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„The Security-Development Nexus in the European Union.

Points of contact in the institutional set-up and in missions abroad. With a case study of EUFOR Tchad/RCA“

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1. Preface

1.1. Introduction

‘Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other.’ (Annan, 2005: 5)

The connection between security policy and development policy may not be obvious at first, especially for people without previous knowledge about the topic.

When thinking of security policy, soldiers with uniforms, military equipment and armed conflict will be among the first things which will come to one’s mind while development policy is seen very differently. Providing aid in so called underdeveloped countries, building schools and helping others to help themselves are among the associations towards development policy. To narrow down these two fields to only these views can be called antiquated however as nowadays soldiers carry out tasks, which fall under development policy and development workers help with ‘Security Sector Reforms’ and disarmament of fighters, which range deep into the security policy field.

1.2. My motivation for working on this topic

I picked this topic because of two reasons. First of all I am sure that the topic of the security-development nexus will stay important over the next decades as conflicts, especially in development countries¹, will most likely not vanish. Resources like oil, water, diamonds and metals get scarcer and more important every day. With fighting for influence over those resources, conflicts will be one of the most important means to secure or widen this influence. For this scenario a working coordination and cooperation between security policy and development policy is very important

¹ The term development countries is seen critical nowadays as it is judgemental and implies the superiority of the developed countries. I will still use the term in my paper as no universally acknowledged term exists instead of it which is non-judgemental.

because on its own both each policy area will most likely fail to carry out peacebuilding operations to tackle these conflicts.

The second reason is my personal interest in the status quo of the coordination and coherence respectively between these two policy fields within the European Union. There is a vast pool of information and publications about the security policy of the European Union (EU) and there is also much material on the development policy of the Union. However if one searches for publications on the contemporary, as well as past connection of these policy fields, the amount of sources is low. As I was very interested in learning more I decided to devote my thesis to this topic.

While for the past decades the European Union was already a global player in the area of development cooperation² it was not, until recently, taken seriously as a global power regarding crisis prevention and peacebuilding. The war on the Balkans and in Kosovo in the 1990s demonstrated the EU and the world that the Union did not have the instruments or the resources to conduct joint missions which can handle such conflicts. This powerlessness led to the creation of capabilities within the EU, primarily the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and to important papers like the European Security Strategy (ESS).

With these new instruments the EU has been carrying out civil-military operations for the last decade. Up to this day 23 missions were led by the EU itself, including six EUFOR (European Union Force) missions. The latest of these, Operation Atalanta on the Horn of Africa, is still running until this day.³

Recently the Treaty of Lisbon led to some fundamental changes within the Union which also influenced the security as well as the development policy. The most obvious examples are the abolishment of the pillar structure as well as the recreation of the post of the High Representative (HR).

The development policy is one of the most important allies for the security policy as today's conflicts and wars are difficult to win by military force alone. Proper

² The European Union is the biggest single donor of development aid worldwide. Its member countries also provide a big part of the global aid.

³ For more information about the mission I would like to refer you to (Leitner, 2009)

development policy is a key aspect in achieving sustainable peace as it should lead to social and economic gains for society.

On paper these two policy areas are getting more and more interconnected especially through newly established institutions, mechanisms and the coherence imperative. A productive connection of these two areas can give missions an impartiality boost and thus makes them more valid. It is often noted that development and security are contingent upon each other and aim for the same goal, which is a prosperous and peaceful civil society.

For nearly a decade the EU is now able to conduct civil-military operations abroad without being dependent on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations (UN), which gives the Union a more powerful voice in the world. It is to be expected that the EU will continue to launch further missions abroad therefore it is important to look into the past, learn from it and adopt the lessons learned for missions to come.

1.3. Research Question

If one looks at birth of the development and security policy within the EU it is apparent that both areas experienced major changes during the last few decades, while always having some sort of connection with each other. Sometimes the connection was very tight and sometimes it was loose but it was always there. In my thesis I want to make this connection between the two policy areas visible, also by showing how the areas individually developed over the last decades.

My research question is:

Is there an interweavement between the policy fields of security and development in the European Union? How can a possible interweavement be seen within the Union's institutions and in foreign missions of the European Union, for example EUFOR Tchad/RCA?

The aim of this paper is therefore to impart on how this connection can be rated and how it developed into the status quo. I will also point out potentials and problems and how they affect missions abroad. These tasks will undergo critical assessment.

To achieve this goal I will elaborate on the EU Treaties, publications, important terms, mechanisms and institutions.

1.4. Methods

The following paper examines the interweavement of development and security policy and should be of relevance for development and security studies as well as political science. Methodologically I used a mix of primary sources (especially EU and OECD documents among others), secondary resources (magazine articles, volumes and monographs) as well as trustworthy internet resources. They all were carefully picked. Most of my sources treated either security policy or development policy on its own. Especially sources dealing with the history of the EU security policy were extensively available while literature, which deals with the connection between security and development, was scarce, which indicates that not much research has been done regarding this topic.

1.5. Structure of the Paper

This chapter provided a short introduction, motives, research questions and methods to introduce the reader to the topic of this paper.

The second chapter deals with definitions, which prove to be important as the defined terms do not have universal meanings. Therefore it is essential to agree on definitions to prevent misunderstandings.

The third chapter describes the beginning of the EU development policy until the Treaty of Maastricht, which introduced the pillar system in the EU. From there on the

chapter elaborates on the latest treaties to point out changes, which happened because of a new treaty or just during the time of it being in force. This chapter also includes the contracts between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), which are the most important development cooperation partners of the Union.

The fourth chapter deals with the EU security policy from the late 1940s until the Treaty of Maastricht and then proceeds in the same fashion as the previous chapter with descriptions of the changes the security policy was undergoing during the Treaty of Maastricht to Lisbon.

The fifth chapter brings security and development together and analyses how the connection between these two can be seen with reference to the two preceding chapters. It also elaborates on the coherence term in connection with development and security policy and how these two policies see each other. This chapter also introduces mechanisms, institutions and changes in treaties, which are important in understanding the security-development nexus.

Chapter 6 deals with reasons for conflict, rules of intervention and how the EU prepares and carries out civil-military operations. A small insight is given into two concluded EU missions, Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo.

Chapter 7 elaborates on the case study of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the most recent concluded EU civil-military operation. Before the mission itself is described, important background information about Chad is given. The preparation of EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the mission itself is then described as well as how the civil-military coordination worked out. The last few pages point out the achievements and the failures of the mission and which point to lessons which should be learned.

The 8th and last chapter concludes the paper and answers the initial scientific question about the connection and coordination between the development and the security policy.

2. Definitions

2.1. Important Definitions regarding Development

2.1.1. Development

The political development term includes quite a few points, which are commonly agreed on by all definitions. Development should lead to eradicating the worst misery and making basic needs available to all people. There is also consensus that development should be more than just survival, by including additional factors like protection from disease, shelter and basic security to the term. (Fischer, Hödl and Parnreiter, 2004: 13)

One could say that development describes the desired social and economic progress. This definition, published in the Brandt-Report of 1980, makes development a never ending process as there will be ever changing and different perceptions of what is desirable. (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980) With the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)⁴ guidance on how to achieve development was introduced. The European Union adopted these eight MDGs to make development available to all.

The EU gives further insight on their view on development in 'The European Consensus on Development' from 2006. This document points out that the eradication of poverty through sustainable development is the primary goal the Union wants to achieve via development policy. Sustainable development means that it should be carried out in a way which does not negatively affect the future generations. (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006: Part 1)

⁴ The 8 MDGs seek to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, to achieve universal primary education, to promote gender equality and empower women, to reduce the mortality rate of child, to improve maternal health, to fight diseases, especially HIV/AIDS and malaria, to ensure environmental sustainability and to develop a global partnership for development. (<http://www.endpoverty2015.org/>)

While it is important to know that development is, it is even more important to provide development through development policy.

2.1.2. Development Policy

Dieter Nohlen states in his 'Lexikon Dritte Welt' that development policy is the sum of all resources used and actions taken by developing countries as well as by developed countries to promote the economic and social development of developing countries. The goal of development policy is therefore to improve the standard of living for people affected by these measures. (Nohlen, 2000: 224) The term is seen as a very broad field which should not be a one-way process but a lively cooperation between various actors. (Nuscheler, 2004: 76)

The EU development policy is a joint competence of the Union and the member states and was to be found in pillar I prior to the Treaty of Lisbon. Development policy of the member states and the European Union should be complementary and coherent to reinforce each other. (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006: The Development Challenge)

Countries which profit the most of the European development policy are the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which consist of 48 countries at the moment.⁵ Europe's development policy also works together with countries, which fall under the Middle Income Countries (MICs) term.

As already stated the development policy is not a one-way street and therefore should not only benefit the MICs and LDCs but also the EU member countries as

'[...] it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the interdependency of its richer and poorer countries. This indicates that

⁵ The European Union does not have its own list of LDCs but follows the UN Resolution of 1971 (Resolution 2186 XXXVI). 33 of these LDCs are in Africa, 14 in Asia and 1 in Latin America. For an updated list of the LDC by the United Nations see <http://www.unohrls.org/en/ldc/25/>.

our security is only possible if development achievements pay off for the developing countries.' (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006: 1)

Europe's development policy is based on Art. 177 of the EC treaty from 1957 in which it states that it should lead to economic and social integration of the developing countries into the world economy which should help to reduce the gap of wealth. Paragraph 2 of Art. 177 continues by stating that democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms are aims of the development policy strategy of the Union (Neisser and Verschraegen, 2001: 110f)

Not all funds and goods given to development countries is development aid. This is an important mechanism which should prevent the 'watering down' of development.

2.1.3. Official Development Aid

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is responsible for important definitions regarding development policy and aid distribution for OECD member countries⁶. It publishes regular Peer-Reviews, which check the member states for complying with the rules in the development area. The published development aid numbers are highly connected with the DAC definitions catalogue and therefore of utter importance. One of the most important definitions is the Official Development Assistance (ODA). It

'[...] is defined as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are:

i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and

⁶ All EU member countries are also members of the OECD.

ii. each transaction of which:

a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and

b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent)' (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 2010: 11)

In contrast to the ODA stand the Other Official Flows (OOF), which define expenses that are not allowed to be declared as ODA. These are for example funds forwarded for commercial or export facilitating purposes as well as transactions with a grant element of less than 25 per cent. (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 2010: 11)

In general security expenditure is excluded from counting as ODA. Over the years some expenses, which are related to security issues, were included in being allowed to be seen as ODA though. These are

'[...] additional costs incurred for the use of military personnel to deliver humanitarian aid or perform development services.' (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 2010: 12)

Tasks which are nowadays included in counting as ODA are:

- Police training for civil policing,
- Security Sector Reform⁷,
- Peacebuilding,
- Conflict prevention and resolution (which includes capacity building, monitoring, dialogue and information exchange)

⁷ For more on what a Security Sector Reform is and does I would like to refer to OECD DAC, 2007

Explicitly excluded are:

- The means to combat terrorism
- Military strategy and defence cooperation efforts (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 2010: 14)

Participation in peacebuilding operations is also partly applicable as ODA if the UN Security Council authorises the mission. Then the following tasks fall also under the ODA term:

- *'Human rights and election monitoring*
- *Reintegration of demobilised soldiers*
- *Rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure*
- *Monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police forces*
- *Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities*
- *Training in customs and border control procedures*
- *Advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilisation policy*
- *Repatriation and demobilisation of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons*
- *Explosive mine removal.'* (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, 2010: 14)

2.2. Important Definitions regarding Security

2.2.1. Security

The meaning of the term security changed a lot over the last decades and is currently fundamentally different from the meaning it used to have. Before the Second World War the term was very state centric. Waging wars was not considered illegal during the time of the League of Nations (LON) and security policy focused on threats by large governmental controlled armies. After the end of the Second World War the establishment of the UN changed a lot as waging wars was no longer considered legal.⁸ Until the end of the Cold War, and also beyond in many areas of the world, the security term was still closely related to the nation states. After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) a paradigm shift of the security term could be observed. The constant threat of war breaking loose between the two superpowers vanished and security policy began to shift towards new focuses with Global Security and Human Security being the most important. (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005: 64)

The concept of security only focusing on the stability on the nation state is therefore out-dated nowadays as 'traditional wars' between countries, where governmental controlled armies fight each other, are on the decline. After the Cold War the threats of insecurity linked more to sources inside a country. The focus shifted from defending national territory against an invading army to different threats like terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The scale of security also shifted from protecting Achieving security got much more difficult with the updated definition of the term as internal security is strongly connected with external security. Examples to illustrate this connection are conflict spill overs or terrorist attacks. (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005: 62)

⁸ The League of Nations existed from 1919 to 1946 but was abandoned after the Second World War as this institution was seen as not capable of preventing wars. The charter establishing the United Nations was signed in June 1945 and succeeded the League of Nations.

The updated security term also pushed the topic of state fragility.

2.2.2. State Fragility

This term is associated with a lot of negative consequences, not only for the citizens of a country, but also for the international community. (Iqbal and Starr, 2008: 315)

The concept of fragile states is very complex with many existing definitions and methods to determine the fragility or non-fragility. One of the most common definitions is the one published by the OECD:

'[...] a fragile state [...] [is] unable to meet its population's expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process. Whether and to what degree these expectations entail poverty reduction, development, security or human rights will depend on historical, cultural and other factors that shape state-society relations in specific contexts. Questions of legitimacy, in embedded or historical forms, will influence these expectations, while performance against expectations and the quality of participation/the political process will also produce (or reduce) legitimacy.' (OECD, 2008: 16)

There are also other definitions, which are often used like the one by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy of the Carleton University (CIFP, 2008) or by the Department for International Development in the United Kingdom (UK). (Department for International Development, 2005: 7f) What most of the definitions have in common is that they care about three central attributes: effectiveness, authority and legitimacy.

The measurement of these attributes is difficult to achieve as there are many variables, which have to be observed: Literacy of the population can hint on the country's effectiveness and criminal rates can tell something about the authority the state while the (non)existence of fair and regular elections can give some insight on the legitimacy of a government. (Mata and Ziaja, 2009: 6)

The danger of fragile states is that they are seen as able to infect bordering countries, especially when they are already vulnerable. (O'Loughlin and Witmer, 2005: 3) They are described as an international risk because they can act as safe havens for actors linked to organised crime, drugs production or terrorism. Fragile states are also not desirable for the development community as fragility can get in the way of fulfilling, at least certain aspects, of the MDGs. (Jenne, 2009: 2f) It is also seen that states marked as being fragile are falling behind in economic terms compared with other, non-fragile, countries over time. (World Bank, 2009)

State fragility is often accompanied, preceded or succeeded by some sort of conflict.

2.2.3. Conflict

One of the most used definitions for conflict nowadays is the one provided by the Uppsala Conflict Date Program (UCDP), which published:

'Armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.' (Department of Peace and Conflict Research,)

This definition raises the issue of the intensity of conflicts. If a conflict is of low, medium or high intensity mostly depends on deaths caused by the conflict. For the UCDP a conflict with at least 25 and a maximum of 1.000 battle deaths a year is considered to be a minor conflict. From 1.000 deaths on the conditions of a war are fulfilled. (Mata and Ziaja, 2009: 7)

Contemporary conflicts have shifted towards a bigger involvement of civilians over the last decades. In many conflicts they are being used as resources of labour and assets for conflict parties. Furthermore civilians and combatants are often very hard to distinguish.

It is not new however, that civilians are involved in conflicts. If one looks at the guerrilla and liberation wars of the last centuries, especially between the 1950s and

1980s, it is indisputable that civilians were always involved in conflicts. What has definitely changed though is that war, conflict and violence are seen as an important source of income for certain people, especially for warlords. (Leader and Macrae, 2000: 14)

Other changes are seen within the 'New Wars' term, advocated by Mary Kaldor and Herfried Münkler. The 'New Wars' see a decline in conflicts between states to conflicts within states, changing motives for starting conflicts and different funding methods for starting and prolonging conflicts.⁹ (Collier, 2000)

One of the negative consequences of conflict is that it can lead to more violent acts in the future. It is more likely that a conflict breaks out in areas where shortly before another conflict has already taken place. This can lead to a vicious circle of violence, which most of the time hits fragile states.

Within the security-development nexus there are some terms which point to a strong interweavement between these two. I want to elaborate on the most important ones.

2.3. Important Definitions regarding both policy fields

2.3.1. Coherence

A widely recognised definition of coherence comes from the Dutch scholar Paul Hoebink. He sees coherence as

'[...] the non-occurrence of effects of policy that are contrary to the intended results or aims of policy.' (Hoebink, 2005: 37)

⁹ The motives of war are said to have changed from geopolitical issues to ethnic conflicts in which civilians are disproportionally involved. A shift away from fighting enemy combatants to gain control over civilians, infrastructure and livelihood systems is the consequence. The funding also changed with international crime being the main source of money needed for waging the conflict. (Glasius and Kaldor, 2005: 65) For more info on the term I refer to Münkler's 'The New Wars' from 2004.

For him the word coherence does not describe an ideal state of interweaving politics but the missing of incoherence, as he sees this as the natural state.

Guido Ashoff on the other hands sees coherence in a positive way as he defines it as the cooperation of different policies towards a superior goal. (Ashoff, 2005: 11ff)

It is important to know that perfect coherence is not the goal neither is it achievable in real politics. The reason is that in complex institutions like the European Union it is simply not possible that all policy areas are perfectly coherent with each other. A decision can lead to a boost in coherence between two policy areas while at the same time it promotes incoherence in another political field. Politics is always a process without a clear end. Therefore incoherence is unavoidable in pluralist systems like the EU.

Incoherence can be intended at the expenses of other political fields, especially when higher goals are of concern.¹⁰ This is rather the exception than the rule however, as most incoherence is unintended. (Hoebink, 2004: 193ff)

Even if it was possible, the existence of perfect coherence would not always be associated with advantages. It can have negative impacts as well. If two political areas, for example development policy and security policy, work together in a field where both of them have opposing opinions, coherence can mean that they decide on the least common denominator, which could be not sufficient to provide a comprehensive solution for a special problem. This can lead to so called negative coordination. Especially since development cooperation is not one of the most powerful policy areas within the European Union a positive coherence approach is very important for reaching the future goals of development, in particular the MDGs. (Kevenhöster, 2002: 185f)

Due to Hoebink three types of coherence or incoherence exist. While internal coherence measures the coherence within a policy field, the expanded internal coherence aims at coherence and coordination between two policy fields. External

¹⁰ The higher goals for one policy area must not be coherent with the higher goals of another area. While the higher goals of development policy are geared towards the reduction of poverty, the higher goals of the trade policy can lead to negative consequences for development.

coherence on the other hand tries to make coherence work between one policy field and many other fields, which concern it for various reasons. (Obrovsky, 2007: 6)

For my paper only the expanded internal coherence is relevant as I want to elaborate on coherence between security and development policy.

Coherency between development and security is especially important due to the changing development and security terms which see Human Security as an important issue.

2.3.2. Human Security

Even if the term was introduced in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 it took several years before it was reflected in real politics. (United Nations Development Programme, 1994)

In 2003 a report was released, which was very influential and important for the term. 'Human Security Now' by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen of the Commission on Human Security tried to steer the focus away from classic security and development patterns towards Human Security, a very elusive term.

The Commission on Human Security uses the following definition:

'The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment.' (quoted from Alkire, 2002: 1)

In the report Amartya Sen conceptualised human security in another way as he focused on the insecurities that affect people and which must be removed. He defines the term like this:

'Human security as an idea fruitfully supplements the expansionist perspective of human development by directly paying attention to what are sometimes called 'downside risks'. The insecurities [...] demand that special attention be paid to the dangers of sudden deprivation. Human security demands protection from these

dangers and the empowerment of people so that they can cope with — and when possible overcome — these hazards.' (Ogata and Sen, 2003: 8)

Regarding development, the report moved the focus away from economic growth, which was the main goal of development policy until the 1990s, to improving the quality of human life, which is much more complex but a better indicator than solely economic numbers. (Robinson, 2006: 73)

Human security can be understood from a narrow or broad point of view. Followers of a narrow understanding concentrate on threats of violence, like civil war, while individuals favouring the broad conception also include risks like natural disasters, famine, environmental pollution, poverty, displacements and social exclusion to the threats.¹¹ (Duffield, 2006: 12)

2.3.3. Good Governance

Good governance is one of the key principles for the European Union for granting development aid nowadays. The EU sees good governance as

'[...] the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purpose of equitable and sustainable development.' (European Commission, 2000: Art. 9.3)

It is an instrument to get governments to improve framework conditions for poverty reduction but also a goal in its own right. (Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for Development Cooperation and Cooperation with Eastern Europe; Austrian Development Agency, 2006: 5)

The United Nations assigned eight major characteristics to identify good governance. This type of government has to be participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and follows the rule of law.

¹¹ For more information see also Klingebiel, 2006: 2f

(United Nations ESCAP,

<http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp>)

An important factor of a good government is that it has output and input legitimacy. Output legitimacy is realised if the government takes decisions, which are in the interest of its citizens, while input legitimacy is achieved when the government picks up its citizen's demands and transform them into political decisions to support these wishes. If a government can deal with its people in this way it is seen as legitimate. (Börzel, Pamuk and Stahn, 2008: 6ff)

2.3.4. Peacebuilding

1975 can be seen as the hour of birth for the term as Johan Galtung's influential article named 'three approaches to Peace' was released. (Galtung, 1975) The big breakthrough for the term came nearly twenty years later however as former UN General Secretary Boutros-Ghali pushed the topic by releasing an 'Agenda for Peace' and an 'Agenda for Development'. The term was included, yet not reflected, in politics immediately. The Brahimi Report brought the term in the spotlight and led to the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2006. The concept is widely used in the security-development nexus and Richmond (Richmond, 2004: 132) noted that a peacebuilding consensus existed. (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 11)

Within the peacebuilding discussion there are two different views on how it should be defined, the broad and the narrow view.

The narrow version has many advocates, for example the former UN General Secretary Boutros-Ghali. He defined peacebuilding in his 'Agenda for Peace' paper as

'[...] action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.' (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: II. 21)

Due to this concept peacebuilding is implemented in a framework consisting of peacemaking, which is understood as diplomatic activities, peacekeeping, which

deals with all military activities, and peacebuilding. In this context peacebuilding got the role of guiding the way to democracy in the aftermath of a military conflict. The Brahimi Report got more concrete and pointed out the connection between military and civilian aspects. Peacebuilding

'[...] defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.' (Brahimi, 2000: 3)

The broad version of peacebuilding sees it less as a connection between civilian and military areas but more as an integrated concept, which includes various kinds of policies that should lead to preventing the outbreak of violence after a conflict officially ended. (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 14f)

To sum up, the narrow version prioritises the security aspect and leaves out areas, which will have an effect in the future¹² and therefore focuses on immediate impacts. The broad version of peacebuilding on the other hand focuses on tackling root causes of conflict by means which range far into the future. This has the negative effect that most of these ventures will not have much effect initially however.

¹² Examples are infrastructure, health care or education which are all future oriented.

3. Development Policy of the EU

3.1. 1950 to Maastricht

The discussion about a European development policy started in the 1950s in a time when the reconstruction of a big part of Europe was not yet completed. Jean-Baptiste Nicolas Robert Schuman, former Prime Minister of France, told in his famous 'A United States of Europe' speech on 9 May 1950 that

'Europe, with new means at her disposal, will be able to pursue the realisation of one of her essential tasks: the development of the African Continent.' (Schuman, 1982: 47f)

This speech took place years before the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC)¹³ Treaties were signed and already showed the will of France to include their associated territories in Africa into the Union. While they were not included in the 1952 ECSC Treaty, a similar approach found its way into the Treaty of Rome.¹⁴ (Bartels, 2007: 716)

The goals of this association in the Treaty of Rome were described as followed:

'The Member States agree to associate with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. [...] The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole. [...] [The] association shall serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic,

¹³ The EEC is also called the Treaty of Rome.

¹⁴ Even today the former associated countries enjoy better access and aid through the European Union than countries, which were never colonised by Europeans. It must be noted though that over the years, thanks to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the European Union, these disparities became smaller. (Bartels, 2007: 716)

social and cultural development to which they aspire.' (European Coal and Steel Community, 1957: Part IV, Article 131)

This part of the treaty manifested the idea of free trade for both sides, as well as a possibility for the associated countries to get investments and development aid easier than before. (Bartels, 2007: 717ff) As most colonial powers of Europe were part of the EEC it was inevitable to work together with developing countries.¹⁵ Especially in Africa many associated countries were located, most of them colonised by France. The Treaty of Rome was therefore the first treaty to include paragraphs which could be linked to development policy. It created 'the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories' which can be found in Part IV, Art. 131 to 135. By today's standards this is of course an out-dated version of development policy, as the colonies had no saying in this cooperation. The aim of Art. 131 was to reduce tariffs, which should be abandoned within the whole territory of the EEC and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) later on, and to give aid to the countries concerned. These two elements, market access and economic assistance and aid, are still one of the main instruments nowadays in the European development cooperation.

In the first step only current and former colonies respectively were able to receive aid and to be part of the OCT. Resistance came from member countries without colonies which led to the introduction of the European Development Fund (EDF) which was put outside of the regular EU budget. From the beginning the development policy of the European Union was not introduced to make the member states' programmes obsolete but to carry out development policy in a way that these two areas, the joint EU policy and the member state policy, should reinforce each other. (Broberg, 2011: 2)

During and after the de-colonisation the now independent countries wanted to maintain the special relations with their former motherlands. This led to many treaties which sustained the preferential trade and aid access for the now independent countries, most prominently the EU-ACP Treaties which are described later in this chapter. (Hoebink, 2004: 26f)

¹⁵ The exceptions were the United Kingdom and Denmark with the latter having no colonies in Africa.

3.2. The Time of Maastricht

Development policy has been part of the European Union since the Treaty of Rome but played a minimal role until the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU)¹⁶. The first attempt to start a strong development policy was during the discussions prior to the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. The Netherlands tried to implement a paragraph about development cooperation into the act, but failed at first. During the Presidency of Luxembourg in 1992, which supported the Dutch intention, The Netherlands were able to deliver the proposal and achieved the inclusion. The result was included as Art. 130u to 130y of Title XVII after only two rounds of discussions. This showed that development policy was not an important topic for the majority of the member countries as most of them did not care if these paragraphs were included or not. Nevertheless over time these articles grew more important as member states and European Union institutions made use of them.

The official objectives of development policy during that time were sustainable economic and social development, a smooth integration into the world economy and the reduction of poverty as well as political goals like the rule of law, promotion of democracy and the compliance with human rights. (Hoebink, 2004: 2ff) The so called 'three C's' also grew important during that time. They stated that the EU development policy should be complementary, coordinated and coherent.¹⁷

3.3. The Time of Amsterdam

The Treaty of Amsterdam did not include changes for the development cooperation besides putting the agenda of migration and asylum policies from pillar 3 to pillar 1, the home pillar of development policy. (Hartmann, 2009: 16) Until 2002 an own

¹⁶ The TEU is also known as the Treaty of Maastricht.

¹⁷ More information, descriptions and relevant publications can be found on the website www.three-cs.net

Development Council existed which was responsible for the development cooperation of the Union. It was abolished that year and integrated into the General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC) which led to a transfer of responsibility from development experts to foreign ministers. These had to deal with CFSP and development issues now. (Hartmann, 2009: 10) This was seen negatively in the development community as a downgrading in importance and quality was feared.

3.4. The Time of Nice

While the Treaty of Nice itself did not change anything regarding development cooperation, the European Union was working hard in this policy field. In 2005 the Commission, the Parliament and the member states agreed on the 'European Consensus on Development'. This consensus provided a conceptual framework for development cooperation for the Union and the member states. It emphasised that development cooperation has to be about partnership and equality, which was not always the case in the past. The framework also says that

'[...] development is a central goal by itself; and that sustainable development includes good governance, human rights and political, economic, social and environmental aspects'. (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006)

This paper can be seen as the 'ESS of the development policy' as it is very blurry and more internally important than externally. It is a guideline on how the European Union wants to achieve their development policy but without any consequences for failure.

3.5. The Time of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, in short Lisbon Treaty, entered into force on 1 December 2009 and brought some changes for the development policy. In terms of

competence of the European Union over development matters the treaty does not modify anything though. Article 4 point 4 says that

'In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.' (European Commission, 2010a: Article 4, 4)

That means that the Union and the member states can legislate side by side over same matters of development cooperation like it used to be in former treaties. About the objective of the joint development policy the Lisbon Treaty emphasises in Article 208 point 1 that

'Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.'

This goal was also known from former treaties.

Still, at first sight it looked as development cooperation was abandoned for the most part in the new treaty as the TEU offered a much broader view on the objectives of development cooperation in Article 177. In fact, development is now to be found, except for Article 208, in Part 5 of the Lisbon Treaty, the External Action by the Union.

Hence development cooperation within the Lisbon Treaty was not abandoned for the most part. Instead it was given the same, if not more, importance under the aegis of the foreign policy. (Broberg, 2011: 6)

In terms of coherence the institutional reform of the Treaty of Lisbon could change something for the better as the incoherent pillar structure was abandoned which was seen as the main reason consistency and coherence was difficult to achieve.

When fading out the institutional changes in Lisbon, nothing substantial has changed in the new treaty. Article 208 (1) does not introduce anything new as

'[...] the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect development countries.'

Over the last two decades European Values got a prominent place in the EC treaty and within the development policy. The Lisbon Treaty further engages the European Union to promote its values in the world according to Art. 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union:

'The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.'

To sum up, Lisbon induced changes in the institutional structure which affect the development policy while major changes in the political field itself were avoided. Due to Broberg only two changes may effect development cooperation noticeable in the new treaty: Further value promotion as well as the strengthening of coherence. Both of these are important for the Union's foreign missions. (Broberg, 2011: 12f)

Regarding the new treaty, the EU has to take care that development policy, as a policy field which is not that powerful compared to others, is not marginalised at the costs of other policies, for example security policy.¹⁸ (Hartmann, 2009: 15)

As already mentioned, the treaties with the OCTs and later ACPs are among the most important examples of EU development policy. These treaties also reflect the changes in development and security, especially regarding the connection of these two policy fields.

¹⁸ Trade policy is another much quoted policy field, which fits this description.

3.6. The EU-ACP Treaties

Shortly after the Treaty of Rome came into effect the colonised African countries one after another declared independence from their motherlands. It started with Guinea in 1958 and only four years later, in 1962, all the other African colonies were independent. The convention of Yaoundé of July 1963 can be seen as a reaction of the former colonial powers in Europe to keep the connections tight after the decolonisation process. (Broberg, 2011: 2)

3.6.1. The Treaties of Yaoundé

The first Yaoundé Treaty (1963 – 1969) regulated aid and preferential market access¹⁹ between the EC and 18 African countries. Most of these countries could be assigned to France's sphere of influence. It was based on previous agreements between the EEC states and the African countries. Therefore it cannot be considered a milestone but rather a continuation of the already present relations. An important issue in Yaoundé was the recognition of the national sovereignty of the African countries.

In 1969 Yaoundé II came into force which only introduced cosmetic changes but included new countries from the Mediterranean, Latin America and Asia. This enlargement made it a Treaty between the EEC and the ACP.

The Yaoundé agreements also established institutions, namely the Association Council, Association Committee, Parliamentary Conference and a Court of Arbitration, which all were practically toothless. (Bartels, 2007: 722f)

During Yaoundé I and II a decline in trade was noticeable between the EEC and the associated countries. This was due to the connection between the former colonial

¹⁹ This preferential access was seen in the reduction and even abolishment of tariffs as well as quotas on goods, especially these important for the development countries.

powers and the ACP getting looser. It led to more economic exchange with other countries due to competitive market measures. (Bartels, 2007: 727) In terms of influence of the former colonial powers not much changed. Especially France was still a mighty actor and maintained military bases in many former colonised countries.

3.6.2. The Treaties of Lomé

The convention following Yaoundé was Lomé I in 1975 which incorporated 21 new countries²⁰, many of them from the Commonwealth. (Hoebink, 2004: 27) The reciprocity principle, which was an important cornerstone in the Yaoundé Convention, was abandoned and replaced by a non-reciprocity approach which should ensure that the new attending countries receive fair treatment in comparison with the countries from Yaoundé. (Bartels, 2007: 733) An important introduction in Lomé I was STABEX which put earnings of important commodities like coffee and cocoa on a solid ground by granting the developing countries stable prices for their exporting goods.

Following Lomé I (1975 – 1979) was Lomé II (1980 – 1985) which did not differ much from the first Lomé Convention but introduced SYSMIN, which helped stabilising the prices of mining products. (Maennig, 1988: 35ff)

Lomé III was in effect from 1985 to 1990 and was signed by 66 developing countries. (Hoebink, 2004: 31) Issues concerning human rights were included in this convention for the first time.

Lomé IV (1990 – 2000) went a step further concerning human rights by talking about the obligations of the contracting countries and by providing financial resources for human rights promotion. In 1995 the EU member states decided that all new contracts signed with ACP countries have to include the compliance of human rights which led to a revision of the paragraphs concerning this topic in Lomé IV. Democracy, the rule of law and human rights were now demanded from the Lomé

²⁰ In total 46 countries signed the Lomé convention with the EEC.

countries, otherwise sanctions could be imposed for non-compliance. (Bartels, 2007: 738)

Lomé IV is therefore considered to be the first ACP-EU contract to acknowledge the connection of security and development by including these mechanisms to protect the citizens of the ACP states.

During the 25 years of the Lomé Conventions the biggest part of aid was received by countries in sub-Saharan Africa which got 78 per cent of all funds. (Cox and Chapman, 1999)

3.6.3. The Treaties of Cotonou

In 2000 the Cotonou agreement followed Lomé IV. The content of this agreement was surprising as both STABEX and SYSMIN were thrown out and replaced by more results based aid mechanisms with tight links to good governance and the compliance of basic human rights. It is clear that in this agreement the European Union had a more powerful voice than the ACP countries, as all the important changes are clearly in favour of the member states of the EU. (Hoebink, 2004: 33) It is also noticeable that with Cotonou security issues got more prominent in this agreement as a new focus on conflict prevention and domestic politics could be noticed. (Carbone, 2008: 334)

In December 2010 Cotonou II was ratified. Once again, the revision included mostly cosmetic changes but two points have to be highlighted. In Cotonou II a new focus on the connection between security and fragility can be seen as the EU included that this condition harms development. The other important inclusion is the recognition of climate change which can have severe effects on the poorest countries and its inhabitants. (European Commission, 2010b) Cotonou II is based on three principles, which are political dialogue, trade- and economic cooperation and development aid. In former treaties the shortcomings in the political regions were criticised and with these changes the EU tried to take this point into account as the political dialogue for the partner countries to receive development aid is essential nowadays. (Faria, 2004: 31)

4. Security Policy of the EU

4.1. 1951 to Maastricht

Like the development policy, the idea of a European security policy started in the aftermath of the Second World War. The first sectors which were integrated within Europe and were already important for security were coal and steel within the ECSC in 1951. At first glance, this agreement, which was concluded between France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and The Netherlands, does not have anything to do with security issues but coal and steel were and are very important materials for military build-up. This agreement should keep Germany from starting a war again.

After this successful project the French, under Prime Minister Pleven, proposed a European Defence Community (EDC) which was highly welcomed by the other ECSC countries. It never came into effect though as ironically the ratification process in the French senate failed as it was feared that the supranational approach could weaken the position of France.

In 1957 the Treaty of Rome was signed and founded the EEC, which can be marked as the birth of the European Union. The newly established community revived the idea of a security and defence cooperation. The so called 'Fouchet Plan'²¹ could have been the predecessor of the CFSP in 1962 but the negotiations failed because of two reasons. The United Kingdom was excluded as it only joined the Union in 1973. The general opinion was that cooperation in this field within Europe should not take place without the United Kingdom. The second reason was the anti-US undertone of the French De Gaulle administration at that time which was not conceived positively among the other member states. They thought that France wanted to weaken the NATO through this cooperation. (Cameron, 1999: 16)

Even though the Fouchet Plan failed, it laid the foundations for future talks in this political field. In 1969, after the resignation of de Gaulle, the idea of the political

²¹ Christian Fouchet was the French ambassador in Denmark at the time.

integration within the EU was picked up again and led to the discussion of a European Political Cooperation (EPC) which should give the EEC a heavier weight in international politics. The French did not directly oppose the idea but insisted on placing the EPC outside of the competencies of the EEC to prevent incorporation in the community framework which could decrease the influence of the nation states in this sensitive policy field. The EPC was established under this condition and led to a tighter cooperation in security questions which can be seen as a first success in reaching the objective of 'speaking with one voice'. The mechanism was still very slow and too shiftless to play a major part regarding the trouble spots in the world. (Cameron, 1999: 17)

During the time of the 1960s and 1970s the idea of a powerful Commission in the area of foreign policy was inconceivable, especially for France, the United Kingdom and Denmark. This position changed over time as respect arose for the Commission which led to an increased legitimacy. (Nuttall, 1996: 130) Finally the result of the Paris Summit of 1974 gave the advocates of a joint security policy hope, as an interest in cooperation in that political field arose. (Nuttall, 2005: 94)

Some improvements happened, the most important being the creation of a troika which gave the chairmanship of the EPC to the present EEC Presidency, assisted by the former and next country in this cycle. The EPC got more confident which led to the imposition of sanctions on the Soviet Union²², Argentina²³, South Africa's Apartheid Regime and Iraq²⁴. These steady steps led to a partly Europeanisation of security issues. The idea of joint interventions or a European army was however still a taboo and therefore not planned at this time.

Until 1987, when the EPC was lifted into the Treaty (Art. 30 of the SEA), it was very informal and had no legal basis. By including it into the SEA it was given formality and codified procedures. Still, the EPC was only considered a forum for discussions about security topics as it did not have the power or legitimacy to decide on military

²² The sanctions were justified by the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981 by the USSR.

²³ Sanctions were imposed on Argentina because of the invasion of the Falklands.

²⁴ The regime of Saddam Hussein was sanctioned because he invaded Kuwait.

matters of the member states. (Cameron, 1999: 18) Finding solutions could take very long due to the unanimity rule and the different interests of the involved countries.

The collapse of the USSR in 1989 had a huge impact on the common foreign policy as the changing world demanded a changing foreign and security policy within the Union. France and Germany laid the cornerstone of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1991 which finally led to the CFSP within the Treaty of Maastricht. (Cameron, 1999: 22f)

The Treaty led to a further communisation of the Union through the introduction of the pillar system which made the EU subordinate to the European Community (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). (Gruber, 2008: 65)

4.2. The Time of Maastricht

In Title V, Art. 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), or Maastricht Treaty, the definition of the newly introduced CFSP was published. The main goals were

- *'to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter,*
- *to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,*
- *to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders,*
- *to promote international cooperation,*
- *to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.'* (European Commission, 2006)

It is also noted that the member states should only take decisions which reflect the spirit of loyalty and solidarity to further strengthen the CFSP. Very important for the

CFSP was the inclusion of the so called Petersberg Tasks which provided a framework for

'[...] humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'. (Western European Union Council of Ministers, 1992)

The Petersberg Tasks were a reaction to changed security perceptions and introduced means to be able to react fast to changing security situations. (Pagani, 1998: 737)

The Maastricht Treaty effectively founded the European Union and the pillar structure which led to CFSP being pillar II. From the beginning the CFSP was intergovernmental and

'[...] shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy [...].' (European Commission, 1992)

In 1998 the St. Malo Declaration was signed by France and the United Kingdom which pointed out that, despite the CFSP being in force, the EU still has too little capabilities regarding crisis management:

'The realization of Europe's military weakness with regard to the Kosovo crisis, which convinced all governments of the need to develop an EU crisis management capacity; the fundamental change of British Policy; and the supportive attitude of the United States.' (quoted from Cameron, 1999: 80)

The French and British pointed out that the EU needed better resources to play a more important role in international politics which led to the Joint Action (JA) and Common Positions which were introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. (Laursen, 2010: 13)

4.3. The Time of Amsterdam

The treaty following Maastricht had to work on the CFSP as it proved to be not community friendly as the cooperation between the governments, the decision making bodies and the organic structure of the Union left a lot to be desired.

A big milestone in the history of the CFSP was the mutual consent on coherence between the CFSP and other policy fields concerning it. (Neisser and Verschraegen, 2001: 115) The second important innovation was the installation of a High Representative (HR) for the CFSP in 1999 to 'add a face' to the CFSP and make European foreign policy more visible outside the EU. The post was held by Javier Solana until the Lisbon Treaty came into force. With the HR the Union tried to escape the so called 'expectation-capability gap'²⁵ to be recognised in the world as a political power.

During the time of Amsterdam the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 was published. At the summit in Helsinki the member states agreed to work towards being able to deploy a European Rapid Reaction Force of 60.000 soldiers within 60 days to manage the Petersberg Tasks. (Lindstrom, 2005: 1ff) This strategy paper was seen as a big step towards a European army. In times were no Petersberg tasks have to be fulfilled these soldiers should be stationed in their home countries serving their nation. Another edition was the introduction of Common Strategies by the Amsterdam Treaty. (Laursen, 2010: 13)

The next big step was going to be the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 shortly followed by the first ever European military mission in Macedonia (Operation Concordia), which used NATO equipment and assets and was rated a success. (Kühne, 2009: 9)

²⁵ For information regarding this term I would like to refer you to Bale, 1999

4.4. The Time of Nice

With the Treaty of Nice the military spectrum of the Union was strengthened with new permanent political and military structures introduced namely the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Also the system of qualified majority voting (QMV) was extended to more decision making areas including the PSC in civilian aspects of crisis management operations. (Republic of Slovenia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011)

During the time of the Treaty of Nice the cooperation within the CFSP pillar could be intensified by improving the coherence between CFSP and the EC. The Parliament and the Commission were also more included in the CFSP with the HR being the link between these institutions. (Gruber, 2008: 68) These changes and the newly introduced bodies further improved the EU's ability for working with international organisations like the UN, the OECD and the NATO. With Nice the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) became legally a part of the CFSP which expanded the EU's scope of crisis management operations. (Fischer, 2009: 8)

The proposal of a European Rapid Reaction Force from the time of Amsterdam was abandoned when in 2004 the new idea of the so called EU Battlegroups (EUBGs) came up. The 2010 Headline Goal demanded that a Battlegroup consisting of around 1.500 soldiers should be available at very short notice to be deployed at any time. Until 2007 there was only one Battlegroup in place every half a year, from then on two of them were ready at the same time. Most Battlegroups in the past consisted of soldiers from at least 2 nations, sometimes even more. Every group has the objective to respond to a crisis or a request by the UN within 10 days. This mechanism is still in charge and there are no signs that they will be abandoned in the foreseeable future even if no Battlegroup was ever deployed. (Keatinge and Tonra, 2009: 20)

The most important document of the time when Nice was in force was the European Security Strategy which was important for several reasons.

4.4.1. The European Security Strategy: A logical step

The European Security Strategy can be seen as the next important step after the St. Malo Convention, the sad role the EU played in the Kosovo conflict²⁶ and the disparity of opinions on the on-going Iraq war.

It was influenced by three events: The end of the separation of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. (Fischer, 2009: 11)

The overarching goal for the ESS is described in the document:

'As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is inevitably a global player [...] it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.' (Council of the European Union, 2003)

The ESS defines five threats to the security of the European Union which are international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.

Three strategic goals should lead to eradicating these threats. If threats occur, these should be countered with the full range of available instruments immediately. The second goal states that acting in a global manner as well as concentrating on the borders of the EU is important while the third principle strengthens the commitment of multilateralism and the rule of international law. (Heusgen, 2004: 6)

The ESS was always considered more important internally and less outwardly oriented. This explains why the ESS is not a concrete strategic document but more a guideline for the CFSP with a non-binding character. (Meyer, 2008: 25)

²⁶ The EU was not able to react in a proper way during the violent outbreak in Yugoslavia in 1999 as its current security policy capabilities were limited. This event led to the acceleration of the process towards a CFSP. (The Amsterdam Treaty: A comprehensive guide http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/index_en.htm)

4.5. The Time of Lisbon

In the Lisbon Treaty four major changes in wording concerning the security policy can be spotted compared to the TEU.

Under the Lisbon Treaty the CFSP is based on

'[...] the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.' (Article 127, Lisbon Treaty, amending Art. 11 TEU)

Member states should

'[...] comply with the Union's action' within the CFSP.' (Art. 127, Lisbon Treaty, amending Article 11 TEU)

'Determining a common approach [...]

is very important. (Art. 135, Lisbon Treaty, amending Art. 16 TEU)

It is also written in the Lisbon Treaty that

'Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others [...]. Member States shall ensure [...] that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity. [...] The diplomatic missions of the Member States and the delegations of the Union in third countries and at international organisations shall co-operate and shall contribute to formulating and implementing the common approach.' (Article 135, Treaty of Lisbon, amending Article 16 TEU)

These changes made it clear that a comprehensive approach becomes even more important and that every country should have the good for all other countries in mind before taking action in this policy area.

The biggest reform in the Lisbon Treaty was clearly the abolishment of the pillar structure. This affected the foreign and security policy strongly as the CFSP was one pillar by its own. Even though it vanished, the structures stayed intact. Before the

Treaty of Lisbon was signed the coherence between the First pillar's (EC) external relations and the Second pillar's (CFSP) foreign and security policy was problematic at times. The new and improved post of a 'High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union'²⁷ (HR), currently held by Catherine Ashton, is responsible for both external economic relations and CFSP issues. She is also vice-president of the Commission and chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Council. By nature this post and the responsibility it holds increases the coherence of institutions which are under the hat of the HR in comparison to the previous treaties which worked with the pillar structure. (Laursen, 2010: 6) The HRs task is to lead the CFSP, to formulate and prepare policy proposals and to implement decisions taken in this area. The duties also involve being the key coordinator for civilian and military instruments in crisis management. (Hynek, 2011: 83) As the power and responsibilities of the HR were expanded a new institution was founded to assist the HR from now on: The External Action Service (EEAS). It was created to increase the vertical coherence²⁸ between the CSFP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)²⁹. It is comprised of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the EUMS, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen). (Hynek, 2011: 84)

There are still specific rules and procedures in force for the CFSP, which lead to the assumption that the second pillar is still existent. Unanimity is still the most used voting mechanism (Art. 1 TEU) and the European Court of Justice cannot operate within CFSP. (Laursen, 2010: 9) The interval of the debates within the European Parliament (EP) on CFSP and the CSDP matters has increased to twice a year instead of only once. (Wessels and Bopp, 2008: 14) The CFSP still does not see the EP as legitimate for coordinating it but rather the member states themselves in form of governments and diplomats. The European Council is still much more important in the field of CFSP as it identifies the interests, objectives and general guidelines for

²⁷ Art. 9E, 13A, 14, 19 TEU describe this new post.

²⁸ Vertical coherence refers to the consistency between the policies within the European Union regarding European security policy in this case. (Carbone, 2008: 326)

²⁹ CSDP is the former ESDP. The transition was geared by the wish to increase coherence through institutional improvement. For further information see Hynek, 2011: 81ff

the CFSP (see Article 2 TEU). (Wessels and Bopp, 2008: 15) Nowadays the CFSP gears more towards joint civilian and military operations and is thus broadened.

The Lisbon Treaty also extends the Petersberg Tasks, which now also include Joint Disarmament Operations, Post-conflict stabilisation and placed a bigger focus on fighting terrorism by military and civilian means. (Laursen, 2010: 14f) Enhanced Cooperation should speed up missions³⁰ while Permanent Structured Cooperation³¹ as well as the 'Entrustment of Task to a Group of States' which can be referred to as a 'Coalition of the Able and Willing'³², were introduced to make the Union more flexible.

Another new implementation in the Treaty of Lisbon was the division of the former GAERC into two new bodies, the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)³³. The GAC is now responsible for preparing the meetings of the EC with its President and the Commission and has a rotating Presidency which will not lead to much continuity as the EC has a full time president. The FAC on the other hand has a fixed chairperson (HR) who is appointed for 5 years which fits better with the years President of the EC who is appointed for 2.5 years. (Wessels and Bopp, 2008: 17)

All in all the Treaty of Lisbon brought many new aspects to the foreign and security policy and especially the CFSP, most of them positive. Due to the increase in use of QMV, efficiency should go up with fewer deadlocks produced. The new permanent President of the European Council should lead to a steady political direction which helps to predict the European security policy. (Laursen, 2010: 19) The HR and the abolishment of the pillar structure on the other hand should lead to more coherence and an improved external perception by the world.

³⁰ Art. 329(2) TFEU

³¹ Art. 42 TEU

³² Art. 44 TEU

³³ Art. 16 (6) TEU

5. The Interweavement of Development and Security

5.1. Connected from the Beginning

The connection between development and security can be traced back to the birth of the development term.³⁴ Former President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman, was a very important figure for development as well as security policy. With his speech in 1949 it is commonly accepted that he started development policy by addressing that the 'American Way' should be an example on how to overcome poverty. The idea of a development policy was therefore born in a time when the Cold War started. This helps to understand why development policy was connected with security from the beginning on. In the quote

'Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.' (quoted from Escobar, 1995: 3)

it is hinted that security deliberations played an important role during the birth of development policy. The Marshall Plan, which marked the start of development policy in real politics, was influenced by security thinking as the United States feared that communism could take over Western Europe and other parts of the world. It is obvious that only nations compliant to the respective ideology could benefit from development funds. (Leffler, 1992: 157ff)

The link between development and security is thus not a recent phenomenon but already existed for decades. After the Cold War both policy areas were broadened. Security policy was not centred on the opposing superpower anymore and was therefore forced to find new areas of application. The field was increasingly opened for economic, environmental and state stability concerns from now on. State centred

³⁴ Due to Clemens Six it can be even traced back to the start of the colonial age, as in those days it was also important for the security of the colonial rulers that the native people do not revolt. This led to some sort of development policy even if it was very different from today and its only aim was to keep the people quiet. This policy served a very nationalistic security approach. (Six, 2007: 5)

approaches got less relevant while security policy which targeted the individual grew more important with Human Security entering politics.

Also development policy changed and widened after the Cold War, mainly because the results during the 1980s were disappointing³⁵. The important change within the development sphere was to move away from a purely economic view to the needs of the individual as well as placing great emphasis on good governance, human rights and security issues. (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 8) It must be pointed out that especially until the 1990s other political areas like environment and trade were at least equally important for the development sector. This can especially be seen in the EU-ACP Treaties where trade issues were always prioritised and only recently security issues, like good governance and the demanded support on the 'War on Terror' got included into the treaties.

During the last two decades both policy areas have undergone fundamental changes in meaning and connection with each other. These changes forced the development and security policy within the European Union to work with each other as their political fields are tied together in comprehensive mandates abroad and by the coherence imperative of the EU. Nowadays peacebuilding missions cannot be successful with only military means and therefore have to include development instruments to reach sustainable peace. This obligatory inclusion of a development component makes security policy integrated and comprehensive. (Klingebiel, 2006: 3)

The 1990s were a hard time for development policy as the credibility and legitimisation of the policy was at stake due to the unsuccessfulness of the 1980s. Crisis prevention and conflict processing were seen as new fields for the development policy to earn back trust and credibility. From the beginning of this reorientation phase there was a fear within the development community that this shift could push major topics and values of development policy, most prominently poverty reduction, in the background. However this reorganisation was not only demanded from people outside the development community but also from within, which may come as a surprise because the resources were already scarce to handle traditional

³⁵ The 1980s were labelled 'the lost decade of development'.

development tasks. A broadening of the development policy area was therefore seen critical because of missing capacities in the already overloaded development field. (Maihold, 2005: 31)

5.2. Positioning of Development towards Security

Both security and development want the well-being of the human but try to achieve that goal with different approaches. It is important for both policy areas to find out the methods, instruments and means of the other political field to identify commonalities and differences. Nowadays the biggest political intersections between security and development are seen in peacebuilding, human security and the 'War on Terror'. (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 10)

Due to Klingebiel and Roehder development policy can position itself in three ways towards the security policy:

- It can pursue a strategy of distance which aims at staying away from the security policy to gain more independence. This should lead to a better development policy which targets its basic goals and the MDGs. The negative aspects of that strategy are that development policy could suffer a loss of importance in international politics and that it is harder to influence opinions and politics outside its sphere of power.
- It can also choose a strategy of cooperation which tries to find coherent approaches for problems regarding security and development. The positive aspect is that development has more influence in security related aspects than with a distance strategy. Then again too many compromises and concessions could weaken the development policy, which could lead to a securitisation of development. Another possible negative effect is seen in traditional development losing funds to security related projects.
- The strategy of complementarity can be seen as a mixture of the two above. Strategic partnerships and cooperation should be entered in fields where they are productive and do not lead to overlapping. This means that the security

aspect should not work in the defined space of development and vice versa. (Klingebiel and Roehder, 2004: 354f)

Regarding military interventions the International Council on Human Rights from 2001 knows three broad categories on how development policy can stand towards military interventions. (Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, 2003)

- First of all the development community can find them never acceptable and always opposes them.
- On the other hand the development community can stand neutral towards a military intervention by never demanding them but also never publicly opposing them when they are carried out.
- A military force can also be seen as acceptable in some circumstances, for example when crimes against humanity are happening (Barry and Jefferys, 2002: 9)

Within official documents it can be seen in more detail on how the European development policy stands towards the security policy and vice versa.

5.3. Important Documents for the Nexus

With the new century a new era of development cooperation was established with improvement in the areas of management³⁶ and content³⁷ of European development cooperation. The outcome of these shifts on the development side was seen in documents like the 'European Consensus on Development' in 2005 (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006), 'The Consensus on Development and the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour' in 2007 (European Commission, 2007a), which committed the member states and the institutions to a common view in terms of development cooperation and implementation. (Carbone,

³⁶ The delivery of better aid took place in a faster way.

³⁷ Poverty reduction was the main goal.

2008: 332) The 'Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness' by the OECD was also very influential within the EU. Important papers regarding security were the European Security Strategy (ESS), the Helsinki Headline Goal and the Headline Goal 2010.

Regarding development and security the ESS said that

'[...] there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace' (European Council, 2008: 12)

The European Consensus on Development also identifies insecurity and violent conflicts as the biggest obstacles for development and the MDGs. It comments that a tighter coordination between development policy and security policy, which is seen as essential to stabilise failed states, should be carried out. (Wagner, 2008: 38) The European Council Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy links these statements and notes that

'[...] the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace' (European Council, 2008: 12).

The Paris Declaration was a major paper for development policy and led to the 'International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding' which got more concrete and designated with goals that should be tackled to achieve development and security. In the paper it is pointed out that objectives must be produced

'[...] that address the root causes of conflict and fragility (AAA 2008) by connecting different policy communities (development, defence, diplomacy).' (UN Peacebuilding Support Office, 2009: 2)

The OECD devoted their fifth Principle of Good International Engagement in Fragile States to the important matter of development-security coordination regarding fragile and states:

'[...] the political-security-development nexus: The political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others. International actors should move to support national reformers in developing unified

planning frameworks for political, security, humanitarian, economic and development activities at a country level.' (OECD, 2007: 2)

In 2004 the DAC of the OECD made it possible through the 'Security System Reform and Good Governance: Policy and Good Practice' that parts of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) were now creditable as ODA. While for example training in human rights questions and democracy are understandable and could definitely be discussed other areas like the elaboration on planning documents for the armed forces and training for police forces are questionable at least. (Wagner, 2008: 52)

The EU-ACP contracts were always important for the EU development policy since the 1960s. Nowadays these contracts also reflect the development-security nexus quite visibly. Over the years a strong connection between receiving development aid grew with the inclusion of security aspects. This could be especially seen in the revision of the Cotonou Agreement in 2005 between the EU and 78 ACP countries. The willingness of the ACP states to fight terrorism and the distribution of Weapons of Mass Destruction and to be a 'good government' was essential for the EU to sign the treaty. In the event of non-compliance on these areas it is even possible that aid is being suspended. (Wagner, 2008: 44)

5.3.1. Points of Contact in Civil-Military Missions

The Treaty of Lisbon with its innovations paved the way for a more integrated Union in terms of military-civilian operations. The biggest obstacle nowadays is not the inability of the EU to achieve civil-military cooperation but to handle the different interests within the EU. (Hynek, 2011: 98)

When the pillar structure was still existent within the EU, the peacebuilding efforts were a great example of cross-pillar policy, as it involved institutions from pillar I and II. Pillar I provided the Commission with the monopoly in initiative without the member states having the power to veto. In pillar II the Commission together with the Council shared the power of initiative with unanimity required. In pillar I the EP had decision making power together with the Council. In pillar II on the other hand the EP did not have this power in terms of decision making. (Sicurelli, 2008: 220)

Pillar I included development assistance, conflict prevention and conflict management without lethal implications and the Commission had the right to initiate operations in these fields. Decision making was done via QMV and the EP. Implementation was carried out by the Commission via budget management.

Pillar II on the other hand, included civilian and military missions with lethal implications. Decision making was carried out by the Council via the unanimity rule and implementation lay with the member states, the current Presidency, the HR for CFSP or the Commission via budget management.

There was also a grey area which included peacekeeping operations without lethal implications and purely civilian operations. (Sicurelli, 2008: 221)

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced several bodies which should help in linking the military and civilian sides of the foreign policy. Examples are the Joint Situation Centre, the EUMS, the EUMC and the Politico Military Group (PMG).

Recently two major developments can be noticed in the context of civil-military missions of the EU. First of all, further specialisation in some traditional tasks, for example policing, has occurred. Second, new types of missions have been carried out, for example cases with goals like the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and disarmament or demobilization which range wide into the civil arm of conflict management. (Hynek, 2011: 86)

During the 1990s the civilian power in solving conflicts was seen as the strongest instrument of the European Union, the military option was only secondary. With including a civil section in the newly founded CFSP a new competitor arose for the development policy field which was connected to the military as well as to the traditional development spectrum. (Ehrhart, 2007: 7)

One step in the direction of a further integration of security issues into development policy was taken in 2004, when several security programmes were included into ODA accountability.³⁸ These changes did not include the costs for the military operations

³⁸ These were the administration of security expenses, the strengthening of the role of the civil society within the security system, the prevention and demobilisation of child soldiers, security sector reform, crisis prevention and solution and small arms. (Wagner, 2008: 3)

themselves but resulted in cross-financing of security issues by development aid. This development can be seen as either positive or negative but it has to be pointed out that more money for security means less money for 'real' development aid, such as poverty reduction efforts, if no new money is induced for the European development policy. (Wagner, 2008: 3) It is estimated that if full accountability of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) of the UN would be possible, the amount of ODA would increase by 12 per cent worldwide without any additional investments in this area. If other military interventions, not led by the United Nations, would be accountable the increase of ODA would amount to around 25 per cent for Germany and even 44 per cent for the United States. (Wagner, 2008: 4) Measures which appoint to about 30 per cent of the ODA can be already seen as questionable today.³⁹ If this development continues it will most likely result in more short military interventions in the future which would gain at the expense of long and preventive civilian operations. (Burghardt and Pietz, 2006: 4)

The use of military assets, for example transport via airplane to deliver aid, convoys for protection of development personnel and information sharing are seen as the three most common contact points for civilian and military personnel in crisis areas. The superiority in transportation equipment can be positive for the development side when departing to a country while the second point, the military escorts, are being seen as highly problematic because it can lead to civilian development workers not being seen as neutral and impartial anymore⁴⁰. Sometimes it is necessary though and even explicitly asked for by development organisations. The sharing of information on the other hand is very important for both sectors and not likely to change perceived neutrality as the citizens of the country where the mission takes place will hardly know about information sharing. (Barry and Jefferys, 2002: 5)

During the last decade civilian development cooperation can be seen as much more integrated and legitimated in security issues as it used to be. The major problem with this trend is seen in sometimes contrasting framework conditions in comparison with

³⁹ Costs for foreign students or for asylum seekers and refugees are examples of 'phantom aid', which can be a big part of the ODA of a country. (Wagner, 2008: 5)

⁴⁰ It is important to note that impartiality and neutrality are not synonyms but mean quite different things. If an actor is neutral it should not affect the political sphere at all, while an impartial force can intervene as long as it is in an even-handed manner.

the development cooperation provided by the security policy. The security policy has a narrower time horizon and demands quick results, which leads to less quality and a focus on quick impacts in the working area. Traditional development policy on the other hand leans towards giving its personnel more time to do their work. This policy is using approaches which do not have a huge impact in the beginning but are geared towards sustainable development. (Burghardt and Pietz, 2006: 3) Coherent policies aim to close or at least decrease that gap and make cooperation between security and development policy possible.

5.4. The Coherence Term and the Development-Security Nexus

Coherence has been a big topic in the European Union, especially within the last decade. The important preparatory work has already started with the signing of the SEA, which introduced the European EPC and marking the first small steps towards coherent policies. In Art. 30(5) of the SEA it is written that

'[...] external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in the European Political Cooperation must be consistent.'

In this context it should be noted that consistency means coherence as the term coherence had not yet entered the political vocabulary.

The legal basis for the coherence term, even if it also was not explicitly named within the EU, is to be found in Article 3 and Article 13 of the TEU and also in the Treaty of Amsterdam in Article 178. Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (Title I, Common Provisions) says:

'The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to this end.'

Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union (Title V, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy) says:

'The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.'

Article 178 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Title XX, Development Cooperation) states:

'The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to [the development policy] in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.'

The coherence imperative of the Union was influenced by the development as well as the foreign policy. Articles 178 and 13, which deal with the EU's development policy and the foreign and security policy, are subordinates to Article 3. (Ashoff, 2005: 28ff)

Within the last two decades much has changed regarding development cooperation and coherence. Until the 1980s most development cooperation was a state to state transfer of funds to help the recipient country in social and especially economic areas. From the 1990s on development cooperation started to include a broader spectrum of political areas such as human rights. It was also no longer solely a state to state affair but included the activities of the civil society like non-governmental organisations (NGOs). (Carbone, 2008: 327) The increasing importance of coherence was then reflected in the establishment of the Policy Coherence for Development term.

5.4.1. Policy Coherence for Development

The DAC of the OECD helped the term to get political recognition, by establishing a definition for Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) which is widely used nowadays:

'Policy Coherence for Development means working to ensure that the objectives and results of a government's (or institution's) development policies are not undermined by other policies of that government (or institution), which impact on developing

countries, and that these other policies support development objectives, where feasible.' (OECD, 2005: 28)

The MDGs are one of the Union's most important goals for which to reach it was seen essential to achieve coherence, especially between development and security.⁴¹ For this matter PCD was established.

The Commission and Council found out that there are three conditions needed to meet the MDGs by 2015. One of them is to support the development efforts by increasing coherence between the development policy and all policy fields associated with it.⁴² (Obrovsky, 2007: 4)

First discussions about this topic started in 1992 but it took more than a decade until it got relevant. (Obrovsky, 2007: 13) The big breakthrough for PCD came in 2005 when the work on the European Consensus on Development began.

Already in Part I (The EU Vision of Development) of the Consensus it is stated that

'It reaffirms EU commitment to poverty eradication, ownership, partnership, delivering more and better aid and promoting policy coherence for development.' (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006: 2)

In that part PCD even got its own sub item with number 6. There it says:

'The EU is fully committed to taking action to advance Policy Coherence for Development in a number of areas¹. It is important that non-development policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources [...].'

⁴¹ The MDGs gave the aid provided a push and doubled the numbers from 52 billion Euros in 2000 to 104 billion Euros in 2006 (DAC, 2008). Nevertheless it soon became clear that raising funds would be not enough and that the coherence must be improved to properly utilise these funds. This resulted in PCD, which was highly welcomed by the DAC of the OECD. (Carbone, 2008: 324)

⁴² The other conditions are to achieve the Barcelona commitments, which demand that 0.7 percent of the Gross National Income is used for development cooperation and to increase effectiveness of development cooperation as stated in the Paris declaration.

Another important document and one of the foundations for PCD was a paper by the Commission which was picked up by the GAERC to speed up the achievement of the MDGs. (European Commission, 2005) The most important section of the paper is 'The 12 PCD Commitments' which also includes security (Point 4). There it says that

'The EU will treat security and development as complementary agendas, with the common aim of creating a secure environment and of breaking the vicious circle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures.' (GAERC, 2005)

PCD: Important but blurry

It was a major leap forward to bring coherence to the development field but it was also seen as very weak and vague. The process, rather than the result, was the goal and it was clear that development as a soft policy would have a hard time to persist against the more powerful hard policies like trade and security. (Carbone, 2008: 330)⁴³

Achieving political coherence within the EU is paved with obstacles as the European Union is a highly complex institution. There are supranational policies, like development, trade and agriculture which involve the three most important institutions of the Union, namely Council, Parliament and the Commission with the latter being by far the most powerful in promoting coherence. On the other hand there are intergovernmental policies like the foreign and security policy, in which the Council should establish coherence. In areas of mixed competencies the member states themselves play the most important role in adding coherence, for example within environment, transport and energy policy. (Egenhofer, 2006: 6f)

To make coherence work it is therefore of utter importance to eliminate grey areas of legislation and to make sure that every institution knows what its competencies are

⁴³ For more information see Hoebink, 1999 and Koulaimah-Gabriel, 1999.

and how far they reach to ensure that the coherence improves or stays intact. (Poeschke, 2008: 53)

In terms of foreign and security policy many politicians and scholars see that coherent policies in this field are a necessary precondition for efficacy. 'Speaking with one voice' is to be seen as important if Europe wants to be taken seriously by the world. Incoherence is seen as negative for the Union's foreign policy as it undermines the main goal which is effectiveness. Unanimity in questions of foreign policy does not automatically induce effectiveness but it is necessary to help legitimising decisions made.⁴⁴ (Portela and Raube, 2009: 4f)

With the Amsterdam Treaty still in force PCD got a revaluation as it was decided that PCD was no longer only about supranational policies but that it was extended to all policy areas within the Union. This approach ought to increase coherence.

The first semi-annual PCD report was published in 2007 and was surprisingly critical. The report pointed out that it positively acknowledged the awareness given to PCD but it also said that the ambitious goals were not met. It stated that PCD works better in some institutions (Commission) than in others (Council) and that it was not well institutionalised in the decision making processes. (European Commission, 2007b: 19)

5.4.2. Criticism of the Coherence Concept

'The development community's best option is to embrace coherence, and try to influence the security agenda in the direction of human security.' (Robinson, 2006: 78f)

That would be one of the goals of the development policy towards the security policy, to steer it in its own direction by making human security a main goal of all missions abroad. This is not the reality however and coherence earned some criticism over the years.

⁴⁴ For more info on that topic I would like to refer to Missiroli, 2001.

One of the most important and strongest points against coherence is that the concept and the formal commitments are blurry. It sometimes seems that everything should be linked to everything and to be

'[...] mutually supportive and not subordinate to each other.' (European Parliament, Council, Commission, 2006: 10)

It is clear that such commitments cannot be reflected in real policy as trade-offs are required to make a powerful and functional coherence possible. This 'everything-should-be-coherent-with-everything-thinking' is probably possible in theory but not in reality. (Biscop, 2004)

It must also be admitted that the question is not raised whether increased coherence is even always good for the policies involved. It is taken for granted that coherence between development and security policy would benefit both. This does not have to be the case though. An example is the shift of the Union towards supporting more and more MICs where traditional development policy is not an important issue anymore. In these countries the focus of the Union is in trade and security questions. Most of these flows to the MICs do not have much in common with 'classic' development aid as money is provided for example to migration programmes, terrorism prevention programmes or technical assistance projects. Also the support for a dialogue between cultures, which was proposed by the Commission in 2007, can be seen sceptical as it can open doors for security strategic programmes without benefitting the development policy. (Young, 2008: 13f)

It has to be pointed out that the approach of security policy and development policy is very different by nature, which makes coherence more difficult. The military has a political approach and neutrality and impartiality are much harder to achieve and communicate. Development policy on the other hand should not be too much influenced by politics but focus on the well-being of the human and to apply development measures in a balanced way along all people in a certain area. Recent EU missions with military means were nearly always accompanied by excessive media coverage, which is partly the answer to the question why there are so few military operations in politically 'uninteresting countries' or dangerous 'hot zones'. Civilian actors on the other hand are active in nearly all countries where poverty is

common or conflict is raging, mostly without notice of the world public. (Barry and Jefferys, 2002: 19)

In most cases armed forces will not be seen as neutral and impartial but as partisan in contrast to NGOs which are much more often seen as impartial even though they have to work in certain political conditions which can make them dependent on policy makers. With this in mind it is clear that development policy by NGOs is more likely to work for the needs of the public as the political aspect is weaker than with security policy. (Burghardt and Pietz, 2006: 2)

A coherent and tight coordination could also lead to a situation where the civilian population and conflict parties lose their view on the development workers as neutral and impartial, which can have severe negative effects. The relationship between the development personnel and the native people could become less intensive and unarmed, non-governmental development workers could get sucked into an armed conflict by becoming targets of combatants. Sometimes armed protection of civilian personnel is seen as necessary but can comprise impartiality and should be avoided if possible. If carried out, the request should always come from the civilian actor and has to be carried out by an actor which is not directly involved in the conflict. (Barry and Jefferys, 2002: 17)

5.4.3. Possible Solutions of Coherence Problems

Despite wanting to increase coherence it is important to prevent a 'securitisation' of development policy. Many scholars have highlighted this matter as being of utter importance to development policy as it should stay independent from security policy while cooperating with it. During the Cold War the 'securitisation' was obvious in some areas as development aid was only given to states which did follow the 'right' ideology. During this time development policy can be seen as a tool for security policy to tie countries to ones sphere of influence. (Six, 2007: 21) Today such a 'securitisation' is much harder to prove.

To avoid problems concerning the tight cooperation between the two political fields, due to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 2001⁴⁵, three guiding principles on how the civilian side should work with the military side are recommended.

- First of all, humanitarian work should be always done by humanitarian organisations and not the military, as civilian engagement is always seen as the better alternative compared to military implementation.
- Civilian NGOs must not work under the command of military actors as independence is not met this way.
- Civilian intervention with development cooperation should always lead to maintaining order and improve security as well as the safety of civilians in a comprehensive and sustainable way. (Barry and Jefferys, 2002: 16)

Within the development community it is feared that teaming up with security policy could lead to former aims of development, such as poverty reduction and the improvement of the quality of life for the individual, being accompanied and in the long run replaced by security related topics. This process could lead to a loss of importance while development policy's most important topic, poverty reduction, is pushed into the background. To escape this fate, development policy should rediscover the MDGs and the poverty goal while cooperating coherently with security policy without adopting the high goals of it. (Maihold, 2005: 35ff)

The development community should also urge the security policy to get more sensitive towards development which could lead to an adoption of development position and a strengthening of the security sector's soft power. (Klingebiel and Roehder, 2004: 351)

Even though much criticism is raised regarding the connection and cooperation between security and development, this nexus also creates opportunities to break the vicious circle of poverty and insecurity and to implement the right development-

⁴⁵ OCHA is a UN secretariat and tries to improve coherence between humanitarian actors. For more information see <http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are>

security mix. Such a mix can fight the root causes of conflict more effectively than security and development policy respectively alone.

5.4.4. Coherence and PCD: Conclusion

Coherence and especially the PCD strengthened the position of the EU 'speaking with one voice' and therefore made the EU as a whole more credible. Development policy got more important in certain aspects as this policy field is needed in a coherent EU to achieve certain goals, most prominently the MDGs. Without the coherence imperative the MDGs are a 'mission impossible' as development policy as well as security policy alone cannot achieve these goals. In this area coherence is an important ally. Nevertheless promoting and carrying out coherent politics is not an easy task, especially with a highly bureaucratic institution like the European Union which is home to many different interests and institutions. (Carbone, 2008: 339f) The approaches of security and development policy are also very different and want to achieve different higher goals. Therefore the coherence between these two areas should be balanced and fair, as otherwise the described problems presumably occur.

6. Conflict Management of the EU

6.1. Reasons for Conflicts

6.1.1. General Reasons for Conflict

Within the European Union the Council and the PSC are constantly observing all regions in the world to find new areas of operation for the European Union. Therefore it is important to see early signs of an upcoming conflict. The key is to have credible and current information about the situation to react in a proper way. (Anderson and Spelten, 2000: 9ff)

The reasons a conflict breaks out are manifold. There are no definite indicators available but there are several issues which can point to a current or future conflict.

The factors which can lead to conflict can broadly be divided into three groups.

- Structural factors are seen as one of the most important reasons for violence. They include political, economic and cultural factors. A political reason for conflict can be that a small group of people have all important positions in a government while the majority of the individuals are excluded from the political process. Huge economic disparities can also lead to conflict as well as cultural differences and clashes between different ethnicities.
- Dynamic factors are events like periods of transition⁴⁶, elections, price surges on important goods and reforms. These can become triggering events for groups and individuals and can lead to violence and conflict. It must be noted however that positive dynamic factors like elections can also strengthen peace and harmony within a country and can reduce the possibility of violence.

⁴⁶ Examples are periods in which a transition from autocracy to democracy happens or when power is handed over from one person or group to another.

- Strategies by groups or individuals to safeguard certain interests or even expand them can also lead to conflict. Warlords are a good example as it is in their interest that conflicts become constant because they are economically dependent on it.

This enumeration of possible reasons for conflict shows that not all causes of need have to be structural. Admittedly, these root causes are often found in conflict torn regions but they are not mandatory for the breakout of a conflict. (Anderson and Spelten, 2000: 4)

6.1.2. Concrete Reasons for Conflict

While structural reasons, dynamic factors and strategies are very broad areas I want to proceed with more concrete reasons for conflict.

Economic and Social Situation

It can be observed that countries with low per capita income, low economic growth and bad health care systems are more likely to plunge into conflict and violence than rich countries or countries with good prospects in these indicators. The social and economic situation can be connected with structural issues (Stewart, 2004: 16)

Ethnicity

The multi ethnicity within most African countries was and is important to many conflicts.⁴⁷ One of the most obvious examples is the Rwanda genocide during 1994. This cause can be linked with structural, as well as dynamic factors.⁴⁸

Resources

When looking at Africa it can be seen that, while some countries recovered quite well from past conflict and have relatively high growth and welfare rates, like for example Mozambique. Many states on the other hand, mostly those with rich resources like Angola or Congo, are much more fragile.⁴⁹ (Biekart et al., 2005: 364) The occurrence of resources is connected with structural factors and strategies.

Costs of Insecurity

People who join the military or a militia, people who need to flee or are harmed are not able to work productively anymore. Large scale conflicts, which take part in the economic powerhouses of a country, have greater effect on the costs for society than conflicts in smaller, regionally restricted conflicts, which take place in the periphery. It can also be observed that in richer economies conflicts have greater and more negative effects than in poor countries. These rich countries with consolidated and stable institutions on the other hand are more likely to sustain important state services, like distribution of medication and food, than countries or regions where

⁴⁷ It can be observed however that conflict on the basis of ethnic reasons becomes much less likely if ethnic diversity exceeds three different groups. (Biekart et al., 2005: 363)

⁴⁸ The Rwanda genocide was triggered by the shooting down of the airplane of the Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana.

⁴⁹ It is often said that countries with many natural resources are cursed with them.

these services are scarce even in times of peace. (Stewart, 2004: 4) The aftermath of these conflicts can start a new one as the unemployment rate is high and it can be problematic to introduce the former combatants into the normal economic life. This can lead to tensions and more conflict.

Colonialism

Colonialism is often said to be one of the most important root factors even for present violent conflicts. It can however explain some conflicts but it certainly is not the most important factor nowadays.

Within the colonialism reason the demarcation is an important aspect. Most of the borders were drawn on maps with a ruler by the colonial powers and did not take ethnicity or territories into account. These artificial borders contain a huge potential for conflicts. Another reason within the discussion is that the colonial powers did modernise most countries but only in a way the motherland could benefit from. This led to huge disparities between regions which would divide countries in privileged and non-privileged areas. (Faria, 2004: 9) Colonialism can be a structural factor for conflict.

Foreign Support for Governments

Another factor was and is the support of governments in Africa by Europe, the United States of America (USA), China and the USSR and Russia respectively, especially with money and military goods. These contributions would strengthen the mostly autocratic rulers of the post-colonial area. After the end of the Cold War a general decrease in contributions could be noticed, which brought up the question of legitimacy of these governments. For many of the conflicts in Africa corrupt and centralised governments were seen as, at least partly, responsible, which point at structural reasons.

Conflicts themselves

While the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was the only 'classic war' in recent decades, all the other conflicts in Africa after decolonisation can be seen as intrastate conflicts, which mostly affected the neighbouring countries. The movement of militia forces, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)⁵⁰ over national borders can destabilise or even spread conflict into bordering countries. The struggle for control over natural resources like oil or diamonds is sometimes the reason for these interstate conflicts. (Faria, 2004: 10) For them all three factors can play an important role.

It is estimated by the British NGO Oxfam, that from 1990 to 2007 the sum of 300 billion US Dollars was lost in Africa because of insufficient security and conflict which also amounts to the development aid received during this time. (Oxfam, 2007: 3) Therefore these reasons of conflict have to be taken seriously that these losses do not occur in the future.

6.1.3. The negative Side of Aid

'Do no harm' by Mary B. Anderson outlined that intervention is not always a good thing if conflict, which most likely started because of at least one of the reasons stated above, takes place. In this sense also the DAC Principles of Good Engagement in Fragile States (2007) say that

'International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of

⁵⁰ Due to the UNHCR IDPs must be distinguished from refugees. While refugees crossed international borders, IDPs have fled for similar reasons, but are still in their home country. Therefore IDPs legally remain under the protection of their government, even though one possible reason for IDPs to leave their home is because of them. See UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html>

corruption or human rights, violations must be carefully judged for their impact on domestic reforms, conflict, poverty and insecurity.' (OECD, 2007: 1)

Intervention can thus not only improve conflict situations but can also fuel them, which can lead to an even more violent environment or another outbreak after the conflict has officially ended. This risk is of special importance for integrated missions which include security and development issues as the latter is especially endangered in this environment. This can lead to the impartiality of humanitarian actors being sacrificed. (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009: 34f)

It is important to know that it does matter how aid is delivered and that aid is not universally positive. During or in the aftermath of a conflict it is essential to know that aid can interact with conflict parties in different ways. During a conflict all parties are usually still connected with each other, for example by infrastructure, history and common values. These connections must be taken into account. Giving aid to a certain group or individuals can either inflame the conflict or build bridges between people. It is common with aid that poor people are always favoured however. This can be seen as a good thing but the question still is how it is provided and to whom? (Anderson and Spelten, 2000: 3)

6.2. How the EU carries out Foreign Operations

6.2.1. The Mechanism within the EU

The structures and institutions the EU uses to prepare and carry out their civil-military missions abroad resemble much from the NATO mechanisms.

The first step in preparing a mission is the operational planning. In the advance planning, areas where the EU could intervene are chosen by the European Council. If an appropriate area for a mission is found a proposal is forwarded to the PSC,

which can decide that 'EU action is appropriate'.⁵¹ After this is done the crisis response planning takes over for the advance planning and the PSC works out a detailed Operational Plan (OPLAN). (Mattelaer, 2008: 11) Then the initiation phase begins with the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), which has to be agreed by the PSC. For this concept the EUMS drafts the Initiating Directive and sends it to the EUMC which adds comments if necessary and forwards it to the PSC. The PSC is assisted by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which pools non-military resources and helps with improving coherence, and the EUMC, which is responsible for consultation in military issues. (Ehrhart, 2007: 9) This directive has to be also accepted by the country where the mission should take place. (Barnes, 2002: 7) The CMC is then forwarded to the GAERC and the PSC, where it is validated. Also the validation of one of the Military Strategic Options (MSO), which are worked out by the EUMS, fall under the responsibility of those two committees. The last important decision is that of a JA, which legally establishes the EU mission and makes decisions about costs, executing personnel and where the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) should be situated. (Mattelaer, 2008: 12) However a JA is not sufficient to carry out an international mission as a UN Security Council Resolution is also needed. This venture can be a pro forma decision or very difficult to get. (Kühne, 2009: 11)

Military CFSP missions are financed by the costs lie where they fall principle. This is reasonable as the military component of the European Union is intergovernmental and every country can decide how they participate in operations. This means that participating countries can steer their costs. The costs which cannot be assigned to a specific country, the common costs, are divided due to the ATHENA⁵² mechanism among the countries involved. These are for example costs for headquarters as well as for infrastructure. ATHENA will not cover for personnel costs of civilian CFSP operations though. These have to be paid by the countries themselves.

⁵¹ The PSC is assembled by permanent representatives of the member countries and a representative of the Commission, which allows the member countries to include development specific ideas into the mission.

⁵² For more info on the Athena Mechanism see Council of the European Union: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/financing-of-csdp-military-operations.aspx>

If one looks at the past CFSP operations it can be noticed that the decision to launch a mission was always a political one. Therefore to carry out a mission abroad, several aspects are important. The mission has to be affordable, the political will has to be there and expediency must be evident. It is also very important that the probability of success according to the mandate is high. (Ehrhart, 2007: 21ff)

6.3. Important former Missions of the Union

During the last decade the EU was very active in Africa regarding conflict management and peacebuilding. While the EU is sponsoring the African Peace Facility (APF), supports the African Union (AU) and the UN and therefore seeks to prevent sending European soldiers and development personnel to Africa, sometimes it is inevitable for the Union to send their own forces. This is due to the fact that Africa, even with the AU and the APF, will not have the capabilities to carry out operations on a suitable scale in the near future. (Olsen, 2009: 256)

The three biggest and most important missions of the EU have been carried out within the last decade. Two of them, namely 2003's Operation Artemis and 2006's EUFOR DR Congo both took place in the DR Congo while 2007's EUFOR Tchad/RCA was deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).

All 3 missions had several aspects in common. They were time bound missions without NATO or AU support, were handed over to the UN after the mandate expired and were heavily influenced by major contributions by France.

As most of the recent EU missions took place in Africa the question is legitimate why this was the case.

It can be seen as a fact that not only the good of Africa was in the focus of the EU but also self-interest, especially from countries which were former colonial powers in the area. Furthermore, Operation Artemis can be seen as an attempt to show the European cooperation in the direct aftermath of the conflicting opinions over the Iraq war that the EU is a global player regarding civilian-military missions. The 2006 mission on the other hand can be understood as a reaction to The Netherlands' and

Ireland's 'No' to the Constitutional Treaty. The Union wanted to show that it still is capable of carrying out an important foreign mission despite this defeat. (Olsen, 2009: 257) The EUFOR mission in Chad and the CAR will be described in detail later.

6.3.1. Operation Artemis

This operation was the first military mission by the EU without NATO support. The goal of Artemis was to restore order and stop the killing in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It was launched on 12 June 2003 and concluded on 7 September that year. The operation (Council Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003) had a robust Chapter VII⁵³ mandate and consisted of 1.400 troops, half of them were French. The forces should secure Bunia, the Bunia airport and the refugee camps as well as the housing of IDPs. The mission was able to reach these, admittedly very narrow, goals but could not achieve any sustainable effect which was one of the reasons why only 3 years later another mission to the DRC had to be deployed.

There were some major points of criticism raised regarding Artemis. First of all it was basically a French mission as soldiers from this country were the only ones engaged in military operations. Also the headquarters were located in France. Additionally the mission was too narrow in scale to be called a real success as only a few kilometres outside Bunia massacres continued. It was clear from the beginning that the EU saw Artemis as a testing ground for its following operations without NATO support. It should show the legitimacy of the newly established PSC, EUMC and the CIVCOM in handling this kind of operation. (Bagoyoko and Gibert, 2007: 21) The costs of the operation were a big motive for the short timeframe and scope. It just could not be afforded, especially by France, to stay longer. This was not a positive sign, because Operation Artemis was very small compared to missions of the USA or Russia. (Deheza, 2009: 4)

⁵³ This mandate allows direct engagement for the EUFOR when civilians are at risk. Chapter VII enhanced the deterrence effect of the presence.

The framework nation concept proved to be suitable for such an operation however which lowered the odds that a common European army would be established in the near future. (Faria, 2004: 48)

6.3.2. EUFOR RD Congo

The goal of this mission was to protect civilians and the airport of Kinshasa. 21 EU Member States, as well as Turkey and Switzerland, were part of this mission which involved 2.300 troops. The mission lasted from 12 June 2006 to 30 November 2006 and took place in and around Kinshasa. (Deheza, 2009: 5) It was supported by UN Security Council Resolution 1671.

The reason why another mission had to be deployed in Congo was that during the political process of the past three years important groups within the country were not represented in the government.⁵⁴ The upcoming election in 2006 was feared to be a triggering moment for conflict breaking loose because of this structural failure.

Like in Artemis one of the big problems for the mission was to obtain enough personnel and equipment from the member states. Another problem was that many saw the operation as an attempt of Belgium and France to secure their influence in the DRC. On the 12 December 2005 the Council of the EU told the Congolese people that the EU wants to help them on the way to a democratic system. Three days later the Council also accepted the strategy paper 'The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership', which says that stability and security of Africa is a precondition for sustainable development and that the EU wants to help the United Nations by achieving peace, also with military means. This includes the use of the EU Battlegroups. (Burkhardt, 2008: 15)

EUFOR RD Congo was seen as a success regarding the mandate as during the deployment not much violence could be observed within the areas where EUFOR was stationed. The election passed without bloodshed and the armed forces only had

⁵⁴ For more information about the reasons of conflict within the DRC during that time I would like to refer you to Justenhoven and Ehrhart, 2008.

to intervene once. After EUFOR left violence returned however and the opposition leader Bemba, who lost the election to Kabila, had to go into exile. It therefore must be said that EUFOR RD Congo did not help to provide a sustainable peace within the country but could only prevent violence during its short presence. (Johnson, 2008: 29)

7. The case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA

As already pointed out in the introduction of this paper I will only elaborate on the deployment in Chad during this mission.

Chad is the fifth largest country in Africa, even though it only has less than 10 million citizens. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, currently numbered 163 out of 169 countries in the Human Development Index.⁵⁵ Around 200 ethnic groups with different languages live in Chad. A strong north-south contrast exists with the northern part being mostly Islamic while the south hosts many Animists and Christian people.

Sudan, the CAR and Chad are said to be a conflict-triangle⁵⁶ as the conflicts in these three countries are highly connected to each other. In addition to that, the Darfur region is also of great importance to the Sudanese North-South conflict. This conflict system is highly complex, also due to the vast area of the countries. Some of the biggest conflicts in Africa are also clearly linked with this triangle⁵⁷, which makes it one huge conflict system that is nearly impossible to resolve.

7.1. The History of Chad: 1960 to 2003

The year 1960 marked a big change for the country as from 1920 to 1960 it was part of the 'Afrique équatoriale française', the French colonial empire. In 1960 independence from France was achieved, which still left a sizeable military presence in the country. (Kühne, 2009: 15) Up to this date the history of Chad's independence is paved with rebellions, abuse of power, corruption and instability.

⁵⁵ See http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Table1_reprint.pdf

⁵⁶ See Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti, 2009

⁵⁷ Examples are the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the internal conflicts in Somalia, Northern Uganda and North Eastern Congo.

In 1960 Francois Tombalbaye, a man from the south of the country, became Chad's first president. The independence and the new president got the citizens of Chad hoping that a change for the good of the people was going to happen. This hope was crushed in 1966 at the latest when civil war broke loose in the Muslim dominated north due to ethnic clashes which were linked to the autocratic rule of Tombalbaye. In 1975 the president was killed in a successful coup, which was led by a rebel group called Front de libération nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT). Goukouni Oueddei, who was supported by Libya, was appointed as president but only achieved a short rule as his former companion in arms, Hissène Habré, who split from FROLINAT to set up his own Forces armées du nord (FAN), overthrew him in 1982 by invading the capital N'Djamena. Habré's rule was always fragile since Libya, under Gaddafi, who controlled parts of northern Chad, stood against him, while he enjoyed support from Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France and the United States which were opposed to the idea of Libyan expansion.

Libya remained an important factor in Chadian domestic policy as it supported Idriss Déby, former security advisor of Habré's government, when he was no longer in favour of the President. Déby retreated to Darfur from which he established a rebel army capable of overthrowing Habré. The coup, which took place in 1990, was successful and Habré was forced to exile. Idriss Déby, who is also the current president, won the next two elections in 1996 and 2001 but did not change the political structure in the conflict torn country. Still, the 1990s can be called a time of relative stability for Chad since no big conflicts occurred. In 2003 huge amounts of oil were found in Chad's territory which opened up a new source of income for the Déby regime. (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti, 2009: 4)

7.2. The History of Chad: 2003 to 2008

2003 was the year when the area of Darfur in Sudan got big media attention because of the massive flows of refugees and IDPs which affected the stability of both Sudan and Chad. During the same time a proxy conflict was going on between these two countries as both sides supported rebel groups, which were trying to overthrow the governments in N'Djamena and Khartoum respectively. Sudanese backed militia and

rebels were operating from Darfur to overthrow Déby while the Chadian aided rebels had their safe haven in eastern Chad. This time was marked by ever changing coalitions between rebel groups and militias but also between Chad and Sudan, which were officially allies in one moment and enemies in the next. Especially Déby often assured the Sudanese government that he would fight the biggest rebel group which was trying to overthrow the current president Omar al-Bashir, even though the military backbone of this group consisted mostly of the Zaghawa, the tribe Déby belongs to. In 2005 Déby decided to support the Chadian rebels in their fight as he needed their assistance to secure his third term, for which he changed the constitution in 2004. The support of the rebels was important as the general public opposed this constitution change. Therefore he needed every domestic support he could get to secure a further term as president and sacrificed the cooperation with Sudan for that matter. Around this time the first earnings from the oil production came in which opened new possibilities of patronage for the government. (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti, 2009: 6) This strategy deepened the conflict with Sudan, which also started to openly support rebel groups again, shortly interrupted by a peace treaty in 2007. It was suspected that Déby signed the treaty to buy himself time before the EUFOR mission was deployed.⁵⁸ (Seibert, 2010: 10ff) The Sudan backed rebel groups carried out two big offensives in 2006 and 2008 with substantial support from Sudan's al-Bashir, who again allowed anti-Déby rebels to operate from Darfur. Both coup attempts did not achieve to overthrow Déby but the proxy war between Sudan and Chad was in full effect again. (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti, 2009: 6f) The 2006 coup attempt took place shortly before the Presidential election. After the attack was repulsed⁵⁹ and Déby got re-elected the EU tried to bring the government and the rebels on a table where they should sign a truce. This undertaking was not successful however, as the government proclaimed a state of emergency which led to harsh oppression against the opposition and the media. (Brüne, 2008: 210)

⁵⁸ Déby hoped that the French would support him, like they did in the past, even though the mission was planned as being impartial. As the other contributing states had to rely much on the French these hopes were not seen that absurd. (Seibert, 2010: 10)

⁵⁹ It showed the weakness of the government troops though as it took severe efforts for Déby to stay in power. (Marchal, 2009: 21)

During the year 2006 a general intensification of conflict could be observed in eastern Chad, especially in the border areas between Chad and Sudan. This escalation led to an increase in numbers of IDPs and refugees which subsequently worsened the situation in both countries. Around that time 230.000 Sudanese refugees were reported in this area. (Seibert, 2007: 8)

7.3. Oil in Chad: The Resource Curse

In early 2000, shortly after the first oil discoveries, the World Bank agreed to support a project in Chad to be able to partly regulate the use of the revenues by implementing a model project. A private consortium invested in the Chadian oil pipeline project which financed a pipeline from Chad to Cameroon for the oil to be exported. (Frank and Guesnet, 2010: 8)

It was the largest single private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa ever. The oil pipeline from Southern Chad to Cameroon's Atlantic coast was seen as a test field for the World Bank. It gave credits and overlooked the project to prevent 'resource curse' effects for Chad as they were seen in the past in resource-rich African countries.

The first oil started to flow in 2003 but major problems occurred before and after this date. The support of the World Bank was granted under the condition that institutional capacity-building must take place to ensure that large parts of the future income from the oil were being used for fighting poverty in Chad. In the end the project ended abruptly in 2008 after it was obvious that the Chadian government did not fulfil their part of the agreement. (Pegg, 2009: 311)

Incidents in 2004 made it obvious that Déby needed the funds from the sale of oil for other areas than poverty alleviation. Despite the fact that oil revenues arrived in the London based account at the end of 2003, the Chadian government was not able to repatriate it to the country until July 2004. The beginning of 2004 was a critical time as money was scarce and the military personnel did not receive their salary for several months, which led to an unsuccessful coup attempt by parts of the military.

2005 can be marked as the year where the contract on how to use the oil funds was violated by Chad. Law001/PR/99 also known as the Revenue Management Law001, which should grant the poor a lion's share of the income, was altered by the Chadian parliament. This alteration changed three important factors of the agreement.

Before the change it was negotiated by the Chadian government and the World Bank that there were five priority sectors where most of the money has to go. These were health and social services, rural development, education, infrastructure and environmental and water resources. The Déby government added justice, security and territorial administration to the prioritised areas. The second alteration changed another integral part of the contract which said that non-priority sectors should only get 13.5 per cent of the oil income. This number was raised to 30 per cent. The third change was that the Future Generations Fund, a savings fund which should get 10 per cent of all revenues, was eliminated. (Pegg, 2009: 312ff)

The reaction of the World Bank was freezing all new and existing loans and the account where all the oil revenues went. Déby replied with the announcement that he would expel the estimated 200.000 Sudanese refugees back to Sudan and that he would cut off all oil exports. This announcement was a good strategy on Déby's part as he knew that the Western countries would not want a worsening situation regarding Darfur and also did not like the idea of a regime change in Chad as this would lead to instability. An agreement was subsequently signed between the World Bank and Chad in which both parties made concessions. The outcome was that Chad had to devote 70 per cent of the oil revenues to poverty reduction and to improve transparency and accountability in the use of the money of the 2006 budget. The country should also set money aside for a special fund and forward 5 per cent of the revenues directly to the oil producing areas. On the other hand the World Bank lifted the freeze and Chad had access to the funds again. (Pegg, 2009: 314)

Some say that the World Bank made too many concessions for just a revised one year budget and a few blurry promises. In 2006 Déby strengthened his bargaining power again by telling China that it is welcome to invest in the oil sector. This strategy aimed at putting pressure on the private western consortium to agree to lower their share from 60 per cent to 40 per cent which would make the Chadian state the most influential shareholder.

In 2007 the Chadian government continued the belligerent approach by making it difficult for NGOs to move near the oil producing areas as travel permits were needed from now on, which were nearly impossible to get. The same year the promise of giving 5 per cent of the oil revenues to the producing areas was abolished. (Pegg, 2009: 315)

All these actions finally led to the withdrawal of the World Bank in 2008.⁶⁰

It can be concluded that the 'resource curse' has repeated itself in Chad as the oil did not better the situation for the Chadian people but even worsened it as the Human Development Index rankings show from 2003 to 2010.⁶¹ On the other hand the rule of President Déby was consolidated by the oil funds as a patronage system ensures the loyalty of his inner circle and that of many tribes and rebel groups until now. He also heavily invested in military equipment and can pay a regular salary to the armed forces now. The rich oil fields also caused the rebels opposing Déby to fight even harder against the central government as overthrowing the Déby is even more lucrative now. (Frank and Guesnet, 2010: 64)

7.4. The Reasons for Conflict in Chad

The current and on-going conflict in Chad is often said to be a spill over from the Darfur region but it can be also seen the other way around. The Chad-Sudan-CAR triangle points out that this conflict is not that simple but on the contrary very complex and thus does not respond to simple resolution patterns. I will not further elaborate on reasons linked with the conflict triangle as this would exceed the scope of my paper.

I will only write about internal reasons and actors which are all at least partly the reason for the conflict.

⁶⁰ For the lessons learned by the World Bank I would like to refer to Pegg, 2009: 316-320

⁶¹ See <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TCD.html>

7.4.1. Idriss Déby and his Government

In 1996 Déby was re-elected without much media attention outside the country. This was due to the fact that there was no electoral fraud in large scope to be seen. The election in 2001 on the other hand was openly doubted and is seen as illegitimate as most opposition parties did not participate. (Kühne, 2009: 14)

During the 1990s Déby started to initiate a democratisation process which unfortunately did not lead the country to democracy. He introduced a multi-party system and did not oppose pluralist media but he also legalised state violence by bringing special laws on the way.

After the second election in 2001 he still reacted to the criticism and said that he would not run for a third term but he broke that promise by changing the constitution in 2004 and got re-elected in 2006. Many experts see this triggering event as one of the most important factors for the violence during the last couple of years. (Handy, 2008: 4) From that time on Déby probably could only stay in power as the rebel groups did not form a united force but also fought among each other which made it easier for Déby to control them. (Mattelaer, 2008: 7)

Déby belongs to the tribe of the Zaghawa which are overly represented in the political power structure and hold many important positions. These loyal people secure his power but hold conflict potential within them. (Seibert, 2010: 7)

During his rule different political positions were and are mostly expressed through violence, a fact which put Chad into constant civil war. This never ending violence gave birth to a war economy which makes conflict profitable for a few. These actors do not have interest in a peace process and constantly try to enlarge and defend their area of power. (Handy, 2008: 3)

7.4.2. Ethnic Causes

The history of Chad has always been marked by clashes between its many tribes and ethnic groups, especially in areas where the governmental control is low, if present at all. These constant struggles for power, land, water, and resources fuel all the other conflicts in the Chad-Sudan-CAR region. All three countries share borders, drawn by the former colonial powers which did not pay attention to ethnic demography.

Especially Chad has been in Civil war most of the time since its independence. This also reflects the fact that no President of Chad got into that position without overthrowing the old regime. This fact is also due to the circuitousness of the country which is a good prerequisite for rebel groups to establish safe havens. (Mattelaer, 2008: 6)

7.4.3. Rebels and Militia

Even though most rebel groups do not have interest to be feared among the Chadian citizens they are often forced to include the civil population into their conflict. They have to ask them for food, water and equipment and if they do not cooperate they loot them for these goods. Most of the anti-government rebels have their headquarters in the eastern area of Chad. (Mattelaer, 2008: 8)

One of the main reasons why there are many rebel groups is, that due to the absent of democratic institutions, rebellion and violence is seen as the only way to express political will, which is catastrophic for a country and its population. (Handy, 2008: 4)

7.5. The Way towards a Chad Mission

The idea of a joint mission in Chad was seen as an act of necessity and it was certainly not the first choice to stabilise the Chad/Darfur area.

In May 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy got elected as President of France and Bernard Kouchner was appointed as Foreign Minister. Both of them wanted to do something to stabilise the Darfur area despite the fact that the UN and the AU were already in this area.

The AU started a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, named African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)⁶², but this mission was seen as ineffective and unsuccessful as it was not able to address the problems in this area. Even after the UN stepped in to establish a hybrid operation with the AU (African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur or UNAMID) the situation did not change for the better. This upgraded operation involved more soldiers and better equipment but failed to make a difference. In 2007, at the same time the EU started working on a Chad mission, the UN wanted to send troops to eastern Chad. This plan was not successful as President Déby did not want a far reaching and political UN mission in his country. The idea of a French-led EU mission was much more to his liking as he hoped that he could influence this operation.

During EUFOR Tchad/RCA a small UN mission was still allowed in the country as it was not political and very small in scale. This mission was named United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and trained Chadian police officers which were to be employed within the refugee camps. (Mattelaer, 2008: 8f)

Prior to the concrete planning of EUFOR Tchad/RCA Kouchner first proposed to establish humanitarian corridors, which should provide development aid to the people of Darfur. NGOs and experts who were invited by Kouchner strongly objected to this idea, as did the UN. This defeat of Kouchner only encouraged him more and he

⁶² The operation was launched in January 2008 on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1769. (Deheza, 2009: 6)

proposed that the EU should carry out a mission in Chad and the CAR which should be taken over by the UN at a later time. (Marchal, 2009: 23) He sent out a cable to all EU foreign ministries which can be seen as the starting point of the preparations to EUFOR Tchad/RCA. (Mattelaer, 2008: 10)

The question why France was so eager to carry out an operation in Chad has several answers. Originally a new mission with a capable mandate should take place in Darfur but the government in Khartoum did not want European troops within its territory. The UN also opposed this proposal as UNAMID was already working there. This led to the idea of a mission in the eastern part of Chad and the CAR which should show the strength and leadership of the new French government by leading a new European mission. (Marchal, 2009: 24)

The French, as a former colonial power, had been greatly involved in Chad's internal politics, also after the independence of the country. It was always a reliable ally of the Chadian government, a fact which could affect the mission positively as well as negatively. Especially the military involvement of France since the 1970s is important to point out. Since 1986 France has also permanent military staff and equipment in Chad under the name Operation Epervier. The original purpose of this deployment was to prevent a Libyan invasion but it also stayed beyond this threat and up to this day. It helped the government also in cases where Libya was not involved at all. (Charbonneau, 2007: 556)

But not only France saw the potential of a positive image campaign through a mission in Chad. Also the whole EU hoped that positive public visibility of the EU and its institution could be achieved. The crisis management institutions also wanted to prove their legitimacy once again. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 8)

Still, the bad diplomatic situation between France and Sudan, due to French funding of the Chadian military, made an operation in the area not easy. From 2006 on France did not get tired of pointing out the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur but did not mention its own responsibility by providing military equipment to Chad. These weapons did not all stay within the Chadian military apparatus but also spread across the region and fuelled this permanent conflict. (Charbonneau, 2007: 556)

The first plan for a mission in Chad was very different from the approach which would be carried out later on. Prior to the operation substantial concessions to President Déby had to be made which led to a much weaker mandate for the mission than originally planned. The desired mandate by the UN would have included a massive United Nations police presence as well as a UN military force which number should have been around 11.000 soldiers and police forces. This force would have had fewer problems in operating in this large area. This proposal was neglected however by the Chadian government as it did not want a UN military force in its country. Instead the negotiators on the Chadian side countered with a different proposal which led to a deadlock within the negotiations with the UN. Former French Foreign Minister Kouchner travelled to N'Djamena to discuss the situation with Déby and brought EUFOR Chad/RCA on its way, as the government agreed to have a French-led European mission in Chad. (Kühne, 2009: 19)

If only the EU had the saying in this new situation the whole operation would have been very different to the actual EUFOR mission. The EU wanted to send troops along the border between Chad and Sudan but both countries involved opposed this plan. Chad also turned down a proposal which would have sent EU military personnel in the eastern region in Chad with the mission to stabilise it. After long negotiations the EU and Chad agreed on a watered down mandate which should only protect UN personnel, IDPs and refugees and enable the exercise of development aid in Chad and the CAR. In contrast to the proposals of the EU this agreement did not engage in internal politics of both countries of operation as such an intervention was not desired by Déby and his government. (Charbonneau, 2007: 557)

7.6. EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Planning and Timeline

After the cable by Kouchner it took two months until a Council Commission Options Paper was produced on 13 July 2007, followed by a CMC on 27 July. This CMC was granted by the PSC on 10 September 2007 while on the same day Mount Valérien was picked as OHQ. The following days the Council granted the CMC as well as the MSO. One of the most important papers of the Mission was Resolution 1778 which was approved by the UN Security Council and gave the following EU mission a legal

fundament for one year. The mission also got a Chapter VII mandate to be able to fulfil its mission properly. The JA by the Council was agreed on in October, while on 14 January 2008 the OPLAN was finished. (Mattelaer, 2008: 14)

From 9 November 2007 on five Force Generation Conferences had to be held to gather enough commitment promises for personnel and equipment from the EU member countries to carry out this operation. It was embarrassing for the Union that it took that many meetings to gather a relatively small force. Four different MSOs were worked out from which MSO 3, which drew most of the attention to the military, got picked.⁶³

EUFOR Tchad/RCA was prepared as a Military Bridging Operation which should be taken over by the UN after a year but was sold to European governments and their citizens as a humanitarian operation. By the time EUFOR Tchad/RCA was deployed there was still no decision on a following mission by the UN, which indicates that the EU hoped for an UN mission but could not be sure if such a successor mission was really to follow.

Soon in the planning process it was seen as important that the EU force has to be impartial and would not intervene in any fighting, which is not threatening civilians. From the beginning it was thus clear that there could be fighting between rebels and government troops. However, even if EUFOR soldiers were stationed in these fighting areas they would not intervene, except if they had to defend civilians or themselves. Nevertheless the mission should lead to a Secure and Safe Environment (SASE) for the people in Chad.

From the outset the mission was planned to have an end-date instead of an end-state. A definite outcome was not the goal instead it was decided to achieve a SASE condition for 12 months which could be handed over to the UN. According to the UN a self-sustaining SASE needs at least 10 years to be established but the EU's hope was that the UN would finish this job to achieve this desired state of a lasting SASE. (Mattelaer, 2008: 18ff)

⁶³ See Mattelaer, 2008: 16, for all 4 MSOs, which were worked out.

7.7. Tasks and Goals of the Mission

The mission should be performed by the European Union and would be in place for 12 months. (Kühne, 2009: 19) It was agreed that there would be no intervention in the bordering area to Sudan and that the EUFOR soldiers were not allowed to go into the refugee camps. Also the Chadian police would still be under the authority of the government. (Kühne, 2009: 20)

The resolution of the UN gave the mission the following tasks

'(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;

(ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;

(iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;' (United Nations Security Council, 2007)

Apart from these official tasks the Union tried to achieve the goal of being seen as credible and impartial. To be seen as credible was no problem as EUFOR, despite its small force, had the most advanced technology and superior firepower compared to the Chadian government forces and the rebels. Maintaining this credibility was very important and linked to the notion of impartiality.

The EUFOR should be impartial but not neutral as civilians who got attacked had to be defended against any actor who carries out such attacks. A neutral EUFOR would not have been able to react at all in such a case. (Mattelaer, 2008: 17f) This credible and impartial force had the main goal to protect refugees, IDPs and also UN personnel through military-humanitarian means and to enable the possibility of providing development aid in a SASE. The Union wanted to keep the military means in the background as these should only be present for deterrence and not searching for open conflict. The deterrence aspect was planned to lead to a changed cost-benefit calculation of the opposing parties, which would make it 'more expensive' to

target civilians. The attacking actor had to know that it will receive punishment as the UN gave the mission a Chapter VII mandate. (Mattelaer, 2008: 26)

7.8. Contributions to the Mission

To get governments to contribute in EUFOR Tchad/RCA was difficult to achieve as five Force Generation Conferences were needed until the mission had enough resources to be launched. These tough negotiations were also the main reason why EUFOR only launched ten months after the first talks, which were held in May 2007. From the beginning it was clear that France, as the initiator, had to provide a big part of personnel and equipment to the mission but it seems that the participating countries thought that France would provide even more than they did in the end. The other two militarily important European countries, Germany and the United Kingdom, would provide no troops as they were still engaged in Afghanistan. For France it was important however that also many other European countries contribute as it wanted to prevent the accusation of the mission being neo-colonialism in the first place. At the last force generation meeting 14 EU member states provided troops and 22 sent personnel to the OHQ in Valérien. The biggest contributions came from France, Ireland and Poland, with France providing the capabilities for air support and reconnaissance. A helicopter pool was also created with equipment from the biggest contributors. As these three countries could not provide enough suitable helicopters for the mission Russia helped out and provided the desperately needed missing ones. (Mattelaer, 2008: 24)

In the end 26 countries, 23 of them members of the European Union contributed 3.500 soldiers. More than half of them were from France⁶⁴ with 13 countries contributing less than 10 soldiers and only 4 more than 100 people. (Seibert, 2010: 44) It must also be pointed out that only one quarter of the stationed soldiers stayed the whole year, most of them from France, which again strengthened its position. (Marchal, 2009: 26)

⁶⁴ It must be pointed out that most of the troops, which were contributed by France came from that pool of soldiers who were already in the country and part of Epervier.

The operation was often seen as a French one with some alibi contributions from other states. The European countries had the chance to contribute more to the mission but decided not to. In this respect France was not really to blame for the disproportional French contribution to EUFOR Tchad/RCA, especially since the United Kingdom and Germany did not provide anything to the mission besides some staff for the OHQ. Especially the fear that France would not act impartial but support the Déby regime, which was not compatible with the European standards on good governance and human rights, led to the weak contributions of the other European states. (Marchal, 2009: 25) France not only had the burden to contribute so much personnel and equipment but also had to pay expenses of some other countries, like Poland, Albania, the Ukraine and Russia.⁶⁵ (Marchal, 2009: 27)

As the European Union has no autonomous military capabilities it relies on its member states to provide troops and equipment. Compared to other current and past missions of different actors EUFOR Tchad/RCA is of relatively small scale. Still the Union had major difficulties to gather enough resources to launch the mission. Most member states were reluctant to participate in EUFOR Tchad/RC which threatened to undermine the credibility of the mission even before it started. Not all of the shortfalls in contributions could be assigned in lacking political will of the member countries however, as most countries simply did not have the capabilities in some areas like strategic airlift and medical personnel and equipment. (Seibert, 2010: 45)

It was unfortunate that the newly established EU Battlegroups (EUBGs) were not put to use in this operation, especially since they were originally created to carry out such bridging missions in Africa. One important reason could be that operations of the EUBGs fall under the common costs, so all EU member countries, also Germany and the UK, would had to pay for it. This situation is one of the most important reasons why EUBGs were never used until now and the Union should reconsider this arrangement. (Seibert, 2010: 46f)

⁶⁵ France had to pay for some Polish equipment, transportation for Albanian staff and fuel for the Ukraine. Furthermore the French forces had to build suitable accommodation for the Russians.

7.9. Logistical Challenges

Getting contributions from other EU member states was hard enough but logistical challenges to deploy these troops and equipment were yet to be faced. The vast operational area, which is 2.000 km away from the nearest seaport, made the delivery long and costly for the EUFOR. For special goods airlift was used but it was too expensive to transport goods and personnel in a large scale via this means of transportation. The delivery of equipment via sea and road did take up to 45 days but as it was impossible to rely on local resources nearly everything had to be delivered from Europe that way. (Mattelaer, 2008: 21) Even the most basic goods, like drinking water, posed to be a logistic problem. In the beginning much of the water supply came by plane. Later on also rain water and wells of the native people were used which has not been received well among the Chadians and led to resentments against the mission and the people involved in EUFOR Tchad/RCA. (Kühne, 2009: 26)

7.10. The Deployment

EUFOR Tchad/RCA is the biggest mission of the European Union up to date with 3.500 soldiers and staff deployed on the ground. From the beginning the mission was on the edge of failing since the policy makers of the two countries Chad and the CAR were reluctant to let armed forces in.

A major setback already happened for the mission shortly before deployment should begin. From 1 to 4 February 2008 rebel groups tried to overthrow the government in N'Djamena. They did not succeed in the end but this incident further delayed the EUFOR mission. On 12 February 2008 the first deployment started with initial operating capability reached on 15 March but it took until 17 September to reach full capability. (Mattelaer, 2008: 14)

It was suspected that the attack and the timing of the rebels were pointed at the incoming EUFOR mission as most of the rebels did not see the mission as impartial but that it would benefit, President Déby and his inner circle.⁶⁶

The rebels nearly overthrew the Déby regime as the fighting even reached the presidential palace with the rebels controlling large areas of the capital. This area could never been conquered though, partly because of the help of the French Air Force which intervened informally. (Kühne, 2009: 19) The offensive only took a few days and started from the Sudanese border which was 800 km away from N'Djamena. The rebel army consisted of about 2.000 people which pointed out how weak the Chadian forces were. 700 people fell victim to this rebel offensive, 300 of them were civilians. (Brüne, 2008: 208f)

This attack proved to be a difficult situation for Sarkozy as Déby requested, just like in past times, assistance by France, which put Sarkozy in a dilemma. The EU put pressure on France that the mission has to be impartial and that France should not intervene on behalf of Déby as the tarnished image could not be repaired. In the end France provided Déby only with indirect support.⁶⁷ (Mattelaer, 2008: 10)

Due to this incident Initial Operating Capability was not reached until 15 March 2008 which meant that the mandate would be terminated on 15 March 2009 where the UN with MINURCAT should take over. (Kühne, 2009: 21) Even though the initial operation started in March 2008 it took nearly half a year until the full capacity of about 3.500 soldiers was reached in September 2008. EUFOR's headquarters in Chad were located in Abéché with three small bases for Special Forces in Goz Beida in the south of the country, Forchana in the centre and Iriba in the north. A fourth smaller camp was located in Birao and was used by a French contingent.

Not only the logistics and the environment of Chad posed to be problematic, also the limitations of the missions' mandate led to problems. It was not only difficult for the locals to understand what the EUFOR staff could and should do but also for the

⁶⁶ Due to the tight ties between France and Chad the biggest rebel group UFFD among others saw the EUFOR mission as an act of war. (Brüne, 2008: 211)

⁶⁷ The Chadian government got intelligence and logistical support but no French soldier fought on the side of the Chadian government.

involved Europeans as well. Therefore an information campaign was started shortly after the Preliminary Operation Capability. This situation of unawareness of what could be done led to a strong gesture which happened during the visit of former HR Javier Solana. Many people engaged in development cooperation in Chad, set a symbolic gesture by wearing black armbands to demand that EUFOR should do more for the refugees and IDPs in Chad.

The public in Chad and Europe questioned the impartiality of the mission, especially since the Déby government achieved a considerable weakening of the mandate under which EUFOR operated. The rebel groups in Chad communicated that they did not believe in the impartiality of the European force and threatened that they would also attack EUFOR troops. In the end however, no fighting between the EUFOR and the rebel groups occurred. This was criticised by President Déby who said that the EUFOR would support and strengthen the rebels by letting them operate. This criticism somehow aided the EUFOR from the accusations of going in to help Déby staying in power. (Kühne, 2009: 25ff)

During the mission violence in the areas where EUFOR operated decreased, even though crime, cross border rebel activities and ethnic conflict could not be sustainably tackled. The narrow mandate played a major role in this case as it did not give the forces the instruments needed. A more suitable mandate could have at least supported and financed internal structures and institutions to fight these problems. The narrow mandate also limited the impact of the humanitarian aid provided, therefore sustainability could not be guaranteed. It could be also noticed that during the last years and also during the deployment of EUFOR the country became a dangerous place for development workers. One reason is that they were not seen as impartial anymore, partly because they were more and more accompanied by armed forces. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 10) Not all NGOs and development workers cooperated with the armed forces but in reality most of the time no distinction was being made by the civilian population and the rebel forces. During the whole year the government of Chad could and did not want to help the NGOs and development workers. EUFOR also did not have enough resources to guard all bases and people who were involved in development cooperation. Many of them would not even want this kind of protection for reasons stated above. On the other hand some NGOs could

go to dangerous areas with the help of armed forces where they were not able to work before. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 11)

7.11. Handing over to the UN

The planned handing over from EUFOR to MINURCAT in March 2009 did not pass without a few problems on the way.

The structures and procedures of the EU and the UN are different, which led to many people on both sides just working to make the mechanisms of the major institutions compatible to each other. The two most obvious difficulties regarded the infrastructure issue and the scarcity in MINURCAT personnel.

Much of the important infrastructure, which was built or rebuilt by the EU, such as airports, was handed over to the Chadian government after the mandate ended without an agreement that the following UN mission could use this infrastructure for free or at cheap conditions. The result was that the UN had to rent it which was quite costly and not to the advantage of the EU and the UN.

A much more threatening issue was that the EU had to 'rehat' personnel to work under the UN. This showed the scarcity in suitable staff of the UN. If the EU would not have helped out the chances would have been high that MINURCAT could not take over the mission. This would have been even more relevant as MINURCAT originally had no end date but wanted to stay as long as it was necessary.

When carrying out bridging missions which will be taken over by other actors it is important to prepare them in a way that the process of handing over runs smoothly. The crisis management tools of the EU are still very young compared to the UN and the NATO, so over time enough experience and knowledge will be gained. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 15f)

Nearly a year after the UN took over the government of Chad wrote a verbal note to the UN Secretary General demanding not to renew the mandate of the mission. The reasons given by the Chadian government were the weak success, the slow

deployment of troops and the changing context of the conflict. The latter was argued with improving relations with Sudan as well as the current military superiority of the Chadian government over the rebels. (Losson, 2010: 1)

7.12. Security-Development Nexus during EUFOR Tchad/RCA

From the beginning a strong scepticism existed between most humanitarian actors and the EUFOR. In the end it had to be admitted however that the civil-military cooperation was the most comprehensive one up to date and therefore set a new standard. If this standard was sufficient is another question. (Helly, 2010: 9)

The second goal of the mandate was to

'[...] facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations.' (Kollias and Reck, 2009: 155)

The overall situation of the safety of humanitarian aid personnel got worse during the last decades. While 60 years ago the symbols of organisations like the United Nations and the Red Cross had a very strong protective effect it constantly decreased over the years. Most NGOs share the same fate, as employees of them often become targets of deliberate attacks which range from robberies and kidnapping to murder. (Kollias and Reck, 2009: 156) This development not only impacts the organisations and their employees but also the people who are dependent on the services of these organisations. More and more NGOs withdraw from dangerous areas nowadays where subsequently important services like water and food provision or medical care cannot be delivered.

Eastern Chad was the main operational field of the EUFOR mission where most of the IDPs and refugees were located. This area was also the focus of the development community. Many violent incidents towards development and humanitarian workers took place within the last years and even during the mission. (Kollias and Reck, 2009: 157ff) In 2008 alone more than 160 acts of violence against humanitarian workers were documented with even four murders included. With the

undocumented number surely being much higher it shows that the respect for logos on shirts and cars is fading as many actors do not see NGOs as impartial anymore. (Kollies and Reck, 2009: 160) In the UN Resolution 1778 the threats towards development personnel were pointed out. They were seen in crime and banditry due to a lack of rule of law, in cross border movements of armed forces and in ethnic clashes.

It had a big influence for the development community that EUFOR was a military and not a police force because ordinary crimes could not be handled by the European forces with responsibility lying with the local police. The result was that most of these crimes were never solved as the capabilities and the will of the Chadian police was lacking in that area. (Kollies and Reck, 2009: 160f) EUFOR still tried to help through increased patrolling in areas where many development workers lived and worked to prevent violence against these people.

As both, the EUFOR and the development organisations in the field focused on helping IDPs and refugees, the most visible points of contact were in this area.

In the beginning EUFOR saw the number of returning people as an important indicator if this mission was a success or a failure.

NGOs strongly objected to this goal because it tended to push people back to their home against their explicit will as the EU needed numbers to present. The determination of numbers itself was seen as the next big problem. Even if people said that they would return to their homes it was nearly impossible to track them and check their statements. There were also a lot of people who did not want to return home as the IDP and refugee sites provided a better standard of living for them. Some people would also go back temporarily during harvesting season and then return to the IDP site.

Another question was if it was always positive if all IDPs or refugees would return home. They would often find a fragile situation with non-existent rule of law and missing governance which could make the return a dangerous venture.

All these factors pointed to the fact that the number of IDPs and refugees returning was not a good indicator of success at all. Not only NGOs and humanitarian institutions but later on also the EUFOR Force Headquarters themselves, through

persuasive discussions with the development community, learned to see it this way which led to a coalition of these actors against the EU decision makers which wanted numbers to present.

There were also other areas where EUFOR and NGOs worked together. One of the most important areas was the movement of humanitarian convoys. Upon request the armed forces would open a corridor and stay in the surroundings of the humanitarian workers. On the other hand some NGOs used this mechanism to announce their movements and destinations so that the military would not be around to secure their impartiality and independence.⁶⁸ NGOs were also able to join military convoys as schedules were given out to them. They could also request private escorts at any time and an emergency line was set up where humanitarian employees and organisations could reach EUFOR 24 hours a day. (Kollias and Reck, 2009: 162ff)

These services showed that the military sector has possibilities regarding logistics and transportation which far outreach these of NGOs and other humanitarian actors. These capabilities also benefitted the development community as the EUFOR helped with transportation and escorts. (Cottey and Bikin-Kita, 2006: 22)

To ease and improve the communication between the military and the civilian side in Chad a Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Officer was deployed as well as a Policy Advisor on Civil-Military relationships. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) meetings were headed by the EUFOR Force Commander once a month where experiences and ideas could be exchanged. Most of the time, these meetings took place with humanitarian representatives who contributed to the issues raised. CIMIC security bulletins could also be accessed by humanitarian organisations and they were able to work out security plans together with EUFOR.

The mission demonstrated that information exchange between the military and the civilian side can be very useful, especially for the security policy, as most humanitarian actors had been in Chad for a long time and therefore could provide EUFOR with important information. The CIMIC mechanism proved to be useful for this kind of cooperation in Chad and should be expanded.

⁹ For case examples see Kollias and Reck, 2009: 165f

As also EUFOR themselves carried out some projects which had points of contact with development policy it was important that EUFOR and the development community decided that the project of one should be coordinated with the other policy to enhance coherence.⁶⁹ (Kollies and Reck, 2009: 166ff)

7.13. Was the mission a success?

If one looks only at the mandate the mission could be seen as a success as IDPs and refugees were safe within their camps because EUFOR patrolled heavily around these areas. Also the ability to provide development aid improved in these zones. However this success has to be seen in relation to the very narrow and non-political mandate and the duration of the mission. These factors make a positive long term impact very unlikely. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 17)

No rebel offensive occurred during EUFOR's deployment but in May 2009, shortly after the EU left and the UN adopted it, a coalition of Chadian rebels attacked the government again. They were repulsed by the government troops but this attack showed that the rebels did not fear the UN mission. This is due to the fact, that the UN's capabilities and equipment are inferior to EUFOR's and that the French EUFOR troops left Chad with the expiration of the EUFOR mission. The attack took the country back to open conflict. A sustainable SASE was thus not reached with some reports even saying that the situation worsened. Especially NGOs published such reports as violence against them also increased after March 2009. (Lanz, 2009: 52)

The root causes of the conflict could not be solved which led to the situation that the operation was not able to have a positive impact beyond the deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 11)

⁶⁹ Most of these projects involved (re)building and infrastructure.

7.14. Lessons to be Learned

During the EUFOR presence rebel attacks against the government declined, which made pacts with rebel groups relatively useless. (Kühne, 2009: 33) Even if the mandate was not political the EUFOR forces still influenced the situation as it made the room of manoeuvre smaller for the conflict parties. EUFOR was a witness which made it more difficult for the opposing parties to act outside the view of the world. As a result, fewer illegal border crossings of the Chadian army and Chadian rebels from Darfur happened which contributed to a safer environment in the eastern area of the country. (Mattelaer, 2008: 28)

The EU has to admit that for the civilian population in Chad no substantial improvement of the general living conditions can be measured. The Chadians are still very much threatened by displacement, robbery and death. But not only the native people are still at risk, also humanitarian personnel is not safe, as kidnapping and robberies occurred to them during and after the EUFOR mission. Over the past few years this constant danger also led to a decrease in numbers of development workers as well as to retreats from dangerous areas. Especially in eastern Chad a SASE was not reached as the security and humanitarian situation was and is catastrophic and did not improve at all after the EU and UN missions. This constant conflict could once again jeopardise the fragile peace between Sudan and Chad. (Losson, 2010: 3)

One of the most important reasons for this lack of success is due to the short duration and the narrow mandate of the mission which was heavily influenced by the ideas of the Chadian president. It had to be clear from the beginning that a one year mission with a non-political mandate would not be enough to solve any root causes of conflict in the area. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 9)

Especially from a development point of view the end-date method of the mission has to be criticised. If an actor wants to achieve certain goals within a mission an end-state approach is surely the better solution, even if it most likely involves more resources and a broader time horizon. It has to be pointed out that even within the European Union, prior to the mission, the end-date concept was criticised in the

lessons-learned process which took place after EUFOR RD Congo in 2006. This approach was nevertheless chosen, because a mission with ambitious goals tends to take decades until sufficient results reveal themselves and the mission can be called a success. (Mattelaer, 2008: 30) This end-date approach is also not a good strategy towards the conflict parties as it signals them that they just need to postpone violent acts to the time after the EU force leaves. For the EUFOR mission it was therefore important that the following UN mission had military and political credibility as well. (Mattelaer, 2008: 31)

Besides the mandate, the capabilities of the contributing countries did not meet the requirements of the vast country. The number and suitability of staff and equipment, which was agreed on earlier, could never be deployed in the end and even if this would have happened it still would have been too little for such a huge country. (Kühne, 2009: 33)

What slowed down the EU ambitions in Chad was the chain of command within the EU, which is too complex and long especially as the civilian and military sides have separated structures. These make it more difficult to work together in a productive way. (Hynek, 2011: 82)

It has also to be pointed out that the EU is still much more ambitious than capable regarding foreign missions. To find a strategy which is accepted by all attending countries is difficult and takes time. Another weak point has also been exposed to the world regarding EUFOR Tchad/RCA: When important European countries like the United Kingdom and Germany do not support a mission it becomes a problem to deploy enough troops and equipment. (Hynek, 2011: 86)

The handover from the EU to the UN challenged both actors. The planning was apparently very poor as some major difficulties and misunderstandings occurred, for example the need to rent back the infrastructure by the UN, which was (re)built by the EU. (Hainzl and Feichtinger, 2009: 18) This was not the only problem for the United Nations. Throughout the whole EUFOR mission cooperation on any level between EUFOR and UNAMID in Darfur was not existent. This was a critical failure as one of

the main motivations of the EU to go into Chad was to improve the Darfur situation.⁷⁰ (Seibert, 2010: 62)

By some the mission is seen as reinforcing President Déby's regime, which suppresses political opposition and human rights and therefore undermines the political process in the country. This argument is raised as many Chadian rebels felt that the incoming EUFOR mission was not neutral or impartial at all. Therefore they attacked the capital N'Djamena on 2 February 2008. During this attack France helped the government to repulse this attack. They helped not directly by sending soldiers, but informally. On 4 February 2008 the UN Security Council also said that UN member states should support the Chadian government, in conformity with the Charter (UN Security Council, UN doc., SC/9238, 4 Feb. 2008). On 6 February France's Minister of Defence, Hervé Morin, visited Déby and ensured him full support.

The presence and the tasks of the EUFOR aided the regime insofar as EUFOR and humanitarian actors took care of the refugees and IDPs. This left Déby with more resources for the conflict with Sudan and the rebels. It was also criticised that Déby forced conditions on the EUFOR, not vice versa. That means that he was nearly immune to political pressure as he could be sure of French assistance. (Charbonneau, 2007: 557)

One of the biggest problems of all for EU missions abroad seems to be the collective amnesia regarding the past operations. In all 3 missions mentioned there were the same problems with transportation and too few specialized personnel. (Deheza, 2009: 10)

⁷⁰ See also Olsen, 2009.

7.15. Conclusion of EUFOR Tchad/RCA

There are voices who say that the EUFOR mission in Chad has not contributed to sustainable peace at all but even worsened the situation there because of the intervention. (Brüne, 2008: 215) Others say that the operation was a success regarding the mandate and showed signs of the improving cooperation between military and civilian structures. These diverging opinions show that it is very hard to seriously rate this mission on an objective basis. The mandate was just too narrow and the time frame was too short to get enough data to name this mission a failure or a success.

Today the EU is well prepared to further intensify the cooperation and integration of comprehensive civil-military operations. These deliberations will get a further boost because of the still on-going financial crisis which leads to the decline in development and military expenditure in most EU countries. This fact makes working together even more important, as integrating policy areas leads to more efficiency, the tighter the connection is. (Hynek, 2011: 82)

EUFOR Tchad/RCA made it visible that a tight relationship and coordination between humanitarian and military organisations should be established from the very beginning with documented coordination agreements between the two sides. EU guidelines for the civil-military relations are still missing and should be established for future missions. For these guidelines it would be advisable to force the decision makers to include the lessons learned from past missions. (Helly, 2010: 10)

8. Conclusions

This paper showed that the development-security nexus within the EU significantly changed over the last 60 years. From the 1950s until the end of the 1980s security policy focused on the opposing superpower and development policy tried to achieve development through economic growth while being limited to 'loyal' and associated countries. Then two decades ago both policy fields experienced a paradigm shift. The security policy needed new fields of activity as the USSR collapsed, while the development policy had to recover from the 'lost decade' which showed that the perception of successful development only through economic means was wrong.

The end of the Cold War, the emergence of more and more NGOs and changed security threats fundamentally altered development and security policy within the institution of the European Union as well as in comprehensive missions abroad. For the last two decades it is seen as important that development as well as security policy pull in the same direction. Coherence was one of the important catchwords for this interweavement. This coherence between the two policy areas holds risks and chances and must be tackled carefully to benefit both policy fields and to prevent a 'securisation' of development.

Human security, peacebuilding and good governance are other important terms for the security-development nexus and will accompany it in the future. Reasons are that conflicts or wars cannot be won by military means alone but must be accompanied by development policy to lead to sustainable solutions.

It is shown in documents of the European Union and the OECD that this connection of the two areas is not an invention but really apparent, even though these documents tend to be very blurry and the wording is very general. A more visible interweavement can be seen within the EU institutions and mechanisms. A more coherent approach is tried via a new HR, the abolished pillar structure, the CIVCOM and CPCC for example.

Within peacebuilding missions of the EU the most visible connections are information and capabilities sharing, which do not only hold advantages but can also have negative consequences, especially for the development community. Through the

ODA mechanism development cooperation also gets broader with programmes allowable, such as SSR, which range wide into the security policy.

It was pointed out that both areas follow very different approaches within missions, which can endanger a profitable cooperation. While the security policy tends to short missions with military intervention, the development policy favours long term and sustainable missions.

In chapter 6 it was pointed out that the reasons for conflict are manifold and connected to both security and development problems and can only be sustainably solved with a mixture of both policy areas. It is also important to understand where these conflicts come from to be able to tackle them.

The case study of EUFOR Tchad/RCA dealt with the history, the constant conflict and the EUFOR mission itself, which was deployed to Chad and the CAR. While the chapter elaborates on motives, timetables and mechanisms of the EU, it also focuses on the EUFOR deployment and the cooperation between security and development actors during this time. The analysis showed that the EU is still lacking in many areas before and during missions. It was difficult to obtain enough suitable contributions, the logistical challenge was tough and the EU had to agree to a watered down mandate, which was not in the favour of the EU but of Chad. During the mission there were many problems regarding maintaining impartiality and the interaction with other actors, for example the UN and also NGOs.

The situation of the people engaged in development policy improved in areas where EUFOR was deployed. In contrast, the work in places where no EUFOR soldiers were stationed stayed the same or got even more dangerous during that time as many rebels associated EUFOR with the development workers and saw them both as their enemies.

The cooperation of development and security policy could be noticed in sharing some goals, for example in the IDP issue, where security and development policy teamed up against the decision makers at home in Europe. Other productive points of contact were information sharing through official discussions and briefings and capabilities sharing. While the security policy could overly profit from information sharing, the development community used much of EUFOR's equipment.

There are various lessons to be learned from that mission regarding the security-development nexus. This knowledge should be implemented into the next missions of the Union. This is an important demand as lessons-learned did not always flow into following missions. This can be seen with the end-date criticism, which was raised by the lessons-learned process of EUFOR RD Congo. Even though much criticism was raised this approach was again used in EUFOR Tchad/RCA.

To see the mission as a success or a failure is in the eye of the beholder. According to the mandate EUFOR did succeed and fulfilled its narrow mandate but sustainability was not achieved as a lasting SASE and a solution of the conflict could not be reached.

Still, the mission has to be seen as the most comprehensive one up to date, which set a new standard for security-development cooperation and coherence. During its deployment IDPs, refugees and UN personnel were safe while development personnel could work in the areas where EUFOR was stationed.

Regarding the initial research question an interweavement between security and development policy within the EU is clearly evident even if this cooperation still has much space to improve. During the last two decades this interweavement got tighter as the coherence imperative, treaties, documents and institutions within the EU promote a better cooperation and coordination. This interweavement is not only evident within the institutions of the EU but also in the foreign missions of the European Union. The example of EUFOR Tchad/RCA showed that some strong points of contact exist even though the security and development policy are very different by nature. Still they managed to share opinions on important matters for the development community, information and equipment. It can only be hoped that the trend continues and the development and security policy come together even more despite their different approaches and structures. This would be important to be able to handle future conflicts in a comprehensive and sustainable way.

9. Appendix

9.1. List of abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
APF	African Peace Facility
AU	African Union
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
CAR	Central African Republic
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUBG	European Union Battle Group
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff

FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FAN	Forces armées du nord
FROLINAT	Front de libération nationale du Tchad
GAC	General Affairs Council
GAERC	General Affairs & External Relations Council
GNP	Gross National Product
JA	Joint Action
HR	High Representative
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LON	League of Nations
MIC	Middle Income Countries
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MSO	Military Strategic Options
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCT	Oversees Countries and Territories
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHQ	Operation Headquarters
OOF	Other Official Flows
OPLAN	Operational Plan
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PJCC	Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters
PMG	Politico Military Group
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSO	Peace Support Operation
QMV	Qualified majority voting
SASE	Secure and Safe Environment
SEA	Single European Act
SitCen	Joint Situation Centre

SSR	Security Sector Reform
STABEX	Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation
SYSMIN	System of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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9.3. Abstract in English

The paper outlines the connection between the security and the development policy within the European Union. Both policy fields have changed substantially over the last six decades while always keeping points of contact with each other. Especially the last 20 years are of particular interest as a sharp paradigm change could be noticed at the beginning of the 1990s. During this time the CFSP was introduced and the development policy repositioned itself. Many important documents were released within the last ten years, which point out that a development-security nexus exists and is expanding. Events, like the war in former Yugoslavia, strengthened the idea of a security policy, which is not dependent on NATO or UN assets and led to important missions of the EU without help from these actors. This led to comprehensive missions with EUFOR Tchad/RCA being the latest and biggest up to now. The cooperation between security and development actors is very important in these comprehensive missions to achieve sustainable peace. Also within the institutional set-up of the EU the development-security nexus is visible, with coherence, human security and good government being important catchwords.

This paper wants to display the security-development nexus within these two areas.

9.4. Abstract in German

Diese Arbeit stellt die Verbindung zwischen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik in der Europäischen Union, mit dem Schwerpunkt auf die letzten zwei Jahrzehnte, dar. Beide Politikfelder haben sich in den letzten sechs Jahrzehnten laufend verändert, sind dabei allerdings immer im Kontakt zueinander gestanden. Vor allem die letzten 20 Jahre sind für das Thema sehr spannend, da Anfang der 1990er Jahre sowohl die Sicherheits- als auch die Entwicklungspolitik entscheidende Änderungen durchliefen. Diese Zeit brachte die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, während sich die Entwicklungspolitik weg von reinem Wachstumsdenken, hin zu nachhaltigeren Methoden, bewegte. Diese Zeit war auch geprägt von wichtigen Dokumenten, die betonten, dass die Verbindung zwischen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik existiert und von außerordentlicher Wichtigkeit ist. Der Krieg in Jugoslawien und andere wichtige Einschnitte verstärkten die Sicherheitspolitik, sodass die Union seit einem Jahrzehnt in der Lage ist Auslandsmissionen ohne NATO und UN Hilfe durchzuführen. In diesen Missionen, von denen EUFOR Tchad/RCA bisher die größte und wichtigste war, spielt die Kooperation zwischen militärischen und zivilem Arm eine tragende Rolle. Eine Zusammenarbeit wird als wichtig gesehen um für nachhaltigen Frieden zu sorgen. Nicht nur anhand der Auslandsmissionen kann die Verbindung gesehen werden, sondern auch im institutionellen Gefüge der EU. Termini wie "Security-Development Nexus", "Human Security" oder "Good Governance" reichen in beide Politikbereiche und können nur in Kooperation gelöst werden.

Diese Arbeit will diese Verbindung zwischen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik, sowohl innerhalb der EU als auch in ihren Auslandsmissionen, beleuchten.

9.5. Curriculum Vitae

<u>Name</u>	Stefan BAUER
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Education

Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam	February 2009 to June 2009
Faculty	Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication
University of Vienna	October 2004 to October 2011
Faculty	Department of Development Studies
Vienna University of Economics and Business	October 2006 to now
Faculty	Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Vienna Business School Mödling	September 1997 to June 2003
Chosen foreign language	Italian

Language Skills

Mother Tongue	German
English	Proficient User
Italian	Basic User