the use of press freedom in the assessment of both democracy indexes, allows considering press freedom as the independent variable. (EIU 2010, p. 40-42; Campbell 2010)

The PFI 2009 ranking does not reflect the rankings of the democracy indexes. Countries as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which do perform quite well on the PFI 2009 but do not make it among the top ranks on either of the two democracy indexes.²⁷ Other examples are Ghana, Mali and Trinidad & Tobago which perform pretty well on the PFI 2009 (within the top 30 ranks) but on contrary do not perform that well on the democracy indexes – Spain and France for instance were rated worse in 2009 than those three countries and do not make it within the top 40 of the PFI 2009. (Reporters Without Borders n.d.)

Conclusion

The relationship, as indicated by the correlations, between press freedom and the quality of democracy is weaker than initially expected by the author of this thesis. However, all HQDs share high degrees of press freedom. Considering the dimension of freedom of Diamond and Morlino, and the inclusion of press freedom in the assessments of the democracy indexes, press freedom can be considered the independent variable that influences the functioning or the quality of democracy.

²⁷All three Baltic States rank among the top 30 on the Democracy Ranking 2009. The EIU 2009 on the other hand categorizes all three Baltic States as “Flawed Democracies” with ranks between 33 and 48.

Table 8: Press Freedom Index 2009 Scores for HQDs

HQDs

Country	Press Freedom Index 2009 Score
Australia	3.13
Austria	3.00
Canada	3.70
Denmark	0.00
Finland	0.00
Germany	3.50
Ireland	0.00
Netherlands	1.00
New Zealand	3.00
Norway	0.00
Sweden	0.00
Switzerland	1.0

HQDs Group B

Country	Press Freedom Index 2009 Score
Belgium	2.5
Iceland	2.0
Luxembourg	4.0
Malta	2.50
United Kingdom	4.00
United States	4.00

**Own illustration. Source of Data:
Reporters Without Borders n.d.**

6.4. Political rights and civil liberties

The Freedom in the World survey by Freedom House (Freedom House Index) tries to evaluate the »state of global freedom as experienced by individuals. « (Freedom House n.d.) Freedom is defined as » (...) the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination « and is measured in two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties.²⁸ (ibid)

The survey does not rate the performance of governments, but rather the right and freedoms enjoyed by individuals in reality. More emphasis is placed whether these rights are implemented in practice instead of the presence of legal rights. The Freedom in the World Survey 2010 contained reports on 194 countries and 14 related and disputed territories. The ratings reach from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (lowest degree of freedom) and the status designations of “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “Not Free” are assigned to each country. The observation period is between January and December 2009. (Freedom House n.d.)

²⁸ » Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. « (Freedom House 2011)

» The survey findings are reached after a multilayered process of analysis and evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars. Although there is an element of subjectivity inherent in the survey findings, the ratings process emphasizes intellectual rigor and balanced and unbiased judgments. « (ibid)

The relationship between the Freedom House Index and the democracy indexes can be ambiguous. Although the purpose of the Freedom in the World Survey is to measure freedom Gastil for instance argues that it is “essentially a survey on democracy”. (Gastil 1991, p. 22) The range of the measured factors however is not as broad as in both of the mainly used democracy indexes. However, this index will be considered in this thesis by its own stated purpose: as a measurement of political rights and civil liberties. Regarding the possible relationship between political rights and civil liberties, arguments of Diamond and Morlino could be helpful. The authors note that the different elements of democracy are interactive and overlapping and they continue: » Without extensive protection for and facilitation of civil and political right, many citizens will not have the ability to participate in the political process, both in the electoral arena and outside. « (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 29) The two categories of the Freedom House Index are exactly the factors Diamond and Morlino, as quoted above, argue are necessary for participation. The authors further consider civil and political rights to be crucial to vigorous participation and competition of interests, organizations and parties which make for responsiveness and horizontal accountability. (ibid, p. 29)

Considering the arguments of Diamond and Morlino the Freedom House Index can be regarded as the independent variable in this analysis. Democracy, after occurring, probably influences the rights and liberties of its citizens. But after becoming democratic, the degree of political rights and civil liberties can influence the dimension of participation within that society. The latter link is in this case more relevant to this analysis since the quality of existing democracies is analyzed.

A simple correlation analysis between the Freedom in the World Survey and both democracy indexes for the 67 democracies result in the following correlations: -0.826980 with the Democracy Ranking 2010 and -0.703242 with the EIU 2010.²⁹ The relationship can be interpreted as medium strong to strong. Countries with a higher quality of democracy tend to have more political rights and civic liberties and vice versa. Since the lowest value of the Freedom House Index is 1, the relationship between rights and

²⁹ The correlations are based on the authors own calculations.

freedoms and the quality of democracy is positive. The higher correlation with the Democracy Ranking is likely because of the inclusion of the Freedom in the World Survey in this index: The dimension “Politics” is weighted with a total of 50 % and within this dimension the indicators the aggregated scores for “political rights” and “civil liberties” of Freedom House are included with a weighting of 25 %. (Campbell, 2010) This means that both indicators of the Freedom in the World Survey have a total effect of 12,5 % on the final score of the Democracy Ranking.

All HQDs and countries in HQDs Group B achieve the best score on the Freedom House Index 2010 which is 1 and are categorized as “free”. On the contrary not all countries with this score are HQDs and in deed some of them are “medium ranks” of the democracy indexes: Chile, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia.³⁰ (Freedom House n.d.)

Conclusion

Between political rights, civil liberties and the quality of democracy – at least according to the indexes – there is a medium strong to strong positive linear relationship. Considering the arguments of Diamond and Morlino the Freedom House Index can be regarded as the independent variable within this analysis. This means that the degree of political rights and civil liberties, does to certain extend has influence on the functioning or the quality of democracy.

6.5. The rule of law

»WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED (...) to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and (...) « (UN 1945, Preamble)

» The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: (..) and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; « (UN 1945, Article 1)

³⁰ Some of the countries that score “1” on the Freedom in the World Survey were not rated by the democracy indexes due to their small population, e.g. Micronesia and Palau.

Referring to the above quoted parts of the Preamble and of Article 1, the concept of the rule of law is embedded in the Charter of the UN. (UNROL n.d.) But what exactly does rule of law mean? According to UNROL the modern concept of the rule of law involves: a system of governance based on non-arbitrary rules, an ideal of accountability, fairness in the protection and vindication of rights, prevention of punishment of wrongs and it is deeply linked to the principle of justice. (ibid) The former UN Secretary-General states a more comprehensive definition of the Rule of Law:

» For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.
« (UN 2004)

It is further continued that the rule of law requires equality before the law, measures to ensure the principles of supremacy of law, separation of powers, fairness in the application of the law, legal certainty, participation in decision-making and the avoidance of arbitrariness as well as procedural and legal transparency. (ibid)

The Oxford Dictionary defines the rule of law as » the restriction of the arbitrary exercise of power by subordinating it to well-defined and established laws. « (Oxford University Press 2012) According to both definitions the rule of law includes the absence of arbitrariness in the exercise of power. The UNROL conceptualization goes further and includes (the ideal) of accountability and fairness regarding the protection and vindication of rights. Both definitions do not draw a link to democracy. The UNROL nevertheless states on their website that the » (...) core values of and principles of the UN include (...) the recognition that peace and security, development, human rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.« (UNROL n.d.) Even if the rule of law and democracy are (among other factors) interlinked this does not draw a clear relationship.

Diamond and Morlino regard the rule of law as one of the dimensions of the quality of democracy. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 21-23) O'Donnell regards the rule of law as one of the » (...) essential pillars upon which any high quality democracy rests. « (O'Donnell 2004b, p. 32) Further the author argues that HQDs require » (...) a truly democratic rule of law that ensures political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in turn affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state

power. « (ibid, p. 32) For a state that enacts a democratic law O'Donnell lists three conditions: maintaining civil right, maintaining freedoms, political rights and guarantees of a democratic regime and a set of networks of responsibility and accountability. (ibid, p. 36) The same author draws the link between the rule of law and other dimensions of the quality of democracy with which the rule of law work intimately: safety of rights, equality and dignity, effective functioning of accountabilities, and responsiveness of the government. (ibid, p. 32) Diamond and Morlino regard the rule of law as a “procedural dimension” of the quality of democracy. (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 23)³¹ Further the authors argue that »The rule of law is the base upon which every other dimension of democratic quality rests. « (ibid, p.23) Additionally, they think that it is likely that with a weak rule of law participation of poor and marginalized groups will be suppressed, organization and support of many civic groups will not be possible, individual freedoms will be insecure, corruption and the abuse of power will spread, political competition will be unfair and overall democratic responsiveness will be seriously weakened. (ibid, p.23)

Regarding the rule of law as a dimension of (quality of) democracy and all its possible implications enables to draw a link to democracy. The exact relation or exact causality would still not be absolutely clear: (1) the rule of law could be a necessary factor to obtain a high quality of democracy or reinforce it (2) a high quality of democracy could grant or reinforce the rule of law (3) or the relationship could be reciprocal. However considering the arguments of the above quoted authors that the rule of law is the essential pillar of any HQD and that it is the base for other dimensions of democratic quality, it is possible to argue for the first case. (O'Donnell 2004b, p. 32; Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 23) In this case the rule of law can will be considered the independent variable.

In the following part of this chapter the relationship of the rule of law and the quality of democracy will be analyzed statistically and HQDs will be compared. An analysis requires again available data. Possible datasets on the rule of law are the aggregate indicator of Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project for the rule of law and the Rule of Law Index – both indicators are available for the year 2009.

³¹ The authors distinguish between three meanings of quality: procedure, content and results. (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 21-22)

a) WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009

The WGI indicator combines views of enterprises, citizens and expert surveys for every assessed country using data from different institutes, NGO, international organization and think tanks. (World Bank 2011e) The WGI rule of law indicator tries to capture perceptions of the degree of confidence which agents have in the rules of the society, property rights, the police and the courts, the quality of contract enforcement and the likelihood of crime and violence. (Kaufmann et al 2010, p. 4) This index has a dual rating: (1) Governance Score between (approx.) -2.5 and +2.5 with higher values meaning better performance (2) Percentile Rank from 0 to 100 with higher values corresponding to a better outcome in comparison to the other countries. This rating indicated the rank of the country and therefore has a relative character in comparison to all the other measured countries.³² (World Bank 2011e)

Using the data of the WGI rule of law indicator together with the data of the respective democracy indexes and plotting them as scatter boxes including regression lines results in the following graphs:


The graphs for both democracy indexes show a positive linear relationship: the higher the scores of the WGI the rule of law indicator are the higher are the scores on the democracy rankings and vice versa.

The computed correlations for 67 observations of 0.899460 with the EIU 2010 and of 0.895005 with the Democracy Ranking 2010 also show a strong positive linear relationship. Computing the correlations with the percentile ranks of the WGI rule of law indicator and the democracy indexes result in similar strong positive correlations: 0.874915 with the EIU 2010 and 0.868720 with the Democracy Ranking 2010.³³ The latter correlations show that the countries which perform well on the democracy indexes do not only perform well on the WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 in the scores they achieve but also that they do well in a comparison with other countries.

³² Usually percentile ranks of a score provide the percentage of the observations that lie below (or at) that score, e.g. a percentile rank of 85 means that 84 % of the scores of all the other observations are lower the score of the regarded observations.


³³ The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.

Figure 20: WGI Rule of Law 2009 Governance Score / EIU 2010



Own illustration.

Figure 21: WGI Rule of Law 2009 Governance Score / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration.

The comparison of the HDQs show that they all have Government Scores for the Rule of Law Indicator much above the average of all 67 compared democracies which is 0,5566.³⁴

Table 9: WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 for HQDs

Country	WGI Rule of Law 2009 Governance Score	WGI Rule of Law 2009 Percentile Rank
Australia	1.74	95.3
Austria	1.78	96.2
Canada	1.79	96.7
Denmark	1.9	98.6
Finland	1.96	100
Germany	1.65	92.9
Ireland	1.73	94.8
Malta	1.51	91
Netherlands	1.8	97.2
New Zealand	1.92	99.1
Norway	1.9	98.1
Sweden	1.95	99.5
Switzerland	1.76	95.7

Country	WGI Rule of Law 2009 Governance Score	WGI Rule of Law 2009 Percentile Rank
Belgium	1.38	88.6
Iceland	1.7	93.8
Luxembourg	1.81	97.6
UK	1.73	94.3
USA	1.54	91.5

Own illustration. Source of Data: World Bank 2011e

³⁴ The average of the 67 observations is based on own calculations. The lowest Government Score of the HDQs is 1.65 (Germany) and among the HQDs it is 1.38 (Belgium).

The respective percentile ranks show that the HQDs and HQDs Group B rank among the top of all countries – besides Belgium (88.6) all achieve percentile ranks above 90 meaning that they have better scores than 90 % of all the other globally rated countries. The average percentile rank of all compared 67 democracies is 66.06.³⁵

b) The Rule of Law Index 2009

The Rule of Law Index 2009 unfortunately rates only 35 countries in total among which only 25 of the analyzed democracies are rated. Besides that this ranking has not a single score but rather scores between 0 and 1 for 16 indicators are calculated – of which only 15 are available in the report. (The World Justice Project 2012) A general statistical analysis for all democracies is therefore not possible. An option would be to analyze only the 25 countries which are included in the Rule of Law Index 2009. For such an analysis the scores of the 15 different indicators would probably not much useful, except one wants to analyze the specific factors such as “Governmental and non-governmental checks”. A possibility is to sum up the scores from all factors to obtain a single total score and use this score for an analysis with the democracy indexes.³⁶ Countries which generally have high scores on the factors would have a high total score as well. A country with high scores on only one or two factors and low scores on the other factors would not have a high score in total. This analysis is neither comprehensive nor is it valid to find a relationship - it only can indicate a relationship due to the used methodology. Despite all limitations in this version of the Rule of Law Index, the author of this thesis regards this analysis as useful and valuable due to the methodology of this index.

If only those 25 observations are considered than the graphs do indicate a positive linear relationship between the quality of democracy and the rule of law. The sum of all factors of the Rule of Law Index includes only the available 15 factors and not all 16.


The respective computed correlations are strong: 0.872836 with the EIU 2010 and 0.836200 with the Democracy Ranking 2010.

³⁵ The average of the 67 observations is based on own calculations using the data of WGI (World Bank 2011e).

³⁶ This is a suggestion by the author of this thesis. The authors of the Rule of Law Index do not proceed this way rather they compare the scores of all factors and sub-factors in a regional level and on a basis of similar income levels.


A comparison of the HQDs cannot be done properly because the Rule of Law Index 2009 includes only five of the HQDs (Australia, Austria, Canada, Netherlands, and Sweden) and only one HQD Group B (USA). But it can be stated that all of them perform well on the assessment of the Rule of Law Index 2009 if the aggregate scores are regarded in general. (ibid)

Figure 22: Rule of Law Index 2009 (Sum of all Factors) / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration

Figure 23: Rule of Law Index 2009 (Sum of all Factors) / EIU 2010



Own illustration

c) Conclusion

The analysis with both of the rule of law indicators shows a strong positive relationship between the rule of law and the quality of democracy. Since both indicators are independent from each other the found results are significant. The correlations with the WGI rule of law indicator for all observed 67 democracies are stronger than with the Rule of Law Index 2009 for only 25 observations. In this case an increasing sample does show a stronger relationship which in turn shows the significance of the rule of law dimension. The arguments of the above quoted authors do indicate the causality from rule of law to the quality of democracy. The rule of law can therefore be regarded as a significant influencing factor in the functioning or the quality of democracy.

6.6. System of Government: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism

Among democracies a major classification of the system of government in two categories is possible and frequently done: parliamentary system (parliamentarism) and presidential system (presidentialism). Parliamentarism is understood as:

» (...) a system of government in which the executive (the prime minister and cabinet: collectively, "the government") is chosen by and responsible to an elective body (the legislature), thus creating a single locus of sovereignty at the national level. « (Gerring et al 2009, p. 337)

Presidentialism on contrary is considered as a » (...) a system where policy-making power is divided between two separately elected bodies: the legislature and the president. « (ibid, p. 337) In this system the president is usually directly elected and is actively engaged in the policy making process and therefore plays a political role. (ibid, p. 337) The CIA Factbook also included the selection of the government by the legislature (parliament) and in addition the dual responsibility of the government to the people and to the parliament. The definition of the CIA Factbook for the presidential system is similar as well and includes the separate existence of the executive branch from the legislature, to which the executive is generally not accountable. (CIA, n.d.)

Gerring et al state that various admixtures between these two polar types exist and refer to a semi presidential system. (Gerring et al 2009, p. 337) The authors did an analysis to find out if "parliamentary systems are better" in comparison to presidential systems by analyzing a global data set with a historical measure of parliamentary rule and 14 indicators. (ibid)³⁷ They found a strong relationship the parliamentary system and good governance in particular in the policy areas human development and economic development. (ibid, p. 327) There conclusion drawn by the evidence in their analysis is that parliamentary systems have significant advantages over presidential systems to the extent in which the nature of the executive makes a differences. (ibid, p. 54) The specific causal mechanisms how the structure of the executive possibly influences various policy outcomes remain unexplored. However the authors list plausible possibilities: corporatist interest organization, centralized electoral accountability on the national level, stronger political parties, tighter principle-agent relationship within the bureaucracy, a more

³⁷ For the "score of parliamentarism" the authors used an own conception generated by a three-part coding scheme (0 = presidential, 1 = semi presidential, 2 = parliamentary) that was weighted with the sum of annual scores to include historical influences. (Gerring et al, p. 337-338)

institutionalizes political sphere, decisive leadership, and the capacity for flexible policy. (ibid, p. 355) According to the authors, parliamentarism does in comparison to presidentialism often offer better tools for resolving conflicts between individual or group rationality and collective rationality. This is because parliamentarism integrates a diversity of views and provides greater incentives for actors to reach agreements. (ibid, p. 354) The causal reasoning of the authors is accompanied by the “*ceteris paribus caveat*”: » Parliamentarism should be more successful than presidentialism in coordinating diverse views and interests, all other things being equal. « (ibid, p. 355) As a conclusion the authors observe a higher quality of governance across many policy areas in parliamentary systems. (ibid, p. 355)

Considering the relationship between parliamentary systems and the quality of governance as found by Gerring et al, this makes a relationship between parliamentary systems and the quality of democracy possible as well. A statistical analysis with all 67 democracies in the analyzed sample for the system of governance and the democracy indexes would not make much sense, since this section focuses only on the two types of governance, parliamentarism and presidentialism.³⁸ However, a comparison of the HQDs is possible which will be done in this chapter. The categorization of the respective systems (parliamentary or presidential) was done by using different sources that are listed in the box below.

Comparing the systems of governance of the HQDs shows that all HQDs and HQD Group B countries (except USA) have a parliamentary system. Switzerland can be regarded as a unique case by its structure of a mixed form of parliamentary democracy, direct democracy and federalism. The system categorization of Switzerland in this dichotomous approach still would allow categorizing this country as a parliamentary system.

Interestingly not only the HQDs and HQD Group B countries have parliamentary systems but also the majority of the countries which rank among the top 30 on one of the two democracy rankings have parliamentary systems: Among the top 30 of the Democracy Ranking 2010 only Chile, Costa Rica, France (semi-presidential), Uruguay, and USA have presidential systems. On the EIU 2010 only Costa Rica, South Africa, South Korea,

³⁸ A possible approach for a statistical analysis would be the one which Gerring et al did take by using a three-part coding scheme. (Gerring et al, p. 337)

Uruguay, and USA made it among the top 30 as presidential systems.³⁹ (Democracy Ranking 2011; EIU 2010) This means that in total only seven countries are among the top 30 of one of the two democracy indexes.

Conclusion

In this analysis the system of governance is the independent variable since the choice of the system is not affected by the quality of democracy.

The system of governance seems to have an influence on the quality of democracy. At least this is indicated by a short analysis in respect to the two democracy indexes. The effects might be similar as observed by Gerring et al, particularly in “good governance”. (Gerring et al 2009, p. 327) The reason for that could be the same as Gerring et al state that is the tendency of parliamentarism to offer better conflict solving tools between individual and collective rationality and its integration of a diversity of views and its greater incentives for actors to reach agreements. (ibid, p. 354)

The effects of parliamentarism (dramatic changes) on the quality of governance or the quality on democracy should not be expected immediately after the switch to or the establishment of a parliamentary system as Gerring et al suggest. The effects are likely to cumulate over time due to the affect on actions and expectations by the new institutional rules. (ibid, p. 337-338)

³⁹ For the categorizations of the type of government is based on the data from EIU 2012, CIA Factbook n.d., Fischer Verlag 2012 and The Economist 2012.

7. Social factors

7.1. Corruption

The term corrupt comes from the Latin word “corruptus” with the meaning “to abuse or destroy”. The term can be used in different contexts and varies in its meaning. Political corruption for instance usually involves the misuse of political office for either material or political advantage. Narrowly applied it means the violation of specific laws, usually for a payment and loosely defined it means the deviation from an expected pattern of behavior or an ideal. A certain degree of political corruption is regarded by some authors as inevitable. Bribery is considered as a main tool of corruption and bribes » (...) can be used by private parties to "buy" many things provided by central or local governments, or officials may seek bribes in supplying those things. « (World Bank 2012a)

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) defines corruption as:

» (...) a complex social, political and economic phenomenon that affects all countries. Corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to governmental instability. Corruption attacks the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existing is the soliciting of bribes. Economic development is stunted because foreign direct investment is discouraged and small businesses within the country often find it impossible to overcome the "start-up costs" required because of corruption. « (UNODC n.d.)

Table 10: List of the systems of governance of the HQDs

HQDS		HQDs Group B	
Country	System of Governance	Country	System of Governance
Australia	Parliamentary (1)	Belgium	Parliamentary (1)
Austria	Parliamentary (1)	Iceland	Parliamentary (2)
Canada	Parliamentary (1)	Luxembourg	Parliamentary (1)
Denmark	Parliamentary (1)	Malta	Parliamentary (2)
Finland	Parliamentary (2)	United Kingdom	Parliamentary (1)
Germany	Parliamentary (1)	United States	Presidential (1)
Ireland	Parliamentary (3)		
Netherlands	Parliamentary (1)		
New Zealand	Parliamentary (1)		
Norway	Parliamentary (1)		
Sweden	Parliamentary (1)		
Switzerland	Parliamentary (1) (*)		

Own illustration

Sources:

- (1) Fischer Verlag 2012
- (2) EIU 2012
- (3) 1HCIA n.d

(*) Switzerland is a unique case as described below.

Transparency International (TI) has following definition for corruption:

» Corruption is operationally defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. TI further differentiates between "according to rule" corruption and "against the rule" corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing. « (Transparency International 2011)


While the TI definition focuses on the operational part, the definition of the UNODC highlights the effects and consequences of corruption and draws the linkage to democracy. In this case the categorization of corruption as the independent variable and the quality of democracy as the dependent variable in a two dimensional approach, seems to be legitimate. In deed corruption is used as an indicator for the “political dimension” of the Democracy Ranking 2010 as well as it is one question in the section “functioning of government” in the public opinion surveys of the EIU 2010 which were used at the creation of this index. Both indexes include corruption in their assessment. The weighting of corruption in both indexes is low. (Campbell 2010; EIU 2010, p. 36) The author of this thesis assumed that in a statistical analysis of corruption and the quality of democracy a relationship will occur. How strong this relationship is, is a different question – by the intuition of the author of this thesis, only the inclusion of corruption in to one dimension in each index with an insignificant weighing should have only a relatively small influence in the total scoring since both indexes are multidimensional and consider many factors in each dimension.

In this section the relationship between corruption and the quality of democracy will be analyzed. By intuition corruption should have a negative impact on the quality of democracy. More precise the perceived corruption as measured by the Corruption Perception Index 2010 (CPI) of Transparency International will be used for the analysis. The CPI ranks countries according to the levels of perceived corruption in the public sector. The index combines different sources of information about corruption. It is an aggregate indicator which makes country comparisons possible. (Transparency International 2010, p. 4) 178 countries were assessed in the CPI 2010 with results that were drawn from 13 surveys and assessments. The index rates countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). The CPI 2010 is based on different sources from the years 2009 and 2010. The majority of the sources cover the year 2009. (ibid) Although the

perceived corruption must not equal the actual corruption in a society it will be a good indicator for the degree of corruption. The actual corruption in a society is probably impossible to measure completely and probably only a small proportion becomes public.


A simple scatter box of the CPI 2010 with the two democracy indexes, with 67 observations each results in the following figures. (Figures 26 and 27) Both figures and regression lines indicate a strong linear relationship between the CPI 2010 and the respectively used democracy index. The better countries performed on the CPI (high values) the better they also performed on the democracy indexes and vice versa.

Figure 24: CPI 2010 / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration

Figure 25: CPI 2010 / EIU 2010



Own illustration

The computed correlations are strong and indicate a strong negative linear relationship between corruption and the quality of democracy: 0.878430 between the Democracy Ranking 2010 and CPI 2010 and 0.900749 between EIU 2010 and CPI 2010 – since higher values on the CPI mean less (perceived) corruption.

Table 11: CPI 2010 Scores for HQDs

HQDs		HQDs Group B	
Country	CPI 2010 Score	Country	CPI 2010 Score
Australia	8.7	Belgium	7.1
Austria	7.9	Iceland	8.5
Canada	8.9	Luxembourg	8.5
Denmark	9.3	Malta	5.6
Finland	9.2	United Kingdom	7.6
Germany	7.9	United States	7.1
Ireland	8.0		
Netherlands	8.8		
New Zealand	9.3		
Norway	8.6		
Sweden	9.2		
Switzerland	8.7		

Own illustration. Source of Data: Transparency International 2010; 2011

A comparison of the HQDs shows that all of them, including Group B, do have relatively high scores on the CPI 2010. All of them have scores above the average of the regarded 67 democracies which is 5.19.⁴⁰

Conclusion

In this case the interpretation of the relationship is easier than in some other used variables: The direction of the relationship goes from corruption to quality of democracy. High corruption levels affect the quality of democracy negatively.⁴¹ Through this analysis it is not possible to elaborate the degree of influence of corruption on the quality of democracy. As the definition of the UNODC states corruption has negative effects on democratic institutions, the rule of law and governmental stability. This in turn seems to affect the quality of democracy.

An interesting, although not surprising, relationship exists also between corruption and economic development. The CPI 2010 strongly correlates with economic output and income within democracies (67 observations): 0.845898 with GDP per capita 2009 and

⁴⁰ The value for the average is based on own calculations based on the data of Transparency International.

⁴¹ As stated before the CPI represents the perceived corruption in a country. Even if the perceived corruption does not equal the actual corruption it is a good indicator.

0.844234 with GNI per capita PPP.⁴² This relationship indicates that higher levels of economic development is related to lower levels or (perceived) corruption. In this case it is likely that economic development influences the corruption levels.

Another interesting relationship is that the CPI 2010 is highly correlated with the indicators of the rule of law. For 67 observations the correlations between CPI 2010 and the WGI Rule of Law Indicators are: 0.915973 with the percentile ranks and 0.945423 with the government scores. The correlation with the Rule of Law Index for 25 observations is 0.943368.⁴³ There is a strong positive relationship between the rule of law and corruption. Indeed those are the strongest correlations between (not related) variables which were analyzed in this thesis. The relationship is probably a mutual one. However, it will not be further elaborated within this thesis.

7.2. Education

The effects education of the citizens can have on democracy can be manifold. The individual and collective choices of a higher educated population would probably be different than the choices of a lower educated education. Especially the knowledge and understanding about political, economic and social conditions would probably have an effect on the demands made by citizens. In his book “Reason, Religion and Democracy” Dennis C. Müller argues that » Knowledgeable citizens are more likely to choose proper solutions to community problems or representatives who make the right choices. «⁴⁴ (Müller 2009, p. 318) Diamond and Morlino argue that » (...) a fundamental condition for widespread participation in a good democracy is broad diffusion of basic education and literacy, and with it a modicum of knowledge about government and public affairs. « (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 24) Participation is one of the 8 dimensions the authors state as a “dimension of the quality of democracy”. (ibid) Another link between democracy and education is drawn by Sodaro:

» As a general rule, there is close correlation between democracy, on the one hand, and high educational levels and multiple sources of information on the other. This positive correlation is consistent with our hypothesis that education and free information can help promote democracy. « (Sodaro 2004, p. 219)

⁴² The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.

⁴³ The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.

⁴⁴ “Right choices” is not explicitly explained. Probably it means the “better choice” for the citizens – although a decision or a regulation does not necessarily need to satisfy all the citizens.

O'Donnell emphasizes the availability of information and considers » (...) the availability of free, pluralistic, and nonmonopolized or state-censored information (...) as a necessary condition for the existence of a democratic regime. « (O'Donnell 2004a, p. 37) In the feasibility study for a Quality Ranking of Democracy David Campbell et al remark that » (...) knowledge is not only being understood as supporting the economic performance, but knowledge is also being regarded as a crucial factor for the quality of a democracy. « (Campbell and Sükösd 2002, p. 6) Also the authors remark that by a circulation of a broader range of "high-quality knowledge" among a high proportion of members of a society, the democratic quality of that society is substantially reinforced. (ibid, p. 6) As already quoted also Dennis Müller argues in a similar way, stating that education should improve the quality of collective decisions in a democracy. (Müller 2009, p. 3)

The quoted authors argue in favor for an influence of education and knowledge on the occurrence and the quality of democracy. On the other hand it can be argued that a well functioning democracy has an effect on education or knowledge diffusion – for instance by offering several public education opportunities for all citizens. The relationship between education or knowledge and the quality of democracy is certainly not clear and it probably might be reciprocal. However considering the above mentioned arguments of the several authors a relationship from education or knowledge on the quality of democracy seem to be valid.

This chapter will analyze the relationship between education and the quality of democracy. Measuring knowledge or education accurately is not easy and maybe only possible to a certain degree. However, most of the indicators measure education in a quantitative form, e.g. years of received education or years of compulsory education measured in years. Measuring education qualitatively and quantifying it afterwards is more difficult.⁴⁵ Although the significance of qualitative measures of knowledge or education would probably be higher for the analysis of the relationship of education and the quality of democracy, for the author of this thesis it is only possible to use existing and available data. The author of this thesis decided to use the following two indicators for the analysis: the literacy rate and the mean years of schooling.⁴⁶

a) Literacy Rate


⁴⁵ Quantitative measure of knowledge or education here means quantitative measurable variables such as years in school, the population's rate of graduates, ect. Qualitative measuring here means the real level of knowledge or the quality of education.

⁴⁶ The selection of those two indicators is subjective based on the author's view that they could be relevant.

The UNESCO defines a literate person as » (...) someone who can both read and write with understanding, a short, simple statement on his or her everyday life. A person who can only read but not write, or can write but not read is considered to be illiterate. A person who can only write figures, his or her name or a memorized ritual phrase is also not considered literate. « (UN Statistics Division 2011)


Having a high literacy rate does not necessarily lead to democracy or vice versa for which Cuba and Belarus are the best examples. The question which arises is if literacy rates make a difference among democracies. In this section the relationship between the literacy rate and the quality of democracy will be analyzed. The data of the literacy rate is taken from the online database of the UN Statistical Division which uses the data of the UNESCO Institute of Statistics. The accurate values are unfortunately not available for all the countries due to several reasons. For some countries, especially high developed countries e.g. Australia, Austria and Canada, estimated rates were used. (ibid)

Figure 26: Adult literacy rate 2005-2009 / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration

Figure 27: Adult literacy rate 2005-2009 / EIU 2010



Own illustration

Both graphs do not show a strong relationship between the quality of democracy and the adult literacy rate. Only a weak positive relationship seem to valid which is not significant. In deed looking at the computed correlations, the relationship can be regarded as weak or medium: 0.568532 between the Democracy Ranking 2010 and the adult literacy rate and 0.412479 between the EIU 2010 and the adult literacy rate for 67 observations.

The statistical relationship between adult literacy rate and the quality of democracy is not strong. A comparison of the HQDs show that they all do have estimated literacy rates of 99 %. Those rates are higher than in comparison to most of the other democracies but they only represent estimations. (ibid) Another concept which could be more relevant than literacy is “functional literacy” but there is no data available.⁴⁷

b) Mean years of schooling (of adults)

Another available measure about education is the average years of schooling of the population on a certain year. The “Mean years of schooling (of adults)” indicator of the Human Development Index (HDI) measures the » Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels using official durations of each level.« (UNDP 2011) The data for the year 2009 of this index was taken from the online database of the HDR statistic website. Most of the values are estimates based on linear interpolation. (ibid)

Figure 28: Mean years of schooling / Democracy Ranking 2010





Figure 29: Mean years of schooling / EIU 2010



⁴⁷ The UNESCO defines a person as functionally literate who can engage in all activities that require literacy for effective functioning of the group and community and also who is able to use of reading, writing and calculating for the own community's development. (UNESCO 2011)

The graphs indicate a certain positive linear relationship between the mean of the average schooling education of the population above 25 and the democracy indexes. The computed correlations (67 observations) also do indicate a certain relationship: 0.625676 with the EIU 2010 and 0.753260 with the Democracy Ranking 2010 – both correlations are medium strong to strong meaning a certain positive relationship exists.⁴⁸ The higher correlation with the Democracy Ranking 2010 might be explained due to the use of “knowledge” as one dimension of this index. The weighting of knowledge however is only 10 % and the indicator of the average of schooling years of the adult population above 25 was not used in the “knowledge” dimension but rather indicators as the school enrollment (secondary and tertiary) and the pupil-teacher ratio. (Campbell 2010) The correlation in the Democracy Ranking 2010 can not merely be explained by the “knowledge” dimension this index has. The EIU 2010 does not include any educational indicators except the literacy rate meaning that its correlation with the average schooling cannot be explained either by the conception of the index itself. (EIU 2010)

A comparison of the HQDs and the HQDs Group B shows that the average years of schooling of the respective population of those countries for the age 25 and above was relatively high in 2009 – in comparison the global average of schooling of all countries in 2009, of which the data is available was 7.55 years.⁴⁹

Table 12: Mean years of Schooling in HQDs

HQDs

Country	Mean Years of Schooling 2009
Australia	12
Austria	10,6
Canada	12
Denmark	11,3
Finland	10,2
Germany	12,2
Ireland	11,6
Netherlands	11,5
New Zealand	12,5
Norway	12,6
Sweden	11,7
Switzerland	10,9

HQDs Group B

Country	Mean Years of Schooling 2009
Belgium	10,8
Iceland	10,3
Luxembourg	10
Malta	9,9
United Kingdom	9,2
United States	12,4

Own illustration. Data source: UNPD 2011

⁴⁸ The correlations were computed by the author of this thesis.

⁴⁹ The average was calculated by the author of this thesis and is based on the data of the HDI 2012 for 175 observations. The second decimal of the value is rounded.

c) Conclusion

A strong relationship between the literacy rate and the quality of democracy could not be found. The correlations (0.5685 and 0.4124) between literacy rate and the democracy indexes are positive and do indicate a certain relationship but this relationship can only be considered to be weak or medium strong. In this case - in which the relationship between education and the quality of democracy is analyzed for a certain period - education can be considered to be the independent variable, since the average education level of a society mostly depends on education policies from previous periods.

The average years in schooling do not necessarily mean a higher level of education because the length of education does not necessarily imply anything about the quality of the education. However it can be used as an indication of education. Even though a certain relationship between this education indicator and the quality of democracy seem to exist, the length of the years in schooling does not necessarily reflect or indicate the quality of democracy: Czech Republic (12.5), Estonia (12) and Israel (11.9) have had higher averages in years of schooling than the majority of the HQDs. (UNDP 2011) Still it looks like, considering the correlations and the mean years of schooling in HQDs, that there is a certain positive relationship between mean years in schooling. This in turn does indicate a certain relationship between education and the quality of democracy. The relationship is possibly as the above quoted argument of Diamond and Morlino, that broad diffusion of basic education, literacy and certain knowledge about government and public affairs are a fundamental condition for widespread participation. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 24) Enhancing this argument it could be argued that the higher the education of a society's citizens is, the better or more effective the participation of those citizens can be which in turn would affect the democratic quality in that society.

7.3. Voter Turnout

Participation as one dimension of the quality of democracy as suggested by Diamond and Morlino can occur in many different forms. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 23-24) The authors of the EIU 2010 consider participation to be a necessary component because apathy and abstention are considered to be enemies of democracy. (EIU 2010, p. 30) The authors of the index continue by stating the requirement of freely chosen and active

participation of citizens: » Democracies flourish when citizens are willing to participate in public debate, elect representatives and join political parties. « (ibid, p.30)

One of the most basic forms of participation in democratic systems is, the participation of citizens in elections. The importance of voter turnout in democracies is often mentioned by various authors and political scientists. Arend Lijphart, for instance, regards low (and unequal) turnout as a problem which is » (...) part of a more general democratic dilemma, namely the conflict between two basic democratic ideals: political participation and political equality. « (Lijphart 1998, p. 1) The author also states that participation is unequal and » (...) systematically biased in favor of privileged citizens (those with better education, higher incomes, and greater wealth) and it is biased against less privileged citizens. « (ibid, p. 1) Lijphart lists five reasons to be concerned about low voter turnout: low participation by less privileged citizens; unequal influence; actual turnouts tend to be lower than official turnout number; turnouts in elections besides on national level are particularly low; declining turnouts in most countries. (ibid, p. 3-5)

In this respect the relationship between voter turnout rates and the quality of democracy will be analyzed. For this, again, the two democracy indexes will be used and available data on voter turnouts. The data is taken by the online database of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) which according to own statement » (...) contains the most comprehensive global collection of voter turnout statistics available. « (IDEA 2010) The data of IDEA is available for two voter turnout rates: (1) Voter turnout (VT): The total number of valid and invalid votes divided by the voters' register in percentage. (2) VAP turnout (VAP): The total number of valid and invalid votes divided by the voting age population in percentage. The VAP turnout refers to one of the problems Lijphart listed about the actual turnouts being lower than the official turnouts. Also the IDEA states that the voting age population figures can provide a better picture of participation and that registration figures can be inaccurate or sometimes even unavailable. (ibid)

The EIU 2010 includes the voter turnout (as proportion of population of voting age in parliamentary elections since 2000) in the assessment as one indicator out of nine in the category of "political participation" – if the voter turnout since 2000 was consistently above 70 % that country obtains one 1 point, 0.5 points if it was between 50% and 70 % and 0 points if the turnout was below 50 % or if voting is obligatory. (EIU 2010, p. 37) The authors state that a high turnout is in general regarded as » (...) evidence of the legitimacy

of the current system. « (ibid, p.33) It is also argued in the EIU 2010 that there is a correlation between turnout and overall democracy measures with a tendency of “developed democracies” to have higher turnout than “less established democracies”. (ibid, p.33)

In this analysis the voter turnout will be regarded as an indicator of participation. Therefore and because of the use as indicator in the EIU 2010, voter turnout will be considered as the independent variable.

The correlations between voter turnout and the democracy indexes do not show a significant relationship and there are only weak positive correlations: Between Democracy Ranking 2010 and VAP turnout the correlation is 0.256492 and it is 0.266523 (66 Obs.) with the voter turnout. The correlations for the EIU 2010 are 0.311760 with the VAP turnout and 0.370199 (66 Obs.) with the voter turnout. In both cases the EIU 2010 has a stronger correlation than the Democracy Ranking 2010. This might result because of the fact that voter turnout is one indicator in the EIU 2010. (EIU 2010) On the other hand voter turnout is just one out of 60 indicators in total with similar weighing and such a small portion of weighting of voter turnout does not necessarily need to explain the stronger correlation. A comparison of the HQDs does also not show a similarity. Neither all HQDs nor HQD Group B countries had voter turnouts or VAP turnouts that were above the average of all regarded 67 democracies (VT: 66.51; VAP: 63.51).⁵⁰ Canada and Switzerland, for instance, had lower voter turnout rates and lower VAP turnout rates than the majority of the observed 67 democracies. Also Germany, Finland, Ireland, United Kingdom and United States are just in the middle of the rank of the voter turnout rates among the observed democracies. The only similarity is that all HQDs except Australia do not have compulsory voting. Also among the HQDs Group B only Belgium and Luxembourg do have compulsory voting.

⁵⁰ The average VT and VAP are based on own calculations of the author for the available data of the 67 democracies. Both values are either for the rates of elections in 2009 or of the closest elections to 2009.

Table 13: Voter turnout of HQDs

HQDs

Country	Year	VT (%)	VAP (%)	CPV
Australia	2007	95,17	82,74	Yes
Austria	2008	81,71	75,61	No
Canada	2008	59,52	53,59	No
Denmark	2007	86,59	83,2	No
Finland	2007	65,02	68,18	No
Germany	2009	70,78	64,61	No
Ireland	2007	67,03	68,89	No
Netherlands	2006	80,35	77,48	No
New Zealand	2008	79,46	77,84	No
Norway	2009	76,37	74,74	No
Sweden	2006	81,99	80,6	No
Switzerland	2007	48,28	39,79	No

HQDs Group B

Country	Year	VT (%)	VAP (%)	CVP
Belgium	2007	91,08	86	Yes
Iceland	2009	85,12	84,74	No
Luxembourg	2009	90,93	53,2	Yes
Malta	2008	93,3	98,39	No
UK	2005	61,36	58,32	No
USA	2008	64,36	57,45	No

	VT (%)	VAP (%)
Average:	66,51	63,51

Own illustrations and own calculations.

Source of Data: IDEA 2010

A comparison of the regarded 67 democracies with and without compulsory voting shows that the average voter turnout in countries with compulsory voting (15 countries) is 74.65 % whereas in countries without compulsory voting (52 countries) the average voter turnout is 64.11 %.⁵¹ The average VAP turnout rates 70.33 % in countries with and 61.54 % in countries without compulsory voting.⁵² There is a difference when the average voter turnout rates are regarded. However it is arguable if this difference is seen as significant. There are some countries with compulsory voting which have lower turnout rates than countries where voting is not compulsory, e.g. Mexico with 44.61 %, Dominican Republic with 56, 46 % and Guatemala with 60.46 % voter turnout rates.

Conclusion

The conclusion of this short analysis is that, at least by analyzing the elections in the years around 2009, there does not seem to be a relationship between voter turnouts and the functioning or the quality of a democracy – at least not according to the regarded democracy indexes.

⁵¹ The averages are based on own calculations using the data from the online database of IDEA.

⁵² The averages are based on own calculations using the data from the online database of IDEA.

7.4. Political Culture and Values

» Democracy requires a supportive culture, the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites of principles underlying freedom of speech, media, assembly, religion, of the rights of opposition parties, of the rule of law, of human rights (...) « (Lipset 1994, p. 3)

One aspect of all political systems including democracies is the so called “political culture”. A relationship between the political culture in one society and its political or democratic system is possible. The authors of the EIU 2010 for instance state: » A democratic political culture is also crucial for the legitimacy, smooth functioning and ultimately the sustainability of democracy. « (EIU 2010, p. 30)

A universal definition of this term does not exist with several definitions being used by different authors. The Dictionary of Social Sciences defines political culture as beliefs, values and attitudes which underlie a society’s political system. (Oxford University Press, 2002) The subject of political culture is especially associated with Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba and their book “The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations” which was first published in 1963. (ibid) According to those two authors the term refers to » (...) the specifically political orientations — attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. (...) It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes. « (Almond and Verba 1989, p.12) When speaking about the political culture of a society Almond and Verba refer to » (...) the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. « (ibid, p. 13) Political orientation refers according to the authors to internalized aspects of objects and relationships and includes “cognitive orientation” (knowledge and beliefs about the political system), “affective orientation” (feelings about the political system) and “evaluational orientation” (judgments and opinions about political objects). (ibid, p. 14)

Analyzing and comparing political culture in a comprehensive manner is probably difficult since there neither seems to be a universal definition for political culture nor there is a complete dataset on it – measuring political culture completely is high likely a difficult task.

Nevertheless Inglehart and Weizel tried to find an empirical linkage between “self-expression values” which they regard as one dimension of political culture and effective democracy. (Inglehart and Weizel 2003, p. 64-76) By referring to Lipset and Almond and

Verba and affirming them, the authors argue that » (...) a specific type of political culture seems to be an essential precondition of effective democracy. « (ibid, p. 62) Self-expression values are defined as a syndrome of mass attitudes which commonly reflect emphasis on freedom, participation and tolerance of diversity at individual and aggregate levels. (ibid, p. 64) According to the authors the presence of self-expression values in a political culture is shown when liberty, public self-expression, participation, interpersonal trust, life satisfaction and tolerance of diversity are emphasized by the public. (ibid, p. 64) Inglehart and Weizel argue that opinions which might be favorable for democracy are not sufficient for the presence of effective democracy at societal level unless they are accompanied by more deeply rooted tolerance, participation and trust. (ibid, p. 62) The authors find a strong linkage between self-expression values and effective democracy within their statistical analysis. The self-expression values were calculated with the aggregated data set of the second and third World Values Survey (WVS).⁵³ (ibid, p. 76-77) Effective democracy is measured by a combination of freedom rights and elite integrity: Effective democracy equals freedom rights (percentages) multiplied with elite integrity (fractions of 1.0). (ibid, p. 67) For measuring freedom rights the authors use combined scores for civil and political rights of Freedom House and for elite integrity the use standardized and revised scores of the corruption perception indexes by Transparency International.⁵⁴ (ibid, p. 67) In the analysis effective democracy is regarded as the dependent variable and the authors find a strong linkage: the attitudes on self-expression values in a society in about 1990 explain 75 % of the variations in effective democracy for the years 1999-2000 between countries. Furthermore the effect of self-expression values seems to remain robust even if the variables of economic development, support for democracy and the experience with democracy are controlled. (ibid, p. 69) In contrary the length of time under democratic institutions experienced by a society » (...) adds very little to the effect of self-expression values on effective democracy. « (ibid, p. 70) Another result the authors draw from their statistical analysis is the implication that » (...) self-expression values do not result from the presence of preexisting democratic institutions. « (ibid, p. 70) They conclude that a political culture that emphasizes self-expression values (self-expression, trust, tolerance, participation and life satisfaction) plays a crucial role in effective democracy and that » (...) components of self-expression values seems to be essential to the flourishing of democratic institutions. « (ibid, p.76) The authors regard

⁵³ The second WVS was generated about 1990. The third WVS was generated about 1995. Missing values for the second WVS were estimated with the data of the third WVS.

⁵⁴ The maximum value for the scores of „Effective Democracy“ is 100.

effective democratic institutions as a consequence and not as a precondition of a “democratic mass culture”. Another interesting link the authors draw is that economic development tends to promote an increase in self-expression values which in turn tend to fuel effective democracy. (ibid, p.76)

Even if the results of Inglehart and Weizel do not reflect the influence of political culture in total; they indicate a relationship between a certain aspect of political culture and (effective) democracy. The link between economic development, self-expression values and effective democracy would indicate an indirect relationship from economical development on effective democracy. Although effective democracy is not interchangeable with the quality of democracy - especially if the used measuring method is regarded - this result could be an indirect explanation for the direction of the previously found relationship between the indicators for economic output or income with the democracy rankings.

Values might have an influence on the political system or on democracy as Inglehart and Weizel suggest. The exact relationship between values and the political system is not clear since both could influence each other. Also as the authors showed a relationship between economical development and values might exist. Hence values will be elaborated and analyzed.

Based on empirical cross-cultural research Shalom Schwartz proposed a “theory of the universal content and structure of human values” and he defines values as » (...) desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity. « (Schwartz 1994, p. 21) Schwartz regards the following implicit four points in this definition of values as goals:

» (1) they serve the interests of some social entity, (2) they can motivate action—giving it direction and emotional intensity, (3) they function as standards for judging and justifying action, and (4) they are acquired both through socialization to dominant group values and through the unique learning experiences of individuals. « (ibid, p.21)

At the end of their research Schwartz and his coauthors find 10 motivationally distinct types of values which they claim to be universal values: Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security. (ibid, p.22) In his paper Schwartz explains the reasons for the derivation of those values. Also the author states that values represent responses to three universal

requirements with which individuals and societies have to cope: » (...) needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and requirements for the smooth functioning and survival of groups. « (ibid, p. 21)

The work of Schwartz and his coauthors is pretty interesting and surely can be regarded as important – An analysis about (the quality of) democracy with the usage of the universal values of Schwartz would be highly interesting and a potential question for further research. If values serve as guiding principles for a person or other social entities as well as they can motivate action, as Schwartz's definition suggest, than values certainly would influence the behavior of human beings. The behavior of citizens of a democracy would probably affect its functioning since competition and participation are regarded as dimensions of democracy quality in the framework of Diamond and Morlino and those two dimensions probably not only depend on the capacities and capabilities of people but also on there will. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21) Unfortunately, there is no dataset with the cross-country comparison according the universal values of Schwartz.

Measuring and comparing values is surely a difficult undertaking and it could be criticized as well. However, an analysis of the values and the quality of democracy requires data about values. A possible dataset for a comparison is the data on “cultural dimension” of Geert Hofstede. Hofstede did a survey among the international company IBM in around 1970 (IBM survey) regarding peoples behavior in large organizations. Later on, when he found time for research, he worked on the data and analyzed it for a couple years. As a result Hofstede derived from the IBM survey conclusions on the general culture of societies in different countries of which he created cultural dimensions. The included countries are ordinal rated with scores on each cultural dimension. According to Hofstede and his co-authors the study was replicated a couple of times finding similar results as the IBM survey which is regarded by the authors as a confirmation of the results of the initial study. (Hofstede et al 2010, p. 34-35) The authors also remark that » The success of the replications does not necessarily mean that the countries' cultures did not change since the IBM research, but if they changed, they changed together, so that their relative position remained intact. « (ibid, p. 34) Further the authors argue that the national dimension scores of the IBM survey or at least their relative positions have remained valid in the year 2010 as they were in around 1970. (ibid, p. 39) Hofstede states on his website that the dimension scores of the countries are relative and that without a comparison a single score of a country is meaningless. (Hofstede n.d.)

Hofstede et al define values differently than Schwartz: » Values are broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others. Values are feelings with an added arrow indicating a plus and a minus side. « (Hofstede, et al 2010, p. 9) According to Hofstede et al values form the core of culture “surrounded by” practices as rituals, heroes and symbols. (ibid, p. 7-9) Culture, which is learned through the social environment, is regarded to be in between “human nature” and “personality”. (ibid, p. 5-7) The authors argue that practices might change but that the values of a society do only change slowly and they even state that » National value systems should be considered given facts, as hard as a country's geographical position or its weather. « (ibid, p. 18-20)


The relativity of the dimension scores and their stable relative positions over time would allow a comparison of democracies with the two democracy indexes used in this thesis. Even if the democracy indexes rate countries for the year 2009 and therefore a different period than Hofstede did, the values of the cultural dimensions would be regarded “relatively” and therefore the results would not differ much even if the data of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions is not up to date. This chapter will analyze the relationship between values and the quality of democracy by using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and the two democracy indexes.

A dimension is regarded by the authors as » (...) an aspect of a culture that can be measured relative to other cultures. (...) A dimension groups together a number of phenomena in a society that were empirically found to occur in combination (...) « (ibid, p. 31) The cultural dimension scores of Hofstede are country average values based on the results of the IBM survey and the later added dimensions were calculated on results of the World Value Survey (WVS). The validity of the survey - even though it has a very specific sample (IBM employees) – is explained by the fact that the employees represent an almost perfectly matched sample since they were similar in all respects except nationality and therefore the effect of “nationality differences” in the answers become evident clearly. (ibid, p. 30) Four dimensions of culture were formed: power distance (PDI), femininity versus masculinity (MAS), uncertainty avoidance (UAI) and collectivism versus individualism (IDV). (ibid, p. 31) A fifth dimension was added later based on the findings of the Chinese Value Survey (CVS) first and then based on the WVS. It was labeled: long-term versus short term orientation (LTO). (ibid, p. 236 – 239) Also based on scores from the WVS a sixth and final dimension was added: Indulgence Versus Restraint (IVR). (ibid, p. 78 – 81) The scale of the values for all dimensions is between 0 and about 100.

A statistical analysis with the data from Hofstede et al and the democracy indexes show only significant correlations (compare Table 13) for two out of the six dimensions. The dimensions of power distance (PDI) and individualism versus collectivism (IDV) have significant correlations with both of the democracy indexes. In both cases the number of included observations is only 51 because the value scores for 13 countries were not available. In addition the values for Belgium, Switzerland and South Africa were not included in the analysis because Belgium and Switzerland had two value scores each according to the (main) spoken languages with the scores differing from each other. South Africa included only the average values of the “white population”. Therefore the author of this thesis decided to exclude them from the statistical analysis.


The graphs for both dimensions with the democracy indexes indicate a positive linear relationship for individualism and a negative linear relationship for power distance with the quality of democracy.

Figure 30: Individualism Index (IDV) / EIU 2010



Own illustration

Figure 31: Individualism Index (IDV) / Democracy Ranking 2010




Own illustration

Power distance is defined by the authors as » (...) the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. « (ibid, p. 61) Hofstede refers about power distance also to “the less powerful members of a society” instead of “institutions and organizations”. (Hofstede n.d.) The scale reaches from about 0 to about 100.⁵⁵ A large degree of power distance (high values) indicates that people in those societies accept a

⁵⁵ Malaysia and Slovakia were added later on this dimension and have PDI values above 100. (ibid, p. 56)


hierarchical order without a need of further justification. Low power distance (low values) on the opposite indicates that people in those societies demand justification for inequalities and strive to equalize the distribution of power. (ibid)

Figure 32: Power Distance Index (PDI) / EIU 2010



Own illustration

Figure 33: Power Distance Index (PDI) / Democracy Ranking 2010



Own illustration

The PDI has correlation of -0.728580 with the EIU 2010 and -0.722469 with the Democracy Ranking 2010. These results indicate a negative relationship between power distance and the quality of democracy, as measured by the respective indexes. In societies with relatively high ratings on democracy quality the power distance on average seems to be relatively low - since Hofstede et al stated that the value score must be regarded relatively.

The dimension of individualism is defined by Hofstede et al as follows:

»Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him- or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. « (Hofstede et al 2010, p. 92)

The correlations of the IDV are 0.676338 with the EIU 2010 and 0.729946 with the Democracy Ranking 2010. The results indicate a positive relationship between

individualism and the quality of democracy, at least according to the indexes. The relationship is medium strong. Societies with relatively high ratings on the democracy indexes seem to have relatively high individualism values on average.

Both dimensions, IDV and PDI, are based on the IBM survey which was initially done around 1970 and its replications with the latest listed replication study in 2002. It is not explicitly stated how much each dimension is based on the IBM survey and how much is based on the replications, except that the PDI is based on three items from the IBM survey plus extensions and the IDV is based on 14 items from the IBM survey plus extensions. (ibid, p.56-63, p. 94-99)

However, the data about the values is not up to date itself or does not refer explicitly to the year 2009 as the democracy indexes do. As stated above the authors argue that societal values tend to stay solid over time and do not change and if they changed, they probably changed together and their relative positions remained the same. (ibid, p.34) Assuming this to be correct the analysis can be done in relative terms and should be regarded as such.

Table 14: Correlations of Hofstede's dimension with Democracy Indexes

Correlation Analysis		Sample: 67			Pairwise samples	
Dimensions of Values	IDV	PDI	IVR	LTO	UAI	MAS
Democracy Ranking 2010	0.729946	-0.722469	0.204072	0.188500	-0.256086	-0.197774
Observations	51	51	54	55	49	51
EIU 2010	0.676338	-0.728580	0.328527	0.117299	-0.441589	-0.191832
Observations	51	51	54	55	49	51

Own illustration and own calculations.

Comparing the HQDs shows that they have similarities in the power distance (PDI) and individualistic (IDV) value dimensions: All of the HQDs, except the French speaking part of Switzerland, have relatively low power distance scores and score lower than the average of included democracies (56.11) of which the value score were available. All HQDs Group B countries, except Belgium and Malta, have relatively low PDI scores too and lie lower than the average as well. Low average values on the power distance dimension, as most of

the HQDs have, indicate that the less powerful members in a society do not accept and expect unequal distribution of power. There seems to be a similarity on the indulgence versus restraint (IVR) dimension as well. This dimension will be neglected due to reasons explained below.

Diamond and Morlino argue that political culture is a supporting condition for the dimension of participation and that it should value participation as well as the equal worth and dignity of all citizens. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 24) If cultural values, as measured by Hofstede et al, do affect the political system through the behavior of its citizens, than low power distance values in a society could indeed affect the quality of democracy because the people in this society would generally not accept or tolerate unequal distributed power. (Hofstede et al 2010, p. 61; Hostede n.d.) Hofstede et al do indeed argue for societal and political consequences of large power distance values:

» In a society in which power distances are large, authority tends to be traditional, sometimes even rooted in religion. Power is seen as a basic fact of society that precedes the choice between good and evil. Its legitimacy is irrelevant. Might prevails over right. This is a strong statement that may rarely be presented in this form but is reflected in the behavior of those in power and of ordinary people. There is an unspoken consensus that there should be an order of inequality in this world, in which everybody has his or her place. Such an order satisfies people's need for dependence, and it gives a sense of security both to those in power and to those lower down. « (Hostede el al 2010, p. 76-77)

No tolerating unequal distributed power probably would people make act or behave in ways not supporting or facilitating unequal power distribution. It also would be more likely that power of other people who have it is questioned and this would make “strive” or competition for power more likely. Regarding the dimensions of democracy quality of Diamond and Morlino, this could affect the dimensions competition and possibly also participation with an increase in both dimensions. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p.21)

On the individualism dimension HQDs also have a similarity: all have relatively moderate high or high IDV average scores which are above the average of all measured democracies (48.83) of which the values were available. This indicates by the definition of Hofstede et al that in those societies the ties between individuals are loose and that everyone is expected to look after themselves. If values are the core of practices than people in more individualistic societies would probably have practices reflecting those values. (Hofstede et al 2010, p. 7-10) The expectation that every individual should take care of him- or herself

could make practicing the representation of ones own interest more likely instead of relying on “other members of the group”. This case would probably foster participation and competition as well. Again as both are seen as dimensions of the quality of democracy this could lead to an increase in the democracy quality in a country.

As Figure 14 illustrates all 12 HQDs, besides the French speaking part of Switzerland, are located in the bottom left quadrant of the 2 axis graph with relatively low power distance values and relatively moderate high to high individualistic values. The same is valid for the countries of the HQD Group B except Belgium and Malta which are situated at the bottom right quadrant.

Table 15: Hofstede's Value Scores for HQDs

HQDs	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	LTO	IVR
AUS	38	90	61	51	21	71
AUT	11	55	79	70	60	63
CAN	39	80	52	48	36	68
DNK	18	74	16	23	35	70
FIN	33	63	26	59	38	57
DEU	35	67	66	65	83	40
IRL	28	70	68	35	24	65
NLD	38	80	14	53	67	68
NZL	22	79	58	49	33	75
NOR	31	69	8	50	35	55
SWE	31	71	5	29	53	78
SWZ (1)	70 / 26	64 / 69	58 / 72	70 / 56	74	66

(1) The first value is for the French speaking population. The second value is for the German speaking population.

(2) The first value is for the French speaking population. The second value is for the Dutch speaking population.

HQDs Group B	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	LTO	IVR
BEL (2)	67 / 61	72 / 78	60 / 43	93 / 97	82	57
ISL	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	28	67
LUX	40	60	50	70	64	56
MLT	56	59	47	96	47	66
UK	35	89	66	35	51	69
USA	40	91	62	46	26	68

Table 16: Averages of all incl. Democracies

PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	LTO	IVR
56.11	48.83	48.68	69.25	48	48.70

Own illustration and own calculations based on available scores of the analyzed (67) democracies from Hofstede et al 2010

Own illustration. Source: Hofstede et al 2010

A certain similarity seems to be on the dimension indulgence versus restraint (IVR) as well. All HQDs and HQD Group B countries have moderately high average value scores which are above the average of regarded democracies (48.7). Higher average scores on this dimension indicates indulgence to be more common in that society, which stands for: » (...) a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires

related to enjoying life and having fun. «⁵⁶ (ibid, p. 281) The author of this thesis can not draw any relationship between indulgence and the quality of democracy. Regarding the definition of indulgence makes a relationship between both unlikely which is the reason this dimension was neglected above.⁵⁷

The other dimensions of Hofstede et al do not show similarities among HQDs and are therefore not really relevant in this context. For the reason of completeness they will be explained briefly.

Figure 34: Power Distance versus Individualism



Source: Hofstede et al 2010

Masculinity index (MAS): societies with clearly distinct emotional gender roles are called “masculine” whereas societies with overlapping emotional gender roles are called “feminine”. (ibid, p. 140) Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) is the extent to which members of a society feel threatened by unknown situations. (ibid, p. 191) Long-term orientation

⁵⁶ Hofstede et al state that the gratification of desires refers to enjoying life and having fun and not to a general gratification of human desires. (Hofstede et al p.281)

⁵⁷ The fact that the author of this thesis could not find or draw a relationship between this cultural value dimension and the quality of democracy does not mean that it is not generally possible.

(LTO) stands for fostering virtues oriented towards future rewards whereas short-term orientation refers to fostering virtues related to the past and present. (ibid, p. 239) Another different definition for LTO is given on the website of Hofstede, in which this dimension is interpreted as the way of a society deals with the search for virtue. (Hofstede n.d.)

Conclusion

The analyzed data indicates a certain relationship although the correlations are not so strong. The relationship between societal values and the quality of democracy is not exactly clear.

In the case of the dimensions of Hofstede et al the authors find two factors which can predict the individualistic dimension (IDV): the country's wealth with richer countries being associated with higher individualism and the geographical latitude with countries closer to the equator being associated with lower individualism. In the original IBM Survey the GNI explained according to the authors 71 % of the differences in IDV scores. (Hofstede et al 2010, p. 132) In this case relationship could be both ways. However the authors come to the conclusion by comparing data over time that causality of national wealth causing individualism is more plausible: » When a country's wealth increases, its citizens get access to resources that allow them to do their own thing. « (ibid, p. 132)

In the case of the power distance dimension (PDI) the authors also find factors that can predict the PDI scores: the geographic latitude of the country (43 %) with higher latitudes being associated with lower PDI scores, the population size with larger size being associated with lower PDI scores, and the wealth of a country with richer countries being associated with lower PDI scores - national wealth plus population size together predicted 58 % of the PDI scores. In the case of the geographic location it is considered to be the cause. In the case of national wealth the causality is not clear, as the authors argue. For the relationship of the population size with the PDI the authors argue that the size of population fosters dependence on authority but they also state that reverse causality could be possible. In the case of the IDV at least wealth seems to be likely to be an influence factor. (ibid, p. 84-86)

The relationship between societal values, the democratic system and the quality of democracy could exist in three ways: (1) the political or democratic system could affect the values of that society (2) the values of the society could affect the political system together with the quality of democracy (3) the relationship between the political or democratic

system and the values of the society could be reciprocal. In the first case the values of the society would not affect the political or democratic system. Therefore, they would not be a factor that might influence the functioning or the quality of democracy.

If an influence of wealth on individualistic values is possible, the same effect could account for the political or democratic system as well. This possible effect could account for the political or democratic system as well.

Even if the relationship is reciprocal than the democratic system would have had an influence on the societal values but only over certain time, since according to the authors mentioned above values do change slowly. On contrary the effect of the existing average value structure of a society on democracy would be subject to the respective period which is regarded. In this case, even if the democratic system had an influence on the societal values, those would affect the quality of democracy in a certain period.

8. Conclusion

The framework of Diamond and Morlino with its eight dimensions of the quality of democracy is helpful for the analysis and in interpreting the relationships: the rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, freedom, equality and responsiveness. Considering each dimension as a variable on which the quality of democracies varies, allows an analysis as done within this thesis. The list of the dimensions might not be complete and additional dimensions can probably be added. (Diamond and Morlino 2005, p. 21-22)

The results of the analyzed factors differ from each other. The results for some factors, in respect to the correlations, are more significant than others. The influence of some factors is lower than initially expected by the author of this thesis. Interpreting the results of the analyzed factors in terms of an influence on the functioning or quality of democracy is not simple: Some factors can be assumed to be the independent variables. On the contrary it is, unfortunately, not possible to assume the same for other factors and their relationship with the quality of democracy is not exactly clear. Even in the cases in which certain indicators were assumed to be the independent variables, it is possible to argue for the opposite. Therefore all found results and relationships are open for discussion. However, there are indications that the functioning or the quality of democracy is influenced by certain factors. Table 16 is visualizing the influence on or the relationship with the quality of democracy, for the three cases: (1) an influence on the quality of democracy exists, at least this is indicated by the analysis within this thesis; (2) no significant influence could be verified within the analysis within this thesis; (3) and a relationship to the quality of democracy exists but the causality is not clear and the causality could not be discovered within this thesis.

Table 17: Overview of the results of the analyzed factors

Factors / Indicators	(1) Influence on the Quality of Democracy	(2) No (significant) influence on the Quality of Democracy	(3) Relationship exists, but the causality is not clear
State Fragility (State Fragility Index)			X
Press Freedom (Press Freedom Index)	X		
State Failure (Failed State Index)			X
Corruption (CPI)	X		
Rule of Law (WGI Indicator + Rule of Law Index)	X		
Political Rights & Civil Liberties (Freedom House)	X		
System of Governance	X		
Voter Turnout		X	
Economic Output / Income (GDP & GNI PPP per capita)			X
Income distribution (Gini coefficient)		X	
Mean years of Schooling	X		
Adult Literacy Rate (15+)		X	
Oil Production and Export		X	
Individualistic Values			X
Power Distance Values			X

Own illustration

It can be argued that history matters and that democratic traditions and experiences in democracy affect the quality of democracy. Surely it might take some time for countries to achieve a certain level of democracy quality after a transition to democracy from another political system, e.g. an authoritarian system: The establishment of necessary institutions and their functioning, the formation of separations of power including the education of the legal personnel, the establishment of a free and independent press and the adaptation of the citizens. History, the evolvement of the system, and the development do probably have an influence on the democratic development and possibly on the quality of democracy. Especially the influence of certain factors could accumulate or they might have an influence after accumulation. Still the author of this thesis thinks it is not the determining factor. However, history does not explain why some of the “newer” democracies have better ratings on the democracy indexes and are therefore regarded as having a higher

quality of democracy as “older” democracies, e.g. the Czech Republic ranks better on the EIU 2010 than the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the following the factors that do have an influence will be concluded first. Then a conclusion will be drawn for the factors which do have a relationship with the quality of democracy but where the causality is not clear. Finally the factors that turned out not have an influence will be summarized.

Press freedom, which is considered to be independent variable, seems to have an influence on the quality of democracy although this relationship is lower than initially expected by the author of this thesis. The correlations of the democracy indexes with the Press Freedom Index of -0.660552 and -0.584652 can only be interpreted as medium strong.

Corruption, as indicated by the Corruption Perceptions Index, is strongly correlated with the quality of democracy, at least according to the two used democracy indexes. In this case corruption can be considered as the independent variable which has an influence on the quality of democracy, possibly by undermining democratic institutions and the rule of law.

The rules of law indicators also have a strong positive correlation with the democracy indexes. The correlation those indicators have with the CPI is even stronger, which indicates the above mentioned relationship of corruption with the quality of democracy through undermining the rule of law. The rule of law can be regarded as the independent variable showing causality that significantly influences the quality of democracy.

The relationship between the Freedom in the World Survey, which is an indicator for political rights and civil liberties, and the democracy indexes can be interpreted as medium strong to strong. The arguments of Diamond and Morlino allow drawing the relationship from political right and civil liberties to the quality of democracy which they seem to influence.

The system of governance, more precise a parliamentary system, does seem to have an influence on the quality of democracy: Not only all HQDs, except the USA in HQD Group B, have a parliamentary systems but also the vast majority of countries which rank among the top 30 of one of the two democracy indexes. In this case the system of governance is the independent variable. A possible reason for the influence of a parliamentary system on the quality of democracy could be similar as suggested by Gerring, that parliamentarism

has a tendency of offering better conflict solving tools, integration of diversity of views and greater incentives for actors to reach agreement. However, it is likely that the effects of parliamentarism cumulate over time. (Gerring et al 2009, p. 354)

The medium strong correlations between the mean years of schooling and the democracy indexes indicate a certain positive relationship between education and the quality of democracy – although the mean years of schooling does not necessarily provide information about the quality of the received education it can be seen as an indicator for the average education level. The argument of Diamond and Morlino is in favor for the influence of education on the quality of democracy as they regard broad diffusion of education, among others, as a condition for widespread participation in a good democracy. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 24) Education, at least if a certain period is regarded, can be considered as the independent variable because the average education level of a society in one period depends on decisions in education policies of previous periods.

The relationship between economic output and income with the quality of democracy is not clear. A strong positive relationship between GDP per capita and GNI per capita PPP and the democracy indexes does exist with correlations of above 0.8 for both variables on both democracy indexes. Although there are several authors that argue for the relationship being from economics to democracy, the relationship from economic output and income on the quality of democracy can not be verified. However, all HQDs do have high economic development as measured by GDP and GNI. If the causality is from economic development to the quality of democracy, a possible explanation could be that increasing wealth increase the possibilities of the citizens which could increase the level of participation, which in turn would influence the quality of democracy. (ibid, p.23-24)

Considering the Failed State Index as an indicator for state failure, a strong relationship to the quality of democracy exists. There are arguments for state failure hindering the democratization but the causality between state failure and the quality of democracy, within democracies, is not exactly clear. A relationship of state failure influencing the functioning or the quality of democracy seems likely but cannot be verified. An influence would probably occur due the decrease in the monopoly on the legitimate use of force which in turn would probably affect the rule of law (law enforcement) negatively. The FSI 2010 has high negative correlations with both rule of law indicators. The negative relationship with the rule of law would in turn affect the quality of democracy. An increase

in “state failure” would probably immediately affect the quality of democracy whereas vice versa the effects would not be as instantaneously.

The relationship between state fragility at least as measured by the State Fragility Index and the quality of democracy is not clear and could not be elaborated. However, a possible relationship could be that state fragility negatively influences the rule of law which in turn has negative effects on the quality of democracy.

The analysis between values and the quality of democracy shows a certain relationship between individualist and power distance values, as defined by Hofstede et al, and the quality of democracy. The correlations between those two value dimensions and the two democracy indexes are medium strong. A positive relationship of individualistic values and a negative relationship of power distance values with the quality of democracy, at least according to the indexes, seem to exist.

The relationship between values and the quality of democracy is not clear and could not be elaborated within this thesis. However, all HQDs have similarities on both value dimensions: All HQDs and HQD Group B countries have relatively high individualist values – all are above the average of all considered democracies. Additionally all HQDs and HQD Group B countries - except the French speaking population of Switzerland, Belgium and Malta - have relatively low power distance values and are below the average of all included democracies. If values do influence the functioning or the quality of democracy, than low power distance values (unequal power distribution is not accepted by the less powerful members of society) would make people act in ways that do not support or facilitate unequal power distribution. That in turn could lead to more competition and participation. Individualistic values (individuals are expected to look after themselves and their immediate family) could make practicing the representation of the own interests more likely which again probably would increase the dimensions participation and competition. Since both are considered to be dimensions of the quality of democracy the behavior guided by those values could influence the functioning or the quality of democracy. (Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 21; Hofstede et al 2010, p. 53-133)

For the factors of voter turnout, income distribution, adult literacy, and oil production as well as exports, either no influence on the quality of democracy was found within the statistical analysis in this thesis or the relationships were not significant.

HQDs still have a certain similarity in the income distribution: They have relatively equal income distributions (low income Gini coefficients) in comparison to the global average, except for the USA. If the income distribution should have an influence on the quality of democracy it probably would be after reaching certain income levels.

The so called “curse of oil” does seem to apply in terms of the occurrence of democracy as a system of government but it either does not have an effect on the quality of democracy for countries that are already democratic or this relationship cannot be elaborated since most of the democracies do not have a significant oil production.

Surprisingly no significant relationship between voter turnout and the quality of democracy could be found. Neither the correlations were significant enough nor did the HQDs have similarities in the voter turnout rates. The only similarity was that the majority of the HQDs including HQD Group B countries, except Australia, Belgium and Luxembourg, do not have compulsory voting.

The adult literacy rate did not show a significant relationship (correlations) in the statistical analysis. The only similarity is that all HQDs and HQD Group B countries have estimated literacy rates of 99 %.

The interpretation of the results can occur in different ways. Some factors, as reflected by the respective indicators, seem to have an influence on the functioning or the quality of democracy. It is likely that those factors are linked to each other, as Diamond and Morlino argue:

»Although it is possible to identify different types of lower-quality democracy, which are deficient in different qualities, the various dimensions are closely linked and tend to move together, either toward democratic improvement and deepening or toward decay. «
(Diamond and Morlino 2004, p. 28-29)

The authors also state that when democracies are very weak on certain dimensions, they tend to be deficient on others as well. (ibid, p. 29) This phenomenon can also be observed by the medium strong and strong correlations between some of the analyzed indexes and indicators. (Table A 6 in Appendix)

For clearer interpretations of the relationships further research would be necessary, especially within those factors in which the relationships could not be verified. In those cases an analysis over time, that includes several periods, would be more accurate. While

this thesis was written the new versions of the democracy indexes were published. A time comparison of the factors of which the relationship remained unclear with the democracy indexes would be highly interesting and probably it would deliver more solid findings.

An example could be the analysis of the relationship between economic development and the quality of democracy for several periods, when the democracy indexes and the data are available. The analyzed year 2009 was also the year (in the aftermath) of the subprime mortgage crisis. The recent financial crisis effected the economies of many countries and led to certain extend to populism as well as it had an effect on politics. The EIU 2010 states to this matter as:

»However, there has been a decline in democracy across the world since 2008. The decades-long global trend in democratisation had previously come to a halt in what Larry Diamond (2008) called a “democratic recession”. Now democracy is in retreat. The dominant pattern in all regions over the past two years has been backsliding on previously attained progress in democratisation. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 accentuated some existing negative trends in political development. « (EIU 2010, p. 1)

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APPENDIX

Table A 1: Rank of Top 50 countries by their GDP per capita 2009 (U.S Dollars 2011)

Rank	Country	GDP p C 2009
1	Monaco	172676,34
2	Liechtenstein	134914,67
3	Luxembourg	104353,69
4	Bermuda	88746,89
5	Norway	76763,74
6	Switzerland	63568,24
7	Qatar	61531,69
8	Denmark	55933,35
9	Ireland	49737,93
10	Netherlands	47998,27
11	United States	45758,10
12	Austria	45638,09
13	Faeroe Islands	45205,93
14	Finland	45084,64
15	Belgium	43799,18
16	Sweden	43471,68
17	Australia	42130,82
18	Kuwait	41364,69
19	France	40663,05
20	Germany	40275,25
21	Macao SAR, China	40105,21
22	Canada	39643,79
23	Japan	39456,44
24	United Arab Emirates	38959,81
25	Iceland	38032,66

Rank	Country	GDP p C 2009
26	Singapore	37789,61
27	United Kingdom	35163,41
28	Italy	35073,32
29	Spain	31891,39
30	Hong Kong SAR, China	29881,81
31	Cyprus	29427,91
32	New Zealand	29352,45
33	Greece	28520,96
34	Brunei Darussalam	27390,05
35	Israel	26102,35
36	Slovenia	24051,04
37	Greenland	22507,89
38	Portugal	22026,76
39	Bahamas, The	20916,28
40	Malta	19727,46
41	Czech Republic	18136,85
42	Equatorial Guinea	17944,40
43	Bahrain	17608,83
44	Oman	17280,10
45	Korea, Rep.	17109,99
46	Slovak Republic	16125,81
47	Trinidad and Tobago	14748,18
48	Estonia	14374,55
49	Croatia	14322,61
50	Antigua and Barbuda	14272,99

Own illustration. Source: World Bank 2011a

Table A 2: Rank of Top 50 countries by their GNI per capita PPP 2009 (internat. Dollars 2011)

Rank	Country	GNI p. C. PPP 2009
1	Luxembourg	59590
2	Macao SAR, China	57850
3	Norway	55390
4	Brunei Darussalam	49730
5	Singapore	49430
6	Switzerland	47010
7	United States	45640
8	Hong Kong SAR, China	44270
9	Netherlands	39690
10	Austria	38400
11	Australia	38380
12	Denmark	38360
13	Sweden	37830
14	Canada	37280
15	Germany	36830
16	Belgium	36610
17	Finland	35910
18	United Kingdom	35640
19	France	33940
20	Ireland	32970
21	Japan	32880
22	Italy	31930
23	Spain	31520
24	Cyprus	30180
25	Iceland	30000

Rank	Country	GNI p. C. PPP 2009
26	Greece	28500
27	New Zealand	28050
28	Korea, Rep.	27250
29	Slovenia	27030
30	Israel	26850
31	Equatorial Guinea	25310
32	Oman	24960
33	Bahamas, The	24580
34	Czech Republic	24060
35	Portugal	24050
36	Trinidad and Tobago	23800
37	Malta	23160
38	Saudi Arabia	22540
39	Slovak Republic	22100
40	Hungary	19260
41	Croatia	19250
42	Estonia	19120
43	Seychelles	18990
44	Barbados	18830
45	Russian Federation	18260
46	Poland	18200
47	Latvia	17400
48	Lithuania	17380
49	Antigua and Barbuda	17050
50	Libya	16740

Own illustration. Source: World Bank 2011b

Table A 3: Rank of Top 50 countries according to their income Gini coefficient 2000-2010

Rank	Gini Coefficient 2000-2010	Country
1	16,80	Azerbaijan
2	24,70	Denmark
3	24,90	Japan
4	25,00	Sweden
5	25,80	Norway
6	25,80	Czech Republic
7	25,80	Slovakia
8	26,90	Finland
9	27,60	Ukraine
10	28,20	Serbia
11	28,30	Germany
12	28,80	Belarus
13	29,00	Croatia
14	29,10	Austria
15	29,20	Bulgaria
16	29,80	Ethiopia
17	30,00	Hungary
18	30,20	Armenia
19	30,90	Netherlands
20	30,90	Kazakhstan
21	31,00	Bangladesh
22	31,20	Slovenia
23	31,20	Pakistan
24	31,60	Republic of Korea
25	31,90	Timor-Leste

Rank	Gini Coefficient 2000-2010	Country
26	32,10	Romania
27	32,10	Egypt
28	32,60	Canada
29	32,60	Lao People's Democ. Rep.
30	32,70	France
31	33,00	Belgium
32	33,00	Albania
33	33,30	Burundi
34	33,50	Kyrgyzstan
35	33,60	Tajikistan
36	33,70	Switzerland
37	34,30	Ireland
38	34,30	Greece
39	34,40	Togo
40	34,60	Tanzania (United Rep. of)
41	34,70	Spain
42	34,90	Poland
43	35,20	Australia
44	35,30	Algeria
45	35,50	Guinea-Bissau
46	35,80	Lithuania
47	36,00	Italy
48	36,00	United Kingdom
49	36,00	Estonia
50	36,20	New Zealand

Own illustration. Source UN Statistics Division 2011

Table A 4: Rank of Top 50 Oil producing countries

Rank	Countries	Total Oil Production 2009
1	Russia	9933,71
2	Saudi Arabia	9759,69
3	United States	9140,79
4	Iran	4176,64
5	China	3995,62
6	Canada	3294,42
7	Mexico	3001,47
8	United Arab Emirates	2794,69
9	Brazil	2577,17
10	Kuwait	2496,43
11	Venezuela	2471,50
12	Iraq	2400,34
13	Norway	2350,18
14	Nigeria	2211,42
15	Algeria	2085,59
16	Angola	1948,04
17	Libya	1789,16
18	Kazakhstan	1540,41
19	United Kingdom (+ Offshore)	1501,50
20	Qatar	1212,89
21	Indonesia	1045,85
22	Azerbaijan	1012,25
23	India	877,47
24	Oman	816,15
25	Argentina	794,47

Rank	Countries	Total Oil Production 2009
26	Malaysia	693,00
27	Colombia	685,82
28	Egypt	678,30
29	Australia	588,25
30	Sudan	486,44
31	Ecuador	485,29
32	Thailand	401,57
33	Syria	399,87
34	Equatorial Guinea	346,02
35	Vietnam	345,59
36	Yemen	286,50
37	Congo	274,34
38	Denmark	262,14
39	Gabon	241,81
40	Turkmenistan	198,15
41	South Africa	192,14
42	Brunei	154,62
43	Trinidad and Tobago	149,77
44	Italy	146,52
45	Peru	146,45
46	Germany	133,04
47	Japan	132,66
48	Chad	115,00
49	Romania	112,39
50	Timor-Leste	96,27

Own illustration. Source: EIA 2011

Table A 5: Rank of Top 50 of Oil exporting countries

Exports of Crude Oil including Lease Condensate (Thousand Barrels Per Day)		
Rank	Countries	Oil Exports 2009
1	Saudi Arabia	6273,56
2	Russia	5430
3	Iran	2295,08
4	Nigeria	2051,18
5	United Arab Emirates	2036,428
6	Iraq	1877,97
7	Norway	1758,88
8	Angola	1757,112
9	Venezuela	1691,42
10	Kuwait	1365,48
11	Canada	1355,36
12	Mexico	1299,28
13	Kazakhstan	1077,63
14	Libya	1038,79
15	Azerbaijan	844,883
16	United Kingdom	788,92
17	Qatar	704,327
18	Oman	701,56
19	Algeria	697,475
20	Brazil	533,2
21	Sudan	370,7
22	Colombia	361,74
23	Ecuador	341,94
24	Equatorial Guinea	299,39
25	Indonesia	293,132

Exports of Crude Oil including Lease Condensate (Thousand Barrels Per Day)		
Rank	Countries	Oil Exports 2009
26	Congo (Brazzaville)	269,78
27	Vietnam	267,46
28	Australia	250,04
29	Malaysia	236,42
30	Gabon	226,84
31	Yemen	191,06
32	Denmark	171,14
33	Syria	144,029
34	Brunei	141,28
35	Chad	115
36	China	101,46
37	Timor-Leste (East Timor)	96,266
38	Argentina	93,6
39	Egypt	86,72
40	Tunisia	65,96
41	Cameroon	64,74
42	Trinidad and Tobago	55,24
43	Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	46,34
44	New Zealand	45,18
45	United States	43,795
46	Turkmenistan	40,1644
47	Thailand	39,82
48	Belarus	34,32
49	Philippines	28
50	Greece	19,96

Own illustration. Source: EIA 2011

Table A 6: All correlations

	Democracy Ranking 2010	EIU 2010 Overall Score	State Fragility Index 2010	Press Freedom Index 2009	Failed State Index 2010	CPI 2010 Score	Rule of Law Index 2009 Sum of all factors	WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 Score	WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 Percentile	Freedom House Index	GDP per capita 2009	GNI per capita PPP 2009
EIU 2010 Overall Score	0.895386											
Observations	67											
State Fragility Index 2010	-0.808204	-0.704280										
Observations	67	67										
Press Freedom Index 2009	-0.660552	-0.584652	0.614772									
Observations	67	67	67									
Failed State Index 2010	-0.914622	-0.880704	0.832750	0.736379								
Observations	67	67	67	67								
CPI 2010 Score	0.878430	0.900749	-0.657700	-0.591701	-0.859978							
Observations	67	67	67	67	67							
Rule of Law Index 2009 Sum of all factors	0.836200	0.872836	-0.598051	-0.706803	-0.849601	0.943368						
Observations	25	25	25	25	25	25						
WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 Score	0.895005	0.899460	-0.717781	-0.591135	-0.886573	0.945423	0.931260					
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25					
Voter Turnout %	0.266523	0.370199	-0.193963	-0.106340	-0.294579	0.347062	0.439105	0.295695	0.287783	-0.133818	0.267486	0.230173
Observations		66	66	66	66	66	25	66	66	66	66	66
WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 Percentile	0.868720	0.874915	-0.703110	-0.573199	-0.862057	0.915973	0.905898	0.991155				
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25	67				
Freedom House Index	-0.826980	-0.703242	0.715240	0.807974	0.809530	-0.680775	-0.651223	-0.735557	-0.733179			
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25	67	67			
GDP per capita 2009	0.875694	0.860841	-0.607557	-0.541107	-0.829327	0.845894	0.893397	0.842953	0.803962	-0.624517		
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25	67	67	67		
GNI per capita PPP 2009	0.906896	0.868112	-0.723339	-0.567931	-0.857156	0.844234	0.838792	0.873231	0.844910	-0.684048	0.963875	
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25	67	67	67	67	
Income Gini coefficient 2000-2010	-0.525510	-0.446449	0.429234	0.314738	0.532110	-0.410454	-0.654171	-0.506454	-0.496252	0.433200	-0.536610	-0.556867
Observations	66	66	66	66	66	66	25	66	66	66	66	66
Mean years of Scooling 2009	0.753260	0.625676	-0.719450	-0.431520	-0.647144	0.604396	0.651694	0.666451	0.658215	-0.580848	0.627325	0.722011
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25	67	67	67	67	67
Adult Literacy Rate (15+)	0.568532	0.412479	-0.663335	-0.158610	-0.443079	0.376978	0.340354	0.410143	0.408211	-0.320049	0.392004	0.493091
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25	67	67	67	67	67
VAP Turnout %	0.256492	0.311760	-0.174974	-0.121639	-0.236077	0.263913	0.264731	0.193580	0.191629	-0.162994	0.259081	0.230048
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25	67	67	67	67	67

Own illustration and own calculations.

Table A 6 (part 2): All correlations. Own illustration.

	Democracy Ranking 2010	EU 2010 Overall Score	State Fragility Index 2010	Press Freedom Index 2009	Failed State Index 2010	CPI 2010 Score	Rule of Law Index 2009 Sum of all factors	WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 Score	WGI Rule of Law Indicator 2009 Percentile	Freedom House Index	GDP per capita 2009	GNI per capita PPP 2009
Exports of crude Oil	0.172552	0.261663	-0.080531	0.052480	-0.146301	0.197837	-0.076184	0.156100	0.131966	-0.050682	0.313793	0.285920
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25	67	67	67	67	67
Total oil supply	0.132099	0.162578	-0.057516	-0.000854	-0.118719	0.141760	0.047521	0.144137	0.133583	-0.078430	0.244103	0.286170
Observations	67	67	67	67	67	67	25	67	67	67	67	67
IDV Values	0.729946	0.676338	-0.544568	-0.601523	-0.666320	0.670321	0.735852	0.746891	0.719547	-0.607239	0.704740	0.730749
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51	22	51	51	51	51	51
PDI Values	-0.722469	-0.728580	0.498027	0.634250	0.587767	-0.690379	-0.770519	-0.666081	-0.635959	0.554263	-0.650730	-0.641606
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51	22	51	51	51	51	51
IVR Values	0.204072	0.328527	-0.008108	-0.013756	-0.199918	0.357426	0.087088	0.195761	0.151292	-0.045773	0.334846	0.287755
Observations	54	54	54	54	54	54	25	54	54	54	54	54
LTO Values	0.188500	0.117299	-0.356919	-0.166449	-0.194198	0.083983	0.390018	0.208622	0.228898	-0.193923	0.135915	0.203660
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55	24	55	55	55	55	55
MAS Values	-0.197774	-0.191832	0.083180	0.133244	0.131970	-0.198986	-0.131055	-0.146309	-0.141126	0.072488	-0.101158	-0.058309
Observations	51	51	51	51	51	51	23	51	51	51	51	51
UAI Values	-0.256086	-0.441589	0.011487	0.253218	0.231996	-0.367899	-0.323420	-0.338350	-0.317547	0.106528	-0.343420	-0.273927
Observations	49	49	49	49	49	49	22	49	49	49	49	49

Own illustration and own calculations.

Table A 7: Data for all analyzed 67 democracies

Country	EIU 2010	Democracy Ranking 2010	Freedom House 2010	PFI 2009	CPI 2010	Gini Coefficient 2000-2010	GNI pC PPP 2009	GDP pC 2009	Adult (15+) literacy rate (%)	SFI 2009	FSI 2010	Total Oil Supply 2009
Argentina	6,84	62,54	2,00	11,33	2,90	48,80	14230	7665	97,73	1	45,80	794,47
Australia	9,22	78,91	1,00	3,13	8,70	35,20	38380	42131	99,00	2	27,30	588,25
Austria	8,49	79,30	1,00	3,00	7,90	29,10	38620	45555	99,00	0	27,20	25,41
Belgium	8,05	78,73	1,00	2,50	7,10	33,00	36190	43640	99,00	2	32,00	11,22
Benin	6,17	44,39	2,00	16,00	2,80	38,60	1570	772	41,65	13	76,80	0,00
Botswana	7,63	53,00	2,50	15,50	5,80	61,00	13060	5790	84,12	4	68,60	0,00
Brazil	7,12	59,67	2,00	15,88	3,70	55,00	10230	8251	90,04	6	67,40	2577,17
Bulgaria	6,84	62,36	2,00	15,61	3,60	29,20	13290	6403	98,32	3	61,20	2,92
Canada	9,08	78,73	1,00	3,70	8,90	32,60	37260	39599	99,00	0	27,90	3294,42
Chile	7,67	69,66	1,00	10,50	7,20	52,00	13270	9487	98,55	2	38,00	10,77
Colombia	6,55	54,02	3,50	40,13	3,50	58,50	8760	5166	93,24	12	88,20	685,82
Costa Rica	8,04	69,59	1,00	8,00	5,30	48,90	10830	6369	96,06	0	52,00	-0,26
Croatia	6,81	66,52	1,50	17,17	4,10	29,00	19260	14323	98,76	3	59,00	24,22
Czech Republic	8,19	70,67	1,00	5,00	4,60	25,80	24060	18137	99,00	1	41,50	10,72
Denmark	9,52	84,25	1,00	0,00	9,30	24,70	38360	55933	99,00	0	22,90	262,14
Dom. Republic	6,20	57,78	2,00	26,83	3,00	48,40	8390	4756	88,24	6	76,80	-0,39
El Salvador	6,47	57,98	2,50	17,25	3,60	46,90	6380	3425	84,10	5	78,10	-0,44
Estonia	7,68	72,18	1,00	0,50	6,50	36,00	19420	14239	99,79	1	50,70	7,60
Finland	9,19	86,45	1,00	0,00	9,20	26,90	36270	44577	99,00	0	19,30	8,72
France	7,77	76,89	1,00	10,67	6,80	32,70	33870	40663	99,00	1	34,90	78,91
Germany	8,38	80,61	1,00	3,50	7,90	28,30	36740	40659	99,00	0	35,40	133,04
Ghana	6,02	51,42	1,50	6,00	4,10	42,80	1530	1098	66,62	14	67,10	7,69
Greece	7,92	69,10	1,50	9,00	3,50	34,30	28180	28936	97,16	1	45,90	6,78
Guatemala	6,05	46,80	4,00	29,50	3,20	53,70	4600	2685	74,47	11	81,20	13,53
Hungary	7,21	69,05	1,00	5,50	4,70	30,00	19060	12847	99,37	0	50,10	35,58
India	7,28	49,09	2,50	29,33	3,30	36,80	3290	1195	62,75	13	79,20	877,47
Indonesia	6,53	49,82	2,50	28,50	2,80	37,60	3940	2272	92,19	10	83,10	1045,85
Ireland	8,79	82,41	1,00	0,00	8,00	34,30	33170	49738	99,00	0	22,40	-0,43
Israel	7,48	72,13	1,50	23,75	6,10	39,20	26850	26102	97,10	9	84,60	4,03
Italy	7,83	70,63	1,50	12,14	3,90	36,00	31930	35073	98,87	0	45,70	146,52
Jamaica	7,21	57,67	2,50	4,75	3,30	45,50	7280	4693	86,36	4	67,40	-0,51
Japan	8,08	73,61	1,50	3,25	7,80	24,90	32880	39456	99,00	0	31,30	132,66
Korea, Rep.	8,11	67,94	1,50	15,67	5,40	31,60	27250	17110	99,00	0	41,30	46,09
Latvia	7,05	70,00	1,50	3,00	4,30	36,30	17400	11476	99,78	0	55,40	0,00
Lithuania	7,24	70,91	1,00	2,25	5,00	35,80	17380	11034	99,70	1	47,80	5,73
Macedonia	6,16	51,20	3,00	8,75	4,10	42,80	11040	4510	97,00	5	72,70	-0,12
Malaysia	6,19	47,11	4,00	44,25	4,40	37,90	13550	6909	92,46	5	69,20	693,00
Mali	6,01	42,87	2,50	8,00	2,70	39,00	1000	601	26,18	14	79,30	0,00
Mauritius	8,04	65,00	2,00	14,00	5,40	N.A.	13120	6951	87,90	1	44,40	0,00
Mexico	6,93	55,27	2,50	48,25	3,10	51,60	13570	7880	93,44	4	76,10	3001,47
Moldova	6,33	51,68	3,50	33,75	2,90	37,40	3040	1526	98,00	10	83,80	0,00
Mongolia	6,36	56,62	2,00	23,33	2,70	36,60	3660	1690	97,49	8	60,10	0,00
Namibia	6,23	54,26	2,00	9,00	4,40	74,30	6190	4096	88,51	6	74,50	0,00
Netherlands	8,99	82,77	1,00	1,00	8,80	30,90	39720	48068	99,00	0	27,90	69,05
New Zealand	9,26	82,82	1,00	3,00	9,30	36,20	28050	29352	99,00	0	23,90	61,15
Norway	9,80	89,42	1,00	0,00	8,60	25,80	54220	78409	99,00	2	18,70	2350,18
Panama	7,15	64,03	1,50	14,50	3,60	54,90	12210	6956	93,61	5	59,30	0,00
Paraguay	6,40	52,07	3,00	14,33	2,20	53,20	4460	2245	94,56	8	72,10	0,00
Peru	6,40	60,66	2,50	20,88	3,50	50,50	8270	4412	89,59	8	76,90	146,45
Philippines	6,12	53,97	3,50	38,25	2,40	44,00	3720	1836	95,42	12	87,10	24,57
Poland	7,05	69,23	1,00	9,50	5,30	34,90	18260	11288	99,51	0	49,00	33,57
Portugal	8,02	75,40	1,00	8,00	6,00	38,50	24040	22030	94,91	0	33,10	4,72
Romania	6,60	61,85	2,00	12,50	3,70	32,10	14480	7500	97,65	5	60,20	112,39
Serbia	6,33	57,67	2,00	15,50	3,50	28,20	10860	5690	97,77	6	77,80	12,31
Slovak Republic	7,35	67,53	1,00	11,00	4,30	25,80	22450	16174	99,00	1	48,80	7,87
Slovenia	7,69	74,46	1,00	9,50	6,40	31,20	26940	24101	99,68	0	36,00	0,01
South Africa	7,79	54,70	2,00	8,50	4,50	57,80	10100	5733	89,00	9	67,90	192,14
Spain	8,16	77,99	1,00	11,00	6,10	34,70	31520	31891	97,68	1	43,50	27,23
Sri Lanka	6,64	49,69	4,00	75,00	3,20	41,10	4650	2035	90,56	12	95,70	-0,64
Sweden	9,50	88,18	1,00	0,00	9,20	25,00	37860		99,00	0	20,90	4,83
Switzerland	9,09	86,05	1,00	1,00	8,70	33,70	46800	63525	99,00	1	21,80	3,49
Thailand	6,55	47,55	4,50	44,00	3,50	42,50	7610	3838	93,51	7	78,80	401,57
Trinidad & Tobago	7,16	58,27	2,00	7,00	3,60	40,30	24300	14684	98,74	4	66,10	149,77
Ukraine	6,30	53,62	2,50	22,00	2,40	27,60	6240	2545	99,69	6	69,50	92,04
United Kingdom	8,16	80,61	1,00	4,00	7,60	36,00	35640	35163	99,00	0	33,90	1501,50
United States	8,18	78,30	1,00	4,00	7,10	40,80	45400	45745	99,00	2	35,30	9140,79
Uruguay	8,10	72,25	1,00	7,63	6,90	47,10	12920	9364	98,27	1	41,30	0,90

Table A 7 part 2: Data for all analyzed 67 democracies. Own illustration

Country	Exports of Crude Oil 2009	WGI Rule of Law 2009 Score	WGI Rule of Law 2009 Percentile	Rule of Law Index 2009 Sum of all factors	Voter Turnout (%)	VAP Turnout (%)	PDI Values	IDV Values	MAS Values	UAI Values	LTO Values	IVR Values
Argentina	93,60	-0,67	30,80	7,63	72,39	70,89	49,00	46,00	56,00	86,00	20,00	62,00
Australia	250,04	1,74	95,30	11,10	95,17	82,74	38,00	90,00	61,00	51,00	21,00	71,00
Austria	0,00	1,78	96,20	11,92	81,71	75,61	11,00	55,00	79,00	70,00	60,00	63,00
Belgium	0,00	1,38	88,60	N.A.	91,08	86,00	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	82,00	57,00
Benin	0,00	-0,70	29,40	N.A.	58,69	61,83	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Botswana	0,00	0,66	67,80	N.A.	76,71	62,20	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Brazil	533,20	-0,21	50,20	N.A.	83,27	83,54	69,00	38,00	49,00	76,00	44,00	59,00
Bulgaria	0,00	-0,05	54,00	8,59	60,64	72,43	70,00	30,00	40,00	85,00	69,00	16,00
Canada	1355,36	1,79	96,70	11,35	59,52	53,59	39,00	80,00	52,00	48,00	36,00	68,00
Chile	0,00	1,24	87,20	N.A.	87,67	59,63	63,00	23,00	28,00	86,00	31,00	N.A.
Colombia	361,74	-0,41	42,70	8,08	40,49	39,42	67,00	13,00	64,00	80,00	13,00	83,00
Costa Rica	0,00	0,54	65,40	N.A.	65,13	54,01	35,00	15,00	21,00	86,00	N.A.	N.A.
Croatia	0,00	0,15	58,80	7,40	59,58	70,84	73,00	33,00	40,00	80,00	58,00	33,00
Czech Republic	0,42	0,96	80,10	N.A.	64,47	65,12	57,00	58,00	57,00	74,00	70,00	29,00
Denmark	171,14	1,90	98,60	N.A.	86,59	83,20	18,00	74,00	16,00	23,00	35,00	70,00
Dom. Republic	0,00	-0,77	25,10	8,64	56,46	56,40	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	13,00	54,00
El Salvador	0,00	-0,80	22,30	8,21	53,58	61,65	66,00	19,00	40,00	94,00	20,00	89,00
Estonia	0,00	1,11	84,40	N.A.	61,91	53,44	40,00	60,00	30,00	60,00	82,00	16,00
Finland	0,00	1,96	100,00	N.A.	65,02	68,18	33,00	63,00	26,00	59,00	38,00	57,00
France	0,00	1,45	90,00	11,02	59,98	43,43	68,00	71,00	43,00	86,00	63,00	48,00
Germany	2,20	1,65	92,90	N.A.	70,78	64,61	35,00	67,00	66,00	65,00	83,00	40,00
Ghana	0,00	-0,08	52,60	8,72	69,52	66,59	N.A.	N.A.	57,00	N.A.	4,00	72,00
Greece	19,96	0,63	67,30	N.A.	70,92	79,24	60,00	33,00	N.A.	112,00	45,00	50,00
Guatemala	12,62	-1,10	14,20	N.A.	60,46	57,19	95,00	6,00	37,00	101,00	N.A.	N.A.
Hungary	0,00	0,78	72,50	N.A.	64,39	41,08	46,00	80,00	88,00	82,00	58,00	31,00
India	0,00	0,01	55,00	9,11	58,19	56,48	77,00	48,00	56,00	40,00	51,00	26,00
Indonesia	293,13	-0,60	34,10	8,10	70,99	74,04	78,00	14,00	46,00	48,00	62,00	38,00
Ireland	0,00	1,73	94,80	N.A.	67,03	68,89	28,00	70,00	68,00	35,00	24,00	65,00
Israel	0,00	0,81	73,90	N.A.	64,72	70,24	13,00	54,00	47,00	81,00	38,00	N.A.
Italy	7,50	0,35	62,10	N.A.	80,54	79,13	50,00	76,00	70,00	75,00	61,00	30,00
Jamaica	0,00	-0,48	39,30	N.A.	60,40	49,56	45,00	39,00	68,00	13,00	N.A.	N.A.
Japan	0,00	1,29	88,20	11,44	69,27	69,34	54,00	46,00	95,00	92,00	88,00	42,00
Korea, Rep.	0,00	0,98	81,00	9,63	46,01	46,59	60,00	18,00	39,00	85,00	100,00	29,00
Latvia	0,00	0,81	73,50	N.A.	60,98	50,18	44,00	70,00	9,00	63,00	69,00	13,00
Lithuania	2,26	0,71	70,60	N.A.	32,37	29,44	42,00	60,00	19,00	65,00	82,00	16,00
Macedonia	0,00	-0,27	46,40	N.A.	57,99	67,08	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	62,00	35,00
Malaysia	236,42	0,47	63,50	N.A.	75,99	53,40	104,00	26,00	50,00	N.A.	41,00	57,00
Mali	0,00	-0,37	43,10	N.A.	32,19	38,96	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	20,00	43,00
Mauritius	0,00	0,93	79,60	N.A.	81,25	75,34	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Mexico	1299,28	-0,59	34,60	7,29	44,61	47,77	81,00	30,00	69,00	82,00	N.A.	97,00
Moldova	0,00	-0,47	39,80	N.A.	58,77	46,36	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	71,00	19,00
Mongolia	5,26	-0,31	46,00	N.A.	74,31	60,47	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Namibia	0,00	0,25	61,10	N.A.	N.A.	67,53	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Netherlands	13,14	1,80	97,20	11,95	80,35	77,48	38,00	80,00	14,00	53,00	67,00	68,00
New Zealand	45,18	1,92	99,10	N.A.	79,46	77,84	22,00	79,00	58,00	49,00	33,00	75,00
Norway	1758,88	1,90	98,10	N.A.	76,37	74,74	31,00	69,00	8,00	50,00	35,00	55,00
Panama	0,00	-0,16	51,70	N.A.	70,05	70,53	95,00	11,00	44,00	86,00	N.A.	N.A.
Paraguay	0,00	-0,97	17,50	N.A.	65,48	49,86	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Peru	18,88	-0,67	30,30	8,43	88,66	84,09	64,00	16,00	42,00	87,00	25,00	46,00
Philippines	28,00	-0,56	36,00	7,84	63,68	54,87	94,00	32,00	64,00	44,00	27,00	42,00
Poland	4,52	0,62	66,80	9,67	53,88	54,24	68,00	60,00	64,00	93,00	38,00	29,00
Portugal	0,00	1,04	82,90	N.A.	59,68	66,14	63,00	27,00	31,00	104,00	28,00	33,00
Romania	0,00	0,05	55,50	N.A.	39,20	40,48	90,00	30,00	42,00	90,00	52,00	20,00
Serbia	0,00	-0,43	42,20	N.A.	61,35	70,17	86,00	25,00	43,00	92,00	52,00	28,00
Slovak Republic	0,30	0,55	65,90	N.A.	54,67	56,40	104,00	52,00	110,00	51,00	77,00	28,00
Slovenia	0,00	1,09	83,90	N.A.	63,10	65,04	71,00	27,00	19,00	88,00	49,00	48,00
South Africa	0,00	0,08	57,30	8,89	77,30	56,57	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	49,00	34,00	63,00
Spain	0,00	1,15	85,30	10,58	76,03	77,92	57,00	51,00	42,00	N.A.	48,00	44,00
Sri Lanka	0,00	-0,08	53,10	N.A.	75,96	70,78	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Sweden	0,00	1,95	99,50	12,46	81,99	80,60	31,00	71,00	5,00	29,00	53,00	78,00
Switzerland	0,00	1,76	95,70	N.A.	48,28	39,79	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	74,00	66,00
Thailand	39,82	-0,23	47,40	9,03	78,51	76,23	64,00	20,00	34,00	64,00	32,00	45,00
Trinidad & Tobago	55,24	-0,23	48,30	N.A.	66,03	72,52	47,00	16,00	58,00	55,00	13,00	80,00
Ukraine	0,16	-0,80	22,70	N.A.	62,03	62,73	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	86,00	14,00
United Kingdom	788,92	1,73	94,30	N.A.	61,36	58,32	35,00	89,00	66,00	35,00	51,00	69,00
United States	43,80	1,54	91,50	10,28	64,36	57,45	40,00	91,00	62,00	46,00	26,00	68,00
Uruguay	0,00	0,71	70,10	N.A.	89,91	96,88	61,00	36,00	38,00	N.A.	26,00	53,00

Abstract (English)

In the last decades there was a trend of democratization with an increase in the number of countries having this type of political system. However, for some reasons some democracies apparently function better than others and have a higher quality of democracy. This analysis takes a closer look on the factors that might influence the quality of democracy by taking a dual approach: A statistical analysis for 67 as democracy categorized countries and a comparison of the similarities of high quality democracies. For both, categorization and the quality of democracy, two democracy indexes are used (EIU Democracy index 2010 and Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy 2010). An analysis for possible influencing factors for the year 2009, by using different indicators, shows certain similarities among high quality democracies and some of the computed correlations are strong. The results indicate that press freedom, corruption, the rule of law, political rights and civil liberties and education (as indicated by the mean years of schooling) do have an influence on the quality of democracy. The parliamentary system also seems to have a positive influence on the quality of democracy – almost all high quality democracies have this system of government. On contrary voter turnout does not seem to have a significant influence on the quality of democracy. Other factors that do not seem to have an influence on the quality of democracy are income distribution and literacy rate. The causalities of the relationships some factors have with the quality remain unclear – even if there factors (indicators) among the, having high correlations with the democracy indexes, e.g. GNI per capita PPP.

Abstract (Deutsch)

In den letzten Jahrzehnten gab es einen Trend in Demokratisierung und die Zahl der Länder mit Demokratie als politisches System ist angestiegen. Dennoch scheint es, dass aus gewissen Gründen einige Demokratien besser funktionieren als andere bzw. eine höhere Demokratiequalität haben. Die durchgeführte Analyse untersucht mögliche Einflussfaktoren der Demokratiequalität: Dabei werden zum einen 67 als Demokratie kategorisierte Länder statistisch analysiert und zum anderen werden Länder mit einer hohen Demokratiequalität auf ihre Gemeinsamkeiten verglichen. Sowohl die Kategorisierung von Demokratien als auch die Bestimmung derer Qualität geschieht an Hand von zwei Demokratieindizes (EIU Democracy index 2010 und Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy 2010). Die Analyse für das Jahr 2009 bezüglich den Faktoren welche die Demokratiequalität beeinflussen könnten, zeigt gewisse Ähnlichkeiten unter den Demokratien mit hoher Qualität und einige Faktoren (Indikatoren) zeigen weisen starke Korrelationen mit den Demokratieindizes auf. Die Ergebnisse deuten auf einen Einfluss von den Faktoren Pressefreiheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, politischen Rechten und zivilen Freiheiten und von Bildung (gemessen an durchschnittlich absolvierten Schuljahren) hin. Das parlamentarische System scheint ebenfalls einen positiven Einfluss auf die Qualität der Demokratie zu haben – fast alle Demokratien mit hoher Qualität haben dieses Regierungssystem. Im Gegensatz scheint die Wahlbeteiligung keinen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Demokratiequalität zu haben. So auch nicht andere Faktoren wie Einkommensverteilung und Alphabetisierungsrate für welche kein signifikanter Zusammenhang gefunden werden konnte. Die Kausalität von einigen Faktoren bleibt, auch wenn sie starke Korrelationen mit den Demokratieindizes haben, ungeklärt wie z.B. BNE pro Kopf in KKP.

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