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“Democratisation in Chile 1989-2009. An Assessment
Twenty Years after the Return to Democracy”

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Stephanie Delgado Martin

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Introduction

The history of Latin America was for a long time seen predominantly as one of authoritarian rule, repression and extreme inequality. The legacies of colonial rule and of the oligarchies that came to power after independence reached far into the 20th century, seemingly capable of persisting for a much longer time if not disturbed. However, in the first half of the 20th century the South American continent started to stir, and while Europe was still dealing with authoritarian and totalitarian systems, many countries already produced a tradition of democratic government of civilian rule comprising regular elections, the separation of powers, and the regulated transfer of power between governments. Chile was one of the countries that fared best in this period. The seemingly stable democracy seemed to withstand anything, and so, daring moves to broaden participation, increase competition and tackle inequality were ventured already in the 1960s. It would not take long until disillusionment made its entrance, with the loss of control of the political mobilisation and the eventual recourse to a military coup. It would take seventeen years until democracy was finally restored; however, this was to happen in a quite unusual way, namely following the path and using the means set out by the authoritarian regime itself. Therefore, the return to democracy was not a tumultuous event, but an organised handover from the military to a civilian elected government. As good and desirable as the absence of violence might be, the transition under the auspices of the military entailed considerable constraints, obstructions and complications to the consolidation of democracy. While free and fair elections soon became commonplace again, many authoritarian elements would remain well into the 21st century. The implications were not only evident in the biased and resilient institutions, but also pervaded civil society, thus reaching into the very core of democracy: the citizens. Measured with indicators that concentrate on formal aspects of democracy and macroeconomic variables, Chile quickly earned the reputation of a showcase democratisation, arousing the interest of scholars, elites and of politicians in subsequently democratising countries. Combed through with a more substantial measurement of democracy, Chile remained a case of incomplete transition and consolidation, and many were the studies that insisted on deconstructing the image of a near-perfect democracy. However, more than twenty years into the transition, and after substantial reforms and events (e.g. the indictment and death of Pinochet) contributed to leaps forward in the consolidation process, it is time to reassess the *status quo* and repeat the question whether Chilean democratisation has been successfully completed. This leads to the guiding questions of this thesis, namely (1) whether, and if so, how Chile was able to overcome its remaining

institutional and political authoritarian legacies; (2) in how far the political, social and economic context has changed or evolved in a way that precludes a renewed breakdown of democracy; and finally (3) what kind of democracy Chile has reached after twenty years. The present thesis addresses these questions in three steps: The first, theoretical chapter discusses the concept of democracy itself and democratisation, following their historical development and presenting different conceptualisations and meanings of the terms. The second part, consisting of three separate chapters, gives a historical oversight of the emergence and rise of democracy in Chile, the development of the political and economic elites, the transformations of all spheres of Chilean society, and eventually the impact of the authoritarian regime on Chile. The last chapter is predominantly analytic, describing the transition and consolidation process, and eventually performing an assessment on the quality of democracy by 2009.

The data and information which form the base of the discussions, descriptions and analyses were gathered from the predominantly secondary and primary analysis of scholar literature, reports and legal texts. The framework for the assessment of the quality of democracy was largely taken from Diamond and Morlino's (2005) *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*.

I Theoretical Background

The importance and relevance of democracy have not diminished in the last decades as, on the one hand, it nonetheless retained its broadly undisputed position as the favourite and most promising political system worldwide, and, on the other, many countries remain where, even when the will is present, democratisation has not been initiated or successfully completed.

However, before turning to the phenomenon of democratisation, it is important to shed some light on the concept behind it: *democracy*. Although the term enjoys a very broad and diversified usage, it has different meanings and concepts which influence what people are speaking about when they actually use the word. Taken a step further, when discussing democratisation and the quality of democracy in a given country, assessments can differ greatly according to the different intensity and extension of the concept used.

1. Democracy

The term *democracy* comes from the Greek words *demos* and *kratein*. What is understood by it, including the meaning, the type and the level of democracy, has come to change and be debated throughout the centuries since the Antique.

The origins of democracy can be found in 5th century BC Athens, where it reflected the direct exercise of popular control over government. However, the Assembly in which debates took place and decisions were made consisted of only few men, excluding a large share of the people (unprivileged men, women, slaves, foreigners) from citizenship. (Dahl 1989) Freedom and participation were not based on the important principle of equality, which would only become paramount many centuries later.

The term experienced an important comeback from the Middle Ages in Europe, especially in the 17th and 18th centuries: The peak was reached with the American and French Revolutions, which elevated direct democracy to their ideal of a political regime (Rousseau 1762). However, with the establishment of nation-states and the growth of administrative territory of the regimes, direct democracy became less and less feasible and gave way to a preference for representative forms. (Grugel 2002: 14; see also Dahl 1989: 135-152)

The rise of two ideologies strongly influenced democratic theory in the 18th and 19th centuries: Liberalism and Socialism. Liberalism introduced the primacy of the individual over the collective, and with it the right, but not the obligation to participate in politics. Individuals

in their quest for self-fulfilment and development were thus respected in their free will by a representative democracy, where their particular interests were aggregated and brought forward for them. The liberal concepts of representation, equality, and accountability thus developed and became an essential component of democracy. (Grugel 2002: 14)

With the rise and intensification of capitalism, the concept of equality of all citizens became an important debate topic in democracy theories, as opinions differed as to the degree of responsibility individuals were believed to be able to take. The rising capitalist ownership class feared that the working class (as well as some peoples) was not “mature” or “civilised” enough to take political decisions and participate in the decision-making process. The concepts of participation and citizenship were discussed well into the 20th century in debates about who should be granted rights and duties in the polity. It would only be well into the 20th century that discrimination based on class, gender and race would be removed from citizenship inclusion. The liberal concept of representative democracy was able to assert itself, and elected parliaments believed to represent the whole community became essential in democracies. (ibid. 15-16)

Socialism revived the Athenian ideal of a direct democracy with a popular government, without the mediation and representation by third parties. The community was given priority in democratic rights, by contrast to the liberal individualist stance. Marxism further developed this concept of democracy, denouncing the exploitation of the masses and the inequality which liberal capitalist democracy did not address, and advocated for economic equality in order to restore the balance of power and guarantee for actual political rights. As representative democracy was in the hands of the bourgeoisie, the only means to break the exploitation and alienation spiral would be revolution and class solidarity. (ibid. 13-16)

The Second World War had a significant influence on the change in democratic theories and the acceptance and primacy of democracy as a political regime. Mobilisation during the war had been extensive and concerned every citizen regardless of birth, occupation or sex. After the War people were not easily to be underprivileged or discriminated against again, and the abolition of persistent exclusions (e.g. of Afro-Americans in the US, women in most European countries), together with the promotion of social and economic reforms became paramount. (Grugel 2002: 16-17)

While revolutionary movements and utopias were largely de-legitimised and abandoned in most of Europe, they persisted in other regions, where they influenced political processes and

conflicts well into the 21st century. It was not until the Cold War with its anti-communist propaganda, and the eventual fall of Real Socialism that liberal democracy became the unchallenged dominant concept of democracy and equated with freedom. With the disintegration of one of the two ideological and political blocks, and the rise of Behaviouralism in the 1950s and 1960s, the empirical reality of the West became the standard of democracy and the only accepted form of government in a “free world”. A dichotomy was created between democracy and all other forms of government. The distinction between socialist and liberal democracy gave way to one between empirical/realistic/descriptive and normative/philosophical/idealistic traditions of democracy. (Grugel 2002: 17-18; 30)

The empirical democratic concept (advocated by Schumpeter) concentrated on the form of government and the election of political leaders. The stance that every member of the population should partake in the decision-making process was not shared by empiricists; instead, they concentrated on the institutionalisation of competition for power between elites. (Huntington 1991: 7) The conditions for democracy were “high-quality leadership in political parties; autonomy of political elites from the state; an independent bureaucracy; an opposition and civil society that accept the rules of the game; and a political culture of tolerance and compromise.” (Grugel 2002: 18) The people’s role was thus reduced from direct participation to accepting or refusing leaders who would decide for them. In spite of its omission of substantive dimensions and narrow conception, the empirical theories allowed the development of clear, transparent criteria for measuring democracy, and thus for comparative studies to flourish. (Huntington 1991: 11; Grugel 2002: 18-19)

Dahl pioneered the change towards normative theories with his distinction between the empirical cases and the political ideal of democracy. Empirical democracies were termed instead as “polyarchies”, since they were on the track to becoming, but still not fully democracies, lacking several conditions necessary for democracy; rather, they reflected consensual government by competing elites. (Dahl 1989)

In spite of the advantages of empirical democratic theory for measuring democracies, its shortcomings were not ignored for long. The assumption that the described Western societies were pluralist and that actors played in a neutral arena (without structural privileges and unevenly distributed power) proved erroneous. The concentration on procedural dimensions completely ignored hidden structures of power, the effects of socio-economic inequalities on inclusion and citizenship, and the substantive dimensions of democracy which influence political activity, focussing only on the formal and observable ones. (Grugel 2002: 20-22; 30)

The result was the understanding that democracy should not be equated with any of the existing systems of government, as Weir and Beetham (ibid.: 21) suggested, and a more critical and thorough approach to democracy assessments.

Drawing away from empirical traditions, new approaches developed normative understandings of democracy from the 1970s onwards, including participatory democracy (giving priority to participation over representation; emphasising active as opposed to passive citizenship, as well as community over individualism; and striving to overcome inequality), feminism (denouncing gendered structural inequalities (social, economic and political); the male bias of democracy theories; and advocating for the extension of democracy to the private sphere), associationalism (seeking to strengthen protection of working people and the poor; freedom through participation in the community), citizenship theories (stressing the importance of civil society; associations, networks, agency and resistance; political, social and economic inclusion) and cosmopolitanism (focussing on trends of globalisation and the transnationalisation of politics; and the increased significance of non-state actors), often being given more to the communitarian perception of democracy than to the liberal one. (Grugel 2002: 23-29)

Until around the middle of the 1990s, democracy was associated with the liberal concept of the term, which implied elections, the existence of two or more parties in the political system, and a certain set of procedures for government. However, newer definitions have come to criticise this understanding as too narrow, and focussing only on the conditions and procedures instead of the defining characteristics. Instead, they pleaded for a broadening of the concept, including also the substantive dimensions of rights, equality and freedom. (Grugel 2002: 6)

A distinction can be made between formal and substantive democracy. Formal democracy is understood as a “set of rules, procedures and institutions” (Grugel 2002: 6).

Substantive democracy by contrast is more dynamic; it is a

“process that has to be continually reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in such a way as to maximize the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live, to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions which affect society. (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997: 67)” (ibid. 6)

This understanding goes hand in hand with the importance given to participation, accountability, the rule of law, tolerance and pluralism. The arena where this process is

reproduced every day is the state or government institutions on the one hand, and civil society on the other. (ibid. 7)

2. The Quality of Democracies

Linz and Stepan (1996) identified five interacting arenas which are necessary for a high-quality democracy: a lively civil society, a relatively autonomous political society, a rule of law, a usable state, and an economic society. However, in order for democracy to be even roughly possible, stateness needs to be robust, i.e. a sovereign state which holds the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a recognised territory, which has the bureaucratic and administrative capability to collect and manage taxes and disposes of a judicial system.

Diamond and Morlino (2005) discerned eight dimensions essential to democracy, and on the basis of which they suggested a framework for assessing the quality of democracy. The dimensions would be the rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, and horizontal accountability (the “procedural” dimensions), as well as freedom and equality (the “substantive” dimensions). The link between the two sets is the eighth dimension, responsiveness (the “results” dimension), reflecting whether the public policies actually conform to and reflect the demands and preferences of citizens.

The rule of law can be said to be the basis without which none of the other dimensions can thrive. It implies that governmental actors have the monopoly on violence throughout the territory and across social strata, a prerequisite for civil order; the equality of all citizens before the law (especially in its enforcement and access to the courts); the clarity, publicity and universality of laws; the active prevention and fight against corruption in all branches (political, administrative, and judicial); an efficient, competent and responsible state bureaucracy; a professional, efficient and law abiding police force respectful of rights and freedoms; civilian control over the military and the intelligence services; an expeditious, neutral and independent judiciary at all levels; the respect and enforcement of court rulings by all agencies of the state; and the supremacy of the constitution, including a constitutional court to interpret and defend it. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xiv-xv)

An important prerequisite for a functioning rule of law is a political culture which reflects whether the liberal and democratic values are rooted in society, and the existence of traditions of a competent and impartial bureaucracy. A further determinant is the existence and

allocation of the institutional and economic means needed for the implementation, which often represents a hurdle not only in developing, but also in developed countries (mostly due to lack of political will or self-restraint). (ibid. xvi)

Possible indicators for the rule of law would be “the degree to which public officials are responsible before the law, or enjoy relative impunity; the extent of official corruption, as measured [...] by indices of perceptions of corruption and market distortions; the extent of civil-liberty violations; the access of citizens to the court system; [...] the average duration of legal proceedings” and the extent of civilian control of the military, police and intelligence services. (ibid. xv, xxxix)

Participation is the second procedural dimension necessary for democracy. It includes formal rights of political participation for adult citizens, ranging from the right to vote to the rights to “organize, assemble, protest, lobby for their interests, and otherwise influence the decision-making process”. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xvi) The full enjoyment of these rights requires political equality, allowing equal access to political resources, but also effective prevention of fraud and protection of voters and candidates against violence and intimidation at and in between elections. The education system here is an important tool, aimed at increasing the literacy rate and enhancing citizens’ knowledge about and interest in the political system. Again, a political culture that values the equality in worth and dignity of all citizens and is propitious to participation is an important asset, while the rule of law protects the actual usufruct of participation rights, especially for economically or socially disadvantaged groups. (ibid. xvi-xvii, xxxii)

Participation can be traced by indicators such as voter turnout rates; membership in political parties, social movements and NGOs; the communication between citizens and their elected representatives in office; and the participation of citizens in public debates. (ibid. xvii)

The third of the procedural dimensions is competition, meaning the competition between different political parties in regular, free and fair elections. It is an important factor which is expressed especially in the political parties, allowing for new parties to join the electoral arena and compete for the citizens’ approval, for the proposition of alternatives among which citizens can choose (including to hold incumbents responsible for “bad” policies by voting them out and alternation in power), for broader access to the media, as well as campaign funding for an equal and fair competition in elections. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xvii) Of course there are great implications by the different variants of representative systems (e.g.

majoritarian, consensual), allowing for varying levels of proportional representation of different groups in parliament and more or less frequent and facilitated alternation of power. (ibid. xvii) Again, the rule of law is essential to competition, as it regulates the finances and funding of parties (and can therefore counteract corruption and bias based on economic resources), oversees the access to and pluralism of mass media, monitors the elections (esp. electoral commissions), and enforces the political rights of parties and citizens. The most obvious indicator for competition is the presence of opposition in parliament. (ibid. xviii-xix)

Vertical accountability is the fourth procedural dimension of democracies. It is closely linked to the previous two dimensions, participation and competition, as it gives citizens and civil society groups the possibility to review and control political leaders and institutions, heavily relying on genuine participation rights of citizens and political actors; and political competition offering alternatives among which to choose. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xiii; xix-xx) It allows for citizens to demand information, justification and responsibility from their elected political leaders, and to accordingly reward (re-elect) or punish (vote for an opposition party or abstain) them according to the citizens' evaluation of their performance. While fair and competitive elections are the most obvious arena for vertical accountability, it is also performed by political as well as civil society groups (civic associations, NGOs, social movements, interest groups, think tanks, mass media) in between elections. This, of course, can only be efficient if they are not only well-developed, but also enjoy the protection of a strong rule of law. (ibid. xx)

However, the preferences and expectations of citizens can not only change with time, but also be influenced and structured by representatives of civil and political groups. (ibid. xix) It should therefore not be seen as a one-sided, but rather as a dynamic and circular process. Furthermore, the liberal assumption that citizens are able to perceive and assess their interests and needs and the means to fulfil them accurately, and that they are capable of judging whether the government is really corresponding to their expectations in the medium term (and not just the short-term results) is delicate, as lack of or manipulated information and knowledge, as well as distortion of motives of political actors can undermine citizens' judgements.

The last one of the procedural dimensions is horizontal accountability. In addition to vertical accountability, incumbent political leaders are answerable to more or less equal political institutional actors, which have the required expertise and legal authority to monitor,

investigate and sanction their performance and decisions. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxi) Some of the most important features of these agencies – the opposition in parliament; the court system; investigative committees; audit agencies; the central bank; the electoral committee; counter corruption commissions; the ombudsman – are their autonomy, independence from political influence, but also the protection by the rule of law. While the scrutiny is mostly disagreeable for incumbents, it is important that these agencies are allocated enough resources, rights and protection to perform their tasks thoroughly and to prosecute offences. Besides a strong freedom of information and transparency, the importance of a functioning rule of law for the enforcement of prosecutions is obvious. (ibid. xxii-xxiv)

The first of the two substantive dimensions is freedom. It is strongly connected to the acknowledgement and implementation of rights: The political rights include “the rights to vote, to stand for office, to campaign, and to organize political parties. [...] [They] make possible vigorous political participation and competition, hence vertical accountability.” (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxv) The civil rights include “personal liberty, security, and privacy; freedom of thought, expression, and information; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly, association, and organisation, including the right to form and join trade unions and political parties; freedom of movement and residence; and the right to legal defense and due process”. (ibid. xxv) Furthermore, socioeconomic rights such as “rights to private property and entrepreneurship, [...] rights associated with employment, the right to fair pay and time off, and the right to collective bargaining” (ibid. xxv) enhance the freedom of citizens from hardship and want. Again, the protecting patron of the implementation of freedom is a strong, effective and fair rule of law, establishing the rights citizens can claim, and ensuring that violations (including by police, military and intelligence services) are prosecuted. Besides the ombudsman and human rights commissions, civil society needs to have leeway and be active in the monitoring of rights, and the mass media should not refrain from disclosing violations or shortcomings; government agencies should be hindered in any attempts to curtail freedom in the name of national security. (ibid. xxv-xxvi)

Equality is the second of the substantive dimensions. Encompassing all previous dimensions, the political equality of all citizens is very important, as it goes hand in hand with the rights and legal protections mentioned above. Citizens need to be seen as equal based simply on their citizenship, and not on other factors such as gender, race or wealth (as used to be the case). Taken one step further, political equality is connected to other forms of equality as

well, in the sense that blatant inequalities in income, wealth and status very often affect political equality and the exercise of citizenship rights. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxvi-xxvii) This entails that cultural (protection from paternalistic treatment and discrimination) and social rights (to mental and physical health, to assistance and social security, to work and to strike, to education, to a clean environment, to housing) need to be envisaged as well in a democracy. (ibid. xxviii) While social and economic equality requires the state to invest in egalitarian policies, regarding infrastructure and human capital (public health and education), the organisation, association and mobilisation of disadvantaged groups needs to be protected by an egalitarian and efficient rule of law. (ibid. xxviii-xxix)

The last dimension, which reflects the results of democracy, is responsiveness. In spite of its similarity to vertical accountability, responsiveness entails a different dimension: It does not limit itself to the competition for voters' reward or punishment in elections, and withstanding political and civil society actors' monitoring and criticism in between election dates, but on the overall responsiveness of governments to the expectations, interests, needs and demands of citizens. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxix) The first question behind this dimension is how to discern what the citizens actually want. Diamond and Morlino discern a chain of three linkages:

“First, choices are structured in a way that distils citizens' diverse, multidimensional policy preferences into more coherent national policy choices offered by competing political parties. Second, citizens' electoral preferences are aggregated [...] into a government of policymakers. And third, elected officials and their appointees then translate policy stances and commitments into actual policy outcomes.” (ibid. xxix)

Thus the interests and preferences of individual citizens go through three “layers” of processing before they are actually reflected (or not) in government policies. The dimension of participation is also quite relevant for responsiveness, as in representative systems the differing interests and demands must be articulated and aggregated by political parties in order to find resonance in the election process. (ibid. xxx) As has been mentioned in vertical accountability, there are some fallacies and weaknesses which can affect responsiveness. Firstly, citizens might have a vague idea of what they want, but not have enough knowledge or information to identify the policies needed to reach their aims. As such, measures that might actually benefit them in the medium or long term, but which appear unpopular in the short term might be unpopular and lead to punishing political behaviour. This leaves political actors the responsibility to decide which path to take. Secondly, it might happen that no party actually offers the interests and aims that a majority of the citizens wants. An electoral victory, then, does not reflect the responsiveness of the victorious party to the citizens' needs,

but other factors. Thirdly, political leaders might compete in the elections with policies and intentions which they do not intend, once elected, to implement. Once elected, they might concentrate on maximising their own influence and take advantage of the complexity of problems over the course of the term. Fourthly, especially in developing countries, political leaders may intend to implement the policies their voters expect from them, but do not have the necessary resources to do this. Fifthly, in many countries, there are some (more or less) influential political parties which are not based on programmes or ideologies, but on ethnic or identity lines. The social and political interests and demands aggregated in these parties only have these cultural factors in common, but other social and political cleavages may prove problematic for the implementation of policies and programmes. Finally, corruption and privileged access to power by lobbies and wealthy interest groups may distort government decisions and actions, undermining the responsiveness to the electorate in its integrity for the responsiveness to a minority. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxix-xxxi)

Indicators for responsiveness could be citizens' assessment of their government's responsiveness to their individual needs and concerns (through surveys), their satisfaction with democracy, and the distance between the elected political leaders and the citizens on certain policies. (ibid. xxxi)

It is important to point out, however, that the authors did not intend to say that a truthful democracy has to fulfil all of the dimensions to the maximum, or even imply that this would be possible. In a pragmatic way, the combination of different achievements and emphases of the dimensions defines the kind of democracy a regime is or wants to be, and the improvements in some dimensions might go hand in hand with benefits, but also tradeoffs and tensions in others. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: x) This means that while there might be some democracies which fulfil less dimensions than others, e.g. defective democracies (political rights are limited; elected leaders are constrained by the influence of powerful groups; civil rights and the rule of law are not guaranteed) or delegative democracies (elected officials do not respect the citizens' preferences, do not respect the rule of law or are not checked by other agencies of government), it is impossible to identify one framework that would be "right and true for all societies". (ibid. xi-xii) Nevertheless, even with this in mind, it can be said that the dimensions are interrelated in such a way that, if one or more dimensions remain extremely weak, the others will be difficult to uphold as well. (ibid. xxxi) The better balanced the dimensions are, the closer a democracy is of being high-quality.

When analysing the level of democratic quality in a case study (as will be performed in part V) it is not only helpful but also necessary to include contextual factors such as the socioeconomic context, legacies from previous regimes, the institutional design, and especially in recently democratised states the mode of transition that led to the present condition. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxxvii)

3. Explanations for Democratisation

Although the struggle for democratisation is mostly accepted as „normal“ and desirable nowadays, the implementation of democracy not only in the developing countries, but also in Europe and the “West” is a quite recent phenomenon, especially in relation to human history. The prerequisite for democracy to become a viable possibility was the emergence and consolidation of state-building and nation-building, beginning in the 17th and 18th centuries respectively.¹ The Treaty of Westphalia, the French Revolution and the threat of Napoleonic domination intensified the process of state nation-building, which was meant to bind the population within the territories together, and thereby strengthen the borders that were still somewhat unstable in the emerging states. The high point of nation-building, according to Linz and Stepan (1996) was reached with the peace treaties after World War I, and the proclamation of the principle of self-determination by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in 1918. The Second World War and later the Cold War eventually asserted the supremacy of democracy after the defeat of Fascism and Communism.

The proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, in force since 1976) represented the point of departure for the increasing importance of rights and the ensuing public relations crisis of regimes that did not respect them. As democracy proved to be the form of government that best upheld human, civil and political rights, its rising popularity further enlarged the discussion whether to include economic and social rights as well in the concept of democracy or not.

Huntington famously explained the emergence of democracy across the globe with a wave model (Huntington 1991; Seligson (1987) used the metaphor of a pendulum); democracies did

¹ As Linz and Stepan (1996: pp. 20 et seq.) point out, these two processes are not identical, and should be considered and analysed separately; even today, not all states overlap with nations, and not all nations have a state of their own. Furthermore, there are still disputes and conflicts (including in Europe) about nationality, stateness and autonomy, although only few state borders have been changed in the last decades.

not surprisingly loom independently and unconnectedly from nowhere, but in groups, or waves, which bore similar explanations for their emergence. The path of democratisation cannot be described as linear, as while an increasing number of states became democratic, other formerly democratic collapsed and experienced renewed phases of authoritarianism.

The first wave of democratic expansion took place from the beginning of the 19th century into the middle of the 1920s (1828-1926), induced by the expansion of capitalism, the emancipation and rise of social classes which demanded popular rule and a socialisation of the economy, and the slow emergence of global markets. Capitalism, however, was not yet seen as mandatory for democracy, as Socialist concepts of democracy also emerged and enjoyed popularity. This wave was “broken” by the rise of Fascism in Europe, and a wave of totalitarianism and authoritarianism would last until the end of the Second World War (reverse wave from 1922-42).

The second wave followed the end of the Second World War and the victory of the Allies over the Axis of powers (1943-1962). Democratisation in Central Europe and Japan was largely orchestrated by the victors, and in Latin America some experiments in democracy were started. The breakdown of the colonial powers and independence of the colonies in Africa also saw democracies emerging in the newly created states, although they were mostly characterised by instability, and were primarily formalistic. However, by the beginning of the 1960s and 1970s many of the developing countries, including Latin America, were again ruled by authoritarian regimes, thus bringing the second wave to an end (reverse wave from 1958-75).

The beginning of the third wave finally was identified in the middle of the 1970s, with the democratisation of Southern Europe (Portugal, Greece and Spain), followed by the breakdown of the authoritarian regimes in Latin America (including Chile) in the 1980s, and culminating with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the ensuing democratisation of Eastern and Central Europe and of some states in Africa. In Asia, Taiwan and South Korea emerged from authoritarian rule, and democratic movements developed in other countries as well (Philippines, China). Expectations of economic performance and better living standards had been disappointed by the authoritarian regimes, which were not able to counteract the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. In many countries, furthermore, the liberalisation of the Catholic Church had a great positive influence on democratisation movements, as well as the pro-democracy shift in US foreign policy (as opposed to supporting any regime that would counteract Communism). (Huntington 1991; Grugel 2002: 34, 43; Baloyra 1987: 2) The end of the Cold War and the defeat of Communism led Fukuyama to perceive the ‘end of history’

altogether, as the West, and with it capitalism and democracy (the ‘free’ world) had clearly and definitely prevailed over all other alternatives, especially Socialism and Communism (the main antagonists). With the end of the competition between ideologies, history as well had found its conclusion. (Grugel 2002: 2, 34) Globalisation thus became an important factor in the explanation of democratisations, as the democratising countries in each wave were seen as having interacted and influenced each other on three different levels: culturally (through the growth of a global communications network), economically (through the propagation of the global capitalist economic order), and politically (with the creation of global governance institutions), even if to a minimal extent. (ibid. 2, 7-8, 34, 121-122)

Although the grouping of cases in phases (or waves) seems to be able to explain some common contextual international causes of democratisation, upon a closer look it becomes clear that these were not the essential or only causes (in spite of the impact of globalisation, national factors still play the overwhelming role in democratisation), that the “waves” are not as clear-cut as it might suggest, often overlapping, and that the understanding of democracy used as a reference was very narrow and formalistic, allowing for states with quite authoritative features to be considered as democratic, just because they presented relatively clean elections (the ‘electoralist fallacy’ (Linz & Stepan 1996: 4)). (Grugel 2002: 1, 32-37) In order to better understand the processes and outcomes of the “waves”, the balance of several factors besides the formal ones would be more yielding: “(1) favourable sociohistorical circumstances, (2) the support and encouragement of external actors, (3) the agreement of key elites on the desirability of democracy, and (4) the availability of alternative leadership committed to democratic politics.” (Baloyra 1987: 2)

The spread of democracy entailed a discussion about types of democracy, as the spread of the liberal democratic model of the West was questioned and criticised for its limitations and bias by civil society, scholars and politicians in the developing countries as well as in the West. Furthermore, the renewed strong connection between capitalism and democracy was challenged by those who criticised the inequality of the emerging global economy, and did not accept that the Western model was the only possible model of democracy. (Grugel 2002: 3; 8) These criticisms have been repeatedly reinforced by decisions of governance institutions to favour and support countries according to other than democratic values, ignoring the superficiality or even absence of democracy. (ibid. 8) Furthermore, the consolidation of democracy has been hindered or hampered in some cases by the insistence on the development of a liberal market by international governance institutions, subverting the

stability of these countries. (ibid. 9, 119-120) “Capitalist development, globally and nationally, may create opportunities for democratisation but it also generates structural inequality, which operates as a barrier to the realisation of democracy.” (Grugel 2002: 10)

4. Theories of Democratisation

The study of democratisation has delivered several different theories over time, which broadly differed in the breadth, intensity and perspective of their interpretations of why and how democracies emerge. The realisation that there are not only different paths, but that quite different circumstances can lead to democratisation, was not developed until the 1980s. (Grugel 2002: 2)

The initial theories which appeared in the 1970s and 1980s mostly used a quite minimalist version of democracy, and concentrated mainly on the process undergone from non-democracy to democracy. The main aim was to identify the paths and mechanisms that lead to democratisation. Stepan (1986) was one of the pioneers in establishing different paths to democracy, depending on several factors such as whether the democratisation was externally or internally induced, who the main actors were, the importance of ideology etc. (cf. Grugel 2002: 3-4) In 1996, Linz & Stepan analysed the implications of different regime types for transitions and consolidation, introducing, besides totalitarianism and authoritarianism, also post-totalitarianism and sultanism (Linz & Stepan 1996: 55 et seq.; Linz 2000) It was only in the 1990s that theories of democratisation shifted their focus from transition to consolidation, i.e. not halting at the conclusion that a given country was finally democratic (by whatever criteria used), but continuing to investigate the nature and quality of that democracy. (Grugel 2002: 3; Diamond & Morlino 2005: ix) The theories no longer restricted themselves to structure and agency, but also to the role of political culture, political economy and institutionalism in the consolidation phase. (Grugel 2002: 3-4) The (formal) concept of democratisation as the “holding of clean elections and the introduction of basic norms [...] that make free elections possible” (ibid. 5) was complemented by an inclusion of liberal individual rights and also citizenship rights, not just *de jure* but *de facto* (substantive democratisation). (ibid. 5) The inclusion of individual and citizenship rights entailed a debate on the impact and necessity of socioeconomic equality for democracy and a successful consolidation (for thresholds of economic and sociocultural development for democracy to emerge, see Seligson 1987: 7). While some scholars argued against a concept that risked to be excessive and therefore less workable, and questioned the necessity of the economic with the socio-political

dimension, others insisted on the impact of economic (in-)equality on democracy itself, and that ignoring this relationship implicated an incomplete consideration of consolidation. (Grugel 2002: 5)

Three theories significantly influenced the debate on democratisation, namely modernisation theory and historical sociology, both concentrating on structuralist explanations of democratisation, and transition theory, integrating an agency approach to the matter. (Grugel 2002: 46)

Modernisation theory emphasised the link between democratisation and globalisation, and was broadly influenced by Lipset in the early 1960s. For modernisationists, democracy was strongly connected to modernisation and progress, which could be measured by subsequent benchmarks valid for all states. According to Walt Rostow, the stages leading from traditionalism to modernity were “the traditional society; the pre-take-off society; take-off; the road to maturity; and the mass consumption society.” (cf. Grugel 2002: 48) Consequently, Western Europe and the US were identified at the highest levels of democratisation and modernisation, having passed all the phases and processes which other states had yet to achieve. Democracy was thus equated with economic development and the establishment of capitalism. The development of a capitalist globalised market was seen as the only possibility for producing wealth, which would eventually trickle down and thereby benefit the masses as well. An educated middle class would then emerge and become strong, and class conflict would automatically become redundant. Non-democratic states would do best in following the example of the more advanced societies; at the end of that process all states would be modern and democratic, and thus quite similar. (ibid. 47)

The shortcomings of this theory include its oversimplification of the relationship between capitalism and democracy, which has been shown not to be as linear as modernisationists suggested (Linz 2000: 57); markets can be propitious, but also harmful to democracy. The correlation of wealth, education and democracy led Lipset to deduce that capitalism led to democracy. Furthermore, the perspective on the developing countries as delayed students and followers of the already far advanced West is ethnocentric, ahistorical and constricting, leaving almost no room for diverging forms of democracy not found in contemporary Western societies and ignoring the influence of changing conditions. (ibid. 49-50) Another criticism arises from modernisationists’ overemphasis on structures, leaving human agents of action and even politics out. (Grugel 2002: 49)

Today, modernisation theory has been restated by scholars, either with a restriction to developing states (Leftwich, claiming that in the long run economic development does produce democracy), or emphasising the role of political culture and of a dynamic civil society in the consolidation of democracies (Diamond). (ibid. 50)

Historical sociology is also a structuralist approach to democratisation (indeed often called “structuralism”) and had its roots in the emergence of behaviouralism in the 1960s and the re-introduction and emphasis on the state in political science. In contrast to modernisation theory, structuralists concentrated on explaining why democratisation happened the way it did, and not in predicting outcomes. The state advances to an important actor, which, however, is seen in a close relationship with class; collective actors are thus considered in explanations of democratisation. (Grugel 2002: 51-52)

“Structuralists trace the transformation of the state through class conflict over time, in order to explain how democracy [...] has sometimes emerged. [...] contains elements of a political economy of democratization in that it emphasizes how changes in the economy – for example the expansion of production for the market – lead to social or class conflict, although economic change is not, on its own, regarded as determining political outcomes. [...] historical sociology identifies factors that are distinctive to particular cases.” (ibid. 52)

An important contribution to historical sociology was Moore’s study of political change in a comparative case study of eight countries. He identified that the interactions between the farmer, the landed upper class and the bourgeoisie considerably shaped the outcomes of democratisation, with “bourgeois revolution leading to capitalism and democracy; revolution from above leading to industrialisation and fascism; and revolution from below leading to communism.” (ibid. 52-53) The emphasis was later enlarged to broader questions of social power, and Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens eventually identified three power structures: relative class power, the role of the state and the impact of transnational power structures. Structuralists accepted the impact of capitalism on the state, but not in the same way as modernisationists. Instead, they argued that what made democratisation viable were the subordinated classes’ demands for reforms of the capitalist state, and the state’s progressive reaction to them. (ibid. 53-54)

In spite of its merits in diachronic comparisons of diverse countries and regions, historical sociology was criticised for its overly structuralist view of democratisation and the omission of individual agency, with its overemphasis on collective actors (classes and the state) and structures. (ibid. 55)

For the analysis of democratic consolidation historical sociology brings in the important acceptance of conflict as an integrated element of democracy, and also possible structural

explanations (economic, social, and global) for unsuccessful or partial democratisations. (ibid. 56)

Transition studies (also known as agency approach) concentrate on the role of individual actors who shape democratisation and democracy through their conscious actions, a degree of luck and their willingness to compromise. In contrast to the structuralist theories discussed earlier, transition studies do not reduce democratisation to a “natural” process when certain structural conditions are in place (economy, development; interaction between classes and the state, history). (Grugel 2002: 56-57) The emphasis is instead placed on elites’ decisions to commit to democracy (Baloyra 1987: 38). Rustow in his critique of modernisation showed that structural conditions are not crucial; instead, he identified three different stages which democratisation entails: “a preparatory phase, a decision phase, in which the choices and negotiations of ‘a small circle of leaders’ play a particularly crucial role (Rustow 1970: 356), and a habituation phase in which citizens and leaders fully adapt to the new system. These stages were later transformed into liberalisation, transition and consolidation.” (Grugel 2002: 57) Thus, the negotiations between (political) elites and the incumbent leaders are seen as decisive for democratisation, as Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead have shown. “They concluded that skilful leadership, aided by luck, was the key to outcomes which lead to the establishment of democratic procedures for government.” (ibid. 57-58) This approach for the first time did not stipulate economic development as a precondition for democracy, thus allowing for optimism in developing countries, as democratisation became more tangible from the agency perspective. (ibid. 62-63)

Rational choice theories also influenced the transition approach, as Przeworski advocated that the elites’ decision on democratisation depended on the alternatives available, as they would opt for the most preferable one for them according to their cost-benefit calculations. (ibid. 58-59) However, as Przeworski would later admit, the elite pacts did not guarantee for broad political inclusion of the masses, and stability might be installed to the cost of more substantive democratisation (thus based on a quite narrow and elitist concept of democracy). Furthermore, the concentration on the elites completely ignored or downplayed the influence and role of civil society in democratisation in each phase (including in unsuccessful democratisations). (ibid. 59-61)

In spite of its shortcoming, transition theory has largely contributed to the renewed focus on political debate and negotiations, and the approach that democratisation does not “happen” and conclude from one moment to the next (e.g. when free and competitive elections are

held), but instead spreads out over three stages (liberalisation, transition and consolidation), has been very fruitful in combination with more substantive understandings of democracy (including an analysis of socio-economic and cultural change as well). (ibid. 63)

5. Transition to Democracy

According to Morlino, (1987: 54-55) transition from an authoritarian regime does not necessarily entail an ideal democracy: He identifies different possible outcomes, including a limited democracy (political rights are partially constrained or limited), a protected democracy (the military's influence and control over the civilian elites lingers, as in the case of Chile after the transition) and an institutional hybrid (elites and institutions retain their roles, some extent of change and opening). In spite of having passed the mark from authoritarianism to democracy, these forms are still weak consolidations or incomplete democratisations, and therefore more liable to recidivism if the problems are not tackled. (Baloyra 1987: 19)

"A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*." (Linz & Stepan 1996: 3)

[...] working definition of a consolidated democracy [...]:

- Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state.
- Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.
- Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process. (ibid. 5-6)

This clearly shows that the transition process itself and the outcomes of the negotiation in this phase can have very significant influence on the democratic regime to follow. In spite of some apparent similarities between cases of democratisation, the legacies of the past, the strength and leeway of the opposition, and the perceptions and choices of elites differ from case to case, making superficially similar cases lead to different outcomes. (Baloyra 1987: 9) This is why, despite all the research and comparative studies made in this field, it is still impossible

to predict the development of democratisations or to identify an ideal one which would be applicable internationally. (Grugel 2002: 10)

As has been shown, the sheer holding of free and fair elections, the re-emergence of parties, and the creation of formally democratic institutions are not enough for a substantive understanding of democracy (ibid. 72-73). For transitions this means that the process is not completed until civil society and culture (and possibly also the economy) are pervaded with democratisation as well. (ibid. 30-31)

Baloyra (1987: 10-12) describes the process of regime transition in five stages: Deterioration (which might be followed by re-equilibration), breakdown, installation, implementation and inauguration. In the first stage, deterioration, the regime is increasingly unable to cope with political and economic issues (security and prosperity) and can no longer maintain its “legitimacy” by force or through effectiveness and efficacy. The containment of the opposition and civil society may fail, as elites (on both sides) revise their preferences, and protests (national, but also international) get out of hand. (Grugel 2002: 98) Although they cannot suffice on their own, economic and political (and sometimes military) pressure from abroad can contribute to the outcome of the deterioration; in the light of an ever more democratisation- and human rights-friendly global environment, this influence has tended to benefit the democratisation struggles in recent years (after subverting them in many cases in the past). (Linz & Stepan 1996: 74-75) Most authoritarian regimes have tried to avert a breakdown either by increasing repression or by means of liberalisation measures, which include more autonomy for civil society organisations, the introduction of *habeas corpus*, the symbolic release of political prisoners, social welfare policies and more tolerance for opposition. (ibid. 3)

If a regime is not able to regain its balance (re-equilibration), a breakdown is the inevitable consequence, marking the end of the nature of the regime. It is also possible, albeit less common, that a breakdown is not preceded by deterioration, for instance when the head of state suddenly dies or another striking event unpredictably initiates the downfall of the regime. However, in the case of military authoritarian regimes, the most common form of breakdown is extrication. An aperturist group within the military may prevail in their decision that a withdrawal from government (military-as-government) would be best for the military-as-institution. (ibid. 59-67; Morlino 1987: 73) The factors leading to this assessment are various, ranging from the perception of a strong opposition, the (un-) availability of better alternatives (cost-benefit calculus), the performance of the economy and the ensuing pattern

of social cleavages and mobilisation against the regime, to the presence of antagonist actors to the military. (Baloyra 1987: 40-41) It would be a fallacy, however, to assume that the causes must immediately precede the breakdown; they might be more or less latently present throughout some period of time, and not be precipitated until an event or action occurs which leads to the collapse. (ibid. 42-44) The outcome of the breakdown can take the form either of a *reforma* (not violent, negotiated and agreed by the incumbents and the opposition; high level of continuity) or of a *ruptura* (mostly violent, opposition as the main actor, strong discontinuity). (Morlino 1987: 62-63)

Installation follows the breakdown, with a new government taking over, usually in order to prepare the institutional and legal changes necessary for democratisation. Before the process is complete, however, there is a very decisive stage of implementation (“more a “muddling through” than an epic story” (Baloyra 1987: 12)), in which the protagonists position themselves and try to implement and negotiate the changes to be carried out and the roles to be played; actors can be either obstructionists or aperturists, i.e. either resist or endorse far-reaching change and reform.

Ideally, aperturists will eventually assert themselves (“endgame”), and finally the last stage of inauguration is reached, entailing “[...] the crystallization of a pattern of relations among society, political community, government and state that conforms to the democratic blueprint and results from the installation of a government committed to democratization” (ibid. 12).

In the installation and implementation stages, there are some crucial aspects that need to be high on the agenda (cf. Baloyra 1987: 13; Grugel 2002: 68-69; Linz & Stepan 1996: 9-14): the restoration of the rule of law, a constitutional revision, the re-emergence of a multi-party system, the electoral process, and the transfer of power. None of these measures are to be understood in narrow terms. The first point, concerning the rule of law, demands that the government itself acts only within the limits of the law, and that the judiciary is entrusted and given competences in the overseeing of the rule of law and the punishment or amnesty for infringements and human rights violations. This presupposes that the territorial integrity is not challenged, that the state actually holds the monopoly of the use of force, and that there is an impartial and efficient bureaucracy available (Linz & Stepan 1996: 11). The constitutional revision reflects the change of the nature of the regime, as the state, the economic model, the representation and the government model must be reviewed and reformed in order to fit the demands and interests of a democratic regime. If the constitution is not at least reviewed during the transition, it is almost inevitable that the emerging democracy will be constrained

by authoritarian features and legacies enshrined in it. The relationship between and limits of the legislative, the executive and judicative powers need to be balanced for the new governments to be legitimate and accountable. Reforms should also envisage important bodies of the state which are not legitimised through elections, namely the bureaucracy, the police, the judicial system, and the security forces. (Grugel 2002: 76) The military-civilian relationship is of utmost importance here.

The (re-)emergence of a multi-party system is fundamental in order for voters to have different alternatives among which to choose, and for the sake of vertical and horizontal accountability, as discussed above. However, the re-emergence of parties which already existed before the authoritarian regime had come to power can be a blessing and a problem at the same time. It is certainly easier for parties to reorganise when they already had strong structures before, and ideally at least some of the previous leaders and actors might be able to step up again or let younger cadres profit from their experience. Furthermore, the legitimacy and belief in the political system might be accepted with less reluctance in view of the tradition. On the other hand, parties (and party cleavages) may re-emerge that do not reflect the contemporary interests and preferences any more, leading to an offer of alternatives that does not correspond to the demands of citizens. As a result, the party constellations that allowed for democracy to collapse in the first place might be reproduced, thus not reflecting an important “learning process”. (Morlino 1987: 66) Furthermore, the re-installment of traditional political elites could reproduce the social cleavages that preceded authoritarianism, and thus resume the alienation from civil society. The result would then be “a kind of hyper-electoralism, in which the parties engage in debate with each other, with society increasingly disconnected from political events.” (Grugel 2002: 74-75)

The fourth point is important with a view to the inauguration stage, as the electoral process needs to be agreed upon, establishing the statute, the timetable to be observed, and the measures to be taken in order to secure the validity, legitimacy (representativeness) and efficacy of the elections. Finally, the transfer of power must be agreed upon and adhered to, establishing the timing and procedures.

A further aspect during the installation and implementation phases after the breakdown of an authoritarian regime is the role and influence the military insists on keeping throughout the process. The military’s readiness to extricate mostly does not automatically entail the complete withdrawal from politics. The first most manifest danger of this refusal to withdraw is the guarantee of the physical integrity of voters in the first elections taking place after the breakdown. (Baloyra 1987: 46) This hurdle being taken, constitutional and institutional

legacies may hinder the democratisation process and the overcoming of authoritarian enclaves of influence and power. Where severe human rights violations during the authoritarian regime need to be addressed, enforced amnesties may constitute serious problems for the reconciliation process. (Baloyra 1987: 47) If these complications are not tackled properly during the installation and implementation phases, or within a reasonable timeframe, the new democratically legitimated governments may be confronted with dwindling support for democracy as such, a reaction which can be exacerbated in the context of economic crises.

II Historical Oversight Part 1: 1960s – 1970

In order to understand the development towards the downfall of democracy in Chile, it is imperative to know the circumstances leading to the polarisation of society and the political system, beginning from the early 1960s.

On a first sight, Chile made the impression of being a model of a functioning, democratic multi-party system, enjoying broad acceptance for its decision-making processes, structures and institutions, and looking back at a long constitutional tradition (with a Constitution dating from 1925). (Klein 1993: 2-3) Although the inclusion and democratisation process was enhanced during the 1960s, the process of integration of all social groups (including rural and urban groups) into the political process through vote was not accomplished until 1970.

The consequence of the industrialisation efforts was not the development of an “innovative and aggressive middle class” (ibid. 29), but rather a strengthening of the ties between the state and the economy: Chile became one of the Latin American countries with the strongest state leading investor long before the election of Socialist Salvador Allende as president in 1970, second only to Cuba. The role of the state became predominant in the economy, making effort to protect and implement its interests a priority. Access and connections to the state became imperative for consideration in employment, distribution, entitlements and receivables, again strengthening the significance of the state’s role. (ibid. 29-30)

An important barrier to general participation was the interdiction of rural trade union formation until 1967; those social sectors best interacting with the state held the primacy of interests (in this case cheap labour and commodities). In return, the state, in search of political support, made effort in obtaining the *financiero*’s, merchant’s, middle classes’ and rural oligarchy’s benevolence, deferring necessary reforms which could disgruntle the land owners, and suppressing any uprising attempts (strikes, land occupations). (ibid. 30)

The political parties reflected the close relationship between state and the privileged classes. Besides the all-encompassing parties, there was not much room for other autonomous forms of social organisation. Through their monopolistic role as mediators between society and the state, it was consequentially mandatory to gain access to a party in order to assert or even articulate one’s interests and enjoy privileges as well. The political parties therefore

permeated all fields of society (from governmental agencies to trade unions, neighbour's unions to schools). (Valenzuela 1978: 3; Klein 1993: 31-32)

The state's interests can thus be characterised as overlapping with the privileged classes'. A rise in economic influence of the state simultaneously meant an increase in access for these actors. It was in their interest to control the access to the state itself, reproducing their own influence and upholding the inclusion and exclusion respectively of certain social classes. The overlap was consolidated through the interweavement of bureaucrats and special interest groups in the decision-making process. (Klein 1993: 31-33)

By the mid-20th century the competition for political influence and participation became more intense, and the interests represented started increasingly differing ideologically and economically. An array of political parties surged, partly through split-off from already established parties, mergers or as start-ups, making the achievement of an electoral majority almost impossible for any of them. By the mid-1960s for the first time, the vote could be evenly split between the three ideological camps: Left, Right and Centre. (Klein 1993: 32-33)

As a matter of course, coalitions were necessary in order to form a government, leading to compromises not only between the collaborating parties, but also with the opposition parties. This state of constant compromise seeking and institutional conflict solving was known as *Estado de compromiso* (state of compromise) and was characteristic of the Chilean political system until 1970. (ibid. 33)

The attenuation of this tradition of compromise and coalition seeking began being felt during the presidency of Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (1958-1964), “[...] da die Parteien doktrinärer, kompromißloser, exklusiver und wesentlich feindlicher einander gegenüber eingestellt wurden.“ (Allan, Angel: Some Problems in the Interpretation of Recent Chilean History, in: Bulletin of Latin American Research 7 (1988) 1, 93, quoted in Klein 1993: 38) The political parties spectrum underwent some considerable changes: The *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC, Christian Democratic Party) founded in 1957 rose to the most influential party, the *Partido Socialista* (PS) united with the *Partido Comunista* (PC, Communist Party) and some other smaller parties to the *Frente de Acción Popular* (FRAP, United Popular Action Front, later *Unión Popular* (UP, Popular Unity)), and a new right-wing party, the *Partido Nacional* (PN, National Party) was founded in 1966. Amidst the rather paralysing (not dynamic), elitist and conservative right wing parties, the new centrist movement, the PDC, soon achieved

electoral success, its main endeavour being a reform of the rural structures, which were seen as the main impediment to economic development. (Klein 1993: 37-41)

The traditional link between the Conservative Party and the Catholic Church had been weakened in part through the secularisation of society in 1925 (though Chile remained a predominantly Catholic country), but especially through the new orientation of the Church towards social reform after the Second Vatican Council. (Collier & Sater 1996: 305-308) Under these conditions, the PDC found a broad support by the Church from the beginning of the 1960s for its intended reforms, though its success should definitely not be reduced to this aspect (as the party itself claimed to be strictly non-confessional). (ibid. 308) One of the big undertakings of the PDC was to create networks of support in areas never before organised nor mobilised: the countryside, the universities, the poor. Neighbourhood committees, mother's groups and youth clubs emerged in the shanty towns in Santiago, creating new bridges to an electorate previously neglected by the parties.

Through its combination of capitalist and socialist elements in its programme, the PDC claimed that a "communitarian" society could transcend the ideological divide – though their concrete conception of this society form was never fixed, allowing for different interpretations and broad identification with the programme. (Collier & Sater 1996: 306-307; del Campo 2002: 16) The combination of democratic values and social reform was described as a "*Revolución en Libertad*" (Revolution in Liberty), attracting moderate left and right wing voters alike. (Collier & Sater 1996: 307)

On September 4th 1964, the PDC candidate Eduardo Frei Montalva won the presidency elections (56.08%), marking the peak of the party's rise since its foundation. Striving to forestall a victory of the leftist candidate Salvador Allende Gossens (FRAP) – in order to avoid the worst case –, the U.S. had joined the *Partido Liberal* (Liberal Party) and the *Partido Conservador Unido* (United Conservative Party) in their support for Frei. (del Campo 2002: 16; Klein 1993: 42) Contrary to the expectations (and political tradition), the PDC decided to govern alone after its electoral victory, without a coalition. Even the Right, which had supported Frei and thereby enabled his victory, could not count on its interests being considered (especially regarding agrarian reform). This perceived arrogance and hubris hardened the political divide, inducing a change in attitudes of the political parties. The time for compromise and deals seemed to come to an end, the struggle for power becoming more pronounced, leading to increasing polarisation. (Collier & Sater 1996: 311, 324; Klein 1993: 41-44)

Taking his election pledges seriously, Frei went about introducing some extensive reforms, which included the nationalisation of copper, the *promoción popular* (popular advancement), rural reform, education (new schools, alphabetisation, increase in expenditure) and welfare (improvements in medical care, new hospitals). (del Campo 2002: 16; Collier & Sater 1996: 311-312)

Public expenditure almost doubling through the costly social reforms, the Frei government soon looked for the most important sector of Chile's economy for new revenues: the copper industry. Most of Chile's industry and manufacture was owned by foreign, mainly US investors, who held not only a monopoly of revenues, but also of technological know-how. The model of import substitution was to be complemented by the partial nationalisation of the most important industries, such as copper and saltpetre, reducing Chile's dependency on foreign investors and taking the production (and revenues) into its own hands. Contrarily to the Left, who demanded an outright nationalisation, and not wanting to take the US interests on, the government tried to induce a peaceful transition in form of *chilenización* ("chilenisation"). In exchange for tax concessions, the Chilean state obtained a 51 percent holding of the companies (the most influential ones being Kennecott and Anaconda) and expected investment and provision interworking - which, however, as noted by Dieter Nohlen, was mostly disadvantageous for the Chilean part. (del Campo 2002: 16-17; Collier & Sater 315)

In addition to the *chilenización* of the industry, the PDC government introduced a far-reaching agrarian reform, at the same time boosting the emerging rural trade unions. Large estate and firms were to be redistributed and split into newly created *asentamientos* (settlements) run by farmer cooperatives. (del Campo 2002: 17) New federations were created, labour laws enforcement was seen to and the minimum wage for farmers was raised to the urban level for the first time in Chilean history. (Collier & Sater 1996: 313) By the end of Frei's period, around 1,300 *haciendas* (farms, mainly inefficiently run ones) had been expropriated and redistributed as *asentamientos*, worked by *socios* (associates) of elected farmer committees. Day-labourers and casual workers, however, were denied *socio* status, seeing a new privileged class replacing the former landlords. (ibid. 314) The constitutional reform and agrarian reform bills necessary for these measures met great resistance by the Right in Congress, but were eventually signed in July 1967. They ruled that all farms over 80 "basic hectares" were "[...] liable to expropriation, the owners being entitled to retain an 80-

hectare “reserve” and to compensation in the form of a small cash payment and long-term government bonds.” (ibid. 313-314)

The *promoción popular* was launched to build up and foster local networks, mobilising and organising previously unattended segments of society. *Juntas de vecinos* (neighbours’ associations), *centros de madres* (mother groups), parents’ groups, youth clubs and sports associations were only some of the many forms the *promoción* took. (Collier & Sater 1996: 311) Traditionally claiming to represent the “unprivileged”, the Left saw its passive clientele increasingly being usurped by the PDC. As a countermeasure, the Left made its inroad into the shanty towns and settlements, and especially began encouraging the seizure of urban and rural land, as a speedier alternative to land reforms. Enticed by the more radical wing of the Left, land *tomas* (seizures) had become a frequent and problematic occurrence by the end of Frei’s period, further enraging the Right, which was increasingly cut off its privileges. (ibid. 312-314; Klein 1993: 43) The envisaged rural mobilisation got out of the PDC’s control and became an action dominated by the Left.

Benefiting from the propitious development in the international market, especially thanks to the adaptation of the copper price to the soaring London Metal Exchange levels (nearly double the price American companies accepted so far), Chile saw an initial economic success, a considerable improvement of life quality of the majority of the population and a rise in agricultural output, leading to higher tax revenues. (Collier & Sater 1996: 315-320; Klein 1993: 42-43) However, the nationalisation of the capital industry and the reforms could not solve the problem of ever rising foreign debt, inflation and decline of GDP in the medium term. New taxes were introduced in order to tackle the growing demand originating from the reforms: as private investors drew back, the state took over their part, further extending and intensifying its interventionist role in the economy. The wage rises and the empowered trade unions however did not halt in the bounds the government had foreseen, constantly increasing their demands (striking when deemed necessary), and thereby making a balanced policy more difficult. (Collier & Sater 1996: 317-319)

In the face of disillusionment from the initial hopes, the reforms eventually nearly grinded to a halt. Leftists as well as rightists (for different reasons: the former because the reforms were not far-reaching enough, the latter because they completely opposed any reform at all which would endanger their clientelistic structures) successfully delayed the enacting of the agrarian

reform until 1967, further contributing to the radicalisation of the masses. (Klein 1993: 43) In addition to a disgruntled conservative electorate, which was directly afflicted by the expropriation and the rising influence of labour unions, the return to conventional economic measures also disgruntled the leftist, for whom the reforms were not sufficiently far-reaching. Taking the reforms to a higher level, the surge of *tomas* (seizures) encouraged by the Left by the late 1960s constituted a considerable challenge for the Frei government. The Centrist movement saw its overall support dwindle. As by 1970 about one-quarter of the Chilean industrial capital was still in foreign hands, the Left also intensified their demand for a more radical and thorough nationalisation, as well as the abolition of the privileges foreign firms still enjoyed. (Collier & Sater 1996: 318; del Campo 2002: 18)

Meanwhile, even within the PDC different factions appeared, insisting on different approaches and measures to be imposed by Frei, thereby straining the relations within the party itself. The appearance of a unified and coherent PDC which had control if not over the economy and trade unions, at least of its own members, was disturbed. From 1967 through 1968 student rebellions at the universities became recurrent, reflecting the rising dispute between the political parties, but also the impact of the Cuban Revolution and the Bolivian guerrilla episode of 1967 (in the course of which Ernesto “Che” Guevara was killed). (Collier & Sater 1996: 322-323)

As the electorate re-polarised in its Left and Right divide, the parties reorganised themselves in preparation for the upcoming presidential elections in 1970. The Right repositioned itself in the *Partido Nacional* (PN, formed by the *Partido Liberal*, *Partido Conservador Unido* and *Acción Nacional*) and the fascist *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Liberty).

The Left saw the split-off of a radicalised revolutionary movement in 1965, the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR, Revolutionary Left Movement), which declared that the democratic means had failed and that armed struggle was the only way to rise to power (adopting anti-capitalist Guevarist views and by the end of 1960s accounting for several urban terrorism incidents such as bank robberies, aircraft hijackings and bomb attacks). (del Campo 2002: 16; Collier & Sater 1996: 320-321, 324) The *Partido Radical* (Radical Party) joined the *Partido Socialista*, *Partido Comunista*, *Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario* (MAPU, Popular Unitary Action Movement, a split-off from the PDC after a violent incident between *Carabineros* and some squatters), *Partido de Izquierda Radical* and the *Acción Popular Independiente* (Independent Popular Action) in the *Unidad Popular* (UP) coalition, sending

(for the third time) Salvador Allende Gossens into the run for president. It is important also to stress the development of a new faction within the *Partido Socialista*, which laid out the creation of a “revolutionary state” as its aim, and favoured a Marxist-Leninist intransigent approach. Allende as many other Socialists was not part of this faction, and instead held on to an electoral strategy to reach his aims. (Collier & Sater 1996: 320-321)

While the Right wing parties saw the country falling apart among all the union tumults, economic crises and radicalised leftist movements, the Left was not content with the reforms in place, demanding a faster and more intensive transformation, parts of the Left approving the use of arms for this purpose. (ibid. 324)

The presidential election of September 4th 1970 saw the three political camps sending separate candidates into the run. The PDC candidate Radomiro Tomic Romero, a former senator and Chilean ambassador in Washington from 1965 to 1968, pleaded for an alliance with the Left. The newly formed UP, however, was not interested in supporting another party’s candidate and designated, after short hesitation, Salvador Allende Gossens as its candidate. Allende had already run for presidency in 1952 (attaining 5.44%), 1958 (28.91%) and in 1964 (38.92%). The majority of the UP agreed, however, that Allende was the best suited personality to be sent, and decided to support him yet a fourth time. (Collier & Sater 1996: 327; Codoceo 2007: 22)

The *Partido Comunista* nominated the poet and former senator Pablo Neruda; the MAPU chose the agronomist Jacques Chonchol Chait as their candidate. Chonchol however withdrew his candidacy in favour of Allende.

Running as an independent, former president Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez was the hope of the Right for an electoral victory, reflecting the demands for law and order and an end to what they saw as demagoguery. The novel importance of television presence turned out to be a considerable disadvantage to the septuagenarian Alessandri. (Collier & Sater 1996: 327)

The polls preceding the election indicated a clear victory for the independent Alessandri. The minor “campaigns of terror” led by the Right depicting a Communist dictatorship in the case that Allende should win, was thought to be enough to keep the Right ahead. (Collier & Sater 1996: 328) The narrow margin of only 40,000 votes leading to Allende’s victory surprised and shocked the Right and the US alike. In the context of the ongoing Cold War, and the acrimonious efforts to keep Communism out of Latin America, the election of a Socialist president was not acceptable for the Republican President Richard Nixon.

Allende got 36.3%, ahead of Alessandri (34.9%) and Tomic (27.8%). As the relative majority was not overwhelming, it was necessary to get an endorsement by Congress for the victory to be made official. This had never posed a problem before, as Congress had traditionally endorsed every leading candidate. This time, however, the PDC insisted on Allende signing an *Estatuto de Garantías Constitucionales* (Statute of Constitutional Guarantees) before confirming him as the President. This measure reflects the profound distrust even the Centrists had of a Socialist president. (del Campo 2002: 18-19) Besides the mistrust the UP encountered in the opposition parties, it is important to stress again that it had not won the elections with a considerable majority:

“Die Wahl des Marxisten Allende zum chilenischen Präsidenten war Resultat des Nichtzustandekommens einer mehrheitssichernden Koalition um das politische Zentrum und keinesfalls Ergebnis eines Linksdralles in der chilenischen Gesellschaft.” (Klein 1993: 45)

III Historical Oversight Part 2: 1970-1973 Unidad Popular

1. The 1970 presidential election

The 1970 presidential election had been regarded as fairly predictable, as surveys preceding the election had indicated a clear advantage for the conservative candidate Jorge Alessandri (see table below).

Table 1. Voter survey on the candidate preference, January and May 1970, and election outcome

Candidate	January 1970 survey	May 1970 survey	September 1970 election
Jorge Alessandri	44.4%	36.1%	34.9%
Salvador Allende	18.5%	25.6%	36.3%
Radomiro Tomic	23.1%	30.8%	27.8%
Undetermined/abstentions	14.0%	7.5%	16.5%

Sources: Nohlen 1973: 123, 132 quoted in Bogdanovic 2008: 66, 70, 74; Collier/Sater 1996: 309

Therefore, the reactions to the result were quite diverse, ranging from enthusiasm to horror. (Codoceo 2007: 21; Collier & Sater 1996: 330) However marginal Allende's winning margin was, it does not come as a surprise when compared with other preceding elections: The fact that three instead of two political blocks were competing with separate candidates allowed for the *Unidad Popular* (UP) candidate to win, as the non-leftist voters were split up between the *Partido Nacional* (PN) and the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC). (Valenzuela 1978: 42)

Although the PDC adopted a programme which reflected many of the same concerns the UP represented (e.g. the nationalisation of copper, the introduction of a unicameral parliament; the difference lay in the intensity of the changes (i.e. improvements vs. introduction of Socialism) (Bogdanovic 2008: 64)), Allende was able to maintain his support from the previous 1964 presidential election (38.9% in 1964), not indicating a voter's drain from the PDC (the increase in popular participation and electoral registration in the 1960s did not, however, induce a proportional upsurge of the Left electorate, contrary to what could have been expected). (Valenzuela 1978: 39) The PDC's candidate, Radomiro Tomic, had tried to arrange an alliance with the Left, thereby further alienating the Right (which as the Left resented the Frei government for its *partido único* (single party) stand and its reforms). The UP, however, was not interested in supporting a PDC candidate. Alessandri on the other hand had not been able to bring his programme of stable modernisation and increase in efficiency

(leaving the structures fairly untouched) to the centrist voters, although he could count on considerable financial support from the CIA.

The U.S. government under the Republican President Richard Nixon did not at all tolerate a Socialist government in Chile. The progression of the East-West-divide in the context of the Cold War gave the perceived gain or loss of an ally an outstanding importance. Latin America was not to be lost to the Soviet enemy, therefore, in spite of the promising surveys, nothing was to be left to chance in the 1970 presidential election. Furthermore, the announced measures programmed by the UP (especially the nationalisation of copper) were detrimental for the U.S. businesses, which were ready to financially avert such an event through support of Alessandri.

The traditional Chilean conservative clientele gladly accepted the supports offered by the CIA and the U.S. businesses in order to avoid a not very probable, but still possible victory of the Left. Already in the previous election in 1964, the PDC had profited from the financial and anti-Communist propaganda aid by the CIA and U.S. businesses which had helped avert the election of Allende back then (the CIA “invested” nearly four million US dollars for this purpose).²

“In March 1970, the 40 Committee decided that the United States should not support any single candidate in the election but should instead wage "spoiling" operations against the Popular Unity coalition which supported the Marxist candidate, Salvador Allende. In all, the CIA spent from \$800,000 to \$1,000,000 on covert action to affect the outcome of the 1970 Presidential election. [...]The large-scale propaganda campaign which was undertaken by the U.S. was similar to that of 1964: an Allende victory was equated with violence and repression.” (Church Report 1975)

Propaganda material (books, posters, advertisements) was distributed, radio stations and the press (especially the conservative daily paper *El Mercurio*) were provided with funding and anti-Communist articles (often fictitious, partly emanating from CIA agents working as journalists), which equated the UP’s programme with brutality, repression, corruption and poverty, and adversarial groups were supported financially. (Bogdanovic 2008: 72, 76)

As the election outcome was not satisfactory, the CIA concentrated its efforts on the Congress deputies. The UP had won the 1970 election by a thin margin; however, it did not have a majority in Congress.

Table 2. Parliamentary elections 1969

Party	Percentage
Partido Socialista (PS)	12.3%

² The actions and plans of the CIA in Chile from 1963 to 1973 were uncovered in a report prepared by a Senate Select Committee in 1975 headed by Frank Church. (Church Report 1975)

Partido Comunista (PC)	15.9%
Partido Radical (PR)	12.9%
Partido Social Demócrata (PSD)	0.9%
Unión Socialista Popular (USOPO)	2.2%
Total Unidad Popular (UP)*	44.2%
Democracia Cristiana (PDC)	29.7%
Partido Nacional (PN)	20.1%
Partido Democrático Nacional (PADENA)	1.9%
Abstentions	26.4%

*The UP had not been created by the time of the congressional election.

Source: Collier/Sater 1996: 351

The Constitution ruled that, if a presidential candidate did not reach an absolute majority in the election, he needed to be approved by Congress in order to be installed. The parties now forming the UP (the FRAP, the *Partido Radical* and the *Unión Socialista Popular*) held only 44.2% of the seats, and therefore did not have the majority needed to ensure the vote for Allende. It was clear that the Right would not vote for a Socialist president; therefore, the decision lay on the PDC deputies, who held the balance of power in Congress with their 29.7%. The CIA's plan was to financially persuade the Centrist and Right deputies to vote for Alessandri instead, who would then instantly step down, inducing elections in which former President Frei could stand again:

“This gambit, which was considered a constitutional solution to the Allende problem, consisted of inducing enough Congressional votes to elect Alessandri over Allende with the understanding that Alessandri would immediately resign, thus paving the way for a special election in which Frei would legally become a candidate. At the September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee, the Frei gam-bit was discussed, and the Committee authorized a contingency fund of \$250,000 for covert support of projects which Frei or his associates deemed important. The funds were to be handled by Ambassador Korry and used if it appeared that they would be needed by the moderate faction of the Christian Deniocratic [sic] Party to swing Congressional votes to Alessandri.” (Church Report 1975)

Eduardo Frei, however, did not consent to this deal, underscoring the respect of the regular and legitimate constitutional process, thereby ending the gambit. (Church Report 1975; Valenzuela 1978: 48)

As the first civilian attempt to prevent Allende from being elected failed, U.S. President Nixon requested on September 15th that preparations for a military coup were started, this time without the knowledge of the Department of State and Department of Defense:

“Half a decade later, in 1970, the CIA engaged in another special effort, this time at the express request of President Nixon and under the injunction not to inform the Departments of State or Defense or the Ambassador of the project. Nor was the 40 Committee ⁽²⁾ ever informed. The CIA attempted, directly, to foment a military coup in Chile. It passed three weapons to a group of Chilean officers who plotted a coup. Beginning with the kidnaping [sic] of Chilean Army Commander-in-Chief Rene Schneider.” (Church Report 1975)

Enhancing the anti-Communist propaganda and support of like-minded groups, economic measures were introduced in order to increase the pressure on the Chilean military and Right (in form of civilian protest) to enable a military coup. Due to the scope of action of the U.S. businesses in the Chilean industry and the U.S. influence in international financial institutions (e.g. the International Monetary Fund or the Inter-American Development Bank), the economy became severely strained. The artificially induced difficulties added to the already developing uncertainty which the upcoming election of a Marxist president brought about. The stock market plummeted; many people distrusted the future economic development and withdrew their assets from the banks, investing in gold and stocks of consumer goods. (Collier & Sater 1996: 328; Rinke 2007: 144) It became increasingly difficult for Chile to take out an international loan, as the U.S. discouraged their allies from supporting a Communist state. (Bogdanovic 2008: 77)

The military was put under pressure by means of the military aid:

“The Ambassador was also authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if Allende were seated, the military could expect no further military assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military that all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Congressional election on October 24.” (Church Report 1975)

As the economic strain was not enough to impede Congress from voting for Allende on October 24th 1970, nor did the military seem to take action proactively, the CIA plotted the kidnapping of the Army Commander-in-Chief René Schneider (known for his unconditional respect for the Constitution, refusing to partake in a coup). (Codoceo 2007: 30; Valenzuela 1978: 48 et seqq.) The operation was prepared by General Viaux, the weapons being supplied by the CIA. However, the kidnapping failed, and ended up in the death of General Schneider on October 25th, caused by a lethal wound resulting from his resistance to the kidnappers three days earlier. General Carlos Prats was assigned as his successor as Commander-in-Chief.

The reactions to the event were contrary to the expected outcome: Instead of overruling the popular vote, the majority of Congress deputies (153 to 35; the PN continuing its opposition) rallied behind Allende, enabling his inauguration on November 3rd as the first Socialist president in Chile.

The election of the Socialist Allende can be seen as the peak of a complete reorganisation of Chilean society. It would be misleading to infer from his relative majority that society as a whole had undergone a dramatic shift to the Left (after all, the winning margin had only been 39,175 votes – in a country counting nearly 8.9 million inhabitants by 1970) (Valenzuela 1978: 41; Codoceo 2007: 25); instead, as Valenzuela puts it, “Allende’s election was the

result of the inability of Chile's polarised political system to structure a winning majority coalition before the election and was further evidence of erosion of traditional mechanisms of political accommodation.” (1978: 39) Nevertheless, the plans of the UP for the upcoming years were very significant, aiming at nothing less than a project of complete social transformation – sought after within the constitutional and legal framework. This would prove very difficult, if not impossible, in the context of a minority presidency. (Valenzuela 1978: 39-41; Codoceo 2007: 22)

Salvador Allende Gossens, born in 1908 to a distinguished freemason, politically active family in Valparaíso, studied medicine and joined the Left movement against the Ibáñez regime while still in his twenties.³ He was one of the co-founders of the Socialist Party in 1933, and had long been in the Senate (president of the Senate from 1966) before running for presidency four times. (Collier & Sater 1996: 330)

In spite of the support in Congress for the confirmation as president, the PDC demanded that Allende sign a *Estatuto de Garantías Democráticas* (Statute of Constitutional Guarantees), a “somehow otiose clarification of freedoms already in the constitution.” (ibid. 328) That the PDC should insist on this reaffirmation “showed the deterioration of confidence between political leaders who had been close for decades” (Valenzuela 1978: 49), but was also a sign of the weak unity of the PDC: Tomic was part of the more liberal faction of the party and supported Allende. Many in the party did not, however, share his trust in the Socialist Allende. The demand of the *Estatuto* was aimed at appeasing the worries of this faction. (ibid.)

Not only Congress, but other key institutions as well, especially the judiciary (e.g. the *Contraloría*, Comptroller) were predominantly conservative, a fact which would later exacerbate the UP government's problems in enforcing its programme. (ibid. 44)

2. The programme and reforms of the *Unidad Popular* government

The UP government set as its goal not less than a *Vía Chilena al Socialismo* (Chilean Path to Socialism), implying a transformation of Chilean society towards the abolition of latifundia and the overcoming of the imperialist, oligarchic and monopolistic capitalist structures. (Codoceo 2007: 33; Tinke 2007: 144 et seqq.) A feature which distinguished Chile from other

³ Carlos Ibáñez del Campo was a dictatorial president from 1927-31 after the military uprising and coup against Arturo Alessandri (father of Jorge Alessandri, president from 1958-64 and PN candidate in 1970), and later again elected for a second presidency from 1952-58. (Codoceo 2007: 22)

Latin American Socialist countries was that this transformation did not imply the destruction of the old order and the completely new organisation of a revolutionary system on the debris of the old one, but a peaceful transition, respecting the Constitution and its democratic, pluralist and libertarian values. (Valenzuela 1978: 43 et seqq.)

In regard to the political ties and foreign relations, the UP did not intend to prioritise like-minded countries; relations should be equal and cooperative in general, emphasising Latin-American solidarity (especially within the Andean Pact). (Bogdanovic 2008: 80 et seqq.) The resumption of diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet and Communist countries were not meant to defy the U.S., but rather as an inclusion of all partners. Within Latin America, however, the resistance to U.S. influence was an important factor in the creation of a feeling of solidarity among the most affected countries (in which U.S. businesses held the largest share of assets). (ibid.) Although the U.S. was hostile of the Socialist Allende, the relations were not cut off. The reduction of the substantial military aid, the decrease of U.S. exports and the hindrance of international credits within the international financial institutions did, however, represent considerable reprisals for Chile (introduced as a reaction to the rise to power of a Socialist, only secondly because of the nationalisation of U.S. businesses).

The UP programme consisted of four principal strategies forming the *Via Chilena al Socialismo*, with the “ultimate goal [...] to transform class and property relations and to institute a new economic development scheme along Socialist lines” (Valenzuela 1978: 50): expansion of government programmes and services, income redistribution, state control of key industries, and extension of land reform.

One of the main concerns of the UP was to overcome the stark social divide, introducing programmes for social development (e.g. the *Desarrollo Social* programme (Social Development Programme)) on the one hand, and fomenting participation on the other hand. The industrial and agrarian reforms were geared to redistribute assets and revenues (in the 1960s, 3% of the industrial companies controlled approx. 60% of the assets, and 2% of landowners possessed 55% of the land) (Codoceo 2007: 33), an intense wage increase and employment offensive would incorporate more people in the working process. Programmes like the distribution of milk to children, of breakfasts, of food in general, free school books and uniforms were introduced to improve the lives of the socially weak. (Codoceo 2007: 34; Valenzuela 1978: 50; Bogdanovic 2008: 96) These measures had immediate positive effects:

“As a consequence of higher wages and new initiatives in health and nutrition, many poorer Chileans, perhaps for the first time in their lives, ate well and clothed themselves somewhat better than before.” (Collier & Sater 1996: 330) The aim was to create a spiral of growth: The wage increases financed by the state would spur demand and consequently production (inducing higher productivity and capacity of the manufacturing industries), which would in turn create more jobs and reduce unemployment, giving more people wages which they could again spend on Chilean consumer goods. (Valenzuela 1978: 50)

The development of participation, which had already seen many improvements and thresholds since its beginning in the Electoral Law of 1874 (initially “*Voto censitario*” (defined by property), 1925 male suffrage for literates, 1934/52 female suffrage (municipal/presidential), 1970 universal suffrage for citizens over 18) reached its peak in the inclusion of illiterates in 1972. (Codoceo 2007: 24; Rinke 2007: 145) The number of voters increased by 130% between 1958 and 1970. Politics were no longer “*eine Art Freizeitbeschäftigung oder sportliche Aktivität, um den sozialen Status zu zelebrieren*” (quoted in Codoceo 2007: 24), as Patricio Meller puts it, but permeated all social strata. The political process increasingly became accessible to all sorts of demands and ideals, creating and fomenting new sorts of organisations and structures. (Collier & Sater 1996: 331) The number of unions grew from 1,997 in 1952 to 4,551 in 1970, the farmer organisations from 33 in 1965 to 510 in 1970. The urbanisation of Chilean society (from 43% in 1907 to 75.1% in 1970) implied a better access to (and heightened demand for) consumer goods. (Codoceo 2007: 24-25)

The overall improvement of the neglected weaker social strata would hopefully induce a rise in popularity of the UP government, which would then broaden the support for Allende (from 34.9% in the 1970 election). (Valenzuela 1978: 51)

Setting forth and intensifying the initiated reforms of the Frei government, the UP strived for the nationalisation and socialisation of the key industries and services (copper, ore and saltpeter; electricity, transport, communications – mainly in U.S. possession). Many sectors had already been nationalised (steel, oil fields, refineries, railroads, airlines) or enjoyed state participation through the *Corporación de Fomento a la Producción* (CORFO, Production Development Corporation) under the previous government. However, the still perceived dependency on imports and foreign corporations – perceived as the main obstacle to development and growth – would be completely overcome when the Chilean state took control of all its industries and large corporations (Collier & Sater 1996: 334 et seqq.), thereby

facilitating the creation of a non-discriminatory egalitarian society. Furthermore, the new revenues would finance the planned extensive social programmes. It was Allende's conviction that this was to be achieved by the democratic means compliant with the legal and constitutional settings.

The importance of copper for the Chilean economy cannot be understated. Possessing the biggest copper deposits worldwide (approx. 40%), Chile was and continues to be the main copper exporter worldwide. The industry was, however, in the possession of a few U.S. corporations (e.g. Anaconda and Kennecott), the revenues (making up 70% of the total foreign exchange) not staying in Chile. (Codoceo 2007: 33; Collier & Sater 1996: 334) The necessary constitutional reform was passed unanimously in Congress on July 11th 1971, establishing that the state was, hitherto, owner of all mineral and natural resources in Chile, but that the former proprietors would be remunerated for the nationalisation. In these terms, nationalisation did not necessarily imply a conflict with U.S. relations. However, compensation was thus calculated:

“El monto de la indemnización, o indemnizaciones, según los casos, podrá determinarse sobre la base del costo original de dichos bienes, deducidas las amortizaciones, depreciaciones, castigos y desvalorización por obsolescencia. También podrá deducirse del monto de la indemnización el todo o parte de las rentabilidades excesivas que hubieren obtenido las empresas nacionalizadas.”⁴ (Ley N° 17.450 Reforma la Constitución Política del Estado)

This regulation resulted in most of the former proprietors actually owing the Chilean state money for the nationalisation (Anaconda US\$78 million, Kennecott US\$310 million). (Collier & Sater 1996: 334 et seqq.) The reactions of the U.S. were no less sweeping: External accounts were frozen or confiscated, the financial boycott expanded and the delivery of much needed spare parts (especially for the copper industry) refused. Furthermore, the companies brought the case to foreign courts (in Europe and the U.S.), some actually producing the retention of copper shipments in international ports. (Codoceo 2007: 33; Rinke 2007: 148; Collier & Sater 1996: 335 et seqq.)

The copper industry was assembled in the new *Corporación del Cobre* (CODELCO, Copper Corporation) which administered the sector henceforth. Soon after copper, the ore and saltpetre mining followed.

After the nationalisation, a centrally planned economy was to be built up consisting of three sectors: a “Social Area” (fully state-owned), a “Mixed Area” (compounding state and private ownership, the state being the majority stockholder), and a “Private Area” (without state

⁴ The amount of the compensation, or compensations, depending on the case, will be determined according to the original cost of the concerned goods, deducing the amortisations, the depreciations, penalisations and devaluation due to obsolescence. Furthermore, the amount of the compensation of the excessive returns that the nationalised companies have obtained can also be deduced. (own translation)

ownership, small businesses). (Collier & Sater 1996: 341) The mixed sector, however, did not materialise, leaving the two other sectors as exclusive options. As to the division into Private and Social Area, opinions differed within the UP coalition: the Communists and the Radicals favoured only the takeover of truly monopolising companies, allowing for small businesses to remain in private hands. The Socialists and the MAPU on the other hand insisted on all means of production being nationalised, without any exemptions. (Collier & Sater 1996: 341)

The newly nationalised sectors were protected from foreign competition by high import tariffs – ranging from 105 to 750%. (Codoceo 2007: 33-34)

The project submitted in October 1971 proposing the nationalisation of all companies exceeding around US\$1 million in net worth (253 altogether) against compensation in “interest-bearing bonds equal to the 1969 book value of their assets, small-time investors receiving an adjustment for inflation, larger shareholders getting a less favorable deal” (Collier & Sater 1996: 341) met strong resistance from the opposition in Congress. In order to get the reform through, Allende used a long forgotten decree (DFL 520) from the short-lived Socialist Republic of 1932 (under Colonel Marmaduke Grove, from June 4th to September 14th 1932) which allowed for nationalisation of “essential” industrial companies in the case they infringed the law – a formulation which was interpreted very generously by the UP (any minor infraction would do). (ibid. 1996: 341 et seq.; Rinke 2007: 146) Another legacy from the past, dating from the Popular Front period, enabled the state to “requisition factories should they fail to operate efficiently, though without transferring formal ownership to the state”. (Collier & Sater 1996: 342) Here again any strike activity (often encouraged by the leftist unions) or disruption of production was enough for the UP to send in its *interventores* (inspectors/comptrollers) to take charge of the factories. Within a short period of time, the state had also gained control over the food, entertainment, textile and IT industry. “By 1973, through a combination of requisitions, seizures, and purchases of stock, the state controlled 80 percent of the country’s industrial output, upward of 400 enterprises, and around 60 percent of GNP.” (Alberto Baltra 1973: 53-54 quoted in Collier & Sater 1996: 342)

Another reform initiated by the Frei government was the agrarian reform, which was to be intensified and accelerated. The remaining *haciendas* and latifundia were seized by the state, re-divided and allocated to new agrarian units: *asentamientos* (introduced by the Frei government), *Centros de Reforma Agraria* (CERA, Agrarian Reform Centres) or *Centros de Producción* (CEPRO, Production Centres). Farm workers were allowed direct participation in

the new *Consejos Campesinos* (Farmer Councils) and were henceforth state employees. (Rinke 2007: 148 et seqq.; Collier & Sater 1996: 338 et seqq.)

By 1972 60% of the cultivable land had been seized by the state and distributed to cooperatives and farmers, and only 3% of the farms were left which exceeded eighty hectares (compared to 55% in 1965). (Codoceo 2007: 34; Collier & Sater 1996: 337 et seqq.)

One of the most important problems to tackle was inflation, an ever-present implication in the Chilean economy for decades. Social expenditures exploded due to the new social programmes (health, housing, education, social security) and the assumption of the part of main investor in the key industries. As a reaction, the state nationalised the banking sector to gain control over credit, then pouring money into the economy in the hope that the structural transformations would eventually slow down inflation. (Rinke 2007: 146; Valenzuela 1978: 52) The prices of consumer products were held down through increasing price regulation (the price for electricity fell by 85%, for telephone by 33%, for postal services by 22% and for gas by 21%), in the belief that this would only be necessary until production met the increasing demand. Additionally, wages were raised by 55% in 1971. (Codoceo 2007: 34; Collier & Sater 1996: 43)

In order to bring its programme across, but also to ensure support from the increasingly participant masses, the UP set forth the nationalisation of the media (newspapers, magazines, radio), but also the creation of new newspapers and magazines and a state publishing house. The contents were mainly propagandistic, acting as a counterbalance to the (partly CIA-subsidised) Right media which did not hesitate in criticising and defaming the government's acts. Striving for a monopoly of the media, the UP exerted pressure on the oppositional papers through advertisement placement: The nationalisation of the industry and businesses meant that the advertising was also ruled by the state, which was a vital part of the newspapers' funding. (Bogdanovic 2008: 85)

The messages were also transmitted through a cultural offensive, the Concientización (Awareness Raising) consisting of cultural and artistic promotion (fighting the cultural imperialism from the U.S., with critics (Ariel Dorfman) and singers (Angel Parra) raising awareness and support for the *Vía Chilena*) (Rinke 2007: 150 et seqq.), and the planning of a new educational system, the *Escuela Nacional Unida* (ENU, National Unified School, 1973). The first concern was to democratise and provide better access to the schooling system for all

children, especially the poor. The main idea however was to instigate the creation of the “*hombre nuevo*”,

“the new man ..., free to develop himself fully in a non-capitalist society, and who will express himself as a personality ... conscious of and in solidarity with the revolutionary process, who is ... technically and scientifically able to develop the economy in a society in transition to socialism.” (Farrell 1986: 96 quoted in Collier & Sater 1996: 352)

The sense of Socialist collectivity was to become primordial in the education of the young Chileans, as opposed to the individualism fomented by Capitalism. (Bogdanovic 2007: 87)

All in all, the first year of the UP government was a very good one economically, with purchasing power as high as never before (thanks to wage increases and price regulation), GNP going up 3.8% in 1971, industrial production soaring by 12.1% and unemployment declining, reaching 3.9% in 1971. (Collier & Sater 1996: 343) The intended consequence of a higher demand for basic goods was achieved. The opposition was still in disarray after the shock of the election and did not yet combine their efforts against the UP measures. However, demand could only be met through the exploitation of available but limited inventories and supplies of raw materials, as well as consumption of the foreign currency reserves for the growing imports. As the reserves became exhausted, the balance quickly became negative. Chilean (especially agricultural) production could not keep up with the internal demand, making the import of basic goods a priority (to the detriment of other urgently needed technical equipment). (Valenzuela 1978: 52)

3. The problems and backlashes of the UP government

Although Allende remained faithful to his intention of not infringing the Constitution and the legal regulations, the resistance to the UP reforms and the problems arising with them eventually led to a violent abruption of the *Vía chilena al Socialismo* through a military coup. The heralds of the coup, however, were quite apparent from the beginning of the UP government, and emanated from many different social and political groups. The most important elements which paved the way to the breakdown of democracy were the strong radicalisation and polarisation of the political parties and of society, and the erosion of a viable Centre which could reach a compromise; the increased participation and mobilisation of the masses, which eventually got out of control of the parties; and finally the economic and institutional crises which brought the country to a standstill. (Codoceo 2007: 21; Valenzuela 1978: 59)

The *Partido Nacional* had not supported the election of Allende in Congress in 1970, and its stance towards the UP did not in any way improve through the planned reforms. Quite on the contrary, the reforms mostly affected its traditional clientele, the oligarchy and rural landlords. The support by the CIA and U.S. businesses was not enough to impede Allende's rise to power; for many, this was a sign that the democratic process had failed in representing their interests. The radicalised faction created on April 1st 1971, the *Patria y Libertad*, headed by Pablo Rodriguez, did not stop at using illegal and violent means in order to sabotage and hinder the new government's plans. It was repeatedly involved in armed street battles with the brigades of the radicalised Left (see below). (Codoceo 2007: 30)

The *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* was challenged by the task of keeping its unity as a Centrist party, in midst of an increasingly polarised political system. The Christian Democrats were not a uniform mass, but also had factions with different tendencies and affiliations. The presidential election had taught many of the party members that an approximation to the Left was not prone to succeed. In between the Left and Right blocks, the Centrists needed to redefine their stance, and present a viable alternative to the other parties, a difficult task in a traditionally polarised political system. One of its most important goals was to gain the sympathy and support of the associations, corporations and unions dissatisfied with the UP reforms. In this point, the PDC was quite successful, and the effects on the reforms were considerable, as the strikes and boycotts further undermined the government's legitimacy. (Codoceo 2007: 30) The agrarian reform, the nationalisation and the confiscation of property affected its clientele to a degree in which any compromise would signify treason to its principles.

However, the gains in sympathy did not reflect in the municipal election results in 1971. This was an important turning point in the PDC's stance: The PDC then decided that light opposition was not enough, and that a broader mobilisation and less accommodation would be needed to gain more support. (Valenzuela 1978: 72)

"For the PDC, the middle months of 1971 were something like a moment of truth. Any attempt at cooperation with the UP threatened it with a loss of identity and to confer on it the status of a political chameleon [...]. The logic of traditional party competition more or less compelled it to assume an opposition stance." (Collier & Sater 1996: 347)

The polarisation of the PDC was enhanced in June 1971 when the former Minister of the Interior under Frei, Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, was assassinated by terrorists of an extremist leftist group, the *Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo* (VOP, People's Organised Vanguard).

The same terrorists had been released from prison through an amnesty granted at the inauguration of Allende. Although Allende quickly disarmed the VOP, it was not able to crush the remaining paramilitary groups (such as the MIR), thereby infuriating the PDC, who decided to mobilise a militant group of its own. (Rinke 2007: 152) The peak of the mobilisation was the PDC's part in the creation of the *Frente Nacional de Defensa Gremial* (National Front of Union Defence) in 1973, representing over one thousand associations, which organised strikes and manifestations. (Codoceo 2007: 31)

The PDC and the PN eventually collaborated in so-called *Comités Democráticos* (CODEs) in order to coordinate their parliamentary opposition to the UP government and to build a coalition in upcoming elections (eventually leading to the victory of their joint candidates in the parliamentary elections). The U.S. were no longer the target of criticism; instead, international Communism and the UP specifically rose to the common enemy which would unite the opposition. Initiated as a democratic movement, it soon took to the streets in its opposition to the governmental measures. In all its destabilisation efforts, the opposition was generously supported by the U.S. through the CIA (amounting to US\$8 million until 1973) and the economic sanctions. (Codoceo 2007: 30-35; Rinke 2007: 154)

The *Unidad Popular* was an even more diversified coalition, with important ideological differences also pertaining to the means to be used in order to change the political, social and economic structures. The Communist party, the Radicals and a moderate group within the Socialist party, which Allende can be attributed to, strived at a peaceful, gradual transformation of society without any transgression of the democratic and parliamentary process. Any change or measure should be legitimised by legal (especially constitutional) means, even if this meant a delay of the process.

However, the more radical faction, especially the part of the Socialist Party headed by secretary-general Carlos Altamirano (surging after the XXII. Kongress in 1967 and which strongly sympathised with the Marxist-Leninist militant *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria*, MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the MAPU, already wary of the democratic and constitutional rules of the political system from the beginning, grew ever more intransigent as the problems became more and more apparent. (Codoceo 2007: 28 et seqq.; Collier & Sater 1996: 332) Their conviction was that the way to Socialism was necessarily an armed revolution, as the Cuban Revolution in 1959 had showed. In this conclusion they differed completely from the moderate faction. This ideological difference

led to independent illegal actions of these groups, which were attributed to the UP, but did not at all reflect the entire coalition's conviction, nevertheless considerably undermining its legitimacy. (Codoceo 2007: 23 et seqq.) Even as it became obviously clear that the continuation of its measures would lead to an inevitable downfall, Allende was not able to resist the pressure from the militant factions. The attempts by Allende to integrate and thereby soothe these radical groups through concessions and amnesties (e.g. on December 31st 1971 of all the convicted MIR-members) proved counterproductive, and only contributed to a further alienation of the opposition. From the beginning, President Allende had not been in control of his own political coalition. (Codoceo 2007: 28; Collier & Sater 1996: 332)

The radicalisation of political discourse emanating from the 1960s now permeated all social groups, making a compromise which could have overcome the crisis increasingly out of reach. An important factor in the radicalisation of society were the media, which either disseminated propaganda for or against the UP government. The opposition media enjoyed a large share of the funds from the CIA and U.S. businesses with the aim of discrediting the government and Communism in general. The exaggeration and also invention of negative news and facts became a specialty of the increasingly extremist media. (Rinke 2007: 147; Valenzuela 1978: 70 et seqq.)

What the radicalised factions of each coalition had in common was the belief that the only way to reach their goals (as different as they could be) was through a violent uprising (of the masses and/or of the military), and that the legal and constitutional channels were not effective. These groups had only constituted a fraction of the parties in 1970, but gradually swelled, finally taking over control of the Left, and the Centrist and Right blocks. (Valenzuela 1978: 45 et seqq.)

Mobilisation had been an important factor during the Frei government and the presidential elections in 1970. The manifestations and assemblies, which had originally been a phenomenon of the Left parties, were increasingly arranged by the opposition, which was now strongly represented in the unions. As a mainly oppositional instrument, strikes got out of control of the UP, being used by the opposition to further exert pressure on the government through economic strain. An important strike which literally paralysed the economy was the strike of the truckers in October 1972. More than 12,000 truckage companies participated in the strike, demanding a better protection of the private sector from arbitrary nationalisations. As commodities could not be delivered, the strike led to a serious shortcut of basic goods,

strongly affecting all social groups and bringing about even more discontent. (Codoceo 2007: 31) The reaction of the government of jailing the strike leaders only led to further turmoil and mobilisation. The number of strikes rose dramatically within few years:

Table 3. Number of strikes in the private sector, 1965-1972

	1965	1969	1971	1972
Strikes	564	977	2.377	2.475

Source: Codoceo 2007: 31

Although the mobilisation had been triggered by the political parties, it became increasingly independent, with the social and economic groups taking control of the actions. Several *gremios* (unions; shopkeepers, farmers, merchants, doctors, lawyers among others) joined the new *Comando Nacional de Defensa* (National Defence Command) which would articulate their interests and coordinate their actions – for the first time, as Collier and Sater point out, a “grass-roots mass mobilization which owed little or nothing to the political parties, although both the PDC and the National party predictably endorsed the nationwide action”. (1996: 349; cf. Valenzuela 1978: 78)

Reacting to the mobilisation of the opposition, middle- und upper-classes, the radicalised groups of the UP coalition reacted by expropriating further factories and property (incorporated into the *cordones industriales*, industrial belts), and organising so-called *comandos comunales* (community commands) in local community groups. (Collier & Sater 1996: 349 et seqq.) These new structures were often paramilitary and only exacerbated the feeling of threat already dominating the middle- and upper-classes. However, according to Valenzuela, the middle- and upper-class counter-mobilisation had the largest share of impact:

“[...] throughout the Allende period radicalized sectors of the working class remained a minority, and the most significant destabilizing and uncontrolled mobilization would continue to be the counter-mobilization of the middle class. The breakdown of Chilean democracy was more the result of counter-mobilization against perceived threats than excessive mobilization of sectors demanding their due.” (Valenzuela 1978: 79)

One of the most important problems of increased and independent mobilisation was the simultaneous loss of importance of the democratic and legal channels, and the loss of control of parties’ followers. (ibid. 1978: 80)

A controversial measure of the UP government which compelled the masses to take to the street was the *Escuela Normal Unificada* (Standard Unified School), designed to form a new sort of citizens taught in the “Socialist Humanism” tradition. The plan disgruntled the private and confessional education sectors (criticising the neglect of Christian values), but also the military: Apart from opposing to the state controlling and influencing the education system,

the military strongly objected to a Communist indoctrination of the children, which they deemed as the worst of all scenarios (see below). (Rinke 2007: 152; Collier & Sater 1996: 352 et seqq.) Allende decided to delay the implementation, and the provision was negotiated in the following months.

The financial and economic boycott staged by the U.S. represented a severe setback to the economy. The U.S. had been the most important trade partner of Chile hitherto, accounting for 37.3% of Chilean imports in 1970. (Valenzuela 1978: 56) The import substitution policy of the government combined with the boycott of nearly all goods by the U.S. reduced the proportion to 10% in 1972. (ibid.) However, the Chilean industry was not able to replace the supplies, and even less meet the exploding demand for commodities and produce in Chile. The soaring social expenditure and the necessary increased imports of basic goods (not to mention technological equipment) depleted the Chilean foreign currency reserves within few months (by 1972 56% of the export earnings were spent on food purchases; the trade deficit rising from US\$18 million to US\$255 million in 1972). (Collier & Sater 1996: 340 et seqq.) New international loans were desperately needed to make up for the insufficient national revenues, but were blocked by the U.S. at the main financial institutions (IMF, IDB, World Bank). The resort to other Socialist and Latin American countries for economic assistance was not able to avert a further economic deterioration. (ibid. 345; Rinke 2007: 148)

The nationalisation of industry and the agrarian reform did not have the expected outcome of a substantial increase in productivity and profits. One hindering factor was the custom of appointing insufficiently qualified, but politically loyal personnel for the management of the new companies and cooperatives (the *interventores*). The priority of the UP government was to employ as many people as possible (leading to the inflationary filling of jobs) and Left party members in special, even if their qualifications and profiles did not at all meet the needs of the companies they were appointed to. (Codoceo 2007: 23; Collier & Sater 1996: 343) This is shown quite clearly in the mining industry: While employment in the mines increased by 45%, per capita production decreased by 19%. (Collier & Sater 1996: 335 et seqq.) These measures, combined with the emigration of technical experts who were not interested in being paid in the comparatively worthless *escudo*, created a lack of technical know-how and did not raise production, but rather contrarily reduced it (the productivity of the mining industry fell by 30%). (Codoceo 2007: 335; Rinke 2007: 147) Furthermore, the appointment of managers and *interventores* often met resistance by staff sympathising with the opposition, who refused

to obey a leftist supervisor. The rise of the oppositional unions led to struggles within the mines and corporations, strikes and a general collapse of labour discipline. (ibid.; Valenzuela 1978: 66)

“In the days of American ownership, the Left had consistently supported the miners’ demands for higher wages. After nationalization, the government expected them to moderate or perhaps even forgo such demands. The workers refused, and the Christian Democrats, who now dominated the mining unions, encouraged their discontent in order to embarrass the government.” (Collier & Sater 1996: 336)

The government reacted by jailing the union’s leaders or sending the *Carabineros* to cease the manifestations. Repeatedly the *Carabineros*, but also the militant Left made use of armed force against the protesters, claiming some deaths. Allende quickly moved to apologise for the casualties, but his lack of effective control over the militant groups of the UP only contributed to the widespread indignation at the events. (Collier & Sater 1996: 336)

Furthermore, technical equipment (machinery) and especially spare parts were predominantly U.S.-made. With the boycotts launched by the U.S. and the prioritisation of basic goods in import, it became almost impossible to get the necessary parts. With the default of infrastructure and equipment, it is not surprising that the production and according revenues (especially in the copper industry) could not rise as had been planned.

The already or soon to be expropriated factory owners stopped investing in their plants, a default the UP administration was not able to compensate. Additionally, the copper price fell by 35 cents per pound between 1970 and 1973, further reducing the profits of the mining industry. (Collier & Sater 1996: 337)

Soon workers (often spurred by the MIR) began taking over factories, which would then form so-called *cordones industriales*, where not the state, but workers controlled production. (ibid. 337-343; Rinke 2007; 147) These areas were not only out of control of the government (which reacted with tolerance), but were also seen as a threat by private factory owners. This created a strong support for the Centrist *Frente Nacional de Defensa Gremial*.

In the rural areas, the myriad of different forms of cooperatives and associations carried out by differing UP members was very confusing and lead to almost completely uncoordinated measures. (Collier & Sater 1996: 337) The UP administration literally lost control of the process of reorganisation it had launched. The different factions had differing conceptions which they put into practice.

On the other hand, the regulation of prices led to a decrease of revenue for the agricultural products, further exacerbating the problem of insufficient investment. Companies and

cooperatives struggled to keep production going (productivity actually decreasing by 23%), while demand kept on soaring as the purchasing power kept increasing. (Codoceo 2007: 35)

The stances to the solution of these problems differed within the UP coalition. While the Communists, Radicals and more moderate Socialists (including Allende) favoured a more careful continuation, the radicalised faction insisted on an acceleration of the pace. The moderate faction was not able to stand up to the radicalised pressure, and so the reforms were further intensified and expanded.

A very crucial aspect to the agrarian reform were the illegal *tomas*, land seizures by farmers mostly encouraged by the radicalised Left.

Table 4. Number of rural *tomas* and strikes, 1967-1971

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
<i>Tomas</i>	13 ² / 9 ³	26	148	456	1,278
Strikes	693	648	1,127	1,580	1,758

² Codoceo 2007: 31

³ Valenzuela 1978: 53

Sources: Codoceo 2007: 31; de Vylder 1976: 205 quoted in Valenzuela 1978: 53

The MIR penetrated the rural sector and organised the farmers in the so-called *Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Farmer Movement) and several *comandos campesinos* (farmer commands). (Rinke 2007: 149) The *Movimiento* went about illegally seizing properties, without respecting the 80 hectares regulation of the government. Again, Allende was in a predicament and had to decide whether to punish or tolerate the farmers performing the *tomas*. The president's resort was less than ideal:

“To escape from this dilemma, Allende resorted to subterfuge: a little-known provision of the reform law allowed the government to seize an estate and appoint an *interventor* (temporary administrator) should a strike or stoppage interrupt work. Use of this measure enabled the government to placate the “ultras,” while remaining within the letter of the law, but it did little to sweeten the opposition's temper.” (Collier & Sater 1996: 337-338)

Resistance came from the farmers who had profited from the Frei reforms and who now saw their properties in danger. Supported by the Christian Democrat unions, they resisted any attempt of control by the government and of seizure by militant groups. As the colleagues from the industrial sector, the oppositional agrarian unions staged manifestations demanding a more advantageous reorganisation (including private plots of land) of the land. Mirroring the development in the copper industry, decreased productivity, farmer unrest, the drastic reduction of important investments by farmers fearing an impending *toma*, but also poor weather dramatically cut on the agricultural production. (Collier & Sater 1996: 340) In addition, many farmers employed in the state plots were more concerned in growing their

private produce, which they could then sell for a multiple of the state price at the black market, than in contributing to the economy.

The shortages of basic goods and decreasing production combined with an undiminished purchasing power generated a burgeoning black market, as well as hoardings. (Codoceo 2007: 35, 346) Inflation got completely out of hand, reaching 1634.4% in December 1972 and 1087% in 1973. The government was not able to counterbalance the inflation (pouring more money into the economy), the decrease in investment and the defective production, as its deficit also soared from 6.6% in 1970 to 30% in 1973. (Codoceo 2007: 35)

However, the crises did not affect the electoral support of the UP coalition. Quite on the contrary, it was able to increase its winning margin in the April 1971 municipal elections (gaining 49.7% of the vote). However, this must be seen as a further sign for the polarisation of society:

“One of the most important characteristics of the 1971 vote is that it reflected further political polarization. Because the electorate perceived the contest to be between a Popular Unity coalition and a more status quo-oriented opposition, it threw more of its support to the two parties on the extremes, the Socialists and the Nationals. All of the centrist parties, including the Christian Democrats and two Radical fragments, lost support in absolute terms with respect to the previous election.” (Valenzuela 1978: 54)

The increase in electoral support did not reflect a clear majority of the population. There were still many Chileans who did not back the UP and its far-reaching reforms, and who furthermore supported the increasingly radicalised opposition to the government. And the results in the municipal elections did not change the power distribution in Congress (two-fifths of the Chamber, one-third of the Senate). As a matter of fact, the UP candidates were actually mostly defeated by united opposition candidates in most congressional by-elections, as well as union and university positions. (Collier & Sater 1996: 331 et seqq.; Valenzuela 1978: 58)

In order to weaken the legislative resistance in Congress, in November 1971, the UP planned a constitutional amendment which would introduce a unicameral legislature. (Collier & Sater 1996: 347) This change would have further strengthened the presidential power, a tendency which had been started already in the decades preceding the UP's electoral victory. The president could dissolve parliament once within a presidential term. The reform, expectedly, did not pass Congress, and was dropped as the UP hoped to make up for the majority at the following congressional elections in 1973. (ibid. 333)

In February 1972 a constitutional amendment passed Congress that forbid any expropriations which were not legitimised by Congress. Making use of his presidential veto, Allende blocked the proposal. However, the opposition voted to override the presidential veto, claiming that a simple majority was sufficient for that matter. This triggered a major political crisis, as Allende insisted that a two-thirds majority was necessary to override the president. As the constitutional regulation was not clear in this point, the opposition demanded a plebiscite, which Allende refused. The matter was to be resolved later on. In June 1972 another constitutional amendment was introduced by the PDC, this time forbidding the seizure of farms smaller than forty hectares. The argument over the amendment was increasingly accompanied by violence on the streets, caused by the demonstrations and counter-demonstrations of the extremist groups. (Collier & Sater 1996: 349) In order to contain violence, a new *Ley de control de armas* (Arms Control Law) went into effect in October 1972. Unfortunately, it had little effect on the increasingly violent confrontations. (Rinke 2007: 153 et seqq.)

As a reaction to the UP reforms, and denouncing the food shortages and soaring inflation, on December 1st 1971 middle- and upper-class housewives organised a “March of the Empty Saucepans” during the visit of Fidel Castro to Chile. When leftist groups assaulted and attacked the demonstrators, the opposition planned to impeach the Minister of the Interior, José Tohá. In order to avoid this, Allende relocated him at the ministry of Defence.

The impeachment of UP ministers became a recurring instrument of the opposition to pressurise the government. (Rinke 2007: 153) Tax increases were constantly vetoed in Congress, impeding the government of collecting urgently needed money. (Valenzuela 1978: 71) In November 1972 Allende appointed the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Carlos Prats as new Minister of the Interior as a measure to appease the opposition.

Another sector where the UP met great resistance was Justice (the *Contraloría* and the courts). The institutions and courts were mainly staffed with conservative personnel, which not only refused to arbitrate the congressional conflicts (especially regarding the voting regulations for vetoes), but also openly criticised the government. The conflict went as far as a declaration by the Justice on May 7th 1973 that the government had breached the law, and on May 26th that the rule of law was in a crisis in Chile. (Codoceo 2007: 35)

The upcoming congressional elections in March 1973 were seen as decisive for the future of the political crisis: If the opposition united in the *Confederación de la Democracia* (Democracy Confederation) won three-thirds of the votes, it could not only override the presidential vetoes, but also impeach Allende himself. With the sabotage, legislative blockade, the mass mobilisation and negative propaganda, the opposition hoped that the hardship and instability would guarantee a landslide victory. (Valenzuela 1978: 77; Collier & Sater 1996: 351)

4. The downfall of the UP government

To the distress of the opposition, the gains it made in the congressional elections of March 1973 (reaching 55.7%, as opposed to 51.7% in 1969) missed the necessary two-thirds majority it had hoped for. (Valenzuela 1978: 77) The expected punishment of the government did not materialise. The president could not be impeached by Congress. As the constitutional and democratic processes had been depleted, the election marked a turning point in the strategies of the opposition, which now predominantly believed that a military coup would be the only solution out of the crisis. (ibid.)

Attempts by the UP moderate wing to reach an understanding with the Christian Democrats were made (in March, June 1972 and July 1973), but were mostly undermined by actions and pressure by the intransigent factions of both blocks. Polarisation and enmity were already too strong to stem the tide: the Chilean society was split up in two intransigent blocks. (Valenzuela 1978: 77 et seqq.; Collier & Sater 1996: 348 et seqq.)

The military was actually materially better off during the UP years than under the preceding Frei and Alessandri governments. However, the increasing armed confrontations on the street between Left and Right extremist groups were a sign that the government had lost the monopoly of the use of force in spite of the *Ley de control de armas* (Arms Control Law). The verbal attacks by paramilitary Marxist groups (calling for a replacement of the military by workers' militias) soon were complemented by disdain by the opposition, which sought to provoke a reaction of the Armed Forces. The Right was not reluctant to openly urge the military to intervene and take control of the state. (Collier & Sater 1996: 353; Rinke 2007: 155)

A precursor of the developments to come was the rebellion of the Second Armoured Regiment on June 29th 1973, known as the *Tancazo*, which clearly showed the discontent of

large sections of the military. (Rinke 2007: 155) The result was lenient, as General Prats managed to stop the coup. However, in the meantime, the Left unionists had encouraged the seizure of more than 350 factories and incorporation in the *cordones industriales*, which they refused to restitute – a further sign that Allende was not in control of power. Allende tried to counteract the impending downfall by appointing more ministries to military personnel (General Prats became Minister of Defence, Admiral Raúl Montero Minister of Finance, General César Ruiz Minister of Public Works). This step, however, came too late, as the opposition, and the military as well had lost all belief in a constitutional solution. (Collier & Sater 1996: 354 et seqq.; Rinke 2007: 156)

The parallel structures of the military, which had been mostly isolated from civil society in the preceding decades (“military in barracks”), were strongly influenced by the U.S. promoted Doctrine of National Security, which elevated the fight against Communism to a national security issue. The officers agreed that it was the duty of the military to protect the Chilean Constitution and state from extremism and decay. However, the means to enforce this, and especially the borders within which the military could act, were interpreted in various ways. (Rinke 2007: 156)

The military was also provoked by the MIR and militant UP factions which assassinated Commander Arturo Araya on July 26th, and a month later a young Army lieutenant. The paramilitary organisations were keen on an armed confrontation, of which they hoped to emerge victorious (as in the Cuban Revolution). (Collier & Sater 1996: 355 et seqq.; Rinke 2007: 155)

On August 22nd, Congress adopted a resolution,

„die die Exekutive des wiederholten Verfassungsbruchs, der Auhöhlung [sic] der Bürgerrechte und der Zulassung außerhalb der Verfassung stehender Parallelorgane bezichtigte und den Präsidenten sowie vor allem die den Streitkräften angehörigen Minister unter Verweis auf ihre Gehorsamspflicht gegenüber den anderen Verfassungsorganen aufforderte, diese Lage sofort zu ändern.“ (Rinke 2007: 156)

Many authors have interpreted this resolution as an appeal to the military to intervene. (cf. Rinke 2007: 156; Collier & Sater 1996: 356) The final proposition by Allende in early September was to call a plebiscite, a possibility still being discussed when the government was overthrown in the military coup.

The group of officers (including General Prats) who respected the Constitution to the point that they would rather try to strengthen than to overthrow a democratically legitimised president, was increasingly edged out by the more radical faction. (Rinke 2007: 156) Eventually, the other Generals passed a vote of no confidence in General Prats, who subsequently resigned from his post. The way was cleared for the military to take action.

IV Historical Oversight Part 3: The Pinochet Regime

As the UP government was unable to concentrate on its programme, the political parties reached a point on which no compromise in any form seemed to be possible, and the judiciary institutions either withdrew from the process or intervened in a clearly partisan way, the only apparently neutral power left which still enjoyed some legitimacy from most sides was the military. (Valenzuela 1978: 82) The expectations both sides (the supporters and opponents of the UP) had towards the military were quite opposite: The opposition expected them to overthrow Allende, subsequently restoring the executive power to them. The UP on the other hand hoped that the military would affirm its loyalty to the Constitution and support the government through active participation (i.e. in the ministries) and curbing the protests.

The military however could not be seen as homogenous. Quite on the contrary, the incorporation of officers and commanders into several ministries only exacerbated the cleavage between the two factions which had developed throughout the UP period. While some abhorred the UP so much they supported any means to overthrow it, others were loyal to the Constitution to a point where they would not violate it even to get rid of a government which they did not fully support, and which was obviously not able to control the situation. (Valenzuela 1978: 82-83) Ironically, because it was increasingly included in the struggle to solve the political crisis precisely because it was considered to be neutral, the military was actually further politicised. The traditional separation of society and the military did not withstand the political undertow of the 1960s and early 1970s.

With the increase of violence and attacks on the military from both Left and Right militants, the “Constitutionalist” officers in the military were eventually replaced by more amenable ones. (ibid. 99-104) This process culminated in the removal of General Prats (Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Minister of Defence) and Admiral Raúl Montero (Commander-in-Chief of the navy) from their posts (after the other generals told them they did not enjoy their trust any more), two of the last few commanding officers opposing a coup. (ibid. 99) General Augusto Pinochet succeeded General Prats as Commander-in-Chief, assuming the highest office in the military.

1. The military coup

The military coup itself was not planned with much anticipation, contrarily to what might have been expected; the concrete actions were only planned a few days before the date, at a meeting on September 8th in Valparaiso. A document was prepared and signed by Admiral José Toribio Merino (Navy), General Gustavo Leigh (Air Force), General Augusto Pinochet (Army) and General César Mendoza from the *Carabineros* on the 10th, stipulating the date and procedure of the coup. (Rinke 2007: 157) The consent by General Pinochet had not been taken for granted before. Until the last minute shift he was considered a Constitutionalist officer. (ibid. 156 et seqq.; Valenzuela 1978: 105 et seqq.) Later on he would, however, portray himself as the mastermind behind the planning of the coup.

This does not mean that the wish and the disposition were not present before. The process, as has been shown, was a long and complicated one, which eventually culminated in the military coup.

The manoeuvres did not raise any suspicion as they were performed one week before the commemorations of the historical *Junta de Gobierno* on September 18th (1810, one of the first important milestones in the independence process of Chile). The attack began in Valparaiso early in the morning at around 4:30 a.m., spreading out throughout the country, the different regiments taking over city by city, until they finally reached Santiago.

The military had expected to meet a major armed resistance by leftist militias (a belief much spurred by the Right and the media, and vindicated by the MIR). Instead, the few attempts at resisting organised by the MIR and the militant Socialists were quickly curbed, even in the supposedly heavily armed capital. The militant Left realised for the first time that the overestimation of its own power and the underestimation of the Army's initiative would have fatal consequences. (Rinke 2007: 157; Codoceo 2007 44-46)

The main connecting roads to the capital were cut off, the leftist broadcasting stations were occupied. At 8:40 a.m. the military broadcast (on *Radio Agricultura*) its first appeal for the president to surrender. President Allende refused to capitulate and instead held out in the presidential palace *La Moneda* even as it was bombed around noon. At 9:10 a.m. he broadcast (on *Radio Magallanes y Corporación*) his last speech to the Chilean people, in which he swore not to give up defending the Constitution. Eventually, as the palace was bombed from the air and troops invaded the palace, he committed suicide. (Rinke 2007: 157; Codoceo 36-37)

It is interesting to analyse the course of the coup in the light of the negligible resistance. There was no parallel leftist army, nor a strong defence at Allende's disposition. Under these circumstances, it seems quite obvious that there was no military necessity to attack the *Moneda* with such means. The bombardment must be seen as a strong symbol, not so much enacted for its need, but for the message it spread: It showed that the military would not recoil from the use of martial means if necessary to pursue its plan. This becomes quite obvious in the *Decretos* (Decrees) issued on the same day, where the military made explicit reference to the bombing of the *Moneda* as a punishment if the people did not subordinate. (Codoceo 2007: 39 et seqq.) Furthermore, the attack on the *Moneda* must be seen in the context of competing factions within the *Fuerzas Armadas* (FF.AA., Armed Forces). As mentioned above, Pinochet had not been a member of the plot until shortly before the coup was performed (although his acquiescence was vital for the coup to be successful). As the Commander of the Army, however, he was highest in the military hierarchy. An open concurrence had developed between him and the air force's General Leigh regarding who should take control after the president had been overthrown. The air bombing was a means of General Leigh to prove his allegiance to the plot, the invasion of the palace can be interpreted as General Pinochet's attempt to stand the pace. (ibid. 40 et seqq.) It was especially important for the latter to show that he had changed his mind completely to the point of brutally persecuting the UP he had previously tolerated. As Codoceo shows, Pinochet underwent a radical change with the September 11th coup, from a moderate Constitutionalist to a brutal dictator. (2007: 40 et seqq.)

As to the involvement of the U.S. in the military coup of September 11th, no evidence was found that the CIA had any direct influence on the event itself. The coup was, however, endorsed by the Nixon administration, and the financial aid, military cooperation and the destabilisation policies against the UP government definitely played an important role in the developments leading to the coup. (Rinke 2007: 157) The financial aid, which had been considerably cut back during the UP period, was resumed after the coup. Early attempts by the United Nations to inquire into the human rights violations and at adopting a resolution against the *Junta* were blocked by the U.S. (ibid. 161)

The reactions to the coup were quite different. While the UP supporters immediately realised that it meant nothing good for them, the opposition and large sections of society actually welcomed the military's intervention. The calls for the military to intervene had been based

on the belief that it was the only institution which could restore political stability and democracy, enjoying a widespread trust. (Rottensteiner 1996: 14; Rinke 2007: 158; Klein 1993: 73) The diverging labels for the event show this split quite well: while the supporters of the coup saw it as a “*pronunciamiento militar*” (a sort of authoritative announcement, ending the previous chaos), the opponents defined it as nothing less than a “*golpe de Estado*” (a coup d’état, clearly breaking with the democratic tradition). (Rottensteiner 1996: 15)

The *Junta* that now took charge consisted of the four generals which had planned the coup. Initially at least, the plan was to restore the power to the political parties, after the perceived threat had been defeated. The FF.AA. would then return to the “barracks” and withdraw from the political process. However, internalising the role preached by the Doctrine of National Security and of neoliberalism, the military set another, more far-reaching objective: to completely restructure Chile politically, economically and socially. The purpose of the coup then was not only to react to the crisis in which the political and social system were, but also to create or restructure a new system altogether, sought to prevent similar developments as had preceded the coup. (Rottensteiner 1996: 16; Klein 1993: 58)

As a further justification of their intervention, the *Junta* denounced an alleged so-called “Plan Z” of the UP. According to the military, the UP had been secretly preparing a paramilitary action with support from Cuba, planning to assassinate leading oppositional political figures and military officers on September 19th. The proofs for this were printed in the “*El Libro Blanco del cambio de gobierno en Chile*” (The White Book of Change of Chilean Government) in October 1973, in which the UP is further incriminated with human rights violations. There is clear agreement, however, that both “Plan Z” and the “White Book” were invented by the military in order to justify and legitimise the brutal coup. (del Campo 2002: 28 et seqq.; Codoceo 2007: 48 et seqq.)

The first important document to be released on the 11th was the “*Acta de Constitución de la Junta de Gobierno*” (Founding Charter of the Government Board, DL 1), which declares the military to be the constitutional defender of the state. According to the *Acta*, as Chile was being systematically destroyed by a “dogmatic and exclusive” ideology, the military saw it as their duty to intervene:

“*Considerando:*
[...] 1.o- Que la Fuerza Pública, formada constitucionalmente por el Ejército, la Armada, la Fuerza Aérea y el Cuerpo de Carabineros, representa la organización que el Estado se ha dado para el resguardo y defensa de su integridad física y moral y de su identidad histórico-cultural;

[...]3.o- Que Chile se encuentra en un proceso de destrucción sistemática e integral de estos elementos constitutivos de su ser, por efecto de la intromisión de una ideología dogmática y excluyente, inspirada en los principios foráneos del marxismo-leninismo;

Han acordado, en cumplimiento del impostergable deber que tal misión impone a los organismos defensores del Estado, dictar el siguiente,

Decreto-ley:

1.o- Con esta fecha se constituyen en Junta de Gobierno y asumen el Mando Supremo de la Nación, con el patriótico compromiso de restaurar la chilenidad, la justicia y la institucionalidad quebrantadas [...].” (Acta de Constitución de la Junta de Gobierno, 1973)⁵

The initial idea was that the leadership would rotate among them, General Pinochet taking the first term due to the traditional primacy of the Army. One of the first measures of the *Junta* was to dissolve Congress and the prohibition and persecution of the leftist political parties and movements:

“[...] los [p]artidos [...] y todas aquellas entidades, agrupaciones, facciones o movimientos que sustenten la doctrina marxista o que por sus fines o por la conducta de sus adherentes sean sustancialmente coincidentes con los principios y objetivos de dicha doctrina [...].” (Decreto Ley 77, 1973)⁶

The PN dissolved voluntarily, as it saw its main objectives (leadership by the military, modernisation of Chilean economy according to neoliberal principles) achieved through the coup. (Rinke 2007: 160; Klein 1978: 84) The freedom of the media was abolished, most newspapers being shut down and all media being subjected to censorship, with the conservative *El Mercurio* rising to the main mouthpiece of the regime. (Rinke 2007: 160; Klein 1993: 93)

2. The Doctrine of National Security

The Doctrine of National Security was greatly influenced and propagated by the U.S. and the Brazilian dictatorship during the Cold War and found its supporters in other Latin American military regimes – in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. It stipulated that the utmost threat to the

⁵ Considering:

1st- That the Public Force, constitutionally formed by the Armed Forces, the Navy, the Air Force and the Police Corps, represents the organisation that the State has given itself in order to protect and defend its physical and moral integrity and its historic-cultural identity; [...]

3rd- That Chile is currently in a process of systematic and comprehensive destruction of these constituting elements, due to the interference of a dogmatic and excluding ideology inspired by the foreign principles of Marxism-Leninism;

Have agreed, in compliance with the urgent duty that such a mission imposes on the State defence organisms, to dictate the following,

Decree:

1st- With this date the Government Board is constituted and takes the supreme command of the nation, with the patriotic commitment to restore chilenity [*chilenidad*], justice and the disrupted institutions [...]. (own translation)

⁶ [...] the parties [...] and all entities, groupings, factions or movements that sustain the Marxist doctrine or which by their aims or the conduct of their members are substantially coincident with the principles and objectives of the aforementioned doctrine [...]. (own translation)

nation was Marxism, which infiltrated society and used its democratic political procedures and institutions to gradually install a Communist dictatorship. After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the threat of a further spread of Marxism in Latin America seemed imminent. In order to effectively ban the threat, the means had to be adapted to the circumstances: In a partisan war, the distinction between enemies and civilians became blurred. Every citizen was potentially a subversive element. Traditional democracy and political processes were not efficient in fending the advance of the Marxists and were rather propitious for them, so in the name of National Security, democracy had to be curtailed. (Rottensteiner 1996: 17 et seqq.) The nation was now in a “War for the salvation of the nation” against Communist intruders. (Rinke 2007: 158)

„El marxismo es una doctrina simplemente equivocada, como ha habido tantas en la historia. No. El marxismo es una doctrina intrínsecamente perversa, lo que significa que todo lo que de ella brota, por sano que se presente en apariencias, está carcomido por el veneno que corroee su raíz. Esto es lo que quiere decir que su error sea intrínseco y, por eso mismo, global, en términos que no cabe con él ningún diálogo o transacción posibles.

No obstante la realidad contemporánea indica que el marxismo no es únicamente una doctrina intrínsecamente perversa. Es además una agresión permanente, hoy al servicio del imperialismo soviético. [...] guerra no convencional [...]. [...] infiltra los núcleos vitales de las sociedades libres [...]. [...] promueve el desorden en todas sus formas. [...] El objetivo [...] es el debilitamiento de las sociedades que la secta roja no controla, a fin de poder dejar caer sus garras sobre ellas en el momento oportuno, para convertirlas en nuevos satélites del imperialismo soviético, donde un implacable régimen totalitario no tolera ni el mas leve atisbo de las manifestaciones que en cambio él mismo estimulo en las sociedades libres.” [emphasis by Klein] (Pinochet, Augusto: Mensaje del Presidente, in: El Mercurio, September 12th 1976; quoted in: Klein 1993: 68 et seqq.)⁷

Under such circumstances, the military was not only allowed but requisitioned to overcome the society-military separation and to intervene in the political process, with whatever means it deemed necessary. (Klein 1993: 63; Codoceo 2007: 48) And in order to be successful, it was mandatory to take control over all activities and institutions of society – with the exception of the economy (regarding regulation), as will be shown below. This was done with the first *Decreto Ley* (DL 1) in which the constitutive, legislative and executive powers were assembled in the *Junta*, without any sort of checks and balances incorporated. (Klein 1993: 93)

⁷ Marxism is simply a misguided doctrine, such as there have been so many in history. No. Marxism is an intrinsically perverse doctrine, which means that everything that emanates from it, however sound it might seem, is rotten by the poison that runs through its roots. That is why its mistake is intrinsic, and as such, global, in the terms that dialogue or deals are impossible with it.

Nevertheless, contemporary reality shows that Marxism is not just an intrinsically perverted doctrine. It is also a permanent aggression, nowadays at the service of Soviet imperialism. [...] unconventional war [...]. [...] it infiltrates the vital cores of free societies [...]. [...] it promotes chaos in all its forms. [...] The objective [...] is the weakening of the societies which are not under the control of the red sect, with the aim of dropping its claws over them at an opportune time in order to convert them into new satellites of Soviet imperialism, where a relentless totalitarian regime does not even tolerate the smallest inkling of the manifestations it had previously stimulated in the free societies. (own translation)

The notwithstanding conservative judiciary posed no significant hurdle to the regime. It was later to be strongly criticised for its immediate subordination to the *Junta*, not staging any sort of resistance or reproach for the human rights and constitutional violations. (Rinke 2007: 161; Klein 1993: 93)

The military as the traditional and constitutionally defined guardian of the national unity and integrity was supposedly legitimised to intervene under such circumstances as it did, as the values it was supposed to protect were at great risk. Their task would only be completed when the “enemies” and the roots of their ascension (the political weakness in society at large) had been completely eradicated. (Klein 1993: 69) As social conflicts were reduced in this ally-enemy dichotomy, any defiant opinion or criticism was regarded as insurgent. Additionally, the concept of *chilenidad*, which according to the regime’s construction reflected the Chilean moral and historic-cultural identity and was therefore intrinsically contrary to atheist Marxism, was put in the foreground as the most important value to be protected. This being said, the danger not only concerned the Western traditional capitalist values, but the very essence of “chilenity” itself. The defence against Marxism was thus elevated to a historic sacred mission. (Codoceo 2007: 50 et seqq.)

In order to fight the elements and structures they regarded as responsible for the chaos and threat of democracy, the *Junta* first decreed all three types of states: of emergency, of war and of siege. A curfew was introduced which remained in force for many years. This made it possible to persecute the Left with rampant measures and an oppression which has been a strong reason for the cleavage in the assessment of the regime in society even today. Outstanding personalities sympathising with the UP were persecuted, tortured and murdered exemplarily (i. a. the famous singer Víctor Jara, university professors, politicians), eventually all political parties were affected by the prohibition by 1977, and the most influential labour union *Central Única de Trabajadores* (CUT, Worker’s United Centre) was dissolved. (del Campo 2002: 27; Codoceo 2007: 56; Klein 1993: 95)

3. The consolidation of the military regime

It must be stressed that in spite of its “rebellion”, the FF.AA. endeavoured to abide by the strong legalistic tradition in Chile (even the UP government with its radical measures had remained within the frame of legislation, though the militant leftist factions did not). This

meant that the rule of the *Junta* be institutionalised and legalised in a new Constitution. (Rottensteiner 1996: 17)

The military had justified the coup with the defence of the Constitution; as it was now advocating a new social order, it needed a correspondent framework to abide by. The preparations for it began shortly after the coup, but the new draft was not ready to be voted until 1980. In the meantime, provisional constitutional amendments (*Actas Constitucionales*) were introduced in order to legalise the actions of the regime after the coup. However, as Rinke (2007) points out, even this framework was breached by the *Junta*, as it did not recoil from breaching its own provisions in order to pursue its major projects. (2007: 161; Klein 1993: 103)

The recourse to traditionally democratic concepts as the presidency (which Pinochet took over in 1974) and plebiscites (performed in 1978 and 1980 – although the circumstances did not allow for fair proceedings) can be seen as attempts at legitimising the regime in a country with a long democratic tradition. (Klein 1993: 91) The overcoming of the deep economic crisis would do the rest for the legitimisation and popularity of the *Junta*. (Codoceo 2007: 56) The plebiscite (“*Consulta Nacional*”) of January 1978 was held as a reaction to international criticism and reprobation of the human rights violations of the regime (and the assassinations abroad, discussed below). Chileans were asked to declare their support for the regime. In spite of the objections of the Catholic Church and of other members of the *Junta*, Pinochet forged ahead with the undertaking and officially attained nearly three-quarters of the vote – under all but democratic conditions. Pinochet used the result as an opportunity to widen his predominance over the other members of the *Junta*. (Klein 1993: 106)

The main targets of the military regime’s oppression and persecution were the members and sympathisers of the Left. Vendettas, house searches, book burnings, arrests, torture (35,868), disappearances (979), extrajudicial executions and assassinations (1,319), forced exile and banishment from public offices became recurrent. (Codoceo 2007: 55; Rottensteiner 1996: 18-19; del Campo 2002: 27) On September 11th the national stadium in Santiago was transformed into a concentration camp where political prisoners were tortured and “disappeared”. Others were sent to another camp on *Isla Dawson* in the Strait of Magellan in the far-south, where they endured harsh conditions, forced labour and almost complete seclusion from their families. (del Campo 2002: 27 et seqq.) 84.42% of the killings and disappearances were registered in the first years of the regime, between 1973 and 1978. (Codoceo 2007: 55)

It was clear to the *Junta* that it would not serve its interests for the military to be identified with the massive human rights violations, internally and externally. (Klein 1993: 100 et seqq.) A new institution was created in June 1974, the *Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia* (DINA, National Intelligence Directorate), led by General Manuel Contreras, which was directly subordinated to General Pinochet.

“[...] organismo militar de carácter técnico profesional, dependiente directamente de la Junta de Gobierno y cuya misión será la de reunir toda la información a nivel nacional [...] con el propósito de producir la inteligencia que se requiera para la formulación de políticas, planificación y para la adopción de medidas que procuren el resguardo de la seguridad nacional y el desarrollo del país.” (Decreto Ley 521, 1974)⁸

The *Junta* thereby outsourced its repressive actions and assassinations, which nonetheless remained under General Pinochet's control. The concentration of all repressive actions in one institution enhanced a better specialisation and coordination, and allowed for the military to withdraw from that political chapter (namely the persecution of dissidents). As the leftist partisans had either been caught in the first days, fled Chile or gone underground, the measures were adapted to combing through society in search of insurrectional elements. The activities of the DINA did not confine to Chile; as many tens of thousands of Chileans had fled the country or been forcefully exiled, the DINA cooperated with the *Operación Condor* (a coordination project of the Latin American military regimes in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile and the CIA, consisting of “[...] Informationsaustausch, die Einrichtung eines „Oppositionellenarchivs“ und die Bildung von Spezialeinheiten, zu deren Aufgabe auch die Ermordung politischer Gegner gehörte“). (del Campo 2002: 29 et seqq.; Rinke 2007: 160) Three particular incidents, the assassination of General Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires in 1974, of the Christian Democrat Bernardo Leighton in Rome in 1975 (who survived badly wounded) and of the UP Minister of Foreign Affairs Orlando Letelier in Washington D.C. in September 1976 caused a great stir, especially in the U.S. (which supported and agreed on DINA's activities as long as they did not occur in the U.S.). (Rinke 2007: 160; del Campo 2002: 29)

As the Catholic Church, the U.S. under the new Democrat President Jimmy Carter (especially after Letelier's assassination in Washington D.C.) and the United Nations increased their pressure on the regime to curb the systematic human rights violations (the U.S. particularly imposing an arms embargo), the DINA was dissolved in August 1977 and replaced by the

⁸ [...] a military organ with technical-professional character, directly dependent of the Government Board and whose mission will be the gathering of all information at the national level [...] with the aim to produce the required intelligence for the formulation of policies, plans and for the adoption of measures that foment the protection of the national security and the development of the country. (own translation)

practically identical *Central Nacional de Información* (CNI, National Information Centre). Though the violations did continue, the number of *desaparecidos* dwindled considerably. (Rottensteiner 1996: 19) In spite of the tensions, the regime made an enormous effort to maintain good external relations with the U.S., especially in consideration of the importance of exports for the economic plan. (Rinke 2007: 161 et seqq.)

4. The programme of the military regime

The main idea behind the restructuring of society was to depoliticise society. Ideologies were made responsible for the crises of the past. In order for the same circumstances not to develop again, the regime set forth a project of banning all political parties and political activities of any sort. In this reasoning the military reflected the perception of the Right, especially of the PN. Resenting its displacement as the dominant political faction, the PN blamed the political modernisation with broader participation and liberalisation of democracy for the decay of the nation. (Klein 1993: 59 et seqq.) The two legacies which should be targeted above all were the *Estatismo* (initiated under the Frei administration and intensified under Allende) and the (multi)party democracy. Instead of the highly ideological, inclusive, mobilising and demagogic party democracy of the preceding decades, the Right favoured the idealised authoritative hierarchical Portilian model from the 19th century, where order and progress ostensibly enabled the country to prosper. (ibid. 61 et seqq.) According to this view, the origin of social and political conflicts was not to be found in the structures themselves (i.e. inherent to any society) but rather as a result of Marxist subversion attempts at destabilising the nation. The aim of the Right (the PN and the *Patria y Libertad*) and the *gremios* (which had significantly contributed to the destabilisation in the UP period) was to reinstall an authoritative, corporatist social order, where the *gremios* would be the link between the state authority and the social base. (ibid. 67-74)

The regime went one step further in its concept for a new society, aiming not only at excluding the middle and lower classes from the democratic process, but any particular interests in general – including those of the formerly privileged Right. Mediators (e.g. unions) between the state and society, which had been an important constituent in the democratic decision process and had enjoyed far-reaching privileges, were dismantled and prohibited. (ibid. 74 et seqq., 80, 94)

Neoliberalism

The crisis in Chile was not restricted to the political system, but affected the economy as well. It was obvious that the situation could not go on as it was. The *Junta* was determined to tackle the problems and was convinced that for this it was necessary to break with the programme and measures of the UP period. Initially, however, the military regime did not have a proper plan how this was to be achieved. Therefore, it confined itself to re-privatising some of the businesses nationalised under Allende, and proceeding with the state incentives. (Klein 1993: 73)

In 1956 an agreement between the University of Chicago and the *Universidad Católica de Chile* had been concluded (prepared by the Chicago professors T.W. Schultz, Earl J. Hamilton, Arnolds Harberger and Simon Rottenberg in June 1955 in Chile), which started a student and professor exchange between the two universities, lasting until 1964. (Codoceo 2007: 57) Many later influential Chilean economists profited from the exchange and were influenced by the Monetarist Neoliberal scholars in Chicago (later known as the Chicago Boys). In the 1960s, as the first of them had returned and graduated, they gained influence in the universities and private economy, and put their learning into practice: For the 1970 presidential election they prepared an economic concept for the Conservative Alessandri, adapted to Chilean reality, in which they designed the necessary measures and restructuring to overcome the crisis. (Klein 1993: 75 et seqq.; Codoceo 2007: 58) As Alessandri did not win the election, the Chicago Boys continued to elaborate their economic plans and concepts during the UP administration. This was an important advantage for them, as when the military took charge, it was in need of a conceived programme, which they could immediately lay before. In addition, the highly technocratic character of the programme was most suitable for the social change envisaged by the military (depoliticisation and modernisation) and compatible with the Doctrine of National Security. Initially an auxiliary to the regime it soon became the main ideology behind most policies and plans, pervading all areas of society. (Klein 1993: 77) The technocratic and scientific nature of the neoliberal reasoning increased its acceptance by the military, which recognised it as the only non-partisan and scientifically true approach available. The claim of objective truth clearly implies an authoritarian concept of power, as one of the state's tasks is to ensure that this truth is not questioned or undermined. (ibid. 82-83)

Eventually, in 1975 Milton Friedman (an important economist at the University of Chicago, later to receive the Nobel Prize in Economics; advocate of Monetarism and opponent of Keynesianism) met personally with Pinochet in his visit to Chile, and was able to convince him of the primacy of the neoliberal concept. This was the turning point to the entry of the Chicago Boys and of technocracy to power. As will be shown in the next section, this also meant the ascendancy of General Pinochet as the strongman of the regime. Unrivalled, the technocrats were able to push through their ideas and programme despite the strong opposition to the measures and the initial setbacks. (Klein 1993: 90-31, 102)

Some of the problems and causes for the crisis were identified in the inefficiency in the use of resources, the public expenditure deficit, the overprotection from foreign concurrence and ownership, the overregulation of private initiative, production and the capital market, the soaring inflation rate (rising around 1% daily), the unproductiveness of the economy, the stagnating exportation and the imbalance of payments. (Klein 1993: 121-123) Although many of the problems had been created and exacerbated deliberately by the U.S. and the Right (boycotts, sabotage, destabilisation), the crisis was also rooted in the many mistakes of the Allende policies and in the very structures, rules and procedures of the economy themselves. Tackling these causes was prioritised, as the regime quickly understood that its legitimacy was strongly linked to an economic recovery. (Codoceo 2007: 56)

The main idea was to abolish the broadly criticised Estatismo (“statism”), i.e. the active interventionist role of the state and the according claiming, expectant attitude of the people; the state was not to intervene in the economy any more, or only where it seemed absolutely crucial. In the last decades the state had increasingly taken over tasks and initiatives from society and had thereby contributed to the suppression of individual and private initiative and freedom, seen as crucial for economic growth, and lead to increasing dependency from the state. (Klein 1993: 60, 79)

„[...] Sin embargo, cuando el Estado se va metiendo cada vez más en la economía, casi todas se convierten en decisiones de tipo político, que se votan directamente. El mercado y la iniciativa individuales, pasan a ser tapadas por el monstruo estatal y, de hecho, la iniciativa y los derechos de las personas se convierten en letra muerta.” (Bardón 1978: La Nueva institucionalidad Económica, in: Informe Gemines 15, 83, quoted in: Klein 1993: 60)⁹

⁹ Nevertheless, if the State increasingly interferes in the economy, nearly all decisions become political in nature, and are voted directly. The market and individual initiative are suppressed by the state monster and, in fact, the initiative and rights of people become empty rhetoric. (own translation)

Withdrawing from this swollen role, the state would finally allow the economy to regulate itself according to the rules of the free market, which would eventually lead to natural growth, efficiency and prosperity: It was believed that each person, given the freedom of choice in a free market, would eventually make the most optimal choices for oneself. (ibid. 80) With the addition of free optimised choices, the market would automatically regulate itself accordingly, creating not only ideal circumstances and outputs, but also political freedom: Through their choices and preferences, individuals restricted the state's power to interfere arbitrarily. Main aspects of the new policies were individualism, consumerism, modernisation, privatisation and the overhaul of values and rules no longer deemed important. (Klein 1993: 84)

An intended effect of the withdrawal of the state was a significant reduction in public expenditure and a renaturation of the bloated state institutions, thus increasing efficiency and allowing for a reorientation of capacities. (ibid. 113)

The only way to do this was to privatise and liberalise economy and society as a whole, and the regime's intervention was aimed at enabling this shift and "liberation" to take place – intervening in order to stop intervention, regulating in order to ban regulation. The state's role was to be reduced to "*die Schaffung und die anschließende Bewahrung eines „geschützten Bereiches“ für die Individuen, der aus der Summe von stabilen Regeln, die die notwendige Abwesenheit von Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Fähigkeit persönliche Erwartungen im Zuge des Austausches zu erfüllen, besteht.*" (Klein 1993: 79) Any further intervention or distortion by the state, including measures aimed at redistribution and compensation for the social inequities, was not allowed. On the contrary, the ensuing different positions and order were regarded as natural and fair, as they emanated from the free doing of the market. (ibid. 80 et seqq.)

Another characteristic ensuing from neoliberalism is that interests are necessarily individual. This means that they are only free and natural if they are not influenced or manipulated through the forging of factional interests. (Klein 1993: 81) This being said, parties, unions and other forms of agglomeration of interests were prohibited and illegitimate in a system which protected the freedom of the market above all. This ban included the *gremios*, which were also seen as a source of distortion of interests and of the individual freedom. Taken a step further, it is easy to realise that these principles are also attributable to the decision making process in general, discrediting majority decisions and collective mobilisation. (ibid. 82) In a perfect symbiosis, the authoritarian state had the necessary power to repress the articulation

(in free media) of aggregated social interests represented in different organisations (free unions, opposition parties, parliament), a prerequisite to the full functioning of the free market. (ibid. 82, 122) Democracy, then, cannot be representative by nature, but is fulfilled in the market itself. The idea was, simply said, to destroy the old structures and order, and by depoliticising society to permit the market rules to materialise in a new system. (Klein 1993: 83-85)

The economy was to undergo a “Shock-Plan” (from spring 1975 onwards), including radical cuts in public expenditure, state investment, the deregulation of the banking system, the decrease of import tariffs (from 1974, gradually to a flat 10% rate in 1977), the privatisation of nearly all state businesses and the opening to foreign investment and ownership (repealing the discrimination of foreign investors in March 1977). (Klein 1993: 124, 125) In order to do this, Chile resigned from the Andean pact in late 1976, which Allende had eagerly helped to draw up. (Rinke 2007: 162, Klein 1993: 125)

The *gremios*, which had hoped to (re-)gain a privileged position in the new economic structures were put behind as their ideas contradicted a fully self-regulating and free market as propagated by neoliberalism. (Rinke 2007: 162)

One of the most important measures to be implemented was the *Plan Laboral* and further reforms introduced in 1979 by the Minister of Employment and Social Affairs, José Piñera (brother of the incumbent president, Sebastián Piñera), radically changing many areas of the social system:

“Todas ellas robustecen la libertad de decisión de las personas. El Plan Laboral con la libertad sindical; la futura reforma previsional con un sistema de pensiones basada en la capitalización individual; la Directiva Educacional y la reforma de la salud a través de la descentralización operativa y la mayor flexibilidad de opciones individuales; la modernización judicial al hacer más efectivo y expedito el acceso [sic] de toda persona a la justicia; el reordenamiento agrícola al fortalecer la propiedad privada en el campo; y por último, la reforma administrativa al agilizar el sector estatal y permitir reducir su tamaño que abruma con su pesada carga a todos los chilenos.” (Piñera 1979: Dar un golpe de timón, crear esquemas nuevos ..., Interview in: *Qué pasa* 454 (27. Dec. 1979 – 2. Jan. 1980), 8, quoted in Klein 1993: 111-112)¹⁰

Through liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, an increase in the role of experts and technocrats and by taking back the role of the state, parties and unions, Chile was to undergo a rapid modernisation based on rationality and freedom, as opposed to dogmatism and ideology.

¹⁰ All of them strengthen the freedom of choice of people. The Work Plan with the union freedom; the future provisional reform with a pension system based on individual capitalisation; the Educational Directive with the health care reform through the operational decentralisation and the higher flexibility of individual options; the judiciary modernisation by making the access of all people to justice more effective and expeditious; the agrarian reorganisation by strengthening private property in rural areas; and finally the administration reform by speeding up the state sector and allowing to reduce its size, which with its enormous weight crushes every Chilean. (own translation)

(Klein 1993: 112, Codoceo 2007: 59) The role of the traditionally strong labour unions was severely cut back, allowing on the one hand an easier creation and thereby fragmentation of unions (lowering the minimum membership figure and allowing for parallel unions), on the other hand restricting their influence on the assertion process: interests were no longer seen as collective but individual, so the collective articulation was reduced to salaries and working conditions on firm level. (Klein 1993: 119) The freedom of organisation was withdrawn for the public servants. The market principles had found their way to the work legislation and relations: The very relationship between the state, the companies and the unions was radically changed: the conflicts and discussions between employers and employees were henceforth seen as private issues, in which the state should not meddle. (Codoceo 2007: 66, 68) During the Allende period, employment had been enforced and protected often at the cost of productivity and profitability. Under the *Plan Laboral*, jobs were no longer protected (especially in the case of a strike), leading to increasing unemployment, especially in the industry. The fear of job loss therefore became pivotal, driving back the need to express discontent in and stand for unions. (Klein 1993: 119-120, Codoceo 2007: 66) The main union, the CUT was prohibited and its leaders persecuted. Any unions deemed as “political”, ideological and deviant to the neoliberal ideals of the regime (i.e. Communist, revolutionary, confrontational) were prohibited. (Codoceo 2007: 66) Mobilisation of workers became almost impossible with the introduction of curfews, the proclamation of state of emergency and of war. (ibid. 67) With the passage of the new Constitution in 1980, these principles were further elevated and established in the 19th article (paragraphs 15 to 19). (*Constitución Política de la República de Chile* 1980)

The fiscal deficit was to be drastically reduced. Some of the most important policies were the ban on state price controls and regulations, the liberalisation of the capital market, the devaluation of the *escudo*, the introduction of a fixed exchange rate towards the dollar in January 1978, the considerable cut in state expenditure (except on the military, from 40% in 1973 to 87% of total expenditures in 1986) and the ban on protective tariffs. The state reduced its role as main entrepreneur and investor (reducing its investments by 15-20%) to a minimum, promoting private ownership and investment. (Klein 1993: 121-124, 135) The income tax was raised while wages declined. Production was deregulated, allowing for a diversification and reorientation of commodities (especially targeted at export).

The initial result (1974-1976) was a continued increase in prices (inflation) with a decrease of real wages, a surge of unemployment, the lapse of the GNP (-12.9%), of the industrial production and of the purchasing power. (Rinke 2007: 162-163, Codoceo 2007: 63) Other factors further exacerbated the situation, as the oil price increased and the copper export proceeds stagnated. (Rinke 2007: 162, Klein 1993: 124-125) The *Junta* nevertheless continued implementing its plan, in spite of the bad performance and the rising criticisms.

However, from around 1977 until 1981 the economy actually stabilised as a result of the drastic measures. (Rinke 2007: 162 et seqq.) Within few years the solvency of Chile had been restored and foreign investors were pouring money into the national economy. The budget deficits were tackled by 1979 and the balance of trade profited from the privatisations and reduction in subventions. With the renewed trust from the international financial institutions (with whom the Chicago Boys were well interconnected), Chile was able to renegotiate its foreign debts and credits. (Klein 1993: 86-87) The inflation rate finally dropped after many decades of abortive attempts, exports and industrial production soared. The agrarian industry was realigned for the export sector, produce was diversified. Within four years the economy had managed a 32% growth. (Rinke 2007: 163) As one of the first countries to actually introduce neoliberalism thus radically, Chile was celebrated as the showpiece of the possible economic miracle. (ibid.; Klein 1993: 128) Though there were also other countries which followed the neoliberal doctrine in their policies (in the U.K. under Margaret Thatcher and the U.S. under Ronald Reagan), none of them were under such an authoritarian rule which combined neoliberalism with the Doctrine of National Security thus meticulously.

There were nevertheless some indicators that show the difficulties of keeping up the recovery: Though GNP was rising again, it did not reach the increase rates it had formerly achieved; the production of produce did not increase enough to meet the demands of society; in the service sector, growth was slow; the investment rate did not recover from its backlash; and unemployment soared, effectively cutting back purchasing power. (Klein 1993: 128) Imports were still necessary and benefited from the overrated Peso (due to the fixed dollar exchange rate), while exports only grew slowly. The promoted mass consumerism only exacerbated the situation, vaulting the foreign balance of payments deficit and debt. (ibid. 128-129) Apprehending a substantial increase of their credit costs, the new company conglomerates effectively (backed by the dogmatic Minister of Finance de Castro) averted the necessary devaluation of the peso until 1982 (thus distorting the allegedly free regulation of the market). (Klein 1993: 130, Rinke 2007: 168) When the urgent devaluation was finally performed (and de Castro was replaced), it was already too late: From a soaring economic miracle, Chile

tumbled into the worst crisis since the 1950s (surpassing even the crisis of the 1970s) from 1981. As the GNP fell dramatically (-14.1%) and the unemployment rate soared to 30%, the *Junta* decided to intervene, pushing the already climbing foreign debt to US\$ 19 billion in 1983. (Klein 1993: 130, Codoceo 2007: 63-64) Along with credits and grants, the central bank was urged to take over the five biggest private banks in order to avoid a financial failure; it was pivotal to preserve the international trust in order to avoid an increase of credit costs from the international financial institutions. (Klein 1993: 131, Rinke 2007: 168)

It would be erroneous therefore to assume that the Chilean state had effectively withdrawn from the economy. In spite of the neoliberal discourse, the state kept its intervention and regulation in certain areas regarded as essential to the national economy, such as copper. The idea behind state interventionism however changed from the pursuit of social equity under Allende to the pursuit of new market relations and growth. (Rinke 2007: 163) As the ensuing economic crisis became unavoidable, the state intervened with grants, re-nationalisations of recently privatised companies and employment programmes in order to prevent the worst. By November 1983, the state had regained control over around 60% of the national capital. (Klein 1993: 131) Banished measures such as tariffs (raised from 10% until 1982 to 20% in 1983 and 35% in 1984), protectionism, luxury taxes and controlled interest rates were re-introduced. (ibid.; Codoceo 2007: 62) Through these measures, the state reversed its anti-interventionist policies, and the Chicago Boys saw their credibility and popularity tumble. This was not, however, to last: From 1985, the economy began to recover and as the indicators improved, the Chicago Boys returned to power along with their neoliberal programme. Many of the emergency nationalised companies, industries and banks were re-privatised, leading to further foreign ownership, as the national investors were recovering from the economic distress and did not have the necessary means to purchase the assets. As a result, ownership became even more concentrated than before 1982. (Klein 1993: 131-132) Further sectors previously in state hand were privatised, such as electricity, gas, water and telecommunications. The tariffs were considerably reduced again. (Codoceo 2007: 61-62) In the remaining years of the regime, Chile experienced a good recovery, with an average 7% growth. (Klein 1993: 132, Codoceo 2007: 63-64) One of the positive aspects of the restructuring of the economy was the decreased share of copper in the total Chilean exports; as production was diversified and re-orientated, Chile was able to reduce its vulnerability to world copper price fluctuations. (Klein 1993: 136) As agrarian products increased their share in exports, the industrial sector saw a setback in its economic importance. (Klein 1993: 136)

With the backing of World Bank credits, Chile was finally able to restructure its foreign debts. (Rinke 2007: 168)

An important effect was the rise of a new technocratic elite, composed of the new “Chilean manager” type businessmen. Taught in the tradition of neoliberalism, they were characterised by their “[...] *Neigung zum spekulativen Aktiengeschäft, die internationale Ausrichtung, sowie die Offenheit für innovative Geschäftsmethoden.*” (Rinke 2007: 163) The new generation distinguished itself through a new culture of pragmatism, secularism and individualism. (Klein 1993: 147-148)

The purchasing power eventually rose, allowing for a surge of mass consumption and of Chilean life standards. Imported goods rushed into the market, the number of cars on the streets rose, the new underground in Santiago was inaugurated in 1975, the computer sector boomed and new shopping centres appeared almost everywhere. (Rinke 2007: 164)

However, as the number of unemployed continued to be exorbitant, there was a large percentage of Chileans who did not partake in the profits of the economic growth. As the state withdrew to a large extent from the economy, it deregulated the employment relationship through the *Plan Laboral* in 1979, leading to a cut-back of workers’ rights and of wages (which continually declined until 1987). Most Chileans now found themselves in precarious employment contracts, unemployed or having to work in the informal sector in order to get along. (ibid.) The number of poor Chileans surged within few years, from around 17% in 1970 to 41% in 1987 (data from CEPAL, quoted in Codoceo 2007: 64). In a light attempt to counteract, the regime started initiatives to build social housing in the worst *poblaciones* (shanty towns) and to employ more people in special programmes. However, the strains of the concomitant labour laws and social security reforms (health and pensions) could not be compensated thus.

Social and cultural reforms

The social insurance scheme was reformed. This was, alongside the *Plan Laboral*, one of the most important policies of the Minister of Employment and Social Affairs José Piñera. The state withdrew from its role as manager of the insurances, privatising the health and pension systems. They were no longer to be based on the solidarity principle (inter-generational) but on individual provisions and capitalisation. (Codoceo 2007: 65, 69) New private companies

emerged offering to administer the individuals' pension contributions. (ibid. 70) The result was a two-tier system, with the ones previously or newly privileged profiting from it. (Rinke 2007: 169) In the 5-year transition period, Chileans were allowed to choose between the old and the new pension system. Spurred by financial incentives, and under the spell of the repression of dissent, most Chileans changed to the new system. (Codoceo 2007: 70-71) As the social and economic differences were not tackled but rather worsened, a majority of the population were put at a disadvantage with the new system. The two-tier system reflected the dual social structure which developed from the policies and reforms of the *Junta*: while an entrepreneurial group (and some parts of the middle class) was able to (re-)gain its wealth and influence through privatisation, the development of the service and financial sectors, the middle class, the workers and the marginalised sectors saw the possibilities for social mobility, interest articulation and improved integration worsen considerably. (Klein 1993: 139) The privatisation of the health system also led to a direct relationship between contributions and services and to the creation of new health institutions and administrations. However, the new *Fondo Nacional de Salud* (FONASA, National Health Fund) was similar to the former *Servicio Nacional de Salud* (SNS, National Health Service) in that the solidarity principle remained between healthy and ill contributors, and that the state continued to subsidise the system. A variety of different providers with varying percentages of public and private contributions emerged. (Codoceo 2007: 71-72)

The agrarian and industrial reforms carried out under the UP government were reversed to a large extent (around 30% of land were returned to their original owners, 30% distributed to other farmers and 20% to other citizens; the number of state owned companies fell from 596 in 1973 to 48 in 1983), allowing for large national and foreign companies and corporations to buy estate and production. (Codoceo 2007: 60-61) New branches of tourism, wood and energy industry developed, and large agro-industrial businesses emerged again. (Rinke 2007: 164, Klein 1993: 121-122) The industry was modernised and reoriented production towards exportation. Effectiveness and productivity rose, accompanied by a worsening of working conditions and a decrease of wages. Many of the U.S. companies which had been expropriated during the Allende period were remunerated (Klein 1993: 123), though the copper production was one of the few sectors exempt from privatisation; it was considered too important and crucial to the economy (constituting over 50% of Chilean exports). (Klein 1993: 127) Therefore, the *Junta* retained the state ownership of the copper industry. Many of the former owners saw their assets back, and in a struggle to undermine any attempt by the

Socialists to regain support among the farmers, those who had not been involved in the farmer uprisings and land seizures were granted property. (Klein 1993: 127-128)

For the ethnic minorities, especially the Mapuche, the repeal of their legal special status worsened their situation again (after it had improved in the UP period), draining even more individuals to the urban slums. As the very existence of indigenous minorities was denied (as it would not fit the friend-enemy dichotomy), many of the scarce communities disbanded themselves. (Rinke 2007: 165)

As for culture, many of the artists which had been successful under Allende were killed, exiled or incarcerated in the first months of the regime. Any cultural production which could be associated to Marxism was prohibited, a strict censorship was introduced in order to prevent any critical content. The elimination of UP legacies included book burnings, the physical destruction of artefacts and even terrorist measures. (Rinke 2007: 165) As the institutions for the promotion of culture were closed down, the cultural life seemed to have come to a standstill. Just as the political and economic systems were to be completely changed and the legacies of the past overcome once and for all, Pinochet envisaged a cultural revolution which would be based on patriotism, piety and respect. Social conflicts were not to be thematised but in a harmonic way. The perceived bad influence of drug traffic, pornography, rock music and of U.S. mass culture phenomena was to be curtailed. In spite of the withdrawal of the state in regulation and investment, new organisations were created to foment cultural events considered to be “authentically Chilean”, especially commercial folk music and sports. However, the cultural programme of the regime was not popular, and was eventually abandoned. With the spread of television and radio, culture became increasingly commercialised, and should therefore be seen as any other product or commodity. As such, the state would not subsidise it anymore; the necessary investments and funding were to be private as in most other economic areas. In the course of self-regulation (within the permission of the censorship) U.S. productions became very popular and superseded Chilean ones. (Rinke 2007: 165-166)

The UP education project *ENU* had been a strong argument for the military to stage a coup, as they envisaged it as an attempt at indoctrinating the children with the Communist ideology. After the coup, the military sought control over the educational institutions, banning and persecuting leftist teachers, professors and students. The rectors of all universities were

replaced by *Rectores Delegados*, mostly members of the military or loyal supporters of the regime. (Codoceo 2007: 52, 72) Eventually liberalisation, decentralisation and privatisation also reached the educational sector: the state gave up its role as sole provider of education (as had been set down in the Constitution of 1925). (Codoceo 2007: 73) Schools were delegated to the municipalities, though the regime continued to subsidise them. As private investors were allowed to open new facilities, and the public subsidies depended of the number of attending pupils, education became capitalised and seen as a form of private investment. The universities were also affected by decentralisation and regionalisation; while the state continued subsidising them, fees and private investment encouraged the creation of numerous private facilities. Under the condition of not advocating for Communism, the state withdrew from its role as regulator and guide of the curricula. (ibid. 75-76)

The public transportation system was also liberalised and deregulated, leading to a surge in transportation companies for busses, taxis, airlines and shipping. (Codoceo 2007: 62)

Finally, it can be said that the Neoliberal Revolution was only possible and successful in Chile due to the military coup. In the wake of the authoritarian rule, it was possible to depoliticise society to a large degree and to “free” the market from factional interests and privileges to a great extent. (Klein 1993: 85) However, the desired effect of a completely self-regulating market, in which interests would automatically be considered through the market mechanisms of demand and response, did not materialise; instead, the structures of collective interest articulation and postulation were destroyed without a replacement, thus silencing many social voices. As each individual was left on their own in the market, inequalities had not been overcome; while from 1970 to 1973 the 20% poorest Chileans owned 3.1% of total capital and the 20% richest 55.4%, between 1974 and 1989 the 20% poorest owned only 2.7%, whereas the 20% richest owned 62%, transforming Chile into one of the most unequal countries worldwide (Meller, quoted in Codoceo 2007: 64-64). This meant that though in the neoliberal view each person had equal chances, at the starting point inequalities were as present (or even sharper) as before, and inhibited an equal assertion of interests. The strong social net built under Allende (with access to education, good health, job security) was largely retracted, as the liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of society proceeded, comprising a worsening of living conditions for many Chileans. In fact, the ones which doubtlessly profited from the policies of the Pinochet regime were those sectors which were in some way connected to large business enterprises. (Valenzuela 1978: 110)

Although the technocrats had strived at depoliticising the economy and society, and thereby overcome dogmatism and ideology, the neoliberal concepts themselves were dogmatically and radically followed, thus inducing an ideology, albeit a completely different one from before. Furthermore, partial interests had a privileged access also in the new system, as the social and economic inequalities which subsisted (and intensified) distorted the access to articulation and implementation; the groups which had been privileged before the UP period profited under the new system as they had the capital needed to buy the privatised businesses and properties, thus regaining much of their lost power and influence. Furthermore, foreign investors and companies were privileged in the acquisition of property and industry, as the economic crisis had left many of the former Chilean proprietors without the necessary capital to buy back their assets in the short term. The result was a similar or even higher concentration of ownership (the ten largest groups effectively controlled 112 of the 250 most important private companies). (Klein 1993: 127) And just as under every previous government, the economic and social policies were influenced by particular interests of those in power, thereby undermining the supposedly free doing of the market. (ibid. 122) The military regime was dependent on the approval of its supporters, i.e. the Right, the landowners, industrialists and merchants; therefore it had to satisfy and consider their interests and demands in order to retain their support. (ibid. 124)

5. The rise of Pinochet and the 1980 Constitution

While the UP had not found the necessary majority to change the Constitution or to implement a new one, the *Junta* did not have much trouble in preparing and establishing a new Constitution in 1980. The plans and drafts began as soon as 1977, and the final version was ready to be voted in 1980. The cornerstone for the preparations was the “speech of Chacarillas” on June 9th 1977, stipulating the regime’s task, „*eine neue Demokratie zu bilden, die autoritär, geschützt, integrierend und technisiert ist (...)*.” (Pinochet, quoted in Codoceo 2007: 77)

Just as there had been a division within the military before the coup (between constitutionalists and conspirators or reactionists), after the *Junta* rose to power, a polarisation ensued between the *duros* (who endorsed an indefinite rule of the regime) and the *blandos* (who advocated for a limitation of the duration and for a plan for the return to democratic rule). (Klein 1993: 113-114) The recurring economic crises exacerbated the regime’s external

and internal legitimacy, further urging an alternative to appease the critics. (ibid. 104) A compromise was reached with the new Constitution stipulating that Pinochet would remain in power for further eight years, until 1988. By then, the *Junta* would decide on a candidate for the ensuing term of eight years, who would then again be voted by the people in a plebiscite. (Rottensteiner 1996: 17) The main goal behind the new Constitution was to institutionalise the authoritarian regime, re-legalise the regime by adapting the Constitution, allow for enough time to reshape society and its structures, and to prepare the pathway to a representative government in the form of a “protected” democracy. (Rinke 2007: 166, Klein 1993: 115) By no means should it be possible to return to the state before the coup; instead, in a “protected democracy”, (Hayek 1985, quoted in Codoceo 2007: 77) the majority was not seen as apt to decide on all topics, and the decision making process was thus not completely democratic, with restrictions on the power and influence of parliament and civil society. On many issues, experts would decide, thereby preventing an unproductive ideological debate. (Codoceo 2007: 77) The adoption of the title of *Presidente de la República* by Pinochet in December 1974 reflected the attempt to take up (at least in appearance) the republican tradition of Chilean governments strongly associated with legitimacy. (Klein 1993: 97) Through certain elements in the Constitution, the regime tried to safeguard the influence and power of the military even beyond the end of the regime. (Rinke 2007: 166-167) The legitimisation was to be ensured in a controlled plebiscite on the Constitution in September 1980. For the seemingly unlikely case of a defeat of the regime, General Pinochet would nonetheless remain in office until the presidential election could take place, and would retain the charge of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for at least the ensuing eight years. (Rottensteiner 1996: 17)

Some of the most important changes brought about by the new Constitution were the personalisation of the regime, the strengthening of the president and of the executive, the weakening of parliament, the introduction of eight year presidential terms, the induction of appointed senators and the creation of the *Consejo de Seguridad Nacional* (National Security Council), in which the military ensured its influence in matters of national security (Art. 106 and 107), and in the appointment of senators and members of the new Constitutional Court (Art. 92-94). The role of the military as the guardian of the Constitution was thus further elucidated. (Rinke 2007: 166, Klein 1993: 114, 116-117) The president obtained far-reaching powers (writ of attachment, the power to restrain the freedoms of information, of the press and of assembly, to stipulate entry bans, expulsions inter alia) and was not constrained by any form of considerable checks. Legislation, which had been dependent on unanimity in the *Junta*, was further subjected to Pinochet’s veto. Parliament was weakened, as some agendas

were transferred to the president or restricted, including the fiscal competences, the right to introduce a bill and the final consent on the suspension of constitutional rights. (Klein 1993: 114-116) Furthermore, within the restricted right to introduce bills, if the outcome was nullified by the Constitutional Court, the involved deputies would immediately lose their mandate. Democratic decision making and interest articulation was adapted to the new ideals, the result being a constraint of the fields of action; decisions were technically reduced to certain domains and matters (affecting the political, socio-economic as well as the military structures), as according to neoliberalism, self-regulation and market freedom should not be disturbed. The Constitutional Court was filled with either regime-sympathising or regime-appointed personnel; considerable opposition and resistance were not to be expected from it. (Klein 1993: 115-117)

A new franchise was introduced which clearly favoured the Right: the binomial majoritarian suffrage. According to the new regulation, each political list could only nominate two candidates per district. In return, two candidates were always elected, thus favouring the second-place finisher considerably. (Codoceo 2007: 80) Furthermore, the achievement of a sufficient majority for a constitutional change was made more difficult, thereby avoiding a prompt revocation after a possible end of the regime. (Rinke 2007: 166, Codoceo 2007: 81)

The plebiscite was performed on September 11th 1980 under the state of emergency. As there were no external, independent control mechanisms, and transparency was not given, the opposition and many international actors did not accept the result as legitimate. (Codoceo 2007: 78) With the desired outcome, Pinochet now had another argument or proof to claim his legitimacy and supremacy as the President, as the 1978 vote had been confirmed by the constitutional plebiscite. (Klein 1993: 114-115)

Although the *Junta* consisted of the four generals which had planned and performed the coup (General Pinochet, General Leigh, Admiral Merino and General Mendoza) and the initial plan had been to alternate in the leadership of the regime, Pinochet remained in power throughout the duration of the regime, usurping the power and influence of the other members of the *Junta*. Although General Pinochet had not been one of the masterminds behind the very idea of a military coup, the supremacy of the Army over the other services was enough for him to prevail over the other generals. The rising of the General is reflected in the sequence of titles gathered throughout the years – from *Comandante en Jefe del Ejército* (August 1973), *Presidente de la Junta* (September 1973), *Jefe Supremo de la Nación* (June 1974), *Presidente de la República* (December 1974), *Capitan General* to *Generalissimo*. (Klein 1993: 90) In the

January 1978 plebiscite, Pinochet had seen the result (75% in support) as a confirmation of his personal legitimacy, although the referendum had taken place under less than democratic circumstances, and had therefore been severely criticised by the United Nations, the Catholic Church and Chilean expatriates.

The concentration of decision making, influence and power within one person is a rare phenomenon when compared to the other contemporary military dictatorships in Latin America; the very Chilean regime was increasingly personalised and personified by General Pinochet, who gradually withdrew the initial influence of the military as a political institution to his own benefit. (Klein 1993: 90) The influence of the military was cut back with the creation of the DINA in June 1974, which was created in order to outsource the “unpopular” and illegitimate repressive measures, as well as the problems involved (possible human rights violations charges, receding support for the policies, etc.). At the same time, a large part of the (para-)military activities were thus withdrawn from the control of the regular military, as the DINA was under General Pinochet’s personal control. (ibid. 95, 98)

The promotion and discharge regulations were changed in a way in which General Pinochet had the last word (Articles 104 and 105). As the General himself stated, „*No se mueve ninguna hoja en este país si yo no la estoy moviendo!*”.¹¹ (Pinochet: Qué pasa en la moneda, in: Qué pasa 548 (8. – 14. Okt. 1981), 9, quoted in Klein 1993: 103) To a large extent, institutional hierarchy was replaced by loyalty to Pinochet, the militaries in all positions becoming dependent on the General’s favours and sympathy. (Klein 1993: 96) Those fallen into disgrace due to critical attitudes or for any other reasons were swiftly discharged by Pinochet and replaced by more loyal ones. This practice reached its peak with the discharge of the airforce member of the *Junta* General Leigh in July 1978, who had fallen into Pinochet’s disgrace for increasingly speaking out in favour of a return to genuinely democratic conditions. (ibid. 106-107) This incident is maybe one of the best illustrations of Pinochet’s supremacy over the other members of the *Junta*. As an effective means of containing critique, discussion and uprising, General Pinochet frequently shuffled offices and positions, thus creating a feeling of insecurity among his subordinates, and thereby ensuring loyalty, submission and compliance. (ibid. 110, 113)

The position of President of the *Junta* itself was bound to the highest ranking military official (the Commander-in-Chief), which in turn was only to change in the case of death, retreat or total invalidity of the actual incumbent. A change of this regulation was subject to the

¹¹ Not one leave moves in this country if I am not moving it. (own translation)

President's approval – and therefore highly unlikely. The other members of the *Junta* did not have any means to change this. As a result, the executive power was definitively consolidated in General Pinochet's hands. (ibid. 96)

A further blow to the influence and power of the military was the shift within the administrative bodies: At the beginning of the regime, military personnel prevailed in the administration and bureaus. The first division of responsibilities assigned the matters of internal and external security to the Army, the economic agenda to the navy, the social agenda to the air force, and finally the agrarian agenda to the police. (Klein 1993: 96) However, as General Pinochet granted the technocratic Chicago Boys more and more leeway (beginning in mid-1975), the relation between military and civilian personnel shifted in favour of the latter; the ministries were increasingly working directly for General Pinochet, while the services were impotent to counteract the ongoing development and loss of authority. (ibid. 97, 109) The military/civilians ratio in the administration changed from 87/13% in January 1974 to 29.4/70.6% in January 1987 (with a short counter-development between 1980 and 1982 during the economic crisis, as the civilians' ratio retreated slightly). (ibid. 108) However, the military's presence in the posts of regional intendants, provincial governors, *rectores delegados* at the universities and in leading positions within the residual state owned businesses remained throughout the regime. (ibid. 108-109)

As the Chicago Boys owed their rising influence mainly to General Pinochet, and the neoliberal ideology went against principles of private interests, their subordination under the military as an institution became negligible. (ibid. 95, 98-99)

The second pool from which Pinochet took his experts was the sympathising Right wing, whose experts, organisations and institutions (inter alia the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril* (Society for Industrial Promotion), the Opus Dei, the *Patria y Libertad*, the *gremios* and the *Centro de Estudios Políticos* (Centre for Political Studies)) had not been affected by the coup. The inclusion of the Right in the administration and government (as advisors, civil servants and ministers) not only secured its support for the regime (and for Pinochet particularly), but also represented a form of legitimisation, as the Right represented around one third of the electorate. (ibid. 102) The initially guaranteed say of the other *Junta* members in the appointment of administration and judiciary posts was effectively repealed as Pinochet made the decisions without previous agreement. (ibid. 97) The General justified the withdrawal of the military's influence from politics with the necessity to return to democratic conditions – through the re-subordination of the military under the political offices (from which he as the new President was, of course, exempt) – and with the neoliberal principles of non-interference

and independence (the technocrats were generally regarded as independent from political ideologies). (ibid. 101) The development was further designed to soothe the international community's pressure for a withdrawal of the military from politics (especially after President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977 in the U.S.). Klein puts the development in a nutshell when he states that the military mutated "*vom politischen Akteur zum politischen Instrument*" to the benefit of Pinochet's and his technocratic experts' autonomy. (1993: 101) As the ratio of civilians in the administration and government increased, so did the independence of General Pinochet from the *Junta* and the military in general. The military nevertheless remained the crucial pier of the regime, enabling Pinochet's continuance in his office. In spite of the reduction of the initially gained political influence, the military profited from the rising military spending, the availability of administrative posts and the chances of social and military advancement provided by the regime; its support did not, therefore, recede, and the long survival of the regime was thus enabled. (Klein 1993: 109-110)

Interestingly, the separation of the civil and the military sector which had been briefly overridden was restored due to the gradual reduction and replacement of military personnel in the administration and the dwindling political influence on the one hand, and the withdrawal of the state in many sectors due to the neoliberal reforms on the other hand. (ibid. 118, 145) Indeed the separation was even intensified, as the military was now a separate privileged class, with exclusive residential districts, an own military jurisdiction, health and pension facilities.

As a means of preventing a further investigation and being made accountable before a (international) court, the *Junta* implemented an amnesty through the DL 2191 in April 1978 (*Ley de Amnistía*), which concerned most of the crimes committed between September 1973 and March 1978, (with the important exception of the assassination of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Letelier in Washington D.C.). (Rottensteiner 1996: 19)

6. The resistance and the rise of discontent

In spite of the violent and harsh repression carried out by the DINA, the CNI and the military, the regime was not able to suppress the re-organisation of resistance and opposition. (Rinke 2007: 167) Eventually all parties had been forbidden, the traditionally strong unions were effectively dismantled and mitigated and critics were either forced to exile, imprisoned, executed, or "disappeared". The small-scale resistance to the coup launched by the militant

Left had been suppressed easily, forcing the surviving members to leave the country or go underground. (Codoceo 2007: 47) In the attempt to depoliticise society, the regime strove to discourage and suppress the aggregation of interests and demands. The electorate was held passive throughout most of the regime, with the exception of the 1978, 1980 and 1989 plebiscites. Electoral registers were discarded; critical stances were not given voice, and the voting itself was everything but transparent and free.

While international NGOs and the numerous Chilean expatriates constantly denounced the absence of freedom and kept record of the blatant human rights violations, these dispatches did not reach the Chilean public, effectively cloistered away by the rigid censorship. (Rinke 2007: 167) Through deliberate misinformation, the strict censorship and the persecution of dissidents, the Chilean public had little to no access to a strong discussion on the events and measures of the regime. According to Klein (1993: 123) this can be seen as the source of misinterpretations and misjudgements throughout the population.

The recurrent declaration of state of emergency was an instrument the regime used in order to curtail and prevent imminent protest and association. Furthermore, an Anti-Terror Law passed in 1984 broadened the term “terrorism” to such a degree, that any actions *„designed to create commotion or fear in a sector of the population, or any actions or omissions that had a subversive or revolutionary intent“* (Borzutzky 1987: 83, quoted in Bogdanovic 2008: 127) fell under its range.

The April 1978 amnesty implemented by Pinochet raised the tempers of the victims’ relatives, who saw their right to justice revoked and their suffering spurned by the impunity of those responsible. (Rinke 2007: 167)

It was in this same year of 1978 that the commemorations of Allende’s election day (September 4th) were resumed clandestinely at first, growing to mass demonstrations in the following years. The official commemorations of the day of the military coup (September 11th) again were increasingly accompanied by counter-demonstrations, especially at burial sites of prominent victims of the regime. (ibid. 167-168) The regime crushed the demonstrations with utmost violence, but could not prevent the September revolts to recur. (Rinke 2007: 168) A peak was reached in 1983 at the decennium celebrations of the regime, with an unprecedented level of violence. (ibid. 168)

In spite of the regime’s violent reaction, the organisation of protests and demonstrations became an important element in the opposition’s return, profiting from the increasing

discontent of large sectors of society. The copper unions which had called for a general strike after the assassination of one of their leaders, Tucapel Jiménez, in May 1983 were astonished to register a mass participation of thousands of Chileans – unprecedented before, and in spite of the huge associated risks. (ibid. 169) Especially as the economic crises and the reforms drew more and more people into distress, the legitimacy of the regime was questioned increasingly. Many had been willing to turn a blind eye to the repression and violence only for as long as the economic recovery benefited them significantly. With the unequal distribution of gains from the neoliberal reforms, discontent and frustration grew rapidly, leading to growing protests and riots. Even the small and medium business owners, who had contributed considerably to the destabilisation of the UP economic programme, were now disillusioned by the opening policies of the Neoliberals, as they were no longer protected against foreign and larger competition and acquisition. (Rinke 2007: 168-169) With the breakdown of the economy in 1983 due to the soaring foreign debt and the ensuing business failures, ever more people did not recoil from articulating their discontent. Furthermore, the income gap grew constantly, carrying ever more people into poverty; according to a survey by CEPAL, in 1970 approximately 17% of the population were poor; according to a survey by the military regime itself, the proportion rose to over 45% in 1987, with 17% living in extreme poverty. (Codoceo 2007: 64) These facts were a strong argument for the end of the regime and a return to democracy not only for its opponents, but also within the regime itself.

The reaction of the regime was to scapegoat and sacrifice the Chicago Boys (who were now criticised for being “too Americanised”), temporarily banning them from the government and administration. Minister of Finance de Castro was replaced by the equally neoliberal Hernán Büchi, who added some protection for national production to the economic policies. (Rinke 2007: 169)

Contrary to the regime’s expectations, the protests did not fade away as the economy slowly recovered again from 1985. The emboldened citizens who had affronted the intimidation, violence and oppression before were not to be easily silenced any more. (ibid. 169)

Backed by the Catholic Church, the unions and the clandestine party remainders, social movements emerged, often led and initiated by women, which included the poor, the Mapuche and the youth: the latter was especially affected by the high unemployment rate and the marginalisation, reflected in the increased alcohol and drug abuse, the rise in the number of violent offences, and the exacerbating social segregation. As the economic recovery and development became evident and present in everyday life (with the new underground system

in Santiago, new urban areas with skyscrapers and shopping centres), those not partaking in the profits were constantly reminded of their segregation and underprivileged position. (Rinke 2007: 170-171)

Three factors can be seen as important catalysts for the recreation of oppositional parties and of civil society, and the gradual liberalisation of the regime: the recurring crises of the neoliberal economic model, the undiminished influence and patronage of the Catholic Church, and the taking office of the Democrat Jimmy Carter in the U.S.

The Catholic Church soon took over the role of supporter and advocate of the regime's victims. As soon as 1975, the *Vicaría de la Solidaridad* (Solidarity Vicariate) was created as a platform for relatives to report on missing persons (*desaparecidos*). The Church actively tried to help the victims, thereby disgruntling the *Junta*. (Rinke 2007: 167) The regime was not, however, able and willing to cut back on the traditional influence of the Catholic Church, and was thereby moderate in its response. Especially soon after the coup, the Church was one of the few social institutional structures to be spared by the repression and annihilation policies of the regime. Furthermore, its influence sphere reached most of the country's territory and social groups. As such, and especially after the Second Vatican Council many of its bishops felt appointed to defend and support the human rights victims. (Klein 1993: 104)

Political parties were admitted for the first time since the bans (the Left in 1973 and all others in 1977) in 1983; this year is often considered the turning point in the increasing liberalisation of the regime and the rise of the opposition. (Rottensteiner 1996: 20) In spite of the persecution and oppression, some meager party structures remained, either in clandestineness or in exile. (Rinke 2007: 170)

It is clear that the initial polarisation and intransigent ideologies were not differences to overcome easily. However, most of the parties were affected by the repression, and after overcoming the initial finger-pointing (reciprocally blaming the opposition and government respectively for the military coup and crises) they agreed on their opposition to the regime, as the PDC definitely discarded its legacy as proponent of the coup. As Patricio Aylwin, the leader of the PDC, put it, "*Wenn wir etwas aus unseren eigenen Fehlern gelernt haben, dann ist es, dass die Demokratie ein Wert an sich ist, der jeden Tag verteidigt und vertieft werden muss.*" (Aylwin 1998, 231, quoted in Bogdanovic 2008: 122-123) The PDC gradually united with the moderate reformist faction of the Socialists, the Radicals, the regime-critical Right and several smaller groups to form the *Alianza Democrática* (AD) under Ricardo Lagos. In

August 1983, the AD constituted through the subscription of the *Manifiesto Democrático* (Democratic Manifest), stating their view of the sources of the crisis, demanding the convocation of a constitutional assembly and the return to democracy:

“6. Lo repetimos una vez más, esta crisis es el producto de un sistema que limita la libertad, la justicia y la participación, bases esenciales de la convivencia democrática entre los chilenos.

7. [...] La democracia no es el caos. Quien afirme lo contrario defiende privilegios inaceptables, teme a la libertad, desconoce los valores profundos del pueblo chileno y reniega de su historia. [...] Si hubiera existido un Parlamento libremente elegido, libertad de prensa y de acceso a los demás medios de comunicación, los abusos cometidos y las malas políticas seguidas no habrían sido posibles y los errores podrían haberse corregido a tiempo.

[...] 11. Para lograr ese gran objetivo, se debe poner término inmediato a los regímenes de emergencia, que han enterado más de nueve años sin interrupción y acaban de renovarse; restablecer la libertad y seguridad individuales y su efectivo resguardo por un Poder Judicial que asuma la tutela del respeto a las personas como corresponde en un Estado de Derecho; poner fin a las expulsiones y dar urgente solución al dramático problema de los exiliados; ejercer en plenitud las libertades de expresión y de opinión y los derechos de reunión y asociación, eliminándose las medidas que los restringen; recuperar la autonomía de las Universidades y regular la vida de los partidos políticos. [...] la convocatoria a una Asamblea Constituyente integrada por las distintas corrientes de opinión y, la adopción de un sistema electoral que garantice la libre, informada y auténtica expresión de la voluntad ciudadana.”
(Manifiesto Democrático 1983)¹²

With this important document, the AD not only declared the collaboration of various parties in the joint struggle, but also the willingness to enter a dialogue with the regime on the transition to democracy: *“16. Llamamos a encarar el futuro sin odios ni revanchismos, con espíritu generoso y voluntad de hacer justicia.”*¹³

The small surviving militant faction of the MIR (the *Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez*, FPMR, Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez) in return started a new *Movimiento Democrático Popular* (MDP, Democratic People's Movement) with the militant faction of the Socialists under the leadership of Clodomiro Almeyda in 1983. (Rinke 2007: 170) In contrast to the AD parties, the MDP did not support a dialogue, but preferred mobilisation and constraint instead – at least initially. (Bogdanovic 2008: 124) The FPMR launched a last attempt to induce an end to the regime through violence on September 8th 1986, with a failed assassination attempt

¹² 6. We repeat it once again, this crisis is the product of a system that limits freedom, justice and participation, which are essential bases for the democratic coexistence of the Chileans.

7. [...] Democracy is not chaos. Whoever affirms the contrary is defending the unacceptable privileges, fears freedom and does not know the profound values of the Chilean people and denies its history. [...] If a freely elected parliament, freedom of the press and access to the other media had existed, the committed abuses and subsequent bad politics would not have been possible and the mistakes could have been corrected on time.

11. In order to achieve that big objective, the states of emergency which have lasted more than nine consecutive years must be stopped immediately; the individual freedom and security must be re-established and protected by a judicial power that guards the respect of people as it should be under the rule of law; the expulsions must be stopped and urgently find a solution for the dramatic problem of the exiles; exercise fully the freedom of expression and opinion, and the rights to assembly and association, eliminating the measures that restrict them; restore the autonomy of the universities and regulate the life of the political parties. [...] the call of a Constituent Assembly integrated by different currents of opinion, and the adoption of an electoral system that guarantees the free, informed and authentic expression of the citizens' will. (own translation)

¹³ We send out a call to face the future without hatred nor revenge, with a generous spirit and the will to do justice. (own translation)

(“*Operación Siglo XX*”, Operation 20th Century) on General Pinochet. However, the operation lacked in organisation, and its performance was poor. The General survived the attack slightly harmed, along with other twelve people, while five other people were killed. (Rottensteiner 1996: 20) General Pinochet actually saw the abortive attack as a further sign of his legitimacy, claiming that providence had saved him from any harm, as he was meant to remain Chile’s protecting leader. On the other hand, the incident made a compelling case for the argument that without the military’s rule, Chile would return to the chaotic, violent state, as during the UP period. As beside the many critics and bereaved there was still considerable support for the regime (mainly from large business owners and some parts of the Right, whose dread still remained the UP period), this argument was unalteredly effective. (Rinke 2007: 171) After this incident, the militant Left largely withdrew from the political agenda of fighting the regime with armed violence. The other parties agreed to join archbishop cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno’s initiative to unite the opposition through the signing of the *Acuerdo Nacional para la Transición a la Plena Democracia* (National Agreement for the Transition to Full Democracy) in August 1985, in preparation for the upcoming plebiscite in 1988. (Rinke 2007: 170) The effects of this coalition were decisive for the further developments, but especially for the time after the military regime; for the first time since the 1960s, the marked polarisation of the political parties and confrontational tone made way for a “*gemäßiger Pluralismus*” (Klein 1993: 118-119), characterised by a less split up and less ideologically intransigent (rather centralised) landscape of political parties. Furthermore, in order to convince the people to find their courage again and stand up for their rights and freedom, it was essential that the opposition united in one front, withstanding the attempts of the regime to divide the minds.

Soon the protests were no longer organised by unionists alone, but were planned and performed by the oppositional social groups and political parties as a preparation of the upcoming plebiscite; on the one hand it was important to pressurise the regime and thereby draw the national and international attention to the Chilean people’s discontent and resistance; the social mobilisation in addition to the economic backlashes were recognised as important catalysers for change. On the other hand the protests encouraged the citizens to take action and to raise their initially particular claims to the democratisation in the upcoming plebiscite.

From 1982 onwards, the regime gradually realised that it could not muzzle the discontent and protests easily (i.e. through increased repression) and granted some small concessions, such as

a slight relaxation of censorship, of the restrictions of the right of assembly, and the drawing of a list of exiles for whom the return was permitted. (Rinke 2007: 171)

With the taking office of President Jimmy Carter in January 1977, the regime had seen the initial supportive or at least tolerant attitude of the U.S. come to an end. (Klein 1993: 104) The new president elevated the human rights concern to a priority, and not only did not look away, but exerted pressure on Chile to improve its human rights record.

In spite of the suppression attempts and violence used against the protesters, the regime eventually opened up for dialogue with the opposition. (Bogdanovic 2008: 127) The *Acuerdo Nacional* and the decision of all parties to the *Acuerdo* to finally accept the 1980 Constitution as the framework in which the transition was bound to take place, led to talks between the archbishop cardinal Fresno and the Minister of the Interior Jarpa. (Bogdanovic 2008: 127-128) Eventually the regime conceded some constitutional changes, namely the direct election of the members of parliament and of the president, the readmission of parties and the introduction of means to perform constitutional changes. Further demands of the *Acuerdo*, inter alia the end of the state of emergency and the reinsertion of all political and social rights, were not granted by the regime. (Bogdanovic 2008: 129)

New hurdles were installed by the regime: Parties were only admitted if they were effectively reorganised in party structures and needed to be officially admitted to the election by the regime. This required a minimum 35 000 declared members. The *Alianza* consisted of various parties with one common aim for sure, but quite different programmes, and the decision whether to unite in one party or as separate ones was much discussed. In the end the members of the *Alianza* decided to split into the PDC and the *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD). Notwithstanding the struggle was led together in a joint “*Campaña del NO*”. (Bogdanovic 2008: 132)

Finally October 5th 1988 arrived and the preparations were all set for the plebiscite. The result of 54.7% against the prolongation of Pinochet’s tenure was striking, alongside the highest turnout in Chilean history. (Bogdanovic 2008: 131) As a result, a presidential election was set for 1990. The most important challenge of the *Alianza* was to get its voters and supporters to sign up in the electoral registers, and to guarantee that this was not accompanied by persecution or violence of any sort. (ibid. 131-132) This was not an easy task in such a short

timeframe. The next step then was to convince the traditionally reluctant people to actually go to the polls in order to avert a defeat. (Bogdanovic 2008: 132)

V The Democratisation Process 1989-2009

Chile is one of the few cases in which the authoritarian regime itself introduced and institutionalised the path to democratisation, paving the way for a transfer of power from the military to a civilian government. (Bogdanovic 2008: 120) The Constitution of 1980 was crafted to consolidate Pinochet's rule and influence, even in the unlikely case of a liberalisation. Pinochet had not predicted that the opposition would be able to reintegrate itself and mobilise enough support for the plebiscite scheduled for 1989. When it became quite evident that the likelihood of a "no" was rising, the General went about to introduce some more elements in the Constitution which would secure his influence and impunity beyond the transition and settle the "rules of the game". (Codoceo 2008: 77-78) In so doing, Pinochet added a significant number of obstacles in the subsequent democratic governments' way, which would take more than two decades to overcome. In return for the opposition's acceptance, however, 54 amendments were further made to the Constitution as a preparation for democracy, which initiated the repeal of the authoritarian features. (Valenzuela 1999: 231)

1. The political parties and governments after the transition

Initially, immediately after the transition, three political groupings constituted the political parties system in Chile. The most influential one during the transition (formed in 1989) was the Centre-Left *Concertación*, comprising the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Socialist Party (PS), the new Party for Democracy (PPD) and the Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD). The Centre-Right formed the "Democracia y Progreso" alliance ("Democracy and Progress") in 1989, which integrated the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and the National Renewal Party (RN). (Valenzuela 1999: 232) In 2009, it incorporated some independents and defectors from the *Concertación* to become the Coalition for Change. Finally, the third block was the Communist Party. (Freedom House 2010)

In the five presidential elections that have taken place since the return to democracy, the first four were won by candidates of the centre-left coalition. The election of 2009 represented a landmark, as for the first time a Centre-Right candidate won the vote. Furthermore, the succession of a right-wing president with a link to the Pinochet regime (his brother, José Piñera, was Minister for Employment and Social Affairs under Pinochet and was largely

responsible for the privatisation and capitalisation of the pensions system) after a left-wing president whose father (General of the Airforce Alberto Bachelet) had been tortured by the regime police and therefore had to flee to Germany during the dictatorship is probably one of the best showcases for the far-reaching division of Chilean society.

The first elected president after the transition was Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) (55.2%) of the *Concertación*, a Christian Democrat, who defeated Pinochet's candidate, former Minister of Finance Hernán Büchi (29.4%). The first democratic term had been established to last only four years, after which a new president would be elected.

The 1993 presidential election brought another *Concertación* Christian Democrat candidate, Eduardo Frei Ruiz to victory (son of the former president), defeating first the *Partido Socialista's* candidate Ricardo Lagos in a preliminary contest, and eventually Arturo Alessandri (a grandson of the former president) of the Centre-Right Coalition for Change in the second round (58.1% to 30.2%). (Valenzuela 1999: 234) Meanwhile, the Chamber of Deputies saw the Coalition for Change lead with 70 (out of 120) seats ahead of the *Concertación*. The Senate, however, continued in the firm grip of the eight designated senators. (Valenzuela 1999: 234) Slowly, within the *Concertación* the Left began to gain the upper hand, thus claiming the next presidential candidate for themselves. (Valenzuela 1999: 234)

The third presidency after the transition from 1999 to 2005 was taken by Ricardo Lagos, and thus for the first time by a Socialist, strongly associated with the former *Unidad Popular*. In the second round he defeated the Centre-Right Alliance candidate Joaquín Lavín of the UDI, who had previously been an adviser of General Pinochet and a journalist for the *Mercurio* newspaper. (Rinke 2007: 184-185)

The last of the *Concertación* presidents after the transition before the continuum was broken was Socialist Michelle Bachelet, Minister of Health and Defence under the Lagos government, who gained 53.5% of the vote against Sebastián Piñera (RN) in the second round in January 2006. (Rinke 2007: 186-187) Bachelet constituted a novelty in many senses: she was the first woman in Chilean history to take over the highest state office, an agnostic, the first president to have a four-year term after the constitutional amendments, and also the first one to have a majority in both houses of Congress, and thus more leeway to introduce reforms. This last point, however, was not to last, as in December 2007 some of the legislature members of the Christian Democratic Party defected, thus dissolving the majorities of the coalition in Congress. (Freedom House 2010)

2. The dimensions of democratic quality

Rule of law

One of the conditions required by the military regime for the liberalisation, which ultimately led to the victory of the “no” in the plebiscite, was that the opposition accept the 1980 Constitution, further impaired by the *leyes de amarre* (“Chain Laws”) pushed through in the last months of the regime. (Valenzuela 1999: 231-232) This meant that, for the beginning, this would remain the framework in which the democratic governments would have to act, but also that an alteration or the replacement of the Constitution would be very difficult to enact due to the barriers included in 1980 and the subsequent amendments by Pinochet (especially in 1989). (Linz & Stepan 1996: 206)

“The highest priorities [were] to eliminate the designated senators, to ensure the presidential right to put officers into retirement, to change the “immobility” status of Pinochet and his other commanders-in-chief, to restructure the composition and mission of the Constitutional Court, to alter Chile’s executive form of presidentialism toward a semiparliamentary model, and to have direct elections for municipal offices.” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 211)

Not until September 2005 did the democratic governments succeed in repealing some of the “authoritarian enclaves” (Garretón) contained in the Constitution which impeded the full transition to and consolidation of democracy (contrarily to Aylwin’s announcement in August 1991 that Chilean transition had been completed). As Linz and Stepan (1996: 206-207) point out, out of the three components of a completed transition, namely that “[...] government has to be in power as a result of a free and popular vote; [...] this government has authority to generate new policies; [...] the executive, legislative, and judicial powers generated by the new democracy do not have to share power with other bodies de jure”, by the beginning of 1994 only the first one had been achieved. The democratic governments saw their plans at an intensification of democratisation impeded by the votes of regime supporters in the Senate, the National Security Council and in the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, it was not until 2005 that they also achieved a majority in Congress. This did not, however, preclude caution not to distress the right-wing opposition in the sake of stability, and with the lasting fear that the military might strike again. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 211) After all, in spite of the victory of the “no”, over 40% of the voters had supported the “yes” and were now probably very reluctant in accepting the reforms of democratisation. In spite of the slow pace of change, the attempt to seek support and compromise within the legal framework and across the political

parties did succeed in reducing and marginalising political violence, thus revoking one of the fears of the democratic right that the country was going to sink in chaos again. (Rinke 2007: 183)

The constitutional amendments introduced and approved under the Lagos government in 2005 were substantial and a leap forward in the democratisation process.

The presidential term was reduced from eight (Art. 25 (1980)) to four years without the possibility of being re-elected consecutively (Art. 25 (2005)).

The right of the president to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies (Art. 32(5) (1980)) was withdrawn from the Constitution.

The nine unelected seats (Art. 45 (1980)) of the Senate were abolished, making all 38 members elected for eight-year terms, half of them alternately being renewed every four years (Art. 49 (2005)).

The role of the military as the protector of the Constitution (Art. 90 (1980)) was discarded, reducing it to the defence of the fatherland and the national security (Art. 101 (2005)).

The procedures for removal of the military commanders from office were changed; the president no longer needs the approval of the National Security Council in order to remove the commanders (Art. 93 (1980)), but instead informs the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of his or her decision (Art. 104 (2005)).

The role of the National Security Council was significantly weakened, reducing it to an advisory organ. The members are not predominantly military any more, and the president reserves the right to convoke the meetings (Art. 95 (1980); Art. 106 and 107 (2005)).

However, a constitutional amendment not only needs the approval of three fifths of the deputies and senators (Art. 116 (1980)), but alterations pertaining to some chapters require a two-thirds majority in each Chamber (Art. 127 (2005)).

The Constitutional Court was enlarged to ten (Art. 92 (2005)) instead of seven (Art. 81 (1980)) members, three of which are appointed by the president, four elected by Congress (two by the Senate, two nominated by the Chamber of Deputies and approved by the Senate), and three elected by the Supreme Court (Art. 92 (2005)). The unremovability of the judges entailed that many of the members installed by Pinochet held their tenure far into the democratisation and thus represented a stronghold of the military's and right elites' interests and a further barrier to constitutional change. (Hagopian 2005: 140; Linz & Stepan 1996: 210)

The importance of the provisions (and limitations) of the Constitution are significant for Chile, as its strong tradition of a rule of law remained unbroken throughout the last century. Every regime, as different as they were, struggled to remain within the framework of the Constitution and laws, and aspired to adapt the legal framework instead of breaking it for its interests and programmes. Even the military regime ultimately endorsed legality over an illegal reaction to the plebiscite. (Valenzuela 1999: 230-231)

The supremacy of the military over the civilian institutions remained a legacy throughout the first presidencies, with their interests being very present in the remaining unelected but influential institutions. Furthermore, the unremovability of General Pinochet as Chief of the Army and of the other *Junta* members included in the Constitution, and the assumption of senatorial and National Security Council seats consolidated their influence for some time into democratisation. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 208) This changed gradually at first, but gained momentum with the downfall of General Pinochet and the reforms and amendments to the Constitution. The retirement and deposition of representatives of the regime have further led to a beginning renovation within the military, the officer corps starting to be filled with democratically loyal elements. (Diamond et al. 1999: 21; Valenzuela 1999: 234) A historical landmark was set in 2003 by Commander-in-Chief General Juan Emilio Cheyre, who postulated a “*nunca más*” (never again) concerning a renewed interference of the military in politics. (Rinke 2007: 189) A further important step was the September 2009 Copper Reserve Law which repealed the regulation that 10% of the profits of the Copper mining were transferred to the military. (Freedom House 2010)

Furthermore, Chile is an exception in Latin America with its homicide rate (2003-2005: Chile 5.5; U.S. 5.9) (The Guardian 13.10.2009) and corruption, though present, is not endemic (Transparency Corruption Perception Index 2009: 6.7; 25th position out of 180 countries).

In spite of its involvement during the Pinochet regime and legal disputes over the responsibility for human rights violations, the police (the uniformed *Carabineros* and the investigative unit) enjoy a high esteem and image in Chilean society. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 215) The police are no longer a branch of the Armed Forces (Art. 90 (1980); Art. 101 (2005)) and are subjected to the Ministry for Public Security. During the student protests in 2006 there were many reported cases of police brutality, leading to the dismissal of the Special Forces Commander and his deputy in June 2006. (Freedom House 2009) However, cases involving the police still underlie to the jurisdiction of military courts. (Hagopian 2005: 130)

While some remnants in the Penal Code were tackled in 2005, namely the Criminal Libel Law (repeal of Art. 263 of the Penal Code), penalising false allegations of a crime and the use of

expressions that might dishonour, discredit or show contempt for another individual, the laws criminalising disrespect for or offence of public officials and authorities, and especially the Armed Forces and its members (Art. 284 of the Code of Military Justice) still persist. (Human Rights Watch 01.2010; 03.2005b) Furthermore, the jurisdiction of military courts in these legal matters is highly problematic, as impartiality and independence cannot be guaranteed, pre-trial release becomes less feasible, evidence can be kept secret by the prosecution up to six months, and testimonies by anonymous witnesses are sufficient for convictions. This has especially been problematic in the case of the Anti-Terrorism Law which places common crimes (e.g. arson, destruction of machinery and equipment, especially affecting the protests of the Mapuche minority) under military jurisdiction. (Human Rights Watch 09.2010)

The legacy of the human rights violations

The chapter of the human rights violations during the Pinochet regime was probably one of the most startling in the democratisation process in Chile. The first step had been set in 1978, with an Amnesty Law passed by Pinochet which exempted all crimes committed between September 1973 and March 1978 from punishment (DL 2191). This provision would be influential until the late 1990s when judges finally started allowing prosecutions into human rights abuses on the grounds that “forced disappearance” was an on-going crime (as the victims had not been found nor their death confirmed) and therefore not in the scope of the 1978 Amnesty. (Human Rights Watch 2004b; Rinke 2007: 194) There was considerable resistance from the right, the military, the judiciary and from groups of civil society which had supported Pinochet and did not accept that the crimes should be reviewed. (Hagopian 2005: 130; Linz & Stepan 1996: 213)

One of the few cases to be pursued in the 1990s was the one indicting former head of the DINA General Manuel Contreras in 1995 of the involvement in the assassination of the opposition leader and Minister of Foreign Affairs Orlando Letelier in Washington in 1976. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 218; Rinke 2007: 193) Due to its international implication this case had been explicitly exempted from the 1978 Amnesty Law after the U.S. had pressurised the regime to convict those responsible. In this case and in others where it was also discontent, the military staged acts of intimidation and defiance, such as “abducting” General Contreras before eventually bringing him to a military prison, or performing unannounced manoeuvres in front of the presidential palace. (Rinke 2007: 192)

General Pinochet enjoyed widespread acceptance and remained Commander-in-Chief until March 1998, when he voluntarily retired and took up his seat as a senator for life. (Rinke 2007: 193) The *Concertación* was reluctant to insist on prosecuting any human rights violations by the military, fearing that this step might prompt a coup resurrection. (Diamond, Hartlyn & Linz 1999: 21; Rinke 2007: 190) President Aylwin set up a *Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación* (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) in 1990 with the aim to investigate the human rights violations of the military regime. The Commission (in the report known as “Rettig Report” after their chairman Raúl Rettig) found 2,279 cases of disappearance or death between 1973 and 1990, for which the military and the secret police were responsible. (Freedom House 2009; Rinke 2007: 190-191; Codoceo 2007) Another Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture was formed in August 2003 and presided by Bishop Sergio Valech, gathering testimonies of thousands of victims of the regime. However, the findings did not immediately entail indictments, as the testimonies were to be kept secret for 50 years; victims could press charges individually if they wanted. (Hagopian 2005: 130; Human Rights Watch 11.2004a and 12.2004; Linz & Stepan 1996: 213) A law was passed to provide the identified victims and their relatives with an annual pension. (Human Rights Watch 11.2004a and 12.2004) As Valenzuela puts it, “Despite President Aylwin’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Chile may have acknowledged the truth, but it has not found reconciliation.” (1999: 238)

The turning point was the General’s arrest in London in October 1998 under an international extradition order from Spain. Pinochet had travelled to London as a respected and feared Senator for a dorsal surgery; but when he was eventually left back to Chile in 2000, officially on health grounds, he had been stripped of his immunity and was welcomed as an indicted man finally facing responsibility for his deeds. From the beginning, Chile had tried to convince London to let the General return; however, initially the reasons were rather protective, as the opposition wanted to prevent Pinochet from being convicted. However, by the time of the return, the tide had turned, and those who demanded for the General’s indictment had gained the upper hand. His claims of impunity were eventually unsuccessful with the Supreme Court’s decision to strip him from his immunity, and he was forced to resign from his Senator post in July 2002. The military under its new Commander-in-Chief General Ricardo Izurieta did not intervene, and even showed willingness to cooperate, accepting to participate at a round table (*Mesa de Diálogo*) with human rights organisations and discuss the cases of the “disappeared”. (Rinke 2007: 194) In 2004 Pinochet was indicted for two cases of human rights violations and for tax evasion. As the case did not look good for

the General, and the latest when he began denying to have learned of the violations his subjects were performing in his name, the remaining institutional and cultural actors which had been faithful to him began to distance themselves from Pinochet. (Hagopian 2005: 155)

The proceedings against Pinochet were suspended in July 2001 for health reasons (Pinochet had suffered several minor strokes and showed an initiating dementia). (del Campo 2002: 6; Rinke 2007: 194) Eventually, in September 2006 the Supreme Court decided that the health grounds for the suspension were not sufficient, and cleared the way for the trials to continue. They would not, however, be concluded, as General Pinochet passed away in December 2006. (Freedom House 2009 and 2010)

Many members of the military and secret police were indicted and convicted, but there are still some cases pending. (see for example Freedom House 2010; Rinke 2007: 196-197)

Horizontal accountability

The left-wing parties and elites had pondered on the causes for the democratic breakdown in 1973 and had recognised that polarisation and minority governments with a strong presidency had contributed to the failure of the political system. This was not so for the right-wing parties, who mostly still saw the military coup as a necessary step and the human rights violations as minor or as side-effects of a positive change. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 216; Valenzuela 1999: 193; 238-239; del Campo 2002: 6) The idea was thus to strengthen parliamentarism after the transition. However, once a democratic government came to power, these plans were put off, due to the obstructions by the authoritarian enclaves, but also by a shift of priority to promote growth and equality, leaving Chile with one of the most powerful presidencies in the world. (Hagopian 2005: 134; Rinke 2007: 175) Many of the president's constitutional rights were banned (e.g. dissolving the Chamber of Deputies), while other quite powerful ones remained, such as the exclusive initiative for proposing budgetary legislation, the high threshold needed to override a presidential veto (two thirds), or the control of the legislative agenda declaring that a proposed legislation is urgent; initiatives by individuals or by parties are thus limited or at least discouraged, thus ruling out interests of their constituents. (Hagopian 2005: 134; 144; Valenzuela 1999: 239)

The judiciary has seen significant improvement, as the terms of some of the Pinochet appointed judges ended and were replaced by democratically loyal ones. During the dictatorship, the judiciary had enjoyed independence in return for an acquiescence to the authoritarian laws and repealing cases of human rights violations. The Amnesty Law of 1978

kept its influence well into the democratisation, roughly until the beginning of the 21st century (Hagopian 2005: 135), when courts finally started accepting human rights violations and disappearance cases with the justification that these crimes were still ongoing, as the victims had not yet been found, dead or alive. The new nomination system for the Supreme Court, requiring not only the approval of the president and the Court itself, but also of the Senate (Art. 75 (1980); Art. 78 (2005)) and the expansion of its size was important in this sense. (Hagopian 2005: 135) In spite of the aforementioned domains in which the military jurisdiction is applied also to civilians and in cases of defamation of public or military officials, the judiciary has evolved into an independent and efficient institution.

Competition, vertical accountability and responsiveness

Probably the most important lesson that the political parties drew from the authoritarian experience was the importance and meaning of consensus, and the danger of competition that is too polarised, confrontational and uncompromising. This epiphany was decisive for the creation of the movement and later coalition that ultimately led Chile to and through democratisation. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 217) The collaboration of a broad spectrum of parties of the Centre and the Left contributed strongly to the reduction of political violence, the legitimacy of the policies that were carried out and the stability of the still developing democracy. However, the necessity of broad support also meant that some more daring (and necessary) reforms were not accomplished (Diamond, Hartlyn & Linz 1999: 33; Hagopian 2005: 145; Rinke 2007: 187), and that the citizens' support for the parties dwindled (as will be discussed below) because of the waning discriminability between party and policy options.

Keeping in mind that 44% of the voters in the 1989 plebiscite did not support a return to democracy, the initial enthusiasm for democracy and the high hopes were quickly disillusioned, as the pace of reforms was quite slow (due to the remaining authoritarian constrictions in most institutions), the economic model was kept without many initial reforms, and the mobilisation which had been so decisive for the plebiscite was now counteracted by the political elites, who saw demobilisation as a prerequisite for stability and efficiency. (Hagopian 2005: 126-127, 145, 153) The strength and predominance of the *Concertación* also meant that an alternation in power of elites with differing programmes was not probable, and thus the public opinion on democracy gradually sank throughout the democratisation process until 200, but has been rising again since. The decrease was not, however, as significant as

turning the tide against democracy, as, overall, citizens appreciated the good economic performance, stability and the slow but present reforms. (Diamond, Hartlyn & Linz 1999: 3, 33; Hagopian 2005: 142) According to Linz, shortly after the transition, in August 1990 Chileans showed a 75% satisfaction with democracy. (quoted in Hagopian 2005: 146) While in 1996 54% of Chileans responded affirmatively to the question whether democracy is preferable to any other type of government in the Latinobarómetro survey, this approval dropped to 45% in 2001. However, it has been rising ever since, reaching 59% in 2009. (The Economist 12.12.2009) Regarding the question whether in certain circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one, the number of approvals has dropped from 19% in 2001 to 11% in 2009. (ibid.)

An important point made by Hagopian is that while the political elites demobilised their voters and strove to find a compromise in the centre which would find the support needed for the policies and reforms, citizens were not depoliticised and moderated to the same degree. Thus the continuing polarisation (even if not extreme) of the population does not mirror itself or find a counterpart in the political parties. The result is not a depoliticisation of citizens, but a growing indifference towards the political process. (Hagopian 2005: 145) The pragmatic Centrism of the long ruling coalition did not reflect the interests of the leftist citizens, who had not profited from the neoliberal economic model and did not find the social reforms necessary for an improvement of their situations, resented the long lasting influence of the military and the political elites of the Pinochet regime and demanded justice for the human rights violation, but also not of the conservative and rightist citizens, who saw their Catholic traditions abandoned and the traditionally strong linkages between the party structures and their constituents missing. (Hagopian 2005: 153) Furthermore, while reforms of the state institutions, of the Constitution and the handling of the human rights violations have been important issues throughout the democratisation process, citizens' concerns seemed to shift to more immediate problems such as crime, poverty, health care and education. (Valenzuela 1999: 236)

One of the first successful reforms to improve vertical accountability after the transition was the introduction of municipal elections in 1992. However, governments at the regional (intendientes) and provincial level (governors and economic and social advisory councils) are still appointed by the president. (Hagopian 2005: 141) Thus Chile remains a highly centralised country, with the regions and provinces depending strongly on the central government. Furthermore, the elections for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate still follow

the “binomial majoritarian” system, which clearly benefits the runner-up party (coalition) and does not reflect voter’s preferences¹⁴. The two members elected for each district are not necessarily the two individuals with most votes, and smaller parties (second runner-up etc.) are not at all represented in Congress. (Hagopian 2005: 141) The will of the electorate is thus not necessarily reflected in its representation. (Hagopian 2005: 152)

Freedom

With the exception of the laws on defamation which had still not been tackled in 2009, Chile is one of the few countries in Latin America to have received the highest mark (1.0) in the Freedom of the World rating in 2009. (Freedom House 2009: Freedom of the World) Chile upholds the civil and political rights of its citizens, although abuses by the police are subject to military jurisdiction, and prosecution in these cases is often abandoned. The laws on defamation dent the guarantee of free speech, which is otherwise generally respected.

The press fares somewhat worse in the Freedom House rating, giving Chile the 63rd place of 195 countries, with a mark of 29 (“free”). (Freedom House 2009: Freedom of the Press) Most of the media are in the possession of a few companies, thus constraining their diversity and independence, and the fear of costly battles leads to a self-censorship of content. (Freedom House 2010; Hagopian 2005: 142; Rinke 2007: 188-189) A major breakthrough was the Law on Access to Public Information inured in April 2009 which strengthened the freedom of information already included in the Constitution (Art.19(12) (2005)).

Although the right to assemble peacefully and of association (Art. 19(13) and (15) (2005)) are generally upheld, demonstrations have sometimes been met with exaggerated police violence, and some practices such as the replacement of workers during a strike or dismissal threats to discourage workers from joining or organising unions have been reported. (Freedom House 2010)

During the dictatorship, the indigenous peoples in Chile (especially the biggest group, the Mapuche) had suffered from the authoritarian regime’s attempt to suppress the existence of different groups, which was contrary to the ideal of a unitary, strong state without diversification and fragmentation. Their situation has come to improve since the

¹⁴ “The ballot structure provides for open lists; voters indicate a preference for one candidate within a list of up to two candidates; all votes for candidates within each list are pooled together to determine the distribution of seats among lists; and seats are allocated to those candidates from seat-winning lists in the order of their individual vote totals. Both candidates on a list can be selected only if their list more than doubles the vote total of the second-place list – otherwise, the top candidate from each of the first two lists is elected.” (Hagopian 2005: 141)

democratisation, with the creation of a “Historical Truth and New Deal Commission” in 1993 and a Non-Discrimination Law was being considered by the end of 2009 (Freedom House 2010; Hagopian 2005: 130-131). However, there are still many problems related to their claims to ancestral lands and ensuing conflicts with landowners and corporations, the slow pace of land transfers and the improving but still widespread poverty of these peoples. (Hagopian 2005: 130-131; Rinke 2007: 181-182)

Participation

The combination of the established political elites’ consensual stance and the high threshold for political alternation in a coalitional political system has a strong impact on participation. The interests and preferences of citizens are more diversified and politicised than the programmes offered by the available parties. Furthermore, the link between the citizens and the political leaders has been weakened as parties aimed to re-depoliticise and demobilise their constituents after the first democratic election, and in between the subsequent ones. The result has not been a depoliticisation of citizens, but rather an alienation from the political process in the form of waning participation. (Hagopian 2005: 126, 150; Valenzuela 1999: 236) Abstained citizens thus either are satisfied with the results of the incumbent government and the work of the political parties and do not see the need to go to elections, or they are not satisfied, but do not find viable alternatives in the political parties’ offers, and thus do not believe that their vote would change anything. Even the introduction of compulsory voting did not show the intended effects: voting is mandatory only for voters who have registered, which does not happen automatically. Consequently, enfranchised citizens who do not register are not liable. (Hagopian 2005: 149; Rinke 2007: 187-188) In view that even those who do vote do not see their will reflected in the elected institutions due to the binomial majoritarian system, and the alienation of the political parties from their constituents, it seems hard to predict when the trend of high absenteeism (reaching 16.3% in the 2009 presidential election) might stop.

The disengagement of the Chilean electorate is a far-reaching result of the Pinochet regime’s policy of individualisation and depoliticisation, leading to lower membership numbers in social, religious and political organisations than before the military coup. (Hagopian 2005: 149) In a neoliberal economy where (to a certain extent) each is responsible for their own well-being and wealth, individualism prevails over association. (Hagopian 2005: 150)

The group that has most clearly removed itself from the electoral process is the youth. Born after the return to democracy, the young adults do not identify themselves with the political parties which fail to capture their interests, preferences and ideals. (Hagopian 2005: 149-150, 152) Furthermore, the social reforms and programmes have not succeeded in reducing the high unemployment rate, and the dissatisfaction with the education system (one of the most expensive ones in the world) tended to lead to mobilisation in demonstrations, but not in electoral participation. (Rinke 2007: 187-188)

Equality

The *Concertación* governments have continued the neoliberal economic model that Pinochet had introduced in Chile and which, despite some setbacks and crises, was seen as quite efficient and efficacious in tackling the long-time problems of high inflation and public deficit.

Thanks mainly to its strong export sector (mining (especially copper), agriculture and forestry) and foreign investment, Chile has continued faring a steady economic growth (GDP growth rate of 3.7% in 2008, -1.7% in 2009, and an estimated 5.3% in 2010), allowing it to tackle inflation (from 27.3% in 1990 to an estimated 1.5% in 2009) and public debt (est. 6.2% in 2009) and to invest in socio-economic reform programmes. (Rinke 2007: 176-178; CIA 2011; Valenzuela 1999: 235) At the same time, while Chile's economy remains vulnerable to slumps in copper market prices, external factors (as became evident during the 1999 Asian economic crisis, when demand and the price for copper dwindled), the problem of sustainability and to ecological costs, it has also been able to create reserves which have recently helped it in overcoming the financial and economic crisis beginning in 2008. (Rinke 2007: 179, 185)

In line with the export-promoting policies of the CEPAL (ECLAC, The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), Chile strove to restore its bi- and multilateral economic relations, joining the APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation), the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), but precluding a return to the Andean pact, because the other members' tariff policies and levels did not match the more liberal ones Chile had achieved. (Barrios 1999: 140 et seq.) For the same reason Chile is associated, but not a member of the Mercosur.

An important change in the economic and social policies was the restructuring of the relationship between the state, the economy and the citizens. Instead of fully withdrawing from any influence and interference with the economy and people's welfare (as the neoliberal model had intended), in spite of further privatisations carried out after the transition, the state resumed social welfare policies to tackle the exacerbated inequality and the high poverty rate. (Rinke 2007: 175)

The education system had been radically liberalised during the military regime, which led to a fragmentation of educational institutions and a steep increase of the fees. State expenditures on education have tripled since 1990, and significant investment was made in education infrastructure. (Rinke 2007: 181) In the summer of 2006 the situation had peaked to a point that the students went to the streets in massive demonstrations, demanding improvements and especially a reform which would allow for more affordable fees. (Freedom House 2009 and 2010) The resurgence of protests in the summer of 2011 shows that these problems have not been tackled yet.

Significant measures and policies were introduced to improve and expand the welfare system, with new hospitals being built, the introduction of a pension for poor seniors who fall out of the privatised and capitalised pensions system, (Freedom House 2009 and 2010) and a number of programmes for the poor, while at the same time keeping public debt within limits. However, Chile remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 52.4 in 2009. (CIA 2011; Hagopian 2005: 125) The introduction of a progressive income tax has helped improve the situation a little, but the problem remains significant. (Rinke 2007: 179-180) The unemployment rate continues to be fairly high, at around 9.6% in 2009, but the percentage of people below the poverty line was significantly reduced from 39% in 1990 to 11.5% in 2009. (Hagopian 2005: 138; CIA 2011) Worker's rights have improved significantly, with the introduction of the so-called *Acuerdo Marco* (Framework Agreement), prescribing an agreement between employers and employees on wages, minimum wages and pensions, and literacy is almost exhaustive (95.7% in 2002). (CIA 2011; Rinke 2007: 179-180) However, the traditionally high levels of union membership and organisation have not been attained again in spite of the reactivation of the former CUT, and the fragmentation into smaller unions arising from the military regime remains an obstacle to a stronger voice of employees' interests.

The equality of women has improved significantly in recent years, with the introduction of divorce as late as May 2004 (one of the last countries in the world to have banned divorce) and the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies held by women also rising (from 4% of

the seats in 1970 to an average of 15 % in 1998; 50% of Bachelet's cabinet seats). (Diamon, Hartlyn & Linz 1999: 32; Hagopian 2005: 138; Freedom House 2009)

Overall it can be said that Chile has shown an impressive performance in the macroeconomic factors, but also in the socio-economic ones. In spite of the remaining problems Chile has succeeded in improving the life situation of most Chileans, and new transparency laws as well as the exposure of financial scandals and corruption are indicators that Chile is improving in becoming a more transparent and fair country.

Conclusion

The word *democracy* encompasses a broad range of quite diverse concepts which have evolved since its emergence in ancient Greece and throughout the centuries. Various currents of thought and developments influenced what was meant by democracy, eventually leading to a broadening and deepening of the dimensions included in the concept. Proponents of liberal and socialist, empirical and normative, formal and substantive understandings of democracy have contributed to the enrichment of the discussion on forms of government in general, and the merits of democracy in particular. From the different available categorisations and indicators for assessing the quality of democracy, the ones developed by Diamond and Morlino (2005) were chosen due to their broad coverage of both formal and substantive dimensions (rule of law, participation, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, freedom, equality and responsiveness).

Starting from the first half of the 19th century, the democratisation of an increasing number of countries in the world has led to an emergence of far-reaching and diverse theories on the causes of and explanations for the development of democratisation in general and in specific case studies. Different starting points of these theories and sometimes quite diverging conclusions allowed for rich discussions and predictions on the present and future of democratic and non-democratic countries alike.

In the case of Chile, the democratisation process which brought the Pinochet regime to fall must be seen in the light of the long preceding democratic tradition of the country. Developments and characteristics from the past were determining for the development of the authoritarian regime, and thus for the process leading to the redemocratisation: The emergence and consolidation of the political parties and state institutions in the first half of the 20th century contributed significantly to the stability and efficiency of the *Concertación* government, which was able to concentrate on other areas of policy and reform (one should keep in mind the difficulties of other Latin American countries in the democratisation processes due to the lack of traditional institutional stability). These characteristics of the pre-authoritarian legacy posed a great advantage for the quality of democracy, and can be said to contribute to the improbability of a relapse to authoritarianism. However, the legacies of the past were not all beneficial to the democratic cause: the high levels of mobilisation and polarisation ultimately led to the downfall of democracy in the first place (in conjunction with other determining factors such as the importance of the Doctrine of National Security, the UP social and political reforms, to mention only a few). The result was a development in the other

direction, namely the radical depoliticisation and demobilisation of society during the military regime, alienating the electorate from the state and later on from the political parties as well. This has had repercussions on the democratisation process and the consolidation of democracy, as the important vertical accountability and responsiveness dimensions suffer from the abstention of the population from the political process on the one hand, and the lack of correspondence between the parties' programmes and the citizens' assumed interests on the other.

In spite of the initial resilience to reforms and the persistence of authoritarian legacies in the political system and in society, the more recent changes and measures have proved fruitful in contributing to the consolidation of democracy in Chile. In most of the dimensions which Diamond and Morlino (2005) discerned as essential for a high-quality democracy, Chile has produced successful improvements and showed a resilient, though sometimes hampered, determination to strive for better. The traditionally strong rule of law (to which even the military regime committed itself) continued to be implemented after the transition. The adherence to the laws proved problematic in the sense that the legal framework which accompanied the transition had been set by the authoritarian regime, and that the commitment to this framework had been one of the conditions for the military's retreat from power. This meant that many important steps and reforms (e.g. the indictment of former human rights abusers, the removal of authoritarian enclaves in the law) were not tackled before a considerable span of time after the transition had already elapsed, and a few aspects persist which still need action (e.g. the laws criminalising disrespect for public officials and Anti-Terrorism Law).

The process of tackling the legacy of the human rights violations during the regime was a tedious process, which only gained momentum and provided success from the beginning of the 21st century, with the arrest of General Pinochet in London as a clear turning point. The initiatives at truth finding and reconciliation were marked by desultoriness, as judges and politicians only reluctantly abandoned the constraints of the Amnesty Law of 1978 and the fear of a renewed intervention of the military receded. Many victims, however, still await justice, and not all perpetrators have been identified and indicted yet.

In the dimension of horizontal accountability the significant power and strength of the presidency has not been curtailed in favour of a stronger parliament, contrarily to what had been envisaged during the transition. The opportunities and powers for checks and balances are thus still limited by the strong position of the president. The judiciary registered

considerable improvement in the observance of its function as an organ of horizontal accountability as the terms of the judges installed by Pinochet gradually ended and the appointment regulations were changed.

Competition, vertical accountability and responsiveness have shown some very encouraging, and also very worrisome developments. On the one hand, the comparatively moderate competition between the political parties and the role of consensus has definitely curtailed the incidence of political violence and escalation of mobilisation. On the other hand, the lack of distinct alternatives and the low probability of alternation in power (important for vertical accountability, as a measure of “punishment” for unpopular or unfavourable policies) have led to an alienation of the electorate from the political process and elites. The binomial majoritarian electoral system remained in place, with the consequence of a distortion and lack of reflection of the voters’ will.

The dimension of freedom has seen significant improvements since the return to democracy. While most of the key fundamental freedoms can be found in the Constitution, distorted influence (e.g. media are concentrated in the possession of a few owners), unproportionality (e.g. exaggerated reactions to demonstrations and assemblies) and the treatment of indigenous peoples (e.g. disputes over land traditionally inhabited by the Mapuche) have remained a problem to the achievement of good levels of freedom.

The aforementioned shortcomings in the dimensions of competition, vertical accountability and responsiveness have had a considerable influence on the participation of citizens in the political process. The alienation from the elites and improbability of alternation in power has led to growing rates of absenteeism, especially of the youth. This is not necessarily a symptom for the lack of interest or the depoliticisation of society (as had been intended and somewhat achieved by the military regime), but of a diminishing representation of the citizens and an ensuing turning away to other than the institutionalised political channels.

Finally, equality has probably remained one of the legacies with most impact on Chilean society. The neoliberal policies of the military regime not only changed society and the relationship between the state and its citizens radically, but were largely kept (with some corrections) throughout the *Concertación* rule. While Chile fares very well in the macroeconomic indicators, the economic success has benefitted only a small stratum of society, while the large share of the population has not seen any improvements deriving thereof for themselves. The policies and measures to tackle inequality have not shown the intended success yet, and important domains such as the educational system and the welfare (sp. pensions) system have not been sufficiently targeted.

As in every present democracy worldwide, some points remain which reach from not ideal to worrisome; the persisting social and economic inequality, the dwindling participation and the pending reconciliation between the proponents and opponents of the military regime are only some of the more demanding problems that remain on the agenda.

The legacies from the authoritarian past have largely been tackled, either by the coming of age of their representatives, international interference, a shift in the political elites' confidence in the military's restraint and a new courage (and electoral majorities) to introduce far-reaching reforms. The military has largely returned to the barracks, and the resurgence of an insurgent outcry has become highly unlikely.

After twenty years of *Concertación* rule, for the first time since the return to democracy a candidate of the Right has attained a majority in the presidential election. While the political cleavage survived the tumults of revolution, the depoliticisation of society during the dictatorship and the strongly consensual phase of the Centre-Left rule, the high abstention from vote and the growing alienation of the electorate from the political parties makes any simplistic explanation for the shift erroneous. The future holds interesting perspectives for Chile, hopefully including a re-approximation of representatives and the represented, and a more fruitful offer of alternatives with increasing competition, without, however, escalating into exaggerated levels of politicisation.

Looking at the recent democratisation wave in North Africa, democratisation has regained actuality – not that it ever ceased to do so, but it has definitely re-entered the public discussion in civil society, after having retreated to predominantly scholarly discussions in the last decade after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Much can be learned with the case of the Chilean democratisation, but a critical assessment of the successes and shortcomings so far remains imperative. Furthermore, comparing past and recent cases of democratisation, it becomes clear that despite some similarities, each case is different, and different contexts can create different outcomes out of similar situations.

Summarising, it can be said that democracy has not lost its charm and controversy, and the ongoing emergence and struggle for democratisation and consolidation, but also of failures and regressions in several parts of the world is a strong indicator that discussion about what democracy is, what value it has, how transitions take place and how they should look like, and which factors promote consolidation will not become redundant anytime soon.

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Appendix

Curriculum vitae

Education

10/04-11/11	University of Vienna , Austria Diploma Programme Political Science Studies, Major subject Developmental and Peace and Conflict Studies ▪ Scholarship for Outstanding Performance (2007)
10/04 to present	Diploma Programme French Studies
03/06 to present	Bachelor English and American Studies
08 - 12/07	University of Oslo , Norway Political Science Studies (Master programme) Erasmus Exchange Program
02/01 – 06/04	Austrian Grammar School Wenzgasse , Vienna, Austria Graduation with distinction
09/89 – 01/01	German School of Lisbon , Portugal

Relevant work experience

03-07, 09-11/11	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime , Vienna, Austria • Intern, Justice Section
02 – 03/10	Asociación de Voluntarios para Areas Protegidas de Costa Rica , San José and Montezuma, Costa Rica • Volunteer

Additional skills

Languages:

Mother tongues: Portuguese, German (bi-lingual)

Other languages:

	Understanding		Speaking	Writing
	Listening	Reading	Spoken interaction	
English	fluent	fluent	fluent	fluent
French	fluent	fluent	fluent	fluent
Spanish	fluent	fluent	fluent	fluent
Norwegian	basic	basic	basic	basic
Japanese	basic	basic	basic	basic

Computer literacy: Microsoft Windows XP and Vista, MS-Office, MS PowerPoint, Adobe Editor, Adobe Reader, Webforce, Siebel, CRM databases (Rexx-Systems, Adam) internet user knowledge

B-driver's license, 16 hours Red Cross first aid course

Summary

The topic of this thesis is an evaluation of the quality of democracy in Chile twenty years after the return to democracy. The questions which guided the research were whether, and if so, how Chile was able to overcome its remaining institutional and political authoritarian legacies; in how far the political, social and economic context has changed or evolved in a way that precludes a renewed breakdown of democracy; and finally what kind of democracy Chile has reached after twenty years.

The word *democracy* encompasses a broad range of quite diverse concepts which have evolved throughout history, leading to a broadening and deepening of the dimensions implied in the word. For the assessment, the dimensions developed by Diamond and Morlino (2005) were chosen due to their broad coverage of both formal and substantive aspects (rule of law, participation, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, freedom, equality and responsiveness).

In the case of Chile, the democratisation process which brought the Pinochet regime to fall must be seen in the light of the long preceding democratic tradition of the country. The emergence and consolidation of the political parties and state institutions in the first half of the 20th century contributed significantly to the stability and efficiency of the *Concertación* government.

However, the legacies of the past were not all beneficial to the democratic cause: the high levels of mobilisation and polarisation ultimately led to the downfall of democracy in the first place (in conjunction with other determining factors such as the importance of the Doctrine of National Security, the UP social and political reforms, to mention only a few). The result was the radical depoliticisation and demobilisation of society during the military regime, alienating the electorate from the state and later on from the political parties as well.

As in every present democracy worldwide, some points remain which reach from not ideal to worrisome. Some of the points identified were the high abstention rate and lack of correspondence between party programmes and citizens' interests; the survival of some last vestiges of the authoritarian legal provisions; the still incomplete process of unwinding the human rights violations legacy; the weak instruments and provisions of checks and balances against the very strong role of the president; the alienation of the electorate from the political process due to the insufficient representation of its interests; the persisting restrictions on the

freedom of the media and the rights of indigenous peoples; and the continuing strong social and economic inequality found in Chilean society.

The most blatant legacies from the authoritarian past have largely been tackled, either by the coming of age of their representatives, international interference, a shift in the political elites' confidence in the military's restraint and a new courage (and electoral majorities) to introduce far-reaching reforms. The military has largely returned to the barracks, and the resurgence of an insurgent outcry has become highly unlikely.

Zusammenfassung

Das Thema dieser Arbeit ist eine Beurteilung der Qualität der Demokratie in Chile 20 Jahre nach dem Beginn der Demokratisierung. Die Forschungsfragen, die die Untersuchung geleitet haben, waren ob, und wenn es der Fall ist, wie Chile die verbliebenen institutionellen und politischen autoritären Altlasten überwinden konnte; in wie weit sich der politische, soziale und wirtschaftliche Kontext derart geändert hat, dass ein erneutes Scheitern der Demokratie ausgeschlossen oder unwahrscheinlich ist; und schließlich was für eine Art Demokratie Chile nach 20 Jahren erreicht hat.

Der Begriff *Demokratie* beinhaltet eine Vielfalt an recht unterschiedlichen Konzepten, welche sich entlang der Geschichte entwickelt, und schließlich zu einer zunehmenden Erweiterung und Vertiefung der im Wort impliziten Dimensionen geführt haben. Für die vorliegende Untersuchung wurden die Dimensionen von Diamon und Morlino (2005) verwendet, da sie eine breitflächige Behandlung formaler sowie substantieller Aspekte erlauben (Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Mitbestimmung, Wettbewerb, senkrechte und waagerechte Verantwortlichkeit, Freiheit, Gleichheit und Umsetzung (*responsiveness*)).

Im Falle Chiles muss man den Demokratisierungsprozess, der nach dem Fall des Pinochetregimes eingeleitet wurde, im Kontext der langen vorangegangenen demokratischen Tradition des Landes untersuchen. Die Entstehung und Konsolidierung der politischen Parteien und staatlichen Institutionen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts haben maßgeblich zur Stabilität und Leistungsfähigkeit der *Concertación*-Regierung beigetragen. Jedoch waren nicht alle Hinterlassenschaften aus der Vergangenheit förderlich für das demokratische Anliegen: der hohe Grad an Mobilisierung und Polarisierung führte letztendlich zum Zusammenbruch der Demokratie (im Zusammenspiel mit anderen ausschlaggebenden Faktoren, wie die Bedeutung der Doktrin der Nationalen Sicherheit, die sozialen und politischen Reformen der UP, um nur ein Paar zu nennen). Das Ergebnis war eine grundlegende Depolitisierung und Demobilisierung der Gesellschaft während des Militärregimes, was eine Distanzierung der Wählerschaft vom Staat und später auch von den politischen Parteien zur Folge hatte.

So wie in jeder anderen gegenwärtigen Demokratie weltweit bleiben einige Punkte bestehen, welche von nicht ideal bis beunruhigend reichen. Einige der hier identifizierten waren die hohe Stimmenthaltung und fehlende Entsprechung der Parteiprogramme mit den Interessen der Bürger; der Bestand einiger Überreste des autoritären rechtlichen Rahmens; die weiterhin

unvollständige Aufarbeitung der Menschenrechtsverletzungen; die schwachen Kontrollmechanismen gegenüber dem starken Präsidenten; die Abwendung der Wählerschaft vom politischen Prozess aufgrund der ungenügenden Vertretung und Umsetzung ihrer Interessen; die bestehenden Beschränkungen der Medienfreiheit und der Rechte einheimischer Völker; und die fortbestehende starke soziale und wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit in der chilenischen Gesellschaft.

Die offensichtlichsten Altlasten aus der autoritären Vergangenheit wurden großteils überwunden, entweder durch die Alterung der Vertreter dieser Zeit, internationale Einmischung, dem Wandel des Vertrauens der politischen Eliten in die Zurückhaltung des Militärs, und durch einen neuen Mut (und Mehrheiten bei Wahlen), weitreichende Reformen durchzusetzen. Das Militär ist weitgehend wieder in die Kasernen zurückgekehrt, und ein Wiederaufleben eines Aufstandes oder Aufforderung dazu ist mit hoher Sicherheit gebannt.