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A Comparative Case Study

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Romana Klinger

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INTRODUCTION

„Europa steht für die unbegriffenste Sache der Welt, für ein mächtiges Nicht – nicht Staat und nicht Gesellschaft – jedenfalls nicht in dem Sinne in dem beispielsweise die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika beides sind.“ (Beck/ Grande 2004, 10)

This thesis will provide an analysis of the unification of the Northern American states and a concluding comparison between the unification processes of the USA and the European states. The following study will strive to provide answers to two main questions:

- Which factors encouraged the unification process in the case of the USA?
- What are the similarities and differences between the US and the EU regarding their respective unification processes?

In his book „Political Unification. A Comparative Study of leaders and forces“, Amitai Etzioni gives an excellent description of his research goal. He seeks to understand the „conditions under which political unification *is* (not should be or could be) initiated“ (Etzioni 1965, xvii). For this thesis, the goal is only slightly different. The author will look at the conditions under which political unification *was* initiated in the US and to a lesser extent in the EU. The approach is therefore more historical than political, at least at first sight. Etzioni's research questions lead into the same direction as the ones shown above, so to further clarify and deepen this project's goal, here is his formulation: „we seek to establish who led a particular unification effort, under what conditions, by what means, and with what results“ (ibid., xviii-xix).

On the basis of Etzioni's approach, the *independent variable* is therefore „the conditions under which the [unification factors, R.K.] emerge“ (ibid., 12). In case of the unification of the British colonies, one of the background conditions is the American Revolution. The *independent factors* in this thesis are „various unification factors and the conditions under which they emerge“ (ibid., 12). An example for an independent factor in Europe's case is the economic and political need to align France and Germany after WWII. The *dependent variable* in this research is both the level and scope of unification. The following graph is an illustration of the functional relations between *independent variable*, *independent factors* and *dependent variable*.




Figure 1. Causal Relations between Independent Variable, Independent Factors and Dependent Variable using the Example of Unification Processes (by R.K., 6.4.2011)

So why do these questions matter? This analysis and comparison is not only an important one because of its explanatory and descriptive value but it might also allow us - viewing history as „applied politics“ - to draw lessons for today’s integration from past unification struggles (for example: the importance of a consistent legal framework); Second, it could, from a more theoretical perspective, challenge Beck’s/Grande’s viewpoint that the US represents both a „state“ and a „society“ and encourage a more open definition, i.e. „union“. Third, it might, on the other hand, encourage US-American scholars to judge the European Union’s weaknesses in a milder manner, taking into account its own 200 yearlong unification struggle.

Roadmap

The article will start with a short methodological and theoretical introduction providing the reader with some of the challenges social scientists face while engaging themselves in the analysis of unification and comparative regional studies. In addition, the first part of the essay will define and explain the term „union“ in order to clarify the concept and

draw a line between this specific standpoint and other perspectives on the topic of comparing the US and the EU. Thereafter, in the main part of the essay, the unification process of the US will be analyzed and in a final step compared to the unification process of the EU. The conclusion will offer some „lessons learned“ as well as risking a little peak into the future of the two unions.

The author chose to focus primarily on the study of US-American unification, since the historical events that led to unification of the former Northern American colonies are less familiar to European scholars than European integration. Therefore, it might offer some new research perspectives to the relatively well-known and established field of European Union studies. The comprehensive examination of European unification and its contributing factors was and shall be subject of future generations.

METHOD

With regards to methodology, answering this thesis' research questions soon leads to a major challenge. Comparing the two unions offers a sheer endless number of possible research focuses, ranging from constitutional history at one end to religious culture at the other. Since this paper provides only limited space, its goal is to give a general thematic overview rather than a deep and detailed analysis of the topic. In order to keep this comparative study consistent despite its broad topic, it is important to select an intelligible method. In the following the method's composition will be illustrated and it will be shown how to avoid possible methodological shortcomings.

The following chapter gives insight into this project's source and case selection process, patterns and pitfalls of evidence collection, as well as the definition of the term *case study* followed by an overview of the method's strengths and weaknesses.

Source Selection

In order to reach answers to the research questions and back up this thesis' argument with empirical evidence, two kinds of sources will be put into use. First, there will be an analysis and comparison of a range of primary sources, such as historical documents, speeches, contracts, and letters. Then, in order to put these sources into greater perspective, secondary literature will be employed to classify and explain the context of the selected material.

Case Selection

For this thesis, the analysis of the two „poster children of unification“, i.e. the United States of America and the European Union will be under scrutiny. These two are not the only cases of unification and it is important to notice that they are not representative of the phenomenon and that they were not chosen from the universe of cases. However, the US and the EU are two of the most successful regional unions to date in terms of their global economic and political standing. The following graph shows the world's Top 5 GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) countries/regions according to data from the CIA World Factbook. The European Union (\$ 14,51 trillion) and the United States (\$ 14,26 trillion)

share the two top spots. Place three goes to China (\$ 8,791 trillion), while Japan (\$ 4,141 trillion) and India (\$ 3,561 trillion) take up seats number four and five.

Top 5 GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) 2009 est.




Figure 2. CIA World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName=European%20Union&countryCode=ee®ionCode=eu&rank=1#ee>, 31.3.2010)

If we take a look at another source, the United Nation's Human Development Index (HDI), which combines indices of „life expectancy, educational attainment and income“ (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/hdi/>, 31.3.2010), out of the Top 15 countries worldwide in 2007, eight are members of the European Union, and the United States ranks at #13 (<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/87.html>, 31.3.2010). A quick look at the HDI world map clarifies the EU's and the US' standing further (the darker the area, the higher the HDI, grey areas signify countries without data)




Figure 3. UNDP Development Reports HDI World Map 2007
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/hd_map/, 31.3.2010)

These statistics only served as a short reminder of the EU's and US' relatively high standing in the world when it comes to economic and developmental factors; The few indices mentioned here are by far not all that could have served to underline the argument (one could have also taken education, gender parity, poverty, health service, etc. into account).

Thus it comes as no surprise that political leaders in other parts of the world have depicted the two unions' institutional designs as prototypes for regional unions. Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian, for instance, said in 2004 that „the EU is successful [...] because the principles of voluntary participation, equality and peace are upheld, and that trade-based interactions serve as the initial approach to bringing European countries closer for further integration“ (Yun-Ping 2004, 1). Another example is the institutional design of the African Union. Babarinde states that,

„Indeed, the architects of the AU have not hidden the fact that the AU was modeled on the EU. President Gaddafi has admitted as much that he drew his inspiration from the EU experience.¹⁴ Likewise, at the July 2001 OAU summit in Zambia that dealt with the transition from the OAU to the AU, “several references were made to the African Union being loosely based on the European Union model“ (Babarinde 2007, 8).

To conclude, the relative success of the US and the EU on a global level make them ideal cases for a deeper analysis of the specific causes of successful unification. Which factors induced unification in the US? Are there similarities and differences between the US-American and the European unification processes?

On the other hand, as in a human relationship, there is enough difference – even friction - between these two that it makes for an interesting comparative coupling. The disparities

serve as a reminder that the general success of unification is not limited to one region at a specific time in history. In 1945 it would have been comprehensible to argue that the only role model for unification is and will be the United States. Today, however, the world sees two examples of prosperous unions that developed in different time periods under different political constellations in different geographic spheres. This simple observation defies the notion that unification is a process that cannot be repeated.

Therefore, the selection of the two most prominent cases of unions serve a dual purpose, namely the extraction of shared factors that caused unification, as well as the explication of differing forces.

Evidence Collection: Patterns and Pitfalls

Since the topic of unification is a comprehensive issue, the justification and clarification of patterns in evidence collection is crucial in order to gain coherency in the analysis. A series of methodical questions arises:

First, how does one select the pieces of evidence and the kind of analytical model that will be used? To state the obvious, the answer to the first part of this question is that the piece of evidence must have a clear link to unification. Ideally, the source has both explanatory and descriptive value for this thesis' argument and will contribute to the validity of its conclusions. Both the elements and the model of analysis – in this case unification – must provide either „a highly accurate *description* of the phenomena [...] a capacity to *explain* the relationships among the phenomena under investigation [and/or, R.K.] offer the promise of reliable *prediction*“ (Singer 1961, 78f).

Second, at which *level-of-analysis* will the evidence collection and subsequent analysis be carried out? The level-of-analysis at which this project will compare the US and the EU and its unavoidable pitfalls are outlined in the first part of the chapter on theory. Since this question does not only touch the subject of methodology but also of theoretical framing, it will be answered in the following chapter.

Third, which *time period* will be the focus of analysis? The time span of this thesis in case of the US stretches over circa 50 years. Roughly, it starts at the time of increasing estrangement between the colonies and Britain and ends with the consolidation of the states at the turn of the 19th century. With regards to previous and successive events, the era in spotlight ranges from around 1750 until 1800. It is the time period in US history in which political actors laid the structural and ideological fundament of the political system

we know today. It is the era in which volumes of politically essential documents were drafted and discussed, for example the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or the Federalist Papers.

With regards to European unification, which will be subject at the end of this thesis, the time span in consideration roughly equals 60 years, i.e. from the period from the end of the Second World War in 1945 until the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, has been chosen.

Since the two cases in focus lie apart over 200 years, there is a danger of applying contemporary categories and concepts to a time period in which they don't fit. Although there is no universal solution to this pitfall of comparative case study from different eras, a certain sensitivity towards historical peculiarities can certainly avoid major flaws in reasoning. When it comes to the definition of democracy, for instance, it is important to note that the US-American version of political participation at its earliest stage did not include voting rights for women and minorities. This understanding of democracy cannot be applied to the politics of contemporary European Union and vice versa. To forestall this potential shortcoming in comparative studies, the author will clarify the specific historical context of categories and terms whenever necessary. This way, an intransparent commingling of disparate concepts will be prevented.

Fourth, how will the author structure the argument and empirical findings? To make this study easier to read and to frame the analysis of the two cases in a traceable and comparable way, the research is organized around these recurrent themes: economy, politics, and culture. Since both unification processes will be organized and analyzed around these topics in the end, thematic consistency and readability is ensured. In addition, the author will establish a time framework, which dissects the respective unification processes into three phases.

The Case Study Approach: Strengths and Weaknesses

In order to bring further light into the darkness of methodology, it is necessary to ask if this thesis' research is best described as a case study as the title boldly suggests. Does the term 'case study' encompass the entire perimeter of the research questions? Or to the contrary, is the label 'case study' too broad to provide a reasonable definition-based framework? In the following, the author will answer these questions by using

George/Bennett's (2005) argument as a reference and applying their definitions to the research questions.

George/Bennett define the case study approach in the Social Sciences as „the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events“ (George/Bennett 2005, 5). If one would apply this statement to this thesis, the aspect of a historical episode under investigation is *unification*.

Furthermore, George/Bennett describe „a case as an instance of a class of events [...]. A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than the historical event itself“ (ibid., 17f). To illustrate this slightly technical definition with help of the US-American example, the aspect under scrutiny is *unification*, while the historical event is the Revolutionary War and the founding of the United States. The answer to the crucial question „what is this event a case of?“ (ibid., 18) is therefore *unification*.

As a conclusion, the term case study is indeed a useful label in order to describe the method of this thesis. Although the multiplicity of historical events in both cases of unification analyzed here sometimes makes it hard to distinguish the actual event from the case, all in all, the method is quite satisfactory.

Besides the case study approach there are plenty of other possible ways to gain a better understanding of the characteristics and scope of unification processes. For instance, one could have worked with long-term statistical data (e.g. economic, democratic, infrastructural indicators) of different regions and could have calculated correlations. Or one could have conducted an analysis of discourses of unification over time. So why choose the case study approach? What are its most prominent strengths and weaknesses? George/Bennett (c.f. 2005, 19-34) shed light on these questions.

In contrast to statistical analysis, case studies offer strong *conceptual validity*. Researchers using the case study approach gain a deeper level of contextual understanding and are able to get a grip on variables that „are notoriously difficult to measure“ (ibid., 19). Furthermore, scholars who conduct case studies often identify new variables that are potentially valuable for subsequent statistical research. Case studies on democracy, for example, lead to the classification of different types of democracy (representative, majoritarian,...) that were later evaluated further by using other methods. (c.f. ibid., 19f).

The birth of *new hypotheses* is linked to the above paragraph. Case studies allow, for instance, that scholars stumble upon new ideas in the process of carrying out qualitative research such as interviews. An interviewee can spontaneously introduce *new hypotheses* that would not have been discovered by strictly following the pre-determined path of database research (c.f. *ibid.*, 20f).

Additionally, case studies allow the exploration of *causal mechanisms*. The contextual analysis of a phenomenon, e.g. historical prerogatives of unification in the United States, leads to a more thorough knowledge of *causal mechanisms*. George/Bennett define the term *causal mechanisms* as „ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate [...] In so doing, the causal agent changes the affected entity’s characteristics, capacities, or propensities“ (*ibid.*, 137). To use an illustration from this thesis, since Thomas Jefferson had certain powers in decision-making at the time of the Revolutionary War, his reasoning and writing influenced the character of US-American unification. The case study approach encourages the exploration of these *causal mechanisms* (c.f. *ibid.*, 21f).

But besides its strengths, the case study approach also has its Achilles’ heels. The *case selection bias* describes the process in which researchers „deliberately choose cases that share a particular outcome“ (*ibid.*, 23). As has already been outlined in the chapter on case selection, the author of this thesis is guilty as charged with a *case selection bias*. There was a clear intention behind choosing two unions that share a similar outcome, the outcome being a general success of unification. The selection of these cases happened on purpose in order to provide new findings on positive as well as negative factors that can induce or hinder fruitful unification (c.f. *ibid.*, 22-25).

Additionally, case studies make *only tentative conclusions* possible. Since there is a *lack of representativeness*, case studies only hold explanatory value for a limited number of cases. They may „uncover or refine theory [or find, R.K.] conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions or outcomes occur“ (*ibid.*, 31). To put it simpler, the two case studies in this thesis will not predict that there will be a successful new union every 200 years, but it will (hopefully) uncover more information about factors that contribute to unification under certain circumstances (c.f. *ibid.*, 25-32).

THEORY

Before we cut to the heart of the thesis – the two case studies – possible theoretical approaches to the topic will be outlined and a closer look at the author's theory choice and the thought process that led her to its adoption will be taken. The chapter on theory is to be seen in the light of the previous paragraphs on methodology and vice versa. The procedures of source, case, and method selection are embedded into a certain theoretical landscape. A scholar in the field of International Political Economy, for example, would probably focus on long-term structures of hegemony in society. The scholar would select his/her case, evidence, and methods according to his/her theoretical predisposition. This process is not a one-way-street in the sense that theory always comes before methodology. The characteristics of a certain method could also become a precursor of theoretical approaches, as is the case in this thesis (conducting a comparative case study virtually screams „Comparative Politics“).

But in order to clarify the theoretical background of this paper, and to escape the irresolvable chicken-or-egg dilemma (What was first? The theory or the method?), this chapter will first, introduce the main fields of International Relations and Comparative Politics as well as their respective origins and advantages for answering the research question. Second, this chapter will examine the different levels-of-analysis and their implications for this comparative case study.

International Relations versus Comparative Politics?

In addition to methodological challenges, comparing the unification processes of two regional blocs touches many different fields of Political Science, for example International Relations, Comparative Politics, US-American Politics, European Studies, etc.; Since all of these diverse areas come with their own approaches and paradigms it is no wonder they do not always harmonize perfectly with each other. The author does not strive to reinvent the wheel of Political Science and introduce a completely new concept. In this thesis a „best of“ of different fields will be put into use. This multidisciplinary approach ensures the conceptual weakening of weaknesses and the strengthening of strengths. In the following, an introduction to the origins, core issues, as well as advantages and weaknesses of International Relations Theory and Comparative Politics will be given. In the end, these will be set into perspective for the challenges of this thesis.

Scholars in the field of *International Relations* mainly study topics out of three main subjects. They analyze the nature of wars, conflicts, and peace, they examine global issues such as inequality, the constitution of international organizations, etc., and they take an interest in „state craft“, i.e. the consolidation of power over people and territories. For this thesis, the evolution of states and state-like structures is of particular interest.

The origins of *International Relations* are entangled with the advent of settled societies after the Neolithic Revolution. With the development of state-like structures it also became necessary for decision-makers to think about their own society's relation to other societies. The consolidation of power, the fighting of wars, and the composition of „states“ soon became a topic of interest for the intellectual elites. With the rise of nation states, *International Relations* became an even more prominent field of political thought. Ibn Khaldun, Hobbes and Kant are all examples of writers that were concerned with questions of International Relations before the field was academically established.

International Relations Theory offers some advantages to a scholar of unification. It gives insight into global dynamics in a long-time perspective and it provides background to the causality of structures and events. For example, the relatively strong global standing of the British Empire in the midst of the 18th century is – amongst other things - a result of a century long maritime hegemony over other European powers. Without the contribution of *International Relations Theory* these global constellations might go unnoticed. On the other hand side, *International Relations Theory* is not at its strongest when it comes to providing an intellectual framework for the detailed analysis of political systems. This is where Comparative Politics comes in handy.

The subject of *Comparative Politics* is the comparison of political systems. Scholars of Comparative Politics study formal as well as informal institutions within these systems, their structures and functions, political culture, and political economy (c.f. Zagorsky 2009: 8-12). In case of the United States, a student of *Comparative Politics* would therefore look at its legal framework, bureaucracy, parties, lobbies, media, citizen socialization, and economy. In comparing his/her results to other political systems the scholar can explore similarities and differences between them. In a third step, potential „lessons learned“ and „best practice models“ can be explored and applied.

As was the case with International Relations, the field of *Comparative Politics* only came to life through the steady development of political structures. The study and comparison of

formal institutions became popular in the 19th century at the height of „nation states“. The analysis of political phenomena outside formal structures, such as the study of parties, media, lobbies etc. became a boost in the 20th century with the heyday of sociology (c.f. Zagorsky 2009: 8-12). After the Second World War the term “political culture” came into focus. It is defined as “political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.” (Almond/Verba 1963, 13).

What are some of the advantages of *Comparative Politics*? When it comes to the understanding of a political system as a body with multiple institutions, functions and agents, *Comparative Politics* offers a useful framework for the analyst to orientate in the wilderness of politics. It helps structuring the research and shedding light on the „body parts“ of a political system that are the most profitable to compare.

To conclude, the first question of this thesis (Which factors encouraged the unification process in the case of the USA?) will mostly be answered by applying the theories of *International Relations*. The second question (What are the similarities and differences between the US and the EU regarding their unification processes?) will mainly be addressed by employing the approach of *Comparative Politics*. But isn't it too simple to put it like that? Aren't there challenges attached to the selection of multiple concepts within one thesis? The answer is Yes:

The level-of-analysis challenge

As Singer already pointed out in 1961 in his essay on the level-of-analysis problem,

„Whether in the physical or social sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system. He may, for example, choose between the flowers or the garden [...] Whether he selects the micro- or macro-level of analysis is ostensibly a mere matter of methodological or conceptual convenience. Yet the choice often turns out to be quite difficult, and may well become a central issue within the discipline concerned“ (Singer 1961, 77).

Keeping in mind the results from the previous chapter, the next paragraphs will introduce the two main levels-of-analysis in World Politics – *systemic* and *national* - , link them to theoretical frameworks, then suggest some additional levels and take into account their respective scientific advantages and disadvantages, as well as conclude and justify my decision to use multiple conceptual approaches and therefore levels-of-analysis within my thesis.

The *systemic* level-of-analysis is the „most comprehensive“ (ibid., 80) of levels. It allows the scholar to take a global perspective, like a sailor does from his crow's nest. It has a high level of descriptive value when it comes to comprehensiveness, but on the other hand side it lacks a sense of detail. When it comes to the *systemic* level's power to explain a phenomenon, it tends to „exaggerate[...] the impact of the system upon the national actors and, conversely, discounts the impact of the actors upon the system“ (ibid., 80). Additionally, a scholar using this level-of-analysis is likely to assume a high degree of uniformity in actorial behavior (c.f. ibid., 80-82). This level corresponds in great parts with International Relations Theory.

The *national* level-of-analysis, on the other side, „permits significant differentiation among our actors in the international system“ (ibid., 82). Through its deep analysis of behavior it is more likely to discover underlying (and diverging) categories, which allow for a comparative study among nations than the systemic level-of-analysis with its built-in tendency to overlook certain crucial details. But the *national* level's advantage also encompasses a potential disadvantage – the exaggeration of differences among actors. Additionally, the *national* level-of-analysis leads to a whole new set of questions regarding the „goals, motivation, and purpose in national policy“ (ibid., 84). Does an actor always behave purposefully and intentionally? Why do certain nations want to reach specific goals? Are there objective factors to lead an actor, or is it the actor's „perception of these ‚objective factors‘“ (ibid., 86). All of these questions need to be addressed in order to gain coherency in analysis (c.f. ibid. 82-89). The *national* level-of-analysis is mainly linked to *Comparative Politics*.

To conclude, the *systemic* level holds a slight advantage in terms of descriptive capacity, since it offers a comprehensive point of view. Conversely, the *national* level provides a more complex and detailed description. When it comes to explanation, the national level gives the scholar a better insight into actors' behaviors and decision-making processes. „And in terms of prediction, both orientations seem to offer a similar degree of promise“ (ibid., 90).

Besides these two major levels-of-analysis in World Politics, there exists a range of other levels: The *sub-national* level, at which scholars focus on e.g. organizational behavior, bureaucratic dynamics and domestic politics; The *individual* level, which concerns the behavior of actors and their personal relations with their environment; The *intra-individual*

level, which focuses on thought processes and conflicts inside an individual¹. Although all of these levels can come into play at a certain point, the focus of this thesis does certainly not lie on decision-making processes within the COREPER or on Thomas Jefferson's psychological relationship to his mother.

In this thesis, the *systemic*, as well as the *national* level-of-analysis will be taken into account. Since the levels outlined above crudely correspond to the theories of International Relations (*systemic* level) and Comparative Politics (*national* level), their usage will follow the relative capability² in answering the two research questions.

A Short Popular History of US and EU Comparison

In every chapter on theory it is necessary to introduce the reader to the history of the stated questions. How does the problem relate to the scholarly and general debates in the field? Have the questions been asked before? How did they vary in formulation and in the answers given? If and how has the author varied her formulation from that usually found, and why?

Surprisingly, comparisons between the US and the EU have been predominantly made outside the halls of academia. Political actors, journalists and the „general public“ have been eager to discuss similarities and differences between the US and the EU. Often these discussions were led under a normative spell. The (future) „nature of the EU“ has been debated by using the USA as a positive example and guiding light.

Especially in the years after the Second World War, the relative wealth, economic and military strength of the States became desirable to a war-torn and exhausted European people³. Looking over the Atlantic, the French and Germans saw a superpower on the height of its success. With this admiration of the US combined with a wide-spread fear of the Sowjet Union, it is only logic that many political actors found it tempting to consider the model of the US as a possible prototype for Europe's future. The European public, partly under US-American occupation, was equally impressed by the wealth and

¹ This level can be summed up by Sigmund Freud's trias super-ego, ego, and id.

² Description, explanation and prediction.

³ See for example Winston Churchill's "Speech to the Academic Youth" held at University of Zürich on the 19th of September 1946, in which he challenged the audience with the idea of a "United States of Europe" (Churchill 1946, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/19083622/Winston-Churchills-Speech-to-the-Academic-Youth-1946>, 6.4.2011).

opportunities the US model stood for. In the author's opinion, political actions (Marshall Plan) and cultural influences (Hollywood movies, supermarkets,...) influenced a whole generation of Europeans and brought a mostly positive attitude towards the „American Way of Life“. This pro US-American atmosphere in Europe caused and affected a whole strand of intellectual debates, which favored an – at least partly – americanized European future.

On the contrary there were always people that voiced critique against „US-Americanization“ of Europe. After the first years of European excitement for the US wore off, negative comments on the USA and its politics grew stronger. The highly publicized protests against the Vietnam War, the skepticism against capitalism, etc. lead to a more wide spread opposition against the US on the left. On the right side of the political spectrum, Anti-Americanism, which had a long tradition, was amongst others composed by elements of Anti-Semitism. As was the case with pro US-American attitudes, anti US-American opinions were and are prevalent in the „general public“ as well as in the thoughts of political elites.

As the author sees it, the general debate in Europe nowadays can be described as schizophrenic. On the one hand, the „American Way of life“ still holds a certain degree of fascination. World-class universities, technology, and media products all emanate what Nye called „soft power“. On the other hand, the US is under scrutiny because of its military operations, jurisdiction (death penalty, etc), social welfare system and hardly tamed financial market.

This thesis will not provide a history of European discourses on the USA, but it is important to give a short overview on popular normative debates as on which grounds political discussions are often exercised. What is missing in past and present discursions on similarities and differences between the US and the EU is a systematic comparison of the two. It has been previously outlined that comparative debates were often lead normatively asking if and why the EU should or should not become the US. It is my goal to provide the reader with a set of systematic questions and answers that do not aim to swing anyone's vote from anti to pro US-Americanism. Of course as a European student of a certain generation the author carries specific values and norms that will almost certainly shine through her work, but the author's goal is to „de-emotionalize“ the debate and lift the veil a little so that the comparison between US-Americans and Europeans can be taken to a new and more factual step.

A Short Scholarly History of US/ EU Evolution and Comparison

The previous paragraphs shone light on general and political discussions on EU/US comparisons. Although it is not entirely true that there doesn't exist scholarly literature on the topic, a „large“ systematic comparison of unification processes regarding the US and the EU could not be found in the process of researching for this thesis. This fact is surprising since one would expect that two of the most powerful regions in the world would have already been surgically dissected into every small bit of politics. It is true that there is a wealth of historical books and articles on the European Union's and the United States' evolution and integration. There are also comparative studies of the two, but an analysis under the theoretical light of unification is new to the field. To bring order to this academic chaos, this chapter will: First, give an overview over theories and terms linked to the European Union's and the United States' evolution, starting with *integration theories* (intergovernmentalism and supranationalism), the notion of *empire* and the term *federation*. Second, introduce and define the term *union* and its implications, as well as set the concept of *unification* apart from other theories and terms of regional integration. And last, introduce some of the comparative works done.

Integration

In a political science context, the term *integration* is primarily used to discuss processes linked to the development of the European Union. Many scholars of Europe struggled to define the term *integration* and it is no wonder that there are multiple ways to characterize *integration*. According to Ernst Haas (1958, 16), as cited in Pollak/ Slominski, *integration* is a process

„whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones“ (Haas cited by Pollak/Slominski 2006, 53).

William Wallace (1990, 9), as cited by Pollak/Slominski, sees *integration* as „the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously autonomous units“ (Wallace cited by Pollak/Slominski 2006, 53). This stripped-down definition of the term and the longer characterization by Haas are only two of the many examples that show how scholars tried to find a word for processes surrounding the

phenomenon that is the European Union. To illuminate the term further, Holzinger/Knill et al. (2005) introduced three facets of integration: sectoral, vertical and horizontal. Sectoral integration refers to the inclusion of a new policy field under the regulatory umbrella of the European Union. Vertical integration means the deepening and widening of regulation competence in a certain field, and horizontal integration refers to the territorial expansion of the EU (c.f. *ibid.*, 20-22).

For this thesis, the term integration is only useful in limited ways. Although the term gives a name to some of the phenomena that are to be analyzed for this project (i.e. the aspects under which the creation of a union takes place), it is too broad a concept to coin it as *the* „dependent variable“ of the thesis. As will be explicated later, the term unification is a better fit when it comes to answering the research questions of this thesis.

Around the concept of integration there exist a whole set of theories, terms, models, and categories, that developed parallel to the European Union. So-called *integration theories* try to find models that answer three basic questions: 1) Why are states willing to give up parts of their sovereignty? 2) Which policy fields are more likely to be transferred to a supra state level, and why? 3) How do institutions come to life in the process? (c.f. Pollak/Slominski 2006, 52). If this thesis were to be packed in the corset of EU integration theory, the focus would lie on the first question.

Integration theories can be divided into two big families, supranational and intergouvernemental, which both have their own refined sub-theories. To make a long story short, scholars of *Intergouvernementalism*, such as Stanley Hoffmann and Andrew Moravcsik, stress the importance of sovereign states and their preferences in the process of integration. For them, supranational institutions are basically instruments to serve nation states with their interests. Theorists of *Supranationalism*, for example Ernst Haas and David Mitrany, emphasize the power of supranational institutions and their role in integration (c.f. *ibid.*, 52-68; Holzinger/Knill et al. 2005, 19-80).

The spotlight of this thesis lies on historical developments and factors that triggered the unification of some of the formerly autonomous European and Northern American states. It is therefore self-evident that the theoretical strain of intergouvernementalism with its attention towards the behavior and interests of independent state units is more fruitful for analysis in this context than supranationalism with its focus on supra-state institutions and their operations in long-term integration processes. Basically, supranational theory concentrates more on the developments after unification, when institutions are already on their way to be consolidated. It is not an ideological decision of the author to prefer the

ideas of intergovernmentalism as a background theory, but rather a pragmatic choice that is caused by the temporal location of the three research questions on the very beginning of the time-line of integration processes.

But can the term integration and the theories that come with it be applied to the development of the United States? It has already been mentioned that integration theory has mainly evolved to get a better understanding of European integration and therefore is not primarily designed to explain other processes of regional integration around the world. However, since political theories always strive to hold a grain of universality and generalized conception, integration theories could also be applied to the development of other regional blocs. Vice versa, the following terms and arguments might also be applied to the European Union. Besides integration, there are other approaches to understand and describe the get-together of previously detached units. In the context of the US, two terms must be explicated further in order to round up this chapter on the „Short Scholarly History of Unification“; First, *empire* and second, *federation*.

Empire

In order to decide whether the US and/or the EU are *empires*, it is crucial to define this term which has been used by many, but confined by few. Herfried Münkler characterizes the noun *empire* with the help of three attributes: First, in comparison to states, *empires* have unclear boundaries, which „involve gradations of power and influence“ (Münkler 2005, 5). *Empires* possess peripheral regions and a powerful center, which do not recognize its neighbors as equals. Münkler states that „states are always in plural, empires mostly in singular“ (ibid., 5). Second, regarding the question of power, „hegemony is supremacy within a group of formally equal political players; imperialism, by contrast, dissolves this – at least formal – equality and reduces subordinates to the status of client states or satellites“ (ibid., 6). As an example for a hegemonic arrangement, Münkler mentions NATO and the United States’ role as *primus inter pares* within the organization. The Soviet Union, on the opposite, would have been an imperial structure following this characterization of *empires*. Third, there is a small but significant difference between *empire* and imperialism, the latter being defined as a condition in which there is „a will to *empire*“ (ibid., 8) (c.f. ibid., 4-8).

The United States has been repeatedly described as an *empire*. In an article of the same name, Charles Maier (2006) refers to the US as an „Empire of Consumption“; in his book „Colossus“, Niall Ferguson (2004) calls the United States after the Second World War an „American Empire“; Amy Chua (2007) does not hesitate to name the US after 1945 an *empire* either and Robert Kagan (2004) even if not explicitly referring to the term, states that „Americans are from Mars“ (Kagan 2004, 3). What these examples all have in common – and I could name many more – is their referral to the US as an *empire* primarily after 1945 (or even after 9/11). Since this thesis will not focus on the United States’ contemporary history, the usage of the term *empire* is out of place for the purpose of answering this projects’ research questions.

But couldn’t the concept of *empire* be applied to the characteristics and evolution of the European Union? Jan Zielonka (2006) argues that the EU resembles a so-called Neo-Medieval *empire*. As opposed to the Westphalian *empire*, which features fixed borders, military control, clear hierarchies of power, and a certain thrive for territorial conquest by the means of war, a Neo-Medieval *empire* is characterized by its fuzzy boundaries, economic and bureaucratic control, multi-level decision-making processes, and horizontal integration through non-violent invitation (c.f. Zielonka 2006, 11-20). In Zielonka’s mind, the EU is somehow a new version of „an empire we know from centuries earlier“ (ibid., 1), namely from the Middle Ages. By introducing the term Neo-Medieval *empire*, Zielonka succeeded to find a concept that puts the European Union on the discussion table when contemporary *empires* are subject of scholarly debate. On the other hand side, there are voices opposing the point of view that the EU should be defined as any kind of *empire*. Chua, for instance, compares the European Union to Rome, which in its „golden age, [...] too attracted entire peoples into its orbit. But Rome always had its legions [...]. The EU has become a magnet for nations without force or even the threat of force“ (Chua 2007, 302). Agreeing with Mark Leonard, Chua therefore names the EU an *anti-empire*, since it is not willing to invade countries for territory, but integrates others through lengthy and voluntary accession (ibid., 300-311).

Although there is some discussion in the previously mentioned literature of whether or not the EU is an *empire* in some facets (Neo-Medieval), or if it carries certain imperial features (center-periphery), it has yet to be argued that the European Union is an *empire* in the strict sense, like – for example – the British Colonial Empire or militaristic China under the Tang dynasty.

To conclude, the term *empire* and its features serve as efficient verbal instruments to give a name to countries that rise to and fall from global dominance in the long term. *Empire* is a useful concept in the field of International Relations, since it draws attention to foreign affairs, and the emergence of war and peace. However, concepts of *empire* do not very well explain why voluntary unifications of formally equal states take place and which forces and actors lead to them. The concept of *empire* contains a spark of violence within. As Münkler states, *empires* don't view themselves as standing on the same level as others. As a cause, wanting to be an *empire* per definition implies the usage of force against others if necessary⁴.

Furthermore, the concept of *empire* is not the most suitable choice of theoretical background for this thesis, the term *empire* in its traditional sense applies to some European powers in the past (Britain, and to a certain extent Spain and the Netherlands), but – as explicated above – it is doubtful if the European Union in its present state can be described as an *empire*. There is less of an opposition against calling the US an *empire* after 1945, but there is no supported historical case to be made that the US was an *empire* from 1776 to 1800. As a result, *empire* might be an interesting choice of concept to compare the EU and the US as they are today, but for the questions of this thesis, the term *empire* is not the first choice.

Federations, Confederations, federal, fédéral, föderal

In general, the term *federation* refers to a union between previously independent units, i.e. states. In comparison to *confederations*, *federations* are characterized by their more intensive quality of cooperation and by their higher level of integration. *Confederations* are looser collaborations and possibly short-term coalitions between states, whereas *federations* are built with the intention to exist for a long time period (c.f. Fröschl 1994, 23). Although both terms have often been used as pseudonyms and despite the fact that there are multiple interpretations of their meanings, in the long historical perspective these divergences (depth and duration of collaboration) crystallize.

In respect to their goals, *confederations* and *federations* are both primarily built to avoid domestic conflicts, to secure peace among the units and to - as James Madison wrote in

⁴ The whole rationale around an empire's aggressive and expansionistic decision-making and the defensive argument of its soon-to-be attacked unequal neighbor can be comprehended by reading Thucydides' nearly 2500 years old Melian Dialogue.

1835 - provide „common safety“ (Madison cited by *ibid.*, 26). Joel Barlow defined the purpose of these collaborations in 1801 as,

„permanent Diet [...], composed of delegates from every state, with power to settle all disputes that might arise between the several states, to prevent any of them from raising armies on their own account, building forts and fleets to act against each other, or forming any foreign alliance, but all exterior relations and all measures of defense should be directed and managed by general Diet, in the name of Confederacy“ (Barlow cited by *ibid.*, 39).

In 1795 Immanuel Kant proposed the most extensive form of a *federation*. In his work „Zum Ewigen Frieden“, Kant suggested a ‚global foedus‘ in order to unify the nations of the world within a congress of states that is based on common law. This institution would then allow solving conflicts between states in a civilized and enlightened environment and would therefore contribute to a peaceful world order.⁵

Since this thesis is a comparative case study between the US and the EU it is important to point out a crucial linguistic difference. In English, the adjective *federal* refers to the nation state level. *Federal* is the English equivalent of the German *Bundes-*. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, is the highest-level national police force, and as an agency directly under the rule of the United States Department of Justice. In French, *fédéral* has the same meaning as in English, expressing a support of the central government at the expense of the state units. In German, however, the term *föderal* has a different connotation. *Föderal* suggests a political system in which the units (Länder) enjoy a great deal of co-determination at the federal level and hold strong competencies in different policy fields. Schools in Germany, for instance, are organized by this principle, leading to a diversity of school systems within the same nation state (c.f. *ibid.*, 41).

In the following, the words *federation* and *federal* will sometimes be used synonymously for *union* and *unified*. Although their meanings and their linguistic history are slightly different, the terms’ similarities and connectedness mostly outshine their discrepancy.

Union, Unit, Unification

After introducing many of the relevant terms, concepts and thinkers that come to mind when comparing the US and the EU, and after building up and introducing the idea of

⁵ As with all historical ideas it is important to avoid an ex-post view. Kant and Barlow have to be understood as thinkers that reasoned within their respective time period and presumptions. Of course, Kant’s ideas influenced the founding of the United Nations, but Kant himself would have probably never imagined African countries as independent states.

federation, the time has come to direct the reader's attention to the central category of this thesis, *union*.

In a comparative context, Goldstein (2001) refers to a *union* as „a specific subcategory of federated union – those formed **voluntarily**, by **independent states**, in the modern Euro-American cultural context“ (Goldstein 2001, 142). Amitai Etzioni (1965), a US-American scholar, who became known through his studies of organizations, used a more comprehensive sociological approach to formulate the definition of *union*.

„[Unions are, R.K.] international systems whose level of integration and scope is higher than that of a typical international organization⁶ and lower than that of an established political community⁷. A union is a group of countries that **acts in unison**, on a **continuous** rather than an *ad hoc* basis, on a **wide range of matters**, and on matters more important to its interest than is the case in typical international organizations“ (Etzioni 1965, 12).

With this definition, Etzioni located the concept of *union* on a scale between an international organization and a political community. He did not define *union* as a ‚positivum‘, but rather than that, as a ‚negativum‘ in relation to other terms. The concept of *union* is indeed difficult to grasp without referencing other terms and differentiating it from them. *Union* is a verbal crutch to name a phenomenon that is not accurately defined by other concepts, such as the previously examined empire, federation, confederation, or even other terms like bloc, political community, or international organization. *Union*, in the context of this thesis, is more of an operational and not an analytical category. The term is used to first, account for the linguistic similarity between the European **Union** and the **United** States, and second, a definitory compromise to allow a comparative case study that keeps the same level-of-analysis.

However, Goldstein and Etzioni give us some clues on how to get a better grasp of the meaning of the term *union*. A *union* is characterized by a voluntary association of units, whereby a unit is defined as „a single constituent of a whole“ (ibid., 3). In the context of this thesis, the units in focus are independent and sovereign states. Furthermore, the states of the union act in joint fashion on multiple matters that concern them. Additionally, *unions* are formed and consolidated over a long period of time. They don't just occur from one day to another. This inherent processual characteristic of *unions* is

⁶ Etzioni mentions the World Health Organization or the NATO as examples for international organizations. In his mind, the United Nations do not count as an international organization and need their own category.

⁷ Etzioni refers to a political community as „a state, an administrative-economic unit, and a focal point of identification“ (ibid., 4).

even clearer by defining the term *unification*, which „refers to the process of increasing [the level and scope of integration, R.K.]“ (ibid., 12).

In order to further deepen the understanding of *unions*, Fröschl discusses the dichotomy between an *incorporating union* on the one side, and a *federal union* on the other side. The best example for an *incorporating union* is the union between England and Scotland, which came into effect after the Acts of Union were passed in 1707 and laid the foundation for what we know today as ‚The United Kingdom of Great Britain‘. The Acts of Union caused an incorporation of the Scottish Parliament into the newly formed Parliament of Great Britain in the Palace of Westminster in London. James Boswell, a Scottish author, identified the gist of an *incorporating union* while talking to an Englishman, „You should not talk of we and you, Sir: there is now an [*sic*] Union“ (Boswell cited by Fröschl 1994, 37).

In comparison, a *federal union* is a union in which the states continue their existence, but decide to hand certain competencies over to a newly found federal government. The United States, for instance, became a *federal union* after the constitution came into effect. In case of the European Union, certain aspects can be described as these of a federal union, but since some other fields (e.g. common security) are not primarily under the rule of a federal European authority, it is not valid – at this point - to call the EU a federal union.

To conclude, the term *unification* is used in this essay to describe the process of states joining together in a political, economic and cultural *union*. Here, *unification* is not as wide a temporal category as integration, but the concept rather focuses on the earlier developments of a union’s formation and on the factors that had an effect on the union’s emergence.

Comparative Case Studies on Unification

In this chapter the author will take a quick look at the already existing literature on the topic. As Italian political scientist Sergio Fabbrini already remarked, „few attempts have been made to conduct systemic comparison of democratic experiences on the two sides of the Atlantic“ (Fabbrini 2007, 1). Nevertheless the author will present four comparative studies on the US and the EU, demonstrate their content and characterize their differences and similarities to this thesis’ focus.

Amitai Etzioni’s book „Political Unification“ from 1965 provides a handy theoretical framework to gain a better understanding of the concept of unification. His ideas have

already been used in the introductory and theoretical chapter of this thesis. Since Etzioni's book does not contain a direct comparison between the unification processes of US and the EU though, but a contrasting of the United Arab Republic, the Federation of the West Indies, the Nordic Associational Web, and the EEC (only until 1964), it falls short of being of substantial content for this thesis. Additionally, the text is from 1965, so it naturally does not consider the European states' further integration until present day (c.f. Etzioni 1965).

In his book „Compound Democracies“, Fabbrini applies his model of *compound democracy* on the developments of the US and the EU. For Fabbrini, a „compound model is proper of polities that have the features of both an interstate (confederal, intergovernmental) and a supracommunity (federal, supranational) organization. A compound polity is a union of states and *their citizens* [sic]“ (Fabbrini 2007, 3). He argues that the US and the EU are becoming more and more similar political entities. The main difference between Fabbrini's work and the outlook of this thesis is the time period under focus. While Fabbrini concentrates his comparison on the time after 1945 and strongly bears future outcomes in mind, this thesis will aim its attention at the respective beginnings of the two unions and the pivotal factors that triggered unification in the past (c.f. *ibid.*).

Another comparative study on the topic was conducted by Leslie Friedman Goldstein in 2001. Although it is certainly more similar to this thesis in approach than Fabbrini's work, Goldstein's analysis centers around a slightly distinct research question: „[W]hat forces, in a nonconsequent situation, cause formerly sovereign states to continue to maintain their willingness to cede sovereignty to a supracommunity unit after their initial decision to join that unit“ (Goldstein 2001, 142). Goldstein's research circles around the time period shortly after initial unification and the motivation of states to prolong their federal engagement. Goldstein then moves on to compare the *membership resistance* of the EU states, the USA, the Dutch Union and the Swiss Union. There are certainly dissimilarities between the two studies, but Goldstein's article provides some useful definitions for this thesis and some interesting hypothesis for future research (c.f. *ibid.*, 141-160).

Peter Gerlich's article „Unions in Comparison: Can the EU and the United States Learn from Each Other?“ from 2007 is perhaps the most proximate study to this thesis with regards to both research question and outcome as the article's title already suggests. However, Gerlich's article is more oriented towards a 'lessons learned' from the two unification processes, while this thesis mainly focuses on the factors which triggered the formation of the unions (predominantly that of the US). Another difference is the sheer

length of this thesis in comparison to Gerlich's article (c.f. Gerlich 2007, 67-79). Like Goldstein's work, Gerlich's text is an important scholarly starting point for the evolution of this thesis and, together with Etzioni's theoretic framework, build a foundation on which the following chapters rest.

THE FORCES OF UNIFICATION IN THE US

Writing this essay from a European perspective, one legend about the US has to be demystified before moving on with the analysis. In its beginning the US was not one single monolithic state bloc, but it was multiple states joining forces against the British. These states were (and at some point still are) struggling their way through a lengthy and conflictory 200-year-long unification-, integration- and enlargement-process. For the European reader, it is therefore helpful to take a closer look at said country's name again. After all the USA is not officially named „State of America“ or simply „America“ but „United States of America“. Although we often tend to put the emphasis on the last word⁸, this essay will focus on the evolution of the first two terms.

Having clarified the conceptual approach to the topic, it is now time to answer the first question; Which factors encouraged unification in the case of the United States? Were there certain economic, political, or cultural incentives that motivated the states to work together?

*Introduction to American Revolutionary History*⁹

Let's begin our historical journey 250 years ago in a hot American summer in a remote outpost of Western civilization. Albany, at that time, was not the typical mid-sized US city it is today, but a Dutch settlement on the Hudson river towered over by a British fort. To the East and South, the the British King ruled the Anglo-American colonies, whilst to the North the French governed their territories. The Indian Nations spread to the West. In the midst of the 18th century Albany was a commercial outpost erected at a crossroads between three worlds. In 1754, colonial commissioners, Indians and traders, met in the Mohawk Valley to attend to the Albany Congress, which should renew and improve the treaties with the Indians. But more importantly for this thesis, several commissioners

⁸ Which makes other nation's citizens on the American continent shudder.

⁹ The term 'American Revolution' has been challenged by some historians. They argue that a revolution is constituted by a set of factors other than in the case of the events in Northern America. Keeping the criticism in mind, the author of the thesis decided to use the term nevertheless for simplicity's sake.

wanted to unify the Anglo-American colonies. By looking at the writings of the most famous (and notorious) Albany attendee, Benjamin Franklin, regarding the formation of an intercolonial union, we can glimpse into the mindset of mid - 18th century colonial America. In comparing the necessity of an intercolonial union with that of the Iroquois Confederacy, Franklin criticized that it

„would be a very strange Thing, if six Nations of ignorant savages should be capable of forming a Scheme for subsisted Ages, and appears indissoluble; and yet that a like Union should be impracticable for ten or a Dozen English Colonies, to whom it is more necessary, and must be more advantageous; and who cannot be supposed to want an equal Understanding of their Interests“ (Franklin cited by Shannon 2000, 103).

Franklin argued that a general union would lead the colonists „to consider themselves, not as so many independent states, but as members of the same body“ (cited by Shannon 2002, 184). He supported a general union because he believed that such a union would be better equipped to regulate trade with the Indians, organize Western settlements and provide military strength than partial unions or single colonies. These arguments sound all too familiar and repetitive if one is accustomed to the constitutional debates one generation later.

So why include the Albany Congress in an introduction to American Revolutionary History? The answer is simple: Franklin and the other attendees discussed their ideas of union strictly in a context of British Empire. Surely, they debated the many hows and whens and whys of intercolonial government but they never questioned that they were British subjects under the rule of the Parliament and the King. Franklin and his contemporaries took pride in possessing the „rights of Englishmen“. And although they laid criticisms upon shortcomings of colonial government, they didn't question their cultural belonging to Britannia or anticipate American independence, which should come into focus only 20 years after the Albany Congress.

The second reason to discuss the Albany Plan in this thesis is that the plan is a piece of evidence, which suggests that the road towards a union is probably not a linear path. If anything, the Plan indicates that forming a union is mostly a trial and error process. The proposed Albany Plan to unify the colonies and govern them by an elected Grand Council (under the general rule of Britain of course) got dismissed in the colonial assemblies because it was feared to take too many rights away from them. In London, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Plan was mostly ignored and finally rejected because it was, among other things, too democratic.

So how come the colonists adopted a much stronger plan for a union only some decades later? What kind of factors encouraged some of the actors to re-new their unification efforts? In which context did these factors occur?

The French and Indian War (1754-1763) strengthened Britain's position in Northern America, but also left London to deal with a huge war debt. The solution for this problem was quick at hand. In 1763, George Grenville, then Prime Minister of Britain introduced four new laws to Parliament that were relevant to the colonies. One of them, which stirred most of the conflict, was the so-called Stamp Act. The law „unambiguously aimed to raise revenue in America by levying taxes on newspapers, pamphlets, almanacs, and other sorts of legal documents such as leases, land titles and licenses“ (Kierner 2003, 57). Subsequently, the Virginia House of Burgesses passed a resolution against the Stamp Act, which was approved by nine other colonies. In October 1765 an intercolonial assembly was formed to discuss measures in order to get rid of the Act. Outside these official channels, colonists boycotted British goods and mass protests were held in urban centers. In March 1766, the Stamp Act was repealed, mostly due to the (often violent) street marchers who harassed stamp distributors. In a move to save face, Parliament passed the Declaratory Act instead, reinforcing Parliament's power over the colonies and its right to levy taxes.

To summarize, the Stamp Act Crisis and the follow up Imperial Crisis (Townshend Acts, Liberty Riot,...) in North America provoked three reactions that should be of importance later on; First, the colonial elites began questioning and discussing the nature of the British Constitution and its aptitude to serve the interests of the colonists. Second, the crisis caused protesters to rethink colonial boundaries and to engage in cross-colonial meetings. Third, the conflict mobilized popular (violent) resistance and established a relationship between the elites and the masses. The Stamp Act crisis and its subsequent discords accelerated the forming of an „imagined community“ of North American colonists (c.f. *ibid.*, 54-64).

The ongoing frictions between townspeople and troops culminated in the Boston Massacre in March 1770, in which British soldiers shot 11 men (of which 5 died), after being taunted by the local mob. Most Bostonians were outraged by this event and news travelled fast through the other colonies¹⁰. After three years of relative peace, Parliament

¹⁰ John Adams, who would later become President of the United States, strongly believed in the virtues of fair trial and agreed to be the troop's lawyer in court. Adams' decision to defend the soldiers caused much dissonance in Boston. However, Adams was successful: the court acquitted most of the defendants.

enacted the Tea Act to help the struggling East India Company. Basically, the Act established the EIC as a monopoly for tea trade and left many middlemen (traders, merchants,...) without income. Additionally, the colonists thought that Parliament only lowered the price for tea in order to sell more and thus increase their revenue from the tea duty (1768). Hence the colonies opposed the Tea Act. Some did not let the British tea ships enter their harbors while others simply destroyed the tea: „On the night of 16 December, a band of men disguised themselves as Indians, boarded the tea ships – by then there were three – and dumped 342 chests of tea into Boston harbor“ (ibid., 89). This „Destruction of the Tea“ later came to be known as „Boston Tea Party“. It marks another step towards increased colonial lawlessness, violent opposition, and fight. Britain responded with the installation of the Coercive Acts to discipline the people of Massachusetts. Although the Acts were primarily aimed at Massachusetts Bay Colony, the laws were rejected and met with resistance throughout the colonies.

In late summer of 1774 the 1st Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia. The plan was to design an alternative power structure in which the American colonies could exist somewhat independently within the British Empire. Economic boycotts were one of the measures considered and carried out by the colonists. During the following year, Congress still held dialogue with London, although the atmosphere was getting tenser by the day. In April 1775, British troops clashed with the Patriots' militia north of Boston, at the Battle of Lexington and Concord. Shortly after, the 2nd Continental Congress came together and matters of military funding and command were discussed. As a response to congress' „Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms“, King George III issued a proclamation in August 1775 in which he criticized the unlawfulness of his subjects in North America, who are

„misled by dangerous and ill designing men, and forgetting the alliance which they owe to the power that has protected and supported them; after various disorderly acts committed in disturbance of the publick peace, to the obstruction of lawful commerce, and to the oppression of our loyal subjects carrying on the same“ (George III cited by ibid., 125).

The mutual build up continued and both sides engaged in provocations. Thomas Paine, for example, published his widely read text „Common Sense“, both a ridicule of British monarchy and a call for American independence, since „The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind“ (Paine cited by ibid., 129). On the other side, Lord Dunmore recruited runaway slaves into the British Army army: „And I do hereby further declare all indentured servants, negroes, or others, (appertaining to Rebels,) free that are able and willing to bear arms, they joining His Majesty's troops as soon as may be

[...]“ (Dunmore cited by *ibid.*, 126f). Meanwhile the colonies tried to attract European allies to support their cause militarily and financially.

With these developments, it was only a matter of time until the Declaration of Independence was to be written and signed in congress on July 4th, 1776. One of the reasons to adopt a declaration was that a formal declaration would certainly help winning foreign allies for their cause and would at the same time publicly rationalize the formation of a continental army. Among the writers were Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and Benjamin Franklin. The Declaration of Independence has four parts, an introduction, a listing of the King's crimes, a conclusion and signatories (c.f. DoI 1776)¹¹.

After its introduction to the public, the main chapter of the Revolutionary War began. One year later during war, in 1777, congress agreed to the Articles of Confederation, ratified and in force from March 1781. These articles established a confederate government for the newly independent states and for the first time enabled a „perpetual Union between the states“ named „United States of America“. The Articles - amongst other things - consist of a preamble, states rights, paragraphs on the formal set up of legislature, rights granted the federal government, and military questions (c.f. AoC 1777)¹².

Although the British Army possessed advantages with regards to resources, military experience, the colonies with their poorly trained militia, inexperience and lack in naval power, eventually won the war against all odds by wearing the intruder down. On the one hand, the colonists played on the long and slow British supply lines. On the other hand, what the militia lacked in experience they made up with volunteer spirit and endurance. After all, the Revolutionary War was a people's war, in the good and in the bad sense. Anne Terrel from Virginia, whose husband fought for the continental army, gives account of her willingness to support the cause for independence:

„I am not only willing to bear the absence of my dear husband for a short time, but am almost ready to start up with sword in hand to fight by his side in so glorious a cause [...] and let the tyrants of Great Britain see the American Ladies both ingenuity and industry, and that we can dress with gentility without any of the British manufactories“ (Terrel cited by Kierner 2003, 153f).

¹¹ The Declaration of Independence and its factual meaning for unification will be discussed in depth in the following chapters.

¹² The Articles of Confederation and its factual meaning for unification will be discussed in depth in the following chapters.

The Treaty of Paris ended the War in 1793 causing Britain to concentrate its power on other colonies, shifting world history in a new direction. On the other side of the Atlantic, the former colonies had to tackle many challenges. The war left the states with a huge debt and the Articles of Confederation did not allow Congress to engage in meaningful foreign relations with European powers. Additionally the Articles prohibited the installation of much needed commercial policies and regulations across the newly found United States of America (c.f. *ibid.*, 229-231). To summarize, in „the Confederation era, Congress was less of a governing body than a forum for discussion and consensus-building among a loose alliance of states“ (*ibid.*, 228).

In September 1786, a first attempt to reshape US government in the Annapolis Convention failed to motivate enough states' representatives to produce any substantial outcome. It took a violent rebellion to wake up some of the states. In winter 1786/1787 Captain Daniel Shay started a revolt against the state after freeing imprisoned debtors in western Massachusetts. The poor farmers' inability to pay their base rates got them send to jail. A manifesto taking sides with the impoverished farmers states that the „present expensive mode of collecting debts [...] will of necessity fill our jails with unhappy debtors, and thereby a reputable body of people rendered incapable of being serviceable either to themselves or the community“ (cited by *ibid.*, 241). After the state of Massachusetts petitioned Congress to send troops, Shay's Rebellion was struck down. Although Captain Shay did not win the battle militarily, many state leaders were shaken to the core by this brutal manifestation of mass discontent and government helplessness. The Philadelphia Convention to revise the Articles of Confederation became a real necessity in order to reinstall popular faith in government and to take on the many other pressing problems of the young union (c.f. *ibid.*, 240f). A worried George Washington writes in a letter to John Jay, „What a triumph for the advocates of despotism to find that we are incapable of governing ourselves, and that systems founded on the basis of equal liberty are merely ideal and fallacious!“ (Washington cited by *ibid.*, 243).

The Philadelphia Convention started on May 25th, 1787. 12 of the 13 states were represented with the exception of Rhode Island. The initial plan to reform the Articles of Confederation was soon abandoned in lieu of a much bolder agenda, namely to draft a constitution. James Madison, the „Father of the Constitution“, was responsible for the

main design of the document¹³. The influences on the document can - amongst others - be traced back to the Magna Carta (1215), the Jamestown Representative Assembly (1619), and the state constitutions (John Jay in NY, John Adams in MA). The Constitution introduced three branches of government: executive (President), legislative (Congress), and judicial (Supreme Court). There are two compromises included in the constitution: First, the installment of a bicameral parliamentary system – House of Representatives and Senate – allowed both for popular and state representation. Second, a clause delaying the states to tackle the slavery question until 1808 and counting slaves as 3/5 of a person (!) appeased the South and kept them on board to endorse the document. Out of the 55 delegates present at the Convention, 39 signed the Constitution. The so-called „Bill of Rights“, i.e. the first 10 constitutional amendments, strengthened the rights of individuals and concluded the fight between Federalists and Antifederalists. George Mason, a Virginian delegate and strong antifederalist supporter of a bill of rights, argued beforehand, that there

„is no declaration of rights, and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and constitutions of the several states, the declarations of rights, in the separate states, are no security [...] This government will commence in a moderate aristocracy. It is at present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its operation, produce a monarchy, or a corrupt oppressive aristocracy“ (Mason cited by *ibid.*, 279ff).

The Constitution came into effect after being ratified by the ninth state (N.H.) on June 21st, 1788. In its aftermath, George Washington, an integral figure of unity, was elected the first President of the United States, giving the young and shaky nation its first father figure, role model, and future point of cultural reference (c.f. *ibid.*, 233-235; Peltason 2004, 3-17; Holton 2007).

We began our rocky journey of American unification in 1754 in Albany and arrived in 1788 looking at a young, independent union consisting of a handful of diverse states united under a common constitution. With this general background knowledge in American Revolutionary History it is now time to dig deep and ask which factors contributed to this unification process.

¹³ Thomas Jefferson and John Adams did not take part in the Philadelphia Convention since they were both assigned posts in Europe at that time.

Economic Factors

With regards to economic factors one can find a wealth of interior and exterior reasons why the 13 British colonies began considering unification. The following questions will be answered in the subsequent chapter: What did the economy look like in Northern America in the second half of the 18th century? What were the economic challenges the generation of the „Founding Fathers“ faced? How relevant were economic questions with regards to political and cultural unification? And finally, how much did or didn't economic factors contribute to the unification of the United States? To examine these issues, there will be four sections. In the first introductory part, we will take a closer look at the nature of trade and production in Revolutionary America. Next, there will be a discussion of interior and exterior economic challenges the young union encountered. This main chapter will deal with the confederation's/union's wide range of monetary and fiscal problems. Third, the author will discuss the cultural and political importance of economic matters for unification. And last but not least, the summary and conclusion will offer insight on the level of unifying energy these economic factors possessed.

Production and Trade

The British colonies in North America, which would later form the United States, were largely agricultural. First and foremost it is important to say that most of the colonists were farmers, living their lives in small self-sufficient communities.

In the South, however, a favorable climatic environment allowed for plantations. They provided larger amounts of produce, especially tobacco, which were then shipped to England. Slaves, which were “imported” from Africa, often had to work under terrible conditions to fulfill the expectations of the rural gentry¹⁴.

In the urban centers that developed on the Mid-Atlantic and Northern seaboard, merchants organized the trade between Britain and the colonies. A whole strata of urban society depended on this colonial trade, for example seamen, ropemakers, etc. (These groups should become essential in the formation of radicalized mobs in pre-war USA).

¹⁴ It is indeed a sad and ironic fact of the American Revolution that the economic and later political independence of the gentry was somehow based on the dependence of African slaves.

To the West, small-scale farming and fur trade (with Native Americans) ruled the face of North America the second half of the 18th century.

A great example to illustrate the division between the different North American lifestyles is to look at the economic background of two of the most essential politicians of the period, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. While Jefferson lived in the South in his dreamily named Palladian „Monticello“, John Adams occupied either a small self-sustained farm in New England or a crowded townhouse in Boston. While Jefferson spent his later years managing the plantation, the redesign of the house and the slaves¹⁵, Adams experienced relatively humble years with his wife Abigail in his Massachusetts farm.

To summarize, the colonies exported mostly raw goods to Britain, while the „motherland“ shipped manufactured goods over the Atlantic, therefore tapping into a growing market for its commodities. T.H. Breen called this development the „birth of Anglo-American ‚consumer society‘“ (Breen 1988, 77) at around 1750. He states an „exceptionally rapid expansion of consumer *choice*, and increasing *standardization of consumer behavior* and a pervasive *Anglicization* of the American market“ (ibid., 79).

The combination of exporting raw materials while importing a wide range¹⁶ of highly crafted and expensive manufactured goods is a perfect example of a classical colonial economy. However, what speaks against this hypothesis is that the North American colonies had to pay lower taxes than their British brothers and sisters, an interesting fact that was often neglected by radical political writers of the American Revolution.

Imperial and Exterior Challenges

The pre-revolutionary era can be characterized by the colonies growing economic relations with Britain. On the one hand, the empire rendered the emergence of a „consumer culture“ possible (see above). Additionally, the demand for raw goods and the naval protection for colonial vessels boosted the colonies maritime economy, i.e. ship building, as well as enabling colonial merchants to find British investors and creditors.

¹⁵ Jefferson was a busy man indeed. He not only fathered the children of one of his slaves – Sally Hemmings – but in the course of history also found the time to invent the swivel chair.

¹⁶ In the 1750s, an American consumer could even purchase „purple gloves, flowered gloves, orange gloves, white gloves, rough gloves, chamois gloves, buff gloves, ‚Maid’s Black Silk’ gloves, ‚Maid’s Lamb Gloves’, and even ‚Men’s Dog Skin Gloves‘“ (Breen 1988, 80).

And third, Britain's military success over the French opened the doors for new territorial and economic expansion to the West. Kierner states, that „the colonial economy benefited overall from the Navigation Acts¹⁷, at least up to the 1760s“ (Kierner 2003, 9).

On the other hand, British companies had a monopoly on imperial commerce, leaving little space for colonial enterprises to flourish anywhere outside the empire. More so, extravagant consumerism not only led to a very fashionable American gentry, but also increased personal as well as international debt and dependencies. Not only did the French-Indian war open some new doors, it also shut some by locking the empire into the prison of a huge war debt, which became the reasoning ground for new taxes on the colonies: „[...] Britons generally grumbled that the colonists, who reaped the chief benefits of victory, did little to help defray its costs“ (ibid., 55). Britain's effort to raise revenue by introducing – for example - the Stamp Acts was met with Northern American suspicion and outrage. John Dickinson, a farmer and pamphleteer, argued in 1767: „Never did the British parliament, till the period above mentioned [Stamp Acts, R.K.], think of imposing duties in America, FOR THE PURPOSE OF RAISING A REVENUE [sic!]“ (Johnson cited by ibid., 79). From the Stamp Act Crisis to the Boston Tea Party the colonies resisted and protested British regulations. These protests, based on economic argumentations, should become one of the main contributing factors for the American struggle for independence and unification.

During the Revolution, trade with Britain came to near stagnation and British products were boycotted. The colonies strived to find multiple ways to finance the war against the Crown. American emissaries in Europe tried to attract foreign allies and investors, for instance in the Netherlands or in France. The Declaration of Independence was partly designed to lure international money into the war-ridden colonies, by asserting the „thirteen united States of America [‘s, R.K.]“ (DoI 1776) enlightened strength and economic competence: „[...] that as Free and Independent States, they have full power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do“ (DoI 1776). From a 21st century perspective, the Declaration's assertion of equality and human rights seems the most striking contribution to global history. But evaluating the document from a standpoint in the 18th century, the Declaration is not only an appraisal of universal rights,

¹⁷ The Navigation Acts from 1757 were a collection of laws to regulate imperial commerce.

but mostly a cleverly designed text serving multiple pragmatic economic and political purposes.

So how can the effects of the document be assessed? Although the Declaration found some idealistic admirers in Europe, notably in pre-revolutionary France, in reality the document and the diplomatic missionaries contributed little to raise the states' international economic standing. Unfortunately for the „united States of America“, the Articles of Confederation did not do any foreign financial good either. Although the text establishes congress' right to enter international „treaties and alliances“ (Art. IX, AoC 1777) and forbid the states to „lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the united States in congress assembled“ (Art. IV, AoC 1777), the general weakness of the „perpetual Union“ (AoC 1777) under the AoC prohibited any substantial positive influence on international trade. In reality congress had little authority since it lacked the principle power of taxation and was constantly blocked by vetoing states.

In the post-revolution period it was a glaring fact that the AoC did not provide a functioning economic framework for the young union. The Constitution of the United States of America 1787 brought new incentives to revitalize international commerce and tackle the debt. First of all, the constitution sent a general global message that the US was on its way towards a stable and objectively „perpetual Union“ (AoC 1777), therefore slowly but surely attracting international investors, that would have shunned the confederation before. Second, from now on Congress possessed genuine legislative power „To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes“ (Art. 1, Sect. 8 (2), CoUSA). These sections provided economic parties (international debtors, investors,...) with a clear anatomy of responsibilities, ergo increasing economic stability and security. Third, Congress' power to tax further progressed the image of the US as a more reliable economic partner, since it - at least on paper – gave Congress a potent instrument to raise revenue in order to decrease the staggering war debt.

„If European merchants could only ‚find in America, the punctuality and security, which alone gain credit and support confidence,‘ True Friend¹⁸ declared, they would be ‚eager‘ not only to lend Americans money but to sell them merchandise on credit. These loans and nothing else would ‚revive our agriculture‘, he wrote“ (Holton 2007, 97).

¹⁸ The synonym of an anonymous Virginian commentator.

To conclude, the quest to find a solution for the imperial and exterior economic challenges was one of the incentives that lead towards unification of the former colonies and can therefore be identified as this thesis' first independent factor.

Interior Challenges

Linked to the above international economic incentives for unification, the young union struggled a great amount of domestic challenges.

Monetary policies, i.e. the regulation of money supply, was deeply flawed in the early days of the United States. On the one hand, paper money was issued in great amounts by several state banks and depreciated in face value very rapidly. The national currency, the so-called „Continental“ (which was denominated in dollars) soon met the same fate. On the other hand, much needed specie – gold and silver – was scarce. Government bonds were not more than promisory notes that would never commit to their word that they would pay the soldiers/creditors/speculators later.

Fiscal policy, i.e. the control of tax revenue and government spending, was equally doomed since the AoC did not provide the political framework to establish a national long-term economic plan. How did the young union's network of economic interests look like before the constitution was ratified and Hamilton introduced his reform?




Figure 4. Graph Depicting the Economic Relations Between Actors After the War Before the Constitutional Ratification (by R.K. 2010)

The above graph was created in order to facilitate a better understanding of the complex economic interactions right after the Revolutionary War. Five main actors can be identified: debtors (often farmers but also people of higher social rank), domestic and foreign creditors, the individual states and Congress proceeding under the AoC. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the war did not only leave the states and Congress with a huge debt but also caused great economic loss on the individual level. During the war years, agricultural production decreased since many farmers served as soldiers in the Revolutionary Army. Additionally, as in any war, property and machinery were destroyed, while food and clothing grew scarce. The economic aftershocks of the war were experienced by many Americans, especially by those at the lower end of social classes, well into the post-war years. To escape financial and productive hardships, debtors yearned for money, products and machinery, which were granted to them by domestic creditors. In case they were able to, debtors paid their creditors back with products, but more often they were entangled in a cycle of debt.

Now that we explained the relationship between debtors and creditors, it is time to ask what the states' position and interests were. What was at stake for them? The huge

amount of debtors after the war posed a dilemma to the states. Should they tax their constituents in order to raise revenue for the union's war debt and therefore risking popular punishment at the next election? Or should the states ease their constituents' economic hardships by issuing more paper money and granting tax relief to debtors while creating a system of monetary unsteadiness and financial insecurity? To the disappointment of domestic and foreign creditors, speculators and Congress, most of the states decided to be "ruled by" their constituents' – i.e. debtors' – will or by an „excess of democracy“ (Hamilton cited by Holton 2007, 5), as Alexander Hamilton noted sharply. First, the results of these measures had direct consequences for congress, which by the rules of AoC was dependent on states' funding and couldn't introduce taxes on its own. The lack of financing posed a challenge to the existence of congress and indirectly the union itself. Second, the lack of taxes paid to the states hence resulted in the non-payment of international debts, further destabilizing international economic relations. Third, domestic creditors felt great injustice since the state governments did not fulfill their own financial responsibilities towards them. Furthermore, the states mostly ignored the creditors' complaints regarding the non-compliance of credit rules by debtors. From a creditor's perspective no one was held accountable for the breaching of rules, neither the debtors, nor the states, nor congress.

To resume, most contemporaries accused the states for the destruction – respectively non-reconstruction – of the domestic economy, or as Holton would argue, „many Americans who lived through the post-war era [...] admitted that the state assemblies had badly damaged the American economy“ (ibid., 17) with their tax relief politics and devaluation of paper money by printing more and more bank notes in order to placate their constituents. Under the AoC, the only national authority – Congress - was too politically insignificant and financially dependent on the states that it could have influenced domestic economy to the better. And although the young union under the AoC was deeply divided into poor and rich, nearly all citizens agreed that the uncoordinated measures by the state assemblies posed a severe threat to the (economic) future of all Americans. For example, John Quincy Adams¹⁹ described the multilayered frustration with the Massachusetts state constitution in 1786:

„While the idle, and extravagant, and consequently the poor, complain of its being oppressive, the men of property, and consideration, think the [Massachusetts state, R.K.]

¹⁹ Son of John and Abigail Adams and 6th President of the United States.

constitution, gives too much liberty to the unprincipled citizen, to the prejudice of the honest, and industrious“ (Adams cited by *ibid.*, 13).

The former passage touches on a subject that is central to the development of the constitution and hence the strengthening of the union. John Quincy Adams and his contemporaries identified and criticized a widespread loss of „civic virtue“ in their countrymen. In their argumentation²⁰, the inflated self-interest, which drives creditors and debtors, hinders the health of the public good. An overhaul of the AoC, respectively a new constitution should reinstall financial justice and sensible monetary and fiscal regulation.

What were the most important differences between the AoC and the CoUSA with regards to economic policies? What were the new rules of economic conduct under the CoUSA? First, under the Articles the states had the sole power to levy taxes, leaving Congress dependent on the state assemblies for their funding: „the taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States“ (Art. VIII, AoC). The Constitution on the contrary granted Congress the right to „lay and collect taxes, duties²¹, imposts and excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States“ (Art. 1, Sect. 8 (1), CoUSA).

Second, although also partially granted by the AoC, Congress received the right to „coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures“ (Art. 1, Sect. 8 (5)), thus laying the groundwork for what would later become national banks and the Federal Reserve.

Third, the Constitution prohibited the states to print their own bills of credit and pay their debts in paper money: „No state shall [...] coin money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts [...]“ (Art. 1, Sect. 10 (1), CoUSA). For many contemporaries, this clause was the most important piece of legislation in the whole document. Charles Pinckney, governor of South Carolina, referred to it as „the soul of the Constitution“ (Pinckney cited by Holton 2007, 9), while Edmund Randolph, governor of Virginia, called it „a great favourite of mine“ (Randolph cited by *ibid.*, 9).

²⁰ For example see governor of New Jersey's, William Livingston's, text „Primitive Whig, No. II“ (1786) (cited by Kierner 2003, 239f).

²¹ „*Duties* are taxes on goods coming into the United States. *Excises* are taxes on sales, use, or production, and sometimes on business procedures or privileges [...]. *Imposts* is a general tax term that includes both duties and excises“ (Peltason 2004, 53).

Last, the constitution virtually forbade the states to levy duties on imports from other states or from abroad, which was previously common in some of the states: „No state shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's [sic!] inspection Laws“ (Art. 1, Sect. 10 (2), CoUSA). This clause established a zone of free trade across the former colonies (c.f. Peltason 2004, 53f, 57f; c.f. Holton 2007, 9).

Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury from 1789 until 1795, breathed life into the constitutional framework. Hamilton introduced a comprehensive set of monetary and fiscal measures to bind elites to the government and find the balance between liberty and order. Hamilton's policies were much criticized²² at the time for being too hierarchical, elitist or even „monarchical“. What did Hamilton propose and implement? Hamilton carried out his idea that the federal government should resume the war debt from the state level and he assured that bonds were paid by face value to propel the economy. Furthermore, he was partly responsible for creating the first national bank in pursuance of providing a stable currency and slowing inflation. This stable monetary supply should be a vehicle to encourage investments by elites. Additionally, the Secretary of State provided direct subsidies to manufacturers to bind a national ruling class to the national government.

So what were the economic effects and challenges of the constitution and of Hamilton's measures? On the one side, the union experienced an economic boom in the 1790s: Relative economic stability went hand in hand with new domestic and international investments, less taxes than ever before, increased revenue from import tariffs, Congress taking over the states' debts and the creditors finally getting their money back. On the other side, Congress was less responsive to citizens' wishes than the state governments and therefore the national government was enabled to impose unpopular laws without much public consent, for example the tax on Whiskey which led to the Whiskey rebellion: „The adoption of the constitution spelled the end of annual elections, of grassroots instructions to representatives, and of popular control of the money supply – all of which dated back to the colonial era“ (Holton 2007, 271). Holton goes so far as to state that the Framers' (of the CoUSA) intention was to „give the ordinary citizens [...] prosperity, not power“ (ibid., 277). In reality, most of the import revenue went into the military abolition of Indian conflicts or into the payment of government bonds, leaving little budgetary

²² First and foremost, the „Hamiltonians“ were criticized by the so-called „Jeffersonians“, who should later become the Republican Party.

space to invest in infrastructure or agrarian/ small business investments (c.f. *ibid.*, 266-271).

The above paragraph shows that the intentions with which the Framers built the CoUSA as well as the real-life effects of the document and the politicians' subsequent policies are two-fold and a complex matter to characterize. More important for this thesis, however, is to answer and summarize the chapter's questions on the economic factors leading to unification: To conclude, the restoration of „civic virtue“, that is the reinstallment of financial justice, as well as monetary and fiscal regulations are a central motive in the development of the constitution and thus another composite economic factor which drove unification. The effects of the constitutional take on economic issues and even Hamilton's reforms still play a vital role in contemporary US politics and remain at the heart of political discourse and conflict even today, i.e. tax reforms, state and national debt, subsidies for business, etc.;

Political and Cultural Importance of Economy for Unification

How relevant were economic questions with regards to political and cultural unification? The following demonstrations serve as a bridge to the sections on political and cultural factors of US-American unification. Moreover, this chapter exemplifies the importance of economic matters in pre- and post-war everyday life and will further underline the influence of the economy on people's evolving shared identity as unified „Americans“.

In colonial times, especially from 1750 until the war, consumism of British goods was a shared experience across all colonies: „From textiles to teapots, colonists were avid costumers of British goods; from 1720 to 1770, colonial per capita imports from Britain increased by some 50 percent“ (Kierner 2003, 9) This communal happening (ironically) also was the basis for the occurrence and success of widespread product boycotts across the Atlantic seabord. Without a previous dependence and love of British products, the protesters wouldn't have identified them as viable points of reference. The colonists' boycotts of imports resulted in a wide range of partly obscure outcomes. Tea parties, clothing and even funerals became highly politicized events. For instance, in 1769 the South Carolina Gazette highlighted Mary Hasell Gadsden's funeral as an example of great patriotism: „Many [...] have this winter clothed themselves in their own manufactures; [...] and a great reform is intended in the enormous expence attending funerals, [and] for mourning...from the patriotic example lately set by Christopher Gadsden“ (S.C. Gazette

cited by *ibid.*, 83). Further, the article urges Americans to „promote INDUSTRY, ECONOMY, and AMERICAN MANUFACTURES, and to keep so much money amongst us as possible“ (*ibid.*, 83f).

Now that the author has shown how highly politicized common colonists were with regards to an economic matter like British imports and imperial policies, it is time to ask what effects these crowd measures had on actual trade.



Figure 5. Value of Goods Imported from England and Scotland 1766-1775. Graph Designed by Using Data Table from Murrin (1999, 183) (by R.K. 2010)

The above graph shows very clearly that boycotts had a tangible influence on British import business. For example, the opposition to the Townshend Acts 1767/1768 caused a subsequent decrease the value of imported goods from England and Scotland. After a short increase of imports, another market break occurred with the events around the Boston Tea Party. At the time of commence of the Revolutionary War, nearly all importation inclines towards zero.

In pre-war America, a pattern of crowd action and Crown reaction can be identified with regards to responses to economic matters. In this circle of provocations, crowd action in

the colonies was usually followed by an attempt to discipline the people through new laws or troops, which was again succeeded by the protests of an even angrier mob and thus more army action, etc...The end result of this cycle of violence in the American case was the Revolutionary War for independence.

There is evidence that this pattern continued even after the war was over, with the only difference that the role of George III was now replaced by US-American state or national politicians. Crowd protests, such as the Whiskey rebellion or Shay's rebellion, were often met with military retaliation. However, and this is the crucial point in which the young union discerns from the British government, there was also a strive to find real political solutions to economic problems, or – if the former is impossible – to design a political framework in which the „wild crowds“ can be tamed:

„[...] But ordinary Americans did influence the Constitution indirectly. During the 1780s relief advocates, the great majority of them farmers, frequently launched uprisings or warned that other people were about to revolt. The gentry class was frightened and infuriated, and one reason the Founding Fathers favored the Constitution was that it would, for the first time, give the federal government the funds it needed to field an army capable of suppressing farmers' rebellions. That is what the Framers were talking about when they stated in the preamble to the Constitution that one of their goals was ,to ensure domestic tranquility'“ (Holton 2007, 157f).

To conclude, the consistency of a pattern of crowd action and grass roots' initiatives caused by economic issues, such as taxes and importation, contributed to a unified identity of ordinary Americans. Generally, this chapter underlines once again the crucial importance economic issues played during the time of American unification. Its role was not only sensed by the elites, but the economic situation also affected the every day life of common Americans.

Conclusion

A review of the above chapters on production, trade, international and domestic challenges, and the politico-cultural implications of economic struggles shows that the importance of the economy in the unification process of the Northern American states cannot be overrated. Its significance shall be explored in depth in relation to the formation of the European Union in the course of this text.

To summarize, due to a set of economic and political imperial policies after the French-Indian War, the British colonies increasingly yearned for independence from Britain. During and after the Revolutionary War they were eager to find their own place in the global trade of the 18th century, as well as establish domestic economic stability and

growth. The newly independent states and their elites soon realized that the loose framework provided by the AoC was insufficient to serve their economic needs regarding fiscal, monetary and international financial security and debt release. The Constitution and subsequent policies, which were substantially shaped by economic concerns, accelerated and deepened US-American unification under a new powerful national government. The new economic measures allowed for free trade among the former colonies, gave Congress the power to tax, stipulate the growth of business, investment rates, and global trade. However, the process of economic unification from 1750 to 1800 was not without inherent conflicts: I.e. the continuation of slavery in the South; citizens' refusal to pay taxes (see for example the Whiskey Rebellion); The exclusion of unpropertied US-Americans from the spheres of political power; The progression of animosities between settlers and Native Americans on the Western Frontier.

Many of these positive, as well as negative economic groundstones laid out during this crucial period of US-American unification still reverberate in the US political culture of today, if one only dares to listen to the echo: The diversion of interests between state-level and federal-level elites; The scepticism towards taxation; The political and popular focus on economic issues²³; A certain level of „unruliness“ (Holton 2007) with regards to anything remotely resembling state authority; But these are just mere observations from the author and shall be verified or falsified in another thesis.

To conclude this chapter and answer the question stated at the beginning: Which economic factors contributed to US-American unification?

First, there were international factors contributing and driving unification. One was to reinstall trust in investors to attract capital from abroad. This was achieved through repaying war debts and framing a political and legal system that guaranteed financial stability. Linked to this, the Founding Fathers were eager to build an independent economic bloc that could hold a place in global trade.

Second, there were a set of domestic factors pushing unification. Monetary and fiscal problems, such as war debt, destabilizing state-level tax reliefs, inter-state tariffs on trade, and the lack of a stable currency and national coinage, could not be solved under the AoC. To the contrary, many economic problems were magnified or even caused by the AoC's lack of instruments for efficient policy-making. The CoUSA and Hamilton's

²³ For instance, Bill Clinton famously used the slogan “It's the economy, stupid” in his 1992 Presidential Campaign.

subsequent monetary and fiscal policies restored justice and stability, established a free trade zone among the former colonies under the eyes of an empowered national regulator, reinstated investors' trust and generally infused the domestic growth of the US-American market for several years to come.

Political Factors

In addition to economic factors one can also find a great number of potential political factors that could have influenced and/or triggered unification. In the following part of the thesis, the author will seek to identify these factors, taking into account the historical background and socio-economic developments of the time. To extract the relevant factors it is helpful to ask some sub-questions regarding the political unification of the colonies. What were the political structures and ideas like in pre-revolutionary America? What was the political culture like in the colonies? Which ideologies contributed to unification?

First, there will be an introductory chapter on the status quo of the political sphere in colonial, „British“ Northern America. The author will examine the structures and ideas of the political world in the colonies. This is deemed necessary to reach a better understanding of the political status quo before the war and the historical background of unification. Second, the political culture of the time will be analyzed. In this chapter the focus will lie on the societal breeding ground on which the evolution from colony to independent states to union took place. Third, the author will take a look at the ideological reasons behind unification. Ideas of republicanism, liberty and good ruler will be put into context of US-American political unification. In this chapter, relevant documents regarding unification will be examined and analyzed. Fourth, there will be a summary and conclusion of the findings to bring out the political factors that contributed unification.

The Nature of Government, Deference, Representation and the „Balance Point of Power“

In order to understand the pre-revolutionary political and ideological structure of the colonies it is helpful to distinguish between three types of colonial government and acknowledge the diversity of political structures in colonial British America: proprietary colony, royal (or crown) colony, and charter colony. A proprietary colony was an early commercially oriented form of colonial management. It describes a form of political structure in which the King gives land to a so-called proprietor or proprietary company in order to establish a commercial outpost and reign over it. A proprietor enjoyed extensive rights over his colony and its inhabitants. An example of a proprietary colony was the Province of Pennsylvania, which was founded by William Penn in 1681. The most common form of a colony - the royal (or crown) colony - was ruled by a governor who

was appointed and could be recalled by the King. In a royal colony, the executive branch, i.e. the governor, was often times advised by a governor's council. A colonial assembly represents the formal legislative body in a crown colony. It was, so to say, composed of the contemporary colonial elite: white and wealthy men of property. Virginia, for instance, which was named after Elizabeth I, was made a crown colony in 1624 after being a proprietary colony in its first years. In addition, a charter colony was perhaps the most autonomous and rare form of colonial government. A charter is a set of articles that establish government in the colony. Compared to proprietary and royal colonies, Rhode Island, for example, received its charter in 1663 and enjoyed relative political freedom and governmental independence.

How were the colonies governed in reality and which ideas shaped colonial government? It is fair to say that in royal colonies the governor held extensive powers. The ideal of a balance between order and liberty, mixed government and independent branches did not hold up to reality. To quote the dreams of a contemporary, Dr. William Douglass of Boston, the colonial governments

„in conformity to our legislature in Great Britain...consist of three separate negatives; thus, by the governor, representing the King, the colonies are monarchical; by the Council, the [sic] are aristocratical; by a house of representatives or delegates from the people, the yare democratical; these three are distinct and independent of one another [...]“ (Douglass cited by Beeman 2004, 13f).

As Beeman points out, political power in the crown colonies, which were the majority of colonies, „heavily tilted toward the monarchy“ (ibid., 14), thus establishing a system in which the governor had the license to appoint members of the assembly and judges, veto legislation and dissolve the assemblies (c.f. ibid., 14).

Fittingly, the colonial structure of society and thence of politics, can be described as deferential. Deference is the acceptance of hierarchy and the view that this order is just and legitimate. The societal subordination of women, African-American slaves, and to a lesser degree white men without property, for instance, was mostly unquestioned at the time. This system of deference was closely linked to an argument that saw a causal relationship between property, independence and the ability to rule over others in a just manner. This classical republican rationale claims that property produced economic and consequently political independence that was deemed necessary to be a good ruler and to serve the public good. Wealth was also set at equal with education, which is another pre-requisite members of this „superior class of citizens“ (ibid., 19) needed to possess in order to become a responsible politician. In this deferential mindset, democracy was

illogical, since it would lead to an unbalanced and ineffective system governed by the dependent, uneducated masses. Or as John Cotton, Puritan minister asked: „If the people be the governors, who shall be the governed?“ (Cotton cited by *ibid.*, 19). Republicans on the other hand, at least the classical English kind, rooted in the idea that a large number of propertied and therefore independent citizens were a potential base for good government. The idea of republicanism had substantial influence on the generation of the Founding Fathers and can be detected in many political writings of the revolutionary period.

Politically, all colonists were British subjects and were consequently ruled by a king who stood at the top step of the socio-political ladder. Indeed, the assemblies had the right to propose legislation regarding internal affairs, but in the end Parliament in London was constitutionally responsible. Since there were no colonists sitting in Parliament, English politicians decided over laws in the colonies. Needless to say, the governor, and therefore indirectly the King had the final word in both domestic and external sayings.




Figure 6. Deferential Colonial Pyramid (Simplified Version) (by R.K. 2011)

With the colonies growing economic interests in foreign trade beginning around 1700, conflicts emerged over who ruled at home and abroad. For example, when Massachusetts businesses started selling food to the Caribbean, Britain saw the trade as a disruption of its laws and started to tax those customs (see Navigation Acts). New voices in the colonies proposed that the English Parliament should have more say in the proceedings

of colonial affairs. According to some colonists - and later to popular opinion - the colonial assemblies should be represented in Parliament. The goal was to build „parliamentary sovereignty, not popular sovereignty“ (ibid., 11), since the latter would suggest a democratic system, which was considered undesirable. Within this discussion, the challenge of representation became an especially contested issue during the Stamp Act Crisis. The idea of virtual representation, put forward by British imperialists, meant that, „each member of Parliament was alleged to represent the interests of all Britain and the empire, not just those of his constituents“ (Kierner 2003, 58). Politically admissible colonists (white men of property) criticized this concept and demanded actual representation in Parliament. These men were already used to vote for members in their assemblies and therefore self-confidently argued that only if they had the power to elect their representatives in Parliament directly, Parliament possessed the right to legislate taxation of the colonies. The slogan „No taxation without representation“ was born and became an instant hit with the revolutionary-minded wealthy and the colonial masses (c.f. ibid., 58). Daniel Dulany, a wealthy man from Maryland, argued famously in 1765 that to

„give property not belonging to the giver and without consent of the owner is such evident and flagrant injustice in ordinary caese that few are hardy enough to avow it. [...] not a single *actual* elector in Great Britain might be immediately affected by taxation in America opposed by a statute which would have a general operation and effect upon the properties and inhabitants of he colonies“ (Dulany cited by ibid., 67f).

However, it is very important to point out that most of the colonists, wealthy or poor, did not question the deferential system itself, but their level in the hierarchy. To put it simply, the colonial assemblies – the wealthy gentry - wanted to gain a better place in the food chain of British politics, without overthrowing the King (as later happened in the French Revolution). They did not want a change of system, but a change of working procedures within the system. The central question for this chapter therefore is NOT if the people wanted to overthrow the government and start a revolution from the outside, but rather how far the system was pushed to its limits from within until it reached a breaking point.

Beeman points out that „the rise to prominence and dominance of the lower houses of assembly“ (Beeman 2004, 14) was not only happening in America. England itself saw a similar development of institutions. The difference, however, was that in the colonies, the class system was not as entrenched as in England, and society all in all was more diverse and volatile, predicting better chances for substantial political change stemming from the informal sphere of politics.

Due to a number of changes in colonial North America like demographic change through immigration increase and growing economic wealth in the upper crusts of society, the old rigid hierarchy was undermined and a new, more responsive system was proposed. To summarize, pre-revolutionary politics in Britain as well as in America were characterized by a discussion about people's placement within a hierarchy, the nature of representation within the Parliamentary system and the equilibrium of power. As Beeman states, after years of monarchical tyranny under the Stuart Kings they „believed that governments were necessary to preserve order and liberty in society, but they also believed that too great a concentration of power within government might endanger the very order and liberty that governments were instituted to secure“ (ibid., 29).

But however big the ideological similarities between the two species of Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic, one of them broke with traditions and built a union of independent states. In the above chapter the author discussed the formal sphere of politics, i.e. the British institutional structures in the colonies, and the political theories prevailing at the time. The following pages will answer why this political change was possible and which political and societal factors accommodated it.

Political Culture and the Societal Breeding Grounds for a Unified Spirit

Almond and Verba define political culture as “political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond/ Verba 1963, 13). Political culture is different than political thought in the sense that it bears an additional notion of action. It is a concept that emphasizes the deeds of political actors, and their words. Therefore, political culture allows us to understand the political expressions of marginalized groups such as seamen, which often lack the ability to communicate their attitudes through “traditional” media, for example through pamphlets, newspaper articles,...;

The concept of political culture, however, does not try to mute the importance of political ideology, it just looks at it from an outcome-oriented angle. Which and how do people implement their ideas into their lives? Which kind of methods do actors use to voice and achieve their goals? How do they establish patterns of communication? Adapting this approach for social science research offers new access into the understanding of the broader social formations and events that caused US-American unification. So in order to see how the colonists filled the American Revolution with life, it is useful to take a closer

look at the people who spearheaded the political change. Since the inhabitants of urban areas along the Atlantic coast of Northern America play a vital role in the dawn of the Revolution, the following paragraphs will focus on this „mob“ culture as it was sometimes called by their fearful contemporaries.

In 1774, Gouverneur Morris of New York, who himself was an adversary of British imperial law, began to be alarmed by the crowd action: „The mob begin to think and reason. Poor reptiles! It is with them a vernal morning; they are struggling to cast off their winter's slough, they bask in the sunshine, and ere noon they will bite, depend upon it“ (Morris cited by Kierner 2003, 103).

So what did the „mob“ do to trigger uneasiness with the authorities? First, the denizens of these waterfront cities lived in close quarters. This is especially true for Boston, which in the 18th century formed an island only connected to the main land by a narrow bottleneck. The waterfront was an area full of wharves, maritime businesses and living quarters. Due to the limitedness of space, people of different classes and occupations lived in close proximity to each other. Thus, all social groups were aware of the others' living conditions. Carp defines this social interaction as a „'face-to-face' society of eighteenth-century Boston“ (Carp 2007, 29). This circumstance contributed to a high level of political conscience about societal differences in all classes of maritime society. The knowledge of their neighbor's situation caused both solidarity and envy/fear. However, it also increased the immediacy and noticability of socio-economic change and thus raising awareness of political challenges.

Second, the inhabitants of the waterfront were aware of their embedment in the British Atlantic world. Due to global shipping trade, the presence of British authorities (Vice Admiralty Court, Customs House Office, Royal Navy) and the constant fluctuation of people, the waterfront outlook on life was „wordly“ in the literal sense of the word.

Third, due to high mobility of seamen, news travelled fast through the harbour towns of the Atlantic coast, thus accomodating intercolonial communication and consequently unified political action (c.f. *ibid.*, 23-61).

One of the political issues at the time is a good example to illustrate the above observations about the „mob's“ political culture. So-called impressment is the act of forcing seamen into working for the Royal Navy. „Press gangs“ often resorted to violence to coerce seamen onto military ships, which offered worse living conditions and lower wages than merchant business. The act of impressment was highly criticized by the

colonial community some even compared the method to slavery. One such impressment incidence regarding a vessel from Marblehead and a Boston station ship was reported by Thomas Hutchinson. The sailors reacted as follows, “The seamen had shut themselves up in the forepeak, and had furnished themselves with harpoons, and other weapons, but nor fire arms, and swore they would die before they would be taken, and that they preferred death to slavery” (Hutchinson 1936, 167). Due to the existence of a „face-to-face society“, a sensitivity about global events and a developing intercolonial discussion culture, different classes of society mobilized politically against impressment. Some marginalized groups even resorted to radicalization and violence advancing the already tense relationship between colonists and British officials. Another example would be the „Destruction of the Tea“ of the unified protests against the Stamp Act.

Now that we have looked at the urban living conditions and political conscience of the waterfront societies at the Atlantic seaboard, it is time to examine the methods these actors used to vent their anger against the British imperialists: Boycotts of British goods were aimed at hurting the empire where it pained most: the economy. Wealthy merchants, marine artisans, seamen and the rural population - shortly nearly all of colonial society - worked together to boycott British goods. Not only was there a non-consumption of imported products, but also some active efforts to destroy British goods.

To work around the shortage of supplies that soon afflicted colonial society, resourceful captains and seamen exercised smuggling. The majority of colonists didn't grasp this transfer of goods as an illegal activity, but rather as a necessary act of resistance against imperial policy: „Seamen, crowds, and merchants were demonstrating their ability to draw upon their collective strength and act together in the interests of commerce and the smooth operation of maritime life“ (Carp 2007, 40).

Besides economic methods, „the mob“ also used physical force to voice their opposition against British authorities. Next to banishing officials from the cities by force, from the beginning of the imperial crisis until the start of the Revolutionary War, colonists used tarring and feathering as a way of humiliating public figures. Tarring and feathering stems from a maritime tradition in which the naked victim is greased with tar used in shipbuilding and then covered in feathers to ridicule the person. What sounds like a harmless tradition on paper was a violent action inflicting great pain and public humiliation in reality: „When customs official John Malcolm struck George R. T. Hewes in the head in 1774, a crowd tarred Malcolm to such a brutal extent that a portion of his

skin peeled off, which he preserved for a voyage to England as a demonstration of his sacrifice“ (ibid., 53).

Additionally, the crowds destructed imperial property or property belonging to allies of the crown. So was the case with Thomas Hutchinson's House, which was destroyed in 1765. Hutchinson, a Massachusetts native and lieutenant gouvernor who oversaw the implementation of British laws, soon became the target of Bostonian rioters. He wrote to a friend: „You cannot receive the wretched state we are in [...] On the one hand it will be said if concessions be made the Parliament endanger the loss of their authority over the colonies; on the other hand if external force should be used there seems to be danger of a lasting alienation of affection“ (Hutchinson cited by Kierner 2003, 71). History proved Hutchinson's political assessment correct. The „alienation of affection“ was finalised only one decade later with the Declaration of Independence.

Another method of „mob action“ was effigy burning. Traditionally used on Pope's Day in Boston as an anti-catholic ritual, in which the North Side competed with the South Side by burning effigies, the tradition became politicized during the years before the Revolution. As a response to the Stamp Act, on „August 14, the crowd hung effigies of local stamp officer Andrew Oliver and the King's former tutor Lord Bute, from the Liberty Tree [...]. Finally the crowds ‚stamped‘ and burned the effigy on Fort Hill, overlooking the water, where British official could clearly see the bonfire from Castle William“ (Carp 2007, 41).

The methods of political protest described above were often times preceded and followed by a range of written and spoken political announcements. Pamphlets were printed and handed out or published in opposition newspapers. In addition to written communication, songs and poems such as the liberty song were composed to jolly the crowd along:

„Come join hand in hand brave Americans all,
And rouse your bold hearts at fair Liberty's call;
No tyrannous acts shall suppress your just claim,
Or stain with dishonour America's name.

In Freedom we're born and in Freedom we'll live,
Our purses are ready,
Steady, Friends, Steady,
Not as slaves, but as Freemen our money we'll give.
[...]“ (cited by Kierner 2003, 82).

In taverns and group meetings people of different backgrounds came together and discussed the political events in the colonies and which kind of action to take. Since many

of the crowd members were illiterate, speakers held lectures and read from the pamphlets and newspapers. Through the advantages of maritime mobility and the circulation of gazettes, an intercolonial network of political communication span from New England to Georgia and helped convert the waterfront cities into revolutionary hot beds.

The above paragraphs show that the urban areas at the Atlantic coast were the epicenters of political mobilization. From these cities, the local flames of resistance spread inland and placed the entire colonial territory under a political bushfire that exploded with the beginning of the Revolutionary War. In 1774, for instance, John Adams overheard farmers in a rural Shrewsbury tavern discuss the seizure of wharves in Boston: „If parliament can take away Mr. Hancock’s Wharf and Mr. Rowe’s wharf, they can take away your barn and my house“ (Adams cited by Carp 2007, 58).

In addition to the factors that promoted urban protest, the colonists in rural as well as in urban areas were used to a „localist“ system in which problems were solved directly and immediately at the town level thus building an uncomplicated and accessible foundation for political involvement at the lowest institutional level²⁴ (c.f. Beeman 2004, 27f).

To summarize the findings from this chapter on political culture, the first thing that comes to mind is that the waterfront communities on the Atlantic coast were microcosms of what should happen later in nearly all areas of the colonies. In pre-revolutionary America, the political culture was characterized by an increase in popular mobilization against British hegemony. The maritime citizens used their „community of interests“ to fight an often violent fight with a range of methods (boycotts, riots, effigy burning, tarring&feathering,...) against imperial authorities. These occurrences of crowd action then spread to the countryside with the help of intercolonial communication networks (travellers, newspapers, pamphlets, meetings,...).

The second and crucial discovery from this chapter is that, a share of political interests overrode the hurdles of societal diversity. Urban denizens fought alongside farmers, and liberal Whigs, although sometimes sceptical about the methods of the „mob“, in principle shared their fellow moneyless countrymen’s views on Britain. The colonists, wealthy or poor, seemed to share a certain political outlook. Their least common denominator was a growing dissatisfaction with British imperial policies, including but not limited to the

²⁴ These open „town hall meetings“ exist until today and rose to prominence again during the Presidential race of 2008 when the candidates Obama and McCain both engaged in town hall discussions and a TV network even adapted this method of political forum for a televised debate.

challenge of Parliamentary representation and the taxation of goods. This „unification of interests“ was a precursor for a „unification of states“. It is not to say that this concurrence of interests was necessary for the building of the political union, but it was certainly helpful for the Founding Fathers to have a majority of citizens at hand that – in some sense – shared an identity. Even if the colonists' identities were „only“ defined by what they disapproved of, i.e. being controlled by the British Empire.

Political Ideas and Unification – The Advent of Liberty and Republic

In the following chapter, which touches on subjects of political theory, the author will examine three main questions: What were the major contemporary political ideas behind the American Revolution and thus US-American unification? How were these ideas manifested in the founding documents? How did these political ideas influence and enforce unification? First, the author will define and explain the major political ideas of the time that played a role in the unification of the states. The three central terms to reach an understanding of the „enlightened“ intellectual framework in which the Founders developed their thoughts are: liberty, republic, and checks & balance. Second, there will be a review of these political ideas and their manifestation in the founding documents, i.e. in the Declaration of Independence and the US-American Constitution. Third and last, the author will summarize her findings and explore the potential relation between political ideas and unification in case of the USA.

So which were the main political ideas at the time in the colonies and where did they stem from? Many scholars have pointed out the intellectual influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on the developments in the Northern Americas. The historian Daniel Walker Howe, for example, called attention to the effects thinkers like Adam Smith or David Hume had on the minds of the Framers. The great influence these Scottish philosophers had on the Northern American elites can be partly explained through the many societal similarities between 18th century Scotland and the British colonies. Both were economically and politically dependent on their „Big Brother England“, both were culturally peripheral territories compared to the central status of London, and both shared a proud commitment towards their own people and – at least – partial independence and liberties (c.f. *ibid.*, 572-587).

What were the central features of the Scottish Enlightenment? Although there are many thinkers and therefore countless facets to the movement, there are some basic ideas that

the American statesmen borrowed and used for their own good. The Scots, for instance, were concerned „with unintended outcomes“ (ibid., 584) of political processes and focussed strongly on economic developments linked to societal growth.

But as Howe points out, „the American Constitution should not be thought of as a timeless document received by a grateful nation through an almost super-natural ‚miracle at Philadelphia.’ It was the creation of a particular time, place, and social group“ (ibid., 586). Thus, the Framers not only picked ideas from the Scottish Enlightenment to help formulate their documents, they were also affected by, what Kierner calls, „the impact of current events“ (Kierner 2003, 120). Jefferson’s preamble to the constitution of the state Virginia, for example, strongly resembled that of the Declaration (c.f. ibid., 120). Additionally, the Declaration in particular „drew on a range of conventional ideas widely shared by eighteenth-century Americans“ (ibid., 120). What were these political ideas that were manifested in the Declaration and the Constitution at that „particular time, place, and social group“?

Liberty

First and foremost, liberty is one of the central terms of American unification. But as great the word sounds and as useful it is to evoke emotional pictures of happy masses swinging independence flags, the term liberty poses a severe problem to the scholar when it comes to its clear definition. The meaning of the word liberty differs greatly depending on the historical context and the group, which uses the term. To pick up the perhaps most extreme example again, liberty meant something different to the poor seaman during the Boston Tea Party, than it did to the liberal urban Whig in one of his discussion circles. To the former it was an expression equatable to sensible personal freedom from abuse by, for instance, British press gangs. To the latter it was a more abstract term closely related to economic freedom, free will and political independence from the motherland. However large the socio-economic and cultural cleavage between the diverse colonial groups was, they nevertheless found common linguistic ground in this term, as can be witnessed by the many „lieux de mémoire“²⁵ of the early stages of the United

²⁵ „Lieux de mémoire“ is a concept of collective memory developed by the French historian Pierre Nora. The „lieux“ (=places) of memory function as societal embodiments of historical events and as touchstones for the self-identification of a given society. They can take the form of statues, monuments, documents, but also rituals (c.f. Nora 1999). In case of US-American history, a lieu de mémoire would for instance be the Declaration of Independence, the Lincoln Memorial in Washington D.C. or Independence Day on the 4th of July.

States in which the word liberty functions as a unifying and at the same time equalizing parole: Statue of Liberty, Liberty Tree, Liberty Song, Liberty Bell,...:



Figure 7. Liberty Bell, Philadelphia. The engraving reads: „Proclaim LIBERTY throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof“ (Leviticus 25:10). Legend has it that the bell was rung to announce the reading of the Declaration of Independence on July 8th, 1776. The bell became a national symbol of independence after the Civil War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Liberty_Bell_2008.jpg, 8.2.2011)

Bernard Baylin, in his standard work „The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution“, solved the definitory challenge by juxtaposing the term liberty to the term power: „[Power’s, R.K.] natural prey, its necessary victim, was liberty, or law or right“ (Baylin 1967, 57). In Baylin’s argumentation, there exist the sphere of power and the sphere of liberty.

„The one was brutal, ceaselessly active, and heedless; the other was delicate, passive, and sensitive. The one must be resisted, the other defended, and the two ‚must never be confused‘ [...]. [P]ower in its legitimate form inhered naturally in government and was the possession and interest of those who controlled government [...]. Liberty was not, therefore, for the colonists, as it is for us, professedly the interest and concern of all, governors and governed alike, but only of the governed“ (ibid., 58f).

Consequently, liberty must be fought for by the governed, since the governors would never voluntarily give up their reign over the sphere of power. But what exactly constitutes the state of liberty once achieved? „Liberty, that is, was the capacity to exercise ‚natural rights‘ within limits set not by the mere will or desire of men in power but by non-arbitrary law – law enacted by legislatures containing within them the proper balance of forces“ (ibid., 77). Liberty, in connection to „natural rights“ is an unalienable status of human freedom that is filled with life in a legislative framework ultimately controlled by the governed. Ergo, keeping in mind the delicate nature of liberty, the

governmental framework itself has to be protected from the razing grasp of monopolous power by a set of rules that prohibit one faction to take control over another.

It's necessary to mention that for many „enlightened gentlemen“ government itself was rather a necessary evil, than a truly desirable form of societal management: „[H]ere then is the origin and rise of government; namely, a mode rendered necessary by the inability of moral virtue to govern the world“ (Paine 1776, 3). Thomas Paine points out the differences between society and government in the first part of his seminal text „Common Sense“, which is perhaps the best example of radical political skepticism by a member of the colonial elite. In his view,

„[S]ociety is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher. Society in every state is a blessing, but Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one“ (ibid., 1).

Paine argues that a society of a small number of people can easily retain a state of „natural liberty“. In case the population increases and immigrants arrive, the defection from moral virtue cannot be regulated and punished by all the people of the village, but have to be transferred to a higher level:

„But as the Colony increases, the public concerns will increase likewise, and the distance at which the members may be separated, will render it too inconvenient for all of them to meet on every occasion as at first [...]. This will point out the convenience of their consenting to leave the legislative part to be managed by a select number chosen from the whole body, who are supposed to have the same concerns at stake which those have who appointed them, and who will act in the same manner as the whole body would act were they present“ (ibid., 2).

Since Paine was deeply embedded in the critical mindset of the 18th century, in his opinion, the members of government could not be trusted to be of moral virtue and to put their own interests behind the concerns of their constituents. Therefore, Paine suggested a transparent and easy governmental frame to minimize corruption and misuse as supposedly was the case with the English constitution: „I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature which no art can overturn, viz. that the more simple any thing is, the less liable it is to be disordered, and the easier repaired when disordered“ (ibid., 3).

Judging from the previous paragraphs on liberty and government it becomes clear what kind of political system the colonists did not want. They refused a governmental body, in which power could be seized too easily by men of no „moral virtue“ or by factions that

worked against the „public good“ (which was basically the right of men to acquire property and work himself up the social ladder, i.e. liberty). In order to argue in favor of independence and to provide a negative example of what their government should not look like, the Framers reviewed the history they knew best. They concluded that the English with their long list of tyrants, oligarchs and even „mob rulers“ were the kind of bad archetype they wished to avoid. The graph below shows the three basic societal classes, forms of government and dangers deriving thereof, that the colonists wanted to avoid like the plague:

Societal Class	Royalty	Nobility	Commons
Form of Government	Monarchy	Aristocracy	Democracy
Abusal Danger	Tyranny	Oligarchy	„Mob rule“

Figure 8. Societal Classes, Forms of Government, and Abusal Dangers Thereof as Perceived by 18th Century Political Writers (by R.K. 2011)

As already mentioned, the colonists did not – at least for a long time – question the (deferential) order of society itself, but rather each faction’s inherent tendency to abuse their power within government.

In the 1770s though, during the imperial crisis, the desirable equilibrium of power in the Atlantic world had deteriorated, at least in the opinion of the majority of colonists. In a concurrence of events that were of economic, political and cultural manner, the opportunity arose to form a government completely free from British influence. For the Framers, it was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to design a government from scratch. Only rarely in history exists a window of opportunity, a sort of political tabula rasa in which theory and the study of historical experience can be so thoroughly implemented into the creation of a new political system from scratch.

The Founding Fathers clearly learned their lessons from English history and Enlightenment philosophy about what kinds of pitfalls to avoid in a political union. But did they have some positive examples to look at regarding the design of a political system?

Republic

First, Paine and Madison both mention Holland and Switzerland as efficacious models of federal governments. In his long list of arguments against colonial dependence on Britain, Paine mentions that only the European republics enjoy peace, while the European monarchies tend to fight each other or cause conflicts within their respective country. „The republics of Europe are all (and we may say always) in peace. Holland and Switzerland are without wars, foreign or domestic; monarchical governments, it is true, are never long at rest;“ (Paine 1776, 15). In Federalist Paper No. 43, Madison even quotes Montesquieu to underline his argument that a republican government is perhaps the only model to protect a society from the shortcomings of monarchies or aristocracies:

„In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. [...] Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. ‚As the confederate republic of Germany,‘ says Montesquieu, ‚consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland.‘“ (Madison 1788, FP#43).

These are only two of the more prominent examples of the many political texts that suggest the formation of a republican system of government in the young union. A republic, in the mind of the majority of 18th century American thinkers, was the best barrier against the dangers of a power-hungry monarchy and aristocracy.

A republic does not depend on a hereditary process. The representative members of government are being elected by the constituents only for a limited term, so there is no danger of power being in the hands of a few people over a longer period of time, which supposedly leads to a deterioration of morale. Since the members cannot pass their seat on to someone who was not explicitly voted for by the electorate, a hereditary mechanism is automatically ruled out in a republic. Why is a hereditary system bad in itself and should be avoided at all costs? Thomas Paine, as always, provides the answer eloquently in the second chapter of *Common Sense*: „One of the strongest natural proofs of the folly of hereditary right in kings, is, that nature disapproves it, otherwise, she would not so frequently turn it into ridicule by giving mankind an ass for a lion“ (Paine 1776, 7). In his opinion, monarchy in general, and its mechanism of hereditary succession in particular, „opens a door to the foolish, the wicked, and the improper“ (ibid., 8). From historical experience, Paine and many of his contemporaries concluded that only a republican form of government with recurring elections will provide for a system that minimizes the

dangers of corruption, misuse and power concentration. In a letter to George Washington from 1792, Jefferson wrote that,

„ I hold it to be one of the distinguishing excellencies of elective over hereditary successions, that the talents, which nature has provided in sufficient proportion, should be selected by the society for the government of their affairs, rather than that this should be transmitted through the loins or knaves & fools passing from the debauches of the table to those of the bed“ (Jefferson cited by Peterson 1975, 462).

In his opinion, the past has proved that a government based on inherited power tends to deteriorate over generations and ends up with a structure of decadence and debauchery. 30 years later, during his closeted²⁶ presidential campaign, Thomas Jefferson argued in a letter to Elbridge Gerry in 1799 that,

„I am opposed to the monarchising it's [the constitution's, *R.K.*] features by the forms of it's administration, with a view to conciliate a first transition to a President & Senate for life, & from that to a hereditary tenure of these offices, & thus to worm out the elective principle“ (Jefferson cited by Peterson 1975, 477f).

From the quote one can see that even though the Constitution had been implemented for over one decade, Jefferson still employed an inherent fear that the young union would become „monarchised“ by its opponents after Washington would leave office. Jefferson was scared the USA would be falling back into European patterns of hereditary succession. This letter illustrates what we 21st century-inhabitants might forget looking at the more or less stable US nowadays. For the contemporaries of Jefferson the union was a fragile republican experiment that could be destructed by outside forces or domestic factions every second and should therefore be guarded like a precious gem. The continuing success of the union from the perspective of 1800 was more like a lottery with uncertain outcomes than an established truth. Accordingly, one of the first lessons of this thesis, to the best of the author's knowledge, is that a union, at least in the case of the early USA, has to go through a (sometimes) painful phase of consolidation before reaching a turning point towards a period of stability. This argument becomes more substantial when looking at the even hysterical writings of US-American politicians at this infancy period of the union, which prophesized all kinds of dangers to destruct the republic.

²⁶ In the early period of US Presidential Elections it was not common to openly run for the highest office. The candidates competed against each other in a kind of open secrecy, that should protect their status as gentlemen.

Second, next to the elective principle and the negation of hereditary succession, a republic, i.e. a republican constitution like in the United States, has the supposed advantage of providing checks & balances to stabilize the government and secure it from exterior influence and domestic power struggles. What are checks & balance and why were they so important to the early US-American political thinkers? Checks & balances are a set of formulas engrained in the Constitution to achieve a mutual protection of the three governmental branches from each other, i.e. to ensure their separation of power. The idea of checks & balances is strongly linked to the Enlightenment credo of mixed government²⁷. By dividing the government into three branches (judicial, executive, legislative) the risk of being taken over by repressive forces at the same time can be minimized. Checks&balances has its root in the belief that the sphere of power is a malign force which constantly threatens the sphere of liberty and should consequently be corraled and observed. In case of republican government, checks and balances should be the gatekeepers that protect the liberty of the separated branches of government from the grabbing hands of power. The most famous argument in favor of checks & balances is perhaps by James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 51, in which he asserts that,

„each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another“ (Madison 1788, FP #51).

Furthermore, Madison demands independent members of government, but admits that people can't be trusted easily. Again, a protection against the malice of human decision-making is necessary:

„But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. [...] In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself“ (ibid., FP #51).

Madison however, a man of pragmatism, anticipates that in a republican government, the legislative branch dominates naturally at the expense of the executive department. Hence, the legislative should be divided into two chambers, while the executive should be fortified. With regards to the States' positions relative to the federal Union, Madison reasons that the federal constitution should „perfectly correspond“ to the State

²⁷ See for instance Montesquieu's writings.

constitutions. He assures his readers that in this „compound republic of America“ the „different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself“ (ibid., FP #51). This sentence, probably not at the center of attention of scholars of American Politics, is nevertheless substantial for the subject of this thesis. Political unification in the US was influenced by the idea that mutual control (states – federal government, state - state, people – state, judicial – legislative – executive), is a necessary and desirable mechanism of politics that enables a country to flourish. The factor „control“, in American speech „checks & balance“, triggered unification in so far as the establishment of an entangled system of mutual observation and protection against power misuse provided the whole community with never before experienced security from tyranny, oligarchy and „mob rule“. For this republic to work it needed more than one actor to check & balance with, it needed a whole complex system of control points and departments, be it between citizen and state, state and federal government, or between judicial, legislative and executive branch in each of the state capitals or in Washington, D.C. The rationale was as follows: The more actors involved in this system of checks & balance, the higher the security for all that liberty would be preserved²⁸. If this hypothesis about the reasons for political unification also rings true with the formation of the European Union, will be examined later in this thesis. To summarize, checks & balance are a set of control mechanisms that should contain the „encroaching nature of power“, which „if it at first meets with no control creeps by degrees and quick subsidies the whole“ (different authors cited by Baylin 1967, 56).

Third, the political elite of the 18th century discussed the advantages of republican government while constantly reminding themselves of the disadvantages of a democratic system. Next to monarchic or aristocratic dominion, which were automatically ruled out by their practice of hereditary succession and bad historic reputation, the democratic system was the only alternative to a republican system.

How did political theorists of the 18th century define democracy and what were their historical reference points? Democratic elements in the union were often mentioned in one sentence with the destructive power of untamed crowds, an uncontrolled cacophony of popular voices and - in the worst case – violent „mob rule“, group secession, and

²⁸ This system of mutual containment holds some interesting contradictions for present day readers, most importantly the somewhat paradoxical combination of liberty and security.

rebellion. When the thinkers of the American Revolution considered democracy in a theoretical context, they associated it with the ancient world, often with the „original“ form of democracy supposedly practiced in Athens²⁹. Furthermore, they referred to works of the European Enlightenment. James Madison, the „Father of the Constitution“ and the writer of the Federalist Papers, for instance, received a book package by Thomas Jefferson from France in 1786, which contained Plutarch's „Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans“ or Barthélemy d Felice's „Code de l'humanité, ou La législation universelle, naturelle, civile et politique“. Madison, through the study of philosophy, history, and his own experience in the young union, concluded that „the Founders had rescued white Americans from kingly despotism only to subject them to something worse; the tyranny of the major number of the constituents“ (Holton 2007, 7).

Madison was not alone in this opinion, that popular will, i.e. „an excess of democracy“, as Hamilton or Gerry would have coined it, was a severe threat to the new union. They came to this conclusion, because the strength of democratic elements in the state constitutions, more precise, the states' responsiveness to the will of the debtors had supposedly brought the union and its parts down into an economic and political muddle. The Framers „lamented that excessive democracy – an overreliance on the popular will – had turned the United States into a farmers' paradise“ (ibid., 12), while the creditors experienced great injustices. The white political elite of the United States, often themselves wealthy creditors, equated democracy with threats of rebellion and financial unfairness.

But next to the fear of insurrection and „mob rule“ that might disrupt the union's stability, democracy also held another risk for the US-American elite: The popular strive for equality. Not only did democracy allow white farmers to voice their opinions and influence their government through their vote, but the idea of democracy also appealed to African American slaves and women of all ethnicities, who dreamt of political representation and equality. A commenter in Southern newspaper complained that „we became intoxicated with Utopian ideas“ (cited by Holton 2007, 165), while Edward Rutledge of South Carolina argued that, „the spirit of subordination had evaporated“ during the Revolutionary War (Rutledge cited by ibid., 165).

US-American society during the period of unification differed widely in its sympathy for democracy. While the elite feared the powers of the vox populi, the majority of the

²⁹ Democracy in Athens does not compare to a 21st century view on democracy, since only a very small portion of society was allowed to vote

American populace embraced the idea that with independence a new era of politics would commence. Holton summarizes that, „[f]or one group, the Revolutionary War had only disconnected us from Great Britain. Few internal changes were required. Other citizens felt differently. They believed the American Revolution had only begun“ (ibid., 176). The white male framers, most of them fearful of democracy, were motivated to „determine just how far they could go in limiting popular influence on the new regime without sacrificing popular support“ (ibid., 193).

James Madison not only wrote a memorable argument in favor of checks & balances, he also voiced his support of a union that would protect from the perils of „Domestic Faction and Insurrection“ (Madison 1787, FP #10), since „[a]mong the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction“ (ibid., FP #10). Implicitly, the text can be interpreted as reasoning against the adoption of too many democratically responsive elements in the CoUSA. In the text Federalist No. 10, he defines a faction as „a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community“ (ibid., FP #10). Madison fears that these factions could insurrect and violently force the other parts of society to conform to their will, even though their will is opposed to the common good. To cure the dangers of faction, Madison proposes two ways; First, to remove the faction's cause, which he rules out as a possibility since neither the repression of liberty nor the equalization of opinions is desirable or doable; Or second, to control the faction's effects by forming a democracy or a republic. The „Father of the Constitution“ argues that,

„a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; [...] [D]emocracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths“ (ibid., FP #10).

Madison defines a democracy as system in which the members of government equal the members of society. Therefore, democracy can only have a prospect in a very small society, because in a civilization with a large population, direct government through personal involvement is logistically impossible. As Thomas Paine noted in another context in „Common Sense“, the sheer geographical distance and organizational efforts

of convening and governing cannot be managed if a certain population quantity is reached. But even in „small enough“ societies, democracy is not a desirable form of government since, according to Madison democracy does not protect society from the perils of faction, which could be insurrection and violence. Democracy does not only fail to guard from the multitude of these egotistical interest groups, it supposedly even encourages the formation of factions by allowing everyone to voice their opinion, manipulate others and form suitable coalitions. The result of democratical government would be instability, violence and a general centripetality of societal forces all going in different directions. As an alternative, Madison proposes,

„[a] republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. [...] The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended“ (ibid., FP #10)

Republics, as opposed to democracies, are managed through an elected government, which represents the society as a whole. Through the mechanism of representation, it is not necessary for every constituent to disrupt his home life, travel to a convention place, and try to govern with all the other members of society, while having to endure the dangers of faction. Thus, a republic is a convenient and logical form of government for a large and geographically dispersed society.

Besides this practical argument, the size of the elected government has to undergo a finetuning so that it finds its balance point, „[T]he representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude“ (ibid., FP #10). The larger the electorate, the less prone it is to chose corrupt candidates, since the pool of possible representatives is large and therefore people have more choices. The elected government will be small in number and therefore more able to find compromises and avoid factions than a large democratic government composed of a multitude of interests.

The same principle that makes a republic more desirable than a democracy, „is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it [...] The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States“ (ibid., FP #10).

But in order to not lose the sense for local interests, Madison states that the balance of representation between states and federal government has to be acknowledged. The common interest of the whole US-American body should be represented in the Union, while the local interest should be accounted for by the States, „The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures“ (ibid., FP #10).

To conclude, the idea that colonized the political thoughts of the American elite was that of the republic. This form of government offered the elective principle instead of hereditary succession, provided for a set of checks & balances to keep the grasping hands of tyrannical powers at the gates, and was a viable alternative to the democratical form of government, that would inevitably spread violence, question the beloved system of subordination (of slaves and women), and open the doors for factions. In contrast to the idea of liberty, which besides its multiplicity of interpretations was a common denominator of different social groups, the idea of republican government was mostly discussed within the higher circles of US-American society and reflects their mind-set. The republican framework was the house that should host the new union. It was an idea that provided the Framers with an alternative to the old forms of government. During the unification process it became inevitable that there needed to be some sort of political structure in which the union could operate, function and bloom. Searching for options, the only possibility at hand was to form a republic. How did these central ideas of American unification, namely liberty and republic, become manifested in documents?

The Manifestation of Political Ideas in the Founding Documents

Two of the most important documents for the self-conception of the United States of America are without a doubt the Declaration of Independence (DoI) and the Constitution of the United States of America (CoUSA). In both documents we can find a palpable manifestation of the political ideas discussed in this chapter, namely liberty, republic, and additionally union.

In case of the DoI, liberty is the crucial term implicitly standing behind the idea of independence and asserting its necessity. From the Battle of Lexington and Concord in the summer of 1775 to the signing of the Declaration one year later, the tense atmosphere between the colonists and Britain was that of mutual increased provocation. The politics of concessions and diplomacy deteriorated into a fastening military build-up. The

colonists organized and centralized their troops, while radical writers wrote the soundtrack to their actions. Thomas Paine published *Common Sense*, the most influential and popular pamphlet in favor of independence, in January 1775. In June 1776, after the Virginian Richard Henry Lee proposed a vote on independence in the Continental Congress, two committees were set up to draft a declaration of independence and a frame of government for the colonies. In the end, Thomas Jefferson wrote the bulk of the draft receiving revisions from Benjamin Franklin and John Adams (c.f. Kierner 2003, 120). According to Kierner, the DoI, which was adopted by the Congressional delegates on 4th of July 1776, served two causes: first, to persuade the American people of the worth of the fight for independence even if hardships will follow. Second, to assert to a „candid world“, i.e. European powers, that the colonies acted wisely and in just defense to strive for independence. The second cause was elementary to pacify potential European allies and convince them of the colonists responsibility (c.f. *ibid.*, 120f). In order to claim diplomatic trustworthiness, the DoI was much mellow in tone than, for example, Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*. In the DoI, only King George III was attacked, while the role of Parliament and the injustices of monarchy in general were left out of the equation. The drafters did not want to anger likely European allies and creditors in advance, since they knew that European investments and loans were necessary to establish an effective military. All in all, „the formal declaration of independence in July 1776 was in some respects the logical culmination of more than a year of political pronouncements and maneuvering at the local, provincial, and continental levels“ (*ibid.*, 118).

How did the idea of liberty play out in the DoI itself? Where can we see the ideological manifestation of the term and its implications? The word liberty itself is most prominently displayed in the famous first sentence of the second paragraph of the preamble: „[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.“ (DoI 1776, 1). This sentence is packed with ideas and possible fields of philosophical and scholarly interest. In this thesis the author will concentrate primarily on the ideas linked to the concept of liberty and its adversary power. The idea that there exist „certain unalienable Rights“ is closely connected to the Enlightened concept of natural rights, that were given to humanity by God. These rights are universal and not dependent on culture. Amongst one of these natural unalienable rights is „Liberty“. In the context of the DoI, the general meaning of liberty refers to

independence from the tyrannic, grasping power of George III. The colonists have the right, moreso the duty, to fight for the protection of their liberty, which is in imminent danger to be held hostage by the Crown. Again, the personal meaning of liberty for individuals and different societal classes is open to interpretation. The DoI had to appeal to a very diverse readership, which made the use of the term liberty quite convenient. To summarize, in its generality, liberty was one of the universal natural rights that was corrupted by the power of the British crown and had to be protected by asserting independence and fighting for it. Specifically and personally, the term liberty functioned as a multipurposed term that was accessible to a diverse range of people and thus colonial experiences. The reverberation of the term liberty can best be seen in the preamble to the CoUSA, in which it says,

„We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America“ (Preamble, CoUSA).

The second significant idea, republicanism, was not explicitly mentioned in the DoI and only referred to once in the CoUSA. However, the republican form of government is the major thread that binds the Constitution together, especially the Articles regarding the actual organizational political framework. Since the DoI and the Articles of Confederation (AoC) did not satisfyingly answer the question of „who should govern at home“, a reform of the AoC became necessary. Mounting war debts, cooling foreign relations, domestic economic challenges, and the increasing helplessness regarding the states' responsiveness to debtors' interests, made an improvement of government performance inevitable. Shay's Rebellion only made the issue of reform more pressing than it had already been. In May 1787, 55 delegates met in Philadelphia to work over the AoC only to realize that the drafting of a new constitution was inescapable. After 4 months of debate and compromises, 39 contributors, amongst them James Madison („The Father of the Constitution“), Alexander Hamilton and Benjamin Franklin – signed the draft on September 17, 1787. The subsequent ratification by „specially elected state conventions“ (Kierner 2003, 244) turned into a highly contested political battle that came to a closure after the Rhode Island convention signed the document on May 29, 1790. However, the CoUSA came into effect two years earlier after the ninth state, New Hampshire, ratified it on June 21, 1788) (c.f. *ibid.*, 233f; c.f. Peltason 2004, 6-13). During the ratification campaign, two movements argued in favor and against the Constitution.

The Federalists supported the national draft, while the Antifederalists demanded the introduction of a Bill of Rights to protect citizen rights and establish additional checks on government. The Bill of Rights, i.e. the first ten amendments to the CoUSA, were ratified on December 15, 1791 following the effective campaigning of Antifederalist politicians.

With regards to content, the CoUSA follows the three republican principles that the author outlined in this chapter on political ideology: first, the CoUSA adopted the elective principle, ruling out hereditary succession and monarchic or aristocratic government. „All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives“ (Art. 1, Sect. 1, CoUSA 1787). The modes of election of the House and Senate members are stated in the first Article:

„The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature“ (Art. 1, Sect. 2, CoUSA 1787)

„The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote“ (Art. 1, Sect. 3, CoUSA 1787).

Section 4 prescribes that „[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators (Art. 1, Sect. 4, CoUSA 1787). The members of the Senate and the House can seek unlimited re-election. The election of the President is managed through chosing electors in each state, which shall then proceed to vote for a Presidential candidate. Until the 22nd Amendment was adopted there was no constitutional limitation of the number of 4-year terms a President can serve if elected. However, the first President, George Washington, set a precedent by leaving office after two terms, which has been followed up until now, with the exception of Franklin D. Roosevelt serving four terms during the Second World War. The members of the Supreme Court are appointed for their lifetime and „shall hold their Offices during good Behavior“ (Art. 3, Sect. 1, CoUSA 1787).

Second, the CoUSA guarantees both popular sovereignty and checks & balances. „We the People“, the first three words of the CoUSA, clearly lay the powers in the hands of the populace. Neither king, nor lord should be the source of power. Politics was from now on a game played by the people, and not by some distant tyrant. Furthermore, the CoUSA guaranteed checks & balances by parting the government into three separate branches:

legislative (House and Senate), executive (President), and judicial (Supreme Court). Additionally, the states themselves are sovereign, as Article 4 states,

„The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence (Art. 4, Sect. 4, CoUSA 1787).

The people, the different branches of government, and the states all control and check each other and therefore limit the danger of any institution becoming too powerful, taking over the rule and acting against the common will.

Third, the Framers were under the pressure of Antifederalists to constitutionally preserve citizen rights and individual freedom. The resulting Bill of Rights is somewhat paradoxically connected to the fear of „mob rule“ caused by too much democracy. The Framers knew they had to make some concessions in order to calm down the public sentiment and to persuade the constitutionally sceptical people to adopt the CoUSA. The drafting of the CoUSA and the addition of a Bill of Rights was a balancing game in order to find the equilibrium half way between national governability and constituents' concessions. Holton summarizes this challenge as follows: „The delegates [*of the Constitutional Convention*, R.K.] rejected some of the most antidemocratic proposals altogether and moderated others. Still other restraints on popular influence were jettisoned in favor of alternative measures that accomplished the same goal less conspicuously“ (Holton 2007, 193). The indirect election of the President by the Electoral College and the composition of the Senate³⁰, which strengthens (smaller) states' positions, come to mind when thinking about „less democratic“ elements in the CoUSA. However, the representation-by-population approach in the House of Representatives³¹ and the posterior attachment of a Bill of Rights provided the Framers with a political position of strength since they took the wind out of their opponents' sails. The Bill of Rights grants individual rights on the expense of federal rights. The first ten amendments, among other concessions, endorse the freedom of religion, press, and speech, the right to bear arms, trial by jury, and that „[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or

³⁰ There are two senators per state, regardless of the states' number of constituents. In reality, this means that citizens of states with low population like Arizona enjoy a „higher level“ of representation in Senate than, for example, inhabitants of densely populated and merely urban states like New Jersey.

³¹ The apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives is proportionate to the population in a state. This approach allows for a „higher level“ of representation of voters from densely populated states like California.

to the people“ (Amendm. 10, CoUSA 1789). Thus, the Bill of Rights sets a limit to the reach of federal powers. The preamble says that „in order to prevent misconstruction of abuse of [the Constitution’s, R.K.] powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added“ (Preamble to the Bill of Rights, CoUSA 1789). One can nearly hear the fear of a misuse of power reflected in the words of this founding document.

To conclude, the ideas and the political mindset of the 18th century is palpable throughout the Declaration of Independence, the CoUSA and the Bill of Rights. The longing for liberty, the anxiety against too much power in too little hands and the need for an orderly republican framework of government after years of chaos are incarnated in the paragraphs of these ground-breaking political texts.

Political Ideas as a Driving Factor for Unification – Common Sense and the Federalist Papers

After reading so much about the ideas that colonized the minds of these US-American thinkers, the reader might ask what all of this has to do with the topic of this thesis. Where is the connex between political ideology and the process of unification? First, there will be an examination of factors from two of the most prolific writings of the American Revolution. What did writers like Thomas Paine, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay have to say about unification? Subsequently, the author will argue that there was a unified ideology to fight for some ideas (liberty, republic) while other ideas were fought against (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy). Third, there will be presentation of contemporary 18th century linguistic and visual evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a connex between political ideology and unification.

In order to get a feeling for what union meant to 18th century thinkers in Northern America, two exemplary writings of the time will be analyzed.

In his pamphlet *Common Sense*, Thomas Paine basically argues that a unification of the colonies is necessary to win the struggle for independence. By union, Paine does not immediately think of a political body comprised of the colonies and led by a federal government. Rather, Paine understands the colonial union as an „unexampled concurrence of sentiment“ (Paine 1776, 26). Union, to him, is more of an atmospheric concept and not an actual governmental framework. For Paine, union is equal to a unity of emotion and interest. Paine has four major thoughts about the advantages of a union

of interests, the objective being independence: First, he states that unity offers the colonies a strength that the British might not be able to counterfeit with their own military power:

„Tis not in numbers but in unity that our great strength lies: yet our present numbers are sufficient to repel the force of all the world. The Continent hath at this time the largest body of armed and disciplined men of any power under Heaven: and is just arrived at that pitch of strength, in which no single colony is able to support itself, and the whole, when united, is able to do any thing“ (ibid., 18).

Although the argument sounds quite propagandic at first sight, when stripping down Paine's rationale to the bone it is rather pragmatic and logic. While the struggle of one colony against the British would have been strategically unwise and star-crossed, a unification of colonial resources would bring a Northern American strength to light that could eventually equal that of the British.

Second, Paine tries to persuade his readers that the relatively small number of colonies is an advantage when it comes to the fight for independence:

„We are sufficiently numerous, and were we more so we might be less united. 'Tis a matter worthy of observation that the more a country is peopled, the smaller their armies are. In military numbers, the ancients far exceeded the moderns; and the reason is evident, for trade being the consequence of population, men became too much absorbed thereby to attend to anything else“ (ibid., 21).

On the one hand, he assures that the less populated a country is, the more military prowess it has. This is because an increase in inhabitants automatically spurs economic growth, which makes men more interested in questions of finance and trade than in security and war. Therefore, heavily populated trade nations do neither have the best nor largest armies. On the other hand, Paine detects an additional advantage in the relative small number of Northern American colonies regarding their comparably unified interests:

„It might be difficult, if not impossible, to form the Continent into one government half a century hence. The vast variety of interests, occasioned by an increase of trade and population, would create confusion. Colony would be against colony. Each being able would scorn each other's assistance; and while the proud and foolish gloried in their little distinctions the wise would lament that the union had not been formed before“ (ibid., 21).

If there would be more colonies, Paine writes, the ambitions of the colonies would increasingly divert and a union of sentiment would be less likely, thus blocking a unified effort to achieve independence. Implicitly this passage says that a union of interests is a necessary precursor for independence, since it supports the people's will to fight for one common goal.

Third, linked to the above argument about the relatively small number of the colonies, the youth of the union is supposedly beneficial to its attempt in reaching independence:

„Youth is the seed-time of good habits as well in nations as in individuals. [...] The intimacy which is contracted in infancy, and the friendship which is formed in misfortune, are of all others the most lasting and unalterable. Our present union is marked with both these characters; we are young, and we have been distressed; but our concord hath withstood our troubles, and fixes a memorable era for posterity to glory in“ (ibid., 21).

Since the union is at an early stage, Paine claims, the bonds between the colonies are still fresh and full of vigor and energy. Somehow like a developmental psychologist (without much evidence) Paine notes that a friendship that is formed at an early age will last a lifetime and that „[t]he infant state of the Colonies, as it is called, so far from being against, is an argument in favour of independence“ (Paine 1776, 21). The comparison and connection between political occurrences, mechanics and human bodies/ minds was a common thread in 18th century materialist philosophy and a rather familiar metaphor for the contemporary reader.

Fourth, Paine tries to convince his readers that it is the exact right time to take up action against the British. The already existing unified devotion of independence is evidence enough that the colonies are ready to fight the war, „[...] the TIME HATH FOUND US. The general concurrence, the glorious union of all things, proves the fact“ (Paine 1776, 18). In this argument, previously implicit thoughts become explicit. For Paine, a union of spirits is a necessary precondition to build a union of fact. And in his mind, the best time to use this emotional unification, which is greatly valuable in itself and will be important in the future, is right now:

„The Sun never shined on a cause of greater worth. 'Tis not the affair of a City, a County, a Province, or a Kingdom; but of a Continent — of at least one-eighth part of the habitable Globe. 'Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected even to the end of time, by the proceedings now. Now is the seed-time of Continental union, faith and honour“ (ibid., 9).

Paine, an experienced rhetoric, highlights the urgency that is imperative to the cause. He presses that if the fight is not commenced in time, the window of opportunity will be closed and might not open again. He stresses the pressing need to further strengthen the union, „[t]he continental belt is too loosely buckled: And if something is not done in time, it will be too late to do any thing, and we shall fall into a state, in which neither reconciliation nor independence will be practicable.“ (ibid., 26).

To summarize, Paine tries to persuade his readers of the immediate necessity for independence. In the course of *Common Sense* argues that a union provides strength,

even more so if it is small in members and young in age, and that the unification of the colonies has to reach new emotional and political heights to successfully fight the British as soon as possible.

The second example of political writings that are concerned with the formation of a union and its merits, are the Federalist Papers (FP). They are a number of articles published between 1787 and 1788 aimed to persuade the public of the necessity for intensified unification in form of a federal constitution. The three then anonymous writers behind the texts were Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. The most relevant parts for this thesis are Federalist Papers No. 1-14, in which the advantages to build a constitutionally based union are discussed.

John Jay starts the Papers off by arguing that the Northern American geography is quite suitable to accommodate a union of states. Jay points out that there is a „variety of soils and productions, and watered [...] with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants“ (Jay 1787, FP #2). These territorial advantages add to commercial interaction and communication. Furthermore, the Northern American people themselves are

„one united people--a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence“ (ibid., FP #2).

As we will see in the following chapter on the factors for cultural unification, Jay might have exaggerated this point a little. The Northern American inhabitants in the second half of the 18th century were far from being culturally united. However, the war for independence these US-Americans fought side-by-side might have contributed to a feeling of unified identity. These two remarks regarding geography and culture only serve Jay for an introduction to his own personal subject of expertise, foreign politics.

In Federalist Paper No. 3, John Jay, perhaps the US's first professional diplomat, establishes that the formation of a long-term political union would greatly contribute to safety from foreign aggression. Jay presents four reasons for his argument: First, European powers would have less temptation to attack a union than separate states or three or more confederacies, since the union would more successfully abide to international rules of diplomacy and commerce. Since a union is bigger per definition it will offer a greater pool of able politicians to conduct its international politics than a small

state could ever provide. These responsible and sensible men would act wisely according to international rules of conduct and will thus minimize the dangers of foreign aggression from the beginning. Second, if there should be European aggression towards the US nonetheless, a national united government would be more tempered, calm and reasonable than several small states, since the union would have the interest of the whole Northern American community in mind. Jay's logic is that the greater the stakes, the less risky the behavior, and therefore the less prone to actual military attacks. Third, the European nation will naturally be hesitant to fight a unified Northern America, simply because of its greater power. A confederacy of three or four states, or a separate state would be easy prey in comparison: „whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us accordingly“ (Jay 1787, FP #4). Last, John Jay concludes that if an attack from abroad should really hit the US, a unified people would be more powerful to defend themselves than a separated people. This plea is strongly influenced by the writer's experiences in his lifetime, since he lived through the Revolutionary War and saw the unified and successful struggle against the British with his own eyes.

The second major reasoning in the Federalist Papers to support the formation of a political union is the supposed safety against domestic conflicts and faction. All three writers offer their thoughts on the topic. In FP #5 John Jay notes that the socio-economic inequality in case of disunion between the separate states or confederacies would eventually trigger quarrels between them. The politically and economically stronger states or regions would cause the others' jealousies and, in the end, political disintegration, chaos and conflict:

„The proposed confederacies will be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations“ (Jay 1787, FP #5).

This „weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves“ (ibid., FP #5). Hamilton is especially concerned with the effects domestic separation could have on internal stability: „To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at

defiance the accumulated experience of ages. The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable“ (Hamilton 1787, FP #6). In Federalist Paper No. 7, he states that if there would be no serious unification the naturally evolving competition of commerce between the states, the developing territorial conflicts (especially regarding unclaimed Western territories) and the quarrels about the apportionment of the looming public war debt would consequentially rip Northern American peace apart. War would be the last and inevitable resort. Hamilton invites the European powers ironically to support a disunion of Northern American states, since „Divide et impera must be the motto of every nation that either hates or fears us“ (Hamilton 1787, FP #7). Madison adds some more points to Hamilton’s case in Federalist Paper No. 14 by highlighting that only a united government could manage to secure the frontiers, which were highly contested areas at the time of after the Revolutionary War. Most famously Madison put forward his case that a REPUBLICAN union would break domestic faction and insurrection in Federalist Paper No. 10 (see also chapter „Political Ideas and Unification“).

The third substantial advantage of a union in opposition to separate states is the supposed growth of economic interaction and commercial activity. In Federalist Paper No. 11, the first Secretary of Treasury writes that a united set of laws to counteract foreign commercial policies and accorded boycott measures would add to the future union’s international leverage on economic questions: „Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!“ (Hamilton 1787, FP #11). Furthermore a free market inside the union would offer „much greater scope, from the diversity in the productions of different States“ (ibid., FP #11). Hence, the inhabitants would be able to choose between a greater range of products than they would if the states or confederacies would have trade barriers and/or import taxes. But not only would there be greater variety in products accessible, but the availability of goods in cases of emergencies (such as a droughts or other shortages) in any given area would be more likely. Interstate commerce would contribute to the economic development and stability of all of the union’s members. In Federalist Paper No. 10, Madison implicitly mentions monetary stability as a factor that speaks for unification, since he uses the diverging interests of debtors and creditors as an example for injustice and the potential danger of faction and insurrection. A union, better a united government, would provide the necessary republican framework to solve questions of monetary concern responsibly.

Last but not least, the writers of the Federalist Papers put forward several –strictly speaking - political reasons on why a constitutionally based union is a necessity for the Northern American states. First, the formation of a successful union would show the world - more specifically – the numerous sceptics in Europe, that a republican union can indeed work, even if it has a greater size than the Netherlands or Switzerland. Hamilton remarks in Federalist Paper No. 11, that unification of the states under a new and functional constitution would restore America's global standing and prove the Europeans and their mostly despotic governments wrong. Hamilton makes the union's case the case of the whole world and thereby emotionalizes the debate, heaves it on a universal level and links it to the achievement of honor:

„Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for her benefit. [...] It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it“ (Hamilton 1787, FP #11).

Second, a republican union would – as repeatedly mentioned above – secure the liberty of the people and protect them from despotism, an argument that is exhaustingly examined in Federalist Papers No. 10 and 11. Third, Hamilton pragmatically states that the organization and maintenance of a union would not be more extravagant than the operation of one of the confederate governments. In his mind, the confederacies, which would be approximately the size of Britain would be equally hard to govern, „No well-informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by the convention“ (Hamilton 1787, FP #13). And last but not least, in order to pacify his Anti-Federalist opposition against the union, Madison appeases his adversaries by guaranteeing that the union's government will not oversee everything, but only the most necessary issues (military, foreign relations, national tax). He eases the discussion by ensuring that the state's fundamental rights will not be touched:

„Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity“ (Madison 1787, FP #14).

In addition to the arguments the writers put forward in support of the union, the „Father of the Constitution“ claims that a union, i.e. a unified government, would facilitate a better infrastructure across the land:

„Roads will everywhere be shortened and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; [...] The communication between the Western and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete“ (ibid., FP #14).

Hamilton himself gave the best summary of factors the Federalists used to argue in favor of the constitutionalized union:

„[...] restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue [...]; in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the State governments which have undermined the foundations of property and credit [...]“ (Hamilton 1788, FP #85).

In comparison to Thomas Paine’s *Common Sense*, the writers of the *Federalist Papers* are not concerned with the immediate necessity of „spiritual“ unity for independence, but their main concern is the ratification of the Constitution. The *Federalist Papers* offer a more comprehensive view on why these politicians thought that union would be a good idea. Their goal was the formation of a novel political system, so they exemplified the necessities of unification on a variety of topics, ranging from military matters, economics, and identity to the design of government. Although many of these factors for building a union seem plausible, it is of importance to notice that the *Papers* are still political pamphlets aimed to persuade citizens. The *Federalist Papers*, even though sophisticated and well argued, are not scientific analysis in the strictest sense of the word, but cleverly formulated opinion pieces. When John Jay, for example, speaks about the cultural unity of the Northern American citizens, one cannot help but notice that he must have polished the facts a little.

However, since the writings of Paine and the Federalists were an important input to the political discussions of the time, and had „real“ effects insofar as they were widely read

and discussed³², they deserve to be included in this thesis as important markers on what kind of political ideas encouraged the process of unification in the United States of America.

In addition to political pamphlets that were intended to persuade the US-Americans of the merits of unification, there are plenty of linguistic manifestations of these unification ideas in the founding documents that still have a strong influence on the US we know today. Not only did the writers of the DoI and the CoUSA mention republicanism and liberty but they also put the text under the „umbrella terms“ union, united,..... In the DoI, for instance, Jefferson & Co wrote that the document is an „unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America“ (DoI 1776, 1) and that „the Representatives of the united States of America“ (ibid., 2) hereby declare their independence from Britain. The use of the word „united“ as a lowercase adjective was replaced with the now all too familiar capitalized proper name and labeling „United States of America“ in the Articles of Confederation. The AoC promote a „perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia“ (AoC 1777, 1). In the first Article of the text the name of the Confederacy is designated: „The Stile of this Confederacy shall be ‚The United States of America‘“ (ibid., 1). Ten years later, the CoUSA starts off with the famous words:

„We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America“ (CoUSA 1788, 1).

Not only is there the repeated usage of the word Union, but also a first person plural „we“, which not only emphasizes the group effort to draft a constitution, but more so highlights the supposed unity of the US-American people when it comes to their motivation to establish a „more perfect Union“ than before.

The connexion between political ideas and unification can also be observed in visual documents. Next to linguistic evidence, illustrations and graphics can serve as a historical

³² Nowadays the Federalist Papers are even sometimes used to interpret judicial challenges deriving from the Constitution.

source to interpret the meaning and interpretation of union in a context of political ideology.



Figure 9. Benjamin Franklin, „Join, Or Die“, *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 9, 1754
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/Benjamin_Franklin_-_Join_or_Die.jpg, 1. 3. 2011)

One of the earliest examples of political illustration in US-American history is Benjamin Franklin's drawing „Join, Or Die“ from 1754. Franklin produced this cartoon on the eve of the Albany Congress and the Seven Years War to show the need for the colonies to unite and fight alongside the British troops against the French and Indians. The cartoon depicts a snake divided into eight parts (omitting Delaware and Georgia, and mingling together the New England colonies). The message is simple: Only a united body can fight the looming danger. Separated colonies will unavoidably die off and risk the survival of the whole body. Two decades later, the cartoon became a popular symbol of unification in the American Revolutionary War (c.f. Peltason 2004, 3).




Figure 10. "On the Erection of the Eleventh Pillar", Massachusetts Centinel Boston, August 2, 1788 (https://www.nyhistory.org/web/crossroads/gallery/celebrations/eleventh_pillar.html, 1. 3. 2011)

The illustration „On the Erection of the Eleventh Pillar“, which was published in 1788 by the Federalist newspaper Massachusetts Centinel, deals with New York’s ratification of the Constitution. The eleven erected pillars, which are connected at the top through star beams, represent the states that had already ratified the CoUSA. The two pillars falling and breaking apart symbolize the states North Carolina and Rhode Island, which adopted the CoUSA last. The poem underneath the drawing predicts that this „federal edifice“, or „beauteous dome“ will provide the states of the union with agricultural, commercial, religious, and political riches. In this „Saturnian Age“, which plays at the Roman myth of Saturn being the god of abundance and wealth, peace, law and justice will reign over the union. Between the erected pillars and the tumbling ones, the illustrator states that the union will „rise“ if the „foundation [is] good – it may yet be SAVED“ (c.f. Kierner 2003, 262).

The cartoon uses visual and linguistic architectural metaphors to illustrate the nature of the federal union. The pillars, which are equally built in height and width, serve as a fundament for the union, which can potentially achieve more than the sum of its parts/ pillars. Together these states can even reach a Golden Age. If some states should choose not to join the union by refusing ratification of the CoUSA, they will inevitably crackle and fall apart. The message is a more detailed rendition of Franklin’s motto „Join, Or Die“ in the context of Constitutional debate.

Conclusion

In this chapter on political factors for unification of the US, the author established that there was a deferential political system in the British colonies in Northern America. The monarch, a hopefully „good ruler“, stood at the top step of the societal ladder both sides of the Atlantic, and was the definite authority in all political and economic matters. In the second half of the 18th century there was growing dissatisfaction amongst elites and commons in the colonies about British rulings mostly concerning taxation and naval matters. At first, the critics demanded a deeper influence into British decision-making. Since this claim was not fulfilled, the tension increased over the years until the pressure was finally released in the cry-out for independence from the motherland.

The political culture in this increasingly hostile atmosphere grew simultaneously strained over time. The oppositional fire spread from the Northeastern seabords to the South and the West through progressively sophisticated intercolonial communication networks. The colonists employed both non-violent forms of opposition against imperial policies, like economic boycotts and political protests, and violent action, such as tarring & feathering and destruction of property. A „community of interests“ overrode the hurdles of societal diversity. This political „unification of interests“ was an early precursor for a „unification of states“.

Additionally to the growing dissatisfaction with British government, there were many political ideas connected to unification. Liberty and republicanism were concepts that were strongly affixed to the need for unification. A shared act to form a union was necessary to achieve the realization of political ideas. Additionally union had an intrinsic value itself. Unification would supposedly bring foreign and domestic safety, economic growth, political stability, infrastructure. Political ideas were the well that provided the union advocates with the water they needed to persuade the people. They were the causes to fight for.

To conclude, the political unification of the USA was both a marriage of convenience and a marriage of love. What does the author mean by this metaphor? On the one hand side, there were multiple practical reasons to form a union of states. Pressing questions of international and domestic safety would be better achieved through a unified federal system that could successfully manage transatlantic diplomacy, organize a joint military, and secure the frontiers. Economically, interstate trade in a free domestic market and a legal framework for financial and monetary stability would facilitate investments from abroad and fire up Northern American commerce and trade. Furthermore, there were the pressing issues of war debt and creditor reliability that needed to be addressed by a federal system with executive, legislative and judicial powers. There was simply more to be gained than to be lost by unification. At the end of the Revolutionary War, former dissension between colonies were all but forgotten, but the problems the people were facing at the time outshone the prior conflicts. The war took a great toll regarding human lives, inland security, infrastructure and economic stability. There was an urgent need to solve these problems in a joint fashion, since otherwise the chance of survival and peace would have been much lower.

On the other hand side, the unification of the US was a marriage of love, since not only were there pragmatic factors in favor of union, but also strong ideological beliefs and

even utopias of a Golden Age of mankind. The attitude that there is an undeniable human right to „Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness“ (DoI 1776, 1) and the wish for a new system of government – republicanism – that should facilitate this „unalienable right“ (ibid., 1) were embedded into the mindset that these goals could only be reached if the states and people form a union. There were not only practical short-term factors for unification, but also the fundamental idea that a better future could be possible, that encouraged the supporters of unification; There was a window of opportunity to start a new political system from scratch; There were many elites that had the expertise to have learned from past historical mistakes with republicanism and had the confidence to improve prior frameworks; And there was the knowledge that Old Europe’s eyes would be directed at the US-American experiment which caused an additional feeling of ambition, and the need to prove one’s political ability.

The combination of a marriage of convenience and a marriage of love is probably the best grounding in politics as it is in real life. History verifies this hypothesis by the fact that US-American unification took place and – looking back from today – was a relatively succesful project.

Cultural Factors

Definition

Now that we established an overview of economic and political factors that might have affected US-American unification, it is time to take a quick look at US-American culture of the 1800s and its relation to the formation of the Union. At first, the author will try to define the term culture for the purpose of this thesis. Second, there will be an examination of the nature of languages spoken and written at the time of US-American unification. Third, the author will shift her attention to the potential influence religion could have had on the American Revolution. Fourth, ethnic considerations will be taken into account. Last, the author will summarize and conclude the chapter in already familiar fashion.

To gain a deeper understanding of the possible effects culture could have had on the dynamics of unification, it's useful to first define the term culture before plunging into medias res. Culture is perhaps one of the most interesting and at the same time confusing terms in contemporary Social Science, that engaged the minds of scholars in over a century. As anthropologist Robert Borofsky pointed out, „Culture [...] is not a set term – some natural phenomena that one can consensually describe (as tends to happen with hydrogen atoms, hamsters, and humans). Culture is what various people conceive it to be, and, as these definitions make clear, different people perceive it in different ways for different ends“ (Borofsky 2001, 433). As a result, cultural anthropologists will define the term differently than political scientists or economists. Social anthropologists Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, for instance, speak of „cultures“ broadly as „the idea that a world of human differences is to be conceptualized as a diversity of separate societies, each with its own culture“ (Gupta/ Ferguson 1997, 1). Samuel Huntington, a political scientist with a strong interest in International Relations, described culture in his famous text „Clash of Civilizations“ as partly synonymous with the term civilization,

“[a] civilization is a cultural entity [...] It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity [...] The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change.” (Huntington 1993, 23-24).

In order to reach a coherent and methodically useful terminology of the word for this thesis, the author decided to adopt her own definition, which is inspired by both Gupta's and Ferguson's more technical anthropological view, as well as Huntington's more

practical political perspective. The concept culture in this chapter is understood as a set of different linguistic, religious and ethnic markers, that bind a group of people together in shared values, rituals, and behavior. Accordingly, the chapter „Cultural Factors“ is divided into the three subcategories language, religion and ethnicity. The author consciously omitted other cultural markers such as customs and traditions, for the purpose of keeping the thesis within admissible reason.

Before diving into the topic of cultural factors for unification, it is of importance to mention some of the methodological pitfalls that limit the scientific preciseness of the chapter. The general data regarding language groups, religious affiliation and ethnicity is hard to come by. There is only one statistical data set that fits our time period of interest, i.e. the United States census of 1790. However, this census was not nearly as comprehensive and methodically reliable as present day censuses. Moreover, the only information we get from the 1790 questionnaires is data on sex, legal age, and slave status. Therefore inventive scholars try to explore the demographics of language groups, religious affiliation and ethnicity in the US through the characterization and analysis of surname patterns. Another approach is the „biographical method“, in which individual biographies from the 1800s were examined and data on, for example, religion is collected. Unfortunately this method has a strong bias towards the white male upper classes, since valuable biographical information on people other than the Founding Fathers and their limited social groups are rare. These methodological shortcomings have to be taken into consideration in the following paragraphs on cultural factors.

Language

Questions about the individuals' spoken and written language were first asked in the 1890 U.S. census. Accordingly, there is no reliable data on language proficiency and usage in the US prior to that date. However, we know from historic documents that the members of the Continental Congress did not automatically assume that English should be the new official language for the union. As Heath, quoted by Stevens points out,

„Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, urged that German and French be taught in America's "English schools" (Heath 1992). On the other hand, Benjamin Franklin ([1751] 1961: 234) feared that German immigrants in Pennsylvania „will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them“ (Heath cited by Stevens 1999, 387).

As these exemplifying remarks show there was disagreement during the process of unification regarding the future of English as a national language. This instance also

demonstrates that the early union was not linguistically homogenous, but heterogenous to a certain degree. Although it is fair to say that the US-American elites at the time, especially the signers of the founding documents, perceived and used English as their first language, they were at the same time aware of the fact that immigration groups from Continental Europe had already created non-English language enclaves in some parts of the country (for example Pennsylvania Germans). As Benjamin Franklin's comment reveals in retrospect, these linguistic groups must have been so present in their every day life that a high-profile politician like Franklin would consider them a threat to Anglo-American dominion. The compromise, so to say, was that the US until present day does not have an official federal language, although its founding documents were written in English. A diversity of languages exists until today in the US and is fed by ever new waves of immigration from different parts of the world³³.

Did the cultural factor language have an effect on unification then? Although the data on the subject is not extensive, most communication regarding political and economic unification was carried out in English, as historic documents show. And despite the existence of several language enclaves, that were numerically significant in so far as to prompt a reaction from the Anglo-American elites, English was the prime language of the American Revolution, and therefore US-American unification. English facilitated unification insofar, as it was understood and used by the most influential intellectual leaders of the Revolution. For US-American politicians and pamphleteers of the earliest hour, language barriers did at least not hinder or slow down intercolonial communication, therefore „passively“ contribute to the process of unification. A widely understood common language, even if it does not actively trigger unification, can certainly ease and fasten communication processes, and is thus, the author argues, a contributing factor to a certain degree.

Religion

Religious affiliation is certainly linked to ethnicity, but is not 100% congruent with ethnic groups as the example of Irish Protestants in colonial Northern America shows (c.f. Carroll 2006, 25). Thus, and because of the role certain religious ideas and leaders played on mobilization during the American Revolution, it is beneficial to examine

³³ In some parts of Southern California, New Mexico and Texas –for example - Spanish is the mother tongue of a majority of inhabitants.

religion as a special factor regarding unification. From biographical information and from secondary name analysis of the ethnicity of inhabitants of the US in 1790, it can be assumed (with necessary methodical caution) that a majority of US-Americans in the 1800s was, or was „made“ protestant, including African-Americans, the largest minority group in the colonies (c.f. Lambert 2003). US-American Protestantism, however, was and is not a monolithic religious grouping, but rather a conceptional parenthesis that holds a great diversity of protestant-oriented churches within. As an example of said variety inside Protestantism, we can look at the religious affiliations of the signers of the DoI. The 56 signers of the document belonged to at least eight different religions, most of them within the boundaries of Protestantism: Anglican, Congregationalist, Deist, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Quaker, Roman Catholic, and Unitarian (c.f. Mount 2011, <http://www.usconstitution.net/declarsigndata.html#rkey>). Furthermore, the diversity of churches was so great that there was even space for religious groups that became politically relevant forces due to their religiously inspired ideas. The best example for a politically active group is the Quakers, a religious circle deeply committed to societal equality and pacifism. For instance, the Quakers were strong advocates for the abolition of slavery in the 18th century and onwards. From an outside perspective, the US appears as a country that is mainly protestant, but looking at the religious affiliations from the inside, one can detect a great variety of religious experience within Protestantism – now and in the 1700s.

Now that we established a short overview of the multifaceted state of religion in the US at the time of unification, it is time to discover what kind of historic role religious factors played in the unification process.

The very beginnings of Anglo-American colonization on the continent were primarily religiously motivated, since the Puritans sought escape from British rule in the 1600s. John Winthrop, one of the first Puritan settlers in New England, famously argued that the new colony on Northern America shall be

„as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world“ (Winthrop 1630).

The new colonial project therefore is not simply one new settlement amidst the others: It is a better version, an ideal come to life and thus standing above the others. Other more or less persecuted groups followed and soon a great number of settlements sprouted up at the Eastern seaboard. These colonists brought their own religious beliefs with them

over the Atlantic. They then refined and dissipated their faiths over the course of time, leading to a unique Northern American religious landscape that was held together by a very basic commitment to Protestantism. In the early 1700s, religion experienced a revival that brought certain socio-political percussions with it. The so-called First Great Awakening, was a religious movement that had effects over multiple denominations and somehow contrasted the rational and mind-obsessed preachings of the Enlightenment. The main focus of preachers like Jonathan Edwards and George Whitfield lay on creating an emotional counterweight to the often detached sermons of other contemporary priests. Their religious ideas, often linked to personal repentance and commitment, were propagated during mass events, attracting huge crowds of mainly lower class citizens. The group mobilization that took place during the Great Awakening should be a precursor of the popular crowd events during the American Revolution. The role of religious leaders as communicators of political ideas such as egalitarianism and as unifiers of people was rehearsed during the First Great Awakening. Their main act should follow during the 1770s (c.f. Lambert 2003). Although the many groups in the colonies were very different with regards to their rituals, rules and beliefs, the majority had one important thing in common: growing disrespect for the Anglican church. Religious views in North America soon intermingled with politics and served people as a psychological motivator to fight in the war for independence. Soon, the Revolution became a moral cause as can be seen on the inscription on one of the battle flags, „Resistance to tyrants is obedience to god“.



Figure 11. Revolutionary Battle Flag, Gostelow Standard No. 10 1776
(<http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel03.html>, 11.1.2010).

To summarize, although the colonies and the early US were composed of a patchwork of religious groups, the basic belief in protestant values was a cultural unifying factor for a diverse society. But this fact alone did not make for unification. The affirmative influence of religious actors during the Great Awakening with regards to mass mobilization, political change and personal responsibility in social affairs additionally built the foundation for the dynamism of unification at a later point in time. Churches with their very wordly assets such as meeting rooms and their eloquent preachers that could easily sway people's hearts towards certain political goals were practical facilitators of the unification movement.

The religious pluralism in the US, however, did prompt the Founding Fathers to pragmatically adopt the First Amendment, „Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof“ (CoUSA 1789, Amendment I), in order to not motivate a single denomination to take over power and decide over others. The word GOD itself is referred to only very shortly in the DoI, but not in the CoUSA, making the founding documents (but not the people themselves) effectively free of religion.

Ethnicity

At the beginning of this chapter on the eventual influence of ethnicity on unification, it is again critical to consider methodological concerns. Since there is no primary data on the demographics of ethnicity in the early US, scholars used surnames as a tool to determine the ethnicity of the US-American population in the second half of the 18th century. For example does the surname Campbell indicate Scottish heritage, whereas the name O'Neill refers to Irish descent. Historians categorized the different surnames from the 1790 census into groups such as „Scottish-American“, then proceeded to count their numbers and following that, calculated the percental ethnic composition of US-Americans at 1790. Taking into account prior studies from the early 20th century, the McDonalds carried out such a study in the 1980s, which was later refined and revised by Purvis and Lavender, and critically evaluated by Akenson. According to Barker cited by McDonald, the white US population at 1790 can be ethnically differentiated as follows:

Ethnicity	Percentage of US Population
English	60.1
Scotch	8.1
Irish Ulster	5.9
Irish Free State	3.6
German	8.6
Dutch	3.1
French	2.3
Swedish	0.7
Spanish	0.8

Figure 12. Estimated Percental Distribution of Ethnicity in the US of 1790 after McDonald (1980) citing Barker (1931) (by R.K. 2011)

The McDonalds criticized some of Barkers methods and re-evaluated the numbers especially for the Celtic inhabitants. For this thesis, it is especially interesting to take a closer look at the geographical distribution of white ethnic groups in the early US. Whereas English-Americans were especially common in New England - Connecticut leading the field with an estimated percentage of 81% citizens of English descent (c.f. McDonald 1980, 198) - some other ethnic groups made up considerable numbers of the White population in certain areas. In Pennsylvania, for instance, German-Americans contributed to one third of the inhabitants (33.3%). In the state of New York (New York City being formerly know as New Amsterdam) the Dutch population at 1790 is estimated with about 17.5 percentage points. More so, adding up the Celtic subgroup in South Carolina, for example, the Irish, Scotch and Welsh taken together even made up the majority of the white inhabitants with 53.4%³⁴. In Pennsylvania, the total of Non-English citizens was an estimated 80.5 percent. To sum up, although the general numbers show a majority of English-American population, there were considerable levels of ethnic

³⁴ To point out a fairly amusing and admittedly unscientific observation, ethnic heritage might have also influenced the reaction regarding certain local alcohol policies. The McDonalds mention that in „western Pennsylvania's Washington County, center of the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, more than three-quarters of the people were of Celtic e: (McDonald 1980, 199).

diversity at the local and regional level. This impression only deepens when looking at the estimated distribution of the Non-White population at 1790.

According to the US Census Bureau (2002), out of the total of 3 929 214 US-Americans in 1790, 19.3% (757 208) were of African descent. From these, 7.9% (59 527) were free, whereas the overwhelming majority, 92.1% (697 681) were slaves. That means that nearly one fifth of the population of the US in 1790 was Black slaves, making them a considerable minority. Especially the Southern, and to a lesser extent, the Mid-Atlantic States were significantly inhabited by African-American slaves. Due to the ongoing human trafficking from Africa, which secured the landowners with a steady supply of cheap work force for their plantation businesses, most of these African-Americans were living in unfree and dependent conditions. The US Census Bureau (2002) calculated the percentage of the Black population in the Southern Region in 1790 as 35.2%, therefore composing over one third of the total inhabitants of the region. The economic and psychological fear of Black empowerment and free population growth certainly was in the back of some of the Southern Founding Fathers' minds when they opposed the abolition of slavery during the Constitutional Convention.

In addition to the African-American non-White population, Native Americans inhabited large chunks of the land that piece-by-piece became the US of today. Unfortunately, the number of Native Americans living in the United States territory of 1790 has not been surveyed in the census. The data inclusion from this ethnic subgroup only began 100 years later. However, from historic sources the number of Native Americans WITHIN the geographical borders of the US of 1790 is to be estimated as quite small. Their presence NEAR the borders and their partly military allegiance with the British did have some effect on US-American politics though, insofar as the future of the relations between the groups was feistily discussed by politicians and implicitly considered in the CoUSA. Both topics regarding the current status and future of the non-White population on the continent were the seeds for conflict and violence at a later time. The question over slavery, which brought the union to Civil War and nearly ended the union experiment in the mid-1800s, and the territorial fights and racial repressions that were brought upon Native Americans for decades, should define the character of the United States until today. But did these seeds of dissention have an immediate influence on unification? Did cultural diversity hinder the process of unifying people?

Conclusion

Did these cultural factors contribute or hinder unification? Did they have a noticeable effect on the process of US-American unification in the positive or negative sense?

First, despite the fact that there were several language enclaves in the colonies, and later states, their existence did not hinder unification. On the contrary, the presence of English, which was widely understood on the Northern American continent (especially in the upper classes) did ease communication processes and prevented language barriers. The cultural factor language facilitated unification insofar as English enabled the popular communication that was necessary to drive the formation of the United States.

Second, religious pluralism existed within the constraints of Protestantism, which can be observed by the wide range of religious affiliations exhibited by the Founding Fathers or the influence of particular groups like, for example, the Quakers. Regardless of the variety of beliefs, the Anglo-American shared history of colonization, which was closely linked to religious exile, served as a bonding factor (against the British) and as a historic reference point of identity for a substantial number of US-American inhabitants (see ethnicity). And despite their religious pluralism, Protestantism was still the main spiritual foundation and least common denominator of the colonists' belief system. Additionally, religious movements and figures in the 1700s facilitated US-American unification since they were experts in mobilizing masses, providing resources (such as meeting rooms, communication networks) and promote ideas like equality and representation, which should all come in handy during the American Revolution. Therefore, religion can be counted as a cultural factor enabling US-American unification.

Third, there was great ethnic diversity within the early US-American population if one looks at the regional and local level. Although the majority of inhabitants stemmed from the British Isles, there was variety within this particular group (Irish, Welsh, Scottish, English) and at certain places other ethnic groups, such as Germans or Dutch, constituted significant minority populations. There were no indicators found that suggest whether this ethnic diversity within the Non-white population constrained or boosted unification. Be that as it may, the case can be made that the considerable number of Non-Whites within the territory – African-American slaves - and near the borders – Native Americans - spawned a racist coalition of fear among some members of the White population. The many debates regarding the future of slavery and the prospective allotment of new Western territories, which were controlled by Indian tribes then, during the development of the Constitution tell us today that these questions were present in the minds of the

Founders. On the other hand, ethnicity became a source of conflict later at time and can therefore be interpreted as a factor against the future of the union. All in all, though, the importance and effect that the cultural factor ethnicity had on US-American unification could not be satisfactorily determined at this point and has to be analyzed further in the future.

To conclude, two of the three cultural factors that were examined for this thesis can be added to the contributing factors of unification, while one is under consideration.

PHASES OF POLITICAL UNIFICATION

Three Phases of Political Unification in the US

In order to reach a coherent and clear structural framework to compare the US-American case of unification with the European one, it is useful to employ a certain time scheme. The following so-called „three phases of unification“ crystallized during the work on this thesis and function as a first approach to summarize, categorize and compare the findings of this work.

The phases can be differentiated along several lines. First, they can be distinguished by time. Nonetheless, the author would like to note that the phases of unification are not strictly sequential in their progression. The phases are not clear-cut and finite time periods, but rather overlapping sequences, allowing for parallel events to take place and sometimes even repeat themselves.

Second, the phases can be discerned by their function regarding unification. To put it simply, they can be distinguished by the relative prominence different factors played in them. For instance, one phase might be heavily affected by economic considerations, while another might be influenced more through cultural factors. Again, unification is not a clear-cut step-by-step process in which boxes are ticked off in sequence. Different factors often play a role simultaneously, and many factors show strong connections to others (for example: economic and political unification). However, certain „factorial centers of gravity“ can be discovered while looking at US-American unification closely. For instance, political ideas played an important role in the starting phase of the union, while the relative influence of political ideology on unification decreased with time.

Having unfolded the relative imperfections of the following structural framework for unification, it is time to dive into the topic, starting with US-American unification and then proceeding to EU unification, finishing off with a comparison of the two.

1st phase (1750s-1770s)

The first phase of unification in the US is characterized by the formation of a “we versus them”-culture, in which the majority³⁵ of the colonists opposed the perceived injustices of British Imperial policies. Over time, Britain developed from motherland and identity reference point (“British gentlemen”) to the common enemy of the Northern American colonists. This transatlantic estrangement, which is linked to a range of political, economic and cultural events, was a necessary predecessor of independence, since it all of a sudden made the utopia of an independent union on the Northern American continent an imaginable alternative to British rule. The establishment of a common enemy not only enabled previously unthinkable thoughts to be thought, but it also unified the colonists insofar as they now, perhaps for the first time, had a clear group identity. Even if their identity was only constructed in a negative sense first - as the antagonist to the British – the group spirit, which evolved from this opposition of forces, was still enough to carry the weight of the Revolution and evolve into a more powerful identity over the years. Over time, this “we versus them” formation transformed into a US-American identity of its own that did not need a common enemy anymore to define itself as an entity.

The second characteristic of this beginning phase of unification is the impact of a bundle of reasons, which the author summarizes under the term “marriage of convenience”. The colonies unified not (only?) because they had a deep cultural commitment towards each other, but they simply saw undeniable military, economic and political advantages that would be triggered through unification. The multiple factors within this cluster of pragmatism certainly lived on during the other phases of unification, but they were set in motion in this first period. As early as during the Albany Congress, politicians such as Benjamin Franklin proposed a union out of pragmatism. The formation of a colonial union would improve the military strength of all of its members through the bundling of forces and would enable better safety measures for the frontier population. During the following Imperial Crisis and the American Revolution, the channeling of troops under one command throughout the colonies was a simple strategic necessity to win the war against the British.

Later on, during the Imperial Crisis, economic considerations came into play, when it became clear that the colonies would certainly benefit from a deepening of intercolonial

³⁵ There was a minority of loyalists, which to a large part settled in Canada before or during the American Revolution.

trade relations. Down the road, the improvement of US-American economy became a political priority of greatest concern, when monetary and financial matters grew out of control. According to many elites, the solution to the economic downward spiral that set in after 1776, was the unification of the newly independent states. The economic promises of a free US-American market, the attraction of domestic and foreign investors, the settling of the staggering war debt and the coming to terms with the strained relation between states, creditors and debtors, were all factors that encouraged US-American unification.

The political factors of unification that can be subsumed under the umbrella “marriage of convenience” are deeply linked to the above military and economic considerations. The beginning political unification of the colonies in a framework such as in intercolonial conferences and in a document such as the Declaration of Independence was necessary to gain footing against the British. Concerted military and economic measures simply needed a political arena in which necessary unified policies could be discussed and resolved. Furthermore, the politicians of the time were concerned with the international standing of the colonies and later independent states. They reasoned that a union of Northern American states would attract more global attention and perhaps financial and military support against the British than one state alone. The writing of the Declaration of Independence, so to say the highlight and apex of the 1st phase of unification, is evidence of this political logic.

But not only can we detect multiple factors for “marriage of convenience” in this phase of unification, we can also observe another dimension of unification, the “marriage of love”. The colonists not only unified out of pragmatic reasons and lack of alternative, but they regarded the new union as something more than its parts. These “united States of America (DoI 1776) would be a novel political experiment, unlike any ever seen before on this planet. In many parts, the United States was a tabula rasa of politics: According to the DoI, government should not be the instrument of tyrannic rule, but should derive its powers from the “consent of the governed” (DoI 1776); Furthermore government should secure certain “unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” (DoI 1776). Jefferson’s declaration, with all due respect to previous political thinkers and to the DoI’s shifting levels of influence on US politics, is a “big bang” of political thought until today, since it summarizes and voices the very basic foundation of human rights and governmental justification, Later on, the republican form of government would be adopted for the first time in human history for such a large

territory, marking another political milestone, that transcended the sheer pragmatic nature of unification.

From the very beginning, the US was a project that should “show the world” what could be possible, if humans only joined hands and fought for a common goal. This ambitious – some might call it – vanity and arrogance was certainly a motivator for unification. The belief that individuals should take their future into their own hands was ironically both influenced by Enlightenment philosophy and 18th century colonial Protestantism. While the first emphasized rational thought and logic, the latter highlighted the role of human passion and emotion in the struggle for a better life in the here and now. Evidence like the “Revolutionary Battle Flag” or the illustration “On the Erection of the Eleventh Pillar” show that unification was not only a matter of military, economic and political convenience, but a matter of emotion and salvation. Many colonists hoped and fought not only for independence from Britain but for a new “Saturnian Age” in Northern America, one that mankind never saw before. They strongly believed that they could achieve their goals only as a community, and they trusted that a union of people (not only states!) would consequently also be the best way to live in the future.

To summarize, the 1st phase of US-American unification was thoroughly characterized by the impact the many diverse pragmatic and ideological factors had on unification. The combination of a “we versus them” political culture, a “marriage of convenience”, and a “marriage of love” laid the groundstones for unification and set in motion subsequent phases of US-American unification.

2nd Phase (1780s-1790s)

The 2nd phase of unification in the US is characterized by the drafting and ratification of the CoUSA and the translation of its Articles into the real political world of the early US. This is the phase in which the major institutions of US politics were introduced and tested. In the 1st phase, we saw that many pragmatic and emotional factors encouraged the unification efforts of the colonies and early states. People voiced their common interests. In the second phase these ideas were written down, realized and put into military, economic and political practise. The framework, which should allow for their accomplishment was the CoUSA. After the Articles of Confederation proved to be incapable of solving the problems of the young union and allow the US-American people to achieve their individual goals, the Constitution provided a republican framework in

which matters could be solved without risking that the union would break apart in individual states and/or smaller confederations. The legislative, executive and judicial branch of US government came to life during this time period of US-American history.

Many practical matters of union government that were not directly referred to in the CoUSA were also given a first try, for example, the installation of monetary and financial institutions under Hamilton, Washington's precedent for a maximum of a two time Presidential term, or the actual planning and design of government buildings in the newly designated capital city, Washington D.C.. The formation and slow institutionalization of the US-American party system also started during this phase of unification, namely during the third Presidential election in 1796.

To summarize, the 2nd phase of US-American unification was characterized by the formation of official and unofficial institutions that should define the workings of the union for years to come.

3rd phase (1800s-1850s)

The third phase of unification in the US, which was not discussed in depth in this thesis, is defined by institutional consolidation on the one hand, and territorial enlargement on the other hand. Both official and unofficial institutions of the union saw a strengthening of powers and, after they survived their shaky post-war birth and tumultuous adolescence³⁶, settled for a relatively calm fifty years until the seeds of disagreement between North and South, that were planted in the CoUSA, should grow so inevitable that a brutal Civil War finally erupted the young nation. Besides the establishment and build up of institutions, the US also saw territorial enlargement, which began during Jefferson's Presidency with the Louisiana Purchase from France in 1803. This was followed by the Florida Purchase, and the acquisition of the Northwestern Territories, etc..

³⁶ In 1804, the political atmosphere in the US was so fired up, that Vice President Adam Burr and Alexander Hamilton even took up a duel over a political disagreement and perceived defamation. This duel should end deadly for the former Secretary of Treasury. One should only imagine the unlikelyness of a duel between Adenauer and De Gaulle to see the blatant differences in "political culture" over the course of history.

Three Phases of Political Unification in the EU

1st phase (1945-1960s)

Shortly after the devastations and terrors of World War II ended, European leaders came to the conclusion that this zero hour of politics was both a fragile moment in history as well as a window of opportunity to re-design the European political landscape from the ground. WWI and WWII ripped Europe apart and the gaping wound caused by nearly 50 years of disastrous nationalism, fascism and national socialism had left the continent in a state of estrangement and exhaustion. The 'Age of Catastrophe', as Eric Hobsbawm named the time from 1914 to 1945, was over but what would come next?

Three main challenges lay ahead: In the East, Sowjet-backed socialism was taking over whole countries, while in the West US-backed capitalism became the go-to ideology of post-war Europe. The threat of war between these two blocs characterized the political sphere for nearly four decades during the Cold War. How would Europe remain in a balanced and peaceful state while being chopped into two different ideological halves? Second, although the German Reich had been vanquished and smashed to pieces, half a decade of aggression and inhumanity could not be easily wiped out of the collective European mind. How could Germany be pacified in the long-term? Third, the 'Age of Catastrophe' left Europe in economic, infrastructural, artistic and intellectual ruins. How could such a devastated continent be lifted to new heights?

The answer to all of the three challenges Europe faced after WWII lay, one way or another, in unification. Paradoxically, the division of Europe in two political blocs enhanced Western European unification insofar as the 'communist East' supplied the West with a common enemy around which a new unified identity could be built. In the first and even second phase of unification the physical and psychological dissociation with Eastern Europe formed an important backbone of Western European identity. Although circumstances and timelines differed greatly, in some points the communist East was to the capitalist West what the British were to the colonists: a common enemy around which one could build their own new group identity. The perceived imminent threat that was the Sowjet Union unified Western Europe and strengthened the bond between the states.

Second, strategically and economically, it was a necessity for Western European leaders to bind West Germany closer to their own hearts. With the help of the US-American European Recovery Project (ERP or 'Marshall Plan'), the first step was made to integrate

Germany into a Western capitalist system in order to clear it from national socialist tendencies and at the same time shield it from the power of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the plan was to build an economic bond between the continental archenemies, **France and Germany, so that they would be pacified through mutual** economic involvement. The idea behind it was that two countries that were dependent on each other economically would be less willing to engage in conflicts. Additionally, economic interdependence would have the positive side effect of growth and safety from resource shortages that were greatly needed after the destructions of WWII (an argument that has been made 200 years before by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper #11). This practical thought stood at the center of European unification and was realized through the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

The first phase of European unification was less a marriage of love than a marriage of convenience. Unification, the author argues, was the least painful economic and political option for the strongly needed demarcation from communism, 'domestic' pacification and general recovery of Western Europe.

Although some politicians might have had thoughts about the spiritually unified future of Europe, at least the first phase of unification does not show signs of a 'marriage of love' between the inhabitants of the European states. European ideas of unification voiced by the political elite (Jean Monnet, Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,...) did not reverberate as strong in the population as the writings and sayings of US-American leaders during the American Revolution. The European continent, with its historically evolved national sentiments and conflicts, was far from the level of shared emotional interdependence and common interest the Northern American colonies showed during their phase of unification.

2nd phase (1960s-2000s)

In the long 2nd phase of European unification we can see the formation, deepening and strengthening of inter-European institutions. First, the ECSC started off economic integration between France and Germany in 1952. The Coal and Steel Community was followed by the EURATOM and the European Economic Community (EEC) to enhance economic relations in Europe in 1958. Slowly but surely, the political arm of European unification developed, adding a Parliament (formerly known as 'Common Assembly') and a Council of Ministers to the European Commission (formerly known as 'High

Authority'). Over time more and more policy fields, such as monetary matters, justice, police matters, and security were added to the agenda of European political institutions. Furthermore, the European Community, which should become the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, expanded its territory from only six founding states in 1951 (Treaty of Paris for the establishment of the ESCS) to 27 members since the beginning of 2007.

3rd phase (2000s-)

The third phase of European unification is characterized by consolidation and refinement of already existing institutions as well as continuing enlargement. The author also argues that this ongoing phase is also a period of introspection: After the European Convention presented their draft for a European Constitution that should cater to the EU's new challenges (i.e. governing an enlarged body of members) in 2003, the failed ratification of said constitution in 2005 led to a period of slowing down European affairs. In 2007 however, a new initiative led by Germany filled the necessary constitutional reform with life and culminated in the adaptation of the Treaty of Lisbon, which is a sort of European Constitution Light.

Like in the US, the third phase of unification is characterized by institutional consolidation and – at the same time – the constant reminders that there are great challenges in the EU that have not been tackled accordingly yet (international security and joint military efforts, immigration, racism, religion, financial regulations, environmental questions,...). If one wants to learn a lesson from the US-American experience in the 19th century that brought the Union to its limits, it is highly recommended to take important societal questions into considerations sooner than later and act in unison on (global and regional) challenges that cannot be administered alone.

COMPARISON AND SUMMARY

In order to summarize and compare the findings of this thesis in a clear fashion, the author decided to use tables, so that the factors of unification can be spotted and compared easily. Each table is arranged around an already familiar thread of this thesis: Economy, politics and culture.

Economic Factors of Unification

After the research done for this thesis, the author feels confident to argue that economic factors are at the very center of unification in the US. Both exterior and domestic circumstances encouraged the formation of a federal union. Both the US and the EU wanted to improve their international standing to attract new investors and establish themselves as strong and viable players in the power game of global economy.

The need to stabilize the financial and monetary situation of the colonies/ the US during and after the war was a burning issue to all spheres of society. The constitutional unification of the American states was to a great part encouraged because the weak framework provided by the AoC did not allow for successful management of war debts, financial justice, and taxation. To build a federal state structure that has the powers to actually rule its people and states was a necessity to end the economic chaos after the war.

200 years later, Europe had to tackle some similar issues. The devastations of WWII left the continent an economic desert that needed watering and a new global outlook as soon as possible. Besides the ERP, some European leaders decided to build an economic zone between countries that would make them interdependent and also encourage economic growth, increased trade relations and reconstruction. Economic ties between former rivals (most importantly France and Germany) were perceived as helpful facilitators of a peaceful Western European zone and an economic counterweight to the Sowjet Union. The founding of the ESCS, a mostly economic institution, marks the beginning of European integration.

One of the differences between the unification of the US and the EU is that in the US there existed a strong link between political protest and economy. During the Imperial Crisis most colonial boycotts and revolts were motivated by economic policies (i.e. Tea Act, Stamp Act,...). Popular mobilization against British trade policies unified the

colonists and should give them a group identity. There was no evidence found that suggested that there existed similar popular mobilization in the EU that was linked to economic matters and encouraged a unification of interests.

	USA	EU
Economy	Exterior Factors - attract foreign investors - reestablish international trade	Exterior Factors - improve global economic standing
	Domestic Factors - manage war debt - establish financial justice - introduce taxation by Congress - monetary challenges - safety from shortages - \$	Domestic Factors - growth through free market - economic interdependence for peace - safety from shortages - €
	Economy and Political Culture - Economic increases mobilization - Trade boycotts - Common identity through shared consumer culture	

Figure 13. Economic Factors of Unification. A Comparison of the US and the EU (by R.K. 2011)

Political Factors of Unification

There are some great similarities, but at the same time some major differences between the existence and outcomes of political factors of unification in the US and in the EU.

Both unions were partly built in order to enable/hinder ideas. In case of the US, the wish to gain independence, liberty, and a republic and the dream of a ‘Saturnian Age’ were factors that encouraged unification. In Western Europe, peace and wealth through

capitalism were the main goals of politicians (and the majority of the population) after the long ‘Age of Catastrophy’ that was full of privations. In both cases a newly found union of states should help fulfill these dreams.

In the US as well as in the EU, there were ideologies and forms of government that people wished to get rid of. The experiences with monarchy, aristocracy and ‘mob rule’ alarmed the American founders to build a system in which such ideas would be suppressed (see for example ‘checks & balances’). Unification seemed a great opportunity to render this possible at the big scale. In Western Europe the very recent encounters with fascism, nationalsocialism and communism reminded people of the need to form an effective system in which such horrific events could not be realized. The unification and therefore pacification of former rivals was one of the options that was supposed to make Europe a wealthy and peaceful continent. A common ideological, political and military enemy in form of the UdSSR right at the border helped facilitate the unification of the Western European states.

Although there is a wealth of practical political factors, which apply to each union individually, there is a great similarity between US-American and European unification. Both processes were partly encouraged by very “down-to-earth” factors. To the European reader, who is probably familiar with the mostly economically motivated birth of the EU, this might sound surprising with regards to the US. In Europe, we sometimes use to think of the US as this great ‘sentimental’ political project that was perceived by enlightened humanist minds in search of a peaceful heaven on earth. We might forget that the US – similar to the EU – was partly unified due to some very practical reasons (i.e. infrastructure, greater military power, safety from domestic conflicts...).

One of the main findings of this thesis, therefore, is that successful unions do not ‘fall from the sky’. They are man-made structures, formed to cater specific interests and are strongly influenced by a range of historically influenced factors. The individual unification factors, as we see in the table below, can differ from case to case, but the evidence from this thesis suggests that a certain amount of factors grounded in practicality (‘marriage of convenience’) need to exist in order to establish strong bonds between states.

The biggest difference between the US and the EU regarding political unification factors is the lack of common popular interest to form a union. The colonists and later the US-Americans began early to accordate their actions and built strong bonds across states during Imperial Crisis and the Revolutionary War in which they fought side by side. In contrast, the beginnings of European unification were not lead, organized, or even

noticed by most European inhabitants. Although this point of argument would need some more research in the future, for now it looks like US-American unification was put through with more public support and/or interest.

	USA	EU
Politics	Unification of Popular Interest - Against British Imperial policies - Intercolonial communication - Accordated resistance	
	Unification to Enable Ideas - Independence - Liberty - Republic - ‘Saturnian Age’	Unification to Enable Ideas - Peace - Wealth - Capitalism
	Unification to Hinder Ideas - Monarchy - Aristocracy - ‘Pure democracy’ (‘mob rule’)	Unification to Hinder Ideas - Fascism - Nationalism - Communism, Sowjet Union
	Unification for Practical Reasons - Military strength - Economic growth - Political stability - Safety from domestic and foreign aggression - Improved global standing - Better infrastructure	Unification for Practical Reasons - Counterweight to communist Eastern Europe - Pacify Germany through binding it to France economically - Rebuilding continent after war needs political stability and economic growth

Figure 14. Political Factors of Unification. A Comparison of the US and the EU (by R.K. 2011)

Cultural Factors of Unification

As with political factors, there are some differences as well as similarities between cultural factors of unification in the US and the EU.

With respect to language, the US of the late 1800s is characterized by the existence of linguistic enclaves along historical lines (i.e. Pennsylvania Germans). However, English was and is widely understood and remains the unofficial main language of communication in most parts of the US, especially in public and political settings. Surprisingly, English is not the official language of the US. In comparison, in Europe linguistic diversity mostly prevails along national borders with the exception of minority languages (such as Catalan in Spain or Slovenian in Austria). The EU officially has 23 languages. In day-to-day EU institutional communication English, French and German remain the most commonly spoken languages.

Regarding religion, both the US and Europe were and are mainly inhabited by Christians. If one takes a closer look though, the differences become obvious. In the US there is a diversity of affiliations within the Protestant church. In Europe, Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians (and due to immigration Muslims), Atheists and Agnostics constitute the largest groups. Although diversity endures in both unions, Protestant pluralism in the US is spread across the country, while in Europe national borders often delineate religious affiliation.

The situation is similar when it comes to ethnicity. While in the US there is ethnic variety along interstate/ regional lines, in Europe the main ethnic groups are still mostly to be found within the borders of one specific country. Due to domestic and foreign population mobility, this phenomenon is now in the process of change and might reach US-level with time.

All in all, the cultural factors of unification show us that in both unions exist certain levels of linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity. The main difference between the two unions lies in the allocation of diversity. In the US it mainly goes along regional lines, while in the EU variety is mostly found when looking at the whole continent. Within the borders of nation states, grades of diversity have not reached US-levels (yet).

	USA	EU
Culture	Language - Linguistic enclaves along historic lines - No official national language - English most common	Language - Diversity (mostly) along national borders - 23 official languages - English, French and German most common
	Religion - Diversity within Protestant parenthesis - Mobilizer of unification	Religion - Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Islamic - Debate about Christianity being common identity of Europeans?
	Ethnicity - Diversity along interstate lines	Ethnicity - Diversity mostly along national lines

Figure 15. Cultural Factors of Unification. A Comparison of the US and the EU (by R.K. 2011)

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

After identifying, characterizing and comparing a wide range of unification factors it is now time to take a quick look at the implications of the findings. At the beginning of the research the differences between the US of the 1800s and the EU of today were glaring realities. The author's fear of answering an unanswerable question quickly vanished after digging into the topic US-American unification. Suddenly similarities between the two unification processes became palpable.

Both unions were built on a foundation of practical economic and political factors that, besides their differences due to historical circumstance – are comprehensible for the contemporary reader.

The greatest difference between the unification of the US and the EU is that the US was and remains a union of both states and people. Elite and common interests were unified and in a long process of crisis and war built the US. In comparison to the US, the EU is still only a union of states that had not been initiated by a combination of practical factors and popular support.

While the US-Americans identify much stronger with their union, many Europeans would hesitate to call themselves European before referring to themselves as Austrians, French or Polish. A US-American tourist abroad would never introduce himself as „Joe from Georgia“, but as „Joe from the US“. What we learned from this thesis, however, is that 200 years ago, our imaginary Joe might have presented himself as a Georgian. If one thing is for certain in politics, it is that nothing is for certain.

The question remains: Will Europeans take the US-American path and move towards a common European identity that leaves national moods and peculiarities behind? Or will it remain a formally united union that is neither state nor society as Beck/Grande implied in their quote at the beginning of this thesis? Will the EU harbor many Europeans instead of a European people in the future?

With regards to the global problems every human on this planet faces today it is the author's strong opinion that one country alone cannot tackle these challenges accordingly. Therefore, a strengthening of supranational initiatives is not only preferable theoretically but necessary practically.

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ABSTRACT

English

The thesis was aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of unification processes through the analysis of two case studies. In order to reach this goal, the author focused primarily on the unification of the US-American states during the time of the American Revolution in the 18th century. Subsequently, a comparison of US-American unification with European unification after WWII was achieved. This case study provides answers to two main research questions: Which factors encouraged the unification process in the case of the USA? What are the similarities and differences between the US and the EU regarding their respective unification processes?

The diversification of factors into three thematic groups – economic, political, and cultural – allowed for systematic research that was carried out through the analysis of primary and secondary sources. In the final part of the thesis, US-American and European unification were compared regarding their temporal characteristics (three phases of unification) and illustrated with the aid of tables. The comparative conclusion highlighted the differences and similarities between the two unification processes and prompted an outlook on the future of European identity.

Deutsch

Im Zentrum dieser Arbeit stand es den Prozess einer Unionswerdung anhand zweier Fallbeispiele näher zu untersuchen. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen wurde in besonderem Ausmaß die Unionswerdung der USA zur Zeit der Amerikanischen Revolution im 18. Jahrhundert analysiert. Im Anschluss daran erfolgte ein Vergleich des Unionswerdungsprozesses der USA mit jenem der europäischen Staaten nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Die Diplomarbeit zielte darauf ab zwei zentrale Fragen zu beantworten: welche Faktoren förderten die Unionswerdung der USA? Welche Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede existieren zwischen dem Unionswerdungsprozess der EU und der USA?

Anhand einer Aufspaltung der Faktorenbündel in drei Themengruppen – ökonomisch, politisch, kulturell – konnten die beiden Forschungsfragen in systematischer Art und Weise und unter Zuhilfenahme von Primär- und Sekundärquellen beantwortet werden. Die Gegenüberstellung des US-amerikanischen und des europäischen Unionswerdungsprozesses mittels einer Phasen- und Tabellendarstellung bildete den Abschluss der Arbeit. In dieser komparativen Conclusio erschlossen sich sowohl Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der beiden Unionswerdungsprozesse und regten zu einem Ausblick über die Zukunft der europäischen Identität an.

Keywords

Unification; Union; USA; EU; Comparison; Case Study; American Revolution;

PERSÖNLICHE DATEN

Name: Romana KLINGER
Anschrift: Sandwirtstraße 12, 4600 Wels
Geburtsdatum: 10. Jänner 1985
Geburtsort: Wels, Oberösterreich
Nationalität: Österreich

AUSBILDUNG

1995 - 1999: Bundesgymnasium Dr. Schauerstraße, Wels
1999 - 2003: Bundesoberstufenrealgymnasium Grieskirchen, Spezialzweig Bildnerische Erziehung
Juni 2003: Abschluss der 8. Klasse “mit ausgezeichnetem Erfolg”, Matura
2003 - 2004: Studium der Architektur an der Technischen Universität Wien
2004 - : Studium der Politikwissenschaft und der Theater-, Film- und Medienwissenschaft an der Universität Wien
Juni 2006: 1. Diplomprüfung “mit ausgezeichnetem Erfolg”
2008 – 2009: Austauschstudium am Wellesley College, Massachusetts und Belegung eines Kurses über Globalisierung am MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

BISHERIGE BERUFSERFAHRUNGEN

Weiters: 2007 - : Mitarbeit bei der “Wiener Tafel”
2008- 2009: Tutorin und Lehrassistentin am German Department im Wellesley College, Massachusetts
2010- : Mitorganisatorin und PR-Beauftragte von “ordinarypeople vienna” (KuratorInnengruppe für freie Gegenwartskunst im Raum Wien)
Juli 2010: Ehrenamtliche Arbeit als Büroassistentin bei der IAS (International AIDS Society) im Rahmen der Aidskonferenz 2010 in Wien

PUBLIKATIONEN

Klinger, Romana/ Ferihumer, Konstantin (2008): „Vergiß, mein Volk,...die treuen Toten nicht“. Kriegerdenkmäler in Oberösterreich, in: Die Maske. Zeitschrift für Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie. Nr. 3 (Juni 2008), Wien.