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List of Abbreviations

ESI	European Stability Initiative
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICO	International Civilian Office
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
US/USA	United States of America

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I. Introductory Part

1. General Introduction

When we take a look at the world of the 20th century, it becomes evident that some major and determining events shaped the course of the century. At the beginning was World War I, which took its starting point with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo and subsequent escalation due to defensive pacts of the global player of this time, Germany, France, Great Britain and Russia. World War I was a war among the great powers of Europe, but because of their colonies the war spread throughout the world. While the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917 and consequently left the war, which gave a hope for victory for the overstretched forces of the Central Powers, the United States entered it in 1918 and could soon celebrate the victory with its allies. The end of World War I finally resulted in the disappearance of four empires – the Austrian-Hungarian, the German, the Russian and the Ottoman. In the course of reorganizing the map of Europe, the League of Nations was formed as an instrument to prevent a similar conflict in the future. The United States under Woodrow Wilson pushed for the creation of an organization, whose main goal should be to establish and maintain a peaceful world. However, we learned in the course of history that a peaceful world is difficult to achieve, especially the U.S. had concerns regarding the peaceful reorganization of Europe and refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, which was thought of being too harsh and restrictive to Germany and the German people. As well as Russia, the U.S. expected the Germans to break loose once again due to the high reparations and the general inequity of the peace treaty. Therefore the national party in Germany got stronger and the second major event in the 20th century was not long in coming. The outbreak of World War II, after Germany attacked Poland in 1939, marked another grim chapter in world's history. Once again the war spread throughout the world and the Nazi crimes horrified the international community. This time the United States got involved in the war, because of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the end of year 1941. Although the U.S. strategy was not to participate directly in the wars of the European countries but only to give support through industrial means, it was forced into this war by the Japanese activities in the Pacific. The attack on Pearl Harbor crushed the last support for anti-war movements in the U.S and just the day after, the U.S declared war on Japan. Finally, just like at the end of World War I, the United States along with their Allies, celebrated the victory in 1945. Learning from the past, the victors of World

War II tried to destroy the industrial and military capability of Germany to start war again by splitting it in half, as well as concentrating on a fair peace treaty. This time, another organization, which should bring lasting peace to the world, was established – the United Nations. It seems like history repeats itself.

In the following years the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union led to a nuclear arms race and many proxy wars of the two remaining superpowers. In some cases the world was very close to a nuclear world war between the two superpowers, like for instance the Cuba-Crisis. Both the leaders of the U.S as well as the Soviet Union wanted to show strength to the enemy to prevent eventual aggression from the potential enemy. This was a risky behavior. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not mean the “end of history”, as assumed by Francis Fukuyama.¹ The world did not become a peaceful place because of the end of the Cold War. The consequence was that the United States of America remained the only superpower and therefore experienced “a unipolar moment” in the words of Charles Krauthammer.²

However, the end of the 20th century was not marked by peaceful coexistence, but by ethnic conflicts and genocide. These new challenges had to be addressed by international organizations like the United Nations, and by the United States, as the sole superpower capable to do so. New military challenges arose as the enemy changed from superpowers and war fighting nations into terror and guerilla warfare. In this uncertain time of new challenges for the leaders of the U.S, Bill Clinton became president of the United States. He was the first president who was elected after the post-Cold War era and therefore he was confronted by a new era of international relations.

The reason for outlining the events of the 20th century is that it was a defining time for the foreign policy of the United States. The experiences made during World War I, World War II and during the Cold War shaped the world as it was, and shaped what leaders of the U.S. wanted the world to be. Furthermore, the first international organizations emerged during this time with the aim to prevent global war, which had an enormous impact on international relations.

¹ Compare: Fukuyama, Francis, The end of history, in: *The National Interest*, Summer 1989.

² Compare: Krauthammer, Charles, The unipolar moment, in: *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990/1991.

The major problems at the end of the 20th century were ethnic conflicts and therefore the concerns about human rights increasingly emerged in those years, especially as the fighting enemies changed from nations against each other to military or often paramilitary groups against civilians. In addition, globalization and new information technologies made the public worldwide more aware of human rights violations in other parts of the world. Not to interfere in these conflicts because of not knowing about them, became nearly impossible. At this time the superpower position of the U.S. became more and more linked to the responsibility to intervene in such conflicts. The mass media began to influence public opinion and, therewith, the politics of states

The most important conflicts in that time were the civil war in Somalia, the genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans wars. A great deal of attention was devoted to the Balkan wars, namely the civil war in Bosnia and later the ethnic conflict in Kosovo, which occupied the Clinton Administration's foreign policy through the whole time in office. On the following pages of this research paper the events of the Kosovo conflict will be outlined and an analysis of the U.S. foreign policy approach will be given.

Chapter Outline

In the introductory part, the research questions are specified and the hypotheses were set up. Thereafter, the motivation behind the research and the relevance of the topic are explained, followed by an overview of the methods which were used to conduct this research paper and the theoretical framework for the analysis are presented. In the main part, the origins of the Kosovo conflict (Chapter 6) and the major events which led to the NATO intervention in Kosovo will be discussed, as well as the NATO intervention itself (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 is devoted to the reasons and consequences of the humanitarian intervention along with the concept of Responsibility to Protect. Chapter 9 deals with the impact of the intervention on Kosovo and the perception of U.S. foreign policy. Finally, the conclusions of this research paper will be presented in Chapter 10.

2. Research Questions and Hypotheses

First of all, I would like to explain how my research questions evolved and further describe the process of formulating the hypotheses I consequently came up with.

At the beginning of my research I intended to write about American foreign policy after the Cold War and to compare different approaches to handling the new era of world politics. As described above the U.S. faced completely new problems in their role as sole superpower of the world. However, after extensive reading to gain a deeper insight into the topic I realized that it would be wiser to concentrate on a specific U.S. administration as the complete discussion of this whole topic would exceed the space of a diploma thesis. After a few considerations on the policies of different administrations, I finally decided to focus on the presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2001).

The reasons for choosing the Clinton Administration are many and varied. Firstly, Clinton's personal background seemed interesting, because his upbringing and experiences contributed to his character and further to his policies. He came from a small middle-class family in rural Arkansas, with an alcoholic and violent stepfather, but he made it to study in Georgetown, Oxford and Yale. Furthermore, an important point in Clinton's biography is his support of the anti-Vietnam-war movement, which was the first sign of his political opinions about war. Secondly, the selection of his political advisors was unusual and therefore shaped his foreign policy in a particular way. In Clinton's first term he took advice from Neocons of the Reagan administration, but at the same time announced Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, who preferred diplomacy over military action.³ This was either a sign of uncertainty, or a sign of evaluating all options closely and without bias. He was later succeeded by Madeleine Albright, who served in Clinton's second term in office. She had a more determined approach concerning the use of military force and was more willing to intervene in conflicts when diplomacy did not lead to the desired goal. As shown by his advisors Clinton made some changes in his political orientation concerning war. Thirdly, Clinton was the first president of the United States elected after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He represented not only a new generation, but also a new era of world politics and faced completely new problems and a completely changed political shape of the world. After nearly 50 years of constant global players the whole world suddenly changed. Therefore, the tasks of his presidency were manifold and, in particular regarding the U.S. foreign policy strategy, a different approach became necessary.

³ Frey, Erich, *Clintons Amerika: Präsident einer neuen Generation*, Frankfurt/Main: Eichborn, 1993, p. 153.

After having decided to conduct my research about the Clinton Administration's foreign policy, I had to come up with a coherent research question. However, the Clinton years were eventful in foreign affairs and to cover everything that occurred during his presidency would have certainly exceeded the scale of the work. Therefore, I had to figure out one major event that gives a good example of his foreign policy approach and consequently demonstrates the effects of the Administration's decisions. Since my second fields of interest, besides Political Science, are Slavonic Studies, it was obvious to me to combine these two fields of interest and choose an event in that specific area. As a result I decided that the Kosovo conflict would pose a good case study for Clinton's foreign policy, in particular because of the active entanglement, not only of the United States, but also of the European Union, Russia, NATO and the United Nations.

Therefore, my research question includes on the one hand the U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton years and its effects on world politics. On the other hand, it deals with the multilateral attempt to prevent the collapse of the Southern Balkans because of ethnic rivalries and the decision of the U.S. and its allies to launch a humanitarian intervention to contain ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This gives the chance to show the change in military and political actions from nation to nation measures to fighting more delicate problems than terror and ethnic cleansing on foreign soil.

Thus my research question is:

In how far was the U.S. foreign policy under the Clinton Administration significant for the course of the Kosovo conflict?

Sub-questions that have emerged are:

- What were the reasons for the U.S. to intervene in the conflict?
- In how far did the U.S. work together with other actors of the international community to solve the conflict?
- What was the perception of the U.S. intervention at home and abroad?
- Why did the U.S. launch a humanitarian intervention without permission of the UN Security Council?

Based on the research question, I set up the following hypotheses:

- i) *If the reason for the Clinton Administration to intervene in the Kosovo conflict was mainly based on moral grounds and in particular to prevent ethnic cleansing, then a military intervention was justified, even though it was illegal according to international law.*
- ii) *If it is assumed that the liberal theory is best suited to explain the behavior of the Clinton Administration, then U.S. domestic policy influenced the acting in the conflict.*
- iii) *If the United States, along with the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, UK and France, had exhausted all diplomatic means to convince the other permanent members, Russia and China, to permit military actions against Serbian forces to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, then acting on their own authority to save lives was inevitable.*

3. Relevance of the Topic

First of all, I would like to explain my motivation to write about this topic and afterwards describe the importance of the topic for international relations.

During my years of study my major fields of interest were International Relations and the Eastern European region. Therefore, it was obvious to me that a combination of these two fields of interest would be the ideal basis for choosing my diploma thesis topic. In the course of studying International Relations I took part in three study trips which had a decisive impact on my further studies. The first one was to New York and Washington D.C., where I had the chance to learn more about the work of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This study trip not only gave me a better insight into the system of international organizations but also influenced my further interest in the politics of the country that shaped these institutions more than any other country in the world. Therefore, the United States of America and their political relations to other nations became an important part of my further studies.

In the following years I participated in a study trip to the European institutions, in the course of which the visit of the International Criminal Court of the Former Yugoslavia was the most interesting part for me. This consequently led to an intensive study of the history and the events in the Southern Balkans during the years of disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, the initiation to focus on Kosovo emerged after a study trip to Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The vestiges of the Balkan wars were still present in the streets of Belgrade and Sarajevo, not only because of some destroyed houses but also in discussions with the people. On the one hand, the Serbs showed their discontent with the independence of Kosovo and how the international community, especially the United States, treated them on this matter. On the other hand, the Bosnians and Kosovo Albanians openly expressed their gratitude towards the Americans, in particular Bill Clinton, who was in their point of view a knight in shining armor. Furthermore, the impressions of the visit to the cemetery in Srebrenica had an impact on the perception of the trip as a whole.

As a result of the impressions I experienced in the course of the study trips, the desire to write my diploma thesis about the impact of the U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton years on Kosovo decisively increased.

However, this topic is not only interesting for me but also has a significant relevance in world politics. After the end of the Soviet Union and therefore, the end of the Cold War, the United States had to define a new foreign policy strategy, because their former enemy suddenly disappeared and therefore the strategic orientation of the American security policy had to be addressed in a different way. This shift in foreign and security policy of the United States mark an important point not only for international politics but also for American domestic politics itself. Bill Clinton, who was the first president elected after the collapse of the Soviet Union, primarily focused his election campaign on domestic policies like the economy, jobs and the healthcare system. Although it is normal practice to give priority to domestic policies during election campaigns, the need for a new or at least a revised foreign policy strategy received little attention.

However, during the Clinton Administration various trouble spots emerged on the international scene. Kosovo was one of these, but the ethnic conflict had previously been underestimated by the U.S. and the international community. Consequently, the actions taken to contain the ethnic rivalries diplomatically demonstrate the will to prevent a violent outbreak of the conflict. This was a relevant attempt of the international community to solve a conflict, which threatened to escalate, although the conflict couldn't be solved by diplomatic means. The cooperation among states, in particular the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia, is an important fact on this matter. Although the U.S. and Russia had a completely different view on how to address the conflict after the Rambouillet Agreement had failed, Russia did not pull back from the international scene. The political position of the U.S was clearly towards a military intervention, but Russia still took part in negotiations to persuade Milošević to give in and therefore stop the military intervention Russia had always opposed.

In this context, the United Nations played a limited role, because the crucial decision to launch a humanitarian military intervention against Serbia was made without the UN Security Council, but among the members of NATO.

Therefore, this topic has a particular relevance when it comes to research in the field of International Relations in the past, and the projection of this research into the future. The question why states cooperate or do not cooperate within the framework of an international organization like the United Nations is often addressed in theoretical debates. Hence, the case of Kosovo offers a good example for further research.

Finally, Kosovo still bothers the international community almost thirteen years later. Ethnic problems were not completely solved through the military intervention, which was perceived by the Serbian people as violation of the sovereignty of Serbia. After the humanitarian intervention ended in June 1999, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was responsible for securing the region and the civilian administration was carried out by UNMIK under the authority of the United Nations. This was not an easy task, because although the region was theoretically demilitarized many weapons and the ethnic tension were still present in the region. To support the development of legal structures in Kosovo the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was established in 2008.

Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, but their new status was only recognized by 85 of 193 member states of the UN. Among the states refusing to accept Kosovo's independence are two of the permanent member states of the UN Security Council – Russia and China. Furthermore, even five member states of the European Union - Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia – have not recognized Kosovo's independence.⁴

In the case of the European Union, Kosovo is actually an obstacle to the accession talks with Serbia. The integration of the states of the Southern Balkans in the European Union is a future goal of the European community, but the ongoing conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, especially Serbia's refusal to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, is threatening the Serbian membership talks with the European Union.

This research paper intends to give an insight into U.S. foreign policy in the new era after the Cold War. It tries to demonstrate the reasons for international cooperation during this time on the example of the Clinton Administration. The U.S. foreign policy is a dominant factor in our globalized world and has a decisive impact on international relations. The Kosovo case study was chosen, because this conflict shows the intention of the U.S. and the international community to solve a conflict peacefully, but consequently led to the use of force without the permission of the UNSC. Furthermore, the Kosovo conflict was the first NATO war and therefore gives a good picture of the cooperation among its member states. Finally, the paper provides an overview and analysis of a conflict, whose development and outcome is significant for further conflict studies and for examining the role of the United States in such situations.

⁴ Compare: Republika e Kosovës, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: <http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33>, accessed 3/1/12.

4. Methods

The research paper is based on a *qualitative content analysis* described by Philipp Mayring as an approach of empirical, methodological and controlled evaluation of various communication material, which is evaluated according to a content analytical structure.⁵ In other words, it is an editing of gathered communication material in terms of a specific structure.

Mayring determines three different variations of qualitative content analysis, which should be part of every reliable analysis:

- 1) A summary of the material should be conducted to have a manageable size of the material, which makes it easier to analyze it.
- 2) Parts of the text should be put in a broader perspective, which means to use additional material to examine the context more precisely.
- 3) The most important technique of qualitative content analysis is the structuring of the text to find formal or content-related characteristics, so that conclusions can be drawn.⁶

The literature for the research paper was gathered in a time period of approximately one year. During this time, I attended several lectures at the University of Vienna about American foreign policy led by Professor Gärnter and lectures concerning Kosovo led by Dr. Vedran Dzihic and Professor Helmut Kramer. Further, I attended the International Conference "Statehood, Democracy and 'Europe' in Kosovo – Analyses and Perspectives", organized by the Renner-Institut, which took place in Vienna in June 2010. This conference gave me the opportunity to talk to various experts on the topic, who supported me with further material and gave me better insight into this field of research during lively discussions. Furthermore, I took part in a study trip to Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, organized by the Academic Forum for Foreign Affairs. In the course of the trip I learned a lot about Serbian and Kosovo Albanian history, the events which led to the escalation and the perception of the international community during this crucial period, which naturally differs between Serbs and Albanians.

⁵ Mayring, Philipp, 'Qualitative Content Analysis' in: Forum: *Qualitative Social Research*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2000.

⁶ Compare: Diekmann, Andreas, *Empirische Sozialforschung. Grundlagen, Methoden, Anwendungen*, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rohwolt Verlag, 2005, p. 512.

On the one hand, the collection of primary literature contained transcripts of interviews and statements of President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Special Envoy to the Balkans Richard Holbrooke, CIA Director George Tenet and General Wesley Clark.

On the other hand, I worked with the documents of the Rambouillet Agreement and UN Security Council Resolutions.

After organizing the primary and secondary literature, the next step according to Mayring's approach to qualitative content analysis, was to summarize the gathered material and put some parts of the text in a wider perspective if further explications were useful, which was particularly the case concerning the interview part. Finally, the material was prepared for the process of structuring and significant categories were set up to analyze the given text. These categories were chosen in regard to the U.S. approach to the multilateral decision-making process, the reasons of intervening in the conflict, and the perception of the intervention among the international community.

Furthermore, a case study was selected to analyze the gathered material and prove the research question and hypotheses. In conclusion, the findings were presented at the end of the thesis.

5. Theoretical Background

The theories of the research paper emerged in the course of summarizing the material and setting up a structure of the analysis. It soon became obvious that the foreign policy strategy of multilateralism describes Clinton's foreign policy approach better than unilateralism. For a better understanding the main points of these two opposing strategies will be laid out on the following pages. Furthermore, the International Relations theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism, were taken into account. In the course of analyzing these three theories, the liberalism theory was chosen to be the one that best explains the acting of Clinton's Administration. The definitions of the mentioned theories will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Multilateralism

There have always been debates between American scholars and policy-makers about the best foreign policy strategy for a prosperous nation. The decision between unilateralism and multilateralism evokes lively discussion in the United States.

At first we will take a closer look at the policy strategy of multilateralism, which contains five key points according to Bruce Jentleson, Professor at Duke University for Political Science. Firstly, *International Institutionalism* is almost the most important key point when it comes to multilateralism.⁷ Therefore, it is necessary to go into further detail about what institutionalism means: Institutionalism is based on international law and international organizations. The roots of this theory go back to the beginning of modern state systems, when the first deliberations were made to setup a structure to overcome the situation without rights among states and to control their rivalries with the help of international cooperation.⁸

These days a more modern approach to Institutionalism can be found in the classical texts of Robert Keohane "After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy" (1984) and the book he had already written with Joseph S. Nye "Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition" (1977). In these texts, the scholars added two new characteristics to the theory of institutionalism, namely interdependence and regimes. Interdependence means that states increasingly rely on each other and therefore violent conflicts are less likely to emerge and, furthermore,

⁷ Compare: Jentleson, Bruce W., *American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century*, 3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 263-267.

⁸ Compare: Schimmelfennig, Frank, *Internationale Politik*, Paderborn; Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2.Auflage, 2010, p. 89.

international cooperation becomes more useful. In consequence, a framework is necessary to handle international cooperation – international regimes.

These regimes establish a framework through which international cooperation can be carried out and arrangements are monitored. Finally, it leads to a better coordinated and more peaceful world.⁹ Jentleson points out that the advantage of multilateral acting is not only the sharing of burdens, but also that actions can only be legitimate when they are carried out multilaterally.¹⁰ Secondly, there is the acknowledgement that there is a difference between power and influence in international relations. The multilateralist approach emphasizes that to be a powerful country does not automatically lead to more influence on the acting of other countries. Therefore, the key word is “soft power”, as Joseph S. Nye called it. He stressed that “*soft power is more than persuasion or the ability to move people by argument. It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation.*”¹¹ A multilateralist approach to foreign policy consequently means not to rely on the military might and the fear by other countries that this power could be used against them, but to influence them by setting a good example. Thirdly, the foreign policy strategy is shaped by national and global interests. Although even multilateralists admit that the national interest comes first, in a globalized world many problems cannot be addressed unilaterally. Therefore, a multilateral approach often not only suits the international community but also the United States.¹² Fourthly, international institutions are necessary for a coherent multilateral action and therefore, should not be rejected, because some of them have structural deficits. Multilateralists tend to support reforms of the institutions instead of abandoning them. Fifthly, multilateralism has a much greater domestic political support than unilateralism, which can be underpinned by opinion polls showing a majority of the people in favor of, for example, the United Nations.¹³

⁹ Compare: Schimmelfennig, Frank, *Internationale Politik*, Paderborn; Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2.Auflage, 2010, p. 90.

¹⁰ Jentleson, Bruce W., *American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century*, 3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 264.

¹¹ Nye, Joseph S., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 8-9.

¹² Compare: Jentleson, Bruce W., *American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century*, 3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 266.

¹³ Compare: Jentleson, Bruce W., *American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century*, 3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 267.

Liberalism

The first and most important theorist of liberalism was the philosopher Immanuel Kant. He wrote in his text "Perpetual Peace" (1795) about the conditions that have to exist for a lasting peace among states, including a "republican constitution". According to Kant a liberal political and social order influences international relations in a positive way and therefore leads to more peace and international cooperation. Kant's theories did not only shape the liberal theory, but also provided a framework for theories that emerged out of liberalism, in particular institutionalism, which was already mentioned above.¹⁴

Furthermore, liberalism acknowledges the fact that the foreign policy of states is not consistent, because it is designed by various domestic actors with different aims. Therefore, the foreign policy of a state is a compromise of national politics, which we have to bear in mind.¹⁵

To the same assumption came Andrew Moravcsik, a modern representative of liberal theory who, in his paper "Liberalism and international relations theory", presented three key assumptions about liberal theory. Firstly, he argued that domestic actors shape the policies of a state to promote their own interest. These actors are mostly individuals or non-governmental groups, who urge their "*interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence*".¹⁶ This means that the members of a society have a particular influence on state politics. Secondly, he assumed that a part of the social society is represented through the state and its institutions and therefore the interests of this part of society influence the state's approach in international politics. Thirdly, he emphasized that the conformation of the different preferences within a state finally shapes the behavior of the state.¹⁷ It can be concluded that the liberal theory is based on the influence of societal actors in domestic politics, who are able to promote their interests in a way that the state's behavior in regard to international politics is a reflection of its society.

¹⁴ Schimmelfennig, Frank, *Internationale Politik*, Paderborn; Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2.Auflage, 2010, p. 138.

¹⁵ Compare: Schimmelfennig, Frank, *Internationale Politik*, Paderborn; Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2.Auflage, 2010, p. 140.

¹⁶ Moravcsik, Andrew, *Taking Preferences Seriously: A liberal theory of international politics*, in: *International Organization* 51, 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513–53.

¹⁷ Compare: Moravcsik, Andrew, *Taking Preferences Seriously: A liberal theory of international politics*, in: *International Organization* 51, 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513–53.

Furthermore, the liberal theory is able to describe the changes of cooperation and conflict among states in international relations, as well as historical variations of the international system.¹⁸ Consequently, it can be said that in liberal theory the state's aspiration for power in international relations is usually weaker than the desire to pursue economic and idealistic goals.

¹⁸ Compare: Moravcsik, Andrew, *Taking Preferences Seriously: A liberal theory of international politics*, in: *International Organization* 51, 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513–53.

II. Main Part

6. The Kosovo Conflict

An inexhaustible source of national pride was discovered on [sic] Kosovo. More important than language and stronger than Church, this pride unites all Serbs in a single nation.[...]The glory of the Kosovo heroes shone like a radiant star in the dark night of almost five hundred years.[...]There was never a war for freedom – and when was there no war? – in which the spirit of Kosovo heroes did not participate. The new history of Serbia begins with Kosovo – a history of valiant efforts, long suffering, endless wars, and unquenchable glory[...].We bless Kosovo because the memory of the Kosovo heroes upheld us, encouraged us, taught us and guided us.

- Čedomil Mijatović, Foreign Minister of Serbia, speech on the 500th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo ("Field of the Blackbirds"), 1889¹⁹ -

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In the run-up to the escalation of tensions between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo in 1999, the past of the Nemanjić era, the historic places, were constantly recalled in Serbian public to once more illustrate the importance of the poor province in the south for the Serbian identity. Therefore, it is necessary to know the background of the tales, myths and historical tradition of the region to gain an insight into the evoked sentiments and reactions in this period.

6.1. The origins of the conflict

Before we can discuss the Kosovo conflict itself, we have to understand the complex history of the region and realize that Serbs and Kosovo Albanians have a completely different point of view concerning their common past. The controversy starts when it comes to the question "Who was in Kosovo first?". On the one hand the Serbs claim that their ancestors, the Slavs, came to the region in the sixth century and spread into the Southern Balkans over the following centuries. They admit that Albanians may have lived there too, but the area was mostly settled by the Serbs, who were the descendants of the Slavs. On the other hand, the Albanians declare that they were in Kosovo before the Slavs arrived there, namely as Illyrians and Dardanians. Therefore, Kosovo Albanians consider Serbs as the intruders. However, this is not only a quarrel between nationalists

¹⁹ Emmert, Thomas, *Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo 1389*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 129.

on both sides, but also between academic scholars, who cannot definitely support either side of this discussion.²⁰ There is not, nor will there ever be any certain answer to the question “Who was in Kosovo first?”, because there hardly exist any archaeological sources about the ethnicities of that time.²¹

When it comes to the Middle Ages, the picture of the region becomes somewhat clearer. The reign of the Nemanjić dynasty marked the beginning of the “Serbdom” and their monarchs shaped the history of the era between 1217 and 1371 significantly. The Serbian kingdom included most of the territory of present Serbia, Albania, Macedonia and up to the Aegean Sea and, in this respect, Kosovo was located in the middle of the kingdom.²² The importance of Kosovo for the kingdom arose especially due to the religious buildings, the churches and monasteries of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which were built there. The two major figures of the Nemanjić dynasty were Stefan Nemanja and his son Rastko. In 1196, Stefan Nemanja, who was the founder of the dynasty decided to become a monk and abdicated his reign. Nemanja's third son Rastko, who also became a monk and is nowadays better known as St. Sava, was essential for the Serbian Orthodox Church. That is because he managed to obtain autocephaly for the Serbian Orthodox Church from the Byzantine Monarch and the Orthodox Patriarch in 1219, just two years after his brother became King of Serbia. During this time several churches and monasteries were built in Kosovo. These churches include the Patriarchate of Peć, Dečani and Gračanica and are meaningful places for the Serbian Orthodox Church.²³ Obviously the Nemanjić dynasty was crucial for the first experience of a Serbian identity, which was not so much determined by territory, but principally by a national church. Having a deeper insight into the historiography of the Serbs concerning the ruling of Kosovo in the Middle Ages and their claim to the region, for example that the majority of the population of Kosovo were Serbs, the Albanian point of view naturally differs once again. Albanian historians agree with their Serbian counterparts that the names of the people living in Kosovo, according to church registers, were mostly of Slavic origin. However, these historians do not agree that the inhabitants of Kosovo ultimately were all Serbs. They state that the majority of the population were Albanians who were forced to have Slavic names as a sign of

²⁰ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 18.

²¹ Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 14-15.

²² Compare: Bieber, Florian; Daskalovski, Židas, *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 15.

²³ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 19.

suppression. Therefore, it seems as if Kosovo was a Serbian populated area²⁴. It is conceivable that the rulers of the Serbian kingdom tried to oppress other ethnicities or religions to spread the "Serbdom" and the Serbian Orthodox religion throughout their territory. However, there exist no scientifically valid sources, which back the argument of the Albanian historians. Therefore, the major problem of the entire discussion is the lack of reliable sources.

6.2. The Battle of Kosovo and its myths

Stefan Dušan, the last ruler of the Nemanjić dynasty, died in 1355. After his death, the Serbian empire began to disintegrate and several feudal lords were trying to gain more control. These lords engaged in battles and - when it suited them - periodically worked together. The rise of the Ottoman Empire extended to the Southern Balkans, but the Ottomans were not keen to fight in the region. Instead, they proposed a peaceful take-over to the feudal lords. If the lords accepted to subordinate themselves under the Ottoman rule, they were allowed to keep the command of their region. That meant that the Ottomans pursued a strategy to leave the feudal lords relatively autonomous. In return, the lord would provide the Ottomans troops during wartimes. For most of the lords this proposal seemed reasonable, but one dismissed it. He was a noble named Lazar, who possessed some parts in the Morava valley, including the city of Novo Brdo. Today it is a small town in the eastern part of Kosovo, but in former times it was an impressive city with about 40,000 inhabitants due to the many silver and gold mines in the area. Why Lazar rather decided to fight against the Ottomans instead of accepting their offer of a peaceful agreement is unknown. It can be assumed that Lazar was aware of the Ottoman strength. Nevertheless, he challenged the Ottoman Empire and deployed a small union of feudal lords, who agreed to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. This war became known as the Battle of Kosovo at Kosovo Polje, a field near the city of Priština. Nowadays it may be better known as "the Field of Blackbirds".²⁵

Even though the Battle of Kosovo, which took place in June 1389, seems to be crucial for the Serbian identity, there barely exists historic knowledge about it. What is known is that both leaders - Prince Lazar on the side of the Christian coalition and Sultan Murad I on the side of the Ottoman Empire - died in this battle. But after this similarity in Ottoman and Serbian historiography, the question of "Who killed Sultan Murad I?" divided the historians once again. The Ottoman annalists argue that the Sultan fell victim to a hideous assassination carried out by assumed Christian defectors. These alleged

²⁴Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 3-4.

²⁵Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 5.

defectors credibly showed interest in Islamic religion and pretended to desire to change their faith, but instead they killed Sultan Murad I. The Serbian annalists submit a more heroic story that just one person, called Miloš Obilić, managed to stab the Sultan in his tent.²⁶ Whatever might be true, the murder of the Sultan did not save the feudal lords from defeat. The battle caused numerous deaths on each side and after Lazar got captured, the Ottomans immediately executed him.²⁷ This battle became legendary and was a mythmaking event for the Serbs, but the distinction between history and myth is ambiguous. Most of the tales may have been a kind of propaganda of the Middle Ages²⁸. In literature, one can find many Serbian songs and poems about the famous battle that glorify Lazar's valor although the battle was a great defeat.

Normally, such a defeat does not seem a good plot for heroic songs and poems, but even centuries after this event poems about it are still recited by Serbs discussing Kosovo. It is perceived as a vital myth for their national identity. The Serbian linguist, Vuk Karadžić, published a collection of old folk songs and poems at the beginning of the 19th century. One of these heroic songs, which were only orally transmitted over the centuries, was: "The Downfall of the Serbian Empire":

*Flying hawk, grey bird,
out of the holy place, out of Jerusalem,
holding a swallow, holding a bird,
that is Elijah, holy one;
holding no swallow, no bird,
but writing from the Mother of God
to the Emperor at Kosovo.
He drops that writing on his knee,
it is speaking to the Emperor:
'Lazar, glorious Emperor,
which is the empire of your choice?
Is it the empire of heaven?
Is it the empire of the earth?
If it is the empire of the earth,
saddle horses and tighten girth-straps,
and, fighting men, buckle on swords,
attack the Turks,
and all the Turkish army shall die.
But if the empire of heaven
weave a church on Kosovo,
build its foundations not with marble stones,
build it with silk and with crimson cloth,
take the Sacrament, marshal the men,
they shall die,
and you shall die among them as they die.'
And when the Emperor heard those words,*

²⁶ Compare: Majoros, Ferenc; Rill, Bernd, *Das Osmanische Reich. 1300-1922*, Augsburg: Marixverlag, 2000, p. 118.

²⁷ Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 19.

²⁸ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 8.

*He considered and thought,
'King God, what shall I do, how shall I do it?
What is the empire of my choice?
Is it the empire of heaven?
Is it the empire of the earth?
And if I shall chose the empire,
and choose the empire of the earth,
the empire of earth is brief,
heaven is everlasting.'
And the emperor chose the empire of heaven
Above the empire of the earth.²⁹*

This famous song demonstrates Lazar's heroic decision to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. It was aimed to show his readiness to make sacrifices for his fellow Serbs and the church. If he had chosen the empire of the earth, the Turkish army would have been defeated, but the victory would have been short-lived. His decision to choose the empire of heaven immortalized Serbia and left the hope of its reawakening one day. Therefore, these lyrics are often remembered, when Serbs are talking about the importance of Kosovo. For them, it is a sacred place, where centuries ago a feudal lord paved the way for a Serbian state on the grounds of the "Field of Blackbirds", which is on Kosovo soil.

For this reason, many Serbs consider Kosovo not only as a central part of Serbia's territory, but also an essential part of the country's destiny till this day. It is incomprehensible for most people that an event that took place centuries ago lacking historical accuracy and lyrics of a heroic song, can be so crucial for a whole nation. However, this myth was built up over many years and constantly propagated in the Serbian society to make sure everyone understands its significance for the Serbian nationhood. The reason to specify the historic background of the legendary Battle of Kosovo is to give an understanding of how long the Serbian claim for Kosovo has existed and why politicians have used myths to gain the peoples' support in their attempt to keep the province of Kosovo, no matter the cost.

²⁹ Pennington, Anne; Levi, Paul, *Marko the Prince: Serbo-Croat Heroic Songs*, London: Duckworth, 1984, p. 17-18.

6.3. Constant demographic shifts in Kosovo

After the defeat on Kosovo Polje, Serbia and Kosovo were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. In this time, many Albanians converted to Islam, because in contrast to the Christian Serbs, they did not belong to an organized national church. It is worth noting that Serbs also converted to Islam during this time, but by far not as much as their fellow Albanians.³⁰ The Ottomans did not try to force their new subjects to convert to Islam, but used a kind of “soft power”, as we would call it today. To climb the social ladder in the Ottoman Empire, individuals needed to be of Muslim faith because only loyal Muslims were allowed to maintain high positions in the Empire. Furthermore, Christians were not accepted in the army and every Christian had to pay a tax per head.³¹ Apart from that, the Orthodox Christians could practice their religious traditions without problems. Therefore, Serbs who were not strictly religious were more likely to convert to Islam. This fact presumably led to a small shift in respect of religious affiliation. However, the demographic shift began in the year 1689, when the Austrian army advanced toward Kosovo to fight back the Ottomans. The Serbian historians say that many Christian Serbs supported the Austrians and started to revolt against the Turkish power. But unfortunately for the Serbs and some Christian Albanians, the Austrians overestimated their strength and finally had to draw back northwards. With them ten thousands of Serbs, fearing retaliation by the Turks, fled to the north of Serbia, which was under Austrian rule, and in particular started settling the Vojvodina region. As a result many districts in Kosovo became depopulated and the Muslim Albanians of the mountains were urged to settle down in these abandoned villages. But also here historians are split about the composition of the insurgents. While most of the Serbian history books state that only the Christian Orthodox inhabitants supported the Austrians, others explain that some Moslems also rose up against the Turks.³² It is, after all, a fact that many Serbs left Kosovo after the Austrian defeat and contributed to one of the first historic demographic shifts in Kosovo.

It took more than a century until the Serbian peasants once more began to revolt against the Turkish foreign rule. In 1804 the Serbs initiated a significant peasant uprising, which after years of fighting finally led to autonomy of the Principality of Serbia in 1830 and

³⁰ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p 8.

³¹ Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 22.

³² Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 33-34.

most of the Turkish units withdrew in 1867. The Serbs managed to achieve their independence again in 1867 when the Congress of Berlin officially recognized Serbia as a state.³³ However, before the Congress of Berlin drew the new map of the Southern Balkans, the Serbs and Montenegrins were once again at war with the Ottomans (1876-1878) to win back the southern territories. For the Serbs that meant in particular – Kosovo. With the recognition of the new independent states of the Balkans in 1878, the war with the Turks ended and Kosovo was still part of the Ottoman Empire. This outcome was not easy for the Serbs to accept.³⁴ The events between 1804 and 1878 caused further demographic changes in Kosovo and the region, because more and more Serbs emigrated from Kosovo to the increasing territory of Serbia, and during the war with the Turks about 50,000 Albanians, most of them Muslims, came to Kosovo and took up their new residence there.³⁵

These demographic shifts were the beginning of an increasing Albanian populated Kosovo, especially in the South. However, as mentioned above, for the Serbs a nation without Kosovo within its borders was not complete, no matter how few Serbs still lived there. Such a view was strengthened in the 19th century by the emerging Serbian nationalism. The old heroic songs were collected and published with the aid of Vuk Karadžić, a linguist, who also initiated a language reform and therefore contributed significantly to the Serbian national identity.³⁶ After 1878 the Serbs not only had their own independent state and national Church, but also a common national language. Everything that was necessary to develop a profound nationalism, which is demonstrated at the beginning of the chapter by the quote of the Foreign Minister of Serbia, Čedomil Mijatović, in 1889!

While the Serbs recovered their sovereignty and became a nation, the Albanians, still under Ottoman rule, ultimately realized the necessity to organize themselves. The League of Prizren was an attempt to bring all Albanians together, debating actions that would shape their future. But unlike the Serbs, Albanian nationalism was not that strong and they only managed to make up vague statements about the future status of Kosovo.

³³ Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 34.

³⁴ Compare: Bieber, Florian; Daskalovski, Židas, *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 16.

³⁵ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 35.

³⁶ Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 31-32.

The days of the Ottoman rule of the Southern Balkans were insecure; the time between 1878 -1912 was marked with constant uprisings, which led to a volatile situation in the region. The Ottoman Empire was defeated and the First Balkan War was over at the end of 1912. The result was devastating for the Albanians, just a month after the declaration of independence of the Republic of Albania, they were again under foreign rule, as Serbia and Montenegro divided Kosovo among themselves.³⁷

6.4. Kosovo: 1912-1989

In 1915, Serbia was attacked by Austro-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria. Many Serbs fled southward through Kosovo to the sea to get rescued by the French or British. But these Serbs needed to survive the way past Kosovo Albanians, who were mischievous and ready to punish their Serbian occupants for what they had done to them over the previous years. But the luck of the Albanians did not last long, because in 1918 the Serbs regained power and Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, also known as Yugoslavia.³⁸ The following years were disastrous for Kosovo as the Kosovo Information Center describes:

After the end of the First World War and the creation of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom (SCSK), forceful colonisation in the Albanian land continued. On 25 February, 1919, the government of SCSK passed the Decree 'Preliminary Regulations on Settlement of Agrarian Relations' which was in effect until 1931, when 'the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonisation' was passed. This law intended the colonisation of Kosova, expropriation of the Albanians' ownership, ethnic cleansing, forceful emigration and serbianisation of the Albanian regions. Various genocidal[sic] measures were used for the expulsion of the Albanians. In the period between 1913-1939, 'flying detachments' of military and policemen acted to punish and massacre the population. From 1918 to 1938, the military burned and destroyed 320 villages with Albanian population. Only between 1918-1921, it killed 12,346 persons, put 22,160 people into prison, plundered 50,515 houses and burned down 6,125 houses.³⁹

The expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo was prepared in detail and was carried out over several years without any international outcry. From the Serbian point of view, Kosovo belonged to the Serbian nation and was therefore supposed to be mostly settled by Serbs. Additionally, the Kosovo Albanians were seen as an obstacle to peace in the region, with regard to their desire to be an independent state or at least to be part of a

³⁷ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 36-38.

³⁸ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 20-21.

³⁹ Kosovo Information Center, *Expulsions of Albanians and Colonisation of Kosova*, Prishtina: 1997. Also available at: <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/kosovo/chap2.htm> accessed on 10/09/2011.

Greater Albania. No ethnic group forgets the punishments of the members of the occupying forces, which for the Kosovo Albanians were the Serbs. Understandably, the atmosphere between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians was tense and for this reason living side by side became almost unbearable. The oppression of the Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo of course did not make them more likely to be part of a Serbian nation, but resulted in a growing feeling of Albanian nationalism and secession efforts. The reduction of the Albanian population in Kosovo continuously proceeded over many years:

While the Albanians comprised 90 per cent of the population in these regions in 1912, it was down to 70 per cent in 1941.⁴⁰

With the beginning of World War II, the tide turned once again. While fascist Italy already invaded Albania in 1939, the invasion of Yugoslavia by the Nazi regime did not start until 1941. This time the consequences were more devastating for the Serbs than for the Albanians.⁴¹ Serbs living in Kosovo were attacked and mostly Serbian populated villages were looted and burned down. The figures show that until 1942 about 70,000 refugees from Kosovo had fled into Serbia.⁴²

It seems like a vicious circle of expulsion and murder that was carried out by Serbs and Albanians. During the course of the fighting, each side gained the upper hand at least once in a while. However, the Serbs exercised power in the region more often and for a longer period. Even after the end of World War II the vicious circle of violence could not be broken. In 1945, Serbia became a constituent republic of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was again annexed to Serbia, but this time as an autonomous region.⁴³ Josip Broz Tito, the president of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, raised the legal status of Kosovo to autonomy in 1974. As a consequence Albanians were officially allowed to govern the territory of Kosovo, but were still not fully independent from Serbia. Over the next few years the rise of national consciousness of Kosovo Albanians increasingly became a problem for Serbia. The Albanians were not satisfied with the general economic situation of the region and still longed for an independent Kosovo. Because of the poor economic situation in the 1980s and the growing "Albanization", many Serbs left Kosovo northwards in the hope of finding work and a secure life. This situation and a high Albanian birth-rate resulted in a new

⁴⁰ Bieber, Florian; Daskalovski, Židas, *Understanding the War in Kosovo*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 20.

⁴¹ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 46-47.

⁴² Compare: Fischer, Bernd J., *Albania at War, 1939-1945*, London: Hurst, 1999, p. 87.

⁴³ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 31.

demographic shift of Kosovo.⁴⁴ In 1981, about 1.6 million people lived in Kosovo, of whom 77.4 percent were Albanians and just 13.2 percent were Serbs. Just ten years later the Albanians already represented 82.2 percent of Kosovo's population, whereas the Serbs only made up 9.9 percent of Kosovo's population, which almost reached 2 million by 1991.⁴⁵ If we look at these numbers, the demographic changes in Kosovo over the years were remarkable due to complex reasons and circumstances. Although the Albanians represented the majority of Kosovo's population, their struggle for independence seemed hopeless, especially after Slobodan Milošević appeared on the political stage and Yugoslavia was about to collapse.

After Milošević was elected president of Serbia in 1989, he addressed a rally on June 28th at Gazimestan, a monument near the actual battlefield of the Battle of Kosovo. He gave a famous speech on the occasion of the battle's 600th anniversary, apparently still believing in the continuation of the SFRY under Serbian domination, which was translated by the National Technical Information Service of the US Department of Commerce:

Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and more frequently and more and more successfully.(...) After all, our entire country should be set up on the basis of such principles. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it.⁴⁶

It remains unclear whether Slobodan Milošević really believed in what he said that day. Obviously he never intended a break-up of Yugoslavia, but an integration of independent states in the state of Yugoslavia. That Kosovo would not become an independent state soon became clear, when its autonomy was abolished in the same year.⁴⁷ Milošević's speech was interpreted differently in the media coverage, as the publicist Hannes Hofbauer points out in his book "Experiment Kosovo". He observed that the conciliatory

⁴⁴ Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 62-63.

⁴⁵ See Appendix One: Population statistics.

⁴⁶ Krieger, Heike, *The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974-1999*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 10.

⁴⁷ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 67.

tones of the speech were not taken into account, because the media coverage of Yugoslavia and Milošević already had a negative orientation. Therefore, statements concerning a peaceful coexistence of all nationalities in Yugoslavia had been omitted.⁴⁸ However, the disintegration process of Yugoslavia continued and led to a civil war, from which two independent states emerged - namely the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia - while the struggle for independence in Bosnia ended in an ethnic conflict.

This chapter describes the origins of the conflict leading to the escalations of the 1990s. It is crucial to have an understanding of the Albanian struggle for self-governance, which has taken place for centuries and caused a high number of victims among the civilian population. On the other hand, for the Serbs Kosovo is an important basis of the nation's identity, the cradle of Serbdom, and therefore should always be a part of the nation's history and territory. There are no certain statements whether the Serbs or Albanians are right with their claim of being the first on the territory or who made up the majority of its population for most of the time. Additionally, for many people these questions do not even matter anymore. The bloody fights of the two ethnicities left generations with so much hatred against each other that reconciliation is hard to reach. After the Kosovo Albanians finally lived with extensive autonomy during the years of Yugoslav rule, they were not willing to give up all their achievements once more. Consequently, the positions were hardened and there was no way out of a conflict, which had been building up over centuries. It was just a matter of time when it finally escalated.

⁴⁸ Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 80.

7. NATO intervention in Kosovo

We had discussed in many forums whether this would be another Vietnam - was this going to take a very long time. I never thought it would be over quickly, but relatively, it was not a long time. It was 78 days. We were dealing with somebody who is genuinely evil, who was committed to overrunning a group of people, and who has control over his country and over his military. Given that, I do think we handled this in a relatively short time.

- Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, in an interview with PBS⁴⁹ -

7.1. Background to the NATO intervention

The loss of autonomy in 1989 enraged Kosovo Albanians and led to a structure of Albanian shadow institutions as part of peaceful resistance against the Serbian oppression. However, they learned that peaceful resistance, as for example to declare independence and establish a de-facto Albanian government - although not officially recognized - would not result in self-determination like in Slovenia or Croatia. The Serbs would never give up Kosovo without being forced to do so, so they had to draw the international attention to their situation. In the meantime the U.S. and the European Union were occupied with the war in Bosnia and eager to prevent a collapse of the entire region, therefore at first, Kosovo did not occur at the top of their list of priorities.⁵⁰ Ibrahim Rugova, an Albanian literary scholar and poet, took the lead of Kosovo in these turbulent times as the chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), formed in 1989. He was the reason why the violence in Kosovo did not get out of hand, the so called "Ghandi of Pristina" insisted on peaceful resistance, because otherwise Serbs would finally have a reason to eradicate Albanians in Kosovo.⁵¹ To run the parallel institutions, money had to be raised in the Albanian communities outside of Kosovo, which were somehow obliged to pay for their compatriots. If this always happened voluntarily is doubtful, but no one ever had the courage to complain about the mafia-like methods of this kind of Albanian mafia organization in public.⁵² The frustration became unbearable for the ethnic

⁴⁹ Albright, Madeleine, in an interview with PBS Frontline, *War in Europe*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html>, accessed 7/10/2011.

⁵⁰ Daalder, Ivo H.; O'Hanlon, Michael E., *Winning Ugly, NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p. 8-9.

⁵¹ stern.de, Ibrahim Rugova: Der "Ghandi von Pristina", 21.1.2006, <http://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/ibrahim-rugova-der-gandhi-von-pristina-553732.html>, accessed 7/10/2011.

⁵² Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 83.

Albanians in Kosovo. The years of struggle for self-determination and an independent state ended up in a violent environment, with the constant threat of Serbian raids on Albanian villages and the fear to be driven out of their homes. In return Serbian settlers in Kosovo could not expect to live in peace either, because Albanians saw them as their enemies, no matter how peace-loving some Serbs seemed. That somewhat explains the different view concerning the question of which ethnic group suffered more in the region. While the Serbs considered themselves as legal settlers on Serbian soil, even though they were a minority, for the Albanians they were part of the occupying forces and jointly responsible for their committed atrocities. Since neither of them were willing to give in, the events could only lead to a violent solution of the conflict.

The first time Kosovo found itself in the Western spotlight was the so called “Christmas warning” of U.S. President George Bush in 1992. In this secret note the U.S. warned Milošević of further attacks against Albanians, because violations of human rights would force them to intervene, although the U.S. emphasized that they still recognized Kosovo as a legal part of Serbia. This threat was repeated several times during the following years, but while for Milošević Kosovo was an internal problem, the U.S. was far more concentrated on solving the war in Bosnia.⁵³ The threat of a military intervention was repeated for the next seven years, when in 1999 NATO started its war against Serbia.

After the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995, the Kosovo Albanians were once more disappointed by the international community, because even the Bosnian Serbs were not allowed to create an independent state and the Western countries did not dare to question the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Therefore, Kosovo’s independence seemed further away than previously expected. In this atmosphere the non-violent resistance of Rugova’s LDK started crumbling and an extremist group of young Kosovo Albanian men ready to fight for Kosovo’s independence at whatever cost, emerged. The Kosovo Liberation Army, also known under its Albanian name Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës or UÇK, took the opportunity of the breakdown of the Albanian state and smuggled a large amount of weapons across the border into Kosovo. With their new equipment the KLA were not only able to launch small bloody attacks against the Serbian police forces, but they also brought several areas under their control and massacred Serbian civilians. The counter-attack of the Serbian forces was not long in

⁵³ Compare: Power, Samantha, *„A Problem from Hell“, America and the Age of Genocide*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2002, p. 446.

coming. The spiral of violence escalated and the KLA achieved what they wanted – to be high on the international agenda.⁵⁴

In an interview with the U.S. television network PBS Richard Holbrooke, chief negotiator of the Dayton Agreement, later explained his position on the Kosovo conflict:

My advice and position on Kosovo, from the beginning of my involvement in the spring of 1998 on, was basically that the Serbs and the Albanians would never be able to settle their problems unless there was an outside international security presence on the ground. The hatred between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was far, far greater than any of the so-called ethnic hatreds of Bosnia, which had been grossly exaggerated by the crooks, and the mafioso demagogues in the ethnic communities of Bosnia.⁵⁵

Richard Holbrooke mentioned in this interview the widespread opinion of the necessity of ground forces in Kosovo to prevent further acts of violence. For most of the observers of the conflict it was obvious that the spiral of violence and counter-violence would not be able to be stopped by the signing of a peace agreement. To bring a halt to ethnic cleansing and displacement, impartial international observers were substantial to assure compliance on both sides.

At first the Clinton administration did not seem keen to intervene in this conflict militarily, but the growing human rights violations made Kosovo impossible to ignore. In 1998 Clinton sent the chief negotiator of the Dayton Agreement and experienced U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade. He negotiated an agreement with Milošević, which included the withdrawal of the Serbian police forces from Kosovo and the acceptance of about 2,000 international observers in Kosovo. The final agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission was signed by the OSCE Chairman in Office and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Yugoslavia in October 1998, and deployed until February 1999 a maximum of 1,500 unarmed observers, who should monitor compliance with the agreement and work together with the authorities of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia (FRY).⁵⁶ The cease-fire did not even last over the winter months. In a statement of the CIA Director George J. Tenet on current and projected security threats for 1999, he already predicted a negative development in Kosovo:

⁵⁴ Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Balkankrieg: Zehn Jahre Zerstörung Jugoslawiens*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2001, p. 95-96.

⁵⁵ Holbrooke, Richard, in an interview with PBS Frontline, *War in Europe*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html>, accessed 7/10/2011.

⁵⁶ Compare: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *Kosovo Verification Mission*, <http://www.osce.org/node/44552>, accessed 7/10/2011.

Kosovo is the most acute problem. The Kosovo Liberation Army will emerge from the winter better trained, better equipped, and better led than last year. With neither Belgrade nor the Kosovar Albanians willing to compromise at this point, spring will bring harder fighting and heavier casualties, unless the International Community succeeds in imposing a political settlement. The fragility of any political solution is likely to generate pressure for the International Community to deploy ground forces to enforce implementation and deter new fighting.⁵⁷

Tenet proved to be right. While the Serbs according to the Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement had withdrawn a great amount of their forces from Kosovo, the KLA saw its chance to fill the gap and therefore provoked Serbian action. The massacre of Račak, in January 1999, committed by Serbian forces, reminded the U.S. of the massacre in Srebrenica four years ago and was a turning point in the perception of the conflict. However, neither the advisors of the Clinton Administration nor the Congress in Washington nor the public liked to hear George Tenet's assumption that whatever political solution of the conflict would be chosen, ground forces would be inevitable to observe the compliance of such a settlement.

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also tried to convince the other members of the Clinton Administration that a reliable threat of force was important to demonstrate power to Milošević and that there was no way to avoid ground troops if an agreement was reached.⁵⁸ She pointed out that the disapproval of peacekeeping forces under U.S. officials originated from four major concerns. First, 'they didn't want to have to support a second major long-term mission in the Balkans'; second, 'they worried about getting caught in the middle of civil war.' Third, 'they doubted our ability to rouse public support for the obscure cause of Kosovar autonomy' and fourth, 'they wondered whether Congress would come up with our share of peacekeeping costs'.⁵⁹ These were practical considerations of Clinton's policy advisors, who first and foremost had to bear in mind the consequences for the United States.

However, a final attempt was made to bring the conflict to a peaceful end in the hope to at least avoid a military intervention – the talks at the chateau of Rambouillet in 1999.

⁵⁷ Tenet, George J., *Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats*, Washington D.C., 2 February 1999. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/ps020299.html>, accessed 7/10/2011.

⁵⁸ Compare: Albright, Madeleine, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, New York: Miramax, 2003, p. 503.

⁵⁹ Albright, Madeleine, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, New York: Miramax, 2003, p. 504.

7.2. Rambouillet Talks

On February 6th 1999 the negotiations for a final peace agreement took place in France to give Milošević one more chance to avoid a military intervention. Representatives of the U.S., the EU and Russia presented a proposal to the Serbian and Albanian negotiators which should be accepted in the main parts by both parties and disagreements on minor parts could be reargued if necessary. The three chief negotiators of the Rambouillet Agreement were Ambassador Christopher Hill representing the U.S., Wolfgang Petritsch as Special Envoy of the European Union and Russian Ambassador Boris Mayorsky. In the following two weeks they discussed the “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo” with the Albanian and Serbian delegations to reach an agreement to end the conflict in Kosovo. The key demands of the Peace Agreement were the following:

- An immediate cease-fire
- Withdrawal of Serbian troops and paramilitary forces from Kosovo
- Safe return of displaced people to their homes
- An extensive autonomy of Kosovo (e.g. free and fair elections supervised by the OSCE)
- Demilitarization of the KLA
- Acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY
- Deployment of NATO-led peacekeeping forces ⁶⁰

The Rambouillet talks, lasting till February 23rd, can be summarized as a conference with intensive and dogged negotiations, interrupted by recurring setbacks. After two weeks and already several extensions of the conference, the demands listed above were finally accepted by the Kosovo Albanian delegation, although two points were highly controversial - the demilitarization of the KLA and the acceptance of the territorial integrity of the FRY. This meant no independent state of Kosovo, which had been a constant claim of the KLA and a major reason of the entire fighting over the years. Madeleine Albright, who became more and more impatient, took an active part in the talks and indicated decisively what a rejection of the agreement would mean for Kosovo: ‘Reject it, and the outcome will be a war you will lose, along with international support.’⁶¹ At first the Albanian delegation hesitated, especially because the head of the delegation Hashim Thaçi was also the leader of the political part of the KLA, but they had taken the

⁶⁰. Compare: Rambouillet Agreement, *Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo*, 1999. Available at: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html. accessed 7/10/11.

⁶¹ Albright, Madeleine, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, New York: Miramax, 2003, p. 510.

U.S. threat seriously and concluded that an extensive autonomy monitored and protected by peacekeeping forces would be the wiser option at that moment.

In contrast, the negotiations with the Serbian delegation were far more frustrating, because they seemed to pursue a strategy of playing for time.⁶² The evaluations and statements concerning the civil parts of the agreement took them a long time and after that, they had withdrawn concessions which had already been made and the discussions started again.⁶³ For the Serbian delegation the main problem seemed to be the NATO-led peacekeeping forces on the territory of the FRY. Milan Milutinović, the president of Serbia, explained to Madeleine Albright that 'we have accepted the idea of autonomy and democracy, but we are stuck on your proposal to insert an outside military force.'⁶⁴ Several attempts to persuade the Serbian side that a military presence would be necessary for the implementation of the Interim Agreement and therefore was not negotiable, failed.

In the end, the results of the Rambouillet peace talks at least conducted a positive development and therefore, after a two weeks break to give both delegations time to consult their people at home, further negotiations continued in Paris. There the finalization of the Interim Agreement was expected.

The negotiations in Paris started on March 15th and on the first day it was already clear that the Serbian delegation was not about to change its mind concerning the military presence on its territory. Once again several attempts were made to intensify the pressure on Serbia, but while the Albanian delegation signed the Interim Agreement on March 18th, the Serbs rallied troops near the Kosovo-Macedonian border. As a result floods of refugees from Kosovo were witnessed.⁶⁵ At this time most of the involved diplomats realized the hopeless situation. At home the U.S finally succeeded in gaining support from the House of Representatives to provide American soldiers for peacekeeping forces if the agreement was signed, although many representatives still

⁶² Compare: Petritsch, W., Kaser, K., Pichler, R., *Kosovo/Kosova. Mythen, Daten, Fakten*, Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, 1999, p. 284.

⁶³ Compare: Petritsch, W., Kaser, K., Pichler, R., *Kosovo/Kosova. Mythen, Daten, Fakten*, Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, 1999, p. 286.

⁶⁴ Albright, Madeleine, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, New York: Miramax, 2003, p. 509.

⁶⁵ Compare: : Petritsch, W., Kaser, K., Pichler, R., *Kosovo/Kosova. Mythen, Daten, Fakten*, Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag, 1999, p. 342-343.

expressed their reservations about ground forces.⁶⁶ If Milošević at this point was still thinking that the U.S. was just making empty threats, he played with high risk.

In mid-March 1999 President Bill Clinton sent Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade for last face to face negotiations with Slobodan Milošević. Holbrooke should have threatened him once again with NATO intervention if he had further refused to accept the Peace Agreement and to withdraw his troops from Kosovo, but there was no reasonable chance to change his mind. On March 23 1999 Holbrooke left Belgrade empty-handed and on the same day the U.S. Senate gave President Clinton the permission to take an active part in NATO bombings.⁶⁷ Consequently, Bill Clinton had no other option than to support NATO airstrikes, because otherwise the U.S. would have lost its credibility after threatening Serbia with bombings for several months and the fear of witnessing another genocide like in Rwanda was a decisive argument as well.

7.3. NATO's first war

On March 24th, 1999, President Bill Clinton made the case for NATO intervention in Kosovo, in a Statement on Kosovo, when he appeared on U.S. television to announce the start of NATO airstrikes against Serbia. The most important factor for Clinton was to point out in his speech why intervening in the southern province of Serbia was in the national interest of the United States, why it was a vital question for the public and why it was necessary to gain their support for airstrikes. He stated that the conflict in Kosovo could endanger the whole region, because the masses of refugees would overburden the neighboring states and their recently established democracies. This would shake all the efforts made in Bosnia and a new war on European soil could be the result. Bill Clinton recalled that if the U.S. had entered World War II earlier to stop Nazi Germany, the losses of U.S. soldiers and the economic costs would have been much lower. Therefore he tried to explain to the American people that to intervene now would mean a lower risk for U.S. soldiers to be killed and the war would be over after a short time of bombing. He emphasized the broad consensus between the U.S. and its NATO allies about the necessary measures to stop ethnic cleansing and to prove the seriousness of NATO to the Serbian dictator.⁶⁸ Bill Clinton had to convince the American people that a NATO intervention, which would be carried out mostly by American soldiers, was

⁶⁶ Compare: Albright, Madeleine, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, New York: Miramax, 2003, p. 518.

⁶⁷ Compare: Clinton, Bill, *Mein Leben*, Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2005, p. 1289.

⁶⁸ Compare: Clinton, Bill, *Statement on Kosovo* (March 24, 1999). Available at: <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3932> accessed 15/11/11.

absolutely necessary and there was no other option to solve this problem diplomatically. Otherwise, the willingness to send American soldiers to Kosovo, a province of a sovereign state somewhere in southern Europe, would have been very limited. The support of the American public was a difficult venture, particularly when even the enthusiasm of the Pentagon and foreign policy scholars was hard to obtain.

The airstrikes, called Operation Allied Force, started in the evening of March 24th, shortly after President Clinton finished his speech about Kosovo. General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, was the American commander of the intervention and held responsible for the outcome. After the first days of bombing, the U.S. and its allies realized that Milošević was far away from giving in. In contrast, he intensified his efforts to drive Albanians forcefully out of their homes and burned down village after village. Ethnic cleansing and a refugee catastrophe should have been avoided by NATO intervention, but instead the situation became worse since the NATO airstrikes had started. Madeleine Albright had initially stated that the airstrikes would not take a long time and that Milošević would give in, but very soon she had to regret her statements and admit that the Administration and NATO underestimated the Serbian resistance.⁶⁹

General Wesley Clark had a tough job during this time. Phase I of the airstrikes did not impress Milošević at all, but an expansion of the target list had to be discussed and confirmed by U.S. officials and NATO allies, which took a certain amount of time. The deployment of ground forces, as demanded by General Clark several times to effectively stop or at least contain ethnic cleansing, were rejected, because of the high risk of American casualties.⁷⁰ The Phase I targets only included the Integrated Air Defense System of Serbia, which was important to destroy regarding the safety of NATO pilots. However, to destroy Phase I targets were not able to prevent Serbian atrocities on the ground and most of this targets already were hit, so General Clark once more affirmed the importance to start with Phase II.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Compare: Albright, Madeleine, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, New York: Miramax, 2003, p. 521- 522.

⁷⁰ Compare: Power, Samantha, „A Problem from Hell“, *America and the Age of Genocide*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2002, p. 454.

⁷¹ Compare: Clark, Wesley K., *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2001, p. 202-203.

A few days after the beginning of NATO's first war, Phase I already ended and Clark could start to bomb Phase II targets as NATO announced on March 27th. NATO spokesman, Jamie Shea, and other NATO officials explained to CNN that the targets of Phase II mostly contained visible targets like tanks and Serbian troops in the field, in order to protect Albanians from further attacks by Serbian forces. But for a better target acquisition the pilots in Phase II had to fly lower and with less speed, which put them in higher danger. However, the Clinton Administration emphasized that Phase II was not a reaction of the unexpected ethnic cleansings, but was already part of the operation plan in the forefront and they continued to refuse the deployment of ground forces.⁷² For the U.S and its European Allies the most important premise was to demonstrate unity concerning the intervention's execution, at least in front of the public. Milošević should be assured that there was no chance to use his strategy of playing for time to discourage NATO and therefore stop the bombings. However, the constant rejection of the Clinton Administration to think of a deployment of ground forces, against the advice of General Clark and Madeleine Albright, may have given Milošević a ray of hope. It was not a wise decision of Bill Clinton to take the option of ground forces off the table, even before NATO intervention started and without knowing how the war would develop. The reason for his cautious behavior was the fear of losing the support of the American people for the war. His defense officials also had another reason to withhold a large number of ground troops - they still pursued the strategy that the U.S. had to be able to fight two wars at the same time in different regions, as they stated to General Clark during a meeting. Therefore they could not provide more troops in the Balkans, even if this would mean to lose the war in Kosovo.⁷³ Recognizing that Washington expected victory in Kosovo only through NATO airstrikes, Phase III had to be launched after four weeks of bombings.

The results of Phase II were not good, because Milošević was smart enough to disguise the Serbian command centers and therefore made it difficult for NATO pilots to locate them. Another big problem posed the weather conditions in the area, because of thick clouds the visibility was poor and the selected targets could not be bombed.⁷⁴ For the above reasons, the war did not work out as NATO had expected and after four weeks of

⁷² CNN World, *NATO officials: NATO air attack shifts, aims at violence inside Kosovo*, 27.3.1999. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/1999-03-27/world/9903_27_nato.attack.07_1_first-nato-plane-nato-personnel-nato-officials/3?_s=PM:WORLD, accessed 15/11/11.

⁷³ Compare: Clark, Wesley K., *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2001, p. 313.

⁷⁴ Compare: Clark, Wesley K., *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2001, p. 221-226.

airstrikes no considerable efforts were achieved to stop Milošević of attacking Albanian villages and accepting the Peace Agreement. NATO, therefore, had to intensify its attacks and decided at the NATO summit, at the end of April, to extend the possible targets for the airstrikes.

Phase III put the war to another level, because most of the targets were located in central and northern Serbia, especially in Serbia's capital. General Clark had to work hard to get the approval to bomb police headquarters in highly populated areas of Belgrade, but in his opinion it was necessary to interrupt the command to the Serbian ground forces in Kosovo.⁷⁵ NATO bombed not only military targets, but also infrastructure which was assumed necessary to uphold Serbian resistance, like transport routes to Kosovo, important bridges, television stations and electricity supply. The consequences for Serbia's civilian population became severe, because of two reasons. First, the roads, bridges and electricity supply NATO had hit were not only necessary for the military, but even more so for the people living in the area. Water, power and telecommunication services broke down in some parts of the country. Second, there were no guarantees that the missiles only hit the chosen targets, in particular when the area was highly populated. Therefore, even schools, hospitals and embassies were not safe. The most well-known incident was certainly the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, because NATO had used an old map.⁷⁶ As a result the political relations between the U.S. and China deteriorated dramatically and the relations to Russia had already been tense long before..

This was a crucial moment for the NATO intervention, because the international attention moved from Serbian atrocities to the mistakes of NATO airstrikes and killings of innocent people. But the U.S. and its NATO allies still demonstrated unity and the willingness to stay there till Milošević surrendered. At that time, Russia realized that it would be better to work together with U.S. and European diplomats to find a solution to end the war and encourage Milošević to accept such an agreement. After intensive talks Martti Ahtisaari, UN negotiator and Russia's special envoy to the Balkans Victor Chernomyrdin finally consented to a 10 points agreement, which they proposed to Milošević on June 2, 1999:

⁷⁵ Compare: Clark, Wesley K., *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2001, p. 219.

⁷⁶ Compare: Power, Samantha, *„A Problem from Hell“, America and the Age of Genocide*, New York: Harper Perennial, 2002, p. 456-458.

- An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal of all forces from Kosovo;
- Deployment of effective international civil and security presences in Kosovo under United Nations auspices;
- International security presence with substantial NATO participation under unified command;
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo;
- Only an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel would be permitted to return to perform limited functions;
- Safe and free return of all refugees;
- Establish an interim political framework agreement according to the Rambouillet accords;
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region;
- Suspension of military activity required acceptance of the points made above.⁷⁷

Milošević was told that he had to accept the document without any revisions, otherwise the bombings would continue. Even the Russians supported the document and he realized that he was on his own now. At last he tiredly gave up and agreed to the deal on June 3rd, ~~1999~~, 1999.⁷⁸

After 78 days of bombings NATO finally reached its goal. NATO's first war lasted longer than expected and left a trail of destruction in Serbia. Nevertheless, for the Clinton Administration it was a hard-earned victory and reestablished their credibility in the world. They announced the message, that if anyone dared to threaten U.S. national interests or its ideas on morality and human rights anywhere in the world, the U.S. would not hesitate to take action to defend its values. Bill Clinton was hailed as the saver of Kosovo, not only by Kosovo Albanians themselves, but also by most of the international media. After his extra-marital affair with a young White House intern a year earlier, which became known as the "Lewinsky Scandal", Clinton needed and was thankful for the admiration abroad. He was at the end of his second term in office and the victory over a cruel dictator certainly improved the perception of his presidency.

⁷⁷ United Nations, Annex 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). Available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 16/11/11.

⁷⁸ Compare: Daalder, Ivo H.; O'Hanlon, Michael E., *Winning Ugly, NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p. 173-174.

8. Humanitarian intervention

It is almost ten years to the day that I stood in this city and gave an address at the height of the Kosovo crisis. In that speech, I set out what I described as a doctrine of international community that sought to justify intervention, including if necessary military intervention, not only when a nation's interests are directly engaged; but also where there exists a humanitarian crisis or gross oppression of a civilian population.

- Tony Blair, speech to Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 23.4.2009.⁷⁹ -

8.1. Clinton and Blair – the world's police

After NATO's intervention in Kosovo came to a victorious end, critical observers started the discussion whether the airstrikes were necessary to stop Milošević and far more important, whether U.S. and its European allies, particularly Great Britain, overextended their commitment to stop a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. NATO's military intervention set an exceptional precedent in international law, because the alliance went to war without permission of the UN Security Council.⁸⁰ Many lawyers stated that the intervention, even if it was carried out on humanitarian grounds, was illegal according to international law. A German judge, member of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, emphasized in an article that the use of military force against a sovereign state carried out by another state or an association of states (like NATO) violates the prohibition of violence. Therefore, no matter what the force against a sovereign state is called, it is illegal⁸¹ according to the UN Charter:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.⁸²

⁷⁹ Blair, Tony, *Tony Blair speech to Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 23.4.2009*. Available at: <http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/speeches/entry/tony-blair-speech-to-chicago-council-on-global-affairs/>, accessed 10/11/11.

⁸⁰ Münkler, Herfried; Malowitz, Karsten, *Humanitäre Intervention. Ein Instrument außenpolitischer Konfliktbearbeitung. Grundlagen und Diskussion*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008, p. 16.

⁸¹ Dieter, Deiseroth, *Der Kosovokrieg und das Völkerrecht*, in: *Friedenspolitische Korrespondenz* 1/ März 2001. Available at: <http://www.ag-friedensforschung.de/rat/FRIKORR/deiseroth.html>, accessed 10/11/11.

⁸² UN Charta, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>, accessed 10/11/11.

However, not only lawyers and foreign policy scholars stated their point of view on NATO's first war, but also famous political figures of states, which were not involved in the conflict, started talking about their opinion on the new era of humanitarian intervention. One of these politicians was the Noble Peace Prize laureate Nelson Mandela, who was President of South Africa at that time, and expressed his concerns about American and British foreign policies in an interview with The Guardian in April 2000:

But I am resentful about the type of thing that America and Britain are doing. They want now to be the policemen of the world and I'm sorry that Britain has joined the US in this regard. It's a totally wrong attitude. They must persuade those countries like China or Russia who threaten to veto their decisions at the UN. They must sit down and talk to them. They can't just ignore them and start their own actions.⁸³

In this interview Mandela referred to a major problem concerning the whole discussion about the intervention in Kosovo. The U.S. and its allies went to war without permission of the Security Council, because the permanent members China and Russia were not convinced that there was no other option than military force to end the conflict in Kosovo. Russia, in particular, made every effort to establish a Peace Agreement that suited everyone, while respecting the sovereignty of Serbia's territory. Therefore, the growing tensions between the U.S. and Russia after NATO launched its airstrikes were foreseeable and consciously taken into account by the Clinton Administration. China's opinion on the topic was also ignored and after NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade the country's relationship with the U.S. became more than tense. Even though the bombing of the embassy was an accident, there remained a bad taste and the feeling that the U.S. dedicated the intervention to one main objective – to sustain its primacy in world politics with the help of its loyal ally, Great Britain.

The British journalist Robert Fisk reported in 1999 for The Independent about NATO's humanitarian war. He was one of the first who saw the destruction of civilian targets caused by NATO bombings and reported about the toll of Serbian deaths. Further, he remarked that NATO, after it started to bomb its Phase III targets, stopped excusing for killing civilians. The reason was that civilian deaths grew in Phase III, because NATO now targeted trains, bridges and telecommunication centers and if they assumed soldiers were hiding in a hospital, NATO also launched airstrikes against a completely

⁸³ Sampson, Anthony, *Mandela accuses 'policemen' Britain*, in: The Guardian April 5 2000. Available at : <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/apr/05/nelsonmandela>, accessed 13/11/11.

civilian target.⁸⁴ The descriptions of Fisk's report point out the shift from attacking military targets, which were not as effective as NATO officials had hoped, to semi-civilian targets in populated areas. However, General Clark emphasized that every single target had to be approved by Washington and British lawyers and additionally NATO officials double-checked the targets before dropping a bomb.⁸⁵

Robert Fisk makes an interesting point in his article, which shows the reality of the humanitarian intervention:

After walking through the rubble of the Serb studios at the time, I reflected that when you kill people for what they say -- however much you hate their words -- then you have changed the rules of war. And that is what Nato did from April through to June of 1999. They changed the rules of war. A military barracks was a legitimate target. Then a tobacco factory, a road bridge, the railway line at Gurdulice -- just when a train was crossing the bridge.⁸⁶

The problem was that NATO fought a war they called "humanitarian", but only based on air strikes. That the casualties of innocent people would be higher if NATO had to rely on the precision of their missiles, instead of tracking Serbian forces on the ground, was presumably taken into account by the Clinton Administration. Even though they tried to check every target in advance, it was not possible to prevent collateral damage on the ground in an aerial warfare.

Michael O'Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, wrote an article after the end of NATO's first war and described how a humanitarian intervention should be carried out in the future. In his opinion there are three questions, which have to be discussed by American policymakers before engaging in a humanitarian intervention:

1) When and where should we intervene?

There are many conflicts around the world, but the U.S. can not engage in every conflict. Therefore O'Hanlon suggests some guidelines of conditions that have to be met to intervene in a conflict:

⁸⁴ Compare: Fisk, Robert, *The bloody truth of how Nato changed the rules to win a 'moral war' in Yugoslavia*, in: The Independent February 7 2000. Available at: <http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/monitor/kskss/kss13.incl>, accessed 1/12/11.

⁸⁵ Compare: Clark, Wesley K., *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2001, p. 224.

⁸⁶ Fisk, Robert, *The bloody truth of how Nato changed the rules to win a 'moral war' in Yugoslavia*, in: The Independent February 7 2000. Available at: <http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=/content/monitor/kskss/kss13.incl>, accessed 1/12/11.

- Already a high scale of deaths
- No great-power conflicts should be created
- Low costs for soldiers
- It should not cost more lives than could possibly be saved
- Practical considerations – to have a realistic chance of success

2) How should we do so?

After the decision to intervene in a conflict has been made, the real work is only just beginning. Therefore, a few points have to be discussed in the forefront:

- Consider an exit strategy
- The mission is to save lives with the least means
- If necessary side with one party, which is the better choice for the country
- Avoid conflicts with large insurgencies in areas where guerrilla-like warfare is likely

3) Who should do the intervening?

O'Hanlon maintains that the U.S. should not do the job alone, because to prevent human rights violations should be in the interest of every country. The problem is that most of the western countries are not able to share the burden, because of their fewer military resources. However, the U.S. should encourage other countries to make their military more effective for humanitarian interventions in other parts of the world and in the meantime peacekeeping missions can be carried out by western countries.⁸⁷

It is interesting that he completely ignores the discussion whether humanitarian interventions, when not permitted by a Security Council Resolution, are violating international law. Therefore, it is unclear whether he supports interventions in internal affairs of other sovereign countries whenever the U.S., and most of its allies, consider it appropriate. O'Hanlon's suggestions for successful humanitarian interventions revolve around American interests. It is desirable, of course, to intervene because of moral principles, but not at any price. His suggestions are based not only on realistic, but far more on national considerations. That means that a humanitarian intervention has to make sense in economic and political terms.

⁸⁷ O'Hanlon, Michael E., *Doing it right: The Future of Humanitarian intervention*, Fall 2000, The Brookings Institution. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2000/fall_humanitarianintervention.aspx, accessed 1/12/11.

In his article he states that he considers that the Clinton Administration's choice to intervene in the Kosovo conflict was a "wise decision", but that an outline of how the intervention should take place and what its specific goal will be should already be outlined at the beginning or it could backfire.⁸⁸ He refers to Clinton's decisions to rule out ground forces when the intervention had not even started and to proclaim that Milošević had to agree to all statements in the Peace Accord. Most of the military work was carried out by the U.S. and Great Britain, whereas in the meantime mostly European soldiers were contributing to the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. As stated in Robert Kagan's book "Of Paradise and Power", the U.S. were "making the dinner" and the Europeans were "doing the dishes".⁸⁹

8.2. American national interests

Before the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo started, Bill Clinton proclaimed in his Statement on Kosovo that this action was in the national interest of the United States.⁹⁰ The phrase "it is in our national interest" appears frequently in U.S. foreign policy and there does not seem to exist a precise definition of it. In the reader "American Foreign Policy", written by Professor Bruce Jentleson, we find an overview of the four key points of the American national interest. He calls it the "4 Ps framework" - Power, Peace, Prosperity and Principles.⁹¹

➤ Power

It is a central part in foreign policy and consequently not only essential for defending itself, but also "for deterring aggression and influencing other states on a range of issues".⁹² The famous scholar of international relations policy, Hans Morgenthau, concluded that "international relations is a struggle for power".⁹³

⁸⁸ Compare: O'Hanlon, Michael E., *Doing it right: The Future of Humanitarian intervention*, Fall 2000, The Brookings Institution. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2000/fall_humanitarianintervention.aspx, accessed 1/12/11.

⁸⁹ Kagan, Robert, *Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York: Vintage Books, 2004, p. 23.

⁹⁰ Compare: Clinton, Bill, *Statement on Kosovo* (March 24,1999). Available at: <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3932>, accessed, 15/11/11.

⁹¹ Compare: Jentleson, Bruce W., *American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century*, 3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 8-16.

⁹² Jentleson, Bruce W., *American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century*, 3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 9.

⁹³ Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd edition, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961, p. 5.

➤ Peace

In his opinion all the other Ps in the framework have just one goal, namely peace. While power has to ensure peace, prosperity has to promote peace, and the principles have to strengthen it. However, the theoretical key part is International Institutionalism, which should demonstrate that working together in international institutions can contribute to the national interest, because it makes it easier to preserve and promote peace.

➤ Prosperity

The most important factor for prosperity is economic strength. Therefore, it is in the national interest to have a sustainable trade policy, which means to foster trade agreements or work closely together with countries that support the U.S. with vital resources like oil.

➤ Principles

The U.S. is proud of being founded on principles they can stand up for. However, they would also like to promote these principles throughout the world. These fundamental principles are the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for everyone.⁹⁴ Especially because the U.S. often emphasizes its strong commitment to the beliefs and ideals written in the Declaration of Independence, other countries criticize the U.S. when it does not follow the proclaimed ideals itself.

Professor Jentleson describes with this framework the most important issues for Americans when it comes to their national interest. When Clinton stated that Kosovo was in the national interest of the United States, he presumably had in mind subjects related to the "4Ps". This means that U.S. and NATO's credibility was at stake, which would have undermined American power. Further, the escalation of the conflict threatened to destabilize the entire region which would have posed great danger to peace. Furthermore, the Kosovo Albanian people were suffering and faced ethnic cleansing. The risk to witness another genocide like in Rwanda would have undermined the credibility of the U.S. in respect of holding up their moral principles and promoting them throughout the world. Relating to prosperity, it has to be said that the U.S. already invested a lot of money and soldiers in the peace of Bosnia, which would have been for

⁹⁴ The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America. Available at: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html, accessed 3/12/11.

nothing if the region collapsed once again. It can be assumed that all of this played a role in deciding to intervene in the conflict. However, not every reason mentioned above would have had the same importance.

In this regard Professor Jentleson concludes that principles and power considerations were the most important factors for the decision to go to war:

As for Principles, it is hard to think of a more compelling purpose than prevention of genocide. In Kosovo, where the United States led the NATO intervention in 1999, Principles and Power were largely complementary. The intervention was intended both to stop ethnic “cleansing” and to ensure stability in Europe (a vital region) and the credibility of NATO (a vital alliance).⁹⁵

When we recall Bill Clinton’s statement on Kosovo and put it into context with the conclusion of Professor Jentleson, President Clinton told the truth to the American people about the reasons to go to war. Although his emphasis laid on the “moral imperative”, he also mentioned the national interest in his speech several times.⁹⁶ With regard to liberal theory domestic actors influence the state’s foreign policy, therefore Clinton was well-advised to persuade the American people to support the intervention.

8.3. Responsibility to Protect

The end of the 20th century was marked by ethnic conflicts, civil wars and genocide. After all, the international community failed to address these hideous crimes. Even though in the 20th century functioning democracies and international organizations emerged, it was not enough to prevent or at least contain crimes against humanity. The most appalling incident in this respect was the genocide in Rwanda, where within a short space of time about 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in 1994.⁹⁷ The following year the Srebrenica massacre took place during the war in Bosnia. This time about 8,000 Bosnians, mostly Muslim men and boys, were killed by members of the Army of Republika Srpska. The international community could not prevent the mass killings in Bosnia and therefore, did not learn its lesson from the genocide in Rwanda. However, four years later, in the case of Kosovo NATO intervened to stop ethnic cleansing, but without the permission of the UNSC. In consequence, discussions followed about

⁹⁵ Jentleson, Bruce W., *American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century*, 3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p. 428.

⁹⁶ Compare: Clinton, Bill, *Statement on Kosovo* (March 24, 1999). Available at: <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3932>, accessed, 15/11/11.

⁹⁷ Compare: US Department of State, *Background Note: Rwanda*, November 30, 2011. Available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm>, accessed 5/1/12.

NATO's right to intervene in the conflict, concerning the violation of Serbia's state sovereignty and if the argument to prevent ethnic cleansing alone could legitimize a humanitarian intervention.

At the end of NATO's war against Serbia, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan wrote in an article about his perception of the past events and what had to be done in the future. He stressed that we were finally living in world with a new appreciation of individual rights and therefore, the state sovereignty had to be redefined when it came to violations of a state against the human rights of its people. Furthermore, the events of the past years in Rwanda and Kosovo showed two things that needed to be borne in mind:

Just as we have learnt that the world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violations of human rights are taking place, we have also learnt that, if it is to enjoy the sustained support of the world's peoples, intervention must be based on legitimate and universal principles. We need to adapt our international system better to a world with new actors, new responsibilities, and new possibilities for peace and progress.⁹⁸

The need for a better coordination among the states became obvious during the events in the 1990s. While in Rwanda the international community was unified in condemning the occurring genocide but did nothing to prevent it, in Kosovo the Security Council's disagreement on a military intervention led to an unauthorized action of a part of the international community to prevent ethnic cleansing. As Kofi Annan points out, both conflicts were addressed in a wrong way and therefore, a new concept of acting in such cases was necessary for the future.

In the context of the events in Rwanda and Kosovo Annan raised two important questions concerning humanitarian interventions:

It has cast in stark relief the dilemma of so-called "humanitarian intervention". On the one hand, is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate? On the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked? The inability of the international community to reconcile these two compelling interests in the case of Kosovo can be viewed only as a tragedy.⁹⁹

These two questions highlight the great dilemma of the international community in regard to humanitarian interventions. What should be done when people are suffering and genocide is expected, but the international community, in particular the five permanent

⁹⁸ Annan, Kofi, Two concepts of sovereignty, in: *The Economist*, September 18, 1999.

⁹⁹ Annan, Kofi, Two concepts of sovereignty, in: *The Economist*, September 18, 1999.

members of the UNSC, cannot agree to intervene? The problem is evident, but difficult to solve. If the international community put aside their state of affairs to concentrate on the common good and to commit itself to common actions, the mass killings of the 1990s could have been prevented or at least contained. The fact that democracies are working together in international organizations does not mean that they always have the same opinion and interests and therefore, common actions of the international community are not easy to achieve.

Finally, Kofi Annan emphasized four points concerning humanitarian intervention which should be considered carefully. He hoped that these points could lead to further discussions about a framework or some kind of guideline in respect to the realization of humanitarian interventions. Firstly, many conflicts could have been prevented before they escalated into violent confrontations. An intervention does not always mean to use military force, sometimes other measures can constrain the ability or even the willingness of criminal states to punish its people. Furthermore, the international community has to apply the principles of human rights not only in regions, where they have a vital interest. Everyone has the same rights, no matter where they live. Secondly, with regard to the vital interest of states in a specific region, Annan points out that just as the foreign policy of the states changed after the end of the Cold War, the national interest also has to be redefined. This means in his words that “the collective interest *is* the national interest”. Thirdly, the UNSC should pose the legal basis for forceful interventions. However, the members of the UNSC have to act unified, otherwise criminal states could see its chance to commit crimes against their own people without getting punished. If the international community, especially the UNSC, is not able to form a unity against such states, it will lose its credibility as a defender of human rights. Fourthly, in case a ceasefire is achieved the work is not over for the international community - it just begins. A lasting peace is hard work and to establish it after a humanitarian intervention, the fundament has to be a commitment to deploy peacekeeping forces.¹⁰⁰

According to the considerations of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan the Canadian government commissioned a project that should propose possibilities to handle violent conflicts in a different way and especially within the United Nations as a crucial part of the international system. Therefore, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established in September 2000. A year later the

¹⁰⁰ Compare: Annan, Kofi, Two concepts of sovereignty, in: *The Economist*, September 18, 1999.

Commission published a report with the title “The Responsibility to Protect”. Furthermore, the standard of “responsibility to protect” was later adopted at the UN World Summit 2005 in the Final Document. However, some parts of the original report were softened.¹⁰¹ In the following paragraphs the main factors of the report will be described.

At the beginning the Commission emphasized that this report did not intend to give big powers the right to abuse the sovereign rights of small countries, but to provide a framework, which sets up rules in case people suffer human rights violations and their own country is not able or willing to protect them. In such a case the international community has the responsibility to protect them. With respect to the debate about sovereignty, the report prepared a new definition of it, whereby sovereignty does not only mean to have control over a country, but also leads to responsibility towards its people. However, it should be in the interest of the international community not to let things get so far that an intervention is the only measure to protect people’s lives. Therefore, the basis for R2P is the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild.¹⁰²

An important point in the concept of R2P is timely attention to the emerging violent conflict. There are four measures that could be taken in the course of the “responsibility to protect”, after the causes of the conflict were examined carefully. Firstly, political measures like offering non-official dialogues, political and diplomatic sanctions or the suspension of the membership in international organizations. That means that the state is put in the dock because of its behavior. Secondly, economic measures could be taken into account like trade and financial sanctions, as well as withdrawal of investment. Thirdly, legal measures are possible, such as offering a monitoring mission or providing ICC trials. Fourthly, if it is necessary, military measures should be considered like consensual preventive deployment or in serious cases the threat to use force. However, all these measures demand a political will, not only on the international level, but also on the regional and national level.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Compare: Jentleson, Bruce W., *American Foreign Policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century*, 3rd edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 2007, p 433.

¹⁰² Compare: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001. Also available at: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>, accessed 5/1/12.

¹⁰³ Compare: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001. Also available at: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>, accessed 5/1/12, p. 19-23.

If it was not possible to prevent a violent conflict the second pillar of R2P comes into effect – the “responsibility to react”. Before intervening in a conflict militarily measures like arms embargos, the expulsion of diplomatic staff or travel restrictions on the leaders should be tried to contain the conflict. Only if these measures did not have the desired effect, military intervention as the last resort should be considered. Furthermore, the Commission identified six conditions, which have to be fulfilled before going to war:¹⁰⁴

- The main reason to intervene ‘must be to halt or avert human suffering’; additionally a broad multilateral cooperation supports the right intention.
- All diplomatic efforts have to be exhausted. In other words, all the measures described under “responsibility to prevent” were taken, but did not work out.
- The planning of a military intervention should consider the least necessary actions to secure the people.
- There should be a reasonable chance to successfully address the conflict.
- The UNSC should authorize the military intervention
- The five permanent members of the UNSC should agree not to apply their veto power to inhibit a resolution concerning an intervention on the purpose to halt people suffering, if the majority supports it.

The central ideas of the report are that a military intervention is always the last resort and the threshold for the ‘just cause’ is very high. Furthermore, the UNSC is still the only authority to permit an intervention. Although the report emphasizes the authority of the UNSC, it provides an exit strategy in case the five permanent members were not able to agree on an intervention:

- I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and
- II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.¹⁰⁵

When we take a look at the situation before the intervention in Kosovo and apply this new framework to the Kosovo conflict, it can be recognized that some principles of the report can be perceived differently. Although the report emphasizes a high threshold for the ‘just cause’ and that ‘large scale of loss’ or

¹⁰⁴ Compare: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001. Also available at: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>, accessed 5/1/12, p. 31-37.

¹⁰⁵ Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001. Also available at: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>, accessed 5/1/12, p. synopsis xiii.

'large scale of ethnic cleansing' have to occur to justify a military intervention, it can be disputed what that means in reality. In the case of Kosovo Bill Clinton had not mentioned ethnic cleansing in his Statement on Kosovo the day before the airstrikes started. However, he had spoken about massacres and refugees. Furthermore the national interest had been stressed in his statement several times. According to the R2P report the primary reason to intervene in a conflict militarily has to be based on humanitarian considerations. No one can say what the main reason was for the U.S. and its allies to go to war. It could be the defense of moral principles, the fear of another collapse of the region, or the loss of credibility if the threats of force were lacking in substance. In respect of the authority of the UNSC it can be said that the U.S., UK and France tried to convince Russia and China to agree to a military intervention, but there was no mutual consent in sight. Therefore, the exit strategy provided by the report to address such a dilemma is a good achievement, but has to be proved in reality.

9. A final reflection of the US intervention

I told the crowd bluntly, "There are those who believe Kosovo will never escape its past.

They say that you will act towards the Serbs as the Serb military and police acted towards you; that you will make it impossible for Serbs to live in Kosovo. These critics point to tragedies such as the cowardly murder this past week of fourteen Serbs in Gracko, and they say, 'See, we are right. The Kosovo Albanians are no better than Milošević.' Today I want to make a prediction that you will prove those critics wrong."

- Madeleine Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, in Prishtina, July 1999.¹⁰⁶

9.1. Impact on Kosovo

On 10 June, 1999 NATO's airstrikes officially were ended and the Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo. On the same day the Security Council Resolution 1244 was passed, in which the basis for future actions in Kosovo were described. The resolution was adopted by 14 votes in favor and one abstention from voting. China abstained and therefore made it possible to pass the resolution. The gratitude for persuading China not to use its veto power was owed to Russia, who convinced the Chinese with the argument, that it would be better to place Kosovo under UN administration than to one of NATO. The key points were that Kosovo was put under the administration of the United Nations, the so called UNMIK. Further an international security presence was authorized, which actually meant a NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping force. The U.S. was keen to have also the Russians participating in it, although the discussions were difficult, because the Russians demanded a sector outside of NATO command. After realizing that NATO will not accept its demand, the Russians finally gave in and deployed troops in one of the NATO sectors.¹⁰⁷ For the international community and especially for the U.S. it was important to integrate Russia in the peacekeeping process, in the hope to stabilize their relations to Russia. Regarding the UNSC Resolution, which were passed on 10 June the publicist Hannes Hofbauer mentioned an interesting point, namely that the UNSC in approving the Resolution 1244 kind of legitimized the humanitarian intervention of NATO at a later date.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Albright, Madeleine, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, New York: Miramax, 2003, p. 544.

¹⁰⁷ Compare: Bellamy, Alex J., *Kosovo and International Society*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p.200-201.

¹⁰⁸ Compare: Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 112.

The main tasks for the peacekeeping force were described in the UNSC Resolution 1244. Firstly, they should prevent new ethnic hostilities, observe and ensure the ceasefire and the withdrawal of the Serbian forces. Secondly, realize the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army and other armed Albanians. Thirdly, it was demanded to establish “a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered”.¹⁰⁹ In particular the last point was essential for the Kosovo Albanians who fled the country towards Albania and Macedonia over the past months.

Two days after the UNSC Resolution was passed, on 12 June, the first NATO troops were moving into Kosovo. After a few days also the Kosovo Albanian refugees took their courage and headed home. Alone within the first three weeks about half a million of the refugees, who had left Kosovo when the bombings began, returned to Kosovo.¹¹⁰ The presence of NATO gave them confidence enough to return to their villages as soon as possible and therefore, the goal of the humanitarian intervention finally was achieved. However, the international community missed one point to consider in celebrating their victory – the Serbian minority in Kosovo. As already demonstrated in Chapter 8, where the origins of the conflict were described, the hostilities between the two ethnicities always flared-up as soon as one side gained predominance. The vicious circle of violence belonged to the Serbian and Albanian history in Kosovo. This time the returning Kosovo Albanian refugees were ready for revenge. NATO troops were not prepared that they would have to protect the Serbian minority from retaliation of victims of the war. Therefore, KFOR peacekeepers were wondering why now the Serbs were packing their belongings and heading north to follow the Serbian forces, who had withdrawn according to the UNSC Resolution. It seemed that the international troops were desperately overwhelmed by the events in the weeks after their deployment. The peacekeepers had not enough time to demilitarization the KLA and therefore, the following weeks were marked by KLA-led terror attacks against everyone who was not Albanian. Most affected by the attacks were Serbs and Roma, who could not count on the protection of KFOR peacekeepers.

¹⁰⁹ UN Security Council, *SC Resolution 1244*, New York, 9 June 1999. Available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 7/1/12.

¹¹⁰ Compare: Judah, Tim, *War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 286.

The story of a Bulgarian UN staff member, who was killed in the streets of Prishtina because he replied to a question in Serbian (or Bulgarian) led to an instruction of the UNMIK to their Polish and Bulgarian staff members that they should avoid speaking their mother tongue in public.¹¹¹ This incident demonstrated that there were not only hostilities between Albanians and the other ethnicities, but deep hatred. Furthermore, it became clear that the precondition for a peaceful coexistence of a multiethnic society was still far away.

While most of the KFOR soldiers had no idea how to address the problem of “terror attacks” against Serbs, the British took the lead in their sector in Prishtina to ease the life of at least few Serbs, who still remained in the city. Murder and expulsion were part of the everyday life and therefore, the Serbian population dropped significantly from 20,000 to around 1000 people.¹¹² The tide has turned so fast and this time the Serbs are suffering from the violence conducted by Albanians. However, the UNMIK Administration needed some time to adapt itself to the new conditions, meanwhile the Serbs fled to Serbia or formed enclaves.¹¹³

Furthermore, terrible activities of the KLA during these years were revealed in a book written by the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). She describes in a chapter of this book that in the time, after the NATO intervention ended and KFOR troops were deployed in Kosovo, there is evidence that the KLA abducted between 100 to 300 Serbs and took them to Northern Albania, where they were killed and their organs were removed and finally sold on the black market for organ trafficking.¹¹⁴ All the events mentioned above draw a dim picture of the time after the humanitarian war ended and KFOR troops were deployed in Kosovo.

While in the following weeks Albanians came back to Kosovo and were glad that the war ended and with its end the Serbian troops disappeared, the Serbs fled. If some did not leave their houses voluntarily, they were forced to leave or simply killed by the KLA. The situation in Kosovo significantly changed, the only Serbs were living in enclaves or in the northern part of Kosovo near the border to Serbia. The KLA tried to take advantage of the power vacuum and in effect ran Kosovo for the following months. However, in October 2000 the first local elections took place and the UNMIK achieved to replace the

¹¹¹ Hofbauer, Hannes, : Hofbauer, Hannes, *Experiment Kosovo. Die Rückkehr des Kolonialismus*, Wien: Promedia Verlag, 2008, p. 113.

¹¹² Compare: Judah, Tim, *War and Revenge*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 289.

¹¹³ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.92.

¹¹⁴ Compare: Der Spiegel, Balkan. Der Handel mit Organen? In: *Der Spiegel*, 27/2008, p. 85.

KLA at least partly. Even though some of the KLA members were now officially elected representatives.¹¹⁵

The winners and the losers of the humanitarian interventions seemed to be obvious. The sentiments of this time were clearly demonstrated when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Prishtina for the first time in July 1999. She was welcomed by the Kosovo Albanian people with cheers and banners of “USA” and the crowd applauded when she appeared to speak to them. In her autobiography “Madam Secretary” she remembers this day:

I said, “We must support the war crimes tribunal, because those indicted for ethnic cleansing and murder should be held accountable, and Slobodan Milošević must answer for his crimes”. The crowd yelled even louder. Then I said, “Democracy cannot be built on revenge. If we are to have a true victory in Kosovo, it cannot be a victory of Albanians over Serbs or NATO over Serbs. It must be a victory of those who believe in the rights of the individual over those who do not. Otherwise it is not victory. It is merely changing one kind of repression for another.” The audience became silent. You could have heard a pin drop.¹¹⁶

Obviously she underestimated the deep hatred rooted in a century-old conflict between Serbs and Albanians. It became clear that the Albanians could not forget the Serbian repression of the last years and that the Serbs remaining in Kosovo would be suffering for what had happened. Nevertheless, in the view of the U.S. Administration and the Kosovo Albanians the humanitarian intervention was a success. On the one hand, the U.S. and its allies were glad to have prevented another massacre like in Srebrenica. On the other hand, the Kosovo Albanians could return home and were relieved that Serbian forces and institutions began to disappear.

However, not all Serbs left Kosovo as a report of the European Stability Initiative showed in June 2004. In this report was stated that in 2004 still 130,000 Serbs were living in Kosovo, although nearly all of them in the rural parts of the region. While in the urban parts almost exclusively Kosovo Albanians had their homes. Nevertheless, about 75,000 of the 130,000 Serbs lived in the areas south of the River Ibar, which is mostly populated by Albanians. However, the peaceful coexistence of the ethnicities in these areas seemed to work out. Therefore, the report suggested that the international community should emphasize that an undivided and multiethnic Kosovo is possible. Furthermore, it

¹¹⁵ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.93.

¹¹⁶ Albright, Madeleine, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, New York: Miramax, 2003, p. 543.

should be stated that for this reason an ethnically cleansed Kosovo would never lead to sovereignty.

Table 1: Where Kosovo Serbs live, based on primary school enrolments

Municipality	Primary school pupils	Percentage of total
Gjilan / Gnjilane	1,936	13.5
Leposaviq / Leposavic	1,819	12.7
North Mitrovica	1,630	11.3
Kamenice / Kamenica	1,325	9.2
Prishtina / Pristina	1,229	8.6
Shterpce / Strpce /	1,217	8.5
Zveqan Zvecan /	981	6.8
Lipjan / Lipljan	969	6.7
Zubin Potok	869	6.0
Vushtrri / Vucitrn	619	4.3
Viti / Vitina	474	3.3
Obiliq / Obilic	408	2.8
Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje	348	2.4
Peja / Pec	180	1.3
Novoberde / Novo Brdo	164	1.1
Rahovec / Orahovac	137	1
Istog / Istok	33	0.2
Skenderaj / Srbica	30	0.2
Total	14,368	100.0

Source: European Stability Initiative, The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo's Serbs, 7 June 2004, Berlin/Pristina. Available at: http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=53, accessed 7/1/12.

The report stated that there were no official figures about the population in Kosovo, only suggestion of the governments in Belgrade and Prishtina. They expected about 130,000 Serbs living in Kosovo, which could be largely affirmed by the ESI. The institute concluded based on the data of school enrolments in Kosovo in 2004, which is shown in Table 1, that about 128,000 were living in the rural parts of the region. According to this figure and with regard to the last census in 1991, the report assumed that around 65,000 Serbs were displaced between 1991-2004. Furthermore, a reason why nearly all Serbs in Kosovo were living in the rural parts were described in the report. It was supposed that after the withdrawal of Serbian forces and state from Kosovo Serbs living in the cities lost their jobs. Therefore, most of them left Kosovo or settled in the rural parts.¹¹⁷

In March 2004, violent riots between Serbs and Albanians occurred once more, resulting in 19 people killed, 900 were injured and 29 Serbian churches and monasteries destroyed.¹¹⁸ This was a signal to the international community that it has to be alerted. In consequence, Secretary General Kofi Annan asked former president of Finland Martti Ahtisaari, who already was experienced with negotiations in the Balkans, to lead talks on Kosovo's future, which took place in Vienna. The talks lasted for over a year and concluded in a plan with a de-facto independence of Kosovo, which was rejected by Serbia. Martti Ahtisaari stated that there is only one solution, namely the independence of Kosovo with supervision of the international community, in particular the supervision of the ICO and EULEX. However, to deny Kosovo's independence would risk threaten its stability and peace. Furthermore, he stressed that UNMIK made important achievements, however, a further international administration would not be supportive of Kosovo's self-government.¹¹⁹ However, Russia rejected the Ahtisaari Plan and a new UNSC resolution relying on it. Therefore, the U.S. and other European States, who supported Kosovo's independence, agreed that if the Albanians endorsed the Ahtisaari Plan, they would support Kosovo's declaration of independence.

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence and only one day later the United Kingdom, France and the United States already recognized its independence. However, their new status was only recognized by 85 of 193 member states of the UN. Among the states refusing to accept Kosovo's independence are two of the permanent member

¹¹⁷ Compare: European Stability Initiative, *The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo's Serbs*, 7 June 2004, Berlin/Pristina. Available at: http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=156&document_ID=53, accessed 7/1/12.

¹¹⁸ Compare: Judah, Tim, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 110.

¹¹⁹ Compare: Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Kosovo's future status, 26 March 2007. Available at: <http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf>, accessed 5/1/12.

states of the UN Security Council – Russia and China. Furthermore, even five member states of the European Union - Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia – have not recognized Kosovo's independence.¹²⁰

Finally, the Kosovo Albanian's managed to live in an independent state without Serbian repression. Their struggle to get that far was bloody and lasted for centuries. Nevertheless, the hostilities between Serbs and Albanians remained and therefore, to achieve a lasting peace in the region will be a future challenge – for the Serbs, Albanians and the international community.

9.1. Impact on US foreign policy

On March 10, 1999, Clinton spoke to the American people to announce the end of the war and NATO's victory over Milošević. Clinton said that he "can report to the American people that we have achieved a victory for a safer world, for our democratic values, and for a stronger America."¹²¹ Furthermore, he emphasized the constructive cooperation of the NATO member states in Kosovo:

The result will be security and dignity for the people of Kosovo, achieved by an alliance that stood together in purpose and resolve, assisted by the diplomatic efforts of Russia. This victory brings a new hope that when a people are singled out for destruction because of their heritage and religious faith and we can do something about it, the world will not look the other way.[...] NATO has achieved this success as a united alliance, ably led by Secretary General Solana and General Clark. Nineteen democracies came together and stayed together through the stiffest military challenge in NATO's 50-year history.¹²²

President Clinton seemed relieved that the intervention finally ended and the option of deploying ground troops had not been discussed any further in order to win the war. An involvement of ground forces would have posed the threat of American casualties and therefore, less support from the American public. Although they were well aware that airstrikes would not suffice as opinion polls showed on April 6, 1999 conducted by Washington Post–ABC News Poll on Kosovo.

¹²⁰ Compare: Republika e Kosovës, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: <http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33>, accessed 3/1/12.

¹²¹ Clinton, Bill, Address on the Kosovo Agreement, 10 March 1999. Available at: <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3933>, accessed 5/1/12.

¹²² Clinton, Bill, Address on the Kosovo Agreement, 10 March 1999. Available at: <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3933>, accessed 5/1/12.

Table 2: Opinion Poll on Kosovo, April 6,1999 (Question 1)

Just your best guess, do you think air strikes WILL be enough to stop Serbia from continuing its attacks in Kosovo, or do you think ground troops will have to be sent in to try to end the conflict?			
	Air strikes enough	Need ground troops	No opinion
4/5/99	25	68	7

Table 3: Opinion Poll on Kosovo, April 6, 1999 (Question 2)

Suppose the bombing does NOT stop Serbia's military action in Kosovo. Would you support or oppose the United States and its European allies sending in ground troops to try to end the conflict in Kosovo? (GET ANSWER, THEN ASK:) Would you support/oppose this strongly or somewhat?							
	-----Support-----			-----Oppose-----			No opin.
	NET	Strongly	Somewhat	NET	Strongly	Somewhat	
4/5/99	55	31	24	41	29	12	4

Source of Table 2 and 3: Washington Post- ABC News Poll: Kosovo, 6 April,1999. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data040699.htm>, accessed 5/1/12.

The polls show that most Americans thought airstrikes would be not enough to end the war, but when it comes to the question if they would support the deployment of ground troops the difference between those who would support and those who would oppose it got smaller. That means, that the American public was very skeptically if airstrikes would lead to success, but the willingness to send ground troops was not that high. Clinton seemed very sensitive about the public opinion and in this respect he made the right decision to reject the deployment of ground troops. According to William Hyland, a former editor of the Journal *Foreign Affairs*, Clinton was a president obsessed “with doing the popular thing”.¹²³

However, it is hard to say if Clinton would not have started a military intervention when there was less public support. What we know is that the public support for airstrikes against Serbia was already high at the beginning and even rose in the course of the intervention according to Table 4.

¹²³ Hyland, William G., *Clinton's World. Remaking American Foreign Policy*, Westport: Praeger, 1999, p. 203.

Table 4: Opinion Poll on Kosovo, April 6, 1999 (Question 3)

Do you support or oppose the United States and its European allies conducting air strikes against Serbia?			
	Support	Oppose	No opinion
4/5/99	68	29	3
3/30/99	55	33	11
3/28/99	55	33	12
3/26/99	60	31	9

Source: Washington Post-ABC News Poll: Kosovo, 6 April, 1999. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data040699.htm>, accessed 5/1/12.

In Clinton's address on the Kosovo Agreement, he pointed out that the work in Kosovo is not over after the intervention, but will start with the NATO-led peacekeeping forces to ensure peace in Kosovo. However, the tasks will be shared between the U.S., European countries, Russia and the United Nations. He stressed that the majority of the peacekeepers will be provided by European Allies and the United Nations will organize the new administration in Kosovo.¹²⁴

While most of the military intervention was carried out by the U.S., the peace building process relied on the Europeans and the United Nations. It can be assumed, that Clinton wanted to act in accordance with an international organization like to UN to give the peace building process more credibility and to reconcile with the Russians, who agreed to deploy peacekeeping troops in one of the NATO-led sectors in Kosovo. Furthermore, both terms of Clinton's presidency the Administration was occupied with the Balkan crises and therefore, the time had come to restrain their commitment in the region and let the Europeans handle the future of the region.

In this context, the scholar Robert Kagan made some interesting remarks in his book "Of Paradise and Power". He pointed out that in the case of Kosovo not only the U.S. ignored the veto of the UNSC, but also many European countries. They agreed that something had to be done and consequently coordinated with the U.S. a humanitarian intervention within NATO. Therefore, even for the Europeans the humanitarian aspect and the fear to witness another Holocaust on European soil counted more than the authorization of the United Nations.¹²⁵ It is unlikely that the U.S. would have acted

¹²⁴ Compare: Clinton, Bill, Address on the Kosovo Agreement, 10 March 1999. Available at: <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3933>, accessed 5/1/12.

¹²⁵ Compare: Kagan, Robert, *Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the new world order*, New York: Vintage Books, 2004, p. 124.

without having its NATO allies on their side, therefore, accusations that the U.S. acted unilaterally seemed exaggerated.

The perception of Clinton's foreign policy performance was mixed. Of course the Bosnians and Albanians saw him as a hero, who saved their lives because he was courageous enough to get involved in the Balkan crisis. In the European countries he enjoyed a good reputation as peacemaker and even the relation to Russia's president Boris Yeltsin was particularly friendly, at least most of Clinton's presidency. However, at home he was criticized much more. William Hyland complained that Clinton "glorified internationalism and multilateralism, the UN and collective security, and the necessity of achieving a moral consensus while scoffing at such crude concepts as the balance of power."¹²⁶ A more contradictory approach to Clinton's foreign policy was given by Joseph Fallon, who took the view that "in Washington's eyes, the end of the Cold War meant a transition from a bipolar world, which functioned within a set of political, military, and legal restraints, to a unipolar one. The U.S. government was now the world's hyperpower, without rival or limitation."¹²⁷ He assumed that the Balkan wars were used to demonstrate America's superpower. First of all towards Russia, because the U.S. launched airstrikes against a state supported by Russia and they could do nothing to stop the intervention. Furthermore, the U.S. condemned Serbian nationalism on the ground that all nationalism "undermines the legitimacy of the virtues of multiethnic states and transnational corporations."¹²⁸ The perception of Clinton's foreign policy is highly diverse. On the one hand, he was criticized for being too much a multilateralist and too keen to work within international organizations, on the other hand it was suggested that his foreign policy intended to ensure America's superpower in a unipolar world, which emerged after the end of the Cold War. Both views show the dividedness of the perception of the Clinton Administration's record during the eight years of being in office.

However, concerning the relationship between the U.S. and the European Union, Robert Kagan set up the assumption that the European desire for multilateral cooperation within a framework of international organizations is based on Europe's military weakness. After the end of the Cold War the European countries missed the point to establish their own military force. Furthermore, the Europeans felt not the need to invest more in their

¹²⁶ Hyland, William G., *Clinton's World. Remaking American Foreign Policy*, Westport: Praeger, 1999, p. 201.

¹²⁷ Fallon, Joseph E., Kosovo and its impact on U.S. foreign policy, in: *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture*, 5 July, 2007.

¹²⁸ Fallon, Joseph E., Kosovo and its impact on U.S. foreign policy, in: *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture*, 5 July, 2007.

military, because they believed that in the case of necessity they could rely on America's power. In this context, the war in the Balkans exceeded the European skills, while the U.S. was prepared to fight two wars simultaneously in two different world regions.¹²⁹ Concerning the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, this seemed to be true, because the U.S. provided the vast majority of equipment and military staff. This only changed during the years of the peacekeeping mission, where the majority of the soldiers were Europeans.

With regard to Kagan's assumption that the European multilateral perspective is just a reaction of its weakness, because otherwise they would exercise power more frequently, Mary Kaldor posed the question if the concept of non-intervention becomes obsolete when crimes against humanity and genocide could be prevented?¹³⁰ Although Europeans often criticized the U.S. for acting unilaterally, in the case of Kosovo both worked together to stop ethnic cleansing. In this respect the scholar Ulrich Beck concluded that the Kosovo conflict demonstrated that a military defense of human rights on the territory of a sovereign state can take place without the authorization of the Security Council and the violations of international law, and nevertheless be supported by western countries with high moral standards. He called it "illegal legitimate war", because the humanitarian intervention obviously violated international law and therefore was illegal, however, but most of the western countries and its people supported the intervention on moral grounds. Beck assumed that the reason for the Europeans was the fear to witness once more genocide in Europe and therefore, they had to decide between violating international law or human rights.¹³¹

In conclusion, it can be stated that the Clinton foreign policy had a significant impact on Kosovo, not only because ethnic cleansing was prevented and Kosovo Albanian lives were saved, but without Clinton's intervention an independent Kosovo would not exist. However, the intervention showed lacks in its performance and the peacekeepers were not prepared for the situation in a post-war Kosovo with ethnic hostilities. Furthermore, European countries cooperated with the United States under the flag of NATO, to conduct a humanitarian intervention on moral grounds. The Americans stand up to its moral principles and their goal to strengthen NATO in Europe was achieved with the victory over Milošević.

¹²⁹ Compare: Kagan, Robert, *Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the new world order*, New York: Vintage Books, 2004, p. 24-27.

¹³⁰ Compare: Kaldor Mary, Das ohnmächtige Empire, in: Speck, Ulrich; Sznajder, Natan, *Empire Amerika. Perspektiven einer neuen Weltordnung*, München: DVA, 2003, p. 192.

¹³¹ Compare: Beck, Ulrich, *Pax Americana, Pax Europæana*, in: Speck, Ulrich; Sznajder, Natan, *Empire Amerika. Perspektiven einer neuen Weltordnung*, München: DVA, 2003, p. 234-235.

III. Final Part

10. Conclusion

*The Kosovo conflict and its outcome have prompted
a debate of worldwide importance.*

- Kofi Annan, Former Secretary General of the United Nations, 1999¹³²–

The aim of this research paper was to analyze in how far the U.S. foreign policy under the Clinton Administration was significant for the course of the Kosovo conflict. Throughout the contextual analysis it was attempted to explain, firstly, the U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton years and its effects on world politics; secondly, how the U.S. dealt with the multilateral attempt to prevent the collapse of the Southern Balkans because of ethnic rivalries; and thirdly, the decision of the U.S. and its allies to launch a humanitarian intervention to contain ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

As a whole the paper is based on primary and secondary sources, which includes statements, speeches and interviews of officials, agreements, resolutions and reports, as well as articles of scholars and discourse books. Furthermore, the attendance of several lectures on the topic and the participation in the Kosovo Conference in Vienna contributed to and completed this research. Finally, a closer look should be taken at the hypotheses set up at the beginning of the research to figure out if they could be confirmed.

The hypothesis i) was largely confirmed, although some grey areas remain.

- i) *If the reason for the Clinton Administration to intervene in the Kosovo conflict was mainly based on moral grounds and in particular to prevent ethnic cleansing, then a military intervention was justified, even though it was illegal according to international law.*

The analysis showed that according to the new framework of the “Responsibility to Protect”, established to address violent conflicts in the 21st century, the primary purpose to intervene militarily in a conflict has to be based on moral principles in order to prevent

¹³² Annan, Kofi, Two concepts of sovereignty, in: *The Economist*, September 18, 1999.

or halt ethnic cleansing. It can be said that President Clinton emphasized in his statement on Kosovo - only a short time before NATO launched the airstrikes against Serbia - that the U.S. decided to conduct a humanitarian intervention to prevent further massacres and refugee floods, because it was a moral imperative. Therefore, the cause for intervention was mainly based on moral grounds. The U.S. and its allies sought permission of the UNSC, but Russia and China signaled that they will not agree to a military intervention. The reasons were therefore assumed to have something to do with conflicts they were confronted with at home, namely Chechnya in the case of Russia and Tibet in the case of China. In this context, the guidelines of the report on R2P pointed out that if the five permanent members of the UNSC cannot agree on a military intervention conducted to prevent ethnic cleansing or genocide, although the majority supports it, then in order to execute "the responsibility to protect" the General Assembly in an Emergency Special Session or regional and sub-regional organizations can be addressed. The majority of the UNSC supported the intervention and the U.S. acted together with several other states on a multilateral basis within an intergovernmental military alliance.

Furthermore, the victims of the conflict – the Kosovo Albanians - requested the NATO states to use force in order to save their lives. In general, most of the points concerning a justified intervention were met, although there are some limitations. On the one hand, no one can say with certainty if the main reason for Bill Clinton was to intervene in the conflict to stop ethnic cleansing. It is assumed, but the national interest and the loss of credibility may have played a role as well. On the other hand, after the U.S. had learned that an agreement in the UNSC over military actions in the Kosovo conflict had no reasonable chance, the U.S. and its allies consequently went to war without the authority of the UN. If they saw no chance to get the permission of the UN or the time was running short to prevent further killings in Kosovo is difficult to say.

The hypothesis ii) could be confirmed as well.

- ii) *If it is assumed that the liberal theory is best suited to explain the behavior of the Clinton Administration, then U.S. domestic policy influenced the acting in the conflict.*

Overall domestic actors as well as the public opinion were taken into account in respect of the decision on how to proceed with the humanitarian intervention. Several officials of the Clinton Administration, Senators and scholars had an influence in the course of the intervention. It was not easy to get support for sending troops to Kosovo from national

security officials like the Defense Secretary Cohen or General Hugh Shelton. Further, mostly Republican Senators, like Donald Nickles of Oklahoma, were not convinced that the killings thus far gave enough reason to intervene in Kosovo. However, influential Senator Richard Lugar of the Republican Party supported the actions in Kosovo, just like most of the Democratic Senators like Joe Biden. Scholars like Noam Chomsky, who is a critical observer of U.S. foreign policy, dismissed the perception that Clinton went to war on moral grounds and criticized publicly that not all diplomatic efforts were taken to prevent using force. Furthermore, as could be shown, the public opinion supported Clinton's decision to launch airstrikes against Serbia, but was reserved on deploying ground troops. Therefore, it can be assumed that President Clinton's decision to reject ground forces in the Kosovo conflict emphatically was associated with the controversial debate and reluctant attitude in American society.

The hypothesis iii) is highly connected with hypothesis i) and could therefore be confirmed partially.

- iii) *If the United States, along with two other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, UK and France, had exhausted all diplomatic means to convince the other permanent members, Russia and China, to permit military actions against Serbian forces to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, then acting on their own authority to save lives was inevitable.*

The U.S. and its allies stressed that they had exhausted all diplomatic means to persuade Milošević to agree to peace. The efforts of the international community were described in chapter 1, where a background to the NATO intervention was provided and the Rambouillet talks were described in detail. Till the day before NATO launched its airstrikes high officials of the U.S., the European Union, the OSCE and Russia were in Belgrade to negotiate a final Peace Agreement with the Serbian leader. In the meantime they learned that Milošević assembled about 40,000 troops at the Kosovo border while he was talking to them. Therefore, the U.S. and its allies decided that the diplomatic efforts came to an end. In respect of the two permanent members of the UNSC, Russia and China, the efforts to convince them to permit a military intervention were intensive. However, Russia emphasized that it would veto any military intervention in the Kosovo conflict and therefore categorically excluded an agreement in the UNSC.

For the above mentioned reasons, the U.S. and its allies, who were determined to halt further massacres of the Kosovo Albanian people, decided to act on their own authority under NATO on a multilateral basis. Nevertheless, it cannot be said what would have happened if the international negotiations had been continued without using force and if

the Serbian forces in Kosovo had committed massacres on the Kosovo Albanian people during that time. After the massacre in Srebrenica the international community was aware of what Milošević was capable of and therefore, they exercised their “responsibility to protect”. Witnessing another attempt of ethnic cleansing before the eyes of the world public and being confronted with accusations of having left the Kosovo Albanians on their own and consequently not learning from history, seemed not to be an option.

Finally, it can be assumed that the U.S. Administration under Bill Clinton thoroughly considered whether to conduct a humanitarian intervention without permission of the UNSC. The Administration was perceived to have a multilateral approach to foreign policy and especially Bill Clinton was perceived as a multilateralist close to liberal theory who is attached to international organizations and agreements and therefore not eager to go to war without necessity. This was particularly the case after the debacle in Somalia with casualties among American soldiers, shortly after he entered the White House office. Furthermore, to endanger the relationship between the U.S. and Russia with the decision to act in Kosovo under the flag of NATO seemed not to be a light-hearted decision of Bill Clinton. However, it can be assumed that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright played a major role in the decision-making process on intervening in Kosovo. She was perceived as the driving force to act militarily after the diplomatic efforts seemed without a chance to establish a Peace Agreement.

11. Appendix

Appendix One - Demographic shifts in Kosovo from 1948-1991

	1948		1953		1961		1971		1981		1991	
	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%
Albanians	498,242	68.5	524,559	64.9	646,805	67.2	916,168	73.7	1,226,736	77.4	1,607,690*	82.2
Serbs	171,911	23.6	189,869	23.5	227,016	23.6	228,264	18.4	209,498	13.2	195,301	9.9
Montenegrins	28,050	3.9	31,343	3.9	37,588	3.9	31,555	2.5	27,028	1.7	20,045	1.0
Muslims	9,679	1.3	6,241	0.8	8,026	0.8	26,357	2.1	58,562	3.7	57,408	2.9
Gypsies	11,230	1.5	11,904	1.5	3,202	0.3	14,593	1.2	34,126	2.2	42,806	2.2
Turks	1,315	0.2	34,583	4.3	25,784	2.7	12,244	1.0	12,513	0.8	10,838	0.5
Croats	5,290	0.7	6,201	0.8	7,251	0.8	8,264	0.7	8,717	0.6	8,161	0.4
Others	2,103	0.3	3,541	0.3	8,316	0.7	6,248	0.4	7,260	0.4	12,498	0.7
Total	727,820	100.0	808,141	100.0	963,988	100.0	1,243,693	100.0	1,584,441	100.0	1,954,747	100.0

*Estimate of the Federal Institute for Statistics, based on the data on the natural augmentation and migrations during the previous period (1981-1990)

See: Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1999), from 'Jugoslavija 1918-1988, statistički godišnjak' (1989), pp.42-3; 'Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije za 1992, dodinu' (1992), pp62-3, as cited in Milan Vučković and Goran Nikolić, Stanovništvo Kosova u razdoblju od 1918. Do 1991. Godine (munich 1996), pp.108-9

Appendix Two - Ahtissari-Chernomyrdin-Milosevic Agreement

Proposal presented by Martti Ahtisaari and Victor Chernomyrdin to President Slobodan Milosevic, 2 June 1999.

Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
 - Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;
 - Marking/clearing minefields;
 - Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
 - Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.¹ A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly

concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
- Timetable for their return;
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

Notes

¹ Other required elements:

- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);
- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals;
- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.

See: Annex 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 5/1/12.

Appendix Three - Annex of the Athisaari Plan

Main provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement

I. General

1. The aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement is to define the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable. It includes detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. In addition, the Settlement prescribes constitutional, economic and security provisions, all of which are aimed at contributing to the development of a multiethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo. An important element of the Settlement is the mandate provided for a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo. The provisions of the Settlement will take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo.

II. Provisions of the Settlement

2. **Kosovo's governance.** The Settlement defines the basic framework for Kosovo's future governance. Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, governing itself democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Kosovo shall adopt a constitution to enshrine such principles. While the Settlement does not prescribe a complete constitution, it defines key elements that must form part of that constitution. Kosovo shall have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership in international organizations.

3. **Rights of communities.** With respect to the protection and promotion of community rights, the Settlement addresses key aspects to be protected, including culture, language, educations and symbols. Albanian and Serbian shall be the two official languages of Kosovo, while other community languages — such as Turkish, Bosnian and Roma — shall have the status of languages in official use. To ensure adequate representation of communities in public life, the Settlement defines specific representation mechanisms for key institutions. Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo shall continue to be guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly. To protect their rights in the legislative process, the Settlement also provides that key laws of particular interest to communities may only be enacted if a majority of their representatives present and voting in the Kosovo Assembly agree to their adoption.

4. **Decentralization.** The extensive decentralization provisions are intended to promote good governance, transparency, effectiveness and fiscal sustainability in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specific needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which shall have a high degree of control over its own affairs. The decentralization elements include, among other things: enhanced municipal competencies for Kosovo Serb majority municipalities (such as in the areas of secondary health care and higher education); extensive municipal autonomy in financial matters, including the ability to receive transparent funding from Serbia; provisions on inter-municipal partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb majority municipalities.

5. Justice system. The Settlement includes specific provisions to ensure that the justice system is integrated, independent, professional and impartial. It provides for mechanisms to achieve a justice system that is inclusive of all communities, and in which the judiciary and prosecution service reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo. Moreover, the Settlement provides for, and is premised upon, the access to justice of all persons in Kosovo.

6. Protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage. The Settlement places great emphasis upon ensuring the unfettered and undisturbed existence and operation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo. The Church and its internal organization shall be recognized explicitly by the Kosovo authorities, its property shall be inviolable, and it shall enjoy tax and customs duty privileges. Protective zones shall be created around more than 40 key religious and cultural sites. Without prejudice to ownership of the property in protective zones, specific restrictions shall apply to activities within those zones to guarantee the peaceful existence and functioning of major religious and cultural sites. NATO shall also provide additional physical security for selected sites, until such time as the military presence decides the conditions have been met for a transfer of their protection responsibilities to the Kosovo Police Force.

7. Returns/protection of property. All refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo shall have the right to return and reclaim their property and personal possessions based upon a voluntary and informed decision. The Settlement reaffirms the principle that displaced persons shall be able to return to a place of their choice in Kosovo, and not only to their original place of residence. The Settlement also calls upon Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate fully with each other and the International Committee of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of missing persons.

8. Economy. The Settlement includes specific provisions designed to promote and safeguard sustainable economic development in Kosovo. The Settlement prescribes transparent procedures to settle disputed property claims and for a continued privatization process, both with substantial international involvement. In addition, the Settlement defines mechanisms to determine Kosovo's share of Serbia's external debt, and to address the issue of property restitution.

9. Security. The Settlement provides for a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo security sector, encouraging significant local ownership in its development, while retaining a level of international oversight necessary for ultimate success in this sensitive area. The Kosovo Police Force shall have a unified chain of command throughout Kosovo, with local police officers reflecting the ethnic composition of the municipality in which they serve. In Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, the Municipal Assembly shall have enhanced competencies in the selection of the police station commander. A new professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force shall be established within one year after the end of the 120-day transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members. The Settlement stipulates that the current Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after the end of the transition period.

10. Future international presence. In general, Kosovo shall be responsible for the implementation of the Settlement. To safeguard and support such implementation, the Settlement defines the role and powers of the future international civilian and military presences.

11. International Civilian Representative. The International Civilian Representative, who shall be double-hatted as the European Union Special Representative and who

shall be appointed by an International Steering Group, shall be the ultimate supervisory authority over implementation of the Settlement. The International Civilian Representative shall have no direct role in the administration of Kosovo, but shall have strong corrective powers to ensure successful implementation of the Settlement. Among his/her powers is the ability to annul decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public officials whose actions he/she determines to be inconsistent with the Settlement. The mandate of the International Civilian Representative shall continue until the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of the Settlement.

12. European Security and Defence Policy Mission. The European Security and Defence Policy Mission shall monitor, mentor and advise on all areas related to the rule of law in Kosovo. It shall have the right to investigate and prosecute independently sensitive crimes, such as organized crime, inter-ethnic crime, financial crime, and war crimes. In addition, it shall have limited executive authority to ensure Kosovo's rule of law institutions are effective and functional, such as in the areas of border control and crowd and riot control.

13. International Military Presence. The International Military Presence shall be a NATO-led military mission. It shall continue the current task of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, in conjunction with the International Civilian Representative and in support of Kosovo's institutions until such time as Kosovo's institutions are capable of assuming the full range of security responsibilities.

14. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Kosovo.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with an extensive field presence in Kosovo, is requested to assist in the monitoring necessary for a successful implementation of the Settlement.

III. Implementation

15. Upon the entry into force of the Settlement, there shall be a 120-day transition period during which the existing mandate of UNMIK remains unchanged.

16. During the transition period, the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative, shall be responsible for approving a new constitution and the legislation necessary for the implementation of the Settlement and the establishment of the new Kosovo institutions it calls for. The constitution and legislation shall become effective immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period.

17. At the end of the transition period the UNMIK mandate shall expire and all legislative and executive authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo, in accordance with the Settlement.

18. Finally, general and local elections are to be held within nine months of the entry into force of the Settlement.

See: <http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf>, accessed 5/1/12.

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Abstract

The intent of the Diploma thesis is to analyze the U.S. foreign policy of the Clinton Administration in the course of the Kosovo conflict. The thesis tries to evaluate the impact of Bill Clinton's presidency (1993-2001) on Kosovo and consequently on the international community. This is done through a contextual analysis which attempts to explain, firstly, the U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton years and its effects on world politics; secondly, how the U.S. dealt with the multilateral attempt to prevent the collapse of the Southern Balkans because of ethnic rivalries; and thirdly, the decision of the U.S. and its allies to launch a humanitarian intervention to contain ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

By means of the liberal theory and multilateralism it is argued that the U.S. Administration under Bill Clinton thoroughly considered whether to conduct a humanitarian intervention in the Kosovo conflict without the permission of the UNSC, because the efforts to convince the two permanent members of the UNSC, Russia and China, to permit a military intervention were intensive. However, Russia emphasized that it would veto any military intervention in the Kosovo conflict and thus categorically excluded an agreement in the UNSC. Therefore, it is claimed that the U.S. Administration would have preferred to act under the authority of the United Nations, however, because this was not possible they acted within the framework of NATO. Furthermore, American domestic actors as well as the public opinion were taken into account in respect of the decision on how to proceed with the humanitarian intervention. Hence, the decisions of President Clinton to go to war on moral grounds and to reject ground forces were associated with the controversial debate and reluctant attitude in American society.

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit versucht mithilfe einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse zu erforschen, inwiefern die amerikanische Außenpolitik der Clinton Administration den Verlauf des Kosovo Konfliktes beeinflusst hat. Die Arbeit legt die Auswirkungen der Präsidentschaft von Bill Clinton (1993 -2001) auf den Kosovo und schlussendlich auf die gesamte international Gemeinschaft dar. Im Laufe einer Kontextanalyse wurde diese Thematik von zweierlei Gesichtspunkten aus bearbeitet. Einerseits wurde die Ausrichtung der amerikanischen Außenpolitik während Clintons Präsidentschaft und deren Einfluss auf die Weltpolitik beleuchtet andererseits wurde der Versuch der Vereinigten Staaten mit multilateralen Bemühungen den durch ethnische Rivalitäten hervorgerufenen Zusammenbruch des südlichen Balkanraumes, zu verhindern, bearbeitet. Außerdem wurde die Entscheidung der USA und ihrer Verbündeten betrachtet, im Rahmen der NATO Luftangriffe auf Serbien zu starten, um ethnische Säuberungen im Kosovo zu verhindern.

Hinsichtlich der Theorien des Liberalismus und Multilateralismus ist zu sagen, dass die Clinton Administration, bevorzugt mit der ausdrücklichen Genehmigung der Vereinten Nationen, die humanitäre Intervention durchgeführt hätte. Der Versuch der drei ständigen Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen, USA, Großbritannien und Frankreich, die beiden anderen ständigen Mitglieder, Russland und China, von einem militärischen Eingreifen in den Kosovo Konflikt zu überzeugen, war zwar bemüht, aber aussichtslos. Russland machte von vornherein klar, dass es einer militärischen Intervention unter keinen Umständen zustimmen werde. Daher sahen die USA und ihre Verbündeten keine andere Möglichkeit als ein multilaterales Handeln im Namen der NATO zu etablieren, um weitere Massaker an den Kosovo Albanern zu verhindern. Darüber hinaus beeinflussten innenpolitische Akteure, sowie die öffentliche Meinung die Entscheidungen der Clinton Administration maßgeblich. Der Entschluss zu einer militärischen humanitären Intervention, sowie deren Durchführung waren davon betroffen. Im Besonderen die Entsendung von Bodentruppen in den Kosovo wurde von Clinton abgelehnt aufgrund kontroverser Debatten und der ablehnenden Haltung der amerikanischen Öffentlichkeit.

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Sprachen:

Deutsch	Muttersprache
Englisch	Fließend, in Wort und Schrift
Französisch	Fließend, in Wort und Schrift
Russisch	Kommunikationsfähig
Polnisch	Grundkenntnisse
Latein	Kleines Lateinum