

Dissertation

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Agreements aimed at the resolution of intra-
and inter states conflicts

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Introduction

This PhD thesis intends to evaluate outcomes of different negotiation processes aimed at the resolution of intra-and inter states conflicts. The aim of this dissertation is not to provide practical suggestions how to achieve the conclusion of the peace accords or to figure out circumstances in which agreements aimed at the resolution of conflicts are likely to be signed. The goal of this dissertation is to create and to show the applicability of an innovative theoretical approach for the analysis of outcomes of negotiation processes.

Much of the conflict resolution research investigates the decision of conflicting parties to sign peace agreements through the rationality assumption and by aggregation of material interests of adversaries. “The idea seems to be that if parties rely solely on logic, both sides can advance their interests and come to a mutually acceptable compromise in the event that those interests conflict.....Once parties have identified their deep-seated concerns and interests, they can make trade-offs and concessions and work together to devise creative solutions to their problems.”¹ Proponents of this approach argue that conflicting parties tend to gather and analyse information in accordance with their rational calculations of self-interest and behave in a manner that increases their material benefit. Supporters of rational choice theory (RCT) usually pay no attention to ideational factors such as ideas, culture, emotion, beliefs and identities and assume that interests of relevant actors are fixed. Constructivists, in contrast, seek to investigate nature, formation and transformation of interests through the full array of ideational factors that influence behaviour of people (such as identities, beliefs, norms, ideas etc.).² Thus, constructivism presents a unique opportunity to find the middle ground between theories of international relations and social theories.³ It provides a possibility to link material factors to

¹ Michelle Maiese (2005): “Limits of Rationality”, Accessed: 2008
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/limits_of_rationality/?nid=6566

² See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998), Alexander Wendt (1999)

³ See Andrea Teti (2004): A Role in Search of a Hero: Construction and the Evolution of Egyptian Foreign Policy, 1952-67, pp.1-2, Accessed: 2008, <http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/politics/research/readingroom/tetiJMS04.pdf>

ideational ones. The theoretical and empirical sections of this dissertation intend to show an example of how that combination of RCT and the constructivists' key theoretical feature might be achieved.

Through the application of the mid-level theory derived from a realist approach, namely RCT, I will analyse the ways of how material factors (such as political, economic and strategic interests) influence the decision of conflicting parties to conclude peace agreements.

Application of this theoretical approach to the analysis of agreements aimed at the resolution of conflicts suggests that the decision of conflicting parties to conclude an agreement depends on their rational calculations of costs and material benefits.

Through the application of the constructivist theoretical framework I will analyse the ways of how ideational factors influence the decision of conflicting parties to conclude peace agreements.

Application of this theoretical framework to the analysis of agreements aimed at the settlement of conflicts suggests that the decision of conflicting parties to sign agreements mainly depends on immaterial factors such as culture, ideas, beliefs, norms, rules, identities .

1.1 Research Methodology

My research is based on a case study analysis. According to Mitchell a case study is “a detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which the analyst believes exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified general theoretical principles”.⁴ Thus, case study analysis intends to provide an in-depth examination of some complex issues or enhance already received knowledge from previously conducted investigations. In my dissertation I will not attempt to produce new data, but rather to investigate existing information in new ways in order to add both theoretical and empirical strength to the investigated phenomenon.

⁴ Mitchell (1983), in: Rhee, Y.(2004): “What is the Case study?”, pp.72, Accessed: 2010, http://www.csus.edu/indiv/r/rhee/Rhee_Case%20Study.pdf

Even though authors offer different methods and techniques for conducting case study research, it is possible to underline the following most common steps for organising this type of investigation:

- Determination of the research question
- Determination of type of case study
- Determination of boundaries
- Selection criteria of case studies
- Determination of techniques of analysis
- Collection and evaluation of the data
- Composing the findings

1.1.1 The research question

Formulating the research question is the first step for conducting any type of research. It helps to outline the scope of the study, the type of research, the techniques of analysis as well as to generate a specific assumption.⁵

Since case studies are usually based on qualitative techniques of data gathering, they often answer the questions “why”, “how” and “who”.⁶ Case studies, however, “should not be confused with qualitative research”.⁷ They can also include some quantitative evidences and, therefore, can be based on questions which intend to answer “what” and “how many”.⁸

My study is based on a few questions which lead to both generating and testing the hypothesis.

The key question is to answer why conflicting parties after many years of uncompromising conflict and non-recognition, decide to accept each other as negotiator and to conclude the peace accords. In other words, how it is possible to

⁵ See “The Case Study as a Research Method”, (1997), Accessed: 2010;
<http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm>

⁶ See “The Case Study as a Research Method”, (1997), Accessed: 2010,
<http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm>; “Qualitative Research Method”, Chapter 5, Accessed: 2010, pp.102, http://www.pathways.cu.edu.eg/subpages/downloads/Research_Chapter_5.pdf

⁷ Yin (1994), in: Rhee, Y.(2004): “What is the Case Study?”, pp.72, Accessed: 2010,
http://www.csus.edu/indiv/r/rheey/Rhee_Case%20Study.pdf;

⁸ See Rhee, Y.(2004): “What is the Case Study?”, pp.72, Accessed:2010,
http://www.csus.edu/indiv/r/rheey/Rhee_Case%20Study.pdf

explain this sudden transformation of their behaviour and perception about each other?

This question helps me to generate my hypothesis of the applicability of my theoretical frame. By reviewing literature on different theoretical paradigms I construct the theoretical framework which is based on two approaches, namely rational choice and the constructivist theories. In my dissertation I will argue that it is the most suitable framework for explaining the decision of the conflicting parties to conclude the peace accords.

Other important research questions of my study are to figure out how RCT and the constructivist theoretical framework can explain the decision of the conflicting parties to sign the peace agreements and what kind of factors influenced their decision. These questions help me to test my hypothesis of the applicability of my theoretical approach to real life.

1.1.2 Determination of type of case study

Depending on the nature of research, types of case studies can vary. There are single and multiple case studies. They can be illustrative, exploratory, explanatory, critical, cumulative etc.⁹ The focus of case studies can vary significantly as well. For example it might be a single individual, specific group/groups, a certain organisation/organisations or particular event/events.¹⁰

My dissertation will be based on multiple case studies. “A multiple case study enables the researcher to explore differences within and between cases. The goal is to replicate findings across cases.”¹¹ Analysis of a few cases will help me to enhance the explanatory scope of my research and to test my theoretical assumptions in a more efficient way by supporting it with different evidences derived from the various cases.

In my dissertations I will analyse the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 and the Oslo Accords of 1993.¹² Above mentioned

⁹ See Rhee (2004), Davey, Lynn (1991), Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008)

¹⁰ See “Qualitative research method”, Chapter 5, Accessed: 2010, pp.102, http://www.pathways.cu.edu.eg/subpages/downloads/Research_Chapter_5.pdf

¹¹ Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008): “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers”, pp.548, Accessed: 2010, <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf>

¹² Below I provide detailed information on selection criteria of my case studies

studies will have both the explanatory and cumulative nature at the same time. In the table below I describe the typology of my case studies.

Type	Explanation	Goal
Explanatory	An explanatory case study is conducted in order to make casual studies as well as to gain a deep understanding of a particular phenomenon. ¹³	To provide in-depth understanding of the decision of conflicting parties to change their behaviour and to sign the peace accord.
Cumulative / retrospective	“Cumulative Case Studies aggregate information from several sites collected at different times”. ¹⁴ Cumulative case studies can be retrospective i.e. gathering data from studies in the past. ¹⁵	To collect information regarding the decision of the conflicting parties to sign the peace accords from various investigations conducted in the past and across different disciplines as well as to gather evidences that might prove or disprove the theoretical assumptions applied in my dissertation.

1.1.3 Boundaries of research

Identifying boundaries of case studies is important in order to avoid collecting information that is not related to initially determined research questions. In other

¹³ See Zaidah Zainal (2007): “Case Study as a Research Method”, pp.3, Accessed: 2010, http://eprints.utm.my/8221/1/ZZainal2007-Case_study_as_a_Research.pdf; Winston Tellis (1997): “Application of a Case Study Methodology”, Accessed: 2010, <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html>;

¹⁴ Lynn Davey (1991): “The Application of Case Study Evaluations”, Accessed: 2010, <http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=2&n=9>

¹⁵ See Lynn Davey (1991): “The Application of Case Study Evaluations”, Accessed: 2010, <http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=2&n=9>

words, boundaries help to ensure that a study does not exceed the initial scope of research.¹⁶

“When a case study proposal includes specific propositions it increases the likelihood that the researcher will be able to place limits on the scope of the study and increase the feasibility of completing the project. The more a study contains specific propositions, the more it will stay within feasible limits”.¹⁷ Propositions of my research will be based on theoretical assumptions elaborated by proponents of rational choice and constructivist theories. In other words, I will conduct my analysis in accordance with the key assumptions of above-mentioned theories (See theoretical part of my dissertation)

1.1.4 Selection criteria of case studies

During the selection of my case studies I pursued three key goals, namely to test the applicability of my analytical frame, to integrate into my analysis the role of different immaterial factors and to select case studies which represent some kind of phenomenon and are not easy to explain.

Theory-testing

The most important aim of my empirical part was to test the applicability of my innovative theoretical framework by means of completely different case studies. It manifested itself in four ways.

First, the selected case studies allow me to examine the applicability of my analytical framework to different types of agreement. The Austrian State Treaty and the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty have been aimed at the resolution of inter state disagreements, while the Oslo Accords were designed in order to find a solution to an intra state conflict.

¹⁶ See Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008): “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers, pp. 546-547, Accessed: 2010, <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf>

¹⁷ Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008): “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers, pp.551, Accessed: 2010, <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf>

Second, the chosen case studies allow me to investigate the applicability of the above mentioned theories to different time frames. The period of time which passed between the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty and the Oslo Accords was very large, totalling more than ten years between each treaty. To grasp different time periods is especially important for testing assumptions of the constructivists' theory. Before the end of the Cold War the shortcomings of conventional theories were not yet visible¹⁸ and, therefore, scholarly interest in ideas-based theories in general and social constructivism in particular was very low. The outcomes of negotiation processes were understood and explained through the analysis of material factors alone. Thus, the conclusion of Austrian State Treaty and the Egypt-Israeli Peace Agreement present a unique opportunity to show the relevance of the analysis constructed in the constructivists spirit during the bipolar international system that accompanied the Cold War.

Third, the selected case studies allow me to investigate the applicability of my theoretical framework to a secular philosophy (as the USSR had) and different religious beliefs such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Religion can be described as a set of beliefs which influence behaviour of human beings. Rituals, traditions, institutions, values, perceptions, convictions of a particular society are strongly associated with its religious belief. Thus, conflicting parties which exercise diverse religious practices perceive the world differently in general and the potential situation of changing their relationship from conflict to cooperation in particular. Therefore, the above mentioned case studies provide a possibility to broaden the scope of my analysis.

Fourth, the selected case studies allow me to examine the applicability of my analytical frame to different forms of government (or regime types) such as democracy (Israel), communism (the USSR) and authoritarianism (Egypt). Forms of government are associated with a set of political, cultural and social norms which constitute as well as regulate the interaction of government with society and shape nations' foreign policy course. Thus, the application of rational choice theory and the

¹⁸ See K. M. Fierke (2001): "Critical Methodology and Constructivism", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation", pp.115; Alexander Wendt (1999): "Social Theory of International Politics", pp.4

constructivist theoretical framework to different types of regime will ultimately increase the explanatory power of my innovative framework.

Different immaterial factors

The main focus of a constructivist analysis is immaterial (ideational) factors. Supporters of this theory agree with each other that immaterial factors play a crucial role in international politics, but they analyse different immaterial factors in their attempt to explain processes of social construction or transformation of reality in general and certain political outcomes in particular.¹⁹ Supporters of conventional constructivism usually focus on ideas, norms, identities and cultures, while supporters of critical constructivism tend to explore the role of speeches, arguments, interpretative process and legal reasoning in their analysis of a certain political outcome.²⁰

In order to increase the scope of my theoretical framework the selection of case studies was carried out in a way that allows me to evaluate the impact of different immaterial factors on conflicting parties' decisions to sign peace agreements. Thus, in the empirical part of my dissertation I will explore the role of ideas, norms, identities, cultural constructs as well as processes of interpretation. By doing so, I will have an opportunity to follow not only conventional, but also critical constructivist research design. It is also important to note that the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty and Oslo Accords which concerned the same actor, namely Israel has not been selected accidentally. Those case studies present a unique opportunity to investigate the way of how different actors (the Labor and the Likud parties) within the same social structure perceive and interpret state's prominent "type identities" through different lenses.

Complexity of case studies

¹⁹ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

²⁰ See Jeffrey T. Checkel (2003); Maja Zehfuss (2001); Maja Zehfuss (2002)

It is clear that the utility of my theoretical framework depends to a great extent on its applicability to agreements, the conclusion of which was not easy to explain. In other words, the relevance of my analysis depends on the complexity of case studies. Thus, all selected case studies represent some kind of phenomenon. The most puzzling question regarding the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty is how it is possible to explain a sudden change of the USSR's official policy course of non-evacuation from the seized territory. The Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty represent a remarkable phenomenon in a sense that Egypt, a creator of the pan-Arabism ideology and supporter of the idea to destroy Israel by all available means, became the first Arab country which established a direct line of communication with the Jewish state. A basic puzzle concerning the Oslo Accords is how it is possible to explain why Israel, a far more powerful party in the conflict, agreed to make significant concessions in order to achieve the peace treaty with the weak PLO. All those questions are open for interpretation and required extensive theoretical explanations.

1.1.5 Techniques of analysis, data collection and analyses

The key strength of the case studies method of research is that it allows to collect data from multiple sources through the application of different types of methods.²¹ My dissertation will be mainly based on qualitative methods of research. In same instance, however, I will also apply quantitative technique in order to support my qualitative assumption with some numerical data. For example, qualitative data such as annual economic assistance of the United States to Israel and Egypt can illustrate material motivation of the conflicting parties to conclude a peace agreement. Another case in point can be numerical data with regard to military expenditure of Egypt and Israel and its consequent reduction after the conclusion of the peace accord.

Nevertheless, qualitative method of research is more useful for exploring a sudden change in the behaviour of the conflicting parties. It is based on the assumptions that there is no single understanding of a reality and that all human

²¹ See Rhee, Y.(2004): "What is the Case study?", pp.72, Accessed: 2010, http://www.csus.edu/indiv/r/rheey/Rhee_Case%20Study.pdf; Winston Tellis (1997): "Application of a Case Study Methodology", Accessed: 2010, <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html>

beings are unique in their nature.²² Thus, it helps to look at a certain phenomenon in many different ways. It “provides information about the “human” side of an issue – that is, the often contradictory behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals.”²³

In my dissertation I will use multiple sources of data. I will collect and compare information from books, reports, articles, interviews, official documents as well as legal and occasional papers on the above-mentioned theory in general and on experiences of conflicting parties in particular. I will also analyse different proposals for the resolution of disputes between the conflicting parties, drafts of peace accords as well as final versions of those agreements.

I will compare predicted outcome derived from theoretical assumptions with the actual empirical findings. The goal is to see whether or not the data gathered across the cases is matching with theoretical assumptions.

1.1.6 Composing the findings

In the organisational term this study will be divided into two parts, a theoretical and empirical one.

The theoretical part will include three chapters. The overall objective of the theoretical part is to elaborate and present a consistent and an innovative analytical framework on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice theory and the constructivist theoretical framework for the analysis of political outcomes of different negotiation processes. In this respect, the first chapter will be dedicated to the rational choice theory; the second one will address the constructivist theoretical framework; the final chapter will show the usefulness of the combination of these two theories under the same analytical framework.

The overall objective of the second, empirical part of my dissertation is to show the applicability of my innovative analytical framework to real life. In this

²² See “Qualitative Research Method”, Chapter 5, pp.86, Accessed: 2010, http://www.pathways.cu.edu.eg/subpages/downloads/Research_Chapter_5.pdf

²³ “Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Field Guide”, pp.1, Accessed: 2010, <http://www.fhi.org/NR/rdonlyres/etl7vogszehu5s4stpb3tyqlpp7rojv4waq37elpbyei3tgmc4ty6dunbccfzxtaj2rvbaubzmz4f/overview1.pdf>

respect, I will investigate the conclusion of three completely different peace agreements through the above mentioned theoretical perspectives. The first case study will be dedicated the Austrian State Treaty of 1955; the second one to the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 and the final one to the Oslo Accords of 1993.

Each case study will include the following elements:

- a description of the negotiation process
- an analysis of disputed issues and a reference to various positions that are taken by the conflicting parties during the negotiation process; the outcome of the bargaining game;
- an explanation of the reasoning behind the decision to accept the peace accord through the above mentioned theoretical assumptions.

Theoretical part

The key aim of the theoretical part of my dissertation is to elaborate and to present an analytical framework for the analysis of outcomes of different negotiation processes aimed at the resolution of intra-and inter states conflicts. This analytical framework will be based on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice theory and the constructivist theoretical framework.

The theoretical part of this thesis will include three chapters. The first chapter will be dedicated to rational choice theory. This theory addresses the full range of material factors that influence people's motivations, actions and interests. The second chapter will be dedicated to the constructivist theoretical framework. This theory addresses a full array of ideational factors that shape perceptions, views and behaviours of individuals. The final chapter will analyse the usefulness of the combination of these two theoretical perspectives under the same analytical framework.

The main aim of the first two chapters is to present an overview, key assumptions as well as main shortcomings of these two theoretical approaches in order to discuss how the combination of these perspectives investigate the relationship between material and ideational factors in general and the decision of conflicting parties to sign peace agreement in particular. The final chapter will have two aims. The first aim is to prove that rational choice and the constructivist theories are compatible with each other. The second goal is to explain why from all other theories of international relations, I decided to select these two theories as the most suitable for the analysis of outcomes of different negotiation processes.

1.2 Rational Choice Theory

1.2.1 Introduction to RCT

This chapter will be divided into three parts. In the first part, I will briefly highlight core assumptions of rational choice theory. In the second part, I will underline key critiques against the applications of rational choice theory in political science as well as in international relations. In the third part, I will try to demonstrate that critiques of RCT are not relevant for the purpose of my analysis.

The key aim of this chapter is to address critiques of rational choice theory in order to be able to apply rational choice theory to the analysis of outcomes of peace accords as well as to show that this theoretical framework can be supplemented with other theories in general and with the constructivist theory in particular.

1.2.2 RCT and its key assumptions

Rational choice theory is a very famous theoretical framework in the field of international relations. It is a theoretic perspective that explains both the behaviour of human beings and the outcomes of their actions i.e. ways of how people create and transform a certain social structure in which they interact with each other.

Rational choice approach is more than just one theory. It encompasses many different theories that attempt to explain behaviour of people.²⁴ Thus, its scope is very broad and there are many variants of rational choice theory which enjoy a wide usage in different fields of science such as anthropology, sociology, economics and political science.²⁵

²⁴ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory", pp.101, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>; Steven L. Green (2002): "Rational Choice Theory: An Overview", pp.2, Accessed: 2008, http://business.baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc

²⁵ See Sociology 319 (2003): "Rational Choice Theory (RCT)", Accessed: 2008, <http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/319m703.htm>; Steven L. Green (2002): "Rational Choice Theory: An Overview", pp.2, Accessed: 2008, http://business.baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc

Some researchers study voting paradox, others focus on markets, others analyse “ethnic minority relations”, others investigate problems of collective actions and social norms etc.²⁶

Nevertheless, despite of different focuses and various influences on rational choice theory, it is possible to underline three key assumptions recognised by all forms of rational choose theory.

Firstly, the rational choose theory is committed to a methodological individualism. According to this approach, outcome produced by joint behaviour of people and social developments can be explained by aggregation of individual actions.²⁷

The focus on the individual distinguishes rational choice approach from all forms of theories that based on holistic approach. The main idea of holism is that reality can be understood through the analysis of the whole social system rather than by investigating the sum of the parts of the structure. Supporters of the methodological individualism, in contrast, believe that features of social life in general and political outcomes in particular can be understood through the analysis of separate individual actions.

Secondly, all forms of this theoretical perspective are rooted in the assumption of human instrumental rationality and concerns over maximization of personal benefits.²⁸

According to rational choice theory, human beings are rational actors of the international system and all their actions are ‘rational’ in character. “Actions of individuals are optimally chosen given the preferences of the individual and given the opportunities or constraints the individual faces.”²⁹ Thus, people try to act in a way that would help them to achieve the greatest level of satisfaction.

²⁶ See John Scott (2000): “Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present”, Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

²⁷ See John Scott (2000): “Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present”, Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>; Sociology 319 (2003): “Rational Choice Theory (RCT)”, Accessed: 2008, <http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/319m703.htm>

²⁸ See Sociology 319 (2003): “Rational Choice Theory (RCT)”, Accessed: 2008, <http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/319m703.htm>

²⁹ Sociology 319 (2003): “Rational Choice Theory (RCT)”, Accessed: 2008, <http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/319m703.htm>

“As it is not possible for individuals to achieve all of the various things that they want, they must also make choices in relation to both their goals and the means for attaining these goals.”³⁰

Thus, people tend to calculate all costs and benefits of any action before deciding how to perform.³¹

Thirdly, rational choice theory assumes that individuals are fully concerned with his or her own benefit.³² It is however necessary to note that even though this theoretical framework is based on the notation that individuals tend to maximize expected utility, it realizes that utility is a very subjective concept and, therefore, it can be considered differently by different people.³³ Thus, researchers must take into consideration personal characteristics of individuals. Some people can be characterised as loss-minimizers while others as gain-maximizers. Some individuals can be described as risk-prone while others as risk-averse.

1.2.3 Critique of rational choice theory

In recent years, a greater number of researchers have tried to apply key assumptions derived from rational choice theory to politics. However, the attempt to apply economic variables to political science brought a lot of discussions about the utility of the application of rational choice theory in the field of political science.³⁴

It is possible to underline three main arguments against application of the rational choice theory in political science as well as in international relations that come about from the nature of this theory. The first argument arises from the concept of human rationality and the notation of self-interest.³⁵ The second argument stems from the idea that rational choice theory has limited explanatory

³⁰ John Scott (2000): “Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present”, Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

³¹ See John Scott (2000): “Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present”, Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

³² See Sociology 319 (2003): “Rational Choice Theory (RCT)”, Accessed: 2008, <http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/319m703.htm>

³³ See John Scott (2000): “Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present”, Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

³⁴ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, pp.87, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rrct-ii.pdf>

³⁵ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004)

power because it does not take into account the issue of micro-macro link and devotes little attention to different time periods, cultural as well as ideational factors.³⁶ The final argument is the assumption that rational choice theory suffers from various methodological mistakes.³⁷

1.2.3.1 The rationality postulate

The first argument against the applicability of rational choice theory in political science arises from the concept of human rationality and the notation of self-interest.³⁸

Critics argue that rational choice theorists can hardly predict peoples' behaviour because actions of relevant decision-makers are not always fully rational. Supporters of this opinion believe that people's decisions depend on cultural and psychological influences as well as on institutional constraints.³⁹

They claim that rational choice theory obviously faces obstacles in explaining issues related to altruism, reciprocity, trust and such problems as collective action, social norms and voting paradox.

The problem of collective action refers to the question of how it is possible to explain why people agree to participate in various types of joint action such as engaging in different kinds of protests, participating in elections, taking part in strikes, joining different organisations, associations and unions. Why should people ever agree to do something that is not likely to bring them material benefit? Why should individuals agree to join and to support certain organisations when they can enjoy all advantages provided by them, without becoming members of those organisations?⁴⁰

Critics argue that the fact that people do participate in protests or become a member of organisations contradicts the core assumption of the rational choice theory.

³⁶ See Richerd Munch (1992); Jackson William. A. (2003); Hans-Peter Blossfeld (1996)

³⁷ See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994)

³⁸ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory", pp.87, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rrct-ii.pdf>

³⁹ See Green and Shapiro (1994); John Scott (2000)

⁴⁰ See John Scott (2000): "Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present", Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

One possible response to this critique is an explanation that people take part in a joint action due to their “collective interest”. However, “in groups with larger membership, such as labour union and business lobbies, the contribution of each member to the achievement of collective goals is negligible, so the potential members’ interests would better be served by free riding on others’ contributions than by making pointless sacrifices for the collective benefit.”⁴¹ Thus, the question why would any rational person decide to contribute to the collective action in terms of time, physical effort or economic resources if she or he could not with certainty influence its result, remains open for the consideration.

Mancur Olson attempted to address this question by arguing that collective actions is undertaken due to “selective initiatives” such as compulsory membership or different kind of services provided to the members of an organisation. It is however important to notice that some organisations or associations do not provide “selective initiatives” to its members, but still manage to attract people to join and support them.⁴² Thus, the problem of collective action remains unresolved.

Likewise, the similar problem of voting paradox refers to the question of why individuals decide to participate in elections despite its relatively high cost in terms of time. “In a large election, it is highly unlikely that any single voter will cast the decisive ballot; therefore, for a rational maximizer to invest any resources in voting, such as time, would be irrational”⁴³ Many defenders of the rational choice theory tried to address this issue. For example some researchers argue that this paradox can be explained by the fact that people often value to high the benefits of their participation in election, while other believe that majority of citizens go to the polls due to their civic responsibilities. However, despite of various efforts to find an answer to this paradox, theorists do not share a common opinion with regard to the problem of voter turnout.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “Economic Approach to Politics”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.20

⁴² See Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “Economic Approach to Politics”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.20 ; John Scott (2000): “Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present”, Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

⁴³ James Bohman (1992): “The limits of Rational Choice Explanations” in: James S. Coleman and Thomas J. Fararo (1992): “Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique”, pp.215

⁴⁴ See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994): “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science”. *Economic Approach to Politics*, pp.47-71

The related problem of social norms refers to the question of how it is possible to explain people's voluntary decision to comply with social norms and rules that do not entail them some personal benefit.⁴⁵

To sum up, according to critics' view, problems of collective action, social norms, voting paradox undermine the assumption of rationality. Thus, according to this point of view, application of the rational choice model to the analysis of conflicting parties to conclude or to withdraw from agreement might produce a poor empirical support.

1.2.3.2 Problem of limited explanatory power of RCT

The second serious argument against the use of the rational choice theory in political science as well as in related disciplines stem from the idea that proponents of this theoretical approach try to explain a wide array of social as well as political phenomena without taking into account the social system and by analysing economic factors alone. As a result, they fail to explain the whole complexity of social life.⁴⁶

It is possible to underline three main issues which can be referred to the problem of a limited explanatory problem of rational choice theory. Among these issues: the question of methodological individualism, the role of time as well as cultural and ideational factors in rational choice theory.

The question of methodological individualism

An important critique against the application of the rational choice theory in political science as well as in international relations is derived from the commitment of the rational choice theory to the position of a methodological individualism.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ See John Scott (2000): "Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present", Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

⁴⁶ See Richerd Munch (1992): "Rational Choice Theory: A Critical Assessment of Its Explanatory Power", in: James S. Coleman and Thomas J. Fararo (1992): "Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique", pp.137-160

⁴⁷ See John Scott (2000); Jackson William. A. (2003); Ross Morrow (2002)

The main idea of this position is that all explanations of an analysed phenomenon must be explained through the aggregation of individual behaviour without taking into consideration the existence of structure and its relationship to agents. “Social structures either are absent or have a subordinate place as market imperfections that must be explained through individual behaviour”⁴⁸.

Critics however argue that structure is a very important element that should be incorporated in any theoretical framework aimed at explaining human behaviour. They claim that it is very hard at best and impossible at worst to explain any kind of individual decision making without reference to structure.

The role of time in rational choice theory

The question of the role of time in rational choice theory refers to the critics’ argument that advocates of rational choice theory do not pay enough attention to such an important aspect as time.⁴⁹ This problem manifests itself in two ways.

Firstly, rational choice theorists assume that different tenses (past, present and future) are autonomous from each other. Thus, they tend to conduct their analysis under static conditions, namely by assuming that agents’ preferences and constraints to which people are exposed remain unchanged during the past, present and future.⁵⁰

“Many rational choice scholars simply assume preferences and constraints as unproblematically given, and they unrealistically pretend that social processes are in equilibrium or, at least, always move swiftly towards them after an external upheaval is introduced.”⁵¹ Since preferences and constraints can vary at different time periods, critics argue that rational choice theorists are not always capable to provide a proper explanation regarding behaviour and interaction of human beings at present.

⁴⁸ Jackson William. A. (2003): “Social Structure in Economic Theory”, Journal of Economic Issues, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5002002132>

⁴⁹ See Hans-Peter Blossfeld (1996); Ross Morrow (2002)

⁵⁰ See Ross Morrow (2002): “Resisting Rational Choice Theory”, pp.161-162, Accessed: 2008, http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/archive/JCRv1n1_morrow159.pdf

⁵¹ Hans-Peter Blossfeld (1996): “Macro-sociology, Rational Choice Theory, and Time. A Theoretical Perspective on the Empirical Analysis of Social Processes”, pp.190, Accessed: 2007, <http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/2/181.full.pdf+html?sid=97e3c52b-b71b-4567-ad1c-23df7165c724>

Secondly, rational choice theorists do not take a proper account for a longer time period because in their analysis time is not dynamic. As a result, critics argue that rational choice theorists can not provide successful predictions of individuals' actions and their outcome in the future. "Good sociological theories should not only allow us to explain (or understand) a given outcome at present with reference to the closed past, but also help us to predict outcomes in an uncertain future with reference to the known past and present conditions."⁵² This problem, however, is beyond my analysis because the aim of my dissertation is not to predict behaviour of conflicting parties in the future but to explain their decision to conclude agreements ex post facto. For the purpose of my study I will need to take the issue of time into account only as a tool for explaining an outcome at past. Thus, critics' argument that rational choice approach is incapable to predict outcomes in an uncertain future is deemed irrelevant for my analysis.

The role of cultural and ideational factors in rational choice theory

The question of the role of cultural and ideational factors in social theory refers to critics' argument that rational choice theory is unable to explain a wide range of political phenomena because it focuses exclusively on the descriptions of economic features of social life.⁵³

Proponents of this view criticize rational choice theorists for measuring actors' preferences in a genuine economic term without taking into consideration psychological, sociological, ideational and cultural factors. They argue that people's behaviour are not only shaped by economic calculation of costs and benefits but also depends on their ideas, beliefs, feelings, identities, values and emotions.

Thus, supporters of this opinion would probably argue that decision of conflicting parties to conclude agreements depends not only on economic factors but also on their ideas, beliefs, emotions etc.

⁵² Hans-Peter Blossfeld (1996): "Macro-sociology, Rational Choice Theory, and Time. A Theoretical Perspective on the Empirical Analysis of Social Processes", pp.182, <http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/2/181.full.pdf+html?sid=97e3c52b-b71b-4567-ad1c-23df7165c724>

⁵³ See Richard Münch(1992); Michael Taylor (1993); James Bonman (1992); Thomas J. Scheff (1992)

1.2.3.3 Methodological problem of the RCT

The fourth argument against the applications of rational choice theory in political science rooted in researches attempt to produce “a universal theory of politics” and the use of method -driven approach to research.⁵⁴

In the book “Pathologies of Rational Choice theory” Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice theory suffers from a verity of methodological mistakes. “Empirical progress has been retarded by what may be termed method-driven, as opposed to problem-solving, research. Rather than ask “What causes X?” method driven research begins with the question “How might my preferred theoretical or methodological approach account for X?”⁵⁵ As a result, according to the authors’ opinion, rational choice theory provides little assets for understanding politics.

Green and Shapiro underlined in their book six main methodological problems of this theoretical perspective that arise at different stages of research. There are the following:

Post hoc theory development

Under the problem of “post hoc theory development” Green and Shapiro understand the practice of constructing a rational choice model that matches to the already known empirical data. According to authors this procedure precludes researchers from testing their assumption in a proper way. “Post hoc theories are not only tested inadequately, the manner in which they are developed tends to be in tension with the enterprise of empirical testing.”⁵⁶ “Ad hoc theory amendments” make the theory’s assumptions hard to check.

Formulating test

⁵⁴ See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1996): “Pathologies Revisted: Reflections to Our Critics”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.235, 238

⁵⁵ Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1996): “Pathologies Revisted: Reflections to Our Critics”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.238

⁵⁶ Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994): “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science”. Economic Approach to Politics, pp.36

Donald Green and Ian Shapiro underline two key methodological failings that take place during formulating tests. There are “slippery” and “vaguely operationalized” predictions.

The “slippery” predictions mean that the rational choice explanations usually include a wide range of unobservable terms that are immeasurable or very difficult to measure. Green and Shapiro argue that the high ratio of unobservable over observable terms generate a testability problem.⁵⁷

Under these circumstances, rational choice scholars can always claim that any received empirical outcome confirms a theory. “When any hypothesis fails, the researcher is always in a position to argue that a successful prediction was thwarted by an offsetting tendency or temporary aberration.”⁵⁸ Thus, it becomes very hard to falsify rational choice assumptions.

The “vaguely operationalized predictions” refer to the procedure of shifting from “point predictions” to “marginal predictions”. The former means predictions of outcomes under static circumstances, while the latter indicates predictions of results that are affected by changing conditions such as alternation in aims, beliefs or environmental restriction. Authors argue that when “point predictions” fail, rational choice theorists are moving to “marginal predictions”, and vice versa. “It is logically possible that only one sort of prediction will survive empirical testing, but availability of two standards of evaluation affords defenders of a model more opportunity to claim support for its predictions.”⁵⁹ As a result, it becomes easy to confirm the theory and very hard to prove the failure of rational choice approach.

Selecting and interpreting evidence

Green and Shapiro underline three pathologies that occur during selection and interpretation of evidence.

⁵⁷ See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994): “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science”. *Economic Approach to Politics*, pp.38-41

⁵⁸ Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994): “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science”. *Economic Approach to Politics*, pp.40

⁵⁹ Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994): “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science”. *Economic Approach to Politics*, pp.41

First, Green and Shapiro argue that rational choice scholars are looking only for confirming instances while neglecting disconfirming evidence. As a result, rational choice theorists illustrate rather than test their hypotheses.⁶⁰

Second, Green and Shapiro claim that rational choice researchers employ the practice of “projecting” evidence from their theory. According to authors view, theorists either argue that a particular fact proves the accuracy of theory without providing a full explanation of the fact or simply claim that a certain data is consistent with RCT. One case in point is the assumption that bad weather decreases voter turnout.⁶¹

Finally, Green and Shapiro write that rational choice theory suffers from the problem of “arbitrary domain restriction”. Specifically, theorists tend to conduct their analysis in domains where theory is likely to work and withdraw from areas which they can not explain. Authors argue that this practice encourage rational choice researchers to look for supporting evidence, while neglecting illustrations that are not possible to verify. Consequently, the practice of selecting confirming instances places some difficulties on testing the theory. “If the appropriate domain within which a theory is to be tested is defined by reference to whether the theory works in that domain, testing becomes pointless.”⁶²

According to Green and Shapiro, above-mentioned methodological problems preclude rational choice researchers from formulating empirically testable assumptions or from examining their notations in an accurate way. As a consequence, rational choice hypotheses are poorly tested and hard to disprove.

1.2.4 Response to critique

Critics argue that the methodological errors as well as problems rooted in the rationality postulate and questions related to a limited explanatory power of rational choice theory are serious shortcomings of this approach. The adequacy of

⁶⁰ See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994): “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science”. *Economic Approach to Politics*, pp.42-43

⁶¹ See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994): “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science”. *Economic Approach to Politics*, pp.43-44

⁶² Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994): “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science”. *Economic Approach to Politics*”, pp.45

the application of rational choice theory to the study of outcomes of peace agreements requires me to provide an adequate response to critiques directed against the applicability of this theoretical approach. In order to be able to accomplish this task I will devote my attention to the arguments elaborated by supporters of the rational choice theory. There are Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004), Jeffery Fridman (1996), Dennis Chong (1996), Deniel Diemeier (1996), Norman Schofield (1996)

1.2.4.1 Response to problems rooted in the rationality postulate

Much of the criticism of rational choice theory is based on the assumption that the rationality hypothesis is not consistent with a wide variety of actors' actions.⁶³ Stephen L. Quackenbush claims that this criticism is derived from two significant confusions and, therefore, is deemed irrelevant.

The first confusion arises from the attempt to equate this theoretical framework with economic factors. This misunderstanding often occurs because the rational choice theory was first used in economics and many advocates of this theoretical approach in political science applied economic variables to analyze behaviour of individuals. They mostly concentrated on actors' preferences. The realisation of the fact that economic as well as political behaviour can not be understood without analysing beliefs of individuals and the way they construct their beliefs about environment and other individuals, facilitated the evolution of this theoretical approach. Through the process of the evolution rational choice theory was forced to develop more complex notation of rationality, to increase its emphasis on beliefs and institutions. It moved beyond the economic domain to integrate into its analysis assumptions elaborated by psychologists, sociologists and other social scientists⁶⁴

⁶³ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory", pp.87, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

⁶⁴ See Norman Schofield (1996): "Rational Choice and Political Economy" in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): "The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed", pp.190-193

Thus, it is wrong to think that all motivations of rational individuals can be limited to their attempt to maximize economic benefits. “Demonstrating that people do not choose according to economic preferences does not demonstrate that they do not choose rationally; it only means that they are not solely motivated by economic gain.”⁶⁵

The second related confusion occurs from a basic failure to distinguish correctly two different concepts of rationality, namely procedural and instrumental. Under procedural rationality, “actors are said to make a cool and clearheaded ends-means calculation.”⁶⁶ Under instrumental rationality, actors perform according to their preferences. In contrast to procedural rationality, it does not form any opinion regarding preferences. “Instrumental rationality is only concerned whether people act in accordance with their motivations, regardless of what these motivations may be.”⁶⁷ Thus, according to the instrumental rationality assumption, a self-interested actor is one that pursues his or her own interest, regardless of whether these interests are reasonable in the common sense or not. Since the rational choice theory is based on the concept of instrumental rationality, it is consistent with a broad range of motivations and behaviours of human beings.⁶⁸

Thus, in this sense people who participate in joint actions, go to polls, obey social norms or commit suicide are just as rational as these individuals who do not perform or commit above listed activities. In other words, I believe that problems of collective action, social norms and voting paradox do not contradict the instrumental rationality postulate in general and the rational choice theory in particular .

Moreover, it is also important to notice that many scientists, who focus on problems derived from the concept of rationality, do not take into account the fact that the this postulate can not be tested in a proper way. It is, however, wrong to give up any key parts of a theory that can not be tested in a significant way. Instead

⁶⁵ Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, pp.94, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

⁶⁶ Verba (1961), in: Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, pp.94, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

⁶⁷ Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, pp.94, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

⁶⁸ Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, pp.88-94, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

of dropping central features of any theoretical framework, such as rationality premise, it is always possible to adapt it to troubling observed phenomena.⁶⁹

1.2.4.2 Response to the problem of a limited explanatory power of RCT

As I demonstrated below, rational choice theory is based on the assumption of “instrumental rationality”.⁷⁰ These facts enable me to address the problem of a limited explanatory power of this theory.

There are two possible solutions to this problem. The first solution is to broaden the scope of rational choice theory by incorporating into this theoretical framework social factors that are relevant for my study. The second solution is to admit that this theoretical framework indeed has a limited explanatory power and to supplement it with other theories. Below I consider the appropriateness of these two ways of addressing the problem.

As I showed in a previous section, rational choice theory has undergone the process of the evolution. Therefore, its domain has been already enlarged to some extent. In early research under rational choice design, scientists typically assumed that preferences and restrictions are given and that individuals are completely aware about all possible outcomes of their actions. Not surprisingly they have not been very successful in predicting actors’ behaviour in general and under the situation of strong uncertainty in particular.⁷¹

However, as rational choice theory has evolved, it has been obliged to acknowledge the importance of social factors. It has been forced to incorporate in its framework the study of beliefs and to capture to some degree important effects of the cultural environment on people calculations of costs and material benefits of any action. For example, the attempt to enlarge the scope of the theory from economics to political economy has pushed rational choice scholars to increase its

⁶⁹ See Daniel Diemeier (1996): “Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.61-63

⁷⁰ Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

⁷¹ See Norman Schofield (1996): “Rational Choice and Political Economy” in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.189-209

emphasis on human beliefs and to admit that institutions help to resolve key problems of human interaction. It became clear that the question why people agree to pay for the production of public goods such as national defence, infrastructure and domestic security can only be explained by analysing both people's institutionally stimulated preferences and beliefs about other people willingness to spend their money on public goods.

However, still, the dominant tendency of rational choice approach is to consider time as a neutral factor without taking into consideration the past and both medium and more extended time horizons.⁷² Moreover, although most of rational choice theorists in our days do not ignore ideational factors, they treat them as secondary important. These variables in their analysis have no independent explanatory power. Actors use them strategically, like any other resource in their disposal order to enhance their own material interests. Thus, despite the evolution of rational choice theory, it is not possible to incorporate all kinds of factors that help to evaluate the result of different negotiation processes aimed at the resolution of conflicts into this theoretical framework without undermining its initial conditions.

Thus, in order to avoid this problem it is necessary to supplement the rational choice framework by other theoretical approaches. Is it however possible to add some additional theoretical assumptions without undermining initial conditions of rational choice approach? As I demonstrated below, rational choice theory is based on the concept of instrumental rationality and, therefore, it is fully consistent with a broad range of people's motivations and behaviours.⁷³ Thus, it is possible to draw on insights from other theoretical approaches without undermining its key assumptions.

In my dissertation, I will supplement rational choice theory by the constructivist approach because it has three important features which are relevant for my study.

First, it seeks to grasp the full array of ideational factors that shape actor's attitude and behaviour (such as identities, beliefs and ideas). Second, it provides an

⁷² See Ross Morrow (2002): "Resisting Rational Choice Theory", pp.161-162, Accessed: 2008, http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/archive/JCRv1n1_morrow159.pdf

⁷³ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory", Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

understanding of micro-macro relationship. Third, it takes into account different time periods and investigates social processes of transformation.

In the section aimed at the constructivist theoretical approach I will consider the above mentioned issues in a more detailed way.

To sum up, in the in the course of the evolution, rational choice theory has increased its explanatory power to some extent. It, however, can not cover the whole diversity of social factors that are crucial for my study. Nevertheless it is possible to supplement the rational choice approach by the constructivist theory without undermining its key assumptions. Thus, ideational factors, the macro-micro links and the issue of time will be analysed through the latter theoretical framework.

1.2.4.3 Response to methodological problems

Above I underlined Donald Green and Ian Shapiro list's of six methodological pathologies of rational choice theory. Authors argue that these shortcomings reduce the explanatory power of the theory. I, however, disagree with their view due to two main reasons.

The first reason is that rational choice is not one theory. Rational choice theory is a “descriptive phrase” that is served to describe different theories of international relations such as power theory, transition theory, conflict theories etc.⁷⁴

Green and Shapiro write that through so-called pathologies researchers make rational choice theory hard to check. “They characterize rational choice theory as bordering on nonfalsifiability because when one rational choice theory is “falsified” another is created to explain the disconfirming evidence.”⁷⁵ This would only be an obstacle to research if rational choice theory were one theory. Since,

⁷⁴ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, pp.92,101, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/trct-ii.pdf>

⁷⁵ Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, pp.101, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/trct-ii.pdf>

however, it is not a case, it is impossible to falsify rational choice theory. Thus, this critique has no strength.⁷⁶

The second reason is that I believe that so-called pathologies do not produce problems in most domains of research in general and in my area of study in particular. Moreover some of them fulfil a variety of useful purposes in the research.⁷⁷ Therefore, most of pathologies are necessary tools for evaluating decisions of conflicting parties to conclude peace accords.

Post hoc theory development pro-arguments

Green and Shapiro criticised rational choice researchers for adjusting their theories to the troubling phenomenon. They underlined two possible ways of doing this. The first one is “arbitrary domain restriction”. It is an explicit way of modification that is achieved by means of concentrating on domains where theory is likely to work and withdrawing from areas where it does not work. The second one is “post hoc theory development”. It is an implicit way of modification that is realized by broadening the definition of rationality to include insights from other disciplines.⁷⁸

Both the “arbitrary domain restriction” and the “post hoc theory development” are common methods applied by researchers in order to avoid irrelevance of their theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, the practice of “post hoc theory development” is more suitable for my area of study due to below mentioned two reasons.

The first reason is that rational choice theory is based on the concept of instrumental rationality and, therefore, it is consisted with a broad range of motivations and behaviours.⁷⁹ Thus, it is almost always possible to adopt rational

⁷⁶ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, pp.101, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

⁷⁷ See Deniel Diemeier (1996): “Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.59-70

⁷⁸ See Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “Economic Approach to Politics”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.15; Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (2004): “Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science”. Economic Approach to Politics”, pp.44-45

⁷⁹ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): “The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory”, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

choice theory to troubling observed phenomena by supplementing it by other theories.

The second reason is that the goal of my dissertation is not to test a theory against its key assumptions. The aim of my research is to understand to what extent rational choice theory provides explanations regarding the outcomes of peace accords and how it can contribute to my analysis.

Since the practice of “post hoc theory development” is used in order to incorporate empirical observations into theory,⁸⁰ it is a very useful tool at my disposal which would improve the explanatory power of rational choice theory.

“Post hoc theorizing should be applauded by those interested in the empirical merit of rational choice theory –since post hoc amendments are designed to incorporate empirical finding into theory. Only if one’s aim is to test a theory against its prepositions will one object to post hoc theory explanations-since such amendments make the theory’s predications unfalsifiable.”⁸¹

Thus, the practice of “post hoc theory development” is sometimes a very useful method of research. Many scientists believe that it is a very helpful tool of conducting investigations. For example both Dennis Chong and Daniel Diermeier write that “post hoc theory development” is a very important feature of research. In order to prove this view they show that successful empirical theories such as the evolutionary theory and Newtonian physics used this tool. “By definition, ad hoc modification increases the empirical power of a theory and therefore is a progressive development”.⁸²

Practice of searching for confirming evidence – pro-arguments

I believe that the practice of searching for confirming instances is an important tool at my disposal that will help me to explain the behaviour of conflicting parties.

⁸⁰ See Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “Economic Approach to Politics”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.11

⁸¹ Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “Economic Approach to Politics”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.11

⁸² Dennis Chong (1996): “Rational Choice Theory’s Mysterious Rivals”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.45

As I already pointed out, the aim of my research is not to provide solutions or to predict circumstances in which conflicts are likely to be resolved. My goal is to analyze and explain complex phenomena without producing explicit predictions and exact policy proposals. “If the task of empirical research is to see whether, and to what extent, a theory explains a particular slice of reality rather than to see whether reality falsifies a theory, positive evidence will be even more valuable than the negative kind.”⁸³

Moreover, I disagree with an opinion that rational choice researchers are only looking for confirming data, while neglecting disconfirming evidence. The key concern of rational choice theory is often the questions that are very difficult to resolve (such as voting paradox). It shows that researchers do not ignore disconfirming evidence. Furthermore, explanatory success of a theory depends not only on its power to explain complex phenomena but also on its ability to pose an exact question of what has to be explained. Since rational choice researchers often return to difficult issues and reformulate questions that have to be asked, they sometimes increase the explanatory power of a theory by changing the question of research. For example, rational choice researchers addressed the question of voting in ways it had not been considered in previous theories. They changed the focus of analysis by trying to explain voting rather than non-voting. Consequently, they did not only contribute to research by changing the theoretical focus but also enhanced the explanatory strength of rational choice theory.⁸⁴

The “slippery” predictions pro-arguments

Green and Shapiro argue that the high ratio of unobservable over observable terms generates a testability problem and, therefore, causes a serious challenge to rational choice theory.⁸⁵ I however disagree with this opinion because of the following two reasons: firstly, rational choice theory contains only two

⁸³ Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “Economic Approach to Politics”, in: Jeffrey Friedman “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.19

⁸⁴ See John Ferejohn und Debra Satz (1996): “Unification, Universalism, and Rational Choice Theory”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.72,75

⁸⁵ Daniel Diermeier (1996): “Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.64

unobservable terms, namely ideas and preferences.⁸⁶ Thus, the ratio of immeasurable over measurable variables is not very high. Secondly, many successful theories contain unobservable terms. Among them are general equilibrium theory, macroeconomics, Newtonian physics etc.⁸⁷ The presence of unobservable terms is not only unavoidable for above mentioned theories but also crucial for their success. Such terms help to avoid generalisations, enlarge the content of a theory and facilitate the developments of new prognoses. “Since theoretical terms (i.e. unobservable terms) are not only unavoidable, but fulfil a variety of useful purposes, such as allowing comparative statistics analysis, prohibiting theories contain theoretical terms would thus not only eliminate all empirical science since Archimedes, but also restrict political science to theoretically trivial generalisation of particular data sets.”⁸⁸

1.3 The constructivist theoretical framework

1.3.1 Introduction

This chapter of my dissertation will be dedicated to the content and the applicability of the constructivist theoretical approach for the study of outcomes of peace agreements. This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will be dedicated to reasons why this theoretical approach became popular in international relations and to the description of its key types. In the second part I will address three key assumptions of constructivism. The first assumption is that reality is socially constructed.⁸⁹ The second feature is that agent and structure have a “mutually constituted” nature.⁹⁰ The final assumption is that ideational (immaterial) factors matter in world politics.⁹¹ I will show that depending on types of analysis, constructivists proceed differently with these above mentioned assumptions in their

⁸⁶ Daniel Diermeier (1996): “Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.64

⁸⁷ Daniel Diermeier (1996): “Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.64

⁸⁸ Daniel Diermeier (1996): “Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.65

⁸⁹ See Maja Zehfuss (2001); Alexander Wendt (1999); Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967)

⁹⁰ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); Alexander Wendt (1999)

⁹¹ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998); Alexander Wendt (1999)

research. Therefore, it is very hard to underline general critique directed against this theoretical approach.

The key goal of this chapter is to show the ways of how I will apply key assumptions of the constructivist theoretical framework to my case studies. Another major aim of this chapter is to prove that constructivism can be supplemented with rational choice approach.

1.3.2 Rise of constructivism in IR and its types

Constructivists study a socialisation process by which human beings obtain knowledge from their life experience. It attempts to provide an explanation regarding social construction and transformation of the reality. Unlike other theories of international relations such as realism and liberalism, constructivism is not a theory.⁹² It is also not a homogenous approach to world politics that can produce a single set of assumptions. Although constructivism based on a greater amount of different disciplines, it has no direct roots in international relation theory.

In political science in general and in the international relations in particular, constructivism addresses various issues such as construction of identities, the role of norms, beliefs and ideas in world politics, the effect of culture on human beings, the power of international organizations and NGOs, the question of the structure and actor etc.

After the end of the Cold War the interest of researches in the constructivist theory has grown dramatically because the shortcomings of international relations theories became more visible. The main analytical approaches of international relations, neorealism and neoliberalism not only failed to predict the end of the Cold War and the break up of the Soviet Union but also had no adequate explanations with regard to these events.⁹³ “In the 1990s, traditional “positivists” approaches in the field

⁹² See John Gerard Ruggie (1998): “Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization”, pp.34; Lars G. Lose (2001): “Communicative Action and the World of Diplomacy”, in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): “Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation”, pp.181

⁹³ See K. M. Fierke (2001): “Critical Methodology and Constructivism”, in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): “Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation”, pp.115; Alexander Wendt (1999): “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.4; John Gerard Ruggie (1998): “Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization”, pp.11

began to lose the high ground, faced with their failure to account for the end of the Cold War or dramatic changes taking place in the world of international politics.”⁹⁴

In contrast to international relations theories, constructivists offer better tools for explaining the sudden change in Soviet foreign policy and end of the Cold War by incorporating in their analytical framework the role of identities, beliefs, regulative and constitutive norms. According to the constructivist school, the ideas produced by Gorbachev’s New Thinking facilitated a fundamental modification of Soviet Union foreign and domestic policy priorities. Soviets’ changing beliefs about the Cold War produced not only new norms of security but also changed the reality. “Gorbachev’s New Thinking was a deep, conceptual reassessment of what the US-Soviet relationship ‘was.’ . . . It may be that objective conditions were such that the Soviets ‘had’ to change their ideas about the Cold War but that does not change the fact that in an important sense those ideas were the Cold War, and as such changing them by definition changed the reality.”⁹⁵

Nevertheless, despite the growing popularity of constructivism after the end of the Cold War, it is impossible to provide an exact description of it. There is no agreed definition of constructivism because it is more than just one theory per se.⁹⁶ Constructivism encompasses a broad range of different theories that aim to address the question of people’s behaviour by emphasising the social nature of international relations.

Like rational choice theory, constructivist theoretical framework is applied to different fields of science such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science and international relations. “Constructivism has a prominent presence in several disciplines, including sociology (Alfred Schütz (1967), Berger and Lukman (1966), Giddens (1984), Luhmann (1997), and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), history (Hayden White (1987)), psychology (Jean Piaget) and anthropology (Benedict Anderson (1983)).⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): Introduction: Constructing International Relations, *The Next Generation*, pp.6

⁹⁵ Alexander Wendt (1999): “Social Theory of International Politics” and Alexander Wendt (1998): “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 101–117, in: Nina Tannenwald and William C. Wohlforth (2005): “The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold War”, pp.7, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/7.2tannenwald01.pdf>

⁹⁶ See John Gerard Ruggie (1998): “Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization”, pp. 34

⁹⁷ Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): “Four Levels and A Discipline”, in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): *Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation*, pp.44

Since there are many different types of constructivism, it is very hard to distinguish its key variants. Nevertheless, it is possible to name three main types of constructivist approaches to the study of international relations. There are conventional and critical/radical variants.

Conventional constructivism is most closely associated with Alexander Wendt, Martha Finnemore, Michael Barnett, Ted Hopf, John Ruggie, Kathryn Sikkink and Peter Katzenstein. This type of constructivism is dominant in the US and very much recognized in the field of international relations.⁹⁸ Key interests of conventional constructivism lie in examination of the role of norms, ideas, beliefs and identities in shaping political outcomes. It attempts to build a bridge between diverse theoretical perspectives of international relations.⁹⁹

Critical/radical constructivism enjoys a wide usage in Europe¹⁰⁰ and has to be identified with such famous author as Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf, Richard Ashley, whose intellectual assumptions are rooted in critical social theory, which was partly elaborated by Anthony Giddens and Jürgen Habermas.¹⁰¹ Nicholas Onuf was the first researcher, who introduced the term constructivism to IR in 1989. With the book “World of Our Making”, he presented the first variant of this theoretical approach to international relations. However, the significance of this event received little attention on the part of international community. Constructivism became a popular theoretical approach only after Alexander Wendt has published in 1992 the article “Anarchy Is What States Make of It”.¹⁰²

Many advocates of critical/radical constructivists stress the importance of power and consider language as a key feature of the creation of reality. Since many of them use linguistic approaches in their research, proponents of this type of constructivism put a great emphasis on language and discourse in their analysis of political

⁹⁸ See Jeffrey T. Checkel (2003): *Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)*, pp.2, Accessed: 2008, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2003/papers/wp03_15.pdf; Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp. 167, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

⁹⁹ See Jeffrey T. Checkel (2003): *Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)*, pp.2, Accessed: 2008, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2003/papers/wp03_15.pdf

¹⁰⁰ See Jeffrey T. Checkel (2003): *Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)*, pp.2, Accessed: 2008, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2003/papers/wp03_15.pdf

¹⁰¹ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp.398, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁰² See Maja Zehfuss (2002): “Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality”, pp.11

outcomes.¹⁰³ For example, Nicholas Onuf was greatly influenced by the later Wittgenstein's view that "the limits of my language are the limits of my world."¹⁰⁴

The key aspect that distinguishes conventional from critical constructivism is their different attitude towards language. The latter criticise conventional constructivists for not taking seriously into consideration the nature and the role of language.¹⁰⁵

Although in my dissertation I will mostly refer to the assumptions elaborated by advocates of conventional constructivism, in some case studies I will employ a number of ideas expressed by supporters of critical/radical constructivism as well.

1.3.3 Key features of constructivism

Despite of different variants, focuses and various influences on constructivism, it is possible to spell out three key assumptions recognised by all forms of constructivism. There are the following:

- First, it is mutually recognised among constructivists that reality is socially constructed and not static.¹⁰⁶
- Second, advocates of different forms of constructivism attempt to resolve the agent-structure problem by assuming that they are "mutually constituted" elements as a starting point of analysis.¹⁰⁷
- Third, constructivists agree with each other that ideational (immaterial) factors provide meaning to material ones.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, they are crucial in determining political outcomes and explaining human action.

¹⁰³ See Jeffrey T. Checkel (2003): *Social Constructivism in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)*, pp. 3. Accessed: 2008, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2003/papers/wp03_15.pdf; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", pp. 398, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>; Maja Zehfuss (2002): "Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality", pp.15-22; Maja Zehfuss (2001): "Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Constructing International Relations"

¹⁰⁴ John A. Hall (1993): "Ideas and the Social Sciences", in: Judith Goldstein and Robert o. Keohane (1993): *Ideas and Foreign Policy Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, pp. 35

¹⁰⁵ See Maja Zehfuss (2001): "Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Constructing International Relations", pp.69-72

¹⁰⁶ See Maja Zehfuss (2001); Alexander Wendt (1999); Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon (2001)

¹⁰⁷ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); Alexander Wendt (1999); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon (2001)

1.3.3.1 The social construction of reality

Constructivists argue that reality is socially constructed and can change over time. “At the heart of constructivist theory is the idea that significant aspects of international relations are socially constructed, that is, historically contingent rather than necessary consequences of the nature of international politics.”¹⁰⁹

According to constructivism philosophy, the social world is constructed by ideational rather than material factors.¹¹⁰ A key goal of constructivism is to understand the processes in which individuals and different groups participate in the creation of their reality. They try to figure out the ways of how the process of social construction takes place at both national and international level.

The term “social construction” was first mentioned by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their famous book “The Social Construction of Reality”, published in 1966. Since then, this term became a key feature of constructivist theoretical framework.

The central argument of this book is that everyone in society participates in the process of construction of reality and that the “sociology of knowledge” must analyze the processes in which this takes place. It must examine the ways of how different societies establish and maintain their realities as well as differences between these realities. ““Sociology of knowledge” will have to deal not only with the empirical variety of “knowledge” in human societies, but also with the processes by which any body of “knowledge” comes to be socially established as “reality.”¹¹¹

It is important to note that although supporters of different variants of constructivism agree with the basic assumption that reality is socially constructed, they have different views with regard to two issues underlined below:

First issue: different level of construction

¹⁰⁸ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998); Alexander Wendt (1999)

¹⁰⁹ Patrick Thaddeus and Daniel H. Nexon (2001): “Whence Causal Mechanisms? Comment on Legro”, pp.1, Accessed: 2008, http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/Inor/Dialogue_IO/jackson_nexxon.pdf

¹¹⁰ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001), Alexander Wendt (1999)

¹¹¹ Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967): “The Social Construction of Reality, The Treaties in the Sociology of Knowledge”, pp.3

At the level of philosophical abstraction, constructivists operate with a different level of construction. They adopt two different approaches of exploring the level of construction of social reality. There are realists (so-called constructive realism) and idealists (so-called constructive idealism) approaches.¹¹²

According to constructive realism, agents have only an epistemic influence on the world i.e. agents construct knowledge but the existence of reality does not depend on the existence of agents.¹¹³

The most radical variants of constructivism accept the idealist version of reality. According to this version, agents have not only an epistemic but also an ontological impact on the world i.e. the existence of world and its nature fully depends on agents' knowledge of it.¹¹⁴ "In the extreme solipsist understanding, reality only exists if we know about it. From the antirealist stance follows that, in the final analysis, everything is socially constructed. Furthermore, we contribute, through our scientific practice, to the construction of the reality we are investigating and describing. Whether deliberate or not, we may even change the social world that we are interested in understanding."¹¹⁵

In my dissertation I will adopt the realist approach of the social construction of reality. I will not claim that everything is socially constructed. I will take some elements of reality as a given as a starting point of my analysis.

Second issue: The role of different people in the process of social construction

Constructivists are not united with regard to the question of how to evaluate contribution, which individuals and groups bring to the process of social construction. Critical constructivists put more emphasis on the issue of power. They link ideas to power. As a result, supporters of this type of constructivism believe that some powerful individuals and groups play a greater role in the process of social

¹¹² See Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Four Levels and A Discipline", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation", pp.39

¹¹³ See Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Four Levels and A Discipline", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation", pp.39

¹¹⁴ See Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Four Levels and A Discipline", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation", pp.39-40

¹¹⁵ Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Four Levels and A Discipline", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen(2001): "Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation", pp.40

construction. Social (conventional) constructivists in contrast view ideas as independent variables from power and, therefore, they often do not distinguish the role of some powerful actors in the process of establishing social reality.¹¹⁶

In my dissertation I will adopt the assumption derived from critical constructivists. Namely, I will assume that some powerful individuals or groups play a greater role in the process of social construction which leads to the conclusion of agreements aimed at the resolution of conflicts. It is important to note that the role of individuals and some powerful groups will vary depending on the case study. It is logical that decision-makers in states which have an authoritarian political system have much more power, in comparison to those who operate in a democratic environment. Thus, for example in the case of the Austrian State treaty it is obvious that since the USSR has a totalitarian political system, leaders of the communist party of the Soviet Union had great influence on the resolution of the Austrian problem. After the death of Stalin, Khrushchev became almost a unilateral decision-maker. Therefore, he played a crucial role in the process of social construction of reality which led to the resolution of the Austrian problem. In case of the Oslo Accord, which was concluded between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the situation is not that obvious as with the totalitarian USSR because there were many major architects of the Oslo Accord. Therefore, in my analysis of this case study I will need to take into account the role of various individuals and groups.

1.3.3.2 Structure and agency debate

Secondly, constructivists address the question of structure and agency by finding the middle ground between methodological individualism and methodological holism. The debate regarding the superiority of structure or agency in determining social reality and their influence on human behaviour is a key question of both

¹¹⁶ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", pp.398, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

classical and contemporary sociology. There are two famous approaches related to this debate.¹¹⁷

The first approach is derived from theories committed to the notation of methodological individualism. These theories highlight the superiority of agency over structure. According to this approach, agents construct and transform social reality. Structure under this approach has no generative qualities because it does not constitute actors.¹¹⁸

The second approach stems from theories committed to the radical version of methodological holism. These theories stress the superiority of structure over agency. According to these theories, actors socialised and act in social structures of society, which restrict or provide them the opportunity to perform. Thus, social structures shape behaviour of agents. Agents under this approach have no generative qualities because they do not construct and reconstruct structures. “Structure-orientated approaches treat social structures as causal variables and derive actors and interests from them. Structures, not agents, are ontologically primitive and the starting point for analysis.”¹¹⁹

To sum up, advocates of the structure-oriented approach tend to embrace a “top-down conception of social life”, while proponents of the agent-oriented approach tend to favour a “bottom-up” analysis of social life.¹²⁰ “Whereas the latter aggregates upward from ontologically primitive agents, the former works downward from irreducible social structures.”¹²¹

Constructivists attempt to find a balance between these two dramatically different approaches. The agent-structure problem was first introduced in international relations by Alexander Wendt in 1987. This problem was derived from sociology, in particular from the work of Anthony Giddens.¹²² “The central issue regards the relationship between structures “out there” that constrain human and social action and

¹¹⁷ See Wikipedia: Structure and Agency, Accessed: 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure_and_agency

¹¹⁸ See Martha Finnemore (1996): “National Interest in International Society, Chapter 1: “Defining States Interests”, pp. 14

¹¹⁹ Martha Finnemore (1996): “National Interest in International Society, Chapter 1: “Defining States Interests”, pp. 14

¹²⁰ Alexander Wendt (1999): “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.26

¹²¹ Alexander Wendt (1999): “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.26

¹²² See K.M. Fierke (2001): “Critical Methodology and Constructivism”, in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): “Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation”, pp.123

the freedom of the individual agent, that is, whether structures determine individual behaviour, or individuals are capable of acting as agents to change structures.”¹²³

Constructivists argue that taking either structure or agency as a given as the starting point of analysis will make the view of world politics very limited. Therefore, constructivists consider structure and agency as complementary elements.¹²⁴ This idea was derived from Anthony Giddens, who introduced the concept of structuration. According to this notation, structures and agents depend on each other.¹²⁵ “Social structures are the result of the intended and unintended consequences of human action, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated by an irreducible structural context.”¹²⁶

According to the constructivist ontology the structures and agents are not only “mutually constituted” but also have a dynamic nature. They are always in a process of development. Agents socialize in a certain social context which influences their actions. In turn, actors determine their own social context when new thoughts and ideas expressed by them enter into this system.¹²⁷

Constructivists agree with each other that structures and agents are “mutually constituted”, but differ with regard to the detail specification of agents and structures.¹²⁸ There are a number of questions that are differently approached by different authors. Among them are the following: What are the most relevant levels and types of structure? What are the key elements that make social structures? What kind of elements and effects of social structure/structures are the most relevant? Who are the relevant actors and what kind of properties do they have? The notation of structure and agent in international politics implies different things to researchers.¹²⁹ Below I will address each above mention question in a separate section. The aim of

¹²³K.M. Fierke (2001): “Critical Methodology and Constructivism”, in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): “Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation”, pp.123

¹²⁴ See Alexander Wendt (1987), in: Erik Ringmar (1997): “Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History”, in: Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (1997): “The Future of International Relations. Master in the Making”, pp.272

¹²⁵ See Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

¹²⁶ Alexander Wendt (1987), in: Erik Ringmar (1997): “Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History”, in: Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (1997): “The Future of International Relations. Master in the Making”, pp.272

¹²⁷ See Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf; John Gerard Ruggie (1998): “Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization”, pp.26

¹²⁸ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp. 393, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹²⁹ See Alexander Wendt(1999): “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.189, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp. 393, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

this work is to show that it is possible to look at the concept of structure and agency in a different way and that the in-depth specifications of above mentioned questions depend on the intellectual beliefs of authors as well as on the task of research and issues analyzed. I will conclude each section elaborated below with a short description of how I will specify the content and properties of structure and agency in my dissertation.

Levels of structures

It is possible to define two levels of structures. There is the level of domestic structures and the level of international structures.¹³⁰

Constructivists interested in the former level of structures, conduct their analysis by defining relevant structures within the domestic environment of states. In this kind of analysis, relevant agents are usually taken from the domestic environment. Thus, the role of agents can be assigned to any individual, decision-maker or group of individuals etc, who operate at the level of domestic structures but can be influenced from the outside world. For example Herman in his analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has focused on the USSR domestic structure and Soviet elites as relevant actors who managed to transform the existed structure through creating new ideas for solving the country's problems.¹³¹

Theorists interested in the latter level of structures, conduct their analysis by specifying relevant structures within the international environment. In this kind of analysis, the role of agent is typically assigned to states or to important decision-makers who represent the interest of a certain state. However, in some case international organizations or activist groups who operate at the level of international structures are assumed to be relevant agents. For example, Kathryn Sikkink tried to show the increasing importance of non-governmental actors and transnational civil society.¹³² He conducted his study at the level of the international system.

¹³⁰ See Jackson: "Social Constructivism", Chapter 6, pp.170-172, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

¹³¹ See Robert G. Herman (1996): "Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War", in: Peter J. Katzenstein (1996): "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics", pp.271-317

¹³² See John Gerard Ruggie (1998): "Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization", pp.27

Constructivists differently approach above described levels of structures. Some put great emphasis on the domestic structures, some stress the importance of the international structures and some integrate both levels of structures in their analysis.

In my dissertation I mostly focus on domestic level structures. However, in some situation I will need to shift my attention to the level of international structures.

Effects of structures

Despite different attitudes of researchers toward different levels and elements of structures, constructivists usually believe that both domestic and international structures can have two kinds of effects on agents, causal and constitutive. Causal effect means that structures can shape agents' behaviour. Structures both constrain and enable actors to act. Constitutive effect means that structures can shape and change actors' properties including their identities and interests.¹³³

In my dissertation I will investigate both causal and constitutive effects of structures on agents' behaviour and properties.

Types of structures

Most constructivists in general and those who refer themselves to the conventional school of thought in particular, acknowledge the existence of three key structures defined by Alexander Wendt. There are material structure, structure of interests and ideational structure (immaterial).¹³⁴ It is almost mutually accepted in the field of international relations that all above mentioned types of structures are important, there is, nevertheless, no united opinion with regard to their relative weight. For example materialists (including advocates of rational choice theory) pay more attention to material structure in their attempt to show the origin of interests, while idealists tend to focus on ideational structure as a source of interests.¹³⁵ Constructivists, in contrast to idealists and materialists, believe that all those

¹³³ See Alexander Wendt (1999): "Social Theory of International Politics", pp.139-145, 165-178, Jackson: "Social Constructivism", Chapter 6, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf; John Gerard Ruggie (1998): "Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization", pp. 26

¹³⁴ See Alexander Wendt (1999): "Social Theory of International Politics", pp.139

¹³⁵ See Alexander Wendt (1999): "Social Theory of International Politics", pp.140

structures are coherent and equally important for explaining any political outcome. “Without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all.”¹³⁶

Thus, according to constructivist view, ideational structures provide meaning to the material ones. Consequently, these structures create a structure of interests.

It is important to note that theorists tend to distinguish different types of structures only for analytical purposes in order to be able to explain a social system in a better way. At the end, any given social system has only one structure that is made up of different elements. Therefore, the core task of constructivists is to combine these structures into a single social system. “It may make sense for analytical purposes to distinguish between “material” structure and “ideational” structure, but in the end a social system has just one structure, composed of both material and ideational elements. The task of structural theorizing ultimately must be to show how the elements of a system fit together into some kind of whole.”¹³⁷

Elements of structures

Material structure

The key feature of constructivism is to understand the ways of how immaterial factors help to determine political outcomes.¹³⁸ Without supplementing it with other theories, constructivism is lacking a comprehensive explanation regarding elements of material structures. Therefore, I will need to refer to other theoretical sources.

In my dissertation, material structures will be understood in a broad term. They will cover a wide variety of political, economic and strategic interests of conflicting parties. I, however, will not attempt to design a universal, applicable to all case studies-description of material structures. This task would be impossible to fulfil because the nature and content of those structures might vary from situation to situation. It is, nevertheless, necessary to find some analytical tools that will help me to link agents’ material interests to these structures. In my opinion, rational choice

¹³⁶ Alexander Wendt (1999): “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.139

¹³⁷ Alexander Wendt (1999): “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.139, 190

¹³⁸ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998); Alexander Wendt (1999)

theory is perfectly suitable for fulfilling this task. According to this theory, people tend to calculate all costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do and how to act.¹³⁹ Thus, it is possible to link agents (conflicting parties) to material structures through quantitative and /or qualitative analysis of costs and benefits of all available options faced by conflicting parties, namely to conclude a peace agreement or to keep the status quo.

Ideational structure

The term ideational structure and its elements are not clearly determined in constructivists research. It can include a great number of different elements such as cultures, norms, beliefs, customs, ideas, rules, ideologies, religions, discourses, languages, values etc. Ideational structure can be divided into two levels, namely microstructure and macrostructure. “Microstructure is the pattern of relations between most basic elements of social life, that cannot be further divided and have no social structure of their own. Macrostructure is thus a kind of 'second level' structure, a pattern of relations between objects that have their own structure.”¹⁴⁰ According to constructivism, elements of ideational structure are mainly based on common knowledge.¹⁴¹

However, the exact specifications of the content, level and the most relevant elements of structure depend on researchers and issues they investigate.¹⁴² In order to show the importance of ideational structure, constructivists conduct the same kind of research as other social scientists do. They collect different evidence and analyze them through a variety of research tools such as qualitative, quantitative and interpretative methods. Depending on the nature of research, they pick the most appropriate tool or combination of different methods.¹⁴³ “Designing constructivist

¹³⁹ See John Scott (2000): “Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present”, Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

¹⁴⁰ Wikipedia, Online Encyclopedia: “Social Structure”, Accessed: 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_sociology

¹⁴¹ See Alexander Wendt (1999): “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.141-142

¹⁴² See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp. 393, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁴³ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp. 396, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

research is not fundamentally different from designing other kinds of research. Constructivists, like any other researchers, use the full array of available tools.”¹⁴⁴

In my dissertation, I will not attempt to specify the exact content, level and most relevant elements of ideational structure that can be applied to all analysed case studies. The substantive description of structures will be provided case by case. In my analysis of the Austrian state treaty I will mostly focus on communist ideology, new ideas and norms as the most relevant elements of Soviet ideational structure. In the case of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty and Oslo Accords I will need to take into account a greater amount of cultural elements.

In my study I will collect information with regard to ideational structures from different sources that are widely used in other types of social analysis. I will assess this information mostly through interpretative methods of research.

Agents and their properties

Constructivists agree with each other on a key assumption that structures and agents have a “mutually constituted” nature.¹⁴⁵ Agents socialize in a certain social environment which influences their identities, power, interests, culture, language etc. These elements effect actors’ preferences, interests and actions. In turn, actors have a potential not only to regulate but also to change existing structures by expressing new ideas, thoughts, principles and beliefs or by interpreting old norms in a new way.¹⁴⁶ “Political system are remade or changed through actors’ practice. Therefore, fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through their practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international relations.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp. 396, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁴⁵ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁴⁶ See Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

¹⁴⁷ Kratochwil, in: Maja Zehfuss (2001): “Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil”, in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): “Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation”, pp.63

However, constructivists do not provide detail specifications of relevant individuals, their properties and ways of how they regulate as well as change structures.¹⁴⁸

Depending on the topic of research, appropriate agents could be these who exercise direct control over existing structure (states, individual politicians, etc.) or those who have no actual authority to govern (activists group, economic actors, international and nongovernmental organizations, etc.).

Constructivists in their attempt to explain mechanisms of construction of social reality and possible processes of structural transformation focus on alternations of different types of agents' properties such as identities, ideas, language, power or culture etc. Advocates of the conventional school of thought tend to focus on identities, ideas, norms and culture as crucial elements of structural change. For example for Alexander Wendt identities are the basis for transformation¹⁴⁹; for Michael Barnett and Martina Finnemore its agents' practice of interpretation and their rational-legal, delegated, moral as well as expert authorities¹⁵⁰; for Peter Katzenstein culture plays a key role in the process of construction of national security paradigms.¹⁵¹

Supporters of critical constructivism, in contrast, tend to focus on the linguistic properties of agents as key factors of structural change. For example for Nicholas Greenwood Onuf ("World of Our Making", 1989) the basis for social construction of reality and structural transformation is language and speech acts.¹⁵² According to the author, speech acts may be institutionalized into rules and thereby change structures.¹⁵³ "Any given language precedes its individual speakers and thereby constrains how they communicate; at the same time. Their use of that language can change it over time-and so the practice alters the structure."¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", pp.393, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁴⁹ See Alexander Wendt (1999): "Social Theory of International Politics", Maja Zehfuss (2002): "Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality", pp.12-29

¹⁵⁰ See Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004): "Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics"

¹⁵¹ See Peter J. Katzenstein (1996): "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics"

¹⁵² See Maja Zehfuss (2001): "Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation", pp.58-63; Maja Zehfuss (2002): "Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality", pp.19-22

¹⁵³ See Maja Zehfuss (2001): "Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation", pp.59

¹⁵⁴ John Gerard Ruggie (1998): "Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization", pp.26

In my dissertation I will try to explain processes of social construction and transformation of the reality through the analysis of actors' identities, ideas, cultural constructs, and processes of interpretation. In doing so, I will have an opportunity to follow not only conventional, but also critical constructivist research design.

1.3.3.3 Immaterial factors

Thirdly, the focal point of a constructivist analysis is immaterial (ideational) factors.¹⁵⁵ Constructivists argue that people's interactions and behaviours can not be understood through the analysis of material factors alone. They believe that human relations are mainly based on ideational factors. Although constructivists do not deny the importance of material aspects in international relations, they argue that cultural factors such as ideas and beliefs give meaning to material aspects of world politics. "Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place."¹⁵⁶

Ideational factors shape actors and explain their behaviour at the domestic as well as at the international level. According to the constructivist assumption, the international system is a human creation constituted by a full array of ideas, norms, thoughts and beliefs.¹⁵⁷

All Constructivists believe that immaterial factors play a crucial role in world politics, but they focus on different immaterial factors in their attempt to explain processes of construction of social reality and its transformation in general and certain political outcomes in particular. For example, advocates of conventional constructivism typically focus on ideas, norms, identities and cultures, while

¹⁵⁵ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998), Alexander Wendt (1999)

¹⁵⁶ John Gerard Ruggie (1998): "Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization", pp.33

¹⁵⁷ See Jackson: "Social Constructivism", Chapter 6, pp.162, Accessed: 2008,
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

supporters of critical constructivism tend to explore the role of speeches, arguments and legal reasoning as mechanisms of social construction.¹⁵⁸

Below I will provide a theoretical specification of immaterial factors that will be integrated in my analytical framework of analysis of outcomes of different agreements aimed at conflict resolutions. There are ideas, norms, beliefs, cultures and identities.

Ideas, Norms and Beliefs

Norms and ideas play a crucial role in research conducted in different fields of social sciences, including psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science. One of the main goals of constructivist empirical research in international relations is to show that norms and ideas matter in the international as well as domestic politics.¹⁵⁹ Since much of the constructivists work focuses on norms and ideas, these immaterial factors are the most define in constructivist theoretical framework. This distinguishes this theoretical approach from most of social science theories including realism and RCT which pay little attention to norms and ideas. Although liberals accept the possibility that norms and ideas can change political outcomes, they do not seek to explain their sources. Moreover, advocates of liberal theory typically focus on formal and liberal types of norms. Constructivists, in contrast, focus on all kinds of possible norms and try to explain their casual as well as constitutive effects. “Constructivists do not claim to understand the extraordinarily complex processes regarding constitutive rules fully (or even mostly). But neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists lack even a space for them in their ontology”¹⁶⁰

In my dissertation I will characterize ideas and norms in a simple way which is often used in a constructivist research design. I will define ideas as opinions, principle, beliefs or convictions that are held by individuals.¹⁶¹ Norms will be viewed as “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of

¹⁵⁸ See Jeffrey T. Checkel (2003): *Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)*, pp.2, Accessed: 2008, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2003/papers/wp03_15.pdf

¹⁵⁹ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp. 393, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁶⁰ John Gerard Ruggie (1998): “Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization”, Chapter I: What makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”, pp.25

¹⁶¹ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane: “Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change”, pp.3

actors.”¹⁶² Ideas can be private and subjective, while norms are always shared and intersubjective.¹⁶³ When norms become institutionalized, they can limit public policy choice and influence the decisions of politicians long after the goals of its original advocates have changed. Ideas, however, through process of institutionalization can acquire properties of norms.¹⁶⁴

Types of norms and ideas

It is possible to define four key types of norms and ideas. There are world views, principled (normative) beliefs, causal beliefs and policy perceptions.¹⁶⁵

World views

World views are an organized collection of ideas and beliefs through which individuals view the world. “World views are embedded in the symbolism of culture and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse.”¹⁶⁶ This type of beliefs comprise at least the following three views:¹⁶⁷

- Views about ontology i.e. beliefs about reality and the nature of being.
- Views about ethics i.e. beliefs about right and wrong
- Views about cosmology i.e. beliefs about the nature of the universe

Thus, world views include a wide variety of beliefs. These beliefs, for example, can be based on religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam etc) or on political ideologies (marxism, communism, capitalism, fascism etc). Therefore, understanding

¹⁶² Martha Finnemore (1996): “National Interest in International Society”, pp.22

¹⁶³ See Martha Finnemore (1996): “National Interest in International Society”, pp.22

¹⁶⁴ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change”, pp.12-13

¹⁶⁵ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change”, pp.7-8; Tannenwald (2005), in: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.167

¹⁶⁶ Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change”, pp. 8

¹⁶⁷ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change”, pp.8; Wikipedia: “Ontology”, Accessed: 2008, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology>; Wikipedia : “Ethics”, Accessed: 2008, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics>; Wikipedia: “Cosmology”, Accessed: 2008, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmology>

the impact of world views on politics in general and foreign policy in particular requires a detailed analysis of culture.

Principle beliefs

Principled (normative) beliefs are beliefs about right and wrong as well as just and unjust.¹⁶⁸ Those beliefs are based on values and attitudes and can be covered by world views. However, in contrast to the latter beliefs, they are purely normative. Moreover, world views can incorporate a greater amount of beliefs, including different, opposing to each other principled views. “Principled beliefs are often justified in terms of larger world views, but those world views are frequently expansive enough to encompass opposing principled beliefs as well. For instance, although many opponents of slavery justified their arguments with references to Christianity, Christianity had tolerated slavery for almost two millennia.”¹⁶⁹

Causal beliefs and policy prescriptions

Causal beliefs are beliefs about cause-effect as well as means-end relationships. Those beliefs provide guidelines or strategies for individuals on how to attain their policy aims and objectives.¹⁷⁰

Policy prescriptions are ideas aimed at addressing a particular problem. In other words, policy prescriptions can be described as a set of pragmatic ideas elaborated by policymakers through processes of specification of solutions aimed at the solving of specific policy problems.¹⁷¹

It is important to note that below provided categorization of beliefs is a simplification and abstraction. In real life, all four types of ideas may be linked.¹⁷² Nevertheless, it is useful for the purpose of my analysis to differentiate these four

¹⁶⁸ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change”, pp.9

¹⁶⁹ Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change”, pp. 9

¹⁷⁰ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change”, pp. 10, Tannenwald (2005), in: Social Constructivism: Chapter 6, pp.167

¹⁷¹ See Tannenwald (2005), in: Social Constructivism: Chapter 6, pp.167

¹⁷² See Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework”, in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): “Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change”, pp.10-11

types of ideas because their ability to change and to influence political outcomes depends on their types. Thus, above mentioned categorization might help me to understand ideas' impact on decisions of conflicting parties to conclude or to withdraw from peace agreements in a better way.

Effects of norms and ideas

Different types of ideas and norms have different effects on construction and transformation of social reality. For the purpose of my dissertation it is important to bear in mind that changes in principled beliefs and world views have a greater impact on agents and structures than changes in either causal beliefs or policy prescriptions have.¹⁷³ However, the former beliefs are not very flexible and therefore, have smaller potential for changes, than the latter have.

According to constructivism, norms and ideas are important in a many different ways. They can have a great number of constitutive and regulative effects on agents and structures.¹⁷⁴ It is possible to underline at least six common effects of norms and ideas that are present in a constructivist research design. These are the following:

Norms and actors interests

*Norms/ideas can shape actors' interests and preferences.*¹⁷⁵ Constructivists working on this issue often try to show that norms can influence actors' preferences in ways that not simply reflect interests of strong actors. Constructivists "produced well-documented empirical studies showing the effectiveness of norms, which could not be easily reduced to interests of powerful states, in such diverse areas as foreign aid, opposition to slavery, piracy, trafficking in women, science policy, development, racism, and laws of war."¹⁷⁶ These theorists typically focus on international norms,

¹⁷³ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change", pp.10

¹⁷⁴ See Alexander Wendt (1999); Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein (1996); Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro (1996)

¹⁷⁵ See Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro (1996): "Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise", in: Peter J. Katzenstein (1996): "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics", pp.462

¹⁷⁶ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", pp.396, Accessed: 2008,

rather than on domestic rules. It is however obvious those domestic-level norms also shape actors' interests. For example, Peter Katzenstein in his analysis of states responses to terrorism in Germany and Japan has shown the ways of how domestic norms and ideas influence the conduct of internal security politics in both countries.¹⁷⁷

Norms and behaviour of actors

*Norms/ideas can regulate actors' behaviour.*¹⁷⁸ These types of norms provide guiding principles for action. Regulative norms can influence actors' behaviour even in a situation when no obvious economic or strategic motivations are present. For example Martha Finnemore argues that international organizations have power to create, promote and interpret norms. She gathered empirical data which show the ways of how states adopt norms in their national politics, which not always enhance their national interests. The case in point is the ability of international organizations to create impersonal rules which provide initiatives for states to participate in humanitarian intervention, when their interests are not at stake.¹⁷⁹

Norms and means

*Norms/ideas can affect the ways actors link their preferences to policy choice.*¹⁸⁰ In other words, they can help to solve particular policy problems and define the means that actors consider acceptable and effective for accomplishing their policy goals.

For example, Nina Helpern analyzed the impact of causal norms in socialist countries during the Cold War. She claimed that leaders in countries not under the control of the USSR adopted Stalinist ideas as means of solving their post revolutionary problems and for achieving their policy goals, namely uncertainty over

<http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁷⁷ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change", pp.22-23; Peter Katzenstein (1993): "Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan", in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change", pp.265-297

¹⁷⁸ See Alexander Wendt (1999); Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein (1996)

¹⁷⁹ See Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro (1996): "Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise", in: Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics", pp.462; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004): "Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics"

¹⁸⁰ See Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro (1996): "Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise", in: Peter J. Katzenstein (1996), "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics", pp.463

what was the socialist ways of conducting policy and the need to find an agreement on this new policy course.¹⁸¹

It is important to note that not only effectiveness but also the character of agents and their normative beliefs determine which means are acceptable. Thus, actors can perceive some means as efficient, but still reject them due to normative constraints and their self-understanding identities. The case in point is Finnemore's study of military intervention. She argues that although states now have broader humanitarian goals than during the Cold War, they are less willing to conduct unilateral intervention due to their normative beliefs about inappropriateness of such actions.¹⁸²

Norms and agents

*Norms/ideas can constitute agents including their identities.*¹⁸³ More precisely, norms through process of socialization can become a part of identity. For example, Michael Barnett in his paper "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East" has shown this effect of norms. According to the author, norms of pan-Arabism strongly affected not only inter-Arab politics but also their national identities. Another case in point is the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. New Thinking course pursued by Gorbachev not only shaped the behaviour of the USSR at the international as well as at domestic level but had a profound effect on Russian national identities.¹⁸⁴

Norms and structures

Norms/ideas can change existing structures. According to constructivists' point of view, both the domestic and the international structures might change

¹⁸¹ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change", pp.14-15; Nina P. Halpern (1993): "Creating Socialist Economies: Stalinist Political Economy and the Impact of ideas", in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political change", pp.87-111

¹⁸² See Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro (1996): "Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise", in: Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics", pp.463-465

¹⁸³ Alexander Wendt (1999): "Social Theory of International Politics"; Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein (1996)

¹⁸⁴ See Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro (1996): "Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise", in: Peter J. Katzenstein (1996), "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics", pp.465, 467-468; Michael N. Barnett (1996): "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East", in: Peter J. Katzenstein (1996): "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics"

dramatically because people and states can start to consider each other differently and thus interpret old principles in a new way or invent norms that may not have anything in common with the old ones.¹⁸⁵ For example Burley and Mattlis showed the ways of how norms shape legal structure within the EU. According to the authors, professional groups working the European Court of Justice (ECJ) through their shared understandings create new norms or interpret old ones in new ways. As a result, they change the existing legal structures at the level of the European Union.¹⁸⁶

In my dissertation I will not only attempt to show that beliefs matter but also will try to figure out which type of norms or ideas matter and how they influence conflicting parties.

Identities and culture

Constructivists emphasize the importance of identities and culture in context of construction and transformation of social reality. This distinguishes this theoretical framework from other theories of international relations including RCT which treat identities as given and pay little or no attention to the issue of culture. “The instabilities of the post-Cold War world have revived interest in culture and identity among scholars of world politics. Taking for granted in realist, neorealist and neoliberal depictions of an exciting world, questions of state identity, sovereignty, and national and ethnic identification have found new resonance, in particular among authors who subscribe to a constructivist ontology of becoming.”¹⁸⁷

At the level of philosophical abstraction, constructivists define culture “as an evolving system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions...Culture shapes practice in both the short and long term. At the moment of

¹⁸⁵ See Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf; John Gerard Ruggie (1998): “Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization”, pp.26

¹⁸⁶ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp.402, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁸⁷ Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prügl (2001): “Feminism: Constructivism’s Other Pedigree”, in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): “Introduction: Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation”, pp.78

action, culture provides the elements of grammar that define the situation, that reveal motives, and that set forth a strategy for success.”¹⁸⁸

The above mentioned specification of culture at the level of philosophical abstraction does not provide sufficient information for conducting empirical research. Simply assuming that “culture matters” is not enough for my research. It is necessary to provide substantive explanation about the impact of culture on political outcomes.

I believe that it is possible to perceive culture in two ways. First, it can be considered as a key factor that shapes identities of actors. Second, it can be seen as an essential part of national identities. In my dissertation I will refer to the former categorization of culture. Thus, I will not explicitly distinguish effects of culture from effects of identities on political outcome.

Although all constructivists acknowledge the importance of identities in determining political outcomes, they, however, did not manage to produce a single theoretical framework for analyzing their effects on politics. The main reason of this shortcoming is that constructivists differ significantly in the way they employ the term identity. The lack of the agreed definition of this notation produces the ongoing difficulty in identity research. As a result, this issue, in contrast to norms and ideas, are not very much specified in a constructivist theory and requires a case-by-case detail description.¹⁸⁹ Nevertheless, constructivists still managed to develop four general assumptions about identities.

First, according to constructivism, identities and interests are connected. “Identities and interests must be intimately connected for the simple reason that what we take our self to be, determines which interests we take our selves to have.”¹⁹⁰ The main contribution of constructivism is its ability to demonstrate that identities influence actors’ preferences and behaviour.¹⁹¹ Thus, application of this assumption to my cease studies will mean that decision of conflicting parties to conclude or to withdraw from peace agreement to a great extent depends on their identities.

¹⁸⁸ M. Hudson (1997), in: Jeffrey S. Lantis (2006): “Strategic Culture from Clausewitz to Constructivism”, *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum*, pp.9, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-claus.pdf>

¹⁸⁹ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp.398-400, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁹⁰ Erik Ringmar (1997): “Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History”, in: Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (1997): “The Future of International Relations. Master in the Making”, pp.280

¹⁹¹ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp.398, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

Second, constructivists seek to show that identities and interests are not given by materialistic factors, but instead always socially constructed by beliefs held and transmitted by individuals.¹⁹² In my dissertation I will assume that changes in principled beliefs or world views have a profound impact on construction of new identities or transformation of old ones.

Third, according to constructivist ontology, actors may have multiple types of identities.¹⁹³ It is, however, important to note that many of actors' identities are only possible to separate for analytical purpose.

Finally, constructivists believe that through interaction, identities can change over time.¹⁹⁴ Although it is generally assumed by constructivists that identities of actors can change, researchers, however, have different opinion regarding the time frame of this change. Some believe that identities are subject to frequent transformation, while others argue that they can only evolve slowly. In my dissertation I will follow the latter view.

Above mentioned assumptions are only the starting points of any analysis conducted in a constructivist vein. They ways of how authors proceed with these stating assumptions depend on the type of their research.

I think that it is possible to underline two main types of identity research. The first one is based on analysis of "territorially defined identities". The second one is based on investigation of national identities rooted in religion, class, gender etc.

Most constructivists are committed to the former type of research, namely they focus on "territorially defined identities" i.e. nations-states. The greatest contribution to this type of research was made by Alexander Wendt, who managed to identify the most prominent kinds of states' identities. There are: "type identities" and "role identities". "Type identities" refer to some common characteristics of state such as types or forms of state. For example, a monarchical state, a communist state, a

¹⁹² See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998)

¹⁹³ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", pp.399, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁹⁴ David Rousseau and A. Maurits Van Der Veen (2005): "The Emergence of a Shared Identity. An Agent- Based Computer Stimulation of Idea Diffusion", pp.288, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.albany.edu/~dr967231/articles/RousseauJCROct2005.pdf>

capitalist state, an Islamic state etc. Thus, one state may have many “type identities”.¹⁹⁵

According to Wendt, “role identities” are necessarily relational. A person can not adequately comprehend oneself without a comparison to others. Formation of “role identities” entails the understanding of the role of the “others”. “Role identities are the product of dyadic relationships among countries. States may be friends, rivals, or enemies.”¹⁹⁶

I believe that an analysis of outcomes of agreement amid at resolution of conflicts often requires attention not only to territorially defined identities but also to national identities. National identities, however, are not properly defined and often poorly addressed by constructivists. Therefore, in order to overcome this problem, I will apply Wendt’s classification of “types identities” not only to the level of nation-state but also to society at home.

At the national level, “type identities” will be referred to some common characteristic of society. For example, Palestinian people have multiple type identities- an Arab identity, an Islamic identity and a Palestinian identity.

1.4 Both theories in the same analytical framework

My analytical framework is mainly based on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice and constructivist theories.

Since such an analytical approach to research is quite innovative, it generates a few questions that require some explanations. The first question is why I believe that these two theories can be applied together without undermining their key theoretical as well as methodological assumptions? The second question is why I think that from all other theories of international relations these two theories are the most suitable for the analysis of outcomes of different negotiation processes? The first part of this

¹⁹⁵ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp.399, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

¹⁹⁶ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp.399, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

chapter will be dedicated to the first question, while the second part will address the second question.

1.4.1 Applicability of my analytical framework

The first question I already addressed to some extent in the previous section of this chapter. Namely, I figured out that rational choice theory can be supplemented with other theories as long as we accept the argument that it is based on the concept of instrumental rationality.¹⁹⁷ The instrumental rationality assumption makes no specific claims regarding people's preferences. According to this concept, actors are not solely motivated by economic benefit. They just behave in accordance with their motivations, regardless of what these motivations may be. Thus, rational choice theory is fully consistent with a broad range of people's motivations and performance.¹⁹⁸

Constructivism in some sense is similar to rational choice theoretical framework. It is more than just one theory. It includes a wide variety of different theories. Therefore, like rational choice theory, constructivism can be supplemented with other theories as long as reality is considered as "socially constructed".¹⁹⁹ Findings of constructivists have diverse results because they are not the predictions of constructivism, but of the "political arguments that inform it". In other words, every piece of research conducted under constructivist vein requires a variety of substantive specifications that can come from different sources.²⁰⁰ Thus, the key assumptions of constructivism are only a starting point of analysis. Constructivism "has a large, almost unlimited potential for integrating other theories within it: all kinds of structures, unites, or mechanisms can be tolerated as long as they are seen as socially constructed. Constructivism thereby has an almost frightening potential as metra-

¹⁹⁷ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory", Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rRCT-ii.pdf>

¹⁹⁸ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory", pp.94-95, Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rRCT-ii.pdf>

¹⁹⁹ See Ole Wæver (1997): "Figure of International Thought: Introducing persons instead of paradigms", in: Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (1997): "The Future of International Relations. Master in the Making", pp.25

²⁰⁰ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", pp. 393-396, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

theory subsuming all others.”²⁰¹ Thus, at the theoretical level these two theories are consistent with each other.

Leaving, however, a theoretical issue behind, I face another problem at the methodological level. Rational choice theory is based on methodological individualism²⁰², while constructivism attempts to find a middle ground between methodological individualism and methodological holism. Thus, rational choice theory analyse independently existing individuals and their motivations as a starting point of analysis of political outcomes. Constructivists in contrast tend to focus on intersubjective beliefs which are not always “reducible to individuals”.²⁰³ Therefore, from the first look it seems to be impossible to supplement these dramatically different theoretical approaches with each other. Nevertheless, rational choice theory does not preclude the possibility that culture socially constructs agents. Constructivism, on another hand, assumes that peoples socialize in a certain social context which constructs their actions. Thus, it is possible to imagine that individual subjective motivations are based on intersubjective understandings rooted in a particular society. Therefore, it is possible to supplement these theories with each other without undermining its key methodological assumptions.

Thus, despite that these two theories operate at a different level of abstraction and have completely different methodological as well as theoretical foundation, they are compatible with each other as long as we accept the notation of instrumental rationality and admit the fact that reality is socially constructed.

1.4.2 Two theories to the analysis of peace accords

The fact that these two theories are perfectly consistent with each other, helps me to address the second question asked above, namely why I think that from all other theories of international relations these two theories are the most suitable for the

²⁰¹ Ole Wæver (1997): “Figure of International Thought: Introducing persons instead of paradigms”, in: Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (1997): “The Future of International Relations. Master in the Making”, pp.25

²⁰² See John Scott (2000): “Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present”, Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm> ; Sociology 319 (2003): “Rational Choice Theory (RCT)”, Accessed: 2008, <http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/319m703.htm>

²⁰³ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp.399, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

analysis of outcomes of different negotiation processes. It is possible to underline at least five reasons why I think this way.

The first main reason is that rational choice theory and the constructivist theoretical framework is applicable to a wide variety of situations because neither constructivism nor rational choice makes any particular predictions about political outcomes.²⁰⁴

They only provide an analytical frame for considering the political world but they do not offer any particular specifications regarding the content of social structure and agents. “Like rational choice theory, it (constructivism) offers a framework for thinking about the nature of social life and social interaction, but makes no claims about their specific content. In rational choice analysis, agents act rationally to maximize utilities, but the substantive specification of actors and utilities lies outside the analysis; it must be provided before analysis can begin. In a constructivist analysis, agents and structures are mutually constituted in ways that explain why the political world is so and not otherwise, but the substantive specification of agents and structures must come from some other source.”²⁰⁵ Thus, in contrast to realism, which mostly focuses on external conflicts (interaction between states) rather than on internal wars, the constructivism and rational choice theories can be applied to the analysis of various types of negotiation processes aimed at the resolution of interstate conflicts as well as intrastate wars under the condition that each case study will be supported with a concrete, specific description of the content of social structure, relevant actors and their wishes.

The second related reason is that both the constructivism and rational choice are neutral to conflict and peace.²⁰⁶ I believe that the analysis of outcomes of agreement aimed at resolution of conflicts requires neutral attitude towards conflict and peace. Without having such an attitude I will risk making a wrong assumption before I start my analysis. Most theories of international relations, however, make particular predictions about this issue. For example, liberalism is based on the idealist

²⁰⁴ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp. 393, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

²⁰⁵ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, pp. 393, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

²⁰⁶ See Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein (1996): “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security”, in: Peter J. Katzenstein (1996): “The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics”, pp.39

assumptions. Thus, it tends to favour a peaceful resolution of conflicts. Realism, in contrast, adopts an assumption of “a Hobbesian war of all against all”. Therefore, it tends to favour conflict rather than peace.

The constructivism and rational choice theory do not predict peace or conflict. They are neutral in a sense that they do not favour a particular result.

The third reason is that rational choice theory is perfectly designed for the analysis of material factors that may determine the outcome of peace accords because of three reasons. First, since material interest of conflicting parties might vary from situation to situation, it is necessary to pick such a theoretical approach that will allow me to undertake a case by case analysis and to cover a great amount of immaterial factors such as political, economic and strategic interests. Rational choice theory permits me to carry out such an analysis. It does not attempt to explain a particular outcome only by focusing on one factor. In contrast to realism, power is not a central element of the analysis for rational choice theory. Through the costs and benefits analysis it seeks to map a wide variety of material factors without favouring one factor over another. Second, rational choice theory is possible to apply at the level of individual actors. It aims not only to investigate states’ actions but also to map the full array of individual behaviour. Finally, it is possible to underline the key conditions under which rational choice theory is likely to produce the most accurate explanation of a specific political outcome. These conditions are present in my case studies. First, the courses of action available to relevant individuals should be limited. Second, the costs as well as benefits attached to alternative courses of action should be well defined.²⁰⁷

The forth reason is that the constructivist theoretical framework is perfectly designed for the analysis of immaterial factors that may determine outcome of peace accords due to three reasons. First, I believe that the analysis of outcomes of peace agreements requires attention to different types of immaterial factors. Constructivism is not preoccupied with only ideas or identities. It seeks to address a wide variety of immaterial factors such as ideas, beliefs, norms, identities, culture etc.

Second, constructivist research can be conducted at different levels. It can be domestic or international, as well as at individual or nation-state levels.

²⁰⁷ See Michael Taylor (1996): “When Rationality Fails”, in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): “The Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed”, pp.225

Third, constructivism, in contrast to liberalism, seeks to investigate not only regulative but also constitutive effects of immaterial factors on political outcomes. I believe that the focus on constitutive effects may enhance my analysis by producing some additional explanation about the question why some negotiation processes resulted in agreements while other fail to produce such an outcome.

The final reason is that through application of the constructivist theoretical approach and rational choice theory it will be possible not only to link micro level to macro level explanations but also material factors to immaterial ones. Rational choice is materialistic theory which is based on methodological individualism. Therefore, it allows undertaking an effective micro level analysis of material factors. The constructivist theory provides analytical tools for linking these micro level explanations to macro level analysis by assuming that structure and agency are “mutually constituted”²⁰⁸ and material factors to immaterial ones by arguing that the latter give meaning to the former.

²⁰⁸ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); Alexander Wendt (1999); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon (2001)

Empirical part

1.5 The Austrian State Treaty of 1955

1.5.1 Introduction

In March 1945, Red Army troops entered Austria. The Russians had proclaimed that they come as a liberating army and do not want to take under their control Austrian territory or to change its political system. In other words the USSR argue that they have only one goal in Austria, namely to implement the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943 under which the Soviet Union and the Western Allies assumed an obligation to liberate Austria and to “restore it as an independent democratic state”.²⁰⁹

It is definitely right to assume that in the short run the Soviets wanted to “liberate” Austria from the Nazi, but what was the real, long-term policy of the USSR in Austria?

Before the soviet documents became accessible to the scientists, little research could have been conducted to gain insight into this question. Those who investigated this issue were not able to asses Soviet documents and, therefore, had to base their assumptions only on official Soviet statements and printed information.²¹⁰ After opening to the public the Soviet archive, this issue has become a popular question of research.

There are, however, many questions related to the Austrian problems that are still open to different interpretation. Among them are the following: What goals did the Soviet Union pursue in Austria? Why did the USSR agree to sign the peace treaty? How it is possible to explain the USSR’s decision not to apply its official policy course of non- evacuation from the captured territory? Why did it agree to

²⁰⁹ See Wolfgang Mueller (2004): “Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian’s Transition to Socialism,1925-1955”, in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004): “Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, pp.343

²¹⁰ See Wolfgang Mueller (2004): “Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian’s Transition to Socialism,1925-1955”, in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004): “Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, pp.343

pull out their troops from Austria, rather than letting the country to be divided in the same way as Germany was? What kind of objectives did the Soviet Union pursue by wanting Austria to become neutral country? Why did the USSR agree to conclude the State Treaty under the condition that Austria should become a neutral country in 1955, while the same proposal was rejected during the Berlin meeting of 1953?²¹¹ Since it is very hard to estimate what type of goals shaped the USSR foreign policy, historians do not share a common opinion with regard to the questions mentioned above.

In organisational terms this chapter will be divided into three sections. In order to answer the above mentioned questions it is necessary to provide an historical background of the Austrian treaty negotiations and to understand the factors that shaped Soviet foreign policy. Thus, the first section of this case study will be dedicated to the historical background of Austrian treaty negotiations. I will try to prove that the Soviet policy regarding the Austrian question was rooted in its ideological aim, namely to create worldwide communism.²¹²

The overall objective of the second and third sections is to examine the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty through an innovative framework elaborated in the theoretical part of my dissertation. I will show that in order to understand the USSR decision to conclude the Austrian Treaty in 1955 on terms acceptable to the West, it is necessary to apply RCT assumptions as a starting point and constructivist approach at the final stage of the analysis. Thus, in the empirical analysis below, I will evaluate the entire complex of different reasons that led to the conclusion of this treaty. The material factors will be analyzed through RCT, while the immaterial ones through the constructivist framework

1.5.2 The Austrian State Treaty negotiation

The aim of this section is to show that the USSR behaviour during various negotiation stages of the Austrian Treaty can be at best explained by analyzing the ideological aims of the USSR. Namely, when the USSR considered that the

²¹¹ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe"

²¹² See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe"

conclusion of the Treaty might prevent the achievement of its ideological aim, it began to raise different conditions or arguments against it. Also, when the Soviet Union believed that the conclusion of the State Treaty might help to realise its plan aimed at spreading the communist ideology around the world, the Kremlin was willing to make some concessions regarding the Austrian question.²¹³

In 1946, the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes made the first attempt to initiate the discussion with regard to the Austrian State Treaty. Despite his effort, however, Austria was not included on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference. The soviet foreign minister Molotov refused to consider this issue. He used two main arguments in order to prevent the resolution of this problem. The first one was that the Soviets claimed that Austria was not democratic enough to grant it independence. The second argument against the resolution of the Austrian problem was rooted in the Soviet desire to sign peace treaties with Germany's former allies first.²¹⁴ After these treaties were concluded, the Soviet Union agreed to an American plan aimed at creation of a "special committee of disputes" to prepare the Austrian Treaty draft. The Special committee of disputes completed and presented its draft treaty version at a Moscow meeting in March and April 1947.²¹⁵

It is necessary to note that Hungarian and Rumanian treaties included provisions that allowed the USSR to keep their troops deployed in these countries in order to keep the lines of communication until the Soviet Union leave Austria. Therefore, the departure from Austria would undermine the legal right of the Soviet Union to keep it under its control. Thus, in the case of a withdrawal from Austria, the USSR would be obliged to remove its arm forces from Hungarian and Rumanian. Therefore, these clauses made the Soviets even less interested in moving forward with the Austrian Treaty negotiations.²¹⁶ Other possible explanations of the Soviet reluctance to start the negotiation process may also have been grounded in its desire to continue extraction of economic resources from

²¹³ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe"

²¹⁴ See Wolfgang Mueller (2005): „Gab Es Eine „Verpasste Chance“? Die Sowjetische Haltung zum Staatsvertrag 1946-1952“, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): "The Austrian State Treaty", pp.89-94, William B. Bader (1966): *Austria Between East and West 1945-1955*, pp. 188; Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.105

²¹⁵ See William B. Bader (1966): *Austria Between East and West 1945-1955*, pp.188

²¹⁶ See William B. Bader (1966): *Austria Between East and West 1945-1955*, pp.188; Audrey Kurth Cronin (1986), "Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955", pp. 19-20; Wolfgang Mueller (2005): „Gab Es Eine „Verpasste Chance“? Die Sowjetische Haltung zum Staatsvertrag 1946-1952“, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): "The Austrian State Treaty", pp.89-94

Austria and its belief that the application of the communist political system in this country was possible.²¹⁷

Thus, at the London meeting and during the Moscow conference the USSR raised three other obstacles to a settlement of the Austrian question. The first one was the Soviet Union support of the Yugoslavian territorial demand on southern Austria. It is clear that this enormous request could not have been accepted by Austria and the West. They clearly stated that they would not sign a treaty that changed Austrian's borders established in 1937. However, Yugoslavs were not able to abolish the claim because they feared that the USSR would not support the compromise suitable to the West.²¹⁸ The second obstacle to the conclusion of the Treaty was the Soviet demand for German assets in the eastern zone of Austria. A controversial point was the definition of what can be considered as the German assets. The USSR defined the German assets in a broad term and wanted to seize as much as possible. The Western powers opposed Soviet's demand to confiscate all property in Austria that had belonged to the Germans in 1945 on the ground that it would make virtually impossible to restore an independent Austria.²¹⁹ Finally, the USSR and the US were not able to reach an agreement about the size of Austrian post-occupation forces. The Soviet Union proposed to allow Austria to have a tiny army to be equipped only with "weapons of national manufacture".²²⁰ The US rejected this proposal. Since the Western powers and the USSR were not able to agree about the above mentioned issues, the London and Moscow meetings ended without any practical results. As General Mark Clark, a member of the U.S. delegation, put it "the Russians have not given in on a single point since we started. They delay the conferences, drag them out, hesitate on discussions, and are unable to delegate authority."²²¹

At the end of the Moscow meeting the U.S. secretary of state, George C. Marshall proposed to submit the Austrian problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations for its resolution. Soviet foreign minister Molotov, however,

²¹⁷ See Audrey Kurth Cronin (1986): "Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria", 1945-1955", pp.20

²¹⁸ See Wolfgang Mueller (2005): „Gab Es Eine „Verpasste Chance“? Die Sowjetische Haltung zum Staatsvertrag 1946-1952“, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): "The Austrian State Treaty", pp.95-96, Audrey Kurth Cronin (1986), "Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria", 1945-1955", pp.44,

²¹⁹ See Audrey Kurth Cronin (1986): "Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955", pp.44

²²⁰ See William B. Bader (1966): "Austria Between East and West 1945-1955", pp.189

²²¹ Mark Clark: in: Audrey Kurth Cronin (1986): "Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955", pp.47

opposed this suggestion. Instead, he called for the creation of a treaty commission in Vienna. The Austrian treaty commission had a lot of sessions over the next five months and produced more than seventy different proposals aimed at the resolution of the disputed issues.²²² Its work, however, appeared to be unproductive and officially ended on 11 October 1947. A series of events such as the May 1947 communist uprising in Austria and communist takeover of Hungary made the Western powers reluctant to make any concessions that might help to the USSR to transform Austria into a communist state. Russians, on the other hand, continued to repeat their previous objections against the conclusion of the treaty.²²³

The next move in the negotiation process over the Austrian treaty came in November 1947 in London. The meeting in London, however, did not result in a breakthrough. The USSR and the Western powers were still not prepared to change their official position over the definition of German assets. Progress was impossible to reach as long as the question of what constituted the German assets remains controversial. "Molotov made the ostensibly generous offer to accept 10 percent less than the amount he had originally demanded. Bevin wryly retorted that it would be rather difficult for the council to calculate 10 percent of unknown quantity."²²⁴

After the London meeting of 1947, the Soviet Union suddenly agreed to change its official policy course and to reach an agreement on the economic part of the treaty. The French proposal, so-called the "Cherriere plan" of "150\$ lump sum payment" instead of 200\$ moved the negotiation process forward.²²⁵ However, the Soviet Union put on the agenda the Yugoslavian territorial demands again. The West appeared to be uninterested in debating the territorial claims of the Soviet Union. Moreover, in 1948 a chain of outside events such as collapse of "Four-Power control" in Germany and the Berlin blockade made the resolution of the Austrian problem less important. As a result, the West did not put the Austrian question on the top of its agenda until the Paris meeting of 1949.²²⁶

²²² See Audrey Kurth Cronin (1986): "Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955", pp.49

²²³ See Audrey Kurth Cronin (1986): "Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955", pp.50-54

²²⁴ Audrey Kurth Cronin (1986): "Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria", 1945-1955", pp.58

²²⁵ See Günter Bischof (2005): "Recapturing the Initiative and Negotiation from Strength", "The hidden Agenda of the Short Treaty Episode", in: Arnold Suppan, Gerald Strouzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): "The Austrian State Treaty", pp.220; William B. Bader (1966): *Austria Between East and West 1945-1955*, pp.192-193

²²⁶ See William B. Bader (1966): *Austria Between East and West 1945-1955*, pp.193-195

At the Paris meeting it seemed that the treaty would be finally concluded. The USSR agreed to recognize the Austrian borders of 1938. Already in summer 1948 the relations between Yugoslav and Soviet communists were terminated and the Soviet Union was prepared to stop to support the Yugoslavian demand. Moreover, most of the economic provisions of the Treaty were almost resolved. The USSR agreed to make three significant economic concessions. Firstly, it stopped to demand the right for shares in the shipping company. Secondly, the Soviet Union reduced the amount of repayment from \$200 million to \$150 million. Finally, it agreed to extend the time of compensation from two to six years.²²⁷

What was behind the Soviet willingness to make concessions at the Paris meeting of 1949? Did it mean that the Soviet Union was finally prepared to sign the Austrian treaty? Events that took place outside the negotiation table confirm this assumption. In February 1948 the Czechoslovakian coup took place and communists managed to come to power without the help of Soviet forces. This event probably made Stalin to believe that Austria would follow the same suit. He possibly hoped that the withdrawal of Western states from Austria would prevent its participation in the Marshall Plan. Consequently, the USSR would be able to secure the victory of the communists in the general election of 1949 in Austria. "Assurance of the continued economic presence of the Soviet Union in Austria after the signing of the treaty would have given the Russian considerable leverage to harass the coalition government and to force the return of the Austrian communists to the government."²²⁸

However, after the Paris meeting, the negotiations were suddenly stopped. The USSR made it clear that it had no intention to move forwards with the treaty negotiation. It began to employ the different types of obstacles such as the future of Trieste, resurgence of fascist organizations and that the Austrian government still had to pay for the use of the "food-stocks" (dried peas) etc.²²⁹ What was behind the USSR sudden change regarding the Austrian problem? In order to answer this

²²⁷ See J.I.Szirtes (1986): "Austrian Foreign Policy 1945-1985", pp.26; William B. Bader (1966): "Austria Between East and West 1945-1955", pp.193,196-198; Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.105-106; Audrey Kurth Cronin (1986): "Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria", 1945-1955", pp.74-76, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): „Gab Es Eine „Verpasste Chance? Die Sowjetische Haltung zum Staatsvertrag 1946-1952“, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): "The Austrian State Treaty", pp.100-108

²²⁸ William B. Bader (1966): "Austria Between East and West 1945-1955", pp.195

²²⁹ William B. Bader (1966): "Austria Between East and West 1945-1955", pp.198; Günter Bischof (1999): "Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55, The Leverage of the Weak", pp.110

question, it is necessary to analyse the worldwide events that made the USSR to reconsider its goals in Austria. Firstly, the Austrian Communist Party lost the general election of 1949. It received only 5.08 percent of the vote. The defeat of the communists probably made the USSR less confident in its plan aimed at the return of Austrian communists to the government.²³⁰ Secondly, the main priorities for Russians were to prevent the establishment as well as rearmament of West Germany and the creation of NATO. All other policy aims in Europe were linked to these questions. The USSR, however, had failed to prevent the formation of West Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. At the Paris meeting the foreign minister Vyshinsky couldn't convince the West to return to "Four-Power control" and the West German government was formed shortly after the Paris meeting.²³¹ At the end of the year Western powers initiated discussions about German rearmament and the USSR decided to use the Austrian question for bargaining purpose. "The evacuation of Austria would be a price for the abandonment of the rearmament of West Germany if it could not be prevented in another way."²³²

Moreover, it is necessary to point out that in 1949, the US had also little motivation to sign the Treaty under the above mentioned conditions. First of all it feared that Stalin might realise its plan of spreading communism in Austria. Due to the communist takeover in Prague, the US worried that the Austrian communists would attempt to acquire power in Austria in a similar way. Thus, the United States launched an intensive program of rearmament of Western zones of Austria in order to prevent the Austrian potential communist revolt. Secondly, from the economic point of view the draft treaty of 1949 was very heavy in the sense that the Soviets wanted a cash payment for its approval to give back the "German assets". Since Austria had virtually no money, it would have anticipated the US to pay.²³³

These above mentioned reasons led to the interruption of talks about the Austrian State Treaty at the end of November 1949.

²³⁰ See Wolfgang Mueller (2004): "Soviet Plans and Policies for Austria's Transition to Socialism, 1925-1955", in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004): "Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context", pp.347

²³¹ See William B. Bader (1966): "Austria Between East and West 1945-1955", pp.198; Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.106-107

²³² Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.106-107

²³³ See Günter Bischof (2005): "Recapturing the Initiative and Negotiation from Strength", "The hidden Agenda of the Short Treaty Episode", in: Arnold Suppan, Gerald Strouzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): "The Austrian State Treaty"

In January 1950 due to Austrian pressure, the negotiations were restarted again in London. However, the Korean War that took place in 1950 had negative effect on the negotiation process. Both the US and USSR had no intention to achieve some progress regarding the treaty talks.

During the Korean War the Truman administration appeared to be more interested in military-strategic priorities rather than in diplomatic ones. It called for increased military strength in order to prevent the communist spill over around the world. In the course of the Korean War the US raised its defence budget from 13 billions dollars to 52 billions dollars.²³⁴

Taking into account military concerns and domestic opposition (Eisenhower criticised the Truman passive approach towards USSR expansion in Eastern Europe), the Truman administration was capable to negotiate seriously with the Kremlin. “In such dangerous times abroad and domestically perilous time at home, one simply did not compromise with the Kremlin. If the US sat down at the negotiation table at all, it was usually with an attitude of presenting maximum proposals that the Kremlin could either take or reject.”²³⁵

The USSR on its part created new obstacles in order to prevent the resolution of the Austrian problem. The Soviets blamed western powers for rearmament of Austria and Trieste. The Soviets announced that the Treaty could not be signed unless the Austria government dropped its policy orientated towards the West. The USSR stated that Austrians “had no right to expect any tender consideration from the Soviet Government so long as the Austrian Government continued to act as a willing tool of powers unfriendly to Russia.”²³⁶

In 1951, the conclusion of the Austrian treaty seemed to be hard at best and impossible at worst to achieve. The US and the USSR were fully concentrated on other issues such as a Japanese peace treaty, future of Trieste, agreement over Germany and “Korean armistice negotiation”. Thus, in this year not a single meeting of deputies over the Austrian problem was held.²³⁷

²³⁴ See Günter Bischof (2005): “Recapturing the Initiative and Negotiation from Strength, The Hidden Agenda of the Short Treaty Episode”, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): “The Austrian State Treaty”, pp.224

²³⁵ Günter Bischof (2005): “Recapturing the Initiative and Negotiation from Strength, The Hidden Agenda of the Short Treaty Episode”, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): “The Austrian State Treaty”, pp.226

²³⁶ Günter Bischof (2005), “Recapturing the Initiative and Negotiation from Strength, The Hidden Agenda of the Short Treaty Episode”, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): “The Austrian State Treaty”, pp.231

²³⁷ See Günter Bischof (2005), “Recapturing the Initiative and Negotiation from Strength, The hidden Agenda of the Short Treaty Episode”, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller, “The Austrian State Treaty”, pp.237

In 1952 both the US and the USSR used the Austrian issue mainly for propaganda purposes. In March 1952, the US presented a “short treaty” draft. It contained only eight provisions instead of the fifty-nine clauses of the old treaty version. This abbreviated treaty draft excluded economical and political obligations placed on Austria and ignored such issues as restrictions on the Austrian army as well as denazification of Austria. Thus, it is logical to assume that the US did not expect the Soviets to agree on this treaty. The US probably used the “short treaty” as a propaganda method to blame the USSR for continued failure to agree on the Austrian question. The USSR on the other hand used the German question not only for a bargaining purposes but also as a propaganda tactic designed to blame the US for “the policy of no- negotiation”. Thus, the resolution of the Austrian problem failed due to the West-East propaganda warfare.²³⁸

After the death of Stalin in 1953, the West had hoped that the Soviet Union would change its attitude toward the Austrian State Treaty. The Berlin conference, however, which began on January 25, 1953 and ended without any results on February 18, 1954, confirmed that the USSR were still not prepared to change its official policy.²³⁹ It continued to use the Austrian question as a tool for preventing the ratification of the Paris accord aimed at entry of Western Germany into NATO.²⁴⁰

In principle, at the Berlin conference the USSR agreed to conclude the Austrian Treaty under three conditions. First of all Molotov insisted that an appropriate solution to the German problem should be found before withdrawal of the soviet troops from Austria.²⁴¹ By appropriate solution, the Soviet Union understood the reunification of Germany under “free election in a communist sense”. The USSR thought that “free election” should follow after the following activities - confiscation of “the property of war criminals”, complete elimination of “monopolies and combines”, redistribution of goods from rich to “poor peasants” and clean up of the civil administration.²⁴² The second precondition for the

²³⁸ See Günter Bischof (2005): “Recapturing the Initiative and Negotiation from Strength, The hidden Agenda of the Short Treaty Episode”, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): “The Austrian State Treaty”

²³⁹ Sven Allard(1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, pp.115

²⁴⁰ See William B. Bader (1966): “Austria Between East and West 1945-1955”; Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”

²⁴¹ See Vojtech Mastny (2005): “The Launching of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Grand Strategy”, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): “The Austrian State Treaty”, pp.151

²⁴² See Sven Allard(1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, pp.115

conclusion of the Austrian Treaty was guarantee that Austrian would never take part in any military arrangements and would prohibit the presence of any military foundations on its land.²⁴³ Finally, the USSR didn't want to evacuate Austria immediately after it signed the State Treaty. This precondition was a trap aimed at the incorporation of Austria into the "socialist camp" in a similar way as it was achieved with the Baltic countries. After signing the Treaty the control agreement would be dropped and the Allied Council would be abolished. As a result the USSR would be able to interfere almost without any restriction on the part of western countries in the domestic policy of Austria.²⁴⁴ "If communist-inspired riots broke out as in September 1950, Soviet troops could occupy the city to "restore order" and the Western powers could do nothing without risking direct hostilities with the USSR."²⁴⁵

Given these preconditions, it is no wonder that the Berlin meeting ended without any practical achievements.

Only in February 8, 1955 Soviet Union announced its decision to consider a possibility of withdrawal of occupation troops from Austrian independently from the German problem. The Kremlin however stressed the importance to elaborate some guaranties that would prevent a new "Anschluss" and situations where Austrian territory would be used for purposes of deploying arm forces of states that have unfriendly relationship with the USSR.²⁴⁶

The Austrian government proposed "a permanent neutrality after the Swiss model" as a guarantee against an Anschluss.²⁴⁷ The Kremlin accepted this suggestion and as a result the negotiation which begun with the Moscow meeting in April 1955 had, in the course of the following month, led to the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty.²⁴⁸

The USSR agreed to evacuate Austria at the latest by December 31, 1955 and to recognize the Austrian status of neutrality. Moreover, the Soviet Union made some important concessions in the economic field, namely it agreed to transform

²⁴³ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.116

²⁴⁴ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.118-119

²⁴⁵ Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.118

²⁴⁶ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.155-184

²⁴⁷ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe"

²⁴⁸ See Rostislav Sergeev (2005): „Wie der Durchbruch in der Österreichischen Frage Erreicht wurde“, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (2005): "The Austrian State Treaty", pp.198-213

the oil ownership rights back to Austria in return for “delivery of one million tons of crude oil per year for ten years”.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, the USSR was prepared to delete a few articles from the body of the treaty, such as obligations placed on Austria to expel some German citizens and war criminals. Finally, the Soviet Union accepted the removal of some clauses that placed limits on Austrian land as well as air forces.²⁵⁰

As a result, the Austrian State Treaty was signed on the 15th of May 1955 and took effect in the following days. After the ratification of the treaty, the Austrian government submitted the draft on the neutrality of the country to the Parliament.²⁵¹

What was behind this sudden change regarding the Austrian question? Why did the USSR agree to conclude the State Treaty in 1955 under the condition that Austria adopts the status of permanent neutrality, while the same proposal was rejected at the Berlin conference of 1953?²⁵² The analysis below is intended to explain above mentioned questions through the theoretical framework elaborated in the first part of my dissertation.

1.5.3 Theoretical part

In this part, the overall objective is to investigate the question of why the USSR agreed to conclude the Austrian Treaty in 1955 under conditions requested by the West. It is possible to identify two general approaches about Soviet behaviour at the international level that might provide some basic explanations of the USSR policy in Austria. There are “hard-line” and “soft-line” approaches.

Supporters of the “soft-line” approach draw their perceptions from the defence theory. This theory describes the USSR foreign policy as defensive policy. Proponents of this theoretical assumption view the Soviet Union as “a profoundly

²⁴⁹ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, pp.196

²⁵⁰ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, pp.190, 195

²⁵¹ See J.I.Szirtes (1986): “Austrian Foreign Policy 1945-1985”, pp.40

²⁵² See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”

conservative state primarily motivated by security concerns; its leaders see to stabilize their international relations so as to allow for greater concentration on internal problems of development.”²⁵³

Application of this theoretical approach to the Austrian case study suggests that the USSR policy in Austria was based on security and economic concerns rather than on its determination to change the Austrian political system under the example of the Soviet Union.

This viewpoint was famous among historians before collapse of communism, particularly among Austrian researchers. Many of them believed that the Kremlin was not prepared to conclude the Austrian Treaty until 1955 due to security and economic disputes. However, after opening soviet archives this assumption was seriously undermined. Newly accessible soviet official data clearly show that that the Soviet Union had an intention to integrate Austria into the “socialist camp”.²⁵⁴

Proponents of the “hard line” approach generate their assumption from the “communist expansionism” theory. This theory suggests that the Soviet aim was to create worldwide communism. It assumes that Soviet leaders used any available opportunity in order to expand its influence and to impose communist ideology on the world. Proponents of this theoretical assumption view the Soviet Union foreign policy as offensive. However, supporters of this approach simultaneously emphasise that the Soviets’ aspiration to create worldwide communism, has its limit grounded in the Soviet unwillingness to pay a high price for this expansion.²⁵⁵

Application of this theoretical approach to the Austrian case study suggests that the USSR aim was to transform Austria into a people’s democracy as was done with East European countries. Indeed, many researchers confirm this assumption and suggest that the Soviet Union attempted to incorporate Austria into “socialist camp” by different methods. Consequently, the main reason why the Soviet Union agreed to conclude the State Treaty in 1955 was the Soviet’s unwillingness to assume risks associated with its aim to include Austria in their sphere of security.

²⁵³ Richard K. Herrman (1991): “Perception and Behaviour in Soviet Foreign Policy”, in: Frederic j. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffman, Robbin F. Laird (1991): “Soviet Foreign Policy. Classic and Contemporary Issues”, pp.187

²⁵⁴ See Wolfgang Mueller (2004): “Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian’s Transition to Socialism, 1925-1955”, in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004): “Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, pp.343-344

²⁵⁵ See Richard K. Herrman (1991): “Perception and Behaviour in Soviet Foreign Policy”, in: Frederic j. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffman, Robbin F. Laird (1991): “Soviet Foreign Policy. Classic and Contemporary Issues”

I completely disagree with proponents of the first approach and I only partly agree with supporters of the second theoretical assumption. I believe that the USSR had an intention to create communist order in Austria. However, I disagree that the Soviet Union have dropped this idea because it didn't want to pay a high price for the realisation of this aim. It is certainly true that by that time of the Austrian State Treaty conclusion the USSR realised that it can not incorporate Austria into the socialist camp by peaceful ways and it was not prepared to initiate a military conflict with western countries over the resolution of the Austria problem.²⁵⁶ Moreover, official documents suggest that the USSR did not what to facilitate a split of the country. "To have forced the division of the country would have deprived Eastern Austria of the industrial raw materials and electrical power. Without these materials and electrical power, Eastern Austrian's industries would have been paralysed unless the necessary resources were taken from the already hard-pressed satellite economies."²⁵⁷

However, in my opinion the USSR had another option at its disposal, namely to keep a status quo. Why the USSR did not follow this alternative?

I believe that this question has to be analysed through a theoretical framework elaborated in the first chapter of my dissertation on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice and the constructivist theoretical framework. The application of these theories to my case study suggests that Soviets leaders abandoned their strategy of delay and agreed to sign the treaty because of material and immaterial factors. In the empirical analysis below, the material factors will be analyzed though RCT, while the immaterial ones through the constructivist framework.

1.5.3.1 Rational Choice Theory

According to rational choice theory, human beings are rational actors and all their actions are 'rational' in character. Each actor seeks to maximize his own

²⁵⁶ See Wolfgang Mueller (2004): "Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian's Transition to Socialism, 1925-1955", in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004): "Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context", pp.348 William B. Bader (1966): "Austria Between East and West 1945-1955", pp.199

²⁵⁷ William B. Bader (1966): "Austria Between East and West 1945-1955", pp.190-191

gains by calculating all costs and benefits of any performance before deciding how to act.²⁵⁸ Thus, supporters of this theory would probably argue that the USSR made a decision to release Austria due to its rational calculation of costs and benefits. From the rational choice perspective, the status quo policy was rejected due to economic and geostrategic calculation of the Kremlin. Indeed, it is possible to mention at least six reasons that can confirm the RCT's assumption about the USSR's rational foreign policy calculations that produced a solution to the Austrian problem.

1) The Soviet Union feared that the hidden American plan of secret Austrian rearmament would facilitate the integration of Western Austria into NATO. "Since the trend towards rearming the Western zones of Austria, and fully integrating them into NATO defence planning, would only have strengthened over time, it seemed like a prudent decision by the Kremlin masters to stop this creeping military integration of Austria into Western European defence and neutralize the country." ²⁵⁹

2) At the time of treaty conclusion the amount of reparations from German assets in Eastern Austria was declining.²⁶⁰

3) The USSR became unable to use the Austrian question for bargaining proposes in order to prevent the plans of the west concerning the final resolution of German question. The Soviet Union failed to prevent the West German rearmament and its integration into the western defence community.²⁶¹

4) The USSR did not want to keep its forces in Austria permanently. In summer 1953 the Soviet Union had to assume all costs associated with the placement of its arm forces in Austria. Thus, from the economical point of view it was logical to leave Austria.

5) Austria had lost by 1955 its economic attractiveness for the USSR. Since by this time the Soviet Union had acquired enough domestic oil, the Austrian oil supply was no longer an important commodity for the Russians. Moreover, the USIA (Administration for the Soviet property in Austria) industries were in a

²⁵⁸ See John Scott (2000): "Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present", Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

²⁵⁹ Günter Bischof (1999): Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55, The Leverage of the Weak, pp.150

²⁶⁰ See Günter Bischof (1999): Austria in the First Cold War, 1945-55, The Leverage of the Weak, pp.150

²⁶¹ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe"

terrible economic condition. It became increasingly hard for these industries to maintain its productivity and to be competitive on the Austrian market.²⁶²

6) Finally, the State Treaty placed some difficulties on NATO defence strategy and the USSR hoped that it would eventually lead to the dissolution of this organisation. After Austria assumed its neutral status, it became hard for members of the NATO to maintain an effective communication and supply chain between Germany and Italy. After the neutralisation of Austria, NATO resources had to be transported through French territory. “If France’s withdrawal of its military forces, NATO is eventually followed with a denial of French territory to NATO activities, the North Atlantic Treaty area would be split by a neutral belt, a situation that would have serious military implications for the West.”²⁶³

I believe that economic and geostrategic reasons played a very important role in the USSR decision to release Austria. Rationalist assumptions bring important assets to the analysis as a starting point. However, in my opinion the conclusion of the Austrian treaty cannot be understood nor explained properly through the analysis of material factors alone. Opponents of the RCT fail to account adequately for the role of immaterial factors and tend to treat ‘national interests’ as exogenously given.²⁶⁴ Therefore, they do not provide sufficient explanations about the question of why the USSR did not keep the status quo in Austria. I believe that the constructivists can contribute to the assumptions elaborated by supporters of theories that are grounded in cost-benefit analysis by integrating cultural constructs into the research. I think that this theoretical approach allows avoiding a universal generalisation of Soviet foreign policy that often produces false explanations of the international behaviour of the USSR.

In this regard, it is argued below, that the conclusion of the Austrian state treaty can not be fully explained without an understanding of how ideas helped to create vital interests of the Soviet Union.

²⁶² See William B. Bader (1966): “Austria Between East and West 1945-1955”, pp.204-205; Norman M. Naimark (2004): “Stalin and the Austrian Question”, in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004): “Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, Norman M. Naimark, “Stalin and the Austrian Question”, pp.356

²⁶³ William B. Bader (1966): “Austria Between East and West 1945-1955”, pp.204

²⁶⁴ See John Gerard Ruggie (1998): “Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization”, pp.13,33

1.5.3.2 The constructivist theoretical framework

Constructivists research design is based on analysis of ideational factors such as identity, culture, ideas, beliefs etc. in world politics. In other words, opponents of this theory focus on immaterial factors in their attempt to explain processes of social construction of reality in general and certain political outcomes in particular rather than on the power of material and economic resources.²⁶⁵ Although constructivists do not neglect the power of material factors in determining a certain political outcome in international relations, they argue that social factors such as ideas, beliefs and identities provide meaning to material ones. “The thought that is involved in international security is more important, far more important, than the physical assets that are involved because those assets have no meaning without the intellectual component: they are mere things in themselves.”²⁶⁶ Since, however, constructivists do not neglect the influence of material factors on a certain political event, they offer one possible way of integrating material and ideational factors into the analysis. In other words, constructivism does not neglect explanations of rational choice theory regarding the conclusion of the Austrian treaty. It rather complements conclusions derived by the former theory.

The constructivist theoretical framework provides insight on two issues that are relevant to my analysis. First of all it explains the evolution and the role of ideas in world politics. Secondly, it addresses the question of the structure and actors’ relationship.

Thus, in the analysis below I will focus on Soviet leaders’ changing beliefs and on domestic structure of the USSR in order to explain the outcome of the negotiating process which resulted in the Austrian state treaty.

Soviet leaders’ changing casual beliefs

²⁶⁵ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998); Alexander Wendt (1999)

²⁶⁶ Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.165, Accessed: 2008,
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

According to constructivism, ideas and beliefs play a crucial role in the international politics. They create actors and provide guidance for their behaviour. Constructivists believe that the international system is created by human beings and constituted by a set of ideas, norms, thoughts and beliefs.²⁶⁷ They define four key types of norms and ideas which might have causal as well as constitutive effects on agents. There are world views, principled (normative) beliefs, causal beliefs and policy perceptions.²⁶⁸ For the purpose of my analyses it is necessary to provide definition of world views and causal beliefs.

World views are an organized collection of ideas and beliefs through which individuals interpret the reality around them. These views can be based on religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam etc) or on political ideologies (communism, capitalism, fascism etc). Causal beliefs are beliefs which provide policy course for individuals on how to maintain or attain their policy aims and objectives.²⁶⁹

The Soviet's world views were based on the communist ideology. As a result the USSR's policy objectives were aimed at the protection of communism domestically and on spreading this ideology around the world. Thus, its concept of security was larger than in most western countries. Security needs were closely linked to expansionist behaviour.²⁷⁰ Therefore, Austria due to its geographical location was viewed as a military as well as an ideological shield against the "capitalist" countries.

The Soviet leaders' new interpretation of the concept of neutrality as a means of realizing their key policy objectives aimed at the communist expansion facilitated the final outcome of the Austrian problem.²⁷¹

Neutrality was originally considered within the context of the European state system and was related to wartime only. The Hague Conventions of 1907 to a considerable extent codify the principles of wartime neutrality. First, it prohibited to neutral states to participate in an international conflict either directly or

²⁶⁷ See Jackson: "Social Constructivism", Chapter 6, Accessed: 2008, pp.162,

http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

²⁶⁸ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change", pp.7-8; Tannenwald (2005), in: Jackson:"Social Constructivism", Chapter 6, pp.167

²⁶⁹ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework", in: Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane (1993): "Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change", pp.8-11; Tannenwald (2005), in: Jackson:"Social Constructivism", Chapter 6, pp.167

²⁷⁰ See Erik P.Hoffman (1991):"Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev", in: Frederic j. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffman, Robbin F. Laird (1991): "Soviet Foreign Policy. Classic and Contemporary Issues", pp.57

²⁷¹ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe"

indirectly by supplying belligerents with arms or money. Second, it did not allow belligerents to use the territory of the neutral states for transit of their troops or military equipment.²⁷² These rights and obligations, however, were not applicable in times of peace. “The core of neutrality is non-participation by a state in a war between other countries. Hence, classical interpretations hold that in the absence of war, the term is devoid of meaning.”²⁷³

However, in the 20th century the concept of neutrality has undergone a dramatic transformation. It was not any longer seen as a wartime phenomenon but rather as a policy applicable in times of peace as well. Nevertheless, despite that the implication of the term neutrality became broader, until the 1950s, this term remained mainly a western phenomenon. Indeed, the whole concept of neutrality is contradictive to the communist ideology.²⁷⁴ This concept is derived from the Latin language, meaning neither of two. According to the communist ideas, however, all human beings must give support to one side or the other because they deemed to participate in the “class struggle”. Marxism-Leninism ideology tries to postulate that man can not “make himself neutral by deciding to opt out of the “class war” altogether. Not to give aid to the “proletariat” in its fight against the “bourgeois” is, objectively speaking, to help the latter: He who is not with me is against me.”²⁷⁵ Thus, until the mid 1950s Soviet’s leaders denied the feasibility of a neutral position.

Khrushchev became the first Soviet top politician who managed to integrate this concept into the communist ideology. His new interpretation of the term of neutrality as means of strengthening the security of the USSR as well as a tool of creation of communist political system around the world made the Kremlin prepared to sign the Treaty under the condition agreed by the West. The Soviet Union believed that by proclaiming its neutrality, Austria would become an obstacle for the realization of military plans of the west in Europe and a model for other countries around the world.²⁷⁶

²⁷² See Bo Petersson (1990): “The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality in Europe : A Study of Soviet Political Language”, pp.3-4

²⁷³ Bo Petersson (1990): “The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality in Europe : A Study of Soviet Political Language”, pp.4

²⁷⁴ See P.H. Vigor (1975): “The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality”, pp.178; Bo Petersson (1990): “The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality in Europe : A Study of Soviet Political Language”, pp.11

²⁷⁵ P.H. Vigor (1975): “The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality”, pp.178

²⁷⁶ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”

In the section below I will explain the complex process of Soviet leaders' changing casual beliefs in general and their impact on the resolution of the Austrian problem in particular through the constructivists understanding of the structure and actors' relationship.

The structure and actors' relationship

According to constructivism, structures and agents are “mutually constituted”. “The relationship between structures and actors involves intersubjective understanding and meaning. Structures do constrain actors, but actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in new ways.”²⁷⁷ Thus, according to the constructivist theoretical approach the structures and agents do not have a fixed nature. They are always in a process of development. Agents socialize in a certain social context which shapes their actions. In turn actors shape their own social context when new thoughts and ideas expressed by them enter the system. Thus, according to the constructivists' point of view, both the domestic and the international system might change dramatically because people and states can start to consider each other differently and thus interpret old norms in a new way or invent principles that may be completely different from the old ones.²⁷⁸

The Soviet Union political and social system was constructed by Lenin. It was based on communist ideology and idea of world revolution. These two elements were essential for the survival of this structure. (When Gorbachev had attempted to change the existing structure in a radical way, the whole system collapsed).

Soviet leaders acquired power from and were socializing the system. Thus, their actions and behaviour were shaped by existing rules in the system. In other words, Soviet leader's interests and identities depended on the context (system) in which they found themselves. However, according to the constructivist view, the Soviet system was not constant. It was always in a process of development because

²⁷⁷ Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter VI, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

²⁷⁸ See Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

soviet leaders had the power to include new ideas and means of spreading communism around the world.

I believe that the constructivist assumptions about the interdependent relationship between agents and their social context help to understand behaviour of the USSR in Austria. It shows that the Soviet leaders depended on the essential elements of the system. Thus, their calculation on the Austrian question was linked its ideological aim of spreading communism around the world.²⁷⁹ However, they were altering the system by creating a new means of achieving this ideological goal. The “mutually constituted” relationship between Soviet leaders and the political system of the USSR produced a new policy course in the field of foreign policy where the principle of neutrality was assigned a unique and more important role as an integral element of “coexistence policy”. As a result the USSR agreed to conclude the Austrian State Treaty and the resolution of the Austrian Problem became possible.²⁸⁰

In the following sections, I will show the ways of how Soviet leaders were changing their beliefs on how to realize the aim of strengthening the communists political system around the world in general and in Austria in particular in a more detailed way. I will prove that both Stalin and Khrushchev have never rejected the idea of world revolution, rather they created new strategies on how to achieve this objective. Thus, the Stalin doctrine of “the socialism in one country” and Khrushchev policy of “peaceful coexistence” were rather propaganda technique than a genuine intention on the part of the USSR.²⁸¹

Stalin and his tactic of strengthening the position of communists around the world

When the world revolution predicted by Lenin failed to take place, Stalin had formulated a new doctrine, the so-called “socialism in one country”. The priority was given to national security and rapid industrialisation of the USSR. “Stalin transformed the Comintern from an instrument seeking world revolution

²⁷⁹ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”

²⁸⁰ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”

²⁸¹ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”

into one serving his domestic policy preferences and his drive to create a personal dictatorship.”²⁸²

It is necessary to point out the Stalin doctrine of “socialism in one county” in no way meant the rejection of the world revolution. “As Stalin himself stressed in his Problems of Leninism, the victory of communism in one country could by no means be considered an end in itself or a final goal.”²⁸³ It was just temporally halted until the economic potential of the Soviet Union would be fully utilised.

During WWII, Stalin realised that the USSR can not survive without economic and military assistance on the part of western allies. Thus, he further reformulated Lenin’s tactics of spreading communism from below (by the working class that should be guided by a small group of communist elite). Lenin understood the process of power sizing as a result of prompt revolution. Stalin in contrast believed that revolution should be organised from above and to be a long-term process lasting many years, if necessary.²⁸⁴

Stalin hoped to spread a Soviet state system in every centimetre of territory conquered by the Red Army in World War II. During WWII, Stalin declared that “Everyone impose his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.”²⁸⁵

Stalin’s tactics of distribution of the communist ideology was based on the creation of national front government consisting of all “antifascist democratic” parties including communists and applied to European countries liberated from the Nazi. According to the communists, the advantage of the strategy of step by step transformation of Central and East European countries into a people’s democracy was that it could be carried out without opposition on the part of the West.²⁸⁶

Thus, in 1945 Stalin decided to set up the provisional government of Karl Renner with the hope to form a communist regime in Austria. The Soviet Union

²⁸² Erik P. Hoffman (1991): “Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev”, in: Frederic j. Fléron, Erik P. Hoffman, Robbin F. Laird (1991): “Soviet Foreign Policy. Classic and Contemporary Issues”, pp.54

²⁸³ Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, pp.57

²⁸⁴ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, pp.77-96

²⁸⁵ Stalin, in: Norman M. Naimark (2004): “Stalin and the Austrian Question”, in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004): “Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, pp.355

²⁸⁶ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, pp.77-96

hoped at least until 1953 to realise this plan in Austria, namely to create a communist government that would insure eventual communist victory.²⁸⁷

The main error of this plan was the Soviet Union decision to hold free “election under impartial control” in 1945 in Austria. This mistake was probably made because the soviet leaders were overconfident in a significant communist vote and feared that the Western Allies’ would not approve the Renner government without free elections. As a result, the KPO gained only 5.4 % of the vote and only four sets in the parliament.²⁸⁸

Nevertheless the political goal to weaken the non-communist parties and to create the communist political system in Austria remained intact.

In order to achieve this aim, the USSR started to apply a new tactic. The soviet authorities started to look for new partners for the Communist Party of Austria by launching contacts with pro-Soviet and pro-communist groups in Austria.²⁸⁹

Thus, in 1946, Soviet leaders contacted the social democrat dissident Erwin Scharf in order to find a new partner for the CPA. Erwin Scharf was a founder of the Workers’ party. Before the general election of 1949, he formed the “linksblock” with the CPA. “This merger was, as Deputy High Commissioner Aleksei Zeltove wrote, inspired and founded by the Soviet element which tried to influence the elections in a pro-communist way”.²⁹⁰ However, communists couldn’t gain support of the Austrian public and failed to increase the amount of seats in the government. They received only 5.08 % of the vote.²⁹¹

Despite this defeat of the CPA, Soviet leaders didn’t drop its tactic of creating the communist regime in Austria. In 1950, Soviet leaders invited the pro-Soviet Democratic Union to join the “linksblock”. As a result, a new bloc, the so-called “Volksopposition” was formed. However, this attempt to strengthen

²⁸⁷ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, 97-98; Wolfgang Mueller (2004): “Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian’s Transition to Socialism,1925-1955”, in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004): “Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, pp. 344-347

²⁸⁸ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, 98-99; Wolfgang Mueller (2004): “Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian’s Transition to Socialism,1925-1955”, in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler: “Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, pp.344-345

²⁸⁹ See Wolfgang Mueller (2004): “Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian’s Transition to Socialism,1925-1955”, in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004):“Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, pp.347

²⁹⁰ Wolfgang Mueller (2004), “Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian’s Transition to Socialism,1925-1955”, in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004):“Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, pp. 347

²⁹¹ See Wolfgang Mueller (2004), “Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian’s Transition to Socialism,1925-1955”,in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler, “Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context”, pp.347

communists' influence in Austria was not successful as well. The election of 1953 appeared to be a third defeat for communists. They acquired only 5.28 % of the votes cast.²⁹²

The tactic of the national front government formation was designed in order to increase communist power in Europe and was applied in Austria until the death of Stalin.

Khrushchev: New policy course

After Stalin death, a collective group assumed governance of the USSR because there was no strong member of the Party Presidium that could become a leader without any objections from his colleagues. The collective group decided to adopt a short-term policy of relaxation at the international level in order to be able to divert more attention to the internal fight over power. This policy of relaxation was also applied to Austria. For example, the USSR eliminated a censorship and abolished or eased traffic controls between Eastern and Western zones of Austria.²⁹³

It is important to point out that in fact the collective group continued to follow the tactics announced by Stalin. Namely, they had been convinced that sooner or later disagreements would arise between capitalist states which would eventually lead to the desolation of capitalist camp.²⁹⁴

Thus, these relatively unimportant Soviet Union concessions were a propaganda trick aimed at convincing the West that the USSR political system might undertake a fundamental modification. By doing so the Soviet Union hoped to achieve some level of reward on the part of Western countries and to worsen the relationship between the democratic states.

The new policy doctrine had been formulated only after Khrushchev had managed to defeat Molotov and to establish his influence in the Party Presidium. He initiated a new course in the field of foreign policy. He made many significant

²⁹² See Wolfgang Mueller (2004): "Soviet Plans and Policies for Austrian's Transition to Socialism, 1925-1955", in: Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Michael Gehler (2004): "Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context", pp.347

²⁹³ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.108-109

²⁹⁴ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", 108-114, 77-96

ideological changes and formulated a new policy approach toward the US, Western Europe, the Soviet block, and the third block (neutral countries). He also reformulated Stalin's "two-camp theory of international politics" by distinguishing five types of nations, namely the USSR, other socialist countries, "neutral or uncommitted countries", "members of regional security pacts with the US and American allies", and the United States. To each type of nation he proposed different roads to communism.²⁹⁵

Khrushchev adopted a new course in the field of foreign policy based on the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence". He believed that Soviet influence in the nuclear area should be enhanced by some other means rather than a military confrontation.²⁹⁶ Thus, he reformulated Stalin's doctrine of "inevitability of war" without, however, losing the hope of further expansion of the Communist movement. "The revision only meant that the Soviet Union did not, as in Stalin's lifetime, consider war the single or the most decisive factor for the realisation of its long-term program: "the final victory of socialism on an international scale." ²⁹⁷

These fundamental changes in the field of foreign policy immediately provided a new and more important role to the concept of neutrality as an integral element of the coexistence policy.

Khrushchev gave a new meaning to the concept of neutrality. He understood this term as a tool of achieving world revolution that should be carried out step by step. Thus, the word neutrality had to serve the following functions²⁹⁸:

- 1) Weakening NATO and to preventing countries to enter into this or similar military arrangements.
- 2) Preventing former colonial states from cooperation with the US and its alliances
- 3) Attracting countries that assume a neutral status to join the "socialist camp".

²⁹⁵ See Erik P. Hoffman (1991): "Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev", in: Frederic J. Flernon, Erik P. Hoffman, Robbin F. Laird (1991): "Soviet Foreign Policy. Classic and Contemporary Issues", pp.59-64; Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.204-214

²⁹⁶ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.205-214; Abraham Brumberg (1962): "Russia Under Khrushchev: An Anthology from Problems of Communism, pp.130-131

²⁹⁷ Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.207-208

²⁹⁸ See Sven Allard (1970): "Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe", pp.204-214

The constructivist assumption regarding the power of words is clearly visible in the case of Austria. The USSR placed special importance on the use of the word neutrality. During the negotiation talks of 1955, the Soviet Union insisted on this definition. The Austrian delegation in Moscow preferred another definition such as “freedom from alliances” or “the foreign policy based on the principle of neutrality”. The Kremlin however categorically rejected these expressions. The Soviet authorities made it clear that the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty depend on the acceptance of the word neutrality by Austrian delegation.²⁹⁹

It is important to note that Molotov - like Stalin - considered neutrality in a different way. Both of them denied the practicability of this concept. They did not believe that it could facilitate world revolution.

Thus, had Molotov instead of Khrushchev succeeded in a power struggle within the Kremlin, it is very likely that the Austrian State Treaty would not have been signed in 1955. This assumption could be confirmed by the fact that during the Berlin conference, Molotov was mainly responsible for the foreign policy agenda. As I already pointed out in the first part of my case study during the Berlin meeting Molotov refused to withdraw from Austria and to sign the treaty under the condition that it agrees to assume the concept of neutrality.³⁰⁰ Thus, the evolution of the concept of neutrality undertaken by Khrushchev led to the resolution of the Austrian problem.

1.5.4 Conclusion

This part of my dissertation was dedicated to the analysis of the policy of the Soviet Union in Austria between 1945 and 1955. The main goal of my research was to understand why the Soviet Union agreed to evacuate Austria in 1955 under terms acceptable to the Western countries. I have come to conclusion that RCT assumptions about human rationality help to understand this question to some extent. I think that economic and geostrategic reasons played an important role in the Soviet decision to release Austria. However, in my opinion, proponents of this

²⁹⁹ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, pp.185-191; Georges-Henri Soutou (2005): “Der Österreichische Staatsvertrag in der Internationalen Politik 1955”, in: Arnorld Suppan, Gerald Strourzh, Wolfgang Mueller, “The Austrian State Treaty”, pp.24

³⁰⁰ See Sven Allard (1970): “Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe”, pp.215-219,115-119

theoretical approach don't provide sufficient explanation about the question why the USSR did not keep the status quo in Austria. Thus, in order to enhance the theoretical explanations elaborated by the supporters of RCT I applied constructivist assumptions regarding two issues. The first one was their assumptions on the interdependent relationship between agents (Soviet leaders) and their social context (the USSR political system). The second issue addressed by constructivists is the evaluation and the role of norms.

In my essay I tried to prove that the "mutually constituted" relationship between Soviet leaders and the USSR political system produced a new course in the field of foreign policy, where the principle of neutrality was assigned a special and more important role. As a result, the resolution of the Austrian Problem became possible.

1.6 The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979

1.6.1 Introduction

The Egyptian-Israeli conflict dates back to 1948, when the UN passed a resolution aimed at the partition of Palestine into two states, one for Jewish and one for Palestinian people. This resolution was categorically rejected by most Arab states, including Egypt. Nevertheless, Israel announced its independence on May, 1948. This event almost immediately provoked the first Arab-Israeli war which resulted in a victory of the Jewish people. Even though Arab states, including Egypt agreed to sign armistice agreements with Israel in 1949, a state of war did not come to an end.³⁰¹ “Officially, no Arab country recognized the armistice lines of 1949 as international borders, and no Arab country recognized Israel, diplomatically. Israel, according to Arab rhetoric, had no right to exist, and was referred to as “The Zionist entity.”³⁰² The destruction of the state of Israel became the key goal of Arab states headed by Egypt.

Since then Israel fought several wars with Egypt, namely the Suez-Sinai War of 1956, the Six Day of war of 1967, the War of Attrition of 1969 and the Yom Kippur war of 1973. Those wars not only deepen negative perceptions of Israeli and Egyptian people towards each other but also produced new disputes.

The most destructive war for Egypt and other Arab states was the Six-Day War of 1967. It resulted in enormous victory of Israel. Israelis managed to occupy all of Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights.³⁰³ However, Israel’s success in the Six-Day War did not stop the conflict. On the opposite, it increased the level of aggression of Arab nations toward Israel and created a huge psychological obstacle to negotiation. In response to its defeat, Arab states established

³⁰¹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp. ix

³⁰² “The Six Days War”, Zionism and Israel - Encyclopedic Dictionary, Accessed:2008, <http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/6daywar.htm>

³⁰³ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp. 2-3

a uniform policy of “three noes”, namely no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel.³⁰⁴

Consequently the possibility of peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and Egypt was greatly reduced. It became difficult to imagine that both states would manage to solve the conflict in a peaceful way.

Nevertheless, in November 1977 Sadat decided to go to Jerusalem to talk with Israelis directly. This journey and Sadat’s remarkable speech before the Knesset did not only shock Israelis and the West but also the USSR, African states and the entire Arab world. This trip led in the following year to the Camp David Accords and to a peace agreement between these two countries, the first such treaty between Israel and Arab state.

Although the history of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and peace diplomacy is quite well documented, there are still some questions that are open for different interpretation. Among them are the following:

Why did Egypt, a creator of the pan-Arabism ideology and an Arab commitment to seek Israel’s destruction, become the first Arab country which established the negotiation line with Israel? Why did Egypt agree to recognise Israel, after so many years of denying the right of it to exist? Why did Sadat agree to move alone without support of other Arab states in achieving a bilateral peace agreement with Israel? Why did Israel agree to give Sinai back to Egypt without requesting in return nothing else but just an official peace treaty? Why did the negotiation process take so many years? Why various efforts over the years to settle the conflict had failed?

In this case study, I will mostly focus on these questions. In order to answer the above mentioned questions it is necessary to provide historical background of Egyptian-Israeli peace process and to understand the factors that shaped both the Egyptian and Israeli foreign policy.

Thus, the first part of this chapter will be dedicated to the historical background of Egypt-Israeli peace diplomacy. I will show that Israelis and Egyptians

³⁰⁴ See James L. Gelvin (2005): “The Israeli-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War”, pp.180; Alan Dowty (2005): “Israel-Palestine”, pp.117; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.ix

were not able to conclude a peace agreement before 1979 because of two key obstacles. During the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser the key obstacle was Egypt's resistance to accept the right of Israel to exist. During Sadat's presidency the key obstacle to the successful resolution of the conflict was the Palestinian issue of self-determination. Sadat faced a controversial question of how to promote Egyptian interest while not sacrificing the demands of the other Arab states in general and the Palestinian people in particular. Israelis, on the other hand, wished to conclude a peace agreement with Egypt but not at any price. They were not prepared to give back Judea and Samaria (the West Bank and Gaza) to a foreign control.

The second and the third parts of this chapter will be dedicated to the theoretical explanation of Israel's and Egypt's decision to conclude the peace agreement in 1979. My analysis of this historical event will be based on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice theory and the constructivist theoretical framework. I will evaluate the entire complex of different reasons that led to the conclusion of this treaty. The material factors will be analyzed through RCT, while the immaterial ones through constructivism.

1.6.2 Negotiating process

Before the Six-Day War of 1967 almost no serious effort aimed at the resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict had been made. Only after the June War the international community began to realise the urgent need to find the solution to this conflict. Moreover, this war made negotiation unavoidable.³⁰⁵ It opened up new possibilities for breaking the diplomatic deadlock that had been present during many years. The occupied territories provided to Israel a powerful bargaining advantage. For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict Israel had something to offer to Arab states in return for recognizing the right of Israel to exist. "For the first time, there appeared to be a basis for a final settlement that would be acceptable to

³⁰⁵ See Alan Dowty (2005): "Israel-Palestine", pp.113

both sides....Israel now had the leverage to pursue a peace based on partition, since it held all of the land that might form any future Palestinian state.”³⁰⁶

The first serious attempt to settle the disputes between these two countries was initiated by the American president. On June 19, 1967 Johnson elaborated five key principles aimed at the conflict resolution in the Middle East.³⁰⁷ There were: “the recognised right to national life; justice for refugees; innocent maritime passage; limits on the arm race; and political independence and territorial integrity for all.”³⁰⁸

Israelis and Egyptians, however, had no motivation to recognise Johnson’s principles. Nevertheless, this peace initiative became a basis for the UN Security Council Resolution 242 aimed at the conflict settlement in the Middle East, which was passed unanimously on November 22, 1967.³⁰⁹ This resolution adopted the “land for peace” formula and became a basis for all subsequent peace negotiation between Arab states and Israeli. “The land for peace formula provided the foundation for every serious effort at peacemaking from the end of the 1967 war to the Oslo Accord of 1993 and even after.”³¹⁰

In order to achieve an unanimous vote, the content and language of the resolution 242 was very ambiguous. It left enormous area for conflicting interpretations and provided only a general outline from which specific negotiations could be initiated.³¹¹ Thus, both countries, Israel and Egypt had the possibility to interpret this resolution to their own benefit. Egypt accepted the paragraph which called for Israeli withdrawal from “territories occupied in the recent conflict”, but ignored all other principles of this resolution. In other words, Egyptian leaders argued that the resolution implies total Israeli withdrawal without a need of further negotiation. They stated that the resolution does not call for formal peace treaties with Israel.³¹² Israel, for its part, argued that this resolution is only an outline for future negotiation aimed at achieving formal peace agreements and it can not be applied to

³⁰⁶ Alan Dowty (2005): “Israel-Palestine”, pp.113 -115

³⁰⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.54

³⁰⁸ Kenneth W. Stein(1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.54

³⁰⁹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.56

³¹⁰ James I. Gelvin (2005): “The Israeli-Palestine Conflict. One Hundred Years of War”, pp.177

³¹¹ See Alan Dowty (2005): “Israel-Palestine”, pp.115; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.56

³¹² See Alan Dowty (2005): “Israel-Palestine”, pp.115; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.56

all involved countries in the conflict.³¹³ Therefore, the following diplomatic efforts throughout the 1960s and 1970s have been an attempt to identify the common language and to find a middle ground between those completely different views regarding the resolution 242.

In early 1969 Nixon became the president of the US and tried to initiate an active Middle East diplomacy. He was fully committed to find a solution to the Middle East conflict. This commitment was grounded not only in his personal motivation to end the conflict but also in his desire to reduce the role of the USSR in the region.³¹⁴ Thus, he authorized a secretary of State William Rogers to draft a plan for the resolution of the Middle East conflict.

On December 9, 1969 William Rogers produced a “package settlement” for the Middle East based on two accommodations. The first one was aimed at ending the state of war between Egypt and Israel, while the second one was dedicated to the resolution of the conflict between Israel and Jordan. This “package settlement” called for Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian land occupied in the War of 1967, for establishing demobilized sectors and for providing both Israel and Jordan with the authority to govern Jerusalem.³¹⁵

This peace plan was formally accepted by Egypt. Israel, however, rejected Rogers' plan without even considering it as an option. It was unacceptable for Israel because of two reasons. Firstly, the US did not consult Israel before introducing the “package settlement” publicly. Secondly, Israelis disliked the content of this plan. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir responded to this initiative by saying that “It would be irresponsible for any Israeli government to support such a plan.”³¹⁶ Israelis were not willing to return to pre-June 1967 borders nor did it want to share Jerusalem with Jordan. There were no sufficient reasons for them to break the status quo. Moreover, this plan did not foresee any formal peace treaties between concerned parties.³¹⁷ As a result, the US Congress had to dismiss this peace initiative.

³¹³ See Alan Dowty (2005): “Israel-Palestine”, pp.115

³¹⁴ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.57

³¹⁵ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.57

³¹⁶ Palestine Facts, “What was the Rogers Plan in 1969?”, Accessed: 2008, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_rogers_1969.php

³¹⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.57-58

In April 1969 Egypt launched the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal against Israel in order to break the diplomatic deadlock. Egypt's goal was to impose on Israel as many damages as possible in order to liberate Sinai.³¹⁸ Israel, however, was very successful in counterattacks. "The fundamental weakness of the "attrition" strategy was Israel's ability to escalate the conflict when costs grew onerous and make the Egyptian costs too great to bear."³¹⁹ Thus, Nasser had to accept another Roger's initiative aimed at cease-fire on the Israel-Egypt front.³²⁰ Although the cease-fire ended an active fighting, a state of war remained in effect. Egypt still demanded total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories without granting it a formal peace treaty and recognition of its right to exist. Israel, in contrast, insisted on full peace without being committed to a complete removal of its troops from the conquered land.³²¹

In September 1970, Nasser died of a heart attack and Anwar Sadat became the president of Egypt. Israelis as well as Americans viewed him as a follower of Nasser. They consider him as a "minor political player" and believed that he will continue to follow the foreign policy goals elaborated by Nasser, namely orientation towards Arab states, willingness to destroy Israel and alliance with the USSR. Indeed, this assumption was confirmed by Sadat in earlier speeches and interviews.³²² For example, in the speech to the ASU of November, 1970, Sadat repeated "Nasserite principles" of anti-imperialism and Arabism. "On anti-imperialism, Sadat promised that all efforts, manpower, and economic resources will be mobilized until victory against Zionism and imperialism is achieved."³²³ During his speeches and interviews he described Israel as "illegitimate, a foreign body artificially implanted in the Middle East by empirical or colonial powers."³²⁴ Thus, it was hard to imagine that Sadat would move the negotiating process forward. He, however, was unsatisfied with the situation of neither war nor peace. Thus, he had to choose between the former and

³¹⁸ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.58

³¹⁹ David T. Buckwalter: "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War", pp. 119, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/1973.pdf>

³²⁰ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.58

³²¹ See Alan Dowty (2005): "Israel-Palestine", pp.118

³²² See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.2

³²³ A.I Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The elements of Foreign Policy", pp.193

³²⁴ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.2

the latter. Since Egypt could not afford another war with Israel, Sadat opted for a diplomatic solution to the conflict in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242. "Having decided that the year 1971 or 1972 would be a year of decision for war or peace, and realising that he could not wage war, Sadat was prepared to launch a peace initiative."³²⁵ Thus, the year 1971 produced two Sadat's profound peace proposals.

The first peace proposal was announced by Sadat in December 1971. He called for a total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai by two stages. The first stage foresaw the retreat of Israel from the Suez Canal to about fifteen kilometres. According to Sadat's plan, after completion of the first stage, the Suez Canal would be open again and six hundred Egyptian policemen would be placed on the east side of the canal. The second stage envisaged a final withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai.³²⁶

Although Moshe Dayan tried to convince Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to agree on a partial withdrawal from Sinai, Golda Meir rejected Sadat's offer. Dayan believed that such a step on the part of Israel might lead to a peace treaty. He argued "that if Israel withdrew from the canal area "far enough so that we do not sit on their (Suez Canal) neck" and receive an Egyptian promise to rebuild the canal cities and open the canal, which has been closed since the June 1967 War, this would be the best assurance that Egypt's intentions were not to launch another war, and perhaps even would bring about negotiations."³²⁷

Golda Meir, however, had other arguments at her disposal. First, she did not believe that Sadat was serious about his initiative and feared that it was just a manoeuvre. "We retreat one inch from the canal....we will in no time land at the international border."³²⁸ Second, Sadat offered too little for the Sinai Peninsula. He did not promise a written peace treaty entitled recognition of Israel. Sadat declared that unless Israel withdrew from all occupied territories, including Jerusalem, he would not sign such a treaty. Israelis, however, were not prepared to return to the 1967

³²⁵ Joseph Finklestone (1996): "Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared", pp.75

³²⁶ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.59

³²⁷ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.59

³²⁸ Gideon Rafael (1992), in: Kenneth W. Stein(1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.59

borders, nor did they want to give up Sinai for only a “non belligerent” treaty with Egypt.³²⁹ Therefore, Sadat’s peace initiative came to nothing.

This failure in the diplomatic realm, however, did not reduce the desire of Sadat to liberate Sinai. Thus, in April 1971 he made another proposal with regard to interim agreements concerning Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in stages. At that time, however, he did not care about the lengths and total amount of stages as well as about the character of withdrawal. He just wanted a complete Israeli’s armed forces removal from the Egyptian land. “The only thing that’s important is that I have the ultimate commitment now, before any action takes place, that there is going to be a final withdrawal.”³³⁰

In return, Sadat offered a non-belligerency agreement to Israel. According to his proposal, the interim agreement would be concluded with the help of mediators but without any direct contact between Israelis and Egyptians.

This proposal, however, had the same destiny as the first one. The Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir rejected it because of four key reasons. Firstly, Israel was not prepared to link the first stage of withdrawal to the second one. Golda Meir did not want to accept the condition under which the withdrawal from one occupied territory has to lead to the withdrawal from another piece of land. Secondly, the USA did not actively support this plan. Since the administration wanted a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict suggested by Rogers, rather than interim or phased agreement proposed by Sadat, it did not invest a lot of time or effort in the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations of 1971. Thirdly, Israel wanted a peace treaty as well as diplomatic relations with Egypt in return for Sinai, while Sadat had only offered the interim agreement. Finally, Sinai was strategically important territory for Israel. It was viewed as a key strategic area. Since, however, Golda Meir did not trust Sadat and did not believe that he had true intention to stop fighting Israel, she feared of even partial withdrawal of Israeli armed force from Sinai. Therefore, Sadat’s second peace initiative did not lead to any practical achievement.³³¹

³²⁹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.59-60

³³⁰ Michael Sterner (1992), in: Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.61

³³¹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.58-61

After the failure of those two plans, Sadat became convinced that Israel would not make any kind of arrangement with him unless Egypt showed that it still had enough military strength to start a war against Israel. Thus, he changed his policy and launched the war in October 1973.³³² The aim of this war, however, was not to destroy Israel but to start a negotiation process with Israel. “Sadat did not seek a total military victory, or even the recovery of Sinai by forces; his aim was to change the psychological relationship by showing that Egypt could still inflict heavy costs on Israel so long as it continued to occupy Sinai-while at the same time removing the burden of humiliation that limited Egyptian flexibility.”³³³

Israelis did not believe that Sadat intended to launch a war against them.³³⁴ Thus, they did not mobilise their armed troops at time. This failure provided Egypt with considerable initial success during the Yom Kippur war.³³⁵ “Only in the early hours of 6 October did Israeli government receive information that finally convinced the Prime Minister and Defence Minister that Egyptian and Syrians intended to attack that very day. But they still got the hour of the attack wrong-a mistake which was to cost many lives.”³³⁶

At the middle of the Yom Kippur war, Sadat produced another peace offer which was greatly influenced by the initial triumph of Egyptian army. Therefore, this proposal was more hostile toward Israel than his previous two offers of 1971.³³⁷ He called for an international conference aimed at a cease-fire and final settlement of the Middle East conflict based on two key conditions, namely on immediate Israeli return to pre-June 1967 borders and self-determination for the Palestinians. In return, Sadat did not even offer a non-belligerency agreement to Israel. He only promised to stop the active fighting. He stated that there would be no recognition of Israel and no diplomatic relations with it. “Calling for an international conference after Israeli withdrawal was a precondition for negotiations without either non-belligerency or peace promised from the Egyptian side. Sadat certainly was not signalling

³³² See Alan Dowty (2005): “Israel-Palestine”, pp.118

³³³ Alan Dowty (2005): “Israel-Palestine”, pp.118

³³⁴ See Joseph Finklestone (1996): “Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared”, pp.81

³³⁵ See Kenneth W. Stein(1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.68-73

³³⁶ Joseph Finklestone (1996): “Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared”, pp.101

³³⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.80-81

compromise to Israeli listeners.”³³⁸ Israelis, however, started to achieve success in the battle field by surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. Thus, it has no motivation to accept this offer.

Thus, the military result of the Yom Kippur war was not obvious. Egypt managed to replace the memories of the defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967 by placing its troops in the east bank of the Suez Canal. Israelis, on the other hand, managed to complete their plan aimed at surrounding of the Egyptian Third Army.³³⁹ Since the distraction of this army would mean a complete defeat of Egypt and another Arab embarrassment, the international community tried to prevent such an outcome at any price. “The destruction of the Third Army had the potential of destroying Sadat’s presidency, not to mention jeopardizing his newly expanded opening to the United States.”³⁴⁰

Therefore, on October 21, Kissinger and Brezhnev wrote a cease-fire resolution aimed at termination of the war within twelve hours and the implementation of the UN Resolution 242. This draft became the UNSC resolution 338, which was accepted unanimously on October 22, 1973.³⁴¹

Egypt had no other option as to accept a cease-fire agreement immediately. Israelis, however, did not want to implement this resolution before they fully enclose the Egyptian Third Army. Although they had no intention to defeat this army, they still wanted to surround it before accepting the UN resolution for the future strategic benefit in the negotiating process. Since the cease-fire resolution did not include any enforcement mechanisms, Israel managed to violate it.³⁴²

Thus, on October 23, the United Nation Security Council passed another cease-fire resolution, known as resolution 339. Unlike the first cease-fire resolution, this one included some enforcement measures. It called for arrival of United Nations

³³⁸ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.81

³³⁹ See Alan Dowty (2005): “Israel-Palestine”, pp.119; Joseph Finklestone (1996): “Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared”, pp.101-114

³⁴⁰ Richard B. Parker (2001): “The October War: A Retrospective”, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.ismi.emory.edu/BookChapters/OctoberWar.html>

³⁴¹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.88-90

³⁴² See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.90-93

observer forces to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement by the conflicting parties. Nevertheless, Israel ignored this resolution as well.³⁴³

This provoked very negative response on the part of the Soviet Union, which believed that there was an American support behind Israel's violation of cease-fire resolutions. This produced a very dangerous situation of a direct clash between the Soviet Union and the United States. Fortunately, Israelis finally agreed to accept the cease-fire resolution which put an end to the possibility of a superpower confrontation.³⁴⁴

At the end of October, Israeli leaders proposed to start direct military talks with Egypt. To their surprise, Egypt agreed to this proposal.³⁴⁵ Thus, on 28 October the direct communication line between military officials of two countries was established. Those discussions became known as "Kilometre 101 Talks".

Israel had two issues on its agenda for negotiations. The first one and the most important was the return of prisoners of war. The second issue was the abolishment of the Egyptian "naval blockade of Israeli shipping at the Bab al-Mandab Straits." Egypt's agenda was the delivery of non military supply to the Third Army and its final liberation.³⁴⁶ Those military talks were unique in a sense that they were organised without a third party in a mediation role.³⁴⁷ Moreover, the "Kilometer 101 talks" were the first direct negotiation attempt conducted by Egypt and Israel since 1948. Furthermore, although the "kilometre 101 talks" were closely monitored by Sadat and Meir, delegations from the Egyptian and Israeli armies went through a greater amount of issues than they initially supposed to discuss. They discussed not only strictly agreed military related issues but also some of the political questions.³⁴⁸

Unfortunately, however, the "Kilometre 101 Talks" were suddenly interrupted due to the US request to stop discussion at the bilateral level. Americans convinced Golda Meir to transform the negotiations to the multilateral arrangement of

³⁴³ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.92-93

³⁴⁴ See Kenneth W. Stein(1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.93-95

³⁴⁵ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.98

³⁴⁶ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.100, 104

³⁴⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.101

³⁴⁸ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.110

the Geneva conference. “The cease-fire remained in effect, but all of the details-withdrawal, how far, and who did what to whom-were to be the subject of the Geneva Conference.....The United States had missed an opportunity to pressure Sadat into making peace with Israel when the Israeli Army was at kilometre 101.”³⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the “Kilometre 101 Talks” resulted in the six-point agreement aimed at the cease-fire.³⁵⁰ It became the first agreement signed by Israel and Egypt since the 1949 Armistice Agreement. Moreover, the success of the “Kilometre 101 Talks” had shown that Egyptian and Israeli leaders not only want to conclude the disengagement agreement but also willing to achieve more comprehensive solution to the conflict. On December 1, 1973, the Geneva conference on the Middle East took place. It was sponsored by the United Nation secretary general, with the US and the Soviet Union as co-chairmen. The agenda for this conference was not less ambiguous as to find a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict and to establish a durable peace in the Middle East.

Although both Egypt and Israel favoured the Geneva Conference, they did not pursue such an unrealistic aim as a comprehensive solution to the conflict. Golda Meir did not want any substantive discussion due to the Knesset parliamentary elections, which had to take place in December 1973, while Sadat because of the opposition on the part of the Arab world.³⁵¹

For Israel participation in the Geneva Conference was very important due to at least four reasons. Firstly, Meir did not want to negotiate with Sadat alone. She wished to have the US as a guarantor of what might be decided during the discussion. Secondly, Golda Meir wanted to maintain good relations with the US and to receive economic aid from Washington. Thirdly, she hoped that this conference might to some degree help to improve relationship with Egypt. Finally, Golda Meir hoped to gain the sympathy on the part of the international community through the international media reporting.³⁵²

³⁴⁹ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.112-113

³⁵⁰ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.108-109

³⁵¹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.118,121

³⁵² See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.113,118,121-122

For Egypt it was very important to hold this conference due to at least three reasons. Firstly, Sadat wanted to attract attention of the USA to the negotiation process and to deepen relationship with it. Secondly, he hoped that the conference would help him to define an agenda for further bilateral negotiations with Israel based on his national interest of liberating the Sinai Peninsula rather than on the Palestinian course. In order to achieve this aim he insisted that discussions which might appear from the conference to be dealt in geographic committees which would allow to each country to reach its own independent agreement with Israel rather than in functional ones aimed at inter-Arab issues such as Israel's withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967. "The goal of Sinai's return would therefore not be held hostage to some topical or functional committee dealing with "territories" or "withdrawal" or "the Palestinian question" in which all participating Arab parties could exercise a veto over Egypt's prerogative."³⁵³ It is, however, necessary to note that Sadat's desire to help the Palestinian people did not reduced. He, nevertheless, was an Egyptian nationalist and, therefore, his national policy priorities were far more important than Palestinians ones.³⁵⁴ Thirdly, Sadat though that the conference would help him to weaken the expected opposition on the part of Arab world that might appear should Egypt conclude a bilateral peace agreement with Israel. He wanted to hide his real motivation aimed at the liberation of the Sinai at any price by showing at the conference that Egypt is not dropping the Palestinian problem. This fact can be confirmed by looking at the behaviour of members of the Egyptian delegation during the conference. They acted in a very antagonistic way toward Israel and demanded its full withdrawal from all occupied territories as well as the Palestinian right of self-determination.³⁵⁵

Thus, the outcome of the Geneva conference was not a durable peace in the Middle East. It did not even produce a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt. This conference, nevertheless, helped to outline an agenda for further negotiations. It was agreed to form political as well as military committees aimed at the conclusion of a disengagement agreement. Moreover, both Sadat and Meir partly

³⁵³ Kenneth W. Stein(1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.123

³⁵⁴ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.126

³⁵⁵ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.139-145

managed to achieve their above mentioned objectives which positively affected the consequent negotiations.

On December 26, 1973 the Egyptian-Israeli military committee was formed and continued to work until January 9, 1974. During this period, six meetings have been held by Israeli and Egyptian with a main focus on the unresolved issues such as the distance of withdrawal of troops, limitations of the force and arms etc. The work of this committee was very successful and resulted in the disengagement agreement, known as Sinai I which was signed on January 18, 1974.³⁵⁶

Although this agreement was not regarded by Egypt and Israel alike as a final peace treaty, the significance of this accord should not be underestimated. It became the first agreement which was made between Israel and an Arab neighbour in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242. Moreover, it constituted a first step toward the final peace treaty.

The Sinai I, however, did not immediately lead to further substantive diplomatic breakthrough. The conflicting parties could not agree on issues concerning the realisation and time frame for the implementation of the agreement. Moreover, Sadat was still not prepared to give Israel a commitment to non-belligerency in return to its withdrawal from the passes and the oil fields (offer made by Rabin on February 7, 1975).³⁵⁷ Furthermore, the relationship between Israel and Egypt became worst after Sadat endorsed the Arab Summit resolution of October 28, 1974 aimed at approval of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people with the right of establishing an independent national authority over all liberated territory.³⁵⁸ As a result, the March 1975 negotiations on another Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement failed but attempts to resolve disputes continue during the following months.

In September 1975, with the help of the US as a mediator, Israel and Egypt could finally find a compromise on the duration of the agreement as well as other issues such as authority over Israeli early-warning station and the length of Israel's withdrawal.³⁵⁹ It is important to note, that the role of the USA in achieving the Sinai II

³⁵⁶ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.147-151

³⁵⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.174-175

³⁵⁸ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.170-171

³⁵⁹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.178

was very profound. It gave to each party some guarantees which were necessary for concluding the second disengagement agreement.

The USA promised to Israel financial assistance, oil supplies and guarantees not to negotiate with the PLO before it recognises Israel's right to exist, while to Egypt to continue its efforts aimed at the conclusion of a second disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel and to pay some attention to the Palestinian question.³⁶⁰

As a result, on September 4, 1975, the second Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement, known as the Sinai II was signed. The significance of this agreement was very profound. Unlike other Arab-Israeli agreements, it covered more than just an issue of disengagement of forces and was concluded not immediately after the war. "The second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement set important precedents in Arab-Israeli negotiations: it was the first Arab-Israeli agreement not negotiated at the conclusion of a war."³⁶¹ Moreover, this agreement made the possibility of another war between Israel and Egypt extremely unlikely because Sadat agreed to sign a "non-use of force" clause, which was almost equivalent to the non-belligerency agreement in return to removal of Israeli force from some parts of the occupied territories.³⁶²

In 1976 U.S. presidential election took place and Jimmy Carter became a new President of the USA. At the beginning Sadat was disappointed with the outcome of the election. He preferred Ford over Carter because the former promised to him to pursue a comprehensive settlement of the conflict, while the position of latter toward the Middle East problem was unknown to Sadat. Nevertheless, to Sadat's surprise and satisfaction, Carter appeared to be a supporter of a comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and creation of a Palestinian state.³⁶³ According to Jimmy Carter, the basic meaning of the United Nation Security council resolutions 242 and 338 are "that Israel's acquisition of territory by force is illegal and that Israel must withdraw from occupied territories; that Israel has the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; that

³⁶⁰ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.179,181

³⁶¹ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.178

³⁶² See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.178

³⁶³ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.185-186

the refugee problem must be settled; and that the international community should assist with negotiations to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”³⁶⁴

Thus, through the whole 1977, all diplomatic efforts on the part of the USA were directed at achieving a comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict through the restarting of the Geneva Conference. Since Israelis didn't want a comprehensive settlement of the conflict or another Geneva Conference, they were disappointed with a new political course undertaken by the USA in general and Carter in particular. Israelis preferred Kissinger's "step-by-step approach" to the conflict resolution and prefer to conclude a peace accord with Egypt first.³⁶⁵

Nevertheless, despite Israel's dissatisfaction, in October 1977 the US together with the Soviet Union elaborated key points for the future Conference. Israel did not like the substance of this working paper. The key disagreement between Israel and the USA was the Palestinian state. Begin was uncompromising with regard to the future of the West Bank. He announced that Israel did not accept the American opinion that the presence of Israel in the West Bank is illegal. Begin believed that Israelis have legitimate right to stay in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, Begin complained that the joint US-Soviet document has no reference to UNSC resolutions 242 and 338. Furthermore, the USA and the Soviet Union did consult neither Egypt nor Israel during elaboration of this paper. As a result, Israelis immediately dismissed this document as an inadequate framework for a future conference.³⁶⁶ They stated that they would not participate in the Geneva should it be conducted under the joint US-Soviet working paper and with the participation of the PLO. "There cannot be a Geneva without Israel, we shall not go if the PLO there. We shall not negotiate with the PLO. And if the Arabs will not be willing to go to Geneva without the PLO, then there will not be Geneva."³⁶⁷

Thus, the USA had no other choice as to comply with Israel's demand. It drafted together with Israel another working paper with the reference to UNSC

³⁶⁴ Jimmy Carter (2006): "Palestine Peace not Apartheid", pp.38-39

³⁶⁵ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.188-198

³⁶⁶ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.200-219

³⁶⁷ Moshe Dayan (1977), in: Kenneth W. Stein(1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.220

resolutions 242 and 338 and provided assurance that representatives of the PLO would not be included in the Arab delegation in a Geneva session.³⁶⁸

Although, in contrast to Begin, Sadat was in favour of Jimmy Carter's idea of conducting an international conference, he was frustrated with some aspects related to its preparation. Firstly, Sadat was unsatisfied with the involvement of the USSR in a future conference and the US-Israel preparatory draft. Secondly, he was displeased with a high level of bureaucracy of the preparation process of the negotiations. "I prefer not to go to Geneva if there are not good preparations for the conference."³⁶⁹

Frustrated by the USA sponsored diplomacy, Sadat decided to try to negotiate with Israelis directly. He wanted the whole Sinai immediately and was not prepared to wait until Israel concludes peace agreements with other Arab states.

Thus, on November 9, 1977 President Sadat made a very important speech in front of the People's Assemble Chamber (Egyptian Parliament). He openly announced his aspiration to travel to Israel and to talk with Israelis directly in order to achieve his goal aimed at liberating Sinai. In the course of his speech, he said, "I am ready to travel to the ends of the earth if this will in any way protect an Egyptian boy, soldier, or officer from being killed or wounded. I say that I am ready for sure to go to the ends of this earth. I am ready to go to their country, even to the Knesset itself and talk with them."³⁷⁰

Some of Sadat's advisers were deeply shocked by his speech, while other did not believe that he indeed intend to go to Israel. For instance Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel did not think that Sadat's trip to Israel is more than just a manoeuvre.³⁷¹ Another case in point is the official Egyptian radio's announcement that "Egypt remained firmly committed to the strategic aims of the Arab world, and that the purpose of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was to unmask the true face of Israel, who presents herself as a lover of peace."³⁷²

³⁶⁸ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.70-74; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.219-220

³⁶⁹ Nicolae Ceausescu (1997), in: Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.222

³⁷⁰ Anwar Sadat, in : Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.11-12

³⁷¹ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp. 12; Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel (1986): "The Camp David Accords"

³⁷² Moshe Dayan (1986): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.76

For Israeli leadership, therefore, was very hard to take Sadat's intention to visit Jerusalem seriously. "It was not clear to the Government whether Sadat's statement was one of operational intent- a clear acceptance of Israel's long-standing appeal for direct negotiations- or simply an exercise in propaganda."³⁷³ Some members of the government even believed that this visit is a trick aimed at drawing away Israel's attention from planned Egyptian military attack against Israel.³⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Begin decided to take a risk and on November 13 and 14 he issued an oral invitation to Anwar Sadat to visit him in Jerusalem in order to conduct talks for a permanent peace between Israel and Egypt. On November 16, he repeated his invitation in a written form.

Thus, on November 19, 1977 the president of Egypt arrived to Jerusalem. Sadat's journey to Israel and his speech of historical importance before the Knesset shocked the whole world. It was a unique historical event which led to the peace treaty. Although Sadat claimed that this visit is nothing else but just a part of the preparations for organizing a new Geneva Conference³⁷⁵, he did not manage to avoid opposition from most of Arab states.³⁷⁶ It was for the first time in the history of Israel that an Arab leader visits the Jewish state.

This dramatic event in Israeli-Arab conflict did not, however, lead to the immediate resolution of all disagreements. Boutros Boutros-Chali, the minister of state for foreign affairs of that time, wrote that Egyptian delegation believed that the President Sadat visit to Jerusalem would solve all problems. This however did not happen. "The Israelis were clearly disappointed with President Sadat's speech and the Egyptians were shocked by Begin's response....It was evident how wide a gap separated the Egyptian and Israeli positions."³⁷⁷

Sadat and Begin had completely different solutions regarding the Middle East settlement. Sadat's attempt to address issues such as the Palestinian question, the status of Jerusalem and Israeli complete withdrawal from all occupied territories in return to recognition and a peace treaty. "I have not come here for a separate

³⁷³ Moshe Dayan (1986): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp. 75

³⁷⁴ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.224

³⁷⁵ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.223

³⁷⁶ See Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel (1986): "The Camp David Accords", pp.34

³⁷⁷ Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.22

agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is not a part of the policy of Egypt....I have not come to you to seek a partial peace, namely to terminate the state of belligerency at this stage and put of the entire problem to a subsequent stage...I have come to you so that together we should build a durable peace based on justice...There are Arab territories which Israel has occupied and still occupies by force. We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories, including Arab Jerusalem.... Achievement of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, including their right to establish their own state.”³⁷⁸

In response to Sadat’s speech, Begin clearly expressed Israel’s view on the resolution of the conflict, which was completely different from that of Egypt. He was not willing to except Sadat’s demand of a full territorial withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, to give up control over the whole Jerusalem and to address the Palestinian issues. He, nevertheless, stated that everything can be negotiated and he is ready to precede with the peace talks at any place and time.³⁷⁹

Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem was a very important event in a sense of symbolic value. It was for the first time that an Arab leader agreed to establish a direct contact with Israel and to recognise the right of the Jewish state to exist in peace and security. Moreover, during this visit Sadat clearly endorsed the “land-for-peace concept” as a basis for further negotiation. Furthermore, this visit created a possibility to continue direct as well as bilateral diplomatic contacts between Israel and Egypt. During Sadat’s trip, the Israeli minister of defence Ezer Weizman and the Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs Boutros Boutros-Chali agreed to communicate with each other directly without a third-party mediator. “The most immediate response catalyzed by the visit was the transfer of the negotiating process into the shoulders of the protagonists; the geographic locus of diplomatic activity, at least temporarily, shifted to the region. A series of bilateral and direct Egyptian-Israeli contacts expanded.”³⁸⁰

Thus Sadat’s dramatic journey to Jerusalem created the basis for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel by moving the negotiating process ahead. “Sadat’s

³⁷⁸ Anwar al-Sadat’s Speech to the Israeli Knesset, 1977, in: Camron Michael Amin, Benjamin C.Fortna, Elizabeth Frierson (2006): “The Modern Middle East”, pp.374,377, 379

³⁷⁹ See Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, pp.82-83

³⁸⁰ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.229-230

journey to Jerusalem marked a beginning of new phase of ponderous and sometimes acrimonious peacemaking between Egypt and Israel with the United States acting as a third party.³⁸¹ This visit resulted in various peace initiatives. Among the most important were the Cairo preparatory conference, Ismailia meeting, political and military committee talks.

Shortly after Sadat's speech in Jerusalem, the president of Egypt announced in the People's Assemble his decision to organise an informal meeting at the technical level in Cairo in order to prepare the agenda for a Geneva Conference on the Middle East.³⁸²

Sadat invited Israel, the US, the USSR and the representatives from Syria, Jordan, Palestine Liberation Organisation and other Arab states to participate in this conference. This peace initiative, however, received a negative response on the part of the most Arab and communist countries. The USSR, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, Syria, Libya and South Yemen refused to participate in the Cairo meeting, while the PLO did not even reply to the invitation.³⁸³

Nevertheless, despite the opposition of Arab states to the Cairo preparatory conference, otherwise known as the Mena House Talks, still took place from the 14 to 17 of December of 1977 with only four participants, namely the United States, Israel, the United Nations and Egypt.³⁸⁴

This conference did not result in any substantive progress. It became a total failure because it lacked a clear defined list of items, was badly organized and both parties had exaggerated demands. "It was path-breaking because the Israelis were in Cairo, but the talks were terrible unproductive. The two sides talked past each other."³⁸⁵ During this meeting Israelis introduced a draft of a peace treaty which didn't address any of the important issues such as borders, the Palestinian question, Israeli settlement in Sinai, demilitarized zones etc. The Egyptians, on their part, presented their draft of a peace agreement, which included items such as Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and creation of an independent state for the

³⁸¹ William L. Cleveland (2004): "A history of the Modern Middle East", pp.379

³⁸² See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.232

³⁸³ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp. 28-39

³⁸⁴ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.39

³⁸⁵ Michael Sterner (1993), in: Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.238

Palestinians under the PLO authority.³⁸⁶ Thus, it is not surprising that the delegation of both states immediately rejected each others drafts and no agreement was reached on a single disputed question.

Nevertheless, this conference was very important because it strengthened a direct communication line between Cairo and Jerusalem³⁸⁷ and contributed to the improvement of the relationship between Egypt and Israel. “Yet despite its failure, the Cairo parley had one side-effect that was to prove positive in the long run. People in both Egypt and Israel began to accept and became accustomed to the fact that their representatives met each other face to face, and talked together as friends; that Israelis could walk freely through the streets of Cairo and Egyptians do the same in Jerusalem.”³⁸⁸

The next move in the peace process came at the end of 1977. On Saturday, December 24, the Israeli prime minister went to Ismailia in return to Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem. It became a historic event which was broadcasted by hundreds of press and television reporters.³⁸⁹

During this summit Begin had a chance to present his draft of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement which consisted of two parts. It was aimed at establishing full diplomatic as well as cultural relationship between the two states.

The first part of the draft was dedicated to the Sinai problem. In this part Begin stated that Israel is ready to withdraw from Sinai under three conditions. The first one was Egypt’s commitment to demilitarize the whole of Sinai east of the Mitla and Geddi Passes. The second condition was Egypt’s conformity with Israeli civilian settlements between Rafah and El-Arish, and Eilat and Sharm-El-Sheikh. Finally, Begin demanded that Israeli military airport and early-warning, which would be changed into civilian facility, to be allowed to remain in Sinai and under Israeli control.³⁹⁰

The second part of Begin’s draft was dedicated to the Palestinian question. According to Begin’s plan the Palestinian Arabs would be given a limited

³⁸⁶ See Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, pp.99-100

³⁸⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.238

³⁸⁸ Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, pp.100

³⁸⁹ See Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, pp.102

³⁹⁰ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.239-240

administrative self-rule. In this document he clearly stated that Judea and Samaria can not be granted to foreign control and that this point can not be negotiated. At the same time, he was not prepared to give to the Palestinians Israeli citizenship because that would change the demography of the state. Therefore, the only possible solution for him was to provide to the Palestinians some kind of minimal independence. Thus, Israel demanded a separate peace with Egypt without granting the Palestinians the right of self-determination.³⁹¹

Sadat immediately rejected Begin's peace plan. A key point of disagreement between two states was Egypt's insistence on a comprehensive, rather than on a bilateral peace treaty. Thus, Egypt presented counter-proposals based on comprehensive peace which included items such as Palestinian self-determination and Israel's full withdrawal from the all land occupied in 1967 war. Sadat also made some amendments to the first part of Begin's peace proposal, namely he insisted on a complete removal of Israeli settlements from Sinai.³⁹²

Thus, the Ismailia meeting was a complete disaster. The conflicting parties were not able to narrow their positions even on a single issue. The only positive result of the Ismailia summit was an agreement to establish two working committees. The first committee was aimed at political and civil affairs, while the second one was dedicated to military issues.³⁹³

The political committee began to work on January 17, 1978. Despite that it was agreed at the Ismailia meeting that the military committee would be bilateral, it included not only Israel and Egypt foreign ministers but also an American delegation as well as a representatives of the UN. The UN representative, however, had only an observer position, rather than a full member status because most of the Arabs states did not want that the UN provide the legitimacy to the Sadat's peace initiative.³⁹⁴

The debate, which took place during the political committee work, was very similar to the debate, which had led to the collapse of previous meetings. Egyptian delegation demanded the same things as before, namely an independent Palestinian

³⁹¹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.233,240

³⁹² See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.240-243

³⁹³ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.103

³⁹⁴ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.44,52

state and Israel's total withdrawal from all occupied territories. Israelis, on their part, tried to prove that they have a right to keep a part of territories occupied in 1967 war.³⁹⁵

International law of the nineteenth century distinguishes defensive and aggressive war. Consequently since the 1967 war was a defensive war, Begin believed that Israel has the right to keep a part of the land that was occupied during this conflict.³⁹⁶

Thus, it is not surprising that talks conducted in the political committee had the same destiny as the previous negotiation attempts. During the political committee work no progress had been achieved and the Egyptian delegation left the meeting even earlier as it was supposed. According to Boutros Boutros-Chali, "everyone seemed happy to be getting out; the enthusiasm for negotiating with the Israelis had vanished."³⁹⁷

Although the political committee work ended very suddenly, it is clear that Sadat did not want to stop the negotiating process after his dramatic journey to Israel. Indeed, President Sadat demanded from his foreign minister Ibrahim Kamel to explain to the Israeli Prime Minister that the sudden termination of the negotiations has a temporary character. "I was to make clear to him that this did not constitute a rupture of the talks, but it was a temporary recall for further consideration of the situation."³⁹⁸

One possible explanation for the termination of the political committee talk could be Sadat's unwillingness to hand over control over the negotiations to high-ranking Egyptian officials who were strongly against of a bilateral peace agreement. He probably understood that in order to get Sinai back he would need to sign a separate agreement with Israel which would require his overall supervision over the whole negotiations process.³⁹⁹

The next move in the peace process came on 18 July 1978 at Leeds Castle in England, where the Egypt-Israel-US conference took place. This conference,

³⁹⁵ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.245-247; Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.111-114

³⁹⁶ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.53,137

³⁹⁷ Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.54

³⁹⁸ Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel (1986): "The Camp David Accords", pp.66

³⁹⁹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.247

however, did not result in a step forward. Both sides were still not prepared to make compromise and to change their official position. Egyptian delegation demanded a compressive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Israel's total withdrawal from all occupied territories including East Jerusalem, while Israel insisted on a Palestinian autonomy plan as well as on a bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt.⁴⁰⁰ Thus, the Leeds Castle conference did not result in any significant achievement.

In August, 1978, the US decided to initiate another attempt to break the deadlock in the negotiation. Thus, in early August Cyrus Vance went to Israel and to Egypt in order to invite Begin and Sadat to a summit meeting at Camp David. Jimmy Carter recalled "our efforts to rejuvenate the overall peace process were fruitless during the spring and summer. My next act was almost one of desperation. I decided to invite both Begin and Sadat to Camp David so that we could be away from routine duties for a few days and, in relative isolation, I could act as a mediator between the two national delegations.....I hoped to achieve a permanent peace between the two countries based on full diplomatic recognition as would be confirmed by a bilateral peace treaty."⁴⁰¹

Both Sadat and Begin accepted this invitation without delay and the summit at Camp David took place on September, 5 and continued to work until September 17. This summit became a key event in the peace process. "The differences between the stands taken by Carter, Sadat and Begin were abundant, wide and basic, and all three parties had to resolve agonizing psychological and ideological crises in order to reach an agreed arrangement. It meant abandoning long-held traditional viewpoints and outlooks and taking up new positions."⁴⁰²

This summit became not only the most productive event in the long history of conflict between those two states but also a very difficult phase in the Egypt-Israeli negotiations. It had more than a few occasions, where it was close to collapse. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser of President Carter, put it "on a number of occasions, it looked as if the whole thing would blow up, either because Sadat and the Egyptians were intransigent.....at one point, Sadat was even

148 ⁴⁰⁰ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.138-

⁴⁰¹ Jimmy Carter (2006): "Palestine Peace not Apartheid", pp.45

⁴⁰² Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.153

quite literally packing his bags and was getting ready unilaterally to pull out....and there were times when Begin was totally obdurate and unwilling to make any compromises whatsoever. So there were a great number of times at which we all felt that the whole thing was going to come to naught.”⁴⁰³

During the first tripartite meeting at Camp David Sadat had an opportunity to submit his peace proposal, known as "The Framework for a Comprehensive Peaceful Settlement of the Middle East Problem". This proposal was based on Egypt's hard line negotiation demand. It was even more ambiguous than the peace offer presented at the Leeds Castle Conference. In this draft Sadat had outlined eight provisions for a peaceful settlement. They were the following:⁴⁰⁴

1. Israel's departure to the 1967 borders, namely from Sinai, Golan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
2. Removal of all Israeli settlements from the captured land.
3. Establishment of appropriate security measures. According to this provision, all concerned parties should sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons. It is important to note that Egypt signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1981 while Israel refused to endorse the treaty. Moreover, in 1974 Egypt put forward a proposal aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (MENWFZ) and from this time onwards it became the strongest opponent of Israel's status as a nuclear state.
4. Recognition of the Palestinians right to form their own state. Abolition of the Israeli military government in the West Bank and Gaza and the transfer of authority to the Arab parties during a transitional period of five years at the end of which the Palestinians people would have a possibility to determine their own destiny. According to this plan, freely elected representatives of the Palestinian people would share power with Jordan and Egypt during the transitional period.

⁴⁰³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Interview: "Zbigniew Brzezinski Discusses his Participation in and Reflections on the 1978 Camp David Accords Reached By Egypt and Israel", Accessed: 2008
<http://www.npr.org/programs/totn/transcripts/2003/sep/030916.conan.html>

⁴⁰⁴ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.161-162; Jewish virtual library: "Framework for the Comprehensive Peace Settlement of the Middle East Problem", Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/sadatplan.html>

5. Implementation by Israel of UN General Assembly Resolution 194 concerning the Palestinian refugee problem which was approved in December 11, 1948. The article XI of this resolution states that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.”⁴⁰⁵ Thus, this resolution covered not only the Palestinian refugees who had fled the country during the war of 1967, but also these who left the country in 1948.
6. Israel’s withdrawal from East Jerusalem and hand over of authority to a joint municipal council for the city, which would consist of both Palestinians and Israelis.
7. Israel’s material compensation to Egypt and other Arab states, which territories had been occupied during the June War of 1967
8. Creation of friendly relations between the parties concerned, including ending of the Arab boycott, full recognition of Israel and free passage through the Sinai Canal.

The Israeli Prime Minister Begin had rejected almost all articles in the draft presented by Egypt. Moshe Dayan’s notes recall that “after reading this document, no member of our delegation held any opinion other than that the Prime Minister Begin that the Egyptian proposal should be rejected outright....It was not a practical basis on which we were prepared to conduct peace negotiations. Had we been ready to discuss those dramatic demands, there would have been no need for a Camp David summit.”⁴⁰⁶

Thus, Sadat’s peace initiative made the talks at the Camp David almost to collapse. Fortunately, the US President Carter, who understood that the differences between Israeli and Egyptian positions were very broad and only pressure on the part of the USA could narrow their positions, produced his own

⁴⁰⁵ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, Article XI, Accessed: 2008

<http://www.mideastweb.org/194.htm>

⁴⁰⁶ Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, pp.162

suggestion for peace.⁴⁰⁷ The substance and language of some parts of Jimmy Carter's peace proposal, however, was very vague. It provided only a general framework from which comprehensive negotiations concerning the Palestinian question could be conducted.

The American plan contained two main parts. The first one was dedicated to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. This section foresaw Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in three years. The second part of the draft addressed the Palestinian question. In contrast to the first part, the second one was far less comprehensive and certain. Moreover, those parts were not linked. As Boutros Boutros-Chali put it: "the first section of the plan –withdrawal from Egyptian land–would not necessary be followed by the second–withdrawal from Palestinian land." ⁴⁰⁸

The Egyptian delegates were truly shocked by Carter's peace proposal, which was much closer to Israel's demand, rather than to Egyptian one. They were virtually frustrated with almost all aspects of the American paper and especially with the following provisions:⁴⁰⁹

1. The resolution 242 was mentioned only in the preamble and it did not say that it applied to all involved parties in the conflict.
2. The American plan did not foresee an immediate removal of Israeli settlement from Sinai. According to American plan, Sinai had to be return to Egypt in stages. Thus, Israeli settlers were to allow remaining in Sinai for another three years. Moreover, it anticipated Israel's control of two of the airfields in the Sinai for the same length of time.
3. Uncertain solution to the Palestinian question as well as to refugee problem.
4. Lack of reference to Israel's withdrawal from Jerusalem.

⁴⁰⁷ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.163

⁴⁰⁸ Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.142

⁴⁰⁹ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.165-168 (1981); Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.141; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.253

Israelis, on their part, were also frustrated with some provisions mentioned in the US peace project. There are the following:⁴¹⁰

1. Demand to freeze Jewish settlement in the territories for five years. American plan called for stopping establishing additional settlements as well as adding new people in already existing villages.
2. Reference in the preamble of the American document to the resolution 242 concerning Israel's withdrawal from the territories occupied in the War of 1967. Israelis were not willing to oblige themselves to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza and, therefore, considered this reference in the Preamble as a serious threat to their national interests.
3. Determination of the definitive status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after a five year period.

Begin and his delegation most of all disliked issues concerning settlements⁴¹¹, while Sadat most of all attacked provisions aimed at the resolution of the Sinai problem.⁴¹² It is important to note that Sadat, in contrast to some members of his delegation, was less frustrated with provisions for the Palestinian question than with articles which were dedicated to the Sinai problem. The latter placed some limits on Egyptian authority in Sinai and, therefore, were unacceptable for Sadat. According to Moshe Dayan, during their private meeting at Camp David, Sadat told him that "will not agree to any foreign regime on our soil, neither American forces in the Sinai airfields, not to your settlements, not even one, not even for a brief period. I am now ready to make peace with you, a full and true peace, and ignore the opposition of the Arab states, but you must take all your people out of Sinai, the troops and the civilians, dismantle the military camps and remove the settlements."⁴¹³ In fact, Sadat's frustration with the American's provisions regarding the Sinai problem was so

168 ⁴¹⁰ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.165-

⁴¹¹ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.165

⁴¹² See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.141

⁴¹³ Anwar al-Sadat, in: Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.172

profound, that he again decided to withdraw the whole delegation from the talks and to leave Camp David. Fortunately, president Jimmy Carter managed to convince him to remain and to proceed with negotiations.⁴¹⁴

Thus, the following days were dedicated to attempts to narrow the differences between Israelis and Egyptians and to bring about a final peace agreement. Eventually, after thirteen days of negotiations, the conflicting parties managed to produce the Camp David Accords. It, however, was not a peace accord. It only provided the framework from which concrete negotiations regarding the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel as well as the question of autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza could be conducted.

The Camp David Accords included three main parts, namely a preamble and two documents. The preamble pointed out to the Resolution 242 concerning Israel's withdrawal from the territories occupied in the War of 1967. This reference, however, was not a serious concession on the part of Israel because it was reformulated in accordance with Israel's initial position, namely it did not stipulate that it applies to all fronts in the conflict.⁴¹⁵ Moreover, according to international law, provisions of the preamble are less obligatory than the articles in the body of the agreement.

The first document of the Camp David Accord, known as "The framework for Peace in the Middle East", was dedicated to issues related to the West Bank and Gaza. It was aimed at establishing an autonomous self-governing authority (administrative council) in these territories. The content of this document, however, was not very clear and it provided to the conflicting parties the opportunity of completely different interpretations of its provisions.⁴¹⁶ Thus, it gave Israelis the chance to block the creation of an "administrative council".

This document represented a great compromise on the part of Egypt. Firstly, this agreement did not stipulate a comprehensive peace. It had no reference to Syria and Lebanon.⁴¹⁷ Mohamed Kamel's notes recalled "the Americans project leads to a

⁴¹⁴ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.141

⁴¹⁵ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.253

⁴¹⁶ See Mark Tessler (1989): "The Camp David Accord and the Palestinian Problem", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada", pp. 3-5; Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.189; William L. Cleveland (2004): "A history of the Modern Middle East", pp.379

⁴¹⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.254

separate peace between Egypt and Israel which would be completely independent of what might happen in the west Bank and Gaza”.⁴¹⁸ Secondly, it did not secure rights of the Palestinians. It did not stipulate Israel’s commitment for total withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.⁴¹⁹ Moreover, this document did not provide any specific schedule for the development of the self-governing authority. Furthermore, no reference was made to the PLO as well as to the refugee problem. “The portion of the Camp David Accords focused on the Palestinian/West Bank-Gaza dimension was only an interim outline or framework of what might be done immediately, without any commitment for a final determination on the future sovereignty of territories.”⁴²⁰ Thirdly, it did not address the question of settlements. Israelis rejected virtually all proposals delivered on the part of the USA concerning the settlements problem. Israelis were not willing to remove existing settlements nor were they prepared to cancel the establishment of new ones. The only minor concession they agreed to make was a commitment to ban the construction of new settlements during the period of negotiation with Egypt, namely for the next three months.⁴²¹ Finally, “A framework for Peace in the Middle East” left the question of Jerusalem unresolved. The destiny of Jerusalem was only mentioned in the letters attached to the agreement, in which Egypt, Israel and the United States had an opportunity to express their views regarding this question. Thus, in the exchanged letters Israel stated that “Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel”⁴²², while Egypt announced that the whole of East Jerusalem should be subject to Arab control. The United States position on the Jerusalem question was similar to that of the Egypt. It considered East Jerusalem to be conquered territory and supported a united Jerusalem. These letters, however, were not of an “operational character”. They did not include any legal obligations and, therefore, had only a symbolic value.⁴²³

The second Camp David document was dedicated to Egyptian-Israeli relations. It became known as “Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty

⁴¹⁸ Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel (1986) : “The Camp David Accords”, pp.363-364

⁴¹⁹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.253

⁴²⁰ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.253-254

⁴²¹ See Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations” , pp.181

⁴²² Menachem Begin (1978): “Exchange of Letters” , in: “The Camp David Accords, The Framework for Peace in the Middle East (1979)”, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.ibiblio.org/sullivan/docs/CampDavidAccords.html>

⁴²³ See Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations” , pp.177-179

between Egypt and Israel". This document called for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Israel agreed to remove their settlements, including evacuation of 4,500 civilian population and airfields from the Sinai within the period of three years. This provision was a great concession on the part of Israel. In return, Israel received an Egyptian commitment to recognize Israel's right to exist and to establish diplomatic relations with it. This document also anticipated demilitarisation of most of Sinai and provided to United Nations force a responsibility to monitor the process of demilitarisation as well as to ensure free transit through the Gulf of Eilat.⁴²⁴

Although the second Camp David document was much more comprehensive and clear than the first one, it also left some important questions unresolved. Among them were the conditions under which Egypt would deliver oil from oilfields in Sinai to Israel as well as the character of armed forces that would be placed in Sinai.⁴²⁵

Thus, the Camp David conference did not produce a real peace treaty and the validity of the agreed framework still depended on the consent of Israel's Knesset as well as on the ratification of Egypt's parliament.⁴²⁶ Moreover, the Camp David documents allow the conflicting parties to interpret its provisions in a very different ways. "Just like the prelude to Camp David, at Camp David, and afterwards, there was mistrust between Egyptians and Israelis, differing interpretations of what needed to be accomplished and what was accomplished and promised at Camp David."⁴²⁷ Nevertheless, this summit was a very significant event in the history of Egyptian-Israeli relations. It showed that Sadat was prepared to make serious compromises with regard to the Palestinian issue, to improve relations with Israel and to negotiate a bilateral peace treaty. Israelis, in return, agreed to remove their troops from Sinai and to recognise the right of Egypt over this territory.

Shortly after Begin's returned to Israel, the Camp David Agreements were approved by the Knesset by the majority of vote. 84 of members of Knesset were in favour of agreements, 19 against and 17 withheld their votes.⁴²⁸ As a result, it became

⁴²⁴ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.180; Mark Tessler (1989): *The Camp David Accord and the Palestinian Problem*, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989), "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada", pp.4

⁴²⁵ See Mark Tessler (1989): "The Camp David Accord and the Palestinian Problem", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians :From Camp David to Intifada", pp.4-5

⁴²⁶ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations" , pp.179-180

⁴²⁷ Kenneth W. Stein (1997), in: *Israel Affairs: "Continuity and Change in Egyptian-Israeli Relations, 1973-97"*, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.ismi.emory.edu/JournalArticles/IASum97.html>

⁴²⁸ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations" , pp.194

possible to continue the negotiation process. Thus, the next move in the conflict resolution came on 12 October 1978 at the Blair House talks in Washington. The aim of this conference was to turn the Camp David framework into a peace treaty. This task, however, was not easy to accomplish and initial optimism achieved at the Camp David disappeared due to many controversial issues on which Egypt and Israel could not agree. There were the following:

1. **Timing of Israeli withdrawals from Sinai.** Israel wanted to accomplish this process within the period of three years, while Egypt wanted a quicker withdrawal. Sadat insist on Israelis returned of El Arish within six months after the signing the treaty. Since Israelis did not trust Egyptians, additional time for evacuation was very important for them as a means of tasting Sadat's true intention. Thus, they were against of changing the timetable of withdrawal agreed upon at the Camp David summit, according to which El Arish had to be evacuated after nine months.⁴²⁹
2. **Timing of the creation of full diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel.** Israelis insisted that diplomatic relations have to be established at the level of ambassadors at the same time as their withdrawal to the El Arish-Ras Mohammad line, namely after the completion of the first stage of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai. Egyptians, in contrast, insisted on a stage by stage process of the establishment of diplomatic relations, which could be listed up to three years period. At the first stage (one month after Israel's withdrawal to El Arish line) Egypt agreed only on diplomatic recognition as well as on the creation of "charges d'affaires". According to Sadat's opinion the exchange of ambassadors had to be contingent on the establishment of the Palestinian autonomy.⁴³⁰
3. **The question of UN force placed in the Sinai.** Israelis feared that the Security Council would fail to authorize a transfer of UN troops to Sinai. They

⁴²⁹ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.224, 233-234; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.253

⁴³⁰ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.212; Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.165

stated that they would not withdraw from Sinai in case it had to be supervised by Egyptian arms alone.⁴³¹

4. **A legal link between the Israel-Egypt peace treaty and a comprehensive settlement (including the issue of settlements, the Palestinian question, the refugee problem as well as the final status of Jerusalem).** Israel was against any legal bonds between the two treaties. It claimed that the Israel-Egypt peace might lose its validity in case no progress would be reached on the Palestinians question. Thus, they insisted on removing the sentence from the preamble which made continuation of peace with Egypt dependent on the implementation of agreements with the Palestinians as well as with Jordan. Egypt, on its part, argued that lack of such ties between the treaties would ultimately lead to the opposition on the part of Arab world and eventually to isolation of Egypt. Thus, Sadat argued that instead of removing this sentence from the preamble, it has to be added to the body of the text of the treaty, since language in the preamble is less compulsory than in the body.⁴³²
5. **Egypt's duty under earlier mutual defence treaties or security agreements signed with different Arab states, which oblige Egypt to go to war with Israel in case other Arab countries undertake this action.** Since in international law earlier treaties have precedence over the later ones, Egypt-Israel peace treaty would be "null and void" in case of war. Thus, Israelis insisted on a written confirmation that their agreement with Egypt would be given a priority. Egypt, on its part, claimed that in order to provide such a confirmation it would have to make invalid around fifty treaties signed with Arab states, including the Arab Collective Security Pact of 1950, and, therefore, this demand is unacceptable.⁴³³
6. **A date for the completion of Palestinian autonomy negotiations. Egypt wanted to complete the talks aimed at creation of the Palestinian**

216 ⁴³¹ See Moshe Dayan (1982): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.213,

⁴³² See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp. 161-162; Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.206, 208-209, 212

⁴³³ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.211-212; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, pp.257

- autonomy within six months.** Israel was against of any fixed date for the completion of talks regarding implementation of the autonomy project.⁴³⁴
7. **Oil supplies from Sinai to Israel.** The evacuation of western Sinai would mean for Israel the loss of oilfields. Thus, Israelis demanded some binding commitments on the part of Egypt that it would sell to them an annual fixed amount of oil produced in Sinai at the fixed price defined by the international market. Egyptians refused to grant any special right to Israel regarding Egyptian oil on the ground that the use of national resources is the subject of its sovereignty.⁴³⁵
 8. **The right of each party to review and to change articles regarding “the security arrangements” in Sinai.** Egypt insisted on a possibility of modifying issues regarding security after a five years period, while Israel did not want to accept an obligatory date for any amendments concerning this issue.
 9. **Creation of Egyptian “liaison officers” in Gaza.** Egypt demanded that it would be allowed to place their liaison officers in Gaza in order to influence people to support the autonomy project. Israel rejected this demand on the ground that the Camp David Accords have no reference to this issue.⁴³⁶
 10. **The U.S commitments to Israel.** Israelis requested a bilateral agreement between them and the United States aimed at economic aid and the U.S. responsibility in supervising the implementation of the peace accord with Egypt.⁴³⁷

The inability to find solutions to above mentioned disputed issues at the Blair House almost caused the peace talks to break. The U.S. had to intervene in the negotiation process again and to continue to carry drafts of agreements to both involved parties in the conflict from 1978 until 1979. Although negotiations for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty were difficult, the conflicting parties with the help of

⁴³⁴ See Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, pp.237

⁴³⁵ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): “Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat’s Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East”, pp.169-171

⁴³⁶ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): “Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat’s Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East”, pp.166-167; Moshe Dayan (1982): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, pp.278

⁴³⁷ See Moshe Dayan (1982): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, pp.214

the president Carter eventually managed to find the following acceptable solutions to all disputed questions:⁴³⁸

1. **Timing of Israeli withdrawals from Sinai.** Israelis agreed to make concession on this question. They changed their initial position and promised to Egypt to evacuate their forces from the area of El Arish, including the town of El Arish and its airfield within two months and to withdraw from east El Arish to Ras Mohammed in nine months after signing the treaty. Egypt, on its part, guaranteed to allow free **transit** of non-military cargo to and from Israel through the canal.
2. **Timing of the creation of full diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel.** Israelis managed to succeed in convincing Sadat to accept their demand regarding this issue. Thus, Egypt agreed to establish full diplomatic relation with Israel including exchange of ambassadors upon the completion of the interim withdrawal, namely after nine months.
3. **The question of monitoring Sinai under the UN supervision.** In order to find a solution to this question the United States had promise to Israel than in case the Security Council failed to approve their mission in Sinai, they would send international troops from Canada or other “friendly country”.
4. **A legal link between the Israel-Egypt peace treaty and a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.** Although both parties had to compromise on this issue, Egypt’s concession on this question was far more profound than Israel’s ones. The Israel-Egypt treaty has no legal ties to a comprehensive peace and its fulfilment did not dependent on the implementation of agreements with the Palestinians as well as with Jordan. The article 6 of the treaty states: “the Parties undertake to fulfil in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and

⁴³⁸ See Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm>; Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, pp.216-278; “Agreed Minutes Regarding the Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt”, Accessed: 2008, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/egypt2_eng.htm; “Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel”, Accessed: 2007, http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1979_us_israel_memorandum_of_agreement.asp; Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): “Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat’s Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East”

independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.”⁴³⁹ On the other hand, the Israel-Egypt treaty provides some political link to the Palestinian problem. The attachment to the treaty states that: “the provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David.”⁴⁴⁰ Thus, Israelis managed to avoid any legal connection between the treaties while not a political ones.

5. **Egypt’s legal obligations under earlier treaties.** With regard to this issue Egypt had to make great amount of concession. Begin received some legal guarantees that Egypt would not joint their allies in case they undertake a military action against Israel. The article VI states: “subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter in the event of a conflict between the obligation of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.”⁴⁴¹ The attachment to the agreement, however, specifies that neither this treaty nor earlier treaties have precedence over each other in a peaceful time. It states: “It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty.”⁴⁴² Thus, this treaty does not nullify Egypt’s obligations under earlier agreements.
6. **A date for the completion of Palestinian autonomy negotiations.** After long consideration Israel agreed to make concessions on this issue. However, it did not accept either Egypt’s proposal of the six month limit nor did it agree to the American’s ones which called for 9 months time for the end of the autonomy talks. Israelis agreed to end those talks in one year after the ratification of the peace treaty, namely three months after the start of normalised relations with Egypt. By doing so, Israel won additional time of three months for testing Sadat’s true intention and his commitment to peace.

⁴³⁹ Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Article VI (2), Accessed: 2008, <http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm>

⁴⁴⁰ “Agreed Minutes Regarding the Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt”, Article VI (2), Accessed: 2008, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/egypt2_eng.htm

⁴⁴¹ Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt”, Article VI (5), Accessed: 2008, <http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm>

⁴⁴² “Agreed Minutes Regarding the Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt” Article VI (5), Accessed: 2008, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/egypt2_eng.htm

7. **Oil supplies from Sinai to Israel.** Egypt refused to give to Israel some written commitments regarding this question. It, however, agreed on proposed by Israel addendum to Appendix III which is dedicated to the creation of normal economic relation between the parties. It states that “such relation will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel, on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil.”⁴⁴³ Although this provision does not oblige Egypt to sell oil to Israel, the maintenance of this note was very important for Israel. It signifies a termination of the Arab boycott against it. Moreover, Sadat gave to Begin some oral guarantee that Egypt would sell oil to Israel according to the fixed international price and permanently. He also agreed to confirm this commitment in a written form after signing the peace treaty. Furthermore, Americans agreed to sign a fifteen-year agreement with Israel, which would oblige the U.S. to supply oil to Israel in case it’s become unable to secure delivery of oil from Egypt.
8. **The possibility of the revision of the security arrangements in Sinai.** Israelis agreed to make a minor change in the treaty regarding to this question. This amendment, however, does not grant to Egypt any right of modification of the security arrangements in Sinai without Israel’s permission. The Article IV states that the security arrangements “may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.”⁴⁴⁴
9. **Creation of Egyptian liaison officers in Gaza.** Sadat agreed to make compromise on this issue and to drop his request to build Egyptian liaison offices in Gaza. Thus, any reference to this question was excluded from the peace treaty.
10. **The U.S commitments to Israel.** On the issue of economic aid, American promised to finance the two new airfields. On the question of obligation, the U.S agreed to conclude an agreement with Israel, which established the U.S

⁴⁴³ “Agreed Minutes Regarding the Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt”, Annex III, Accessed: 2008, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/egypt2_eng.htm

⁴⁴⁴ Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt”, Article IV (5), Accessed: 2008, <http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm>

obligations in case of the violation of the peace treaty by Egypt. The Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel states: “should it be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States that there has been a violation or threat of violation of the Treaty of Peace, enhance friendly and peaceful relations between the parties and promote peace in the region, and will take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which may include diplomatic, economic and military measures...”⁴⁴⁵ This memorandum provides only support to Israel. “The United States will provide support it deems appropriate for proper actions taken by Israel in response to such demonstrated violations of the Treaty of Peace.”⁴⁴⁶ Egypt was not able to accept the same guarantee on the part of the U.S because its status of non-aligned country prohibited the formation of any security arrangement with a superpower. Thus, Egypt objected this agreement. It argued that it represents an alliance between Israel and the United States against Egypt and would have a negative impact on the whole peace process.

As is visible from the above, during the last stage of the negotiation process Sadat made a greater amount of compromises than Begin did. As a result the conflicting parties managed to resolve all disputed questions and finally to agree to sign a peace treaty in Washington on March 26, 1979. It contains nine articles, a military annex, agreed minutes and an annex aimed at defining the consequent relation between the countries.

March 26 became a historical day in the history of the Arab-Israel conflict. On this day, Egypt, a country that wanted to destroy Israel at any price, became the first Arab country to recognize the right of Israel to exist. The Israel-Egypt peace accord was a very impressive achievement, which ended 30 years of war!

⁴⁴⁵ “Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel”, Article II, Accessed: 2007,
http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1979_us_israel_memorandum_of_agreement.asp

⁴⁴⁶ “Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel”, Article III, Accessed: 2007,
http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1979_us_israel_memorandum_of_agreement.asp

1.6.3 Theoretical part

The key task of my dissertation research is to investigate the outcome of different negotiations and the way of how various factors influence the decision of conflicting parties to conclude peace agreements.

Thus, in this case study my goal is to figure out what kind of factors caused Israel and Egypt to sign the peace treaty. There have been many attempts to answer this question from a variety of angles and through the application of different theories. I believe that the analytical framework on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice theory and the constructivist theoretical framework is the most suitable approach for analysing conflicting parties' decision to enter the negotiations and to accept the outcome of the bargaining game. In the empirical analysis below, the material factors will be evaluated through RCT, will immaterial ones through the constructivist framework.

1.6.3.1 Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory states that human beings are rational actors and all their actions are 'rational' in nature. Thus, each actor seeks to increase his own gains and to pick the most appropriate alternative that would help him to achieve as much as possible benefits. In order to achieve this aim actors tend to calculate all costs and benefits of any performance before deciding how to act.⁴⁴⁷

Application of this theoretical approach to my case study suggests that both Egypt and Israel started the negotiation process and sign the peace treaty because they started to consider it as a better choice than the use of force or status quo. Both sides come to this conclusion after undertaking costs and benefits analysis of the existing situation. According to RCT, the outcome of their calculation was based on minimization of costs and maximization of material benefits such as political, economic and strategic profits.

⁴⁴⁷ See John Scott (2000): "Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present", Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

Since, however, “it is not possible for individuals to achieve all of the various things that they want”⁴⁴⁸, both Sadat and Begin had to make trade-offs and concessions. By doing so they tried, however, not to harm their most important interests derived from their instrumental rationality.

In accordance with the rational choice theory, the analysis below will be divided into the following three sections.

1. In the first section I will survey the entire complex of material factors that have influenced the willingness of conflicting parties to enter the negotiation process.
2. In the second section I will undertake analysis of the bargaining process and the outcome of this process.
3. In the final section I will review the entire complex of different material factors that made the conflicting parties to accept the outcome of the bargaining process.

1.6.3.1.1 Reasons of why conflicting parties agreed to enter the negotiation process.

Many supporters of RCT focus their attention on the most favourable toward peace moment in conflicts in their attempt to explain why certain conflicts can be settled, while others not. They argue that successful conflict resolution depends on the ripeness of a conflict i.e. a situation in which conflicting parties are prepared to conduct peace talks.⁴⁴⁹

Indeed, after the analysis of different documents, memories as well as research papers I realized that the conflicting parties entered the negotiation process at the period of ripeness and figured out key factors which created this situation. The

⁴⁴⁸ John Scott (2000): “Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present”, Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

⁴⁴⁹ See I. William Zartman (2003): “Ripeness”, Accessed: 2008, <http://crinfo.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/>

core reason for Israel was the outcome of the October War of 1973⁴⁵⁰, while for Egypt it's rapidly deteriorating economy.⁴⁵¹

Israel

The October War showed to Israelis that they can not keep status quo in the conflict with Egypt any longer. This war improved a bargaining position of Egypt which was greatly damaged in the earlier war of 1967.

The Six-Day War of 1967 resulted in enormous victory of Israel. Israelis managed to gain all of Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights.⁴⁵² The achieved military dominance and the occupied territories provided Israel with a powerful bargaining card. "The perception of a strong bargaining position combined with a decisively superior military force led to a new overly confident Israeli position that proved to be counterproductive to the peace-making process."⁴⁵³

Thus, Israelis had little motivation to break the status -quo by entering the negotiation process.⁴⁵⁴ The October War of 1973, however, changed the existing situation. It provided new possibilities for breaking the diplomatic stalemate. Egyptians managed to achieve their limited objectives aimed at demonstrating that they are still able to impose a lot of damage on Israel so long as it continued to occupy Sinai.⁴⁵⁵ These costs manifested themselves in three ways.

Firstly, Egypt managed to achieve some strategic success during this war. Egyptians obtained the east bank of the Suez Canal. This success increased Israel's concern over its security. It showed to Israelis that Arab soldiers can fight properly and that their military dominance was not a strong deterrent against Egypt. "Everyone had the illusion that this would be a short war, another Arab humiliation,

⁴⁵⁰ See Alan Dowty (2005); Shibley Telhami (2001); Joseph Finklestone (1996); Kenneth W. Stein (1999)

⁴⁵¹ See A.L. Dawisha (1976); Mark N. Cooper (1982); William L. Cleveland (2004); Kenneth W. Stein (1999)

⁴⁵² See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp. 2-3

⁴⁵³ Brian Christopher Nethery Kelly (2008): "Ripe Without Warning: Israel and Egypt 1967-1973", in: African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, pp.015, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR/PDF/pdf2008/Jan/Kelly.pdf>

⁴⁵⁴ See Shibley Telhami (2001): "The Camp David Accords: A case of International Bargaining", Accessed: 2008; pp.3; Brian Christopher Nethery Kelly (2008): "Ripe without warning: Israel and Egypt 1967-1973", pp.016,017, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR/PDF/pdf2008/Jan/Kelly.pdf>

⁴⁵⁵ See Alan Dowty (2005): "Israel-Palestine", pp.118

and there was no way they could obtain significant territories.”⁴⁵⁶ This perception, however, appeared to be wrong. The Egyptian soldiers fought much better than the Israelis had predicted.⁴⁵⁷ Thus, Israelis need peace in order to enhance its security

Secondly, Egypt managed to impose serious economic casualties on Israel. During “the first ten days of the war, Israel lost around two-thirds of its mechanized forces”⁴⁵⁸ and “more than 6,000 troops had been killed or wounded in eighteen days of fighting.”⁴⁵⁹ “The loss of equipment and the decline of production and exports as a consequence of mobilization came to nearly US\$7 billion, the equivalent of Israel's gross national product for an entire year.”⁴⁶⁰ Thus, Israelis need peace in order to resupply its weapons and other military equipments which were damaged during the war.

Thirdly, Egypt found new bargaining power. The members of the organization of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) raised the price per barrel of oil in 1974 in order to boycott Israel and states which provided any kind of support to Israel. The OPEC members “mounted an oil embargo against all those states supporting Israel in the war - and used the resulting oil shortage as a lever to force up the price by three times.”⁴⁶¹ The reduction in the international supply and increased oil prices produced worldwide inflation and caused some states of Western Europe as well as Japan to become more favourable towards the Arab cause. “The post-1973 pro Arab posture of Japan and some EEC countries in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict can be attributed, if not wholly then partially, to these countries’ dependence on Arab oil.”⁴⁶² As a result Israel became more dependent on the United States for economic and military aid as well as for diplomatic assistance.

Finally, the October War produced a very dangerous situation of a direct conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. It became clear to the international community in general and to the U.S. in particular that as long as the

⁴⁵⁶ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.72

⁴⁵⁷ See Joseph Finklestone (1996): “Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared”, pp.105

⁴⁵⁸ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.74

⁴⁵⁹ “What was the Result of the Yom Kippur War?”, in: “Palestine facts, Israel 1967-1991”, Accessed: 2008, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_ykwar_result.php

⁴⁶⁰ “What was the Result of the Yom Kippur War?”, in: “Palestine facts, Israel 1967-1991”, Accessed: 2008, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_ykwar_result.php

⁴⁶¹ “A War for Oil”, in: New York Times, 26 February 1979, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.socialistalternative.org/literature/gulfwar/ch1.html>

⁴⁶² A.L. Dawisha (1976): “Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy”, pp.83

Middle East conflict remained, there was a possibility of massive confrontation between the superpower. As a result, the United States became more interested in pressuring conflicting parties to enter the negotiation process by all possible means.
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The outcome of the October War can therefore be posited as a primary deterrent of Israel's decision to accept peace talks with Egypt.⁴⁶⁴

Egypt

Sadat realized that the legitimacy of his leadership depends on his ability to improve the economy of Egypt as well as to regain Sinai to Egyptian control through any available means at his disposal.⁴⁶⁵ Thus, the situation of "no war no peace" was unacceptable to Egypt.⁴⁶⁶ Egypt, however, had no recourse to fight Israel. It was suffering from unemployment, overpopulation, inadequate social services, underdevelopment and corruption.⁴⁶⁷ Sadat knew that he can achieve his objectives only through peace with Israel

Since the war of 1969 the Egyptian economy was worsening very rapidly because of various reasons. Among them were the following:

The first reason is Nasser's economic reforms aimed at creation of the socialism system in Egypt. Nasser's nationalisation program in a combination with Egypt's lack of raw resources as well as the quick increase in population had very negative effect on the economy of Egypt. It resulted in increased reliance on foreign aid, corruption, political repression as well as in a lack of foreign investments and reduction of the foreign community in Egypt. A profound rise in imports led to the trade deficit and to the reduction of Egypt's gold as well as currency reserves.⁴⁶⁸

The second reason is the outcome of 1967 war. As a result of this war, 10,000 soldiers and 1,500 officers were lost⁴⁶⁹ and 80% of military equipment was

⁴⁶³ See William L. Cleveland (2004): "A history of the Modern Middle East", pp.376

⁴⁶⁴ See Alan Dowty (2005); Shibley Telhami (2001); Joseph Finklestone (1996); Kenneth W. Stein (1999)

⁴⁶⁵ See David W. Lesch (2001): "The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East", pp.36

⁴⁶⁶ See William L. Cleveland (2004): "A history of the Modern Middle East", pp.374

⁴⁶⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.11; A.L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy",

⁴⁶⁸ See A.L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.84-86; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.11

⁴⁶⁹ See A.L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.50

destroyed⁴⁷⁰. Apart from the oil deposits which are mostly located in Sinai, “Egypt is a poor country in terms of natural resources and raw materials”. Thus, the canal’s income is economically very important for Egypt.⁴⁷¹ Moreover, Egypt had to increase its spending in order to admit displaced people who had been forced to flee after the war 1967 from their homes located along the canal.⁴⁷² Furthermore, the war had a negative impact on the tourist sector. “Because of its unique pharaonic and Islamic history, Egypt counts on tourism to generate revenues and foreign exchange; however, tourism declined sharply after the 1967 war and the War of Attrition, and it remained depressed when the Arab-Israeli tension were high, which was certainly the case in the early 1970s.”⁴⁷³

The third reason is Egypt’s enormous defence expenditure. The bad economic situation had been greatly worsened by Egypt’s astonishing spending on its armed forces and military equipments. “Egypt’s defence expenditure as a percentage of her Gross National Product has risen from 13.5 in 1967 to a crippling 34.1 in 1975. According to the director of the Central Bank of Egypt, the country has spent, or has borrowed in order to spend, no less than \$25,000 million on military equipment and operation during the period 1967-75.”⁴⁷⁴

In order to overcome various economic problems Sadat launched the policy of liberalisation and modernisation. The short term-result of Sadat’s “open door” policy, however, had negative result. It did not stop Egypt’s growing inflation. For example from January 1973 to September 1974 the price index of food and beverages increased by 19.8 on the countryside areas and by 29.0 in the cities.⁴⁷⁵ Moreover, Sadat’s policy resulted in an increased corruption. The gap between the rich and the poor became more profound. The growing costs of living led to a number of strikes, protests and riots.⁴⁷⁶ The population of Egypt in general and industrial workers in particular were dissatisfied with the outcome of new economic program launched by Sadat. “Economic reform and moderate liberalisation produced no tangible improvements and the people were becoming restless. War costs continued without

⁴⁷⁰ See Encyclopaedia: “Information About 6-day War”, Accessed: 2009, http://www.informationdelight.info/encyclopedia/entry/6-Day_War

⁴⁷¹ See A.L. Dawisha (1976): “Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy”, pp.83

⁴⁷² See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.11

⁴⁷³ David W. Lesch (2001): “The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East”, pp.36

⁴⁷⁴ A.L. Dawisha (1976): “Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy”, pp.185

⁴⁷⁵ See A.L. Dawisha (1976): “Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy”, pp.187

⁴⁷⁶ See A.L. Dawisha (1976): “Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy”, pp.188

war. The private sector fell into a recession. Reform of the public sector did not even appear to be implemented. The students were back out on the street. The government was lambasted in the press and the assembly.”⁴⁷⁷

Thus, because of above mentioned reasons Sadat could not keep status quo in the conflict nor could he initiate another war with Israel. “A week before the 1973 War, Sadat estimated that the Egyptian economy was “at zero, with commitments till the end of year which we will not be able to fulfil with the bank.”⁴⁷⁸ Therefore, in order to improve Egypt’s economy, Sadat had to start a peace process.

The economic motives can therefore be considered as a key reason of Egypt’s decision to enter the peace process⁴⁷⁹.

1.6.3.1.2 The bargaining process and its outcome

In this part I will undertake the analysis of the outcome of the bargaining process. I will show that the peace treaty was much closer to the Israel’s vision of the final resolution of the conflict than to the Egypt’s position.

Sadat presented his opening bargaining position for the first time during his trip to Jerusalem in November 1977.⁴⁸⁰ The following month during the Ismailiyya summit, Israelis introduced their initial demands as precondition for the peace treaty.

In the table below I underline all things that conflicting parties tried to achieve from negotiations and the outcome of bargaining process.⁴⁸¹ From the table below it is visible that the gap between Egypt’s and Israel’s initial bargaining position was tremendous.

⁴⁷⁷ Mark N. Cooper (1982): “The Transformation of Egypt, pp.85

⁴⁷⁸ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.11

⁴⁷⁹ See A.L. Dawisha (1976); Mark N. Cooper (1982); William L. Cleveland (2004); Kenneth W. Stein (1999)

⁴⁸⁰ See Jonathan Oakman (2002): “The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation, pp.2, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf>

⁴⁸¹ See Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm>; Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”, “Agreed Minutes Regarding the Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt”, Accessed: 2008, http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/egypt2_eng.htm; Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): “Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat’s Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East”; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”; Mark Tessler (1989): “The Camp David Accord and the Palestinian Problem”, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): “Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada”; Jonathan Oakman (2002): “The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation”, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf>

Table: Initial bargaining position and the outcome of negotiations

Issue	Egypt's demand	Israel's demand	Outcome
<i>The Camp David Framework</i>			
Nature of peace			
Type of settlement	Comprehensive peace agreement of the Middle East conflict based on UN Resolution 242	Bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt	Israel's original demand
Recognition of Israel	Recognition of Israel depends on the implementation of a comprehensive settlement	Recognition of Israel in return for the Sinai	Israel's original demand
Security arrangement in the Middle East	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Israel should sign the NPT	This question is not a basis for negotiations	Israel's original demand
Golan/West Bank-Gaza dimension			
Israel's withdrawal from Golan, West Bank and Gaza Strip	Occupation is illegal, Israel's withdrawal from all occupied territories	Right to keep these territories, no withdrawal	Israel's original demand
Jewish settlements in Golan, West Bank and Gaza Strip	Settlements is illegal, evacuation of all civilian settlements from the occupied territories	No removal of Jewish settlements	Israel's original demand
Establishment of new settlements in Golan, West Bank and Gaza Strip	Suspension of creation of new Israeli settlements and prohibition to add new members to existing villages.	No restriction on the establishment of new settlements	Israel's slight compromise Temporary prohibition to build new settlements during negotiations of the peace treaty (only 3 months)
The Palestinian question			

Right of the Palestinian people	The Palestinians have the right to establish their own state at the end of the transition period of autonomy (5 years)	Autonomy instead of self-determination as a final status	Israel's slight compromise Vague language of the agreement, possibility of different interpretation ⁴⁸²
The jurisdiction of the Palestinian self-governing authority during the transitional period	Territorial and functional jurisdiction	Only functional jurisdiction. Autonomy refers not to the land but only to the people	Israel's original demand
The scope of the functional jurisdiction of the Palestinian self-governing authority	Broad power of the self-governing authority with executive and legislative duties	Limited power of the self-governing authority with just administrative duties.	Israel's original demand
The election of self-governing authority during the transitional period.	All Palestinians including refugees permitted to vote	Only inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza can vote	Israel's original position
Administration of the West Bank and Gaza during the transitional period	Administration of the West Bank by Jordan and Gaza by Egypt in cooperation with representatives of the Palestinian people	No foreign administration on the territory of Israel	Israel's original demand
Question of Jerusalem			
Status of East Jerusalem	East Jerusalem should be subject to Arab sovereignty, Israel's withdrawal	No withdrawal from East Jerusalem	Israel's original position.

⁴⁸² Some people criticized Bagin for accepting the Camp David Framework which commits Israel to compromises. Domestic opposition argued that despite of uncertain language of the agreement, the accords do acknowledge that the autonomy project has only a temporary nature

Administration of Jerusalem	Establishment of a joint municipal council with an equal number of Palestinians and Israelis	City status is non-negotiable, remained under Israeli control	Israel's original demand
Rights of Arab living in East Jerusalem to participate in the autonomy negotiations.	Participation of the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem in the autonomy negotiations	No participation of the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem in the autonomy talks	Israel's original demand
The refugee problem			
The right of the Palestinian refugees to return to Israel.	All refugees have the right to return to their homes, implementation of UN Resolution 194	The Palestinians fled voluntarily, Israel is not responsible for their decision	Israel's original demand
<i>The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty</i>			
Nature of the Egypt-Israel treaty			
Conditions of the maintenance of the Treaty	The maintenance of peace with Egypt is conditional upon implementation of agreements with the Palestinians as well as with Jordan	The maintenance of peace with Egypt is not conditional upon implementation of the Camp David framework for peace in the Middle East	Israel's slight compromise Only political link between the treaties. No legal provisions.
The question of Sinai			
Type of evacuation	Full evacuation including civilian settlements	Evacuation without removal of Israeli civilian settlements	Egypt's original demand
Security arrangement in Sinai	No foreign troops in Sinai	Placement of UN or other international troops in Sinai	Israel's original demand
Revision of the security arrangements in Sinai	Possibility to modify "security arrangements" after five years	No obligatory anticipated date for the revision	Israel's slight compromise Security arrangement can be amended but only by mutual agreement of the parties.

Oil supplies from Sinai to Israel	No written commitments to Israel regarding Egyptian oil	Written obligation on the part of Egypt that it would sell oil from Sinai to Israel at the international price.	Egypt's original demand
Recognition of Israel			
Diplomatic relations between the two states	Establishment of full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level conditional upon the creation of the Palestinian autonomy	Establishment of full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level upon the completion of the first stage of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai.	Israel's original demand

As is visible from the table above, the outcome of the bargaining process “was much closer to Israel’s initial position than to Egypt’s”.⁴⁸³ The only significant concession on the part of Israel was its commitment to pull out from the Sinai. Israelis agreed to remove all settlements, including evacuation of all civilian residents and airfields in the Sinai within the period of three years.⁴⁸⁴

In all other fundamental issues, however, Egypt eventually had to accept Israel's original demands. The peace treaty did not anticipate a comprehensive solution of the conflict based on the implementation of U.N. resolution 242. Israel refused to withdraw from all the land occupied in 1967 and to recognize the Palestinian rights to form their own state. Moreover, the accord failed to address the refugee problem and the status of Jerusalem.⁴⁸⁵

Thus, Sadat agreed to make a lot of concessions. He agreed to normalize relations with Israel and to establish full diplomatic contacts by exchanging

⁴⁸³ Jonathan Oakman (2002): “The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation”, pp.7, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf>

⁴⁸⁴ See Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm>; Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”; Jonathan Oakman (2002): “The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation”, pp.7, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf>

⁴⁸⁵ See Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm>; Moshe Dayan (1981): “Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations”; Jonathan Oakman (2002): “The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation”, pp.7, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf>

ambassadors in return for Sinai.⁴⁸⁶ Sadat, therefore, dropped his commitment to pursue the Arab course in general and the Palestinian question in particular. By doing so, he reduced a number of potential benefits and increased the costs associated with the peace treaty. Indeed, the peace treaty with Israel led to Egypt's suspension from the Arab League, the transformation of the Arab league secretariat from Cairo to Tunis and to the termination of Arab economic assistance as well as diplomatic relations with most of Arab states.⁴⁸⁷

1.6.3.1.3 Reasons of why conflicting parties agreed to accept the outcome of the bargaining process

In the final stage of my costs and benefits analysis I will evaluate factors which influenced the decision of conflicting parties to accept the outcome of the bargaining game.

It is possible to underline at least four key reasons of why Israel accepted the outcome of the negotiation process. There are: strategic consideration, economic benefit from cooperation with Egypt, Jimmy Carter's diplomacy and the U.S. financial aid packet.

It is, however, important to bear in mind that the peace treaty was much closer to Israel's initial position than to Egypt's.⁴⁸⁸ Therefore, Israel's victory of the bargaining game can be posited as a primary deterrent of Israel's decision to accept the accord.

Although Egypt lost the bargaining process, it, nevertheless had much to achieve from the peace treaty. It is possible to call at least four reasons which influenced Egypt's decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process. There are: territorial benefit, Carter's diplomacy and American economic assistance.

⁴⁸⁶ See Jonathan Oakman (2002): "The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation", pp.7, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf>

⁴⁸⁷ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.223; Shibley Telhami: "The Camp David Accords: A case of International Bargaining", Accessed: 2008, James Jankowski: "Egypt: A Short History", Accessed: 2008, <http://www.oneworld-publications.com/books/texts/egypt-a-short-history-ch8.htm>

⁴⁸⁸ See Jonathan Oakman (2002): "The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation", pp.7, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf>

Israel

Reason I: Strategic consideration

The key factor which influenced Israel's decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process was strategic consideration, which manifested itself in three ways.

First, Israel's attitude towards the importance of the occupied territories can be considered through its concern over security. Although the strategic value of the Sinai Peninsula is important, it, nevertheless, less significant than the strategic value of other territories occupied in the war of 1967.⁴⁸⁹ The geography of the Sinai places some limitation on Egypt's ability to launch a successful surprise attack across the Sinai. In contrast to Israel's boundaries with Jordan, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt's borders with Israel is not very close to the most populated areas of Israel. Moreover, the Sinai has only a few roads which are vulnerable to air and land attack.⁴⁹⁰

The second strategic consideration was that the peace treaty took into account Israel's concern over its security. The accord mandated the demilitarization of much of the Sinai territory and transfer of U.N arm forces to Sinai to monitor this process.⁴⁹¹ Moreover, the peace agreement placed some restriction on the troops Egypt can locate on the Sinai. Furthermore, the peace agreement resulted in the United States' commitment to undertake some action in case of Egypt's unilateral withdrawal from the treaty.⁴⁹² Finally, the treaty foresaw a slow Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Thus, it provided Israel with additional time for testing whether or not Sadat is truly committed toward peace.⁴⁹³

Third, Israel achieved some strategic benefit from the peace treaty by changing the balance in the Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of Israel. Israelis saw the peace agreement with Egypt as a means of enhancing security of the state.⁴⁹⁴ Since Egypt is the most densely inhabited as well as powerful state among other Arab

⁴⁸⁹ See James I. Gelvin (2005): "The Israeli-Palestine Conflict. One Hundred Years of War", pp.183

⁴⁹⁰ See Anthony H. Cordesman (1996): "Perilous Prospects. The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance", pp.211-212

⁴⁹¹ See Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt (1979), Article VI, Appendix to Annex I (article I, III, IV), <http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm>

⁴⁹² See "Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel", Article II,III, Accessed: 2007, http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1979_us_israel_memorandum_of_agreement.asp

⁴⁹³ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations"; pp.224

⁴⁹⁴ See David W. Lesch (2001): "The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East", pp.41- 44

countries, it represented the most serious military threat imposed by Arab states to Israel.

A large size of population enabled Egypt to have a very important position in the Arab world⁴⁹⁵ and it represented a source of strength in term of military potential. The table below shows the size of Egypt's population in comparisons to the other Arab countries.⁴⁹⁶ It clearly demonstrates Egypt's advantage in terms of the demographic factor.

Table II
Population of Egypt in comparison to other Arab states, 1955-1975
(millions)

Years	Population of Asian Arab states (Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia)	African Arab states (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia)	Population of Egypt
1955	17.2	25.4	23.0
1958	18.2	27.5	24.7
1961	19.3	29.9	26.6
1964	23.0	49.9	28.9
1967	26.0	48.3	30.9
1970	29.5	52.6	33.3
1971	37.1	53.4	34.2
1972	39.4	55.7	34.9
1973	41.1	56.7	35.7
1974	42.0	58.4	36.6
1975	43.5	60.2	37.5

Another factor which gave Egypt the most important role in the Arab world was its high spending on defence. Egypt's expenditures greatly exceeded the expenditures of other powerful Arab states.⁴⁹⁷ The table below shows Egypt's expenditures in comparison to some other powerful Arab states.⁴⁹⁸ It clearly demonstrates Egypt's dominance in term of military capabilities.

⁴⁹⁵ See A.L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.183

⁴⁹⁶ A.L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", in: Lecture in International Politics University of Lancaster, 1976, pp.80, 183

⁴⁹⁷ See A.L. Dawisha(1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.185

⁴⁹⁸ A.L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", in: Lecture in International Politics University of Lancaster, 1976, pp.87, 185

Table III
Defence Expenditure of Egypt in Comparison to Some Selected Arab states,
1958-75 (\$million)

Year	Iraq	Syria	Jordan	Egypt
1958	83.5	65.0	38.0	211.0
1960	103.5	66.5	60.0	280.0
1962	125.0	73.0	53.0	314.0
1964	170.0	91.1	59.8	267.1
1966	237.9	82.6	60.5	425.5
1968	253.9	101.3	106.9	506.9
1970	399.4	161.4	104.8	568.3
1971	237.2	176.0	90.4	1,495.0
1972	237.2	206.5	90.4	1,510.0
1973	338.0	216.0	119.2	1,737.0
1974	803.0	460.0	142.0	3,117.0
1975	803.0	668.0	155.0	6,130.0

Thus, from the tables above it is visible that the success of the Arab armies from any potential confrontation with Israel heavily depended on the participation of Egypt. Therefore, Israelis wanted to reduce the possibility of Egypt's participation in future Arab-Israeli conflicts. "Separating Egypt from the rest of the Arab world had been a long-standing Israeli goal as a way to weaken Arab bargaining power and remove the greatest single military threat to Israel, which, for many in the Likud party especially, would make it easier to hold onto the rest of the occupied territories (after presumable returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt) and to downgrade, if not totally ignore, the Palestinian situation."⁴⁹⁹ Thus, Israel believed that the peace treaty with Egypt would transform the Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of Israel. Indeed, the credibility of an Arab war against Israel fundamentally decreased after the removal of the most powerful Arab state from the military arrangement.

Thus, even though Israel's decision to give back Sinai to Egypt in return to the peace treaty was associated with great economic costs ("loss of oilfield which supplied "some two million barrels of oil a year"⁵⁰⁰, the cost of replacing installations about three billion eight hundred million dollars⁵⁰¹ and the trauma of forcing some

⁴⁹⁹ David W. Lesch (2001): "The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East", pp.43-44

⁵⁰⁰ Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.180

⁵⁰¹ See Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.232

Israeli residents to leave Al-Arish⁵⁰²), it nevertheless was consistent with Israel's concerns over its security and even represented a strategic benefit.

Reason II: Economic benefit from cooperation

Israelis hoped to achieve not only strategic benefit from peace with Egypt but also economic one in terms of cooperation. For years the Israeli economy had suffered from the Arab boycott. A boycott was introduced in 1948 by the Arab League. It was directed against Israeli-made goods. It prohibited the importation of Israeli-origin goods and services into boycotting states. In 1952 the Arab boycott was broadened to include non-Israelis who maintain economic cooperation with Israel. Thus, the Arab league prohibited to companies as well as to individuals to conduct any business relation with Israel.⁵⁰³

The economic boycott had a very devastating effect on the Israeli economy. "According to an estimate of the Israel chamber of commerce, the boycott cost Israel \$20 billion in potential exports and \$16-32 billion in lost investments. Another estimate put the combined cost of the Arab boycott at \$40 billion since 1948."⁵⁰⁴ Thus, for Israel it was very important to conclude peace with a leading Arab state. During negotiations Israel was prepared to exchange peace for land. It demanded from Egypt a broad peace accord with agreements on such issues as tourism, trade and diplomatic ties. Israelis political economists expected a great direct benefit from bilateral relationship with Egypt. Yet, the "cold peace" between Egypt and Israel did not fulfil Israelite's expectation. The process on normalisation of relation was very slow and in 1980s the peace produced only minimal economic contacts between the two states. "Almost no tourism from Egypt to Israel materialized and few commercial deals were negotiated. Academic and cultural exchanges were stillborn."⁵⁰⁵ Nevertheless, the relaxation of boycott positively affected the Israeli economy in

⁵⁰² See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.219; Wikipedia, online encyclopaedia: "Camp David Accords", Accessed: 2008, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords_\(1978\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords_(1978))

⁵⁰³ See Ofira Seliktar (1998): "The Peace Divided, The Economy of Israel and the Peace Process", in : Ilan Peleg (1998): "The Middle East Peace Process, Interdisciplinary Perspectives", pp.225; Dalia Dassa Keye (2001): "Beyond the Handshake: Multilateral Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", pp.36-38

⁵⁰⁴ Ofira Seliktar (1998): "The Peace Divided, The Economy of Israel and the Peace Process", in : Ilan Peleg (1998) : "The Middle East Peace Process, Interdisciplinary Perspectives", pp. 225

⁵⁰⁵ Kenneth w. Stein (1997): "Continuity and Change in Egyptian-Israeli Relations, 1973-97", in: Israel affairs, pp. 266-320, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.ismi.emory.edu/JournalArticles/IASum97.html>

general and some industries in particular. For example in the late 1980s and the early 1990s Israel began to receive foreign cars for the first time. The estimation shows that in case “boycott had continued to be enforced, and these cars did not enter the Israeli market, the Israeli car market would have been 12% smaller leading to a \$790 price increase per car. Total welfare loss for the study year, 1994, would have been \$89 million.”⁵⁰⁶

Thus, it is possible to conclude that economic variable although was not a primary deterrent but still played an important role in Israel’s decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process.

Reason III: Jimmy Carter’s diplomacy of ‘Carrots and Sticks’.

When Jimmy Carter became the president of the US, he had little knowledge about the Middle East, the Jewish and conflict. However, he, very quickly acquired knowledge on these issues. Carter was very determined to solve the Middle East conflict and was willing to participate in the conflict resolution process directly as well as to use all necessary means for accomplishing this goal.⁵⁰⁷

Thus, Jimmy Carter managed to find effective strategies of persuading the parties to conclude the peace agreement. Therefore, it is possible to posit that another key factor which influenced Israel’s calculation of costs and benefits in favour of the peace accord was Jimmy Carter’s “directive strategies” of conflict resolution. This tactic is the most powerful type of involvement in the conflict resolution⁵⁰⁸ which is conducted by “offering each party in conflict incentives, promises of support, or threats of diplomatic sanctions..... Directive strategies take the form of promises of rewards or threats of withdrawals, if certain agreements are not made or actions are not taken.”⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁶ Martin A. Weiss (2006): “Arab League Boycott of Israel”, in : CRS, Report For Congress, pp.4, Accessed: 2008, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/65777.pdf>

⁵⁰⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”

⁵⁰⁸ See Jacob Bercovitch (2004): “International Mediation and Intractable Conflict”, Accessed: 2008, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med_intractable_conflict/

⁵⁰⁹ Jacob Bercovitch (2004): “International Mediation and Intractable Conflict”, Accessed: 2008, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med_intractable_conflict/

This kind of diplomacy might change the calculation of conflicting parties of costs and benefits.⁵¹⁰ It may add up a number of potential benefits from concluding an agreement and reduced the costs associated with this particular action. Carter very effectively used the combination of sticks and carrots in order to make Israel to accept the outcome of the bargaining process.

The stick was Carter's threat to withdraw the U.S support for Israel in case it refuses to accept the outcome of the negotiation process. Moshe Dayan notes recalls that Jimmy Carter told to Israelis that "the failure of talks would be catastrophic for relations between Israel and the United States. He would be obliged to report to Congress that Israel was not prepared to take the necessary steps to achieve peace."⁵¹¹

The Carrot was Carter's promise to provide to Israel some economic support and to monitor the implementation of the peace treaty in order to be able undertake certain actions in case of its violation by Egypt.⁵¹²

Taking into consideration the fact that traditionally the US economic as well as political support has been very important for Israel, there are no doubts that Carter's diplomacy played an important role in changing Israel's perception with regard to the peace treaty.

Reason IV: American economic aid.

Another very important factor which influenced Israel's decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process was the U.S financial aid packet.

Until 1971 the United States economic support to Israel was not very high. "Between 1948 and 1973, the U.S. provided Israel with an average of \$122 million a year, or a total of \$3.1 billion for the entire period. In fact, more than \$1 billion of that amount consisted of loans for military equipment before and during the Yom Kippur War of 1973."⁵¹³ The situation, however, changed dramatically after Israel agreed to accept the outcome of the peace process and to withdraw from Sinai.

⁵¹⁰ See Jacob Bercovitch (2004): "International Mediation and Intractable Conflict", Accessed: 2008, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med_intractable_conflict/

⁵¹¹ Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations", pp.173

⁵¹² See "Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel", Accessed: 2007,

http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1979_us_israel_memorandum_of_agreement.asp; Moshe Dayan (1981): "Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations"

⁵¹³ Yuval Levin: American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions", pp.11, Accessed: 2008,

The Israel-Egypt agreement resulted in the United States committing a \$2.2 billion loan and \$ 800 million grant package to the government of Israel⁵¹⁴. This amount of economic aid helped Israelis to cover expenses associated with their departure from Sinai. The tables below show the U.S. economic assistance to Israel for the years 1949-1996.⁵¹⁵

Table IV
The United States economic assistance to Israel, 1949-84
(\$million)

Year	Total aid*	Year	Total aid*
1949	100.0	1967	23.7
1950	None	1968	106.5
1951	35.1	1969	160.3
1952	86.4	1970	93.6
1953	73.6	1971	634.3
1954	74.7	1972	430.9
1955	52.7	1973	492.8
1956	50.8	1974	2.621.3
1957	40.9	1975	778.0
1958	85.4	1976	2.337.7
1959	53.3	1977	1.762.5
1960	56.2	1978	1.822.6
1961	77.9	1979	4.888.0
1962	93.4	1980	2.121.0
1963	87.9	1981	2.413.4
1964	37.0	1982	2.250.5
1965	65.1	1983	2.505.6
1966	126.8	1984	2.631.7

*Total aid includes military loan, military grant, economic loan, economic grand, FFP (food for peace) loan, FFP grant

The tables above clearly illustrate a sudden increase of economic aid to Israel immediately after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Egypt. Thus, it can be posited that the U.S. financial aid packet played an important role in changing Israel's calculation of costs and benefits in favour of the peace treaty.

<http://www.iasps.org/strat11/strategic11.pdf>

⁵¹⁴ See Daniel Feith (2006): "The Costs of U.S. Aid to Israel", Accessed: 2008

<http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hireview/content.php?type=article&issue=spring04/&name=feith>

⁵¹⁵ Jeremy M. Sharp (2009): "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel", CRS Report For Congress, pp.21- 22, Accessed: 2009, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/134987.pdf>

Egypt

Reason I: Egypt's territorial benefit

The key factor which influenced the decision of Sadat to conclude the peace treaty, which was based mainly on Israel's initial position than to Egypt's, was territorial consideration.⁵¹⁶

Sadat wanted Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai at any price. "The Sinai Peninsula was considered to be part of sovereign Egyptian territory: its return would justifiably signify a renewal of Egyptian territorial integrity, as well as of the honour lost during the previous years of war."⁵¹⁷

The Sinai is a relatively little area, which is about 60,000 km². However, because of its unique geographical location and natural resources, its importance should not be underestimated. The Sinai provides a "land bridge" to Southwest Asia because it lies between the Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea.⁵¹⁸ Thus, traditionally the Sinai has been very important territory for Egypt for various reasons such as cultural, economical and security.

Historically, it was an area which provided security along the Nile. In the twentieth century Sinai became an important land due to the economic reasons.⁵¹⁹ Thus, by regaining control of the Sinai, Egypt received at least three sources of an economic benefit.

The first economic benefit comes from large reserves of oil and natural gas founded in the west side of the peninsula. In addition to it, in 1990 Egypt started to acquire coal from Sinai. Since Egypt has almost no natural recourses⁵²⁰, profits from the Sinai represents an important source of income for the government of Egypt.⁵²¹

The second source of revenue came from opening the Suez Canal, which was closed since the Six-Day War.⁵²² Since the canal allows "the fastest crossing from the

⁵¹⁶ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999); Jonathan Oakman(2002); David W. Lesch (2001)

⁵¹⁷ Clarissa C. Eagle: "Optimal Behaviour in International Negotiation: An interdisciplinary study of Camp David", Accessed: 2008, <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/CampDavid.pdf>

⁵¹⁸ See Sharm El- Sheikh: Sinai- A brief History, Accessed: 2010, <http://www.diveafrica.com/redsea/history.html>

⁵¹⁹ See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.133

⁵²⁰ See A.L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.185

⁵²¹ See David W. Lesch (2001): "The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East", pp. 36

⁵²² See David W. Lesch (2001): "The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East", pp. 36

Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean”, it is constantly used by international ships. The government of Egypt in return to its permission to cross the canal gains significant income from taxes paid by ships.⁵²³

The final economic benefit came from the tourist sector.⁵²⁴ The Sinai attracts a great amount of tourists due to its beautiful nature. Tourism is one of the most dynamic sectors of the economy of Egypt. According to the official data it accounts of 11.3% of GDP. Moreover, this sector provides a great amount of jobs.⁵²⁵ Therefore, the government of Egypt received an important source of income from opening the Sinai to tourists.

Reason II: Jimmy Carter’s diplomacy of “Carrots and Sticks”

Another key factor which influenced Egypt’s calculation of costs and benefits in favour of the peace accord was Jimmy Carter’s directive strategies of conflict resolution. As I already noticed in the section above, this tactic is the most powerful type of intervention which includes promises of rewards or threats or the combination of both.⁵²⁶ Carter applied directive strategies not only to Israel but also to Egypt. He used the combination of sticks and carrots in order to convince Sadat to accept the outcome of the bargaining process.

The stick was Carter’s threat to terminate the U.S support in case Egypt refuses to accept the outcome of the negotiation process, while the carrot was his promise to provide all kind of political as well as economic support to Egypt in case it accepts the treaty.

Boutros Boutros-Chali notes recalls that at the Camp David Summit the president Carter told to Sadat that if the Camp David negotiation collapsed, it would lead to the end of his political career. He would not have a chance to be re-elected for a second term. Consequently, Egypt would be left without his political support. “But

⁵²³ See Egypt: Facts and Figures, International Business Intelligence, Accessed: 2010
http://www.lingo24.com/international_business_intelligence/egypt.html

⁵²⁴ See David W. Lesch (2001): “The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East”, pp.36

⁵²⁵ See “Invest in Egypt, Tourism, Value Proposition”, pp.3, Accessed: 2010,
<http://www.gafinet.org/English/SectorsValuePreposition/Tourism%20Value%20Proposition-2010.pdf>

⁵²⁶ See Jacob Bercovitch (2004): “International Mediation and Intractable Conflict”, Accessed: 2008,
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med_intractable_conflict/

if the Camp David talks succeeded, Carter said to Sadat, then in his second term he would insure that the agreement fulfilled all Sadat's expectations."⁵²⁷

Moreover, it is also important to note that Sadat was not able to justify his rejection of unwanted paragraphs during the bargaining process due to the centralised political system of Egypt. In contrast to Begin, he could not avoid unwanted concessions on the grounds that they have to be ratified by the parliament first and accepted by his electorate. "Sadat could not credibly reject a certain agreement on the grounds that he could not mobilize domestic support behind it. Because everyone knew that his hands were not tied politically, he had little room to manoeuvre strategically."⁵²⁸

Thus, Carter's diplomacy in a combination with the political system of Egypt played an important role in the negotiation process and Sadat's decision to accept the peace treaty.

Reason III: American political and economic support

Another very important factor which influenced Egypt's decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process was the U.S financial support. Indeed, the peace treaty resulted in grants and military aid packages to Egypt.

In 1951 the U.S. began to provide economic support to Egypt. However, between 1951 and 1973 the U.S. provided to Egypt only a very limited amount of aid and almost terminated its assistance in 1967 when Nasser rejected the U.S. economic support and turned toward the "Soviet camp".⁵²⁹

After the death of Nasser the U.S. restored its support to Egypt. When president Sadat showed his aspiration to improve relations with the United States in 1974, the latter provided to the former \$700 million.⁵³⁰ In the following year a large – scale U.S assistance for Egypt continued to increase. After Sadat agreed to accept the outcome of the bargaining process and to establish diplomatic relations with Israel,

⁵²⁷ Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.142

⁵²⁸ Jonathan Oakman (2002): "The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation", pp.8, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf>

⁵²⁹ See Yuval Levin : American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions", pp.5, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.iasps.org/strat11/strategic11.pdf>

⁵³⁰ See Ruttan, United States Development Assistance Policy, in: Yuval Levin : American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions", pp.5, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.iasps.org/strat11/strategic11.pdf>

Egypt received about \$2,6 billion annually.⁵³¹ Thus, it became the second largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S. aid.⁵³²

The tables below show the U.S. economic assistance to Egypt for the years 1949-1996. It clearly illustrates an increase of economic aid to Egypt after the conclusion of the peace accord.⁵³³

**Table V,
The United States economic assistance to Egypt, 1949-84
(\$million)**

Year	Total aid*
1949	None
1950	None
1951	0.1
1952	1.2
1953	12.9
1954	4
1955	66.3
1956	33.3
1957	1
1958	0.6
1959	44.8
1960	65.9
1961	73.5
1962	200.5
1963	146.7
1964	95.5
1965	97.6
1966	27.6

Year	Total aid*
1967	12.6
1968	None
1969	None
1970	None
1971	None
1972	1.5
1973	0.8
1974	21.3
1975	370.1
1976	464.3
1977	907.8
1978	943.2
1979	2.588.5
1980	1.167.3
1981	1.681.2
1982	1.967.3
1983	2332
1984	2.470.8

*Total aid includes military loan, military grant, economic grant, I.M.E.T(International Military Education and Training) grant, D.A (development assistance) loan, D.A. grant, ESF loan (Economic support funds), FFP (food for peace) loan, FFP grant.

⁵³¹ See Yuval Levin: American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions”, pp.3-5, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.iasps.org/strat11/strategic11.pdf>

⁵³² See Yuval Levin: American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions”, pp.3, Accessed: 2008 <http://www.iasps.org/strat11/strategic11.pdf>

⁵³³ Jeremy M. Sharp (2009): CRS Report For Congress, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, Accessed: 2009, pp. 37-38, <http://www.fas.org/sfp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>

The U.S. economic support helped Egypt to finance its defence budget, to rebuild its military equipment and to improve the state's infrastructure.

Thus, it can be posited that the U.S. financial aid package played an important role in changing Egypt's calculation of costs and benefits in favour of the peace treaty.

Concluding remarks

As I showed above, both parties had sufficient reasons to enter the negotiation process and both of them achieved some material benefit from the peace treaty. Thus, this case study is consistent with the rational choice approach. However, in my opinion RCT have some important shortcomings.

Firstly, opponents of this approach fail to address the question regarding the role of immaterial factors. Since it is impossible to prove that immaterial factors play no role in shaping state behaviour, their inability to address important aspects of social life such as identity, culture, norms and ideas reduces the explanatory power of the RCT.

Secondly, rational choice theory tends to treat 'national interests' as "exogenously given". According to this theory, people act according to their preferences that are assumed to be fixed and exogenously given. Constructivists, in contrast, believe that interests are not fixed and, therefore, their nature and creation have to be properly investigated.⁵³⁴

Finally, supporters of RCT fail to provide an adequate explanation regarding the question of external as well as internal opposition to the peace process. In other words, why, if the material benefits of concluding the peace accord with Israel were obvious, many Egyptians criticized this agreement and most of Arab states did not accept the peace treaty nor did they want to follow the Egypt's example.⁵³⁵ For example, although Syria could have gained a lot of material benefit from the peace treaty with Israel (such as Golan Heights, American economic support as well as

⁵³⁴ See John Gerard Ruggie (1998): "Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization", pp.13,33

⁵³⁵ See Dominic Coldwell (2003): "Egypt's 'Autumn of Fury': The Construction of Opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process between 1973 and 1981", Accessed: 2008, <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~metheses/Coldwell.pdf>

opportunity to reduce its extraordinary spending on armed forces), it did not even want to consider the possibility of launching a negotiation process with Israel.

In this regard, it is argued below, that the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty is incomprehensible without an understanding of how cultural factors help to construct vital interests of the conflicting parties.

1.6.3.2 The constructivist theoretical framework

Constructivists recognize the central importance of identity, culture, ideas, beliefs etc. in world politics. Supporters of this approach argue that behaviour of people and their interactions can not be understood properly through the analysis of material factors alone. Constructivists believe that human relations are constructed mainly by ideational and social factors such as ideas, identities, norms, beliefs etc. These factors provide meaning to material aspects in world politics. Constructivists, however, do not neglect the influence of material factors on the outcome of certain political event.⁵³⁶ By doing so, they offer one possible way of integrating material and ideational factors into analysis.

Thus, Constructivism does not dismiss explanations of rational choice theory of a specific political outcome. It complements conclusions derived by the latter theory by integrating cultural elements into analysis.

Although Constructivists agree with each other on the key assumption that immaterial factors play a very important role in world politics, they focus on different immaterial factors in their attempt to explain processes of social construction of reality in general and certain political outcomes in particular.⁵³⁷ In this case study I will focus on identities in order to explain Israel's and Egypt's decision to conclude the peace treaty.

⁵³⁶ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); Alexander Wendt (1999); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon (2001)

⁵³⁷ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink: "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

In accordance with the constructivists theoretical framework, the analysis below will be based on the following assumptions elaborated by the supporters of this theoretical framework regarding issue of identity:

1. Constructivists argue that identities and interests are connected.⁵³⁸ They shape actors' preferences and actions.⁵³⁹ It is a starting point of any analysis of identities conducted in a constructivist vein. Application of this hypothesis to my case study means that Israel's and Egypt's decision to conclude the peace agreement to a great extent depended on their identities.
2. According to constructivist ontology, actors may have multiple types of identities. It is, however, important to bear in mind that actors' identities can cut across and often overlap with each other. According to constructivism the most prominent kinds of states' identities are "type identities" and "role identities". "Type identities" refer to some common characteristics of state such as types or forms of state.⁵⁴⁰ The most important "type identities" of Israel are Jewish and democratic identities. The most important forms of identification of Egypt are Egyptian nationalism, Islam and Arabism.⁵⁴¹ Those identities constitute policy preferences and the way of how conflicting parties considered the peace process in general and the outcome of bargaining process in particular.
3. Constructivists believe that through interaction, identities can change over time.⁵⁴² Since identities and interests are connected, the transformation of identities would lead to the construction of new interests and policy preferences. Egypt's decision to conclude the peace treaty with Israel confirms this assumption.

⁵³⁸ See Erik Ringmar (1997): "Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History", in: Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (1997): "The Future of International Relations. Master in the Making", pp.280

⁵³⁹ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", pp. 398, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

⁵⁴⁰ See Wendt, in: Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", pp. 398-399, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

⁵⁴¹ See Dominic Coldwell (2003): "Egypt's 'Autumn of Fury': The Construction of Opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process between 1973 and 1981", Accessed: 2008, <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~metheses/Coldwell.pdf>

⁵⁴² See David Rousseau and A. Maurits Van Der Veen (2005): "The Emergence of a Shared Identity. An Agent-Based Computer Stimulation of Idea Diffusion", pp. 288, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.albany.edu/~dr967231/articles/RousseauJCROct2005.pdf>

4. According to constructivism, structures and agents are “mutually constituted”. Constructivists believe that both domestic and international structures can have two kinds of effects on agents, causal and constitutive. Actors may shape their own social context (structures) when new thoughts and ideas expressed by them enter into this system.⁵⁴³

1.6.3.2.1 Israel (identities)

I believe that the Likud agreed to conclude the peace treaty with Egypt because of its interpretation of the prominent “type identities” of Israel, namely Jewish and democratic ones through the lenses of a revisionist variation of Zionism.

In the first part of this section I will analyse above mentioned “type identities” of Israel in the historical context and how these identities are viewed domestically.

In the second part I will try to prove that Israel’s decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process was consistent with the Likud’s interpretation in general and Begin’s in particular of Israel’s identities as a Jewish and democratic state through a lens of a revisionist version of Zionism.

Historical background

Israel’s identities as a Jewish and democratic state are derived from a Zionist ideology. Zionism is the Jewish national liberation movement which was created in the late 19th century in response to increasing anti-Semitism in Europe. The term “Zionism” was derived from the biblical word “Zion”, which means a synonym for words Jerusalem and the Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael).⁵⁴⁴ Supporters of this movement advocated return of Jewish people to their original homeland.

Zionism is not a monolithic ideology. There are various strands of Zionist such as religious, cultural, political or socialist Zionism. It is also not a static movement. Zionism is a dynamic ideology which has the capacity to change. “Zionist

⁵⁴³ See Alexander Wendt (1999): “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.165- 167; Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

⁵⁴⁴ See “What is Zionism and who are the Zionists?”, in: Palestinian Facts, Accessed: 2010, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_early_palestine_zionism.php

ideas evolved over time and were influenced by circumstances as well as by social and cultural movements popular in Europe at different times, including socialism, nationalism and colonialism, and assumed different "flavors" depending on the country of origin of the thinkers and prevalent contemporary intellectual currents.”⁵⁴⁵ Although Zionist ideology is subject of frequent reinterpretation and modification, its key basis remain unchangeable, namely creation and protection of the Jewish state.

The tragedy of Holocaust, increased persecution of Jews and rejection of the Arab world the right of Israel to exist reinforced Jewish identity of Israel which is based on some ideas derived from the various strands of Zionist ideology.

Firstly, Zionists view Jewish as a distinct people connected to each other by common history and destiny.⁵⁴⁶ Jews are “distinct people with a continuous identity expressed in language, culture, genealogy, and religious practice.”⁵⁴⁷ This belief of Jewish people leads to a feeling of mutual responsibility aimed at preservation of Jewish culture and promotion of the unity of the Jewish people.

Secondly, Zionists believed that anti-Semitism can not be eradicated and only creation as well as preservation of a Jewish state might secure Jews survival. The Holocaust reinforced this belief and the memories of this tragedy still have a profound impact on the Jewish identity. Thus, demography became a key element which helps to secure the safety of the state.

Thirdly, Zionists do not ignore any Jewish people anywhere. They take responsibility with regard to the right of all Jewish people. “Zionism is concerned with the fate of Jews everywhere.... In the Zionist view means that as many Jewish as possible should be settled in the Jewish homeland, and it may also entail a complete exodus of Jews from countries in which danger threatens.”⁵⁴⁸

Finally, supports of a more religious or revisionist variation of Zionism have a very strong attachment to the ancient land of Israel (Eretz Israel).⁵⁴⁹ Religious circles consider Israel as the biblical and historic homeland of the Jewish people. This attachment to the land of Israel goes back almost 4,000 years to the time of Abraham.

⁵⁴⁵ Ami Isseroff, “A history of Zionism”, What is Zionism”, Accessed: 2008, http://www.zionismontheweb.org/zionism_history.htm

⁵⁴⁶ Simon N. Hermann (1989): “Contemporary Expression of Jewish Identity, Zionism and Pro-Israelism: A Distinction with a Difference”, pp.122

⁵⁴⁷ Alan Dowty (2005): “Israel-Palestine”, pp.22

⁵⁴⁸ Simon N. Hermann (1989): “Contemporary Expression of Jewish Identity, Zionism and Pro-Israelism: A Distinction with a Difference”, pp.125-126

⁵⁴⁹ See Karin Aggestam (1999): “Reframing and Resolving Conflict, Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998”, pp. 59, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Aggestam.pdf>

“In the Bible, Israelite peoplehood is inextricably tied to the Land. God promises the Land to Abraham and his descendants, though the gift is contingent on virtuous behaviour.”⁵⁵⁰ Proponents of a religious variation of Zionism argue that religious law prohibits the return of the territory of Eretz Israel to the Palestinian. Some even view the capture of additional parts of Holy Land in 1967 as a sign of arrival of Messiah within a short period of time and, therefore, strongly oppose the return of the captured territory on the ground that this land can accelerate the coming of the Messiah. Supporters of revisionist Zionism, in contrast to religious groups, drew their attachment to the territories because of historic claims of Jewish people rather than due to their religious beliefs.⁵⁵¹ Nevertheless, majority of them also advocate the creation of a Jewish state which would include the West Bank as well as all or some parts of Jordan. It is important to note that Jerusalem as the capital of David and Solomon’s kingdom plays a key role in the Zionist ideology. All above mentioned ideas derived from the Zionist ideology and are visible in Israel’s Jewish identity as well as in the laws, traditions, and norms of the state. For example the Star of David is painted in the flag of Israel, “the national anthem describes the millenia-old Jewish hope of freedom and return to the homeland”⁵⁵², Judaism is the official religion of the state, Hebrew is the most widely spoken language and Israelis keep the calendar of the land from which they had been forced out for two thousand years. Israeli memorial days and holidays are connected to the Jewish common memory. There are holocaust day, Jerusalem day, Sabbath etc.⁵⁵³ Only Kosher food is allowed to be served in government institutions⁵⁵⁴, Arab and Israeli children attend different schools and there are no civil procedures for matters related to birth, marriages as well as death. Moreover, Israeli diplomats assume responsibilities not only in relation to Israeli citizens but also to the Jewish community in the countries to which they are placed.⁵⁵⁵ Furthermore, according to Israeli law, Israel does not belong only to its

⁵⁵⁰ Israel in Jewish Thought 101, Accessed: 2010,

http://mobile.myjewishlearning.com/israel/Jewish_Thought/Israel_in_Jewish_Thought_101.shtml

⁵⁵¹ See Mark Tessler (1989): “Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel”, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): “Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians : From Camp David to Intifada”, 275-277: Mark Tessler (1989): “Israeli Politics and the Palestinian Problem after Camp David”, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): “Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians : From Camp David to Intifada”, pp.152

⁵⁵² The State of Israel as a Jewish State, Accessed: 2010,
http://huka.gov.il/wiki/index.php/The_State_of_Israel_as_a_Jewish_State

⁵⁵³ See Don Peretz and Gideon Doron (1997), “The Government and Politics of Israel”, pp.61

⁵⁵⁴ See James Ciment (1997): “Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict”, pp.125

⁵⁵⁵ See Bernard Reich (2004): “Israeli Foreign Policy”, in: L. Carl Brown (2004): “Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers”, pp.124

citizens but to all Jewish worldwide. The Law of Return, adopted on July 5, 1950, provides every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen. “Even Jewish converts to Christianity or Islam should be considered Jewish by nationality and be granted citizenship.”⁵⁵⁶

Israel’s identity as democratic state is also derived from the Zionist ideology. A Zionist approach seeks to postulate the idea that Israel has to exist not only as a Jewish but also as a democratic state. “Israel’s Jewish and democratic values are both grounded in its existing constitutional documents. In the Declaration of Independence, Israel’s founders proclaimed both the Jewish and democratic nature of Israel”⁵⁵⁷

Democratic ideas are especially visible in earlier Zionist movement. For example, Theodore Herzl, the founder of modern political Zionism, was committed to “the secular, progressive ideas of the Enlightenment, envisioning a democratic policy which would be, in effect, Jewish by name only.”⁵⁵⁸

Thus, the laws and norms of the state seek to embrace in various different ways not only the Jewish identity but also the democratic one. Barak writes that “The values of Judaism and democracy have broad jurisprudential importance in Israel..... They have constitutional status, influencing both the determination of the extent of human rights and the protection accorded them in Israeli jurisprudence.”⁵⁵⁹ Indeed, Israel has all elements of a democratic state. There is free and regular elections in which all citizens (not only Jews) have the right to participate, there are a separation of power, a competitive party system, a free press, an independent judiciary, an active parliament as well as civil society.⁵⁶⁰

Thus, Israel’s dual identities as a Jewish and democratic state are fully integrated into the laws and customs of the state of Israel.

Link between Israel’s identities and the peace treaty

⁵⁵⁶ Don Peretz and Gideon Doron (1997), “The government and Politics of Israel”, pp.60

⁵⁵⁷ The State of Israel as a Jewish State, Accessed: 2010, http://huka.gov.il/wiki/index.php/The_State_of_Israel_as_a_Jewish_State

⁵⁵⁸ Iran Peleg (1998): “The Peace Process and Israel’s Political Kulturkampf”, in: Iran Peleg (1998): “Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, pp.242

⁵⁵⁹ Aharon Barack, in: Gidon D. Remba “What is Zionism? A Peace Now Vision”, pp.4, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.chicagopeacenow.org/wiz-complete.pdf>

⁵⁶⁰ See Iran Peleg (1998): “The Peace Process and Israel’s Political Kulturkampf”, in: Iran Peleg (1998): “Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, pp.243; Don Peretz and Gideon Doron (1997): “The Government and Politics of Israel”

Various political parties of Israel represent the above mentioned prominent type of identities differently depending on their interpretation of the Zionist ideology. Their ideological diversity affects the character of government policies significantly. The Likud party originally occupies the right of political spectrum. It embraces a revisionist variation of Zionism which is based on a historical connection to the ancient land of Israel.⁵⁶¹

I believe that the Likud agreed to accept the outcome of the bargaining process, namely to pull out from Sinai and to implement the Palestinian autonomy project because of its interpretation of the prominent type of state's identities through the lenses of a revisionist variation of Zionism. By doing so, Begin believed that he would manage to keep the democratic and Jewish character of the state, while at the same time create a possibility to integrate the biblical and historic homeland of the Jewish people into Israel.

Indeed, it is possible to underline two pieces of evidence which confirm this assumption.

Firstly, Israelis have never had an emotional attachment to the Sinai Peninsula. They did not consider Sinai as the biblical and historic homeland of the Jewish people. "The Sinai had never been part of the "land of Israel", and although it does play a role in Jewish historical memory (after all, Moses did receive the Ten Commandments there), that role is hardly overwhelmingly positive: For most Jews, the Sinai has represented a place to get out of, even if it takes forty years."⁵⁶² Israelis have always been prepared to pull out from some territories occupied in the War of 1967 in case those territories were relatively unimportant in term of their biblical claims and historical connection. The case in point is Israel's proposal of the 60s to return the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a peace agreement. Thus, Israel's decision to pull out from the Sinai did not undermine its ideology. It did not contradict Israel's Jewish identity. Moreover, since this decision was in accordance with the democratic ideas, it helped to strengthen Israel's character as a democratic state, enhance its legitimacy as well as security.

⁵⁶¹ See Karin Aggestam (1999): "Reframing and Resolving Conflict, Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998", Lund University Press, pp.59, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Aggestam.pdf>

⁵⁶² James L. Gelvin (2005): "The Israeli-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War", pp.183

Second of all, Begin's Palestinian autonomy project was consistent with the Likud's interpretation of the prominent type of state's identities through the lenses of a revisionist variation of Zionism. The Likud leadership argued that Israel could not grant the West Bank to a foreign authority because of its religious connection to this land. Judea and Samaria had always played a special symbolic role in the Zionist ideology. Begin pointed out: "You can annex foreign land. You can not annex your own country, Judea and Samaria are part of the land of Israel, where the nation was born."⁵⁶³ It is however, important to note that the Likud party, in contrast to religious circles, believed that Israeli control in the West Bank and Gaza must be preserved because of nationalistic reasons rather than Israel's religious claims.

The democratic nature of Israel, however, required some attention to the humanitarian rights of the Palestinians. On the other hand, Israel was not prepared to treat the Palestinians equally to Jews within the Israeli political system because that would undermine the Jewish character of the state. Therefore, the only possible solution to the Palestinian problem was to provide them some kind of minimal autonomy. Thus, Begin's plan called for granting the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza the authority to run only their own internal affairs within the borders of Israel. "For Begin, Palestinian autonomy was the only acceptable formula that would not compromise philosophical requirements of keeping Judea and Samaria under Israeli control while not providing the Palestinians with full political rights in the Jewish state."⁵⁶⁴ According to his plan, Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza would have the free option to receive either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. Likud, however, argued that most of Arabs will prefer to leave rather than to stay under Israeli control. Therefore, the Jewish character of the state would be sustained. The proponents of this approach claim that the Palestinians who, nevertheless, decided to stay would still not pose a demographic threat because the preservation of the West Bank and Gaza would intensify Jewish immigration from abroad and reduce the high Arab birth rate due to economic development produced through integration of the occupied territories into Israel.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶³ Begin, in: James Ciment (1997): "Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict", pp. 130

⁵⁶⁴ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.233

⁵⁶⁵ See Mark Tessler and Ann Mosely Lesch (1989): "Israel's Drive into the West Bank and Gaza", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians : From Camp David to Intifada", pp.207

Thus, the peace treaty with Egypt was consistent with the Likud's interpretation in general and Begin's in particular of Israel's identities as a Jewish and democratic state through the lenses of a revisionist version of Zionism. Thus, it can be posited that immaterial factors, such as Israel's identities as Jewish and democratic state were constitutive to the construction of Israeli interests and played a crucial role in Israeli's decision to pull out from the Sinai.

1.6.3.2.2 Egypt (identities)

Constructivists present a unique opportunity to investigate origin of interests rather than by assuming them fixed and defined by material factors. Opponents of this theoretical approach argue that identities and interests are connected.⁵⁶⁶ They shape actors' preferences and actions.⁵⁶⁷ Application of these assumptions to my case study suggests that Egypt's decision to conclude the peace treaty with Israel was a result of a dramatic transformation of its prominent "type identity". It is possible to underline three prominent "type identities" of Egypt. There are: Egyptian nationalism, pan-Arabism, and Islam.⁵⁶⁸

Under Nasser the Pan-Arabism ideology played a key role in the establishing of Egypt's policy preferences and interests. However, after the death of Nasser, Egyptian foreign policy has undergone substantial evolution based on values, ideas, beliefs as well as perceptions of the new country's presidents. Thus, it can be posited that Egypt's decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process was based on Sadat's commitment to Egyptian nationalism.

In the first part of this section I will analyse the Pan-Arabism ideology in the historical context and how this ideology was articulated under Nasser's regime. In the second part I will investigate the process of transformation of Egypt's identity as an Arab state into a national one. I will show the ways of how Sadat modified the principles elaborated by Nasser such as anti-imperialism, Socialism and the Arab

⁵⁶⁶ See Erik Ringmar (1997): "Alexander Wendt: A Social Scientist Struggling with History", in: Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (1997): "The Future of International Relations. Master in the Making", pp.280

⁵⁶⁷ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", pp.398, Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

⁵⁶⁸ See Dominic Coldwell (2003): "Egypt's 'Autumn of Fury': The Construction of Opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process between 1973 and 1981", Accessed: 2008, <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~metheses/Coldwell.pdf>

unity. In the final part of the section I will try to prove that Egypt's decision to sign the peace agreement with Israel was a result of construction of a new reality, in which Egypt's identity as national state became much more important than the Arab one.

Historical background

Pan- Arabism

The occupation of Egypt by Britain dates back to 1882. The period of British authority in Egypt led to the rise of feeling of cultural connection between Egypt and the other Arab states and aspiration for independence. "As Egyptians began to grasp the idea of being Arab, there was a rise in the thinking of the need for Arab unity and that Egypt was the natural leader of that unity."⁵⁶⁹

After long struggle, Arab nationalist conducted a military coup against existing government in Egypt. They eliminated the monarchy, managed to terminate the British occupation and established a new republican regime. The major figure in the new government became Gamal Abdel Nasser. He adopted and contributed to the development of the ideas associated with the Pan-Arabism ideology both in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. This ideology became a dominated national identity of Egypt.⁵⁷⁰

The Pan-Arabism ideology is a cultural and political nationalist movement aimed at the political unity between the Arab nations in the Middle East. "Arabism is an amorphous concept based primarily on emotional and sentimental attachments to a perceived entity called "the Arab nation". It presupposes a high level of homogeneity among the inhabitants of the Arab states based on mutual perceptions of a common cultural, linguistic and religious heritage."⁵⁷¹

⁵⁶⁹ Robert Eugene Danielson (2007): "Nasser and Pan-Arabism : Explaining Egypt's Rise in Power", Accessed: 2008, pp.24, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/StudentTheses/danielson07.pdf>

⁵⁷⁰ See James Jankowski (1997): "Arab Nationalism in "Nasserism" and Egyptian State Policy, 1952-1958, in: James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (1997): "Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, pp.150; A.L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.9; Robert Eugene Danielson (2007): "Nasser and Pan-Arabism: Explaining Egypt's Rise in Power", pp. 25-24. Accessed: 2008, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/StudentTheses/danielson07.pdf>

⁵⁷¹ A.L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.129

It is possible to underline five key elements which are present in the Pan-Arabism ideology and were integrated into Egypt's foreign policy-making as well as to national identity. They are the following:

Arab unity

Arab unity is a central element of the Pan-Arabism ideology.⁵⁷² The notation of Arab Unity is based on the idea of the creation of a single state which would comprise all people speaking the Arabic language in the Middle East and North Africa.

Nasser's attitude about the need of the Arab unity were often expressed in his speeches. However, the identification of Egypt with the Arab nations and his nationalism became more evident in 1955 because of the Baghdad Pact, a military agreement which was signed by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In response to this Pact, Nasser formed an alliance with Syria as a first step towards a broader integration of the Arabs countries. The same year, Nasser concluded two military pacts, one with Syria and another with Saudi Arabia.⁵⁷³ In his speech of 1957, he declared that Egyptian national interests are deeply rooted in Arab nationalism. "Our policy is based on Arab nationalism because Arab nationalism is a weapon for every Arab state. Arab nationalism is a weapon employed against aggression."⁵⁷⁴ The same year, Nasser signed the "Treaty of Arab Solidarity" with Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan. In 1958 he accepted Egyptian-Syrian union.⁵⁷⁵

Egypt's active participation in the nationalist movement aimed at unification of the Arab world remained throughout the whole period of Nasser's rule. The idea that Egypt is a part of the Arab entity was vigorously promoted by Nasser. For example the first article of the 1956 constitution stated "Egypt is a sovereign, independent Arab state...and the Egyptian people are an integral part of the Arab

⁵⁷² See Michael Doran (2004): "Egypt: Pan-Arabism in Historical Context", in: L. Carl Brown, "Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers", pp.109

⁵⁷³ See A. L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.11-12

⁵⁷⁴ Gamal Abdel Nasser (1957), in : James Jankowski (1997), "Arab Nationalism in "Nasserism" and Egyptian State Policy, 1952-1958, in: James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (1997), "Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, pp.155

⁵⁷⁵ See A. L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.16-20

nation.”⁵⁷⁶ The Egyptian national charter drafted in 1962 also had an explicit Arab character, dedicating in its opening to “The Arab People of Egypt”.⁵⁷⁷

Anti-imperialism

Anti-imperialism is a key element on which the whole Pan-Arabism movement is based.⁵⁷⁸ The principle of anti-imperialist has been permanently present in the perception, attitude and behaviour of Nasser. Anti-western feelings and anti-imperialist policies are clearly visible throughout his presidency. For example, in 1961 he exercised his anti-imperialist policies by participating in the Arab Security Force against Iraq. Another case in point is the Czech arms deal of 1955 aimed at the elimination of the Western arms monopoly and proclamation of Arab independency.⁵⁷⁹

Even in relatively peaceful atmosphere, Nasser continued to express his anti-imperialist attitude. For instance in 1965 he stated that “throughout the years, the imperialism was working for the division of the Arab world. Imperialism wanted to sow the seeds of dissent among the Arab states...”⁵⁸⁰

Distraction of Israel

Anti-Israel ideas in the Pan-Arabism ideology are rooted in anti-imperialism principles⁵⁸¹ and perception that Israel, along with the Western countries, has colonists’ ambitions. According to supporters of the Pan-Arabism ideology “Israel was internationally inflicted upon them by the same imperial powers that had denied Arab independence and self-determination to the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Zionism was an illegitimate national movement, Israel an artificial offspring of colonialism. Arab anti-Semitism was not directed at

⁵⁷⁶ A. L. Dawisha (1976): “Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy”, pp.14

⁵⁷⁷ See James Jankowski (1997), “Arab Nationalism in “Nasserism” and Egyptian State Policy, 1952-1958, in: James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (1997), “Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, pp.151

⁵⁷⁸ See Michael Doran (2004): “Egypt: Pan-Arabism in Historical Context”, in: L. Carl Brown, “Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers”, pp.109

⁵⁷⁹ See A.L. Dawisha (1976): “Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy”, pp.12-13,128

⁵⁸⁰ Gamal Abdel Nasser (1965), in: A.L. Dawisha (1976): “Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy”, pp.125

⁵⁸¹ See Michael Doran (2004): “Egypt: Pan-Arabism in Historical Context”, in: L. Carl Brown (2004): “Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers”, pp.109

Jews, but at Israel as a whole.”⁵⁸² Nasser as president of the most powerful Arab state became the recognized leader of the Arab world’s aim to destroy Israel. Anti-Israeli statements were always expressed by the president. However, the highest point of his antagonism toward Israel was reached at the Khartoum summit of 1967. At that summit the Arab league adopted main principles (known as “three noes”), by which the Arab States agreed to unite their political efforts aimed at fighting Israel. Those principles, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it eliminated every possibility that might lead to a peaceful settlement.⁵⁸³

The centrality of the Palestinian course

The entire Arab world is considered as a single world. According to the Pan-Arabism ideology the loss of Palestine was a colonist aspiration of western countries. Egypt’s concern over the Palestinian question has always been strong. It produced the 1956 and 1967 wars. Nasser actively supported the UNSC Resolution 242 as well as Palestinian claims of self-determination. In 1964 he helped to form the Palestine Liberation Organization.⁵⁸⁴ Nasser considered the PLO as a tool of advancing Egypt’s goal of uniting the Arab nations.

Separation of religion from politics

The Pan-Arabism tends to be a secular movement based on socialist or fascist ideology. It emerged as an alternative to the ideology of Pan-Islam, with the main focus on the Arabs rather than on Muslims.

Throughout his presidency, the president Nasser articulated his aspiration to create a socialist state and his desire to separate religion from politics. In 1954 Nasser stated that “after eighteen months in power, I still don’t see how it will be possible to govern according to the Koran....I don’t think it is suitable as a source of policy and

⁵⁸² Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.48

⁵⁸³ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, ix, James L. Gelvin (2005): “The Israeli-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War”, pp.180

⁵⁸⁴ See James Ciment (1997): “Palestine/Israel: The Long Conflict”, pp.41

political doctrine.”⁵⁸⁵ Thus, Nasser rejected a religious foundation for the conduct of the national politics and in the late 1950s he began to form his state policy in accordance with socialist line. In 1952 and 1961 Nasser introduced the land reform aimed at reducing the amount of land that an individual could have in their possession. He nationalised foreign-owned banks as well as insurance companies and forced out foreigners from Egypt. He established free education programmes and introduced the universal medical service for all citizens. From 1958, Egypt became dependant on Soviet military as well as economic aid. “Like many other Arab nationalist leaders, Nasser was a strong proponent of Arab Socialism, and his economic policies were characterized by a centrally planned economy, state subsidies, and state ownership of businesses.”⁵⁸⁶

Transformation of identity

On October 15, 1970 Anwar Sadat became the president of Egypt. Most of Egyptian and foreign analysts thought that Sadat would follow a similar policy course as Nasser did. They believed that the new president would continue to distribute principles of the Pan-Arabism ideology both in Egypt and throughout the Middle East. Almost nobody could predict that Sadat will alter Egypt’s political course dramatically by transforming the existing Egypt’s identity as a socialist state with Pan-Arabism orientation into national one. Indeed, during the initial period of his presidency, Sadat continued to pursue Nasser’s principles. However, as his power increased he initiated various reforms aimed at transformation of Egypt’s political system.⁵⁸⁷ Sadat began to modify “Nasserite” principles such as anti-imperialism, Arabism, Socialism and the Arab unity.

Revision of anti-Western orientation

⁵⁸⁵ Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954), in: James Jankowski (1997): “Arab Nationalism in “Nasserism” and Egyptian State Policy, 1952-1958, in: James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (1997): “Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, pp.155

⁵⁸⁶ “Gamal Abdel Nasser”, Documents for Small Business and Professionals, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Accessed: 2008, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/6170966/Gamal_Abdel_Nasser

⁵⁸⁷ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace; Mark N. Cooper (1982): “The Transformation of Egypt, pp.67-82; A. L. Dawisha (1976): “Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy”, pp.193-194; Robert Eugene Danielson (2007): “Nasser and Pan-Arabism :explaining Egypt’s Rise in Power”, pp. 45-53, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/StudentTheses/danielson07.pdf>

Sadat almost totally changed Nasser's anti-imperialist i.e. anti-Western attitude. The United States became Egypt's ally. Sadat terminated his friendly relationship with the Soviet Union and expelled their military advisers out of Egypt. At the end of March 1976 he withdrew from the Egyptian Friendship Treaty with Moscow. After those steps, Sadat turned toward the US and in November 1973, the US-Egyptian relationship was re-established. He became the first Arab leader who manages to create positive relations with the US. The latter started to consider its relationship with Egypt as one of the most important diplomatic priorities in the Middle East.⁵⁸⁸

Similarly, Egypt's approach towards European countries as well as the pro-Western Arabs regimes became much more positive. "Egypt's relations with the Western community as a whole, including the West European countries, became overtly warm and cordial. This transformation at the global level induced a modification in Egyptian attitudes at the regional level, as a result of which the pro-Western, conservative Arab regimes, who had formed Nasser's major regional enemies, became Sadat's main allies and supporters."⁵⁸⁹

Revision of Arab Nationalism

As Sadat's domestic power increased, he started to pursue an "Egypt first policy." "Nasser, like Caesar, preferred to be "first in his village", meaning the village of the third world. Sadat accepted being "second in Rome", meaning the capitals of great world power."⁵⁹⁰ Thus, the value of "Egyptian Patriotism" replaced Nasser's notion of Arab unity. For example, in 1971 he changed the name of the country from the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt.⁵⁹¹

The principle of Patriotism and attention towards domestic affairs became even more pronounced after the post-1973 period because of two reasons. Firstly, the 1973 war helped to Sadat to regain national honour by removing the embarrassment

⁵⁸⁸ See A. L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.181-183, 194; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace"

⁵⁸⁹ A. L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.194

⁵⁹⁰ Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): "Egypt's Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East", pp.111

⁵⁹¹ See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace", pp.12

experienced by the Egyptian army during the Six-Day War. Secondly, the enormous costs of the October War, made Egyptians to believe that they had made enough contribution to the Arab course in general and to the Palestinian question in particular.⁵⁹²

Revision of socialist economic policy and system

During his presidency Sadat often expressed his ideas about the need of democracy, capitalist's economic policy and liberalized political system. Already in 1971 he started economic reform aimed at abolition of the socialist system in Egypt. He opened up a free currency bank, made it easy to buy land, launched reforms in the agriculture sector, drafted laws designed to attract foreign investment, abolished all legal prohibitions against the creation of private enterprises and reduced the government control over industrial sectors.⁵⁹³ Sadat's new economic policy, which became articulated in the October Working Paper of 1974, rested on three principles such as Arab capital, Western technology and Egyptian resources. According to Sadat, the combination of those principles would eventually lead to development and progress.⁵⁹⁴ As is visible from above, the changes introduced to a new economic policy were very profound and were based on new ideological principles.

Egypt's identity as national state and peace treaty

I believe that Sadat agreed to accept the outcome of the bargaining process because of the transformation of Egypt's identity as a leading Arab state into an independent, national state.

As I showed above, Sadat revised Egypt's identity which was based on "Nasserite" principles of anti-imperialism, socialism and the Arab unity. Identities and interests are not fixed and constructed by materialistic factors, but instead always socially constructed. Sadat transformed the existing state's identity by integrating new

⁵⁹² See A. L. Dawisha (1976): "Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy", pp.194; Kenneth W. Stein (1999): "Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace"

⁵⁹³ Robert Eugene Danielson (2007): "Nasser and Pan-Arabism :explaining Egypt's Rise in Power", Accessed:2008, pp.45-48, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/StudentTheses/danielson07.pdf>

⁵⁹⁴ See Mark N. Cooper (1982): "The Transformation of Egypt", pp.88-91

ideas, such as Egyptian Patriotism, open economy and western alliance into social context (structures).

By rejecting old principles of Pan-Arabism, Egypt didn't need to seek the destruction of Israel on the basis of the principle of anti-imperialism or to follow the aspiration of Palestinians to form their own state. New norms such as Egyptian Patriotism, open economy and western alliance even stimulated Egypt to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Israel. Egypt's new identity as a national state helped to transform the interests of Egypt. The need of financial, military, technological as well as diplomatic assistance on the part of western countries required a peaceful accommodation with Israel. Since the state of war with Israel was not a favourable condition for attracting foreign capital to Egypt, Sadat had to accept the right of Israel to exist in accordance with the Resolution 242 and to make a bilateral peace with Begin.

1.6.4 Conclusion

The key argument of my study has been that the conclusion of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel has to be analysed through a theoretical framework on the interplay between a mixture of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice and the constructivist theoretical framework. This analytical frame allowed evaluating decisions of the conflicting parties to enter the negotiation process and to accept the outcome of the bargaining game through the entire complex of material and immaterial factors.

The empirical analysis showed that RCT provides some significant asset for the analysis. Indeed, both parties entered the negotiation process at the favourable moment in the conflict. The core reason for Israel was the outcome of the October War of 1973, while for Egypt its stagnating economy. The bargaining process was very difficult and long. During various meetings different peace proposals and the positions of each side on each issue were examined and modified. Eventually, the bargaining game resulted in Israel's victory. Egypt accepted Israel's original position on almost all fundamental issues such as the Palestinian problem, borders, the status

of Jerusalem, the nature of peace etc. The most significant concession that Israel agreed to make is to pull out from the whole Sinai.

Nevertheless, in my analysis I showed that both parties had much to gain from the peace treaty. For Egypt it was territorial benefit and American economic assistance, while Israel's decision was grounded in security concerns, strategic consideration, economic benefit from cooperation with Egypt as well as the U.S. financial aid. Another key factor which influenced parties' calculation of costs and benefits in favour of the peace accord were Jimmy Carter's strategies of conflict resolution.

In my study I proved that RCT has some important shortcomings which can be resolved by constructivist assumptions. Rational choice theorists tend to treat ideational factors as secondary important. These factors have no independent explanatory strength in their analysis. Actors use them strategically, like any other resource in their disposal in order to enhance their material benefit.

Constructivists, in contrast, seek to analyze the wide variety of ideational factors that shape actor's outlooks (such as identities, beliefs and ideas). Moreover, they provide an understanding of micro-macro relationship and investigate nature and construction of interests rather than regard them as defined and fixed. Furthermore, supporters of this theory take into account different time periods and investigate social processes of transformation.

In my thesis I argued that conclusion of the peace treaty cannot be understood nor explained properly without taking into consideration the identities of both sides. I showed that Begin's interpretation of Israel's identities as a Jewish and democratic state through the lenses of a revisionist version of Zionism and transformation of Egypt's identity from Arab state to national one were constitutive to the construction of the conflicting parties' interests and played a crucial role in their decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining game.

1.7 The Oslo Accord of 1993

1.7.1 Introduction

The origin of Israeli and Palestinian conflict dates back to the late 19th century, when the Zionist political movement was formed and proclaimed its desire to create the land of Israel in Palestine. From this time onwards, Jewish people started to immigrate to the Palestine that was first under the Ottoman ruling and later under British authority. This produced a negative reaction on the part of Arab population.

After the end of the WWII the British government made a decision to live Palestine and the conflict became a key preoccupation of the international community. In 1948 the UN passed a resolution aimed at the partition of the territory into two states, one for Jewish and one for Palestinian people. However, this proposal was categorically rejected by most of Arab states, including the Palestinians. Nevertheless, Israel declared its independence on May, 1948. This event almost immediately provoked the first Arab-Israeli war which resulted in a victory of Jewish people.⁵⁹⁵

Since then Israel went through several wars, namely the Six Day war of 1967 and the Yom Kippur war of 1973. Those wars not only increased the level of antagonism of Israeli and Palestinian people towards each other but also produced new disputes such as the Palestinian refugee issue, the question of occupied territories and the status of Jerusalem. Consequently, the likelihood of peace between Israel and Palestinians has been greatly reduced. It became difficult to imagine that both parties in conflict would come to favour any peaceful agreement.

Nevertheless at the end of August 1993 Israel and the PLO agreed to sign a peace agreement, the so-called Declarations of Principles (DOP) that called for mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the creation of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority.

The conclusion of the Oslo Accord in Washington D.C. by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman

⁵⁹⁵ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.1-2

Yasir Arafat, took many people by surprise. As Rabin expressed during this event-it was a “historic moment which hopefully will bring about an end to 100 years of bloodshed and misery between the Palestinians and Jews, between Palestinians and Israel.”⁵⁹⁶

Despite of various efforts over the years to settle the conflict between Israel and PLO, “the Oslo agreement makes the first comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace accord in an almost 100–years-old conflict.”⁵⁹⁷ How it is possible to explain this sudden change of Israel and the PLO behaviour? Although the History of Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peace diplomacy is very well documented, the above mentioned question is still possible to interpret in a different way and through the application of different types of theories.

Thus, the key aim of this case study is to answer the question of why Israelis and Palestinians after many years of conflict and non-recognition, decided to accept each other and to conclude the Oslo Accord in 1993.

In organisational terms this chapter will be divided into three parts. The first provides historical background of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and investigates various aspects that shaped both the Palestinian and Israeli foreign policy. The overall objective of the second and the third parts is to examine the conclusion of the Oslo Accords through an innovative framework elaborated in the theoretical part of my dissertation. I will first provide an understanding of Israel’s and PLO’s decision to enter the negotiation process and to agree with the outcome of the bargaining game through rational choice theory and second through the constructivist theoretical framework. The material factors will be analyzed through RCT, while the immaterial ones through the constructivist framework.

1.7.2 Negotiating process

In the late 1950s and early 1960s the international community paid little attention to the Palestinian demand to build their own state. The Palestinian conflict

⁵⁹⁶ Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in: Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz (2002): “The Oslo Process - Fate or Folly?”, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/80/currentpage/16/Default.aspx>

⁵⁹⁷ David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.1

was generally equated with the refugee problem and the International community believed that the solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict would eventually lead to a settlement of the Palestinian question.⁵⁹⁸ “The objective Palestinian, if used at all, was utilized primarily as modifier for “refugees”, and that this was the context in which the Palestinians were best known.”⁵⁹⁹ The famous Resolution 242 aimed at conflict settlement in the Middle East did not even mention the word “Palestinian”. It only briefly pointed out to the refugee problem without even providing the definition of the concept of a refugee.

The war of 1967 has changed the situation dramatically. It became a key factor which stimulated the construction of Palestinian national identity. This war made many Palestinians to believe that they have to rely on their own in their struggle with Israel over Palestine. “Most Palestinians saw the Arab state defeat as justification to apply their philosophy of “armed struggle” to the liberation of Palestine.”⁶⁰⁰ Acts of terror as a means of liberation of Palestine and distraction of Israel made the international community to pay attention to the Palestinian problem.

Nevertheless, the first serious attempt to address the Palestinian question was only made in 1978 at the Camp David summit. The Camp David Accords not only provided the framework for the conclusion of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, but also set a possibility of resolving the Palestinian problem. It approved Begin’s concept of the Palestinian autonomy. By 1980, however, no progress has been achieved with regard to the principles of Palestinian self-rule called for in the Camp David Agreements.⁶⁰¹ It is possible to underline at least three issues which precluded Egyptians and Israelis to reach an agreement on the Palestinian dimension of the accord. Firstly, Begin considered Palestinian self-rule to mean a very limited autonomy, covering only “administrative functions in social and educational affairs”, while Sadat interpreted the term of autonomy as a first step towards creation of independent state for the Palestinian people.⁶⁰² Secondly, Egyptians considered Israeli

⁵⁹⁸ See James Ciment (1997): “Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict”, pp.40

⁵⁹⁹ Rashid Khalidi (1989): “The Palestinian People: Twenty-Two Years After 1967”, in: Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (1989): “Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation”, pp.114

⁶⁰⁰ Kenneth W. Stein (1999): “Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace”, pp.52

⁶⁰¹ See Mark Tessler (1989): “The Camp David Accord and the Palestinian Problem”, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): “Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians : From Camp David to Intifada”, pp.14

⁶⁰² See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): “Israel on the Road to Peace”, pp.32

efforts to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza as illegitimate.⁶⁰³ Finally, the two countries had a different opinion regarding the representation of the Palestinian people and the role of the PLO in the peace process.⁶⁰⁴ Israelis were not prepared to provide neither to Jordan nor to Egypt the right to administrate the West Bank and Gaza, nor did they want to recognize the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Due to the above mentioned disagreements between the conflicting parties, Israel and Egypt decided to extend the initially agreed date for the termination of autonomy talks.⁶⁰⁵ However, a series of outside from the negotiation room events such as Israeli new law according to which East Jerusalem became a part of capital of the state, Israel annexation of the Golden Heights and invasion of Lebanon caused the talks to collapse.⁶⁰⁶

The Lebanon war had a great impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process in general and the Palestinian problem in particular. Firstly, this war led to the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut and an increased support for the PLO among West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. Israel failed to achieve its key objective aimed at reducing legitimacy of the PLO in the occupied territories. "West Bank and Gaza Palestinians resorted to any available means to demonstrate their support for and solidarity with the PLO. They issued statements denouncing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and asserting the principle of the exclusive legitimate representational character of the PLO to the Palestinian people."⁶⁰⁷ The PLO also took some steps towards modification of its policy. It started to focus more on Palestinians in the Diaspora rather than on Palestinians from West Bank and Gaza.

Secondly, the Lebanon war resulted in an increased comprehension of the Palestinian problem as well as sympathy towards the PLO among some European countries. For example the French government throughout the war kept contact with the PLO and called for mutual recognition between Israeli and the Palestinians.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰³ See Mark Tessler (1989): "The Camp David Accord and the Palestinian Problem", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada", pp.13-17

⁶⁰⁴ See Mark Tessler (1989): "The Camp David Accord and the Palestinian Problem", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada", pp.17-20

⁶⁰⁵ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996) : "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.31

⁶⁰⁶ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996) : "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.32

⁶⁰⁷ Emile F. Sahliyah (1986): "The PLO After the Lebanon War", pp.33

⁶⁰⁸ See Emile F. Sahliyah (1986): "The PLO After the Lebanon War", pp.58-63,71

Finally, this war led to an increased attention of the United States towards the peace process in general and the Palestinian question in particular. The US started to believe that the regional stability depends on its ability to find a solution to the Palestinian problem. Moreover, it had to demonstrate its commitment to bring peace in the Middle East domestically and internationally, namely to the Arab world and to its European allies.⁶⁰⁹ As a result, on September 1, 1982, President Reagan introduced his peace initiative aimed at the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the Palestinian problem.⁶¹⁰

The Reagan plan called for a full autonomy for the Palestinians after a five-year transition period, the termination of the construction of new Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, implementation of Security Council resolution 242 and the settlement of a final status of Jerusalem through negotiation process. This plan mentioned the right of Arabs from East Jerusalem to vote for the “autonomy council”. The Reagan’s peace initiative, however, dismissed the possibility of the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. It also excluded the PLO from the participation in the peace talks and assigned a role of representation of the Palestinian people to Jordan.⁶¹¹

The Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza had a different reaction to the Reagan peace plan. Some supported this project while other rejected it on the ground that it excluded the PLO from the peace talks and did not encourage the formation of a Palestinian state. Members of the PLO also had different opinion regarding Reagan’s initiative. The radicals inside the PLO immediately rejected the peace proposal, while some moderate leaders found some positive aspects in this plan. They, however, argued that the plan requires some serious adjustments. According to them, it had to include the right of creation of an independent Palestinian state and to provide a role to the PLO in the peace process. Nevertheless, due to radicals, the Palestinian National Council dismissed the Reagan plan.⁶¹²

The reaction of the Arab countries to this peace proposal was also very diverse. Nevertheless, despite that the gap between their positions was very broad, they managed to elaborate a joint Arab peace plan, known as a plan of Fez. In contrast

⁶⁰⁹ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): “Israel on the Road to Peace”, pp.34-35

⁶¹⁰ See Emile F. Sahliye (1986): “The PLO After the Lebanon War”, pp.72

⁶¹¹ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): “Israel on the Road to Peace”, pp.36-37; Emile F. Sahliye (1986): “The PLO After the Lebanon War”, pp.74-75

⁶¹² See Emile F. Sahliye (1986): “The PLO After the Lebanon War”, pp.78,93-94,101,108-109

to Reagan's peace proposal, this plan called for the creation of the Palestinian state, Israeli withdraw to the 1967 borders including Jerusalem, an acceptance of the PLO as a single representative of the Palestinian people.⁶¹³ Although it is obvious that this plan had no chance of success, it, nevertheless, constituted a very important change in the policy of the Arab league towards Israel. The Article 7 of the Arab peace initiative mentioned indirectly the right of Israel to exist in the Middle East.⁶¹⁴

Israel's reaction to the Reagan's peace plan was more obvious. The Begin government very quickly announced its decision to reject this peace initiative on the basis that it contradicted to the Camp David Accords. The Israeli government claimed that issues such as the role of representation of Palestinians by Jordan, the status of Jerusalem, the participation of the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the election of the autonomy council and the total termination of the construction of settlements were not mentioned in the Camp David Agreements.⁶¹⁵ Israelis also rejected Reagan's notation of a Palestinian autonomy. "It opposed granting the Palestinians territorial autonomy because it believed autonomy did not concern territory but inhabitants only."⁶¹⁶ In other words, the Likud government maintained the position that the Resolution 242 does not cover the West Bank and Gaza and, therefore, it has the right to keep those territories under its control. It is however important to point out that Israel did not have a united position on the Reagan plan. The Labor party disapproved Likud's policy. It argued that this plan can serve as a foundation for further negotiation. "The Labor party, which Peres heads, has consistently acknowledged that the Resolution 242 applies to the West Bank and Gaza and has been willing to yield sovereignty over most of these territories to Jordan in the context of peace settlement."⁶¹⁷ However, Begin was against of freezing all Israeli settlement in the occupied territories on the ground that they were crucial for the protection of the state. In any case Begin's government rejected all aspects of this peace initiative and continued to build new Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹³ See Emile F. Sahliyah (1986): "The PLO After the Lebanon War", pp.78-80

⁶¹⁴ See Emile F. Sahliyah (1986): "The PLO After the Lebanon War", pp.82

⁶¹⁵ See Emile F. Sahliyah (1986): "The PLO After the Lebanon War", pp.76-77

⁶¹⁶ Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.39

⁶¹⁷ Mark Tessler and Ann Mosely Lesch (1989): "Israel's Drive into the West Bank and Gaza", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians : From Camp David to Intifada", pp.201

⁶¹⁸ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996) : "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.40-41

Thus, the US didn't manage to find a joint position regarding Reagan's initiative and to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiation room. As a result, the Palestinian question was once again left without resolution.

Hopes of progress in a diplomatic domain were raised again in 1984 when Israeli election resulted in a political arrangement known as "national unity government", in which Labor and Likud agreed to share power.⁶¹⁹ As a result, Labor leader Shimon Peres became a prime minister and Yitzhak Shamir a vice prime as well as a foreign minister of Israel for the first two years. For the second half of the government's term they supposed to switch these roles.

In contrast to Likud, the Labor party had a different attitude towards the Palestinian problem. Labor's solution to this problem was based on a territorial compromise rather than on functional ones proposed by Likud. This policy was primarily formulated by Yigal Allon who called for a limited Israeli territorial control over the West Bank and Gaza as a means of the preservation of the Jewish nature of the state.⁶²⁰

Thus, Peres believed that the solution to the Palestinian question can be found through the control of Jordan over the occupied territories. Therefore, he called for direct negotiation with Jordan. On April 11, 1987, a secret meeting between King Hussein and Shimon Peres in London took place. The outcome of this meeting became a document, so-called "London agreement", which endorsed the idea of organizing the international conference aimed at the resolution of the Palestinian question, with the participation of the five permanent member of the Security Council and all conflicting parties involved, including Palestinian people as a part of the Jordanian delegation.⁶²¹ It was agreed that any solution reached by the involved parties would not be subject of vetoing by the two superpowers and that this conference would create an opportunity for bilateral negotiation between Israel and the Arab countries.⁶²²

This international conference, however, never took place. Shamir who became a prime minister of Israel in July 1986 was uncertain about this peace initiative. As a

⁶¹⁹ See James Ciment (1997): "Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict", pp.83

⁶²⁰ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.40

⁶²¹ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.50

⁶²² See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.50-51

result, King Hussein dropped the idea of hosting the international conference and Arab counters shifted their attention toward the Iran-Iraq war.⁶²³

Due to the lack of progress in a diplomatic domain, inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza decided to find the solution to the Palestinian problem by themselves. In December 1987, they started a series of violent riots, known as the Intifada.⁶²⁴ A popular uprising throughout Gaza and the West Bank had a great impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Firstly, it had an effect on the PLO. The PLO accelerated the process of the modification of its policy, by further shifting its attention from the Palestinians in the Diaspora towards the West Bank and Gaza.⁶²⁵ Secondly, the Intifada was a very significant event because of its enormous level of intensity. For the first time, the uprising included not only the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza but also Israel's Arab citizens.⁶²⁶ This made some Israelis more determine to find the solution to the Palestinian problem as soon as possible. "There have been instances of Palestinian solidarity across the Green Line before, but not on this scale and not in this manner. The general strike on December 21, 1987 was unprecedented. It was a signal to the Israelis that if they continue along this road, than they will have to deal not only with the Arabs of the territories but with "their" Arabs as well."⁶²⁷ Thirdly, the Intifada resulted in a creation of various extremist Islamist movements such as Hamas.⁶²⁸ Finally, the uprising against Israeli occupation brought the Palestinian question to world's attention again and signified another opportunity for the US to launch the peace process. Thus, in 1988 Shultz produced a new peace proposal, which combined elements of the Camp David Accord, the Reagan plan and the London agreement.⁶²⁹

The Shultz plan called for almost an ideational international conference to what Peres and king Hussein had envisioned during their secret meeting in London, but it was not very welcome by both the Israel right and the PLO.

⁶²³ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.51-52

⁶²⁴ See James Ciment (1997): "Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict", pp.51; Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.52

⁶²⁵ See Salim Tamari (1990): "What the Uprising Means", in: Zachary Locjman and Joel Bein (1990): "Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation", pp.133

⁶²⁶ See Salim Tamari (1990): "What the Uprising Means", in: Zachary Locjman and Joel Bein (1990): "Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation", pp.133

⁶²⁷ Salim Tamari (1990): "What the Uprising Means", in: Zachary Locjman and Joel Bein, "Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation", pp.133

⁶²⁸ See Alan Dowty (2005): "Israel-Palestine", pp.132

⁶²⁹ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.53

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir did not reject the plan, but objected some key elements of this initiative. He opposed a new timetable of a three-year autonomy period for the West Bank and Gaza and the concept of territory-for-peace. Moreover, he questioned the suitability of the international forum as a basis for productive talks. Nevertheless, Shamir stated that Israel would be prepared to conduct negotiation with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation based on the Camp David framework, without the participation of the PLO as well as interference, either by a superpower or by Arab states.⁶³⁰

The PLO reaction to the new peace initiative was more definitive. Arafat rejected this plan because it did not address Palestinians aspiration aimed at the creation of their own state and did not anticipate a direct participation of the PLO in the negotiation process.⁶³¹

The US tried to convince Israel to follow the Shultz peace plan. Nevertheless, no international conference took place. Another failure in the diplomatic domain, however, did not preclude the US for introducing another peace plan. Thus, in 1989 US Secretary of State Baker formally submitted his peace proposal aimed at establishing a negotiation process between Israel and the inhabitants of the West Bank in Cairo on the basis of the Israeli government's May 14 initiative which called for the participation of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in talks on self-rule as well as on the permanent settlement.⁶³²

In contrast to Israeli initiative, however, the Baker plan did not include assurance that the PLO would not be allowed to participate indirectly in the negotiations, nor did it state about the exclusion of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. It also did not explicitly guarantee that the talks in Cairo would include only the issue of election and would not lead to the question of future accommodation. As a result, the Likud party refused to accept Baker's terms for launching the Cairo peace talks and the Israeli Knesset dissolved the Israel National Unity government in a vote of no confidence over Shamir's rejection of another peace initiative. This terminated the six-year partnership between Likud and Labor.⁶³³ Within three month after the

⁶³⁰ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.56

⁶³¹ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.54

⁶³² See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.61,69

⁶³³ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.69-73; David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.10

dissolution of the government, the Prime Minister Shamir formed the ultra right coalition which was reluctant to move the peace process forward.⁶³⁴ Moreover, the US stopped its contacts with the PLO due to its unwillingness to disapprove a terrorist attack which took place on a beach near Tel Aviv. As a result the peace process was undermined once again.⁶³⁵

The end of the Cold War, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent eruption of the Gulf War advanced the opportunities of breaking the diplomatic stalemate. "The Gulf War created unique opportunities for renewed U.S. mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had brought about a "historic" international coalition, with the United Nation playing its intended original role, and the defeat of Saddam Hussein had created new hope for diplomacy and negotiations."⁶³⁶

Indeed, after the termination of the Gulf War, the Secretary of State James Baker went to the region to meet Israelis, Palestinians and heads of other Arab states in order to promote an idea of launching an international conference for Middle East peace. He proposed to hold the conference in Madrid on 30 October 1991 with the participation of Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation under the joint sponsorship of the US and the USSR. It was agreed that this conference would be based on the London document of 1987, Shult's peace ideas and would take into account some of Likud governments' requests. Thus, it was decided that talks would be conducted in the bilateral committees, that any decision achieved by the involved parties during the negotiation process would not be subject of vetoing by the two superpowers and that it would be based on 242 and 338 resolutions.⁶³⁷

After some consideration and extensive pressure by the Bush administration all invited parties formally accepted the invitation for attending the conference. Shamir government could not any longer ignore the pressure to negotiate, coming from the US, the Palestinians and the international community. The Palestinian popular uprising, the dissolution of the Soviet Union⁶³⁸ and the American's threat to

⁶³⁴ See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): "Israel on the Road to Peace", pp.75

⁶³⁵ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.10

⁶³⁶ Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.77

⁶³⁷ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.75,81

⁶³⁸ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.89

withdraw \$ 10 billion of loan guarantees aimed at accommodation of Russian immigrants pushed Shamir to start the talks with the Palestinians.⁶³⁹

As a result, the Madrid conference started its work on October 30, 1991, as agreed. It became a very important conference not in terms of achieved progress over substance but in terms of bringing for the first time all major parties involved in the conflict together in the conference room. "For the first time, Israel sat as an equal at the negotiating table with all of its closest Arab neighbours. For the first time, Israel engaged in face-to-face political negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians. And for the first time, Arab states from Saudi Arabia to Mauritania signalled their willingness to make peace with Israel if acceptable terms could be found."⁶⁴⁰

The Madrid Conference resulted in a few rounds of bilateral negotiations in Washington conducted between Israel and different Arab states. In addition, multilateral talks as a part of peace process began in Moscow on 28 January 1992. Multilateral talks were held in five regional committees responsible to cover different issues such as economic cooperation, arms control, environment, water and refugees. However, due to inability of conflicting parties to narrow their differences and to identify a common position on disputed issues little progress was achieved.⁶⁴¹

The Palestinian-Israeli bilateral talks were held in 10 rounds. The first five rounds of negotiation took place before the Israeli election of 1992, which dismissed Likud party from power. Therefore, no substantive success during this period of time was achieved. The Likud government was against the Palestinian's demand for broader self-rule, an absolute freeze on Israeli settlement in the occupied land as well as the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza.⁶⁴²

The situation, however, changed dramatically after the Labor party led by Yitzhak Rabin won the election in June 1992.

Rabin tried to maintain personal control over policy of Israel in the peace process. Therefore, he excluded Peres from important decision making processes by taking the defence portfolio for himself.⁶⁴³ "Peres wasn't supposed to be involved in

⁶³⁹ See Marvin Feuerwerker (1995): "Israeli-American Relations in the Second Rabin Era", in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): "Israel Under Rabin", pp.10

⁶⁴⁰ Marvin Feuerwerker (1995): "Israeli-American Relations in the Second Rabin Era", in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): "Israel Under Rabin", pp.10

⁶⁴¹ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.84-85

⁶⁴² See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.84-89

⁶⁴³ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.23

bilateral peace talks with any Arab group. Rabin had received that job for himself, limiting Peres's role to mediating in multilateral talks about economic matters, the environment, the sharing of water, and other non-political issues.”⁶⁴⁴

Although like the Likud leadership, Rabin's official position was that it would not communicate with the PLO, it was prepared to make a lot of compromises in order to achieve a peace treaty with the Palestinians. Thus, he agreed to cancel the establishment of new Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza.⁶⁴⁵ Moreover, during the following five rounds of the bilateral negotiations some improvements in the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks were achieved. Rabin offered to start election of a Palestinian administrative council with far broader autonomy which Likud had never been willing to consider. Furthermore, he assured the Palestinians that Israel consider the autonomy project not as a permanent solution to their problem. “Likud had never been ready to discuss any idea that permitted anything more than personal autonomy for the Palestinians, enabling them to run only the most elemental aspects of their daily life. After Labor replaced Likud the Israeli government for the first time raised the territorial or geographic aspects of Palestinian self-rule.”⁶⁴⁶ Nevertheless, despite those concessions on the part of Rabin, the gap between Palestinians and Israeli position remained enormous. The PLO's bargaining position was so extreme that even the Labor government was not willing to accept.⁶⁴⁷

First, the Palestinian delegation demanded a very broad power such as legislative, executive and judicial authority for the future government. Secondly, the Palestinians wished to start talks on the permanent status of territories in a year and a half rather than in two years.⁶⁴⁸ Thirdly, the Palestinian delegation demanded that Israel address the refugee problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 which recognizes the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to Palestine. Fourthly, the Palestinians demanded that Israel release all Palestinian political prisoners. Fifthly, the Palestinian delegation wanted Israelis to acknowledge that they view the permanent status of territories as synonym to an independent Palestinian

⁶⁴⁴ Dan Kurzman (1998): “Soldier of Peace: The life of Yitzhak Rabin”, pp.444-445

⁶⁴⁵ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.12; Ziva Flamhaft (1996): “Israeli on the road to Peace”, pp.85

⁶⁴⁶ Ziva Flamhaft (1996): “Israeli on the road to Peace”, “The Final Building Block: The Madrid Conference”, pp.89-90

⁶⁴⁷ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): “Israeli on the road to Peace”, “The Final Building Block: The Madrid Conference”, pp.95

⁶⁴⁸ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): “Israeli on the road to Peace”, pp.87

state. The PISGA, a document of the Palestinian delegation which summarized its official position, stated that “The acceptance, by the Palestinian people, of interim self-government arrangements does not in any way prejudice the exercise of their legitimate right to self-determination as embodied in the United Nations Charter and in the UN resolutions affirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.....The Palestinian people is resolved to establish its own independent state.”⁶⁴⁹ The Palestinians argued that the East Jerusalem should be included in the negotiation over a final status of the occupied territories. According to the PISGA, “Jerusalem lies at the heart of our people's aspirations, and we are committed to make it the capital of our future independent state.”⁶⁵⁰

Israel was not prepared to make some significant concessions to the above described issues. It didn't want to address the refugee problem, to free all Palestinian prisoners, to include the East Jerusalem in the debates over the final status of territories, to start the negotiation on a final settlement earlier than in two years period and to commit itself to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state after the interim agreement. In addition to those disputes, the growing Palestinian violence against Israelis in the occupied territories had negative impact on the peace process. In December 1992 in response to the killing of eight Israel soldiers, Rabin ordered to expel 415 Islamic militants from the territories under Israeli control.⁶⁵¹ This decision further undermined the peace process and as a result, the formal arena of the bilateral negotiations was shut down in 1993, without producing an agreement or at least a basis for the constructive negotiations.

The PLO and the Israel, however, were also acting outside the official Washington-based diplomacy. They opened a secret channel of the negotiations, unknown to the USA, in Oslo. Raymond Helmick, a USA mediator of conflicts, notes recalled “My dealings with the Middle East problem were substantially in the context of the Interreligious Committee. None of us knew anything of the clandestine meeting in Oslo, the black channel between Israel and representatives of the PLO.”⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁹ Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority - "PISGA" – Plan , 3 March 1992, Preamble, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=348>

⁶⁵⁰ Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority - "PISGA" – Plan , 3 March 1992, Preamble, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=348>

⁶⁵¹ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.24

⁶⁵² Raymond H. Helmick (2004): “Negotiating Outside the Law: Why Camp David Failed”, pp.48-49

The secret negotiation between Israel and the PLO can be divided into at least two stages. The first stage of secret negotiations was conducted at the informal level, namely between private Israeli citizens and the PLO members. The second stage of talks was organized at the governmental level. This stage of negotiation began in May 1993 and ended in September 1993 with the conclusion of the Declaration of Principles.

The first stage of secret negotiations dates back to 1974 when the Palestinian National Council (PNC) gave to the PLO leadership a task to make contacts with Israeli citizens. At the beginning this authorization covered contacts only with “anti-Zionist” Israelis. However, shortly after, this mandate was extended to cover contacts with non-Zionist Israeli and finally the PLO leadership received an authorization to conduct talks with all Israeli who either supported the creation of a Palestinian state or had some weight in the society.⁶⁵³

The Rabin’s victory in the general election created an opportunity to deepen the citizen based diplomacy through a Norwegian black channel. In 1992 Terje Larsen, a director general of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science (FAFO), proposed to Yossi Beilin, a member of the Labor party, to create a black channel of negotiations between Israel and the PLO in Norway. Larson believed that the official Washington-based diplomacy would not bring any progress. He argued that only a direct contact between Israel and the PLO can lead to the resolution of the conflict. Beilen, who shared this opinion, advised him to assign the task of setting up a black channel to Hirschfeld, a Haifa University history professor. As a result, Hirschfeld became a key Israeli figure in this channel of negotiation.⁶⁵⁴

In December, he met a senior PLO figure, Ahmed Sulaiman al- Krai, the PLO's Minister of Finance, for the first time. During this meeting they agreed to continue talks in Norway in order to explore each other positions towards the peace process. A few rounds of talks were conducted between January and April 1993 and produced some significant results.⁶⁵⁵

⁶⁵³ See Helena Cobban (1995): “Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond”, in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): “Israel Under Rabin”, pp.101

⁶⁵⁴ See Helena Cobban (1995): “Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond”, in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): “Israel Under Rabin”, pp.101-102

⁶⁵⁵ See Helena Cobban (1995): “Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond”, in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): “Israel Under Rabin”, pp.102

The first meeting was held in January 1993 under cover of an academic conference, hosted and sponsored by the FAFO in Sarpsborg, 100 kilometres southeast from Oslo.⁶⁵⁶ The aim of this first meeting was not to find a solution to the conflict but rather to identify common language, to try to see the conflict from the other side's point of view and to narrow the differences. "The parties were not discussing how a solution to the conflict would possibly look, but rather whether it was possible to find common ground so that they could start working together."⁶⁵⁷ During the following meetings the conflicting parties agreed on the basic issues such as removal of the Israeli forces from Gaza, slow transfer of economic power to the Palestinians and "Marshall Plan" for the citizens of Gaza.⁶⁵⁸

In February, the conflicting parties decided to go further in their attempt to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, they agreed to draft a Declaration of Principles regarding the Palestinian autonomy. The drafting process begun in the small town of Sarpsborg in February and was finalized in March. This document, known as Sarpsborg III DOP contained fifteen articles and was similar to the final version of the Oslo Accords.⁶⁵⁹

As negotiation proceed, it became more obvious that additional legal as well as governmental knowledge were necessary for the talks. Therefore, the foreign minister Peres decided to inform Rabin about the Oslo initiative and the necessity to move forward the talks. Even though Rabin still hoped that the talks in Washington would bring some visible success, he agreed to send Israeli official state representatives to Oslo under the condition that the peace talks remained hidden from publicity.⁶⁶⁰

Thus, in May 1993 he authorized Uri Savir, the director general of the foreign Ministry and Yoel Zinger, a legal expert, to go to Norway.⁶⁶¹ This decision clearly indicated that not only Peres but also Rabin began to support the secret Oslo channel and, therefore, a transformation of the negotiations from informal level to the

⁶⁵⁶ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.21

⁶⁵⁷ Geir Dale: "Facilitating Oslo", Accessed:2008, <http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/3/p25.html>

⁶⁵⁸ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.23

⁶⁵⁹ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.31

⁶⁶⁰ See Helena Cobban (1995): "Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond", in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): "Israel Under Rabin", pp.102

⁶⁶¹ See Helena Cobban (1995): "Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond", in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): "Israel Under Rabin", pp.102

governmental stage. “Upgrading the talks had significance beyond procedural wrangling and proved to be a pivotal turning point. It transformed the Oslo track from academic, exploratory discussion to genuine, official negotiations. To Abu Alaa, it was an unmistakable sign that Rabin and not just Peres stood behind the Oslo channel.”⁶⁶² From that time the secret negotiation in Oslo became the main arena for Israeli-Palestinian talks.

Uri Savir, however, initially received a very limited mandate from Rabin. He had no authorization to negotiate an agreement with the PLO. His task was to figure out the PLO’s true intention regarding the peace process and provide recommendation whether or not Israel should become more actively involved in the negotiations.⁶⁶³

Many hours of talks were conducted in order to explore the positions of each side in the conflict on each disputed issue. Those talks were useful because it clarified the points of disagreement, but no significant progress was achieved. Abu Alaa wanted Israel to accept that the autonomy would ultimately lead to the creation of the Palestinian state, while Savir was mainly concerned with issues related to the security of Israel.⁶⁶⁴

Savir rejected Alaa request to connect the autonomy project to the Palestinian state and to release 200 Palestinian prisoners. Instead, he demanded that the Palestinians in the occupied territories stop their terrorist activities against Israel. Abu Alaa, however, argued that the PLO has no power to demand from the local Palestinians to end their arm struggle before Israel recognizes the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.⁶⁶⁵

Nevertheless, despite those differences, Savir recommended to Rabin to move the negotiation process in Oslo forward. He was confident that eventually an agreement would be possible to achieve. Therefore, he suggested appointing some additional legal experts to assist in writing a final version of the peace accord. Thus, in early June, Rabin allowed Joel Singer, an Israeli prominent lawyer who provided legal expertise during the Camp David talks, to join the Oslo team. By doing so, the

⁶⁶² David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.45

⁶⁶³ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.46

⁶⁶⁴ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.46-47

⁶⁶⁵ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.48

Primer Minister increased the level of his involvement in the negotiations and virtually recognized the PLO as a legitimate bargaining partner.⁶⁶⁶

Joel Singer, who joined the Oslo team in June, was unsatisfied with the draft of Israeli-Palestinian peace accord, so-called Sarpsborg III DOP. According to him the document was lacking legal accuracy and required some significant amendments. Singer wanted to exclude from the agreement the idea of the UN trustship and to remove any references to the question regarding the future status of Jerusalem. Thus, on July 4, 1993 Singer produced a new draft of the declaration of principles and presented it to the Palestinian team in Gressheim, a town north of Oslo.⁶⁶⁷

In this document Israelis formally agreed to pull out their military force from Gaza and Jericho area within three months after signing the DOP, to address the question of Jerusalem in future talks on final status of the occupied territories and committed themselves to execute a partial redeployment of IDF (the Israeli defence force)⁶⁶⁸

It is, however, important to note that the issue regarding the redeployment was written in a very vague language. Rabin wanted to insure that he would be capable to maintain security of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. According to the Prime Minister “the detailed deployment of Israeli troops for strategic defence or for the protection of Israeli settlements and Israeli civilians would not be conditional on the other party’s agreement.”⁶⁶⁹ Thus, the new version of the peace agreement made the issue of redeployment conditional upon the Palestinian election and the ability of the Palestinian force to keep public order in the occupied territories. Since, however, majority of Israeli leaders believed that Arafat would not allow the elections to take place because of his anti-democratic style of ruling, they did not think that an interim redeployment would ever take place.⁶⁷⁰

From the Palestinian team, Singer demanded a lot of concessions. First, the agreement stated that Israel retain responsibility for all security issues in Gaza and

⁶⁶⁶ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.48-49,52

⁶⁶⁷ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.52,54

⁶⁶⁸ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.54-58

⁶⁶⁹ Peres, in: David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.56

⁶⁷⁰ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.56-57

Jericho. Second, Singer demanded from the Palestinians to drop the idea of the UN trusteeship and accept a limited power in the land beyond Gaza and Jericho. According to Singer's proposal the PLO would have right to cede control only in the fields of education, taxation, health, tourism and welfare. Thirdly, Israelis wanted to keep Jerusalem under Israeli control over the whole interim period. Thus, they demanded that the Palestinians withdrew their demand to place Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem under their authority. Fourthly, the new draft of peace agreement called for Israeli control over Israeli settlements and an absolute freedom of movement for the IDF in the occupied territories. Finally, Israelis also demanded from the PLO to stop terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens, to end the Intifada and to amend the articles of the Palestinian charter which call for the destruction of Israel.⁶⁷¹

The Palestinian team found a new declaration of principles, drafted by Singer, unacceptable. "From their perspective this new draft contradicted the earlier draft and rejected all the Palestinian input into the first draft. The Palestinians felt a sharp betrayal of the trust they had begun to develop with the Israeli team."⁶⁷²

The Palestinians decided to respond to Singer's peace proposal by introducing their own peace plan. Thus, on July 10 at Halvorsbole they introduced a new version of the peace treaty, which included twenty-six amendments to the draft presented by Singer.⁶⁷³ The key differences between Israel's proposal and the PLO's initiative were obvious. The Palestinian position was based on the following elements:⁶⁷⁴

- The new draft called for the appointment of the PLO as the governing authority in the occupied territories.
- The PLO demanded a greater amount of territorial jurisdiction. It determined the size of Jericho differently than Israelis did. According to their measurement, the size of this town was far larger than the area from which Israel agreed to leave.

⁶⁷¹ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.52-58,64

⁶⁷² William J. Bien: "The Oslo Channel: Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator to Secret Negotiations", pp.124, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/4.pdf>

⁶⁷³ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.59

⁶⁷⁴ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.59-71, Joel Singer (1998): "Manipulating Arafat: Behind the Scenes at Oslo-Recognizing the Need for Mutual Recognition, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51a/026.html>; William J. Bien: "The Oslo Channel: Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator to Secret Negotiations", pp. 124, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/4.pdf>

- The PLO demanded that Israel provide to the Palestinian authority the right to control the Allenby Bridge as well as roads between Gaza and Jericho.
- The PLO wanted to control Gaza and Jericho from Jerusalem. Thus, they insisted that the PLO headquarters would be placed in Jerusalem.
- The Palestinian wanted to control the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and demanded that Israel permit to the Palestinian inhabitants of this city to select their candidatures for the election for a self-rule council.
- The PLO wanted that Israel recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people.
- The PLO demanded more power in the occupied land beyond Gaza and Jericho, namely the right to maintain control over Israeli settlements and military facilities.
- Finally, the new draft didn't address the issues of the abandonment of terrorism and the cancellation of the articles of the Palestinian Charter which call for the distraction of Israel. The Palestinians argued the official cancellation of the Charter is not necessary because recognition of UN resolution 242 is equivalent to the modification of some articles of it.

Uri Savir was shocked by the latest Palestinian version of the peace treaty. He immediately dismissed this document. Thus, both teams return home without reaching an agreement on disputed issues.⁶⁷⁵

After the collapsed of talks, the Norwegian mediators had intervened in order to find a solution to the negotiation deadlock. Eventually Norwegians managed to convince both sides to return to the negotiation table and the conflicting parties resumed the talks in Oslo on July 24. Although the Palestinians agreed to drop their demand to control roads between Gaza and Jericho area, they continued to reject most

⁶⁷⁵ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.60; William J. Brien: "The Oslo Channel: Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator to Secret Negotiations", pp.124, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/4.pdf>

of the elements of the Singer's peace plan. Israelis, on their part, refused to accept any amendments to this initiative. As a result, the talks once again collapsed.⁶⁷⁶

Joel Singer believed that the disputed issues could be resolved through Israel's recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Therefore, he often asked for the authorization to present the concept of mutual recognition to the Palestinian representatives. His notes recalled "I also believed that the PLO was keen to win Israeli recognition as a legitimate negotiating partner, and would be willing to pay a high price for this. Israel should take this opportunity immediately, while it held the upper hand. I felt that there were commitments that only the PLO could make - for example, a commitment to cease terrorist activities outside the territories."⁶⁷⁷

Peres, however, was not in favour of the idea of mutual recognition with the PLO. He believed that this concession on the part of Israel should be presented as a final card at the end of negotiations in order to obtain more compromises from the Palestinians.⁶⁷⁸ Rabin was also reluctant to approve the concept of mutual recognition. He feared that the recognition of the PLO would lead to discussions regarding an independent state for the Palestinians as well as refugee issue.

As negotiation stalemate progressed, Rabin, however, started to realise that the mutual recognition agreement was an important precondition for achieving an agreement with the PLO.⁶⁷⁹ Thus, on August 11, Rabin authorized Joel Singer to present the mutual recognition agreement to the Palestinian delegation which was conditional upon the following PLO's commitments:⁶⁸⁰

- The PLO recognises "Israel's right to exist in peace and security".
- The PLO accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

⁶⁷⁶ See William J. Bien: "The Oslo Channel: Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator to Secret Negotiations", pp.124-125, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/4.pdf>

David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.63

⁶⁷⁷ Joel Singer (1998): "Manipulating Arafat: Behind the Scenes at Oslo-Recognizing the Need for Mutual Recognition, Accessed: 2007, <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51a/026.html>

⁶⁷⁸ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.54

⁶⁷⁹ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.62-63; Joel Singer (1998): "Manipulating Arafat: Behind the Scenes at Oslo-Recognizing the Need for Mutual Recognition, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51a/026.html>

⁶⁸⁰ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.64; Joel Singer (1998): "Manipulating Arafat: Behind the Scenes at Oslo-Recognizing the Need for Mutual Recognition, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51a/026.html>

- The PLO commits itself to resolve all disputed issues with Israel peacefully.
- The PLO agrees to call on all Palestinians to stop all forms of terror against Israel.
- PLO agrees to delete all articles of the Palestinian Charter entitled the destruction of Israel.

After Israel presented to the PLO the mutual recognition agreement and agreed to link it to the peace treaty officially, the PLO withdrew its July 10 peace plan. However, many significant amendments to Singer's peace proposal remained. The two sides could not agree on the final arrangements of issues related to security, Jerusalem, the size of the Jericho, the amount of jurisdiction of the PLO in the captured land, the location of the Palestinian authority, and the control over the Allenby Bridge, roads between Gaza, Jericho as well as the crossing points to Egypt and Jordan.⁶⁸¹ Nevertheless, it became clear that the PLO would agree to make crucial concessions in order to achieve the mutual recognition agreement. "The July crisis, in which the Palestinian suddenly demanded comprehensive changes in the DOP, was no less an attempt to wring last-minute concessions on self-rule from the Israel than an opportunity to achieve mutual recognition, a long-sought PLO goal that would have a far-reaching psychological impact on both the Israeli and Palestinian public."⁶⁸²

On August 17, Shimon Peres went to Sweden in order to resolve the remaining disputes. He contacted Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Holst and asked him to meet secretly in Stockholm in order to help him to finalize negotiations. They arranged an eight-hour telephone call with the PLO. Throughout the night, one by one, the negotiation partners managed to eliminate all remaining controversial questions.⁶⁸³

The PLO accepted a limited control in the occupied territories. It was limited both in geographical scope (covering only Gaza and a little part of the West Bank) and in functional authority. The Article VI of the agreed minutes to the declaration

⁶⁸¹ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.69-72

⁶⁸² David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.69

⁶⁸³ See Helena Cobban (1995): "Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond", in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): "Israel Under Rabin", pp.103

of principles states: “Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.”⁶⁸⁴ The Annex II further extends jurisdiction of Israel. It states: “Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.”⁶⁸⁵

During the Stockholm telephone, the most difficult question to resolve was Jerusalem. The PLO continued to demand that the Palestinian leadership would exercise its authority from Jerusalem. Rabin refused to make concession on this issue. He clearly stated that the PLO offices would be located in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and this point can not be negotiated. Nevertheless, Israeli leadership’s aspiration to conclude an agreement as soon as possible compelled them to make a compromise. Rabin agreed to write a letter in which he would guarantee to the Palestinian people a free access to Holy Sites in Jerusalem. After Israel made this commitment the conflicting parties finally managed to frame the final version of the Declaration of Principles. The only difficult question remained for Rabin was to find the way of how he could formally recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.⁶⁸⁶

On August 27, Peres and Holst went together to California in order to inform the US about the achieved Declaration of Principles and to ensure its support toward the peace agreement. The Secretary of state Warren Christopher was shocked to hear that Israel achieved a deal with the PLO. Although the US was aware of the Oslo secret channel, it never took this process seriously. Nevertheless, after became familiar with the agreement, the US agreed to support the treaty.⁶⁸⁷

Peres suggested that the US present the Declaration of Principles as an outcome of the Washington negotiations. Peres, probably, made this proposal in order to reduce the expected domestic opposition and to ensure a greater level of public

⁶⁸⁴ “Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-governing Arrangements”, 1993, Article VI, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>

⁶⁸⁵ “Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-governing Arrangements”, Annex II, 1993, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>

⁶⁸⁶ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.71-72; Helena Cobban (1995): “Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond”, in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): “Israel Under Rabin”, pp.103

⁶⁸⁷ See Helena Cobban (1995): “Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond”, in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): “Israel Under Rabin”, pp.103

support towards the agreement. It is clear that the peace agreement mediated by a major power such as the United States can be better viewed domestically. Since the United States has a lot of diplomatic, economic and military resources at its disposal, it can compel the conflicting parties to conclude the peace accord and provide necessary guarantees in case of a violation of the treaty. Thus, Israelis wanted to portray the Declaration of Principles as an outcome of the Washington talks. The US official, however, rejected this proposal on the ground that they don't want to take the credit for success achieved by Norwegian mediators. The United States, nevertheless, agreed to host the signing ceremony in Washington and to take an active role in subsequent negotiations.⁶⁸⁸

On August 30, Rabin handed over the Declaration of Principles to his cabinet for its approval. Although some Israeli official did not want to recognize the PLO while others complained about the content of the agreement, the majority of the cabinet understood that they can not afford the agreement to fail and voted in favour of the Declaration of Principles.⁶⁸⁹

Many of the Palestinians also found the peace accord unacceptable. They complained that it represents a lot of concessions and no guarantees that Israel would allow the creation of the Palestinian state and continue talks on such sensitive issues as Jerusalem, settlements and refugees.⁶⁹⁰

Most shocked of all, however, were the Israeli and Palestinian delegates in Washington official talks. For months they were actively engaged in a bargaining process without even knowing about the existence of the Oslo secret channel where the genuine negotiations took place. Elyakim Rubinstein, a member of the Israeli delegation, notes recalled "I didn't hear about the Oslo channel until the agreement had been cooked. Rabin called me in and said, "Look here is the text." I read it and found that the agreement called for fulfilment of only about 60 percent of what we demanding in Washington."⁶⁹¹

⁶⁸⁸ See William J. Bien: "The Oslo Channel: Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator to Secret Negotiations", pp. 125-126, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/4.pdf>; David Makovsky: "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.75

⁶⁸⁹ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.76-77

⁶⁹⁰ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.77

⁶⁹¹ Elyakim Rubinstein, in: Dan Kurzman (1998): "Soldier of Peace: The life of Yitzhak Rabin", pp.456

On September 10, the last obstacle to the conclusion of the peace treaty was removed. Rabin issued a recognition letter in response to Arafat's letter in which he recognized the right of Israel to exist and undertook legal commitments to stop all acts of violence against Israel as well as to remove some articles from the Palestinian Charter.⁶⁹²

Thus, on Monday, 13 September 1993, Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organisation chairman Yasir Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles for Palestinian self-government in Gaza and Jericho in the White House in Washington. Despite all its shortcomings, this peace agreement represented a very significant achievement in a long-lasting conflict. After so many years of denying each other the right to exist, the conflicting parties finally agreed to sign the mutual recognition agreement. Thus, the 13th of September became "one of the most momentous events in the history of the Middle East in the twentieth century. In one stunning move, the two leaders redrew the geo-political map of the entire region."⁶⁹³

1.7.3 Theoretical part

In this part, the overall objective is to investigate the question of why Israel and the PLO agreed to enter the negotiations and to accept the outcome of the bargaining process.

There have been many attempts to answer these questions from a variety of angles and through the application of different theories. My explanations will be based on the theoretical framework outlined in the previous part of my dissertation on the interplay between a mixture of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice and the constructivist theoretical framework.

In the empirical analysis below, the material factors will be analyzed through RCT, while the immaterial ones through the constructivist framework.

⁶⁹² See Helena Cobban (1995): "Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond", in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): "Israel Under Rabin", pp.104

⁶⁹³ Avi Shlaim (1994): "The Oslo Accord", Journal of Palestine Studies, Accessed: 2008, <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0005/The%20Oslo%20Accord.html>

1.7.3.1 Rational Choice Theory

The key assumption of the rational choice theory is that human beings are rational individuals, who act in a manner that increase their potential benefit. In order to achieve this aim they tend to calculate all costs and benefits of any action before deciding how to perform.⁶⁹⁴

Application of this theoretical approach to my case study suggests that both Israel and the PLO started to consider peace as a better option than the use of force or status quo due to some material factors such as security, strategic or economic considerations. In other words, they enter the negotiations and agreed to sign the Declaration of Principles because of both negative experiences derived from the conflict and positive expectations of future gains such as political, economic and strategic benefits.

In accordance with the rational choice theory, the analysis below will intend to answer the following questions

4. Why did conflicting parties agree to enter the negotiation process? What kind of material factors stimulated this decision?
5. What was the outcome of the bargaining process? What kind of factors determined it?
6. Why did the conflicting parties agree to accept the outcome of the bargaining process? What kind of reasons were behind this decision?

1.7.3.1.1 Reasons which prompted the conflicting parties to enter the negotiation process

The most famous explanation of change from conflict to cooperation was developed by supporters of RCT who focus their attention on the most constructive towards peace moment in conflicts in their attempt to explain why certain conflicts can be resolved, while others not. They argue that decision of conflicting parties to

⁶⁹⁴ See John Scott: "Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present", Accessed: 2008, <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm>

enter the negotiation process depends on the ripeness of a conflict i.e. a situation in which “the status quo seemed more painful or dangerous than a potential negotiated compromise.”⁶⁹⁵

Indeed, in a previous case study, the analysis of different documents, interviews, memories as well as research papers suggests that the conflicting parties entered the negotiation process at the period of ripeness of the conflict. Domestic, regional and global conditions influenced both Israel and the PLO and created the situation which was favourable to the resolution of the conflict.⁶⁹⁶ Below I will survey the entire complex of material factors that have influenced the willingness of conflicting parties to enter the negotiations.

Israel

It is obvious that the main reason which brought Israel to the Oslo negotiations was rooted in a domestic change in the country, namely the general election of 1992 that led to a victory of the Labor party over Likud. The policy of this party was less uncompromising toward the Palestinians’ problem.⁶⁹⁷

This Labor party was a ruling party in Israel for many years. It lost its governing position in Israel primarily because of several domestic scandals and internal conflicts rather than due to its foreign policy program or outlook towards the Palestinian problem. In 1976 the Labor party was accused in fraud of public funds. As a result, the election of 1977 resulted in Likud victory and ended a period of twenty-nine years of Labor’s power.⁶⁹⁸

The general election of 1992 resulted in the victory of the Labor party and completely excluded Likud from decision-making process. According to RCT, the shifting mood by the Israeli electorate can be largely explained by economic factors and security concerns. Indeed, it is possible to underline at least four pieces of evidence which confirm this assumption.

⁶⁹⁵ Stein and Lewis (1991), in: Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan (1998): “The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in Historical Perspective”, in: Ilan Peleg (1998): “The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, pp.5

⁶⁹⁶ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996); David Makovsky (1996); Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz (2002); Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan (1998); Theodore H. Friedgut (1995)

⁶⁹⁷ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): “Israeli on the road to Peace”, pp.101

⁶⁹⁸ See Mark Tessler (1989): “Israeli Politics and the Palestinian Problem after Camp David”, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): “Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada”, pp.155

Firstly, Israel was struggling with a high unemployment rate which reached 25 percent among the recent immigrants. The wave of Jewish immigration starting in 1989, mainly from the former Soviet Union, brought around 260.000 new citizens to Israel who have the right to participate in the election. These new immigrants were not successfully integrated into the job market. They were either unable to find a job or obtained an extremely low salary.⁶⁹⁹ The Labor party managed to use Likud's failing integration policies very effectively during the election campaign. It "played into the hands of the Labor Party, which blamed the Likud government for spending huge amounts of building of political settlements in the occupied territories-settlements of ideological value only-rather than allocating funds towards improving the conditions of new immigrants and the poor."⁷⁰⁰ The ability of Labor to appeal to this electorate helped it to win nearly 75 percent of the Russian immigrant vote.⁷⁰¹ These immigrants' votes gave the Labor leadership an opportunity to gain five vital mandates without which their victory would have been not achievable.⁷⁰²

Secondly, there was a lack of houses for new Soviet immigrants. Thus, in 1990, the Likud party introduced a proposal for providing accommodation to these immigrants. It was agreed to pay for this project in part by the United States' loan guarantee and in part by an increase in taxes. Likud raised personal income tax on 5 percent as well as national sales tax on a 2 percent. This policy was not positively met in Israel which motivated the national union decided to organize a general strike.⁷⁰³ Moreover, Likud lost thousands of Sephardi Jewish votes because of several of its leaders did not manage to secure a place in the top leadership of the party. As a result, many people who voted in the previous election for Likud changed their preference and cast their vote for Labor in 1992.

Thirdly, the USA demanded from Israel to undertake a serious effort aimed at reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians. The United States threatened to withdraw its \$ 10 billion loan guarantee for the accommodation of new Soviet immigrants in case Israel was to continue settlement-building in the West Bank and

⁶⁹⁹ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.176

⁷⁰⁰ Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.176

⁷⁰¹ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.86

⁷⁰² See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.176

⁷⁰³ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.176, David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.84

Gaza. The Likud government, however, refused to comply with American's demand and increased spending on settlements. During the election campaign Likud continued to emphasize on ideological value of building new settlements as a key priority, while the Labor leadership focused on economic prosperity. Rabin's campaign motto called for freezing settlements and allocating resources on more important social needs.⁷⁰⁴

Finally, the intifada reinforced the security concerns among Israeli citizens. They started to realize that their safety depends on the ability of the government to find a solution to the Palestinian problem. Moreover, the Palestinian uprising was very costly in economic terms. It included military spending, reduction of foreign investment as well as distraction in tourism sector and other industries.⁷⁰⁵ Thus, Labor's emphasis on security and economic needs as well as its commitment to a peace process played a significant role in the elections, influencing "86 percent of all voters, 44 percent of those who voted for Likud in 1988 but switched to Labor in 1992."⁷⁰⁶ "Rabin's personality, his position on the political spectrum, and the security myth he represents in the Israeli collective memory evidently made the differences in the polls."⁷⁰⁷

Traditionally, Labor's attitude towards the Palestinian problem was different from that of Likud on at least two issues. First of all, it did not support Likud's settlement activities in the West Bank and Gaza. It only advocated the establishment of a limited amount of settlements in the West Bank as a means of protecting Israel. Labor "did regard Israel as having a legitimate and inevitable security interest in the West Bank... Thus Labor had never advocated Israel's complete withdrawal from the West Bank, and after 1967 the Labor government had begun establishing settlements it regarded as necessitated by security consideration."⁷⁰⁸ These efforts were mostly directed towards two areas, the Jordan Valley and in the zone near pre-1967 Israeli border. In 1980, Labor, however, started to call for a cancellation of the establishment of new Jewish settlement.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁴ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.84-85; Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the road to Peace", pp.178-179

⁷⁰⁵ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the Road to Peace", pp.180

⁷⁰⁶ Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the Road to Peace", pp.180

⁷⁰⁷ Ilan Peleg (1995): "The Likud Under Rabin II Between Ideological Purity and Pragmatic Readjustment", in: Robert O. Freedman (1995): "Israel Under Rabin", pp. 147

⁷⁰⁸ Tessler (1989): "Israeli Politics and the Palestinian Problem after Camp David", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada ", pp.157

⁷⁰⁹ See Tessler (1989): "Israeli Politics and the Palestinian Problem after Camp David", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada ", pp.157-159

Second of all, Labor, in contrast to Likud leadership, promoted a territorial compromise to the Palestinian problem. It believed that the autonomy project should cover territorial and functional jurisdiction, rather than a limited control over administrative affairs. Labor emphasized a Jordanian solution to the Palestinian problem. It advocated Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and from the most areas from the West Bank in order to return this land to Jordan. Labor, however, didn't want to ban the existing settlements, which were not related to security interests but were built during Likud leadership. Thus, Labor's view on the fate of settlements after returning the territories to Jordan was not clearly defined.⁷¹⁰

Labor and Likud, however, also had identical views regarding some matter concerning the Palestinian problem. First, like Likud, the Labor party was against the formation of a sovereign Palestinian state due to security consideration. Second, it was against any direct contact with the PLO. The majority of the members of the Labor party argued that the PLO is a terrorist organization and, therefore, could never become a negotiation partner. Finally, Labor's outlook towards Jerusalem was little distinct from that of Likud. It believed that it has a legitimate right to keep East Jerusalem united and under Israeli control. Nevertheless, in contrast to Likud, the Labor party was willing to break the status quo and to move ahead with the peace process by making compromises on two vital questions, namely settlements and territory.⁷¹¹

Thus, it is not surprising that the Labor party entered the negotiation process with the Palestinians. The question why it agreed to talk with the PLO, however, requires explanations. How it is possible to explain this sudden change in Labor's perception toward the PLO. What kind of factors led to the modification of its official position? The Rational choice theory provides some credible insights into this question from a materialistic point of view. Explanations derived from this theoretical approach can be divided into four groups. There are: necessity to break a status quo, collapse of the Jordanian alternative, the failure of the Washington talk and strategic considerations.

⁷¹⁰ See Mark Tessler (1989): "Israeli Politics and the Palestinian Problem after Camp David", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada", pp.156-160; Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the Road to Peace", pp.179

⁷¹¹ See Mark Tessler (1989): "Israeli Politics and the Palestinian Problem after Camp David", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada", pp.155-164; Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the Road to Peace", pp.181

Necessity to break a status quo.

Some changes in domestic, regional as well as in international environment created a situation which required an immediate rejection of a status quo.

When Yitzak Rabin assumed office, he was aware that the sympathy of the electorate depends on his ability to fulfil his promises. During the June 1992 Israeli election campaign he promised to achieve at least three related goals, namely to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, to improve relations with the Arab world and to enhance personal security of Israeli citizens.⁷¹²

The security conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, however, continued to worsen. A new round of intensified attacks against Israel took place in 1992. In order to counter this extremist violence Rabin decided to deport 415 senior Hamas activists from the territories. It, however, didn't stop Islamic militants from fighting Israel. The popularity of Hamas which opposed any negotiated solution with Israel continued to rise.⁷¹³

Although Rabin still hoped to find a solution to the Palestinian problem without having to deal with the PLO, his fears continued to intensify that militant group such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad might seize power. Moreover, the PLO became less undesirable negotiating partner because of its acceptance of the right of Israel to exist in 1988. "Rabin and his advisers calculated that between Arafat and Hamas, Arafat was clearly the lesser of two evils. The time had come to strike a deal with Arafat, while he was still inclined to deal and before he became irrelevant."⁷¹⁴

Another factor which prompted an immediate solution to the Palestinian problem was the end of the Cold War. Israel's government understood that with the end of the Cold War the two superpowers would not be willing any longer to subsidize the conflict in the Middle East. In other words, the Israeli leadership feared that the US might not be longer the "strategic ally" and stop its high level of economic

⁷¹² See Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan (1998): "The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in Historical Perspective", in: Ilan Peleg (1998): "Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives", pp.8-10; David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.85

⁷¹³ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.88-89; Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan (1998): "The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in Historical Perspective", in: Ilan Peleg (1998): "Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives", pp.10

⁷¹⁴ See Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan (1998): "The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in Historical Perspective", in: Ilan Peleg (1998): "Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives", pp.10

aid, namely three billions of dollars annually.⁷¹⁵ The collapse of the USSR also created new economic possibilities for Israel. It represented the beginning of trade with the former Soviet Union as well as with China. It showed to Israelis that they have to spend their resources as well as efforts on those new opportunities rather than to continue to invest their energy on the occupied territories.

All those factors showed the necessity to break the status quo as soon as possible. Nevertheless, Rabin still hoped to find a solution to the Palestinian problem by finding an agreed formula with Jordan or with the citizens of the West Bank, without the need to communicate directly with the PLO.

The failure of the “Jordanian option”

After Labor came to power, it started to seek a solution to the Palestinian problem through Jordan. Rabin wanted to conclude an agreement with Jordan by returning to King Hussein the Gaza and large portions of the West Bank. Hussein, however, was neither willing to endorse Labor’s plan nor to represent officially the Palestinians.⁷¹⁶

In 1974 at the Arab summit conference held in Rabat, King Hussein accepted the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and six years later he approved the Fez Summit resolution which called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In other words, Hussein formally accepted the partition of the West Bank from Jordan. By doing so he pursued domestic interests, rather than the Palestinian course. “Jordan’s economic dependence on other Arab states requires it to avoid action that does not have broad Arab support, and the country’s numerous Palestinian citizens could offer serious internal opposition if he were seen as acting against their interests.”⁷¹⁷ Thus, when Labor turned to King Hussein in 1992, he had no initiative to change his official policy course toward the Palestinian question. Thus, it can be posited that the

⁷¹⁵ See Theodore H. Friedgut (1995): “Israel’s Turn Toward Peace”, in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): “Israel Under Rabin”, pp.74; Ziva Flamhaft (1996): “Israeli on the road to Peace”, pp.94-95

⁷¹⁶ See Tessler (1989): “Israeli Politics and the Palestinian Problem after Camp David”, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): “Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians”, pp.158

⁷¹⁷ Mark Tessler (1989) : “Israeli Politics and the Palestinian Problem after Camp David” , in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): “Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada ”, pp.159

collapse of the “Jordanian option” played an important role in Rabin’s decision to start the direct talks with the PLO.⁷¹⁸

The failure of the Washington talk

The failure of the official talk in Washington was one of the most crucial reasons behind the Labor decision to start the negotiation process with the PLO. From the beginning the official negotiation process in Washington faced a lot of obstacles. It manifested itself in two ways. First, the Labor party was not able to find a substitute to the PLO. The PLO fully manipulated the Palestinian delegation by instructing it in a way that made any progress virtually impossible. It either gave instructions to make extreme demands that even the Labor government was not able to negotiate or to agree on a great number of concessions that were unacceptable for members of the Palestinian delegation. “Whenever some progress was made in the negotiations, the PLO would instruct the Palestinian delegation not to make concessions and to go back to principles. In such a situation, the PLO gave the Palestinian delegation hard-line instructions which were intended to block the negotiations.”⁷¹⁹ On the other hand, when in August 1993 the PLO sent to the Palestinian delegation a draft agreement which contained a lot of concessions, the prominent members of the delegation resigned in protest. By doing so, the PLO probably wanted to show to Israel that it is the only leadership which could make concessions and to come to agreement with Labor.⁷²⁰

Another problem at the Washington talk was that the negotiations were closely monitored by the international community which undermined the success of the peace process due to negative public opinion. All rounds of negotiation in Washington were covered by media. It made any progress virtually impossible to achieve because each

⁷¹⁸ See Guy Ziv (2007): “Hawk-to-Dove Foreign Policy Change: The Case of Shimon Peres”, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, Accessed: 2008, pp. 39, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_spring07-spring09/ziv.pdf

⁷¹⁹ Karin Aggestam (1999): “Reframing and Resolving Conflict, Israeli-Palestinian, Negotiations 1988-1998”, pp. 155-156, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Aggestam.pdf>

⁷²⁰ See Karin Aggestam (1999): “Reframing and Resolving Conflict, Israeli-Palestinian, Negotiations 1988-1998”, pp. 156, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Aggestam.pdf>

side in conflict tried to show to its potential voters that they did not betray their original bargaining position.⁷²¹

Strategic considerations

In addition to the fear that militant group might come to power and inability to find an alternative negotiating partner, the Labor government has another two strategic reasons for entering into the negotiation process with the PLO.

The first reason was that the agreement with the PLO would give a possibility to Israel to find a comprehensive solution to the conflict. In other words, it would create a situation in which the accord between Israel and the Palestinians would be concluded by the organization acting on behalf of all Palestinians.

The second strategic reason is that weak actors are generally disadvantaged in the bargaining process. In this sense, Labor probably saw the PLO as an attractive bargaining partner because the latter was greatly weakened as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Intifada and the Gulf War. Thus, it tried to use the opportunity to conclude a peace agreement with the PLO before it would gain its strength again and would demand the greater number of concessions on the part of Israel. In other words Israel wanted to “make peace with the PLO while the latter was vulnerable- in order to strike a better deal than it could expect were it to wait until the Palestinians had regained strength.”⁷²²

Thus, I believe that RCT bring important asset to the analysis of Israel’s decision to start the negotiation process with the PLO. In the section below I will evaluate the entire complex of material factors that have influenced the willingness of the PLO to enter the negotiation process.

The PLO

The Palestinian Liberation Organization is not a single organisation. It consists of different political bodies. Before the Oslo Accord, the PLO was controlled by two

⁷²¹ See William J. Bien: “The Oslo Channel: Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator to Secret Negotiations”, pp. 131-133; Accessed: 2008, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/4.pdf>; Ziva Flamhaft (1996): “Israeli on the Road to Peace”, pp. 93-94

⁷²² “The international Self”, State University of New York Press, pp. 6, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.sunypress.edu/pdf/61137.pdf>

bodies, the Palestine National Council (PNC), which functioned as the Palestinian parliament in exile and the Executive Committee, over which Arafat had reasonable great amount of control. The PLO's policy was based on the Palestinian National Charter, so-called the Covenant which called for the destruction of Israel.⁷²³

Arafat's group, Fatah, was the biggest party within the PLO. The second largest political faction after al-Fatah is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). It was created in 1967 and from this time onwards the PFLP represents the left wing of the political spectrum.

The PLO was founded in 1964 by the president of Egypt Nasser. Ahmed Shukeiry, an official representative of the Arab League and a marionette of the president of Egypt, became a leader of this organization. In 1969 Fatah or Victory Party which was founded in 1959 and governed by Yasir Arafat, took control over the PLO. Shortly after, Arafat tried to set up the PLO's headquarters in the West Bank. He, however, failed to achieve this goal and was forced to flee to Jordan. PLO's acts of international terror and Israel's retaliation led to the PLO's expulsion from Jordan to Lebanon in 1970. From there Arafat, however, continued its terrorist attacks against Israel which eventually resulted in Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Yasir Arafat and some other member of Fatah fled to Tunis, where they established the PLO headquarters.⁷²⁴

The most puzzling question here is why the PLO started to seek a negotiated compromise after so many years of denying Israel's right to exist? What kind of factors prompted this decision? According to RCT, the PLO decided to enter the negotiation process with Israel because it was weakened by regional as well as international conditions, which reduced the amount of financial aid to the PLO and undermined its legitimacy. Those conditions can be summarised into the following groups: the Lebanon war, the Intifada, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War and the fall of the ideology of the Pan-Arabism.⁷²⁵

The Lebanon war

⁷²³ See James Ciment (1997): "Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict", pp.102-103

⁷²⁴ See James Ciment (1997): "Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict", pp.41-45

⁷²⁵ See JoAnn A. DiGeorgio-Lutz (1998); Ziva Flamhaft (1996); Ilan G. Gewurz (2000); Laura Zittrain Eisenberg und Neil Caplan (1998); Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz (2002)

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in summer 1982 and departure of the PLO from Lebanon to Tunis greatly affected the PLO. It manifests itself in three ways.

First, the Lebanon has undermined the PLO's ability to carry out armed attacks on Israel because it lost its independent basis for conducting such operations. The Lebanon was a very lucrative place for the PLO's network of soldiers because the former suffered from divisions within the society and from the lack of an effective central government. This allowed the PLO in Lebanon to enjoy a great amount of political and military freedom. It almost became a state within the state. The evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon placed a lot of difficulties on the PLO's capacity to continue military campaign against Israel. First, it lost its access to human resources to fight Israel. Before the war, the PLO recruited the Palestinians from refugee camps in Lebanon. Therefore, it always had in its disposal a sufficient amount of the Palestinians to pursue its liberation goal. Second, the PLO lost its access to Palestinian troops because after the Lebanon war they were placed to several isolated areas in Arab countries. As a result, it became more difficult for the PLO's leadership to communicate with, coordinate and instruct its soldiers. Third, the PLO lost its military infrastructure and equipment. Fourth, the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon to Tunis deprived it from common border with Israel. As a result it became harder for the PLO to attack Israel. Moreover, it reduced the significance of the PLO's ownership of conventional weapons such as light arms, battle tanks, heavy artillery etc.⁷²⁶

Second, the Lebanon war resulted in the shift of PLO's constituency from Lebanon toward the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Life under Israeli power made the Palestinians in the occupied territories more willing to approve a diplomatic solution to the conflict, instead of a revolutionary one. Thus, the PLO had to adjust its outlook and strategy to preferences of many West Bank and Gaza Palestinians.⁷²⁷

Finally, the Lebanon war facilitated the split in the PLO in general and within its largest faction, Fatah in particular. Although the differences of opinion existed before the war, the post-Beirut era produced additional disagreements between moderates and radical members of the Fatah. "At the heart of the controversy was

⁷²⁶ See Emile F. Sahliyah (1986): "The PLO After the Lebanon War", pp.87-89

⁷²⁷ See JoAnn A. DiGeorgio-Lutz (1998): "The PLO and the Peace Process", in: Ilan Peleg (1998): "The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives", pp. 125

underlying struggle between those who wanted to pursue diplomacy and negotiation as realistic tools for advancing Palestinian national aspirations and those who continued to harbour many illusions about the unity and the relevance of military struggle to liberate Palestine.”⁷²⁸ The undermined organizational unity led to a poor performance of the PLO. The radicals inside the PLO attacked moderates members in general and Arafat in particular. They criticized Arafat’s efforts to break away from past policies by establishing contacts with the Egyptian regime and Jordan as well as undertaking diplomatic moves toward opening direct contact with the US and Israel. Radicals called for another leadership in occupied land.⁷²⁹

Thus, it can be assumed that the Lebanon War and the consequent evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon to Tunis reduced the PLO’s capacity as well as willingness of some moderates, including Arafat to continue military struggle against Israel.⁷³⁰

The Intifada

Another important factor which made a potential negotiated outcome more desirable for the PLO than armed struggle or status quo was the outbreak of the Intifada (“shaking of” in Arabic) in the late 1980s. This event clearly showed to the PLO’s leadership that Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank were not willing to live any longer under Israeli control. The Palestinians in the occupied territories started to question the efficiency of the PLO and to look for another leadership. “The Intifada marked a serious challenge to the Tunis-based PLO which was losing touch with the needs of the local Palestinian population living under Israeli occupation.”⁷³¹ The PLO’s dominance appeared to be challenged from different movements, which emerged during the Palestinian popular uprising as an alternative force.

The first movement was the Unified National Leadership (UNL). Although this movement was consisted of local PLO factions, they, nevertheless, were relatively independent from the PLO. The UNL directed the initial activities of uprising. “Working clandestinely and maintaining their autonomy, the UNL issued the

⁷²⁸ Emile F. Sahliyeh (1986): “The PLO After the Lebanon War”, pp.90

⁷²⁹ See Emile F. Sahliyeh (1986): “The PLO After the Lebanon War”, pp.89-108

⁷³⁰ See JoAnn A. DiGeorgio-Lutz (1998); Emile F. Sahliyeh (1986)

⁷³¹ Ilan G. Gewurz (2000): “Transition from Conflict: The Importance of Pre-Negotiations in the Oslo Peace Process”, in: Efraim Karch (2000): “Israel: The First Hundred Years”, Vol. 2: “From War to peace?”, pp.185

famous leaflets directing the people in mass action such as strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, civil disobedience and the resignation for all Palestinians working for the Israeli occupation authorities.”⁷³² However, since this movement took its lead from the PLO, it did not deny the latter leadership and didn’t intend to serve as a negotiating partner with Israel. Nevertheless, the Intifada created an instrument of political unification for different kind of groups that have been divided before.⁷³³

The second group, which increased its prominence due to the Intifada, was comprised of independent Palestinian elites, so-called “brokers”. Most of those elites were educated individuals in such fields as law, medicine, academia etc. They called for the negotiations with Israel on the basis of a “two-state solution” and criticized the PLO for its unrealistic strategy of arm struggle.⁷³⁴

The third group which raised its importance as a result of the uprising consisted of militant group such as Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and Islamic Jihad. These Islamist groups became the most dangerous alternative to the PLO’s leadership and very creditable political force which challenged Arafat’s authority in the occupied territories. The militant groups as a competitive force to the UNL, appeared during the early months of the uprising. At the beginning it was headed by the Islamic Jihad. Shortly after, however, some of its important leaders were taken to prison. As a result, Hamas took control over the daily attacks against Israel. Hamas did not recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of a Palestinian people, rejected a “two-state solution” as well as the PLO’s political program and called for the creation of an Islamic Palestine through defeat of Israel. During the Intifada, it attacked the popular, pragmatic slogan among the residents of the West Bank and Gaza for launching the international conference in order to find a solution to the Palestinian problem.⁷³⁵ Hamas stated in its Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement that “such conferences are nothing but a form of judgment passed by infidels on the land of the Muslims. Since when have the unbelievers been

⁷³² James Ciment (1997): “Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict”, pp.110

⁷³³ See James Ciment (1997): “Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict”, pp.110

⁷³⁴ See James Ciment (1997): “Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict”, pp.110-111

⁷³⁵ See Lisa Taraki (1989): “The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising, in: Zachary Locjman and Joel Beinin (1989): “Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation”, pp.171-177

fair to the people of faith? There is no solution to the Palestinian question other than sacred struggle.”⁷³⁶

Thus, it can be posited that the emergency of alternative political groups in general and militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in particular made the PLO to realise that it should do something in order not to lose its power. It played a significant role in the decision of the PLO to re-evaluate its strategy of armed struggle and to start to seek a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.⁷³⁷

The end of the Cold War

The collapse of the USSR and the end of the cold war was another very important factor that prompted the PLO’s willingness to find a negotiated solution to the Palestinian problem. Because of the superpower competition in the Middle East, the Soviet Union provided to the PLO economic and political support as well as military assistance in terms of training and education. “During the communist period, the Bolsheviks supported national liberation movements of the developing nations all over the world—including Palestine and recognized the social and political rights of the Palestinian people, at a time when the West was unwilling to do so.”⁷³⁸

Already in earlier 60s the USSR had established secret communication line with the PLO leaders. In 1969 it recognised the Palestinians as nationality and started to promote their right to self-determination at the international level. Throughout this period the Palestinian problem, however, was not a top priority for the USSR. A crucial shift in Soviet-Palestinian relations took place only in the 70s because of Egypt’s decision to withdraw its alliance with the USSR. As a result the Palestinian question became a main concern of Moscow’s Middle East policy as a means of increasing its influence in the region in general and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular.⁷³⁹

⁷³⁶ Hamas, in: Lisa Taraki (1989): “The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising, in: Zachary Locjman and Joel Bein (1989): “Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation”, pp.174

⁷³⁷ See Efraim Karch (2000); Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz (2002); JoAnn A. DiGeorgio-Lutz (1998); Laura Zittrain Eisenberg und Neil Caplan (1998); Ilan G. Gewurz (2000)

⁷³⁸ Dr. Andrej Kreutz (2007): Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?, pp. 78, Accessed: 2008, http://d01.twirpx.net/140/140588_103A9_andrej_kreutz_russia_in_the_middle_east_friend_or_foe.pdf

⁷³⁹ See Dr. Andrej Kreutz (2007): Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?, Accessed: 2008, pp.49- 50 http://d01.twirpx.net/140/140588_103A9_andrej_kreutz_russia_in_the_middle_east_friend_or_foe.pdf

The Soviets started to supply military equipment directly to the PLO instead of delivering weapons through third Arab countries as it did before its evacuation from Egypt. In 1974 the PLO was allowed to open its office in Moscow and to train its soldiers in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the same year the Soviet Union helped to the PLO to receive an observer status in the UN and in 1978 Moscow recognized the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”⁷⁴⁰

However, in the mid-1980s the situation started to change. New thinking promoted by Gorbachev brought about significant modification in Soviet foreign policy. It started to improve its relations with Israel and reduced its support to the Palestinian people. After collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the single superpower and the new Russian political elite further reduced its assistance to the Palestinians. Thus, the PLO could not any longer ask for Soviet economic and military help. It is also important to point out that the fall of the USSR brought another important change that significantly affected the PLO, namely it increased the amount of Soviet Jewish immigrants and consequently the demographic situation in Israel.⁷⁴¹

Thus, it can be concluded that the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union played a significant role in the decision of the PLO to reconsider its strategy of arm struggle and to start to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict.⁷⁴²

The Gulf War

The Gulf War of 1993 also had some important consequences for the PLO's approach toward the conflict and potential negotiations with Israel. Arafat's alignment with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War very negatively affected the PLO. Since the Iraq's attack of Kuwait was opposed by international community in general and

⁷⁴⁰ See Dr. Andrej Kreutz (2007): Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?, Accessed: 2008, pp.50, http://d01.twirpx.net/140/140588_103A9_andrej_kreutz_russia_in_the_middle_east_friend_or_foe.pdf

⁷⁴¹ See Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz (2002): The Oslo Process - Fate or Folly?, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/80/currentpage/16/Default.aspx>, Dr. Andrej Kreutz (2007): Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?, Accessed: 2008, pp.50-52, http://d01.twirpx.net/140/140588_103A9_andrej_kreutz_russia_in_the_middle_east_friend_or_foe.pdf

⁷⁴² See Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz (2002); Ziva Flamhaft (1996); Laura Zittrain Eisenberg und Neil Caplan (1998)

many Arab states in particular, the decision to support Saddam proved to be a disaster for the PLO.⁷⁴³ It manifests itself in two ways.

First, it undermined the legitimacy of the PLO. Arafat's support of Iraq was not only criticized by the West but also by the Arab world. "Arafat's support of Saddam during the Gulf war combined with Saddam's defeat not only delegitimized the PLO's role in the Peace process but also reduced overall Arab support for the Palestinian cause."⁷⁴⁴ Immediately after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the United States excluded the PLO from participation in any peace initiatives designed to resolve the Palestinian question and many Arab countries expressed their disapproval of the PLO. For example Saudi Arabia and other Persian states started to favour the Hamas as a substitute to the PLO's leadership. Their economic aid enabled Hamas to finance the uprising activities as well as social projects. As a result, the Hamas' ability to gather popular support further increased.⁷⁴⁵

Second, Arafat's cooperation with Saddam Hussein deprived the PLO from financial aid. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait terminated their economic aid, including so-called "liberation taxes" paid by the Palestinians people employed in the Gulf states. As a result, the PLO financial assistance to the Palestinians in the occupied territories sharply declined from \$120 million in 1989 to about \$ 45 million in 1992.⁷⁴⁶

Thus, at the conclusion of the Gulf War the PLO became weak and unimportant.

Fall of the ideology of the Pan-Arabism

The fall of the ideology of Pan-Arabism was another very important factor that increased the PLO's willingness to find a negotiated solution to the Palestinian problem. The peace agreement of 1979 between Israel and Egypt as well as the increase of the fundamentalist movements in the region (which created to official regimes a great threat) encouraged many Arab states to shift their attention from the

⁷⁴³ See JoAnn A. DiGeorgio-Lutz(1998); Ziva Flamhaft (1996); Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz (2002); Ilan G. Gewurz (2000)

⁷⁴⁴ Ziva Flamhaft (1996): "Israeli on the Road to Peace", pp.99

⁷⁴⁵ See Ilan G. Gewurz (2000): "Transition from Conflict: The Importance of Pre-Negotiations in the Oslo Peace Process", in: Efraim Karch (2000): "Israel: The First Hundred Years", Vol. 2: "From War to peace?", pp.185

⁷⁴⁶ See Ilan G. Gewurz (2000): "Transition from Conflict: The Importance of Pre-Negotiations in the Oslo Peace Process", in: Efraim Karch (2000): "Israel: The First Hundred Years", Vol. 2: "From War to peace?", pp.185; David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.108

Palestine problem towards internal policy priorities. “Following the Camp David Accord of 1979, when Egypt became the only Arab country to recognise and sign a peace deal with Israel, the option of united Arab military action against Israel disappeared.”⁷⁴⁷ Many Arab states stopped to consider Israel as the most dangerous threat and many of them even launched bilateral negotiations with the Jewish state.⁷⁴⁸

The Gulf War even undermined to some extent the norm of non-alliance with Israel. For example Saudi soldiers participated in Israel’s retaliation attacks against Scud strikes and Syria entered a coalition in which Israel took a part.⁷⁴⁹

Thus, the Palestinian people were left alone in their fight with Israel. Therefore, it can be posited that the only alternative appeared to be left for the PLO was to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict with Israel.

1.7.3.1.2 The bargaining process and its outcome

The analysis below is intended to evaluate the outcome of the bargaining process between Israel and the PLO. I will show that both sides had to make some very significant concessions in order to achieve the peace treaty.

The Labor party introduced its opening bargaining position for the first time at the Washington official talk, while the PLO during the secret negotiations in Oslo. As it is visible from the table below the gap between PLO’s and Israel’s initial bargaining position was very significant.

Table: Initial bargaining position and the outcome of the negotiation process⁷⁵⁰

⁷⁴⁷ Iffat Malik: “Analysis of the Oslo Accords”, Accessed: 2008, http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_2/article/2a.htm

⁷⁴⁸ See Ilan G. Gewurz (2000): “Transition from Conflict: The Importance of Pre-Negotiations in the Oslo Peace Process”, in: Efraim Karch: “Israel: The First Hundred Years”, Vol. 2: “From War to peace?”, pp.184

⁷⁴⁹ See Uri Bar-Joseph (2000): “Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel’s National Security Conception”, in: Efraim Karch (2000): “Israel: The First Hundred Years”, Vol. 2: “From War to peace?”, pp.102

⁷⁵⁰ See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”; Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13, 1993, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>; Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-governing Arrangements”, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>; Ziva Flamhaft (1996): “Israeli on the Road to Peace”; Joel Singer (1998): “Manipulating Arafat: Behind the Scenes at Oslo-Recognizing the need for mutual recognition, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51a/026.html>; William J. Bien: “The Oslo Channel: Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator to Secret Negotiations”, Accessed: 2008,

Dispute	PLO's demand	Israel's Demand	Outcome
<i>The Oslo peace accord</i>			
Nature of peace			
Mutual recognition	The Mutual recognition agreement should be link officially to the peace accord	No official recognition of the PLO. Presenting the peace accord as a proposal by a third party	PLO's initial demand
Cessation of all terror activities against Israel	The PLO can call for the cessation of all terror activities only after creation of the Palestinian state	The PLO's commitment to stop all terror activities against Israel should be incorporated in the peace accord	Israel's initial demand
Revision of the Palestinian Charter	No need in official amendments of the articles of the Palestinian Charter which request the destruction of Israel. This was already done through recognition of UN resolution 242	Amendments of the articles of the Palestinian Charter which request the destruction of Israel at the time of the conclusion of the peace treaty	Israel's initial demand
The Interim Self-government Arrangement			
Amount of the territorial authority of the Palestinian self-governing authority during the transitional period	Withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem	Withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from the Gaza Strip only	Israel's compromise Withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area
Timetable for withdrawal of Israeli soldiers from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area	An immediate withdrawal of Israeli soldiers	Gradual withdrawal of Israeli soldiers within two years	PLO's initial demand withdrawal within four months after conclusion of the agreement.

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/4.pdf>; Iffat Malik: "Analysis of the Oslo Accords", Accessed: 2008, http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_2/article/2a.htm; Helena Cobban (1995): "Israeli and the Palestinians: From Madrid to Oslo and Beyond", in: Robert o. Freedman (1995): "Israel Under Rabin"

Creation of U.N. “trusteeship”	Creation the U.N “trusteeship” upon withdrawal of Israeli soldiers	No “trusteeship”	Israel's initial demand
Amount of the functional authority of the Palestinian self-governing authority during the transitional period	Full jurisdiction (legislative, executive and judicial powers)	Limited jurisdiction without control over settlements, military facilities, external and internal security	Israel's initial demand
The Palestinian institution in East Jerusalem	PLO’s control over Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem	Jerusalem remained under Israeli control	Israel's initial demand
Location of the offices of the Palestinian authority	The offices of the Palestinian authority will be located in Jerusalem	The offices of the Palestinian authority will be located in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area	Israel's initial demand
Holy Sites in Jerusalem	Free access to the Palestinians to Christian or Muslim holy locations	No legal commitments from Israel	PLO’s initial demand
Participation in self-rule elections	Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have the right to participate in self-rule elections	No participation of the Palestinian inhabitants of East of Jerusalem in the elections	PLO’s initial demand
Negotiation over the final status of territories			
The creation of the Palestinian state	Legal commitment towards the creation of the Palestinian state	No legal commitment	Israel's initial demand
The status of Jerusalem	Jerusalem should become the Palestinian capital	City status is non-negotiable, remained under Israeli authority	Israel’s compromise Israel agree to negotiate the status of Jerusalem in the future talks

The destiny of Israeli settlements	Evacuation of all Jewish settlements	No removal of Jewish settlements	Israel's compromise. An absolute freeze on establishment of new settlements. The status of the existing ones will be negotiated in the future talk.
The right of return of the Palestinian refugees	All refugees have the right to return to their homes, implementation of UN Resolution 194	The Palestinians fled voluntarily, Israel is not responsible for their destiny.	Israel's compromise. Israel agree to negotiate the right of return of refugees in the future talks

As is visible from the table above the outcome of the bargaining process required significant concessions of both conflicting parties. Israel agreed to pull out its soldiers not only from the Gaza strip but also from the Jericho area. By doing so it granted to the Palestinians not only functional but also territorial authority. Moreover, Rabin agreed to recognize the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, Israel agreed to negotiate the issue of Jerusalem, the right of return of the Palestinian refugees as well as evacuation of all Jewish settlements from the occupied land in the future talk regarding the final status of West Bank and Gaza.⁷⁵¹ These concessions represented a significant concession on the part of Israel.

The PLO, on its part, also made a lot of concessions that removed the most vital obstacles to the conclusion of the peace treaty. The PLO agreed to a limited territorial authority, without any legal commitment on the part of Israel regarding the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state in the occupied land. It also dropped the idea of the UN trusteeship and its insistence to control the Allenby Bridge as well as roads between Gaza and Jericho. Moreover, the PLO agreed to a limited functional jurisdiction by giving to Israel the authority to supervise settlements and military

⁷⁵¹ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13, 1993, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>; Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-governing Arrangements", Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>

facilities as well as to exercise its control over external and internal security. Furthermore, the PLO was also agreed to put aside many important issues such as Jerusalem, settlements and refugee to the future negotiation on the final status of the land under Israeli control. It also promised to Rabin to amend the Palestinian charter and to terminate all terrorist acts against Israel.⁷⁵²

Thus, it is possible to conclude that the PLO agreed to make a greater number of compromises than Israel did. Although the PLO did not achieve the aim the Palestinians always desired, namely an independent state, it nevertheless obtained a lot of benefits from the peace treaty. Moreover, the PLO was a weak negotiating partner. With the official recognition of the Jewish state in the late 1980s the PLO lost its last bargaining card. Arafat noticed “it is a bad agreement. But it is the best we can get in the worst situation.”⁷⁵³

Israel, in contrast, had a lot of things to lose. It agreed to recognize the PLO and to some extent the Palestinians right of self-determination. Moreover, Israel was the strongest party during the whole negotiating process. It, nevertheless, agreed to grant to the PLO much more than it was willing during the Camp David summit.⁷⁵⁴

Therefore, I believe that although Israel had some important reasons to accept the outcome of the negotiations, the PLO, however, had a greater number of motives to sign the peace treaty. The analysis below is intent to prove this assumption.

1.7.3.1.3 Reasons of why conflicting parties agreed to accept the outcome of the bargaining process

Israel

⁷⁵²See David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”; Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13, 1993, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>; Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-governing Arrangements”, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>

⁷⁵³ Graham Usher (1997): “Palestine in Crisis: The struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo”, pp.1

⁷⁵⁴ See Nadav Morag (2000): Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process”, in: Efraim Karsh (2000): “Israel: The First Hundred Years. Vol. 2: From War to Peace?”, pp.205-209

The key factor which influenced Israel's decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process was security considerations.⁷⁵⁵ It manifested itself in three ways.

First, Rabin believed that the peace treaty with the PLO would enhance security of Israel. He was confident that PLO is capable to stop Intifada and to defeat militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Indeed, during the Oslo secret talk he made clear to the PLO that he would not conclude an agreement without its full commitment to stop popular uprising, to eradicate the militant Islamic threat and to cancel the articles of the Palestinian charter which request the destruction of Israel.

Second, the importance of the West Bank and Gaza from a security point of view continued to decline. The "military technology revolution" and the proliferation of modern arms greatly reduced the possibility of the classic conventional conflicts. International and regional changes showed to Israel that old-fashioned military deterrence had a great limitation and that the ability to defeat its enemies does not fully depend on territorial superiority.⁷⁵⁶ For example Ephiam Sneh, a member of Israeli Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, pointed out that "The Awacs radar aircraft would provide Israel with better early warning than the country's current stations in West Bank."⁷⁵⁷

Third, Rabin hoped that the peace treaty would help him to reduce external threat derived from some radical Arab states which did not want to participate in the peace process. Moreover, the Palestinian problem had a negative impact on moderate Arabs regimes inclined to negotiated compromise and, therefore, had the potential to increase the level of hostility between Israel and its neighbours. The proliferation of non-conventional weaponry changed the Israel's perception regarding its security. Arab's countries attempt to acquire weapons of mass distraction such as nuclear, chemical as well as biological arms showed to Israelis that military strength has its limitation, while a negotiated solution to the conflict may increase its security. In July 1992 Rabin announced that "the possibility that nuclear weapons will be introduced in the Middle East in the coming years is a very grave and negative development from Israel's standpoint...this situation requires to give further thought to the urgent need

⁷⁵⁵ See David Makovsky (1996); Ziva Flamhaft (1996); Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz (2002)

⁷⁵⁶ See Uri Bar-Joseph (2000): "Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel's National Security Conception", in: Efraim Karch (2000): "Israel: The First Hundred Years", Vol. 2: "From War to peace?", pp. 103-104

⁷⁵⁷ Ephiam Sneh, in: Mark Tessler (1989): "Epilogue: Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada", pp.279

to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and live in peace with our Arab neighbours.”⁷⁵⁸ Thus, by making peace with the PLO Israel received an opportunity to address a root cause of the Israeli-Arab conflict and, therefore, to improve relations with many Arab states and a possibility to counter a nuclear threat from radical regimes such as Iran and Iraq. Indeed, the Oslo accord facilitated a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan and improved relations with some Arab and other states.

Taking into account that the security concerns has been the most important component of Israeli policy from the first days of its existence, the Oslo accords was a very good deal. Some experts, however, believed that Rabin, who had a better bargaining card, was capable to extract a greater amount of concessions from the weak PLO. Although this argument is quite reasonable, it fails to take into account the fact that Rabin had no time to continue the negotiation process.

On the one hand he was pressed by his election campaign promises to solve the Palestinian problem within maximum nine months after becoming a prime minister.⁷⁵⁹ On the other hand Rabin was pushed by internal instability of his coalition. The first threat to Labor’s narrow majority in the Knesset occurred two weeks after Rabin assumed his duties when opposition parties submitted non-confidence vote over the government’s decision to stop construction of Jewish settlement and to make a territorial compromise with Syria. A more serious crisis emerged in May 1993 when the ultraorthodox Shas Party leader threatened to withdraw his party from the coalition. This produced uncertainty whether or not the government manages to survive and, therefore, reinforced a need to sign an agreement with the PLO as quickly as possible.⁷⁶⁰ As Peres put it “we must hurry or we may end up with a peace treaty but no government to sign it.”⁷⁶¹

Thus, I believe that security concerns as well as time pressure were key factors which made the Labor party to accept the outcome of the bargaining process.

The PLO

⁷⁵⁸ Rabin, in: David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.112

⁷⁵⁹ See David Makovsky (1996). “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.115

⁷⁶⁰ See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): “Israeli on the road to Peace”, pp.103-104; David Makovsky (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.68-69

⁷⁶¹ Peres, in: David Makovsky: (1996): “Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government’s Road to the Oslo Accord”, pp.69

The key factor which influenced PLO's decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining game was its weakness.⁷⁶² Indeed, after the Lebanon and Gulf war, the PLO in general and Arafat in particular found themselves as weakened bargaining actors which dominance was challenged by nationalists as well as militant forces in the occupied territories. Moreover, Arafat feared that Israel might withdraw from the Oslo negotiations and make a deal with either Jordan or Syria. Indeed, Israel used those fears as a chip to extract some substantive concession on the part of the PLO. During the negotiation process Peres even informed Holst and the Palestinian delegation in a written form that if the talks were not completed, "the vacuum may be filled by opposing forces, or with other initiatives, including the possibility of desired progress between Israel and Syria."⁷⁶³

Thus, the peace treaty with Israel was vital for preventing the collapse of the PLO. The conclusion of the accord provided perhaps the last possibility for the PLO to rule a Palestinian self-rule as well as to achieve worldwide legitimacy. "The PLO calculated that the recovery of some land from Israeli control, along with Israeli and American legitimization of the organisation, would counter the anticipated backlash from those Palestinians who had consistently rejected any compromise with Israel."⁷⁶⁴

Moreover, the Oslo agreement was accompanied by promises of considerable amount of economic benefit for the PLO. The Annex IV of the Declaration of Principles calls for economic aid for development of the West Bank and Gaza.⁷⁶⁵ Indeed, already on October 1, 1993 different nation as well as international institutions met in the US in order to arrange economic assistance to the Palestinians. As a result they agreed to provide around \$ 2.4 billion in the following five years.⁷⁶⁶ Since then bilateral as well as international donors such as the International Monetary Funds (IMF), the World Bank, International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) etc. have been very active in providing financial aid to the Palestinian

⁷⁶² See David Makovsky (1996); Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan (1998); Ziva Flamhaft (1996); JoAnn A. DiGeorgio-Lutz (1998)

⁷⁶³ David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", pp.65

⁷⁶⁴ Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan (1998): "The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in Historical Perspective", in: Ilan Peleg (1998): "The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives", pp. 10

⁷⁶⁵ See Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, September 13, 1993, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>

⁷⁶⁶ See Clyde Mark (2004): "United States Aid to the Palestinians", CRS Report for Congress, pp. 2, Accessed: 2008, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/45198.pdf>

National Authority (PNA). The Palestinians in the occupied territories became the recipients of the highest amount of aid in the world. The US alone granted to the PLO \$375 million between 1993 and 1998 for the implementation of development program in the West Bank.⁷⁶⁷ Thus, for the PLO the peace agreement signify a lot of benefits. In fact the Oslo Agreement was the only available option for Arafat. Moreover, it resulted in sufficient benefits. Thus, the PLO gained power, economic recourse as well as worldwide legitimacy.

Concluding remarks

In the previous part of my dissertation I evaluated the entire complex of material factors that have influenced the willingness of conflicting parties to enter the negotiation process and to accept the outcome of bargaining game. I showed that both parties acted as rational actors and achieved some material benefit from the peace treaty. Thus, this case study is consistent with the rational choice approach. However, I believe that the application of RCT to a certain political phenomenon in general and to this case study in particular produces some important shortcomings.

Firstly, this approach tends to treat 'national interests' as exogenously given. Constructivists, in contrast, investigate nature and formation of interests rather than regard them as given.⁷⁶⁸ Thus, by following the constructivist research design I have an opportunity to enhance the quality of my analysis.

Secondly, supporters of the rational choice theory are unable to address important aspects of social life such as identity, culture, norms and ideas. They do not acknowledge the importance of immaterial factors in world politics. This greatly reduces the explanatory power of the RCT.

Finally, RCT has some difficulties to explain the question of why Israel came to favour the peace accord. The question whether or not a more powerful party in a conflict is likely to make significant concessions with a weaker negotiation partner is open for interpretation. Some experts counter RCT assumptions and argue that Israel

⁷⁶⁷ See West Bank and Gaza, Commercial guide, July 2004, Prepared by The U.S. Commercial Service, Accessed: 2008, <https://www.buyusa.gov/westbank/en/130.doc>

⁷⁶⁸ See John Gerard Ruggie (1998): "Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization", pp.13,33

had almost nothing to fear from the weak PLO and, therefore, could keep a status quo or to extract greater amount of concessions. Nevertheless, I think that rational choice assumptions bring important asset to the analysis as a starting point. It does however not provide sufficient explanation about the above mentioned question. I believe that the constructivists can address the shortcomings of RCT by integrating nonmaterial factors into analysis.

It is, however, important to note that rational choice approach provides more sounding explanations regarding PLO's willingness to agree with the outcome of the bargaining game. The peace treaty was vital for the PLO as the only available option to secure its survival. To put it differently, the PLO had much to gain from the Oslo and almost nothing to lose since it was losing its dominance in the occupied land very rapidly. Thus, conclusions derived by RCT do not necessarily have to be complemented with other theoretical approaches. Integration of immaterial factors, however, to my analysis may produce interesting results by explaining the opposition among the Palestinians to this accord through the lenses of their conflicting identities. This investigation, however, will be beyond the scope of my study. Israel's decision to sign the treaty, however, required some further explanations. The Israeli government, in contrast to the PLO, had much to lose. It took a serious political risk by establishing the dialogue with the PLO and recognizing the Palestinians right of self-determination. Thus, the analysis below will have a particular emphasis on Israel.

1.7.3.2 The Constructivist theoretical framework

Constructivists recognise the central importance of ideational factors such as identity, culture, ideas, believes etc. in world politics.⁷⁶⁹ This theoretical framework seeks to explain the ways in which actors of international systems participate in the construction of reality.⁷⁷⁰ It argues that people's interactions and behaviours can not be analyzed through material factors alone. Constructivists, however, do not reject the importance of material factors on the outcome of certain political event. By doing so,

⁷⁶⁹ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998), Alexander Wendt (1999)

⁷⁷⁰ See Maja Zehfuss (2001); Alexander Wendt (1999); Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967)

they complement theories that are grounded in cost-benefit analysis and offer one possible way of integrating material and ideational factors into analysis.

Although Constructivists usually agree that immaterial factors play a crucial role in world politics, they focus on different immaterial factors in their attempt to explain processes of social construction of reality in general and certain political outcomes in particular.⁷⁷¹ Thus, the application of this theoretical framework to a given case study produces different possibilities of how to approach parties' decision to conclude the peace agreement.

One possible explanation was elaborated by Ilan Danjoux. His interpretation is based on the constructivist assumption regarding the social construction of national identities. In his study he focuses on "role identity". According to constructivism, "role identities" are always relational. An individual can not understand oneself without a comparison to others. Thus, construction of "role identities" involves the examination of the nature of the "others".⁷⁷²

Ilan Danjoux in his article "Political cartoons and Conflict: Revealing shifts in the Israeli Palestinian conflict" claims that national identities are not fixed and can change over time. Using a constructivist approach he tried to prove that the conclusion of the Oslo Accord in 1993 became possible due to the transformation of the Israeli and Palestinian identities and opinion about each other. "The prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians demand a fundamental transformation of the identity of 'self' and the recognition of the 'other'. The Oslo Peace Accords constituted such a watershed, breaking long-standing symbolic taboos on mutual recognition."⁷⁷³ Consequently, according to the author's opinion, the collapse of peace negotiations in 2000 took place due to the "equally dramatic return to the demonized stereotypes that had defined the conflict for so long."⁷⁷⁴ Ilan Danjoux in

⁷⁷¹ See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics", Accessed: 2008, <http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf>

⁷⁷² See Ilan Danjoux (2005): "Political Cartoons and Conflict: Revealing shifts in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict", pp.12, Accessed: 2007, http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/politics/research/research_groups/cip/documents/Danjoux-CIP-15.pdf

⁷⁷³ Ilan Danjoux (2005): "Political Cartoons and Conflict: Revealing shifts in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict", pp.12, Accessed: 2007, http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/politics/research/research_groups/cip/documents/Danjoux-CIP-15.pdf

⁷⁷⁴ Ilan Danjoux (2005): "Political Cartoons and Conflict: Revealing shifts in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict", pp.13, Accessed: 2007, http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/politics/research/research_groups/cip/documents/Danjoux-CIP-15.pdf

order to prove his point of view has undertaken an analysis of political cartoons that were drawn from the major Palestinian and Israel news papers.⁷⁷⁵

In my opinion, however, this explanation has important shortcomings. While I do believe that national identities can change over time because they are human invention constructed by full array of rules, principles, ideas, norms and shared belief, I however disagree that this dramatic transformation of “role identities” took place in a given case study.

The Palestinians and Israeli “role identities” are very much related to their prominent “type identities”. Through the latter type of identities they perceive the former. Therefore, a fundamental change of the identity of ‘self’ and the recognition of the ‘other’ required to some extent a transformation of “type identity”. The most prominent “type identities” of Israel are Jewish and democratic identities. The most important forms of identification of Palestinian people are - an Arab identity, an Islamic identity and a Palestinian identity. These identities are largely formed by cognitive and ideological beliefs. “Cognitive beliefs depict how the frames of agents are formed by historical lesson drawing and experience, whereas ideological beliefs constitute more abstract reasoning.....”⁷⁷⁶ For example, the refugee problem can be referred to the Palestinian cognitive belief drawn from historical lessons, while the question of Jerusalem can be regarded as Israeli as well as Palestinians ideological beliefs based on the idea that Jerusalem is a holy place.⁷⁷⁷ Thus, a fundamental transformation of “type identities” of conflicting parties required a change of their cognitive and ideological beliefs. However, most of the problems that constitute those beliefs were not mentioned in the Oslo peace agreements. The Oslo Accords did not address such important issues as “Sovereignty, nor does it provide answer to the question of borders, refugees, the fate of Jewish settlements, or the question of Jerusalem, all of which are postponed to a later stage in the negotiation.”⁷⁷⁸

Therefore, I think that the above mentioned explanation is not suitable to a given case study. In my opinion the constructivist approach to the Israeli-Palestinian

⁷⁷⁵ See Ilan Danjoux (2005): “Political Cartoons and Conflict: Revealing shifts in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict”, Accessed: 2007, http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/politics/research/research_groups/cip/documents/Danjoux-CIP-15.pdf

⁷⁷⁶ Karin Aggestam (1999): “Reframing and Resolving Conflict, Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998”, pp.54, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Aggestam.pdf>

⁷⁷⁷ See Karin Aggestam (1999): “Reframing and Resolving Conflict, Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998”, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Aggestam.pdf>

⁷⁷⁸ Efraim Karsh (1994): “Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel”, pp.158

conflict should be applied under another angle. Thus, in the analysis below I will focus on “type identities” of Israel, cultural factors as well as the interpretative process of the Oslo documents.

1.7.3.2.1 Cultural developments

Application of the constructivists explanations regarding the decision of conflicting parties to sign the peace agreement produce a similar starting point of the analysis to that of the RCT. In other words, constructivism does not deny that the main reason which made the Oslo Accords possible was the return of the Labor party to power in the 1992 election. Rational choice theorists, however, proceed with this starting point in a completely different manner than the constructivists do. The former theory focuses on material explanations, while the latter on the analysis of some social and cultural factors. According to RCT, the shifting mood by the Israeli electorate can be largely explained by economic factors and security concerns. I believe that by ignoring immaterial factors RCT provides only partial explanations regarding the questions of what permitted the Oslo negotiations to take place and to end successfully. Thus, the evaluation below is intended to fulfil the gap that was left by RCT through the integration of cultural elements into the analysis.

Constructivists believe that international, regional or domestic structures can have two kinds of effects on agents, causal and constitutive. Causal effect means that structures can shape agents' behaviour. Structures both constrain and enable actors to act. Constitutive effect means that structures can shape and change identities, value and interests of a relevant actors.⁷⁷⁹

Changes that had occurred at the international and regional structures had a great impact on Israeli ideational structure in general and on the peace process in particular. On the regional level those included the Lebanon war, the Palestinians popular uprising, the Iraqi war and the proliferation of the weapons of mass destructions. On the international level those changes included the collapse of the

⁷⁷⁹ See Alexander Wendt (1999): “Social Theory of International Politics”, pp.165- 167; Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf; John Gerard Ruggie (1998): “Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization”, pp.26

Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, technology revolution, the acceleration of processes of democratisation.

Those cultural and social developments had both causal and constitutive effect on Israeli society. It affected public behaviour, identities, perceptions and interests. Cultural developments increased such values as liberalism, individualism and human rights as well as multiculturalism in Israel. The democratisation trend was expressed in a number of ways and became visible in many sectors in Israel. It is possible to outline at least four profound cultural changes that have occurred in Israel. There are the following: the democratisation of mass media⁷⁸⁰, the appearance of a civil society⁷⁸¹, the changes in the Judiciary system⁷⁸², the transformation of military-societal relations⁷⁸³.

Democratisation of mass media

In the past decade the Israeli media has undergone a process of democratisation. According to Yoram Peri, the complex relations between the media and the state can be divided into three stages. The first stage began from the first days of independency and continued until the Yom Kippur War. During this period the Israeli media was directed and controlled by government, particularly in the field of security. The Israeli defence force (IDF) had a right to approve the appointment correspondents responsible for writing issues related to security matters and they largely depended on information provided by the IDF.⁷⁸⁴ “This was typical deferential journalism. The result was that the security discourse in the media was dictated by state oadministration and the military. The tone of the press was always supportive, and there was barely a mention of anything negative.”⁷⁸⁵

The second phase of the media-governmental relations began after the Yom Kippur war. The mistakes made by intelligence services during the war of 1973 greatly impacted the media. The latter started to reconsider its relationship with

⁷⁸⁰ See Yoram Peri (2000)

⁷⁸¹ See Yoram Peri (2000)

⁷⁸² See Gard Barzilai (1998)

⁷⁸³ See Staurt A. Cohen (1998)

⁷⁸⁴ See Yoram Peri (2000): “The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision”, in :Stuart A. Cohen (2000): “Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context”, pp.184-187

⁷⁸⁵ Yoram Peri (2000): “The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision”, in :Stuart A. Cohen (2000): “Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context”, pp.187

government and military sphere. Many journalists, reporters and editors started to demand a greater amount of freedom of press. They wanted to limit the censorship and their dependence on the government. They started to look for various sources of information. By doing so they transformed their relation with government from “subordination” to “competition”.⁷⁸⁶

The third period began in 1980s and can be characterized as confrontational relations of media with the state. The Lebanon war and the Palestinian revolt produced a widespread criticism of government and the military institutions. The Israeli media increased its emphasis on moral values, international human rights norms and the right of citizens to read different types of information.⁷⁸⁷ For example the editor of Davar daily, Hanna Zemer in response to the events of the massacre in the refugee camps in Lebanon wrote: “The Prime Minister... should have gone to the Presidential Residence to tender his resignation and thus free Israel and the Jewish people from the curse of this government which has turned our image into that of monster ...we will not remain silent....there will come a day when we all send back our Israeli identity cards, because this is not the way we want to be identified.”⁷⁸⁸

The Intifada further mobilized the press. It resulted in an increased level of opposition to government’s security policy in general and to state’s approach towards the Palestinian problem in particular. Journalists started to interview the Palestinians and to provide information acquired from their sources. They began to question the efficiency of the use of force as an instrument of policy and some even to advocate a territorial compromise with the Palestinians.⁷⁸⁹

The appearance of a civil society

Another very important cultural development that has occurred in Israel was an appearance of a firm civil society in Israel. “Civil society is the space outside the

⁷⁸⁶ See Yoram Peri (2000): “The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision”, in :Stuart A. Cohen, “Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context”, pp.187-190

⁷⁸⁷ See Yoram Peri (2000): “The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision”, in :Stuart A. Cohen (2000): “Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context”, pp.190-193; Uri Bar-Joseph (2000): “Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel’s National Security Conception”, in: Efraim Karch: (2000) “Israel: The First Hundred Years”, Vol. 2: “From War to peace?”, pp.108-109

⁷⁸⁸ Hanna Zemer, in: Gil Merom (2003): “How Democracies Lose Small Wars”, pp.193

⁷⁸⁹ See Yoram Peri (2000): “The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision”, in :Stuart A. Cohen (2000): “Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context”, pp.190-193; Mark Tessler (1989): “Epilogue: Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel”, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): “Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada ”, pp.272-277

state... this arena is conceptually distinct from the state, and is a site for the production of discourses which can in principle be critical of the state.”⁷⁹⁰ Thus, civil society has an ability to challenge state’s monopoly on transmitting the “moral order”.⁷⁹¹ At the beginning of the history of Israel, the country was lacking a civil society. The Zionists did not intend to create a sphere independent from the state realm where the voluntary discourses can take place. Currently, however, the situation began to change in Israel. The combination of global and national structural changes has stimulated the emergency of a civil society in Israel. Signs of it became visible in the increase of the non-governmental organisations as well as different independent social groups.⁷⁹²

Since many of these organisations try to promote human rights norms and the rules of international law, most of them have a very liberal approach to the Palestinian problem. Many of these organisations advocate a territorial compromise and strive to mobilize the Israeli society against of some spheres of government policy. For the first time an enormous opposition of NGOs to state’s policy emerged during the 1982 Lebanon war. Peace activists attacked the use of force in the occupied territories, the settlement policy and bombing of Beirut.⁷⁹³ The Intifada was a second major vehicle which set in motion the existing peace movements and led to the creation of new NGOs. The Palestinian popular uprising created a new reality and extensive support among the peace advocates to end the occupation as well as to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict on the basis of a territorial arrangement.⁷⁹⁴ For example, during the Intifada Peace Now, a far left-wing non-governmental organization in Israel, was very active in attacking government policy based on the impediment of all possibilities aimed at reaching a compromise to the Palestinian problem. Peace Now

⁷⁹⁰ Yoram Peri (2000): “The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision”, in :Stuart A. Cohen (2000): “Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context”, pp.202

⁷⁹¹ See Yoram Peri (2000): “The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision”, in :Stuart A. Cohen, “Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context”, pp.202

⁷⁹² See Yoram Peri (2000): “The Media and the Military: From Collusion to Collision”, in :Stuart A. Cohen, “Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context”, pp.201-204

⁷⁹³ See Gil Merom (2003): “How Democracies Lose Small Wars”, pp.192-193

⁷⁹⁴ See Reuven Kaminer (1989): “The Protest Movement in Israel”, in: Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (1989): “Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation”, pp. 242-244; Mark Tessler (1989): “Epilogue: Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel”, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): “Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada”, pp.272-277

proclaimed “The security forces can only hold their fire temporally; the only answer is negotiations, talks and compromise.”⁷⁹⁵

Changes in the Judiciary system

The situation is more complex with regard to the Judiciary system, in particularly with the High Court of Justice (HCJ). Israel had no written constitution. The HCJ, therefore, has a broad authority. The HCJ is responsible for all issues that are not covered by other legal jurisdiction and has the power to change state decisions. The HCJ may also pass new laws and ask to cancel legal rulings taken by other lower level courts, including in some cases decision adopted by religious courts.⁷⁹⁶ “In establishing legal precedents the HCJ functions as a lawmaker parallel to the Knesset.”⁷⁹⁷

The HCJ, however, tries not to intervene in states decisions and often takes the positions of the security and political institutions in its rulings. Although it played an active role in promoting a unique nature of Israel as a democratic state, it takes a passive approach towards the Palestinian conflict in general and the peace process in particular. “Traditionally, Supreme Courts tend not to adjudicate “political issues” or issues of war and peace. Foreign affairs are usually conceived as subject to executive prerogative and to electoral politics....Abdication on foreign policy issues enables Supreme Court to legitimize and legalize governmental policies...”⁷⁹⁸ Nevertheless, Israel provided to Palestinians the right to bring their appeals to the HCJ and in some rare occasions the court rules in favour of the Palestinians. For example, in 1979 the Palestinians from a little village in the West Bank brought their case regarding illegal confiscation of their property by the state before the court. The High Court of Justice ruled in their favour and against state’s decision to appropriate the land for building a Jewish settlement. It instructed the government to take out the settlers.⁷⁹⁹

⁷⁹⁵ Peace Now, in: Reuven Kaminer (1989): “The Protest Movement in Israel”, in: Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (1989): “Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation”, pp.243

⁷⁹⁶ See Don Peretz and Gideon Doron (1997): “The Government and Politics of Israel”, pp.183

⁷⁹⁷ Don Peretz and Gideon Doron (1997): “The Government and Politics of Israel”, pp.184

⁷⁹⁸ Gard Barzilai (1998): “Political Institutions and Conflict Resolution: The Israeli Supreme Court and the Peace Process”, in : Ilan Peleg (1998): “Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, pp.96

⁷⁹⁹ See Gard Barzilai (1998): “Political Institutions and Conflict Resolution: The Israeli Supreme Court and the Peace Process”, in : Ilan Peleg (1998): “Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, pp.95

Moreover, in the early 1990s Israel has undergone profound constitutional changes with regard to human rights norms. In 1992 it adopted two Basic Laws: “Human Dignity and Freedom” and “Freedom of Occupation”. Thus, for the first time in Israel’s history the Knesset agreed to guarantee human rights such as rights to life, property, privacy, human dignity etc.⁸⁰⁰

Furthermore, the non-governmental organisations in Israel began to oppose the passive attitude of HCJ to the Palestinian conflict. These organisations started to bring issues related to the human rights of Palestinians to domestic as well as to worldwide attention by bringing cases related to the Palestinians before HCJ and by showing its legal decisions to mass media. Thus, although the HCJ still pays little attention to petitions derived from the Palestinians, it, nevertheless, became more sensitive to human rights’ norms and more opened for public criticism.

Transformation of military-societal relations

The combination of global, regional and national changes has transformed military-societal relations in Israel as well. Originally, the Israeli defence force (IDF) had two tasks. It was not only a fighting force but also a key tool for nation building. As Ben-Gurion’s put it “while the first task of the IDF...is security of the State, that is not its only task. The Army must also serve as a pioneering education force for Israeli youth, both native- born and immigrants.”⁸⁰¹ The IDF enjoyed almost widespread domestic respect. A military record was associated with a status of full Israeli citizenship and was an essential precondition for obtaining a good job. There were almost no negative comments regarding the military bodies. The period since 1973 has witnessed a dramatic transformation of military-societal relationship. The disapproval of Israel’s public of issues related to security matters became visible. Israeli society began to question policies of governmental bodies, including IDF in general and the efficiency of the use of force in particular. It started to demand a greater level of scrutiny of IDF activities and greater amount of transparency of the

⁸⁰⁰ See Gard Barzilai (1998): “Political Institutions and Conflict Resolution: The Israeli Supreme Court and the Peace Process”, in : Ilan Peleg (1998): “Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, pp.98-99; Don Peretz and Gideon Doron (1997): “The Government and Politics of Israel”, pp.182-183

⁸⁰¹ David Ben-Gurion, in: Stuart A. Cohen (1998): “The Peace Process and Societal Military Relations in Israel”, in: Ilan Peleg (1998): “Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, pp.115

military branch. For example in 1980s influenced by the mood of Israeli public the HCJ began to evaluate the IDF performance in the West Bank and Gaza.⁸⁰²

It is also important to note that changes have occurred not only in the perceptions of society towards Israel defence establishments but also in the military institutions itself. This tendency can be proved by the fact that in 1990s many generals and important officers started to join the Council for Peace and Security, an organisation which promotes a territorial compromise with the Palestinians.

To conclude, I believe that the constructivist theoretical approach brings an important asset into analysis. By explaining the shifting mood of the Israeli electorate through cultural constructs, it fulfils the gap that was left by RCT. In the next two sections I will address another very important assumptions elaborated by the constructivists. I will analyse the impact of “type identities” of Israel and the interpretative practice of the Oslo documents on the peace process.

1.7.3.2.2 Israel’s identities as a Jewish and democratic state

In the previous case study aimed at the analysis of Israel-Egypt peace treaty I described the prominent “type identities” of Israel, namely Jewish and democratic ones and showed the way of how these identities are viewed domestically and influence the attitude, law and structure of the official institutions in Israel. (See chapter III) I proved that that Likud’s decision to conclude the peace treaty with Egypt was largely a result of the interpretation of these dual identities of the state through the lenses of a revisionist variation of Zionism.

In this chapter I have a unique opportunity to investigate another interpretation of the above mentioned identities and its impact on the peace process.

According to constructivism, the international system is a human creation constituted by a set of ideas, norms, thoughts and beliefs.⁸⁰³ Actors’ preferences, perceptions, attitude and actions depend on their understanding of the world. There are, however, multiply possibilities of understanding the existing reality. The Labor’s

⁸⁰² See Staurt A. Cohen (1998): “The Peace Process and Societal Military Relations in Israel”, in: Ilan Peleg (1998): “Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives”, pp.107-118

⁸⁰³ See Jackson: “Social Constructivism”, Chapter 6, pp.162, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

interpretation of Israel's identities as a Jewish and democratic state was different from the Likud's perceptions of these two identities. The former viewed it through the lenses of a Labor or more secular Zionism rather than through a revisionist variation of this ideology. For the secular Zionists a historical attachment to the ancient land of Israel (Eretz Israel) is less relevant than a demographic factor and the application of a "Western-style democracy". According to their point of view a Zionist state and Israel's identities can not be maintain without a majority of Jewish people as well as democratic style of governance . Thus, the Oslo Accords which called for a territorial compromise on the basis of separation was a rational response to the Labor's interpretation of the Zionist ideology. In contrast to Likud, it argued that the incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza with a rapidly increasing Arab population of around 1.4 million people into Israel would ultimately lead to the collapse of Israel's identities as a Jewish and democratic state. The high birth rate of the Palestinians would make them the majority in Israel already in one generation.⁸⁰⁴ "Jewish state would either have to deny equal political rights to a large segment of its permanent or indigenous population or free the prospect of having the Jewish state voted out of existence by Palestinians working through its democratic system."⁸⁰⁵ In case Israel would not grant to the Palestinians Israeli citizenship or they voluntarily decided not to opt for it –the democratic character of the state would be undermined because the minority would rule over majority.⁸⁰⁶

Along those interpretations of Israel's identities, a new leadership also challenged the principle of "self-help" that is dominant in the national security paradigm and exercise an ongoing influence on the Jewish identity. This paradigm is largely based on the Zionist ideology, memory of Holocaust and perception that anti-Semitism can not be eradicated.⁸⁰⁷ After the Labor party won the election, Rabin pointed out "we must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in thrall for

⁸⁰⁴ See Mark Tessler (1989): "Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada ", pp.274-279; Theodore H. Friedgut (1995): "Israel's Turn Toward Peace. The Foundations of Israel's Negotiations for Peace", in: Robert O. Freedman: (1995) : "Israel Under Rabin"; See Karin Aggestam (1999): "Reframing and Resolving Conflict, Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998", pp.58, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Aggestam.pdf>

⁸⁰⁵ Mark Tessler (1989): "Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada", pp.279

⁸⁰⁶ See Mark Tessler (1989): "Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel", in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): "Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada ", pp.279

⁸⁰⁷ See Uri Bar-Joseph (2000): "Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel's National Security Conception", in: Efraim Karch (2000): "Israel: The First Hundred Years", Vol. 2: "From War to peace?", pp.107

almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation, and cooperation that is sweeping the entire globe.”⁸⁰⁸

A radical shift of attitude with regard to the concept of national defence began to take place since 1975. For example, in 1975, Peres emphasized that Israel should rely on its own military power and enhance its military power in order to obtain peace, whereas in 1993 he believed that Israel should cooperate with international as well as regional organizations and to strive for peace in the Middle East in order to achieve its security.⁸⁰⁹ He stated that it is necessary to move from “the traditional concept of national defence, which depends mainly on military and weapons systems, to the modern concept, which is of necessity based on political accords, and embraces international security and economic considerations.”⁸¹⁰

The Labor’s interpretation of Israel’s identities as well as the principle of security provided a very different view with regard to the potential danger from keeping status quo in conflict or from the incorporation of the occupied territories into Israel.⁸¹¹ By dropping the principle of “self-help” and by viewing reality through the secular Zionists, Rabin perceived a potential separation from the Palestinians as an opportunity for enhancing Israel’s national security, sustaining Israel’s democratic and Jewish character of the state.

Moreover, the Oslo Accords provided a possibility to legalize and legitimize Labor’s interpretations of the Palestinian conflict along the line of a unique nature of Israel as a Jewish democracy. The wording of the Oslo Accords enhanced the legitimacy of Israeli policy. First, it adopted the notation of “disputed” rather than “occupied” territory. Second, instead of “withdrawal” the Oslo Accords use “redeployment”. Third, it refers to “Palestinians in the territories” but not to the territories themselves.⁸¹² Finally, the PLO by accepting not to use terrorism against Israel admitted perception of Israel that it was a terrorist organisation, rather than a liberation movement.

⁸⁰⁸ Rabin (1993), in: Theodore H. Friedgut (1995): “Israel’s Turn Toward Peace. The Foundations of Israel’s Negotiations for Peace”, in: Robert O. Freedman (1995): “Israel Under Rabin”, pp.78

⁸⁰⁹ See (2002): “The Oslo Process - Fate or Folly?”, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/80/currentpage/16/Default.aspx>

⁸¹⁰ Ophir Falk and Yaron Schwartz (2002): “The Oslo Process - Fate or Folly?”, Accessed: 2008, <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/80/currentpage/16/Default.aspx>

⁸¹¹ See Mark Tessler (1989); Theodore H. Friedgut (1995)

⁸¹² See Graham Usher (1995): “Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo”, pp.

Thus, it can be posited that immaterial factors such as cultural elements, new concept of security and identities were crucial to the construction of Israeli interests and played a very important role in Israel's decision to sign the peace treaty with the PLO.

1.7.3.2.3 Conflicting interpretation of the Oslo Accords

The key task of the constructivism is the analysis of a socialisation process by which people obtain knowledge from their life experience. According to theoretical assumptions of this theory, actors of international system participate in the construction of reality through creation of new rules or interpretation of the existing ones in a new way.⁸¹³ Their knowledge of the existing reality is constructed as a result of interpretation processes. This process might change the actual meanings of the rules, legal documents, concepts and principles in question. In other words, each interpreter creates her own knowledge of reality. Constructivists argue "that all human beings construct their own version of reality, and therefore multiple contrasting ways of knowing and describing are equally legitimate.....each interpretation of reality is as valid as the rest."⁸¹⁴ Thus, there are many possibilities of interpretation of reality and all those interpretations are justified.

Application of this assumption to my case study suggests that both the PLO and Israel read the Oslo agreements through different lenses. Thus, their conflicting interpretation of the nature of the agreement was a very important factor which made the successful conclusion of the Oslo Accords possible.

Indeed, the Oslo Accords laid down a basis for conflicting interpretation. The architects of this agreement constructed it in a manner that made multiply possibilities of interpretation not only possible but also necessary. They virtually encouraged the parties to interpret the treaty in a way that was beneficial for them.⁸¹⁵

⁸¹³ See Jackson: "Social Constructivism", Chapter 6, pp.162-163, Accessed: 2008,

http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf

⁸¹⁴ Jill J. Ramsfield (2003): "Bridges in Legal Discourse: From Socrates to Social Constructivism", pp.4, Accessed: 2008, <http://ec.hku.hk/kd2proc/proceedings/fullpaper/Theme6FullPapers/RamsfieldJill.pdf>

⁸¹⁵ See Nadav Morag (2000): "The Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process", in: Efraim Karsh (2000): "Israel: The First Hundred Years. Vol. 2: From War to Peace?", pp.202; Graham Usher (1995): "Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo", pp.9-10

The agreement was very vague and based on "constructive ambiguity." This term was first used by Henry Kissinger as a means of negotiating tactic. It refers to deliberate application of unclear wording to contentious issues in an agreement in order to enable conflicting parties to interpret it in a manner suitable for them.⁸¹⁶ The "constructive ambiguity" of the DOP was in particular visible with regard to issues such as external security, the size of Jericho, the status of Jerusalem, the question of refugee, Gaza's settlement, the number of Palestinian prisoners to be realised, implementation of the agreement and a final settlement.

According to Israeli interpretation of the Accords, the DOP stipulated that Israel would maintain control over external security, while the PLO insisted on a shared Palestinians/ Israelis control over external borders.⁸¹⁷ On 30 August 1993 Rabin noticed before the Knesset that "We are prepared to be party to establishing a reality whereby the internal Palestinian security will be in the Palestinians' heads'. Let me re-emphasise –the security of Israel, of settlements and Israelis, is in our hands, with the extensive interpretation we will imbue it with."⁸¹⁸ Another disputed issue during the stage of the implementation of the Oslo accord was the size of the Jericho. Israelis defined it's of 25 square kilometres, while the PLO referred to the "Jericho district" of 390 square kilometres. Conflicting parties also could not agree on the definition of the settlements in Gaza. Rabin wanted to define the settlements as blocs, while Arafat referred to it as isolated communities. Finally, the most important controversial issue became a final settlement, including creation of a Palestinian state, future status of Jerusalem and the problem of the Palestinian refugees. Those issues were simply undefined in the agreement.⁸¹⁹ Thus, both parties enjoyed a great degree of flexibility in interpreting those issues in a completely different way. The PLO was able to interpret and to present the Accords to the Palestinians in the land under Israeli control as a basis for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in Gaza strip, all of the West Bank as well as

⁸¹⁶ See "Constructive Ambiguity", in: Wikipedia, Accessed: 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructive_ambiguity

⁸¹⁷ See Nadav Morag (2000): "The Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process", in: Efraim Karsh (2000): "Israel: The First Hundred Years. Vol. 2: From War to Peace?", pp.214-218, David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", Graham Usher (1999): "Dispatchers from Palestine. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process", pp.42-43

⁸¹⁸ Rabin: in: Graham Usher (1995): "Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo", pp.12

⁸¹⁹ See David Makovsky (1996): "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord", Nadav Morag (2000): "The Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process", in: Efraim Karsh (2000): "Israel: The First Hundred Years. Vol. 2: From War to Peace?"

East Jerusalem. Israel, in contrast, perceived the agreement without any commitment from their side to the creation of a sovereign state. “Israeli side was not prepared to concede the fact that the Oslo process would eventually lead to a Palestinian state-just as the Palestinian side was also reluctant to relinquish its ideological commitment and dream of regaining control of all of historic Palestine.”⁸²⁰

Thus, it can be concluded that conflicting parties’ conflicting interpretation of the Oslo accord played a crucial rule in their ability to come to agreement with each other and to build domestic support of their decision.

1.7.4 Conclusion

The core argument of my study has been that the conclusion of the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO has to be analysed through a theoretical framework elaborated in the first chapter of my dissertation on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice and the constructivist theoretical framework. The application of those theories to my case study showed that the decision of conflicting parties to enter the negotiation process and to accept the outcome of the bargaining game depended on the entire complex of material and immaterial factors.

According to the RCT, both parties acted as rational actors and achieved some material benefit from the peace treaty. In other words, they enter the negotiations and agreed to sign the Declaration of Principles because of both negative experiences derived from the conflict and positive expectations of future material gains such as political, economic and strategic benefits. For Israel it was strategic and security considerations as well as inability of the Labor party to find a different to the PLO negotiating partner. For the PLO the peace treaty was the means of survival. It provided a possibility for the PLO to gain power, economic resources as well as worldwide legitimacy.

⁸²⁰ Nadav Morag (2000): “The Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process”, in: Efraim Karsh (2000): “Israel: The First Hundred Years. Vol. 2: From War to Peace?”, pp.208

In my study I proved that rational choice materialistic explanations have important shortcomings which can be resolved by constructivist assumptions. Constructivism presents a unique opportunity to build bridge between theories of international relations and social theories.⁸²¹ It provides a possibility to link material factors to ideational ones. By doing so, it fulfils the gap that was left by supporters of RCT.

In accordance with the Constructivist theoretical framework I showed that the decision of conflicting parties to sign the peace agreement depended to a great extent on cultural developments in Israel; the Labor's interpretation of Israel's identities as a Jewish and democratic state through the lenses of a revisionist variation of Zionism; and on both sides' conflicting interpretation of the Oslo documents.

⁸²¹ See Andrea Teti (2004): A Role in Search of a hero: Construction and the Evolution of Egyptian Foreign Policy, 1952-67, pp. 1-2, Accessed: 2008, <http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/politics/research/readingroom/tetiJMS04.pdf>

Conclusion

The key goal of this dissertation has been to show that the outcomes of different negotiation processes can not be understood through the analysis of either material or ideational factors alone. I argued that the decisions of enemies to break the status quo and to conclude peace agreements should be analysed through both perspectives.

In this respect, in the theoretical part of my dissertation I presented an innovative theoretical framework on the combination of RCT and the constructivist theory. The former theory allows to investigate the process of transformation from conflict to cooperation through the entire complex of material factors, while the latter through the full array of ideational factors.

The overall objective of the empirical part of my dissertation was to show the applicability of my theoretical framework to the real world. For this purpose, I selected three completely different case studies, namely the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 and the Oslo Accords of 1993. My findings suggest that in all case studies conflicting parties acted in a rational way and started to consider peace a better option than the use of force or status quo due to various material factors such as security, economic and strategic considerations. Nevertheless, in all above mentioned case studies RCT's explanations appeared to be not sufficient for explaining the question of what encouraged adversaries to seek peace with each other. The application of the constructivist theoretical framework helped me to address shortcomings of the former theory. It showed that immaterial factors played an important role in motivating the conflicting parties to come to a mutually acceptable compromise. In other words, actor's identities, beliefs and the ability to interpret the world through the different lenses were not less crucial for successful resolution of conflicts than their rational calculations of material benefits.

The key contribution of this dissertation was theoretical. It manifested itself in two ways. Firstly, after the end of the Cold War scholarly interest in the social constructivist theory has grown dramatically because the limitations of conventional

theories became more visible.⁸²² Thus, IR constructivist empirical studies include many different issues such as analysis of the culture of national security (Peter J. Katzenstein 1996), humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996), etc. However, little research is available on political outcomes of different negotiation processes in the social constructivist vein. Thus, by conducting my research in a largely unexplored domain, I contributed to the extension of the explanatory power of the constructivist theory.

Secondly, in my dissertation I combined the constructivist theory with rational choice theory. I showed that despite that RCT and constructivism operate at a different level of philosophical abstraction and have completely different methodological as well as theoretical foundations, it is possible to supplement these theories with each other without undermining their key assumptions. I proved that they can be combined with each other as long as we accept that the RCT is based on the concept of instrumental rationality⁸²³ and the constructivist's postulate that reality is socially constructed.⁸²⁴ By doing so, I developed an analytical framework for the analysis of outcomes of different negotiation processes.

⁸²² See K. M. Fierke (2001): "Critical Methodology and Constructivism", in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): "Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation", pp.115; Alexander Wendt (1999): "Social Theory of International Politics", pp.4; John Gerard Ruggie (1998): "Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International Institutionalization", pp.11

⁸²³ See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): "The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory", Accessed: 2008, <http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rct-ii.pdf>

⁸²⁴ See Ole Wæver (1997): "Figure of International Thought: Introducing persons instead of paradigms", in: Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (1997): "The Future of International Relations. Master in the Making", pp.25

Abbreviation List

ASU	The Arab Socialist Union
DOP	Declarations of Principles
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EEC	European Economic community
EU	European Union
FAFO	The Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science
Hamas	Islamic Resistance Movement
HCJ	High Court of Justice
IDF	Israeli defence force
IMF	International Monetary Funds
INGOs	International Non-governmental Organisations
IO	International organisation
IR	International Relations
ISGA	Interim Self-Government Authority
MENWFZ	A nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OPEC	Organization of petroleum exporting countries
PFLP	The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PISGA	Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority
PLO	The Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PNC	Palestinian National Council
RCT	Rational choice theory
UN	United Nations
UNL	The Unified National Leadership
UN SCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

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Zusammenfassung

Diese Doktorarbeit analysiert die Ergebnisse von unterschiedlichen inner- und zwischenstaatlichen Verhandlungsprozessen. Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es nicht, praktische Vorschläge für den Abschluss von Friedensabkommen zu erarbeiten oder die Rahmenbedingungen zu identifizieren, unter welchen Vereinbarungen zur Konfliktlösung voraussichtlich unterzeichnet werden. Vielmehr ist es Ziel dieser Dissertation, einen innovativen theoretischen Ansatz für die Analyse der Ergebnisse von Verhandlungsprozessen zu erarbeiten und dessen Anwendbarkeit zu zeigen.

Die vorliegende Studie besteht aus zwei Teilen, einem theoretischen und einem empirischen Teil. Der theoretische Teil setzt sich aus 3 Kapiteln zusammen. Das Hauptziel des theoretischen Teils ist die Erarbeitung eines kohärenten und innovativen theoretischen Ansatzes für die Darstellung des Zusammenspiels zwischen zwei theoretischen Ansätzen, nämlich der Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung (Rational Choice Theory) und dem konstruktivistischen Ansatz (constructivist theoretical framework), um die politischen Ergebnisse unterschiedlicher Verhandlungsprozesse analysieren zu können. Folglich widmet sich das erste Kapitel der Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung, und das zweite Kapitel behandelt den konstruktivistischen Ansatz. Das dritte Kapitel beschreibt den Nutzen einer Kombination beider Theorien in einem gemeinsamen Ansatz.

Das wesentliche Ziel des zweiten Abschnitts, des empirischen Teils, meiner Dissertation ist, die Anwendbarkeit meines innovativen Ansatz in realen Situationen zu zeigen. Deswegen untersuche ich den Abschluss von drei gänzlich unterschiedlichen Friedensabkommen mittels Anwendung der oben genannten theoretischen Ansätze. Die erste Fallstudie behandelt den Österreichischen Staatsvertrag von 1955; die zweite Studie den Israelisch-ägyptischen Friedensvertrag und die dritte Fallstudie das Oslo-Abkommen von 1993.

Der wesentliche Beitrag dieser Dissertation ist theoretischer Natur und zeigt sich in zweifacher Form.

- 1) Nach Ende des Kalten Krieges wuchs das wissenschaftliche Interesse am Sozialkonstruktivismus dramatisch, weil die Restriktionen der

konventionellen Theorien offensichtlicher wurden⁸²⁵. Deswegen enthalten konstruktivistische Studien viele unterschiedliche Themen wie die Analyse der Kultur der nationalen Sicherheit (Peter J. Katzenstein 1996), humanitäre Intervention (Finnemore 1996), etc. Nichtsdestotrotz gibt es wenig Forschung zu den politischen Ergebnissen unterschiedlicher Verhandlungsprozesse im sozialkonstruktivistischen Umfeld. Aufgrund meiner Studie in einem somit größtenteils unerforschten Bereich erweitere ich die Erklärungskraft der konstruktivistischen Theorie.

- 2) In meiner Dissertation kombiniere ich die konstruktivistische Theorie mit der Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung. Obwohl die Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung und der Konstruktivismus auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen philosophischer Abstraktion operieren und gänzlich verschiedene methodologische als auch theoretische Grundlagen haben, zeige ich, dass es möglich ist, dass diese Theorien einander ergänzen, ohne dass ihre wesentlichen Annahmen unterminiert werden. Ich zeige, dass sie miteinander kombiniert werden können, wenn man akzeptiert, dass die Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung auf dem Konzept der instrumentellen Rationalität (instrumental rationality⁸²⁶) basiert, und man zusätzlich das konstruktivistische Postulat, dass Realität sozial konstruiert ist,⁸²⁷ akzeptiert.

Auf diese Weise entwickle ich einen Ansatz für die Analyse der Ergebnisse unterschiedlicher Verhandlungsprozesse.

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